

7 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Movement OPORD 28-65)

TO: Commanding Officer
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
APO San Francisco, Calif 96347

Checker board

1. General:

- a. Name of Operation: OPORD 28-65.
- b. Date of Operation: 031000H - 031610H Dec 65.
- c. Location: From BIEN HOA, vic coord XT9815, Province RIEM HOA, to vic BEN CAT, vic coord XT7533, Province BINH DUONG.
- d. Control Hqs: 2d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.
- e. Reporting Officer: Lt Col Henry E. Emerson.

2. Task Organization:

TF Alpha:

2/502

2/320 Arty(-)

2 Plat 2/327

3rd Plat, A Co, 326th Eng

Tm, 3rd RRU

1 Sqd, 1st Plat, 101st MP Co

3. Supporting Forces:

- a. 2 1/2 Ton trucks, 1st Log Command, were in direct support, 030800H Dec 65, for movement to vic BEN CAT, RVN.
- b. 9th ARVN Regt, 5th Div, provided route security from the SP to CP 9.
- c. Aviation Bn, 1st Inf Div, provided two HU1D gunships for route security during the entire move.
- d. The 1st MP Co, 1st Inf Div, provided TCPs from the SP to the town of Phu Cuong (XT8114).

4. Intelligence: Element of A/2/17 Cav received one (1) round small arms fire from two (2) VC suspects, vic coord XT783247, at 031316H Dec 65.

5. Mission: TF Alpha moved by motor convoy, commencing D-Day, from vic Bien Hoa, XT031152, to defensive positions vic Ben Cat, Vietnam (XT7533).

6. Concept of Operation: TF Alpha moved by motor transport, utilizing organic and attached transportation, from vic Bien Hoa (XT031152), to defensive positions vic Ben Cat (XT7533). Movement was divided into five serials. Serials provided internal convoy security. Route security was provided by 9th ARVN Regt, 1st Inf Div, from SP to CP 9, and by Trp A 17th Cav, from CP 9 to RP. Two gunships provided aerial route security for the entire move. TCPs were established from the SP to Phu Cuong, by the 1st MP Co, 1st Inf Div.

7. Execution: On 031000H Dec 65, TF Alpha crossed the SP and began convoy movement to defensive positions vic Ben Cat, Vietnam (XT7533). Serial #1, Trp A 2/17 Cav, had the responsibility of provided route reconnaissance from SP to CP 9, and established route security from CP 9 to RP. The composition of the serials

SUBJECT: After Action Report (CHECKER BOARD)

TO: Commanding Officer
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
APO San Francisco, Calif 96347

1. General:

- a. Name of Operation: CHECKER BOARD
- b. Dates of Operation: 100001H Dec 65 - 161702H Dec 65
- c. Location: Nam Phan Province, RVN
- d. Control Headquarters: Hqs, 2d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf
- e. Reporting Officer: Lt Col Henry E. Emerson

2. Task Organization:

100001H Dec 65 thru 110715H Dec 65

A 2/502
Sqd 3/A/326 Engr
B 2/502
Sqd 3/A/326 Engr
C 2/502
Sqd 3/A/326 Engr

TF BAKER:
2 Plts, A2/327
Recon Plt
AT Plt
Mort Plt (-)
Det, 3rd RRU

110715H Dec 65 thru 141609H Dec 65

A 2/502
Sqd 3/A/326 Engr
B 2/502
Sqd 3/A/326 Engr
C 2/502
Sqd 3/A/326 Engr

TF BAKER:
Recon Plt
AT Plt
Det 3, 3rd RRU
Mort Plt (-)

141610H Dec 65 thru 160700H Dec 65

A 2/502
Sqd 3/A/326 Engr
B 2/502
Sqd 3/A/326 Engr
C 2/502
Sqd 3/A/326 Engr

TF BAKER:
Recon Plt
AT Plt
Det 3, 3rd RRU

Bn Control:
Mort Plat. (-)

160700H Dec 65 thru 161702H Dec 65

A 2/502
Sqd 3/A/326 Engr
B 2/502
Sqd 3/A/326 Engr
C 2/502
Sqd 3/A/326 Engr
Recon Plt

Bn Control:
A Trp, 2/17 Cav (eff 1915 hrs)
AT Plt
Mort
Det 3, 3rd RRU

3. Supporting Forces:

- a. USAF flew six missions in support of 2/502 Inf, during Operation CHECKER BOARD. The following is a listing of these missions:

MISSION NO	DATE/TIME	GROUP	TYPE	A/C	TGT COORD	REACTION TIME
1	111305H	Dec 65	2	A1-E	XT656335	5 min
2	111355H	Dec 65	2	A1-E	XT620330	20 min
3	111555H	Dec 65	2	A1-E	XT620338	20 min
4	121008H	Dec 65	2	A1-E	XT635572 & 637367	30 min
5 & 6	130130H - 13230H	Dec 65	2	C-123	XT626375	20 min

MISSION NO	TGT DESCRIPTION	ORDANENCE EXPENDED	RESULTS
1	VC unit, unk size, firing on US troops	114 rockets, 2 napalm, 10 GP bombs	VC dispersed
2	VC access route	114 rockets, 10 WP bombs, 8 napalm	Unknown
3	VC access route	114 rockets, 4 napalm	Unknown
4	VC unit firing on US troops	114 rockets, 10 napalm	VC dispersed
5 & 6	Friendly unit	31 M-24 flares	Prevented VC surrounding unit from attacking.

b. Medevac was provided by 57th Med Det and 283rd Med Det.

c. 1st Avn Bn, 1st Inf Div, provided 30 helicopters for extraction 16 0800H Dec 65. These helicopters shuttled between LZ Kilo and LZs 9 and Silver until the 2/502 had been extracted. 45 helicopter loads were landed at LZ 9 and 38 at LZ Silver.

d. 155 Avn Co provided aerial resupply during the conduct of the entire operation. A total of 70 loads of resupply items were transported. This company also provided helicopters for extraction of water cans following each resupply mission.

4. Intelligence:

a. Estimated enemy situation: Main force units were known to be in the general area, however, no major unit had been fixed. Red Haze and SPAR reports indicated guerrillas moved freely throughout the area. Reconnaissance patrols, infiltrated into the area prior to the operation, observed groups of 20 to 30 persons moving in the area of the rubber plantation, vic coord XT3065.

b. Actual enemy situation: Only small groups of local guerrillas were encountered. Resistance consisted of sniper fire and chance encounters, with small groups of individuals. Only when a small friendly group of 8 men was isolated did the VC attack. No VC were found in any of the base camps discovered. Numerous caches of food and equipment were found throughout the area indicating that this area served as a major base area capable of supporting at least one regiment.

c. Terrain varied from rubber plantation, relatively free of undergrowth, to dense jungle. Rice paddies in the area were generally dry and afforded rapid movement.

d. Detailed location of enemy installations discovered is included in inclosure 1.

5. Mission: TF 2/502 Inf conducted night infiltration operations into area "Grape", vic coord XT6932 (See Incl 4), beginning 100001H Dec 65; conducted search and destroy operations in area Grape from D-Day thru D+2; conducted search and destroy operations in area Cherry, vic coord XT6240 (See Incl 4), from D+3 thru D+5; secured LZ Kilo (See Incl 4) for helicopter extraction of 1/327; conducted a helicopter extraction from LZ Kilo to LZ 9 and LZ Silver (See Incl 4) and provided route security along designated route for passage of elements of 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div D+6.

6. Concept of Operation: TF 2/502 conducted Operation CHECKER BOARD in four phases.

a. Phase I (D-2 thru D-1) TF 2/502 initiated operations in area Grape by night infiltration of two "Hatchet Teams" (Long range reconnaissance teams, see para 10a) one team each from A Co and C Co.

b. Phase II (D-Day thru D+2) TF 2/502 conducted search and clear operations in area Grape commencing D-Day, 100001H Dec 65, with A Co and C Co sweeping assigned zones from east to west. Upon completion of initial sweep, A Co, B Co, and C Co, swept north, in assigned zones, from PL Elm to PL Joker, reaching PL Joker D+2. TF BAKER was battalion reserve during Phase II.

c. Phase III (D+3 thru D+5) TF 2/502 conducted search and clear operations in area Cherry, commencing D+3 with A Co, B Co, and C Co, sweeping north from PL Joker to Objectives Juliet and Kilo, and establishing a battalion defensive position. On D+4 and D+5, A Co, B Co, and TF BAKER conducted search and destroy operations, and reconnaissance and ambush patrols in area Cherry. TF BAKER was battalion reserve on D+3. On D+4 and D+5, Mort Plt(-) was battalion reserve.

d. Phase IV (D+6) TF 2/502 conducted operations to secure LZ Kilo for the helicopter extraction of the 1/327 and 2/502, and secured designated route for the withdrawal of 1st Bde (-). A Co and B Co landed at LZ 9 and C Co and TF BAKER landed at LZ Silver. A Co, B Co, and C Co, moved by foot to assigned areas to secure designated route for withdrawal of 1st Bde (-). Trp A, 2/17 Cav, was battalion reserve.

e. 2/320 Arty provided fire support for the entire operation.

7. Execution: TF 2/502 initiated operation CHECKER BOARD by infiltrating two "Hatchet Teams" across the Song Thi Tinh River, on 081930H Dec 65. A Co and C Co each provided one team. The A Co patrol infiltrated to a position vic coord XT674349, and the C Co team infiltrated to a position vic coord XT709319. These patrols remained in position during 9 Dec 65.

At 092330H Dec 65, the battalion departed the base camp on foot. The order of march was, A Co, C Co, B Co, and TF BAKER. The lead company crossed the LD (bridge vic coord 738328) at 100001H Dec 65. The battalion then moved to PL Pine (See Incl 4) and deployed with A Co on the right and C Co on the left. B Co was to follow A Co. AT 100343H Dec 65, the battalion began the sweep of the assigned area.

At 100500H Dec 65, vic coord 713322, one man from A Co was killed and four others were wounded by a booby trap. A medical evacuation helicopter extracted all casualties at 100557H Dec 65. A minefield extending 250 meters north and south of this area was discovered.

Young male inhabitants of a village, located vic coord XT710315, were conscripted and detailed to each company. These indigenous personnel were plantation workers and it was concluded that they would be aware of the location of VC minefields. Therefore, two such personnel were caused to precede each unit to reduce the possibility of walking into an enemy minefield. As a consequence, no additional casualties from booby traps were sustained.

At 0840 hours, A Co "Hatchet Team" reported it was being attacked by 30 VC at coord XT674334. The battalion at this time had almost completed the sweep of its assigned sector. Upon learning of the engagement, the battalion commander requested that the battalion be allowed to cross PL Elm (See Incl 4) and sweep north. Permission was granted and the battalion crossed PL Elm at 0905 hours with three companies on line, C Co on the left, A Co in the center, and B Co on the right. TF BAKER and the TAC CP followed behind A Co.

The A Co "Hatchet Team" had been discovered at 090900H Dec 65, and had come under attack by a VC platoon. Communications with the patrol had been disrupted due to a faulty hand set, which permitted receipt of traffic but prohibited transmission of information. Three platoon size assaults upon the patrol's position during 9 Dec 65 were repulsed. As a result, one team member was wounded and estimated 10 VC killed. At 1700 hrs, the patrol received word to move to a new location, and at 1730 hours, the lead man activated a booby trap which killed one man and wounded another. Two more assaults, by a VC platoon, during the night of the 9th and 10th, were repulsed. During this action, two members of the "Hatchet Team" were killed and an estimated 5 to 10 VC were killed. At 100815H Dec 65, the "Hatchet Team" established radio contact with an airborne FAC and began calling for supporting fires. At 0945 hours, A Co, after a rapid sweep, arrived at the team's location, and the VC were dispersed with no further contact.

B Co and C Co arrived at PL Spade (See Incl 4) at 1148 hours and 1400 hours, respectively. At 1700 hours the battalion formed a defensive perimeter at coord XT668333. The battalion was resupplied in this area by helicopter and by organic M274 vehicles. At 1930 hours, a "Hatchet Team" from each rifle company was infiltrated into the area the battalion was to clear the following day. The patrols moved to positions vic XT648350, XT640344, and XT650358.

At 110737H Dec 65, the battalion crossed PL Spade and began to sweep to the northwest in the direction of PL Club (See Incl 4) with A Co on the left and C Co on the right. A Co soon discovered numerous VC supply points in the vic XT655338. While A Co halted to destroy these supply points, which included rice and building material. B Co became the left flank company in the sweep. TF Baker screened the right flank and provided security for the TAC CP. At 1012 hours B Co received sniper fire from coord XT656335. Artillery fires and an air strike were utilized and an estimated VC squad dispersed. B Co and C Co proceeded to PL Club without further incident, reaching PL Club at 1525 hours and 1610 hours respectively. A Co and TF BAKER reached PL Club at 1630 hours.

The battalion established a defensive perimeter at coord XT646352 and improved a bomb crater to be used as a resupply point. Pioneer tools were brought in by helicopter and the attached engineer platoon completed preparation of the helicopter pad. The pad was able to accept aircraft at 1930 hours. "Hatchet Teams" were again infiltrated into the area to be cleared the following day. At 2030 hours three patrols, one from each rifle company, infiltrated to positions vic coord XT639369, XT626377, and XT619369.

The next morning, at 120700H Dec 65, the battalion continued to sweep northwest towards PL Joker (See Incl 4). B Co was deployed on the right and A Co on the left in the battalion sector. At 0915 hours, B Co made contact with an estimated squad of VC vic coord XT638368. During the ensuing engagement, B Co suffered five WIA, one of which later died of wounds. VC casualties were one KIA, confirmed by body count. B Co uncovered a number of large rice caches vic coord XT635372 and destroyed these by explosives and spreading the rice on the jungle floor. At 121516H Dec 65, B Co linked up with elements of A/1/327 on PL Joker. A Co reached PL Joker at 1545 hours. C Co and TF BAKER reached PL Joker at 1605 hours. A battalion defensive perimeter was established at coord XT635388.

At 130805H Dec 65, the battalion swept north towards objectives Juliet and Kilo with A Co moving on the left, B Co in the center, and C Co on the right. During the search and clear operations on 13 Dec 65, numerous base camps and hospital facilities were discovered (See Incl 1). At 1630 hours B Co, C Co, and TF BAKER reached Objective Kilo. At 1645 hours, A Co closed on Objective Kilo. By 1730 hours a battalion perimeter was established around Objectives Juliet and Kilo. Five "Hatchet Teams" were infiltrated into the area where the battalion had passed through 13 Dec 65. The teams departed prior to 2000 hours and moved to positions at XT602392, XT627410, XT626425, XT635401, and XT622385. The teams returned by 140600H Dec 65.

At 140840H Dec 65, two platoons from A Co departed the battalion perimeter and moved to the VC base camp vic coord XT610386, which had been seen the day before. At 0840 hours, platoon sized forces from both B Co and C Co, departed the battalion perimeter and returned to destroy VC base camps (See Incl 1) discovered the previous day.

1 rifle, unknown nomenclature, 1 foot long barrel, pistol grip, destroyed since it was rusted beyond recognition.

(c) 1 57mm RR mount, US

(3) Ammunition, demolitions, and explosives captured and destroyed:

(a) 5,000 rds small arms ammunition

(b) 72 bangalore torpedoes, unknown manufacture, 5 ft aluminum sections.

(c) 25 Chinese stick grenades

(d) 26 Chinese rifle grenades

(e) 12 Chinese AT rockets, 3.5

(f) 18 Chinese claymore disk mines

(g) 2,000 rds 7.62 linked Russian

(h) 1 75mm round, US

(i) 5,000 rds 20mm, in boxes with Chinese markings

(j) 3,000 rds 7.92

(k) 9 rds US 81mm mortar

(l) 33 rds 60mm mortar, unknown manufacture

(m) 3 rds 57mm RR US

(n) 5 mortar rounds, unknown manufacture

(o) 800 lbs of Chinese block dynamite

(p) 11 flares

(q) 5 boosters

(r) 15 blasting caps

(s) 10 fuzes

(t) 600 ft electrical cord

(4) Documents: Numerous pamphlets, medical records, leaflets, cards, slogans, lesson plans, maps, drawings, and charters were captured as well as pictures and movie film.

(5) Equipment, material, foodstuff, and grain

(a) Medical equipment to include US and Japanese produced surgical instruments, morphine, uncut heroine, and vials of achromycin, tetracyclin, aureomycin, and tetramycin was captured.

(b) Material, mostly black pajama uniforms (25-30 sets), was captured and destroyed.

(c) Small quantities of foodstuff, including live animals, were captured and destroyed.

(d) 286 tons of rice were destroyed

(e) Propaganda plant with mimeograph machine and pamphlets was destroyed.

(f) 50 rolls of corrugated tin were destroyed.

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(CHECKER BOARD) (Cont'd)

(g) 6 battalion medical kits were captured. 5 were destroyed and 1 was extracted.

c. Not all areas where air strikes were conducted were searched by ground forces. In those areas that were searched, there was no evidence of enemy losses.

9. Administrative Matters:

a. Supply:

(1) Normal resupply was accomplished by delivering the requested supplies by helicopter to subordinate units each evening.

(2) Emergency resupply requests were forwarded to the S4 representative and brought into the Bn area on the first available helicopter.

(3) Combat loads carried by individuals were:

M-16 - minimum of 300 rds, M-79 - 40 rds, M-60 - 1200 rds

(4) One M274 vehicle (MULE) was used by B Co for transportation of ammunition, rations, and water during the entire operation. The use of the M274 increased the amount of equipment B Co could take into the jungle without unduly burdening their individual soldiers.

(5) Five gallon plastic water containers were used for water resupply. These plastic containers have the advantage of being able to be more easily transported by an individual if extraction cannot be accomplished. Metal cans would have to be destroyed in place.

(6) Clearing of LZs for resupply and medical evacuation was difficult in the jungle. Clearing was accomplished largely by use of individual hatchets. Later, pioneer tools were brought into the area to complete the clearing.

b. Maintenance: No maintenance problems were encountered as organizational maintenance was stressed throughout the entire operation.

c. Communications: When the battalion command group was stationary for a period of time, an RC292 antenna was erected. This technique provided excellent communications with higher headquarters and the rear area.

d. Treatment of casualties and evacuation:

(1) Treatment of casualties was divided into two phases. The first phase consisted of emergency care rendered by the field medics. Phase two was the treatment of casualties at 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div, clearing station. Here the medical care prepared the patient for further evacuation, if evacuation was necessary. If not, the patient was held at the station for further treatment or returned for duty.

(2) The primary method of obtaining medical evacuation was through the Bde Admin/Log Net. If contact could not be made on this net, the command net was utilized as a secondary means of communications. In most instances evacuation of casualties was accomplished in a timely manner.

10. Special Equipment and Techniques:

RECONDO

a. Infiltration of "~~Hatchet~~ Teams" for reconnaissance of areas prior to entry by a major force, provided valuable intelligence information concerning the nature of terrain and enemy dispositions, thus reducing vulnerability to VC ambushes. A "Hatchet Team" is normally composed of six men. Individual duties are - patrol leader, forward observer, radio operator, and three riflemen for security. The mission of a "Hatchet Team" is to infiltrate deep within enemy areas prior to the entry of a major force, and to obtain information concerning enemy disposition and the nature of terrain. The team normally infiltrates one or two nights prior to a sweep of an area and moves to a concealed position located at a major trail junction from where it can observe movement on the trails. It is felt that in order for the VC to accomplish

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Action report (CHECKER BOARD (Cont'd))

rapid movement at night through jungle, the enemy must travel on the trails. If a lucrative target appears, the team has the capability of requesting supporting fires. As the major force moves through the area, the "Hatchet Team" can provide information concerning the withdrawal of enemy forces.

b. During this operation the "Yeti" net, recently issued to the battalion was tested in a combat environment. The "Yeti" net is a piece of burlap, approximately 80" long by 40" wide, which serves as an individual camouflage net for each trooper. One side is painted green and black in order to blend into jungle foliage. The other side is left the basic burlap color. Using these nets correctly, the troopers can always camouflage themselves quickly and easily. These nets were also utilized in connection with the preparation of "spider holes", another technique recently introduced to the battalion. Specifically, as a man digs his individual "spider hole", he places the spoil on his "Yeti" net and then hauls the spoil away to some concealed location. Thus the location of the "spider hole" is not compromised by the presence of raw spoil around the hole. Following the preparation of individual "spider holes", lids or covers are fabricated by using a combination of sticks, wire, and "Yeti" nets. The lids are then covered with sod, grass, or leaves.

c. The "spider holes" were prepared on the concept that each squad would have a concealed area for rest and shelter and that the "spider holes", which are located forward, be "fighting holes" and nothing else. This means that the hole need only be as large as the man and therefore is easier to camouflage and less vulnerable to grenades, etc. The "spider holes" are arranged in groups of two in order to retain all the merits of the buddy team system.

d. Young male inhabitants from a village within the area were used on D-Day to reduce the possibility of encountering minefields. At 10050H Dec 65, A Co received 5 casualties from a detonated booby trap. Young male civilians from the closest village were conscripted and placed at the head of each company. It was concluded that these personnel had knowledge of the whereabouts of minefields in that area. During the movement for the remainder of the day, no booby traps were encountered.

e. On D+1, 11 Dec 65, artillery was fired as a rolling barrage in front of the line of advance of the rifle companies. This action had a two-fold purpose. First, the fires were planned in likely ambush positions to disrupt any VC ambushes in these areas. Secondly, the fires provided a guide for the companies in their movement through the jungle.

11. Commanders Analysis:

Secondo

a. The concept of the "Hatchet Teams" is a very promising technique for obtaining accurate, timely intelligence of the VC. Refinements, such as increasing the size of the team to eight or ten men to add more combat power, may increase the "Hatchet Teams" effectiveness.

b. While there were no opportunities to ambush large enemy formations on this particular operation, it is believed that the combination of "Yeti" nets and "spider holes" offers attractive possibilities for surprising the enemy and beating him at his own game in future operations.

c. Young male inhabitants of villages, sympathetic to the VC, can be conscripted and placed at the head of units to reduce the possibility of entering booby trapped areas. These indigenous personnel have knowledge of the danger areas in the vicinity of their villages.

d. Plastic water containers are better adapted for resupply in jungle than are metal cans. If extraction of the metal cans can not be accomplished they must be destroyed. The plastic containers can be collapsed and carried by an individual.

e. Use of the M274 (MULE) for transportation of ammunition, rations and water provided a means of reducing the weight of the infantryman's load and gave added mobility to the individual soldier.

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HEADQUARTERS
2d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf
APO San Francisco, Calif 96347

AVADC-C

22 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Movement OPORD 35-65)

TO: Commanding Officer
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
APO San Francisco, Calif 96347

1. General:

- a. Name of Operation: OPORD 35-65.
- b. Date of Operation: 190738H Dec 65 - 210015H Dec 65
- c. Location: From Ben Cat vic coord(XT7533), Binh Duong Province, to vic Phan Rang (BN7587), Ninh Thuan Province.
- d. Control Hqs: Hq, 2d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.
- e. Reporting Officer: Lt Col Henry E. Emerson

2. Task Organization:

- a. TF Alpha - 190738H Dec 65 - 191223H Dec 65
 - 2/502
 - 2 plt, A/2/327
 - 2/320 Arty
 - A/2/17 Cav
 - A/326 Engr
- b. TF 2/502 - 191223H Dec 65 - 210015H Dec 65
 - 2/502
 - 2 plt, 2/327

3. Supporting Forces:

- a. 1/16 Inf, 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div, provided route security from the SP vic Ben Cat (XT758314), to the town of Phu Cuong (XT8114).
- b. The 1st MP Co, 1st Inf Div, provided TCPs from the SP to Bien Hoa AB vic Bien Hoa (XT0315).
- c. One (1) truck Co, 1st Inf Div, provided twenty-eight (28) 2½ ton trks - and twenty-three (23) 1½ ton trailers for movement from Ben Cat to Bien Hoa AB.
- d. Aviation Bn, 1st Inf Div, provided 2 HU1D gunships for convoy security during movement from Ben Cat to Bien Hoa AB.
- e. 101st Avn Det provided one (1) H-13 for command and control during the movement from Ben Cat to Bien Hoa AB.
- f. USAF provided thirty-three (33) C-130 sorties to move TF 2/502 from Bien Hoa AB to Buu Son Airfield vic Phan Rang (BN7587).
- g. 101st Abn Div MP Co, provided TCPs from Buu Son Airfield to 1st Bde base camp area vic Phan Rang (BN7587).
- h. A Btry, 27 Arty, provided four (4) 2½ ton trks and Service Btry 27 Arty, provided five (5) 2½ ton trks to shuttle personnel from Buu Son Airfield to 2/502 base camp area.

4. Intelligence: No enemy contact.

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5. Mission: TF Alpha conducted tactical motor march from Ben Cat to Bien Hoa AB. On arrival at Bien Hoa AB TF 2/502 loaded C-130 aircraft and conducted movement to Phan Rang.

6. Concept of Operation: TF Alpha moved by motor transportation, utilizing organic and attached transportation, from vic Ben Cat to Bien Hoa AB, commencing, 190738H Dec 65. TF Alpha was divided into three (3) serials for the move. A 2/17 Cav provided route reconnaissance from the SP vic Ben Cat (XT758314) to the RP vic Bien Hoa (XT990116). 1/16 Inf, 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div, provided route security from the SP to Phu Cuong (XT8114). Two (2) gunships provided aerial convoy security from the SP to the RP. Upon arrival at Bien Hoa AB, TF 2/502 loaded C-130 aircraft for movement to Buu Son Airfield. Upon arrival at Buu Son Airfield personnel were shuttled by 2½ ton trks and organic transportation from the airfield to 2/502 base camp area vic Phan Rang (BN 759870).

7. Execution: On 190738H Dec 65, TF Alpha crossed the SP and began tactical motor march from Ben Cat to the RP. Trp A 2/17 Cav had responsibility of route reconnaissance from the SP to the RP. Serials provided internal convoy security. The composition of the serials for the move from Ben Cat to Bien Hoa AB was as follows:

SERIAL	UNIT	ATTACHMENTS	CROSSED SP	CROSSED RP
1	A 2/17 Cav A 326 Engr HHC (-), 1st Bde	None	0738	0939
2	Co C, 2/502 HHC (-), 2/502 Co B, 2/502 B 2/320 Arty C 2/320 Arty	16-2½ ton trks	0810	1103
3	Co A, 2/502. HHC (-), 2/502 2 plt, A/2/327 105 F Btry, RAA Hq 2/320 Arty A 2/320 Arty	13-2½ ton trks	0940	1210

TF Alpha closed at Bien Hoa AB 191223H Dec 65. TF 2/502 became effective at this time, 191223H Dec 65. TF 2/502 moved to a marshalling area vic west end of Bien Hoa AB runway. Commencing 200810H Dec 65, TF 2/502 began out-loading on C-130 aircraft for movement to Buu Son Airfield. TF 2/502 utilized thirty-three (33) sorties during the movement. The first aircraft departed Bien Hoa AB 200831H Dec 65 and the last aircraft arrived Buu Son Airfield 202350H Dec 65. Upon arrival at Buu Son Airfield, TF 2/502 moved, utilizing nine (9) 2½ ton trks and organic transportation, to 2/502 base camp area. TF 2/502 closed in base camp effective 210015H Dec 65. No enemy contact was made during the move from Ben Cat to 2/502 base camp area.

8. Results: 2/502 closed at base camp area vic Phan Rang (BN759870) effective 210015H Dec 65.

9. Administrative Matters: No traffic problems or maintenance difficulties were encountered enroute.

a. No refueling of vehicles was necessary. Five (5) C-ration meals were consumed enroute. No ammunition was expended.

b. A maintenance team traveled at the rear of each serial to repair any minor damage or mechanical failure.

c. No casualties were suffered during the move.

d. Communications were generally excellent.

BN After Action Rpt (partial)

CHECKER BOARD

11/28/65 - 12/21/65

Bde (-) of 1/327 + 2/502
move to III Corps & attached to
1st INF Div.

File in NARA incomplete

This file consists of:

- Movement to III Corps (1 page)
- Movement back to II Corps (3² pages)
- BN After Action rpt (7 pages)

page 5 missing
all after page 8 missing

Due to the page length of the report, it was necessary to 2 scans per report sheet starting with p3 of the AA report