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# **SECURITY**

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AD 394022

MACJ42-SU (8 Sep 66)

SUBJECT: After Action Report - 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Operation  
Fillmore (RCS-NAVY-J3-32)

TO: ACofS, J3

FROM: ACofS, J4 <sup>26</sup>

DATE: 21 <sup>6</sup> CMT 2  
MAJ Ferguson/rw/60396

1. The attached report has been reviewed and matters of interest to J4 have been noted.

2. Although no significant logistical problems developed during the operation, two items, dry cell batteries and grease, were reported as being difficult to obtain or as being in short supply (para 2a(2) & (3), Incl 4). There are no known or reported shortages of these items at the present time. No shortages of these items which would affect combat operations are anticipated.

3. The report contained a recommendation that medical evacuation helicopters be provided a reliable winch or hoist capability for extraction of casualties where landing zones are not available (para 16). Twenty litter devices, used in conjunction with the UH1D helicopter equipped with a hoist, are now being evaluated in-country by ACTIV. If proved satisfactory, this will provide a capability for extracting casualties where no landing zone is available.

4. The report also contained a statement that PE 75 generators should be replaced (para 3, Incl 6). PE 75 generators are being replaced as a part of the generator standardization program. The replacement generator is the 3 KW 60 cycle mil std generator. None of these generators are in stock. Thirteen hundred are programmed in, however, no anticipated delivery date is available at this time. This quantity includes requirements for the replacement program, maintenance float and depot stock.

5. These comments relative to reported logistical problems and equipment recommendations have been provided as a matter of information.

1 Incl  
no

*J. B. Clark*  
JOHN B. CLARK  
COL, GS  
Acting ACofS, J4

ACSPOR - RD File  
66X096

# DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 340-13)


OFFICE SYMBOL OR FILE REFERENCE	SUBJECT
MACJ343	After Action Report - 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division

TO MACPD *RP* FROM ACofS, J3 DATE 0 8 St CMT 1  
J4 LTC Grezaffi/ejc/40882  
In Turn

1. The attached after action report is forwarded for action deemed appropriate. Your attention is invited to paragraph 16 of the report.

2. Request J4 return the attached report to J34 for file.

1 Incl  
as

  
JOHN C.F. TILLSON III  
Maj Gen, USA  
ACofS, J3

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION  
APO SF 96347

AVBD-C:

17 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE  
(RCS: HMMV 03-32)

THRU: ~~Commanding General~~  
~~Field Force Vietnam~~  
~~APO US Forces 96243~~ 24

TO: Commanding General USARV  
~~US Military Assistance Command Vietnam~~  
ATTN: ~~445 GS~~  
APO US Forces 96243

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation FILLMORE.

2. (U) Date of Operation: 25 March - 21 July 1966. The entire Brigade was involved in Phase I of the operation covering the period 25 March through 8 April. Beginning 7 April, the Brigade (-) was withdrawn from the operation and SF 2/327 Infantry continued on Operation FILLMORE under the operational control of I MACROSV. This report covers the period 25 March through 8 April 1966.

3. (U) Location: PHU XEM Province, Vietnam.

4. (U) Command Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. ( ) Task Organization:

<u>1/327 Inf</u>	<u>Sdc Troops</u>
Tn, 3d RRU	A 2/17 Cav
	A 326 Engr (-)
<u>2/327 Inf</u>	6th Sec, 2d Flt, B 29 Arty (SLT)
Demo Tn, A 326 Engr	Ede HHC (-)
	MR Flt (-)
<u>2/502 Inf</u>	Scty Flt
2 Demo Tns, A 326 Engr	20 Cal Det
Tn, 3d RRU	161 MI Det
	3 RRU (-)
<u>2/320 Arty</u>	ISRF
	HE-1, 245 Psy Ops Co
B 1/30 Arty (CPCON)	Ede Avn Sec
<u>5/27 Arty (-)</u>	

7. ( ) Supporting Forces:

a. 2/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.

ACSFOR -RD File  
66X098

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(RCS: MICOV J3-32)

- b. 5/27 Arty (-): Provided general supporting fires during the operation.
- c. B 1/30 Arty (OPCON): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.
- d. 6th Sec, 2d Flt, B 29 Arty (Searchlight) (OPCON): Provided effective on-call illumination from several locations during the operation.
- e. 10th Army Avn En: Provided two light airmobile companies in general support of the operation. These helicopters flew troop lifts and combat service support lifts to maneuver and fire support units. OH-47 helicopters were provided on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery units.
- f. 7th Air Div, USAF: Flew 86 Tactical Air missions totalling 197 sorties. Of these missions, six were immediate strikes requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request Net. Average response time for immediate strikes was twenty minutes from the initial request until time over target. The total of the above missions accounted for 79 structures destroyed, 31 structures damaged and 11 secondary explosions. In all instances the Tactical Air Support rendered was responsive and accurately delivered.
- g. Strategic Air Command, USAF: Flew one B-52 mission in support of the operation.
- h. 496th Med Tpt (Airmobile): Provided responsive, rapid evacuation support to the Brigade throughout the operation.
8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 2, Intelligence.
9. ( ) Mission: Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam directed that the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division secure and protect the rice harvest north and northwest of TUY HON while continuing to locate, fix and destroy the remaining elements of the 95th NV. Regiment, 3d Viet Cong Main Force Regiment and local Viet Cong forces.
10. ( ) Concepts of Operation: The concept of the first phase of the operation was to have one battalion secure and protect the rice harvest, while two battalions conducted search and destroy operations in the area.
11. ( ) Execution: Operation FILLMORE began without interruption, following the termination of Operation HARRISON. Brigade units were already deployed in the operational area. The 1/327 Inf continued operations east of SONG HON, while the 2/327 Inf and 2/502 Inf continued operations in the central TUY HON rice area and in the mountains south of TUY HON. On 26 March, one company from the 2/327 Inf and one battery from the 2/320 Arty conducted an airmobile assault over the mountains from the south. The 1/327 Inf moved by tactical motor march to TUY HON South Airfield on 27 March and assumed a mission as the Brigade and I FFRGV reserve. The 2/327 Inf continued saturation patrolling in the central rice area, and began exploitation of the B-52 strike in the southern mountains with one company (Company B, 2/327 Inf). The 2/502 Inf continued to operate in the mountains north of the B-52 strike, and remained prepared to assist in the exploitation. Company B, 2/327 Inf completed the exploitation operation on 30 March when it effected link-up with elements of the 2/502 Inf after having completely traversed the mountain range from south to north without enemy contact. The 2/502 Inf then began operations through the mountains south of TUY HON with the aim of sweeping eastward to Highway 1. On 31 March, the 2/327 Inf moved north by tactical motor march on Highway 1

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(RGS: AFGV J3-32)

to an operational area near TUY AN, north of TUY HOA, and began search and destroy operations. The 1/327 Inf began deployment from TUY HOA South Airfield to its next operational area near DONG TRU, with the air movement of one company by CV-2 aircraft during the night of 2 April. During the day, the 2/327 Inf moved by tactical motor march to an area north of TUY AN to commence patrolling and search and destroy operations to protect the rice harvest in that vicinity. The 2/502 Inf, after completing its sweep to Highway 1, conducted a tactical motor march to TUY HOA South Airfield where it assumed the mission of Brigade and I PARCEV reserve from the 1/327 Inf. A second company from the 1/327 Inf conducted a night air movement to DONG TRU by CV-2 aircraft on 3 April and immediately deployed to the south and east toward the mountainous plateau. On 4 April, the 2/327 Inf conducted an airborne assault with one company, south of blocking positions occupied by elements of the 1/327 Inf and then swept toward the 1/327 Inf with no enemy contact. When one company from the 1/327 Inf made contact with an estimated Viet Cong company southeast of DONG TRU on 7 April, the remainder of the 1/327 Inf was committed to the scene of the engagement by helicopter assault in an attempt to encircle the Viet Cong force. The engagement lasted throughout the day until the Viet Cong force withdrew suffering heavy casualties. The Brigade, minus 2/327 Inf, deployed to FILLMORE on 7 April and 8 April. On 9 April, the 2/327 Inf was detached from the Brigade and continued on Operation FILLMORE under the operational control of I PARCEV.

#### 12. ( ) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission to locate, fix and destroy Viet Cong forces in the TUY HOA area and was successful in protecting the rice harvest north of TUY HOA.

b. Losses inflicted on the enemy during Phase I of Operation FILLMORE included the following: 122 VC KIA (80), 57 VC IIA (Est), 12 VC KIA (DC), 155 VCB, 15 VCC, 1 million, and 32 individual and crew served weapons captured. In addition, large amounts of supplies and equipment were captured or destroyed. (See Inclosure 2).

c. Friendly losses during the period included the following: 8 KIA, 69 IIA.

#### 13. (U) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 1, Personnel and Administration.

b. Logistics: See Inclosure 4, Logistics.

14. ( ) Special Equipment and Techniques: In one battalion, each of the companies formed an airborne resupply unit. The air-  
borne resupply unit functioned well  
and executed air movements.

#### 15. Commander's Analysis:

##### a. Lessons Learned:

(1) The use of slings and nets in helicopter resupply was effective and reduced the time the helicopter was required to spend on the ground.



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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE  
(RCS: LACV JJ-32)

(2) Periodic spraying of the area with DDT, utilizing a modified M38A1C vehicle, was effective in suppressing insects.

b. Highlights of Operations:

(1) In an effort to obtain maximum effectiveness with Psychological Warfare, wounded NVN captives were given immediate medical attention. They were fed, given cigarettes and were well treated. Photographs were taken of the prisoners while they were receiving this treatment with the intention of distributing the photographs throughout the operational area and among the civilian populace. In addition, Psychological Warfare tapes were developed using themes based on conversations and discussions with the captives. The photographs were never reproduced and still had not been delivered when the Brigade (-) departed TUY HO. The tapes were ineffective when finally broadcast because of the altitude of the broadcast aircraft and insufficient amplification. Psychological Warfare can be a powerful tool for the commander, but in order for its full potential to be realized, the Psy War detachment must be responsive to the Commander's requirements.

(2) In some areas units encountered extreme difficulty in extracting casualties because of a lack of suitable landing zones. Construction of landing zones was impractical in terrain where the jungle canopy frequently reached 100 feet or more in height. A solution, which met with success, was the use of USAF rescue helicopters which had a hoist capability. It was easier to locate or construct a gap in the jungle canopy, large enough to allow extraction with a hoist from a hovering helicopter, than it would have been to construct landing zones large enough to accommodate a CH-47 aircraft.

16. (U) Recommendations:

a. That medical evacuation helicopters be provided with a reliable winch or hoist capability to enable extraction of casualties from areas where landing zones are not available.

b. That the supporting Psychological Warfare Detachment be provided an increased capability in broadcasting and photograph reproduction equipment.

*Willard Pearson*  
WILLARD PEARSON  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

Inclosures:

- 1 - Personnel and Administration
- 2 - Intelligence
- 3 - Operations Schematic
- 4 - Logistics
- 5 - Civic Action
- 6 - Communications
- 7 - Artillery

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE  
(RCR: MACV 53-32)

Distribution:

- 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army  
Washington DC 20315
- 1 - CG, USAREAC (ATTN: GPOF-22)
- 1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC 5343)
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- 1 - CG, USARV (ATTN: ANO Historical Division)
- 2 - CG, I PROCEV
- 2 - CG, 101st Abr Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
- 1 - CG
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- 1 - J7
- 1 - J8
- 1 - J9
- 1 - J10
- 1 - J11
- 1 - J12

Inclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE.

1. ( ) Unit Strengths:

a. The Brigade personnel strengths at the start of Operation Fillmore were:

Authorized Augmented (MTOE)	4490
Assigned	4805
Present for Duty	4293
Not Present for Duty	512
Airhead	3389
Base Camp	904

b. The assigned strength was 107% of the augmented authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 93% of the augmented authorized strength.

c. Of the Not Present for Duty strength, 394 were hospitalized personnel. Because of casualties, ETS losses, and the number of personnel remaining in a hospitalized status, rifle company strengths were reduced during the period. Additional rifle company strength was obtained by the end of the operation by returning personnel assigned to provisional units to their parent units, reducing Base Camp strength to the minimum, and through receipt of replacement personnel.

The Brigade received 6 ARVN NCO interpreters during the period; 20 interpreters and 2 LNO's were also attached to the Brigade.

2. ( ) Casualties:

Casualties for the operation were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
1/327th	2	25
2/327th	3	29
2/502d	2	11
2/320th		2
A/326th		2
NAC	1	
TOTAL	<u>8</u>	<u>69</u>

3. (U) Personnel Program: Various personnel programs were initiated during this operation.

a. Safety Program. "Stay Alert and Stay Alive" Messages were disseminated to all units summarizing each accident in the Brigade. The purpose of the program is to reduce loss of lives and materiel damage.

Inclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE (contd)

caused by carelessness. Each message contains a "lesson learned". These messages are widely disseminated and are discussed at commanders conferences. Units involved with the accident are designated in the message. The messages are distributed in TFM format to gain attention.

b. Pay Program: A letter was published and disseminated on "Monthly Pay". The intent was to encourage the use of savings bonds and savings allotments by Brigade personnel. This program was intended not only to provide an added service to the troops (by saving the cost of money orders and speeding delivery of the funds) but also was designed to remove surplus funds from the forward area, thereby reducing the possibilities of loss, theft, etc. Commanders were requested to encourage all personnel to use this service. This program coincided with the Savings Bond Drive.

c. Personnel Services: To provide necessary personnel services to troops in the field, SI teams continued to periodically visit units - normally just after payday - to sell money orders, rectify pay discrepancies, provide legal assistance, and to keep personnel records current. Red Cross representatives also accompanied the SI teams to offer assistance in personal matters. In addition, a "Personnel Services Center" was established in the forward area on a permanent basis to provide services throughout the month.

d. Immediate Recognition for Valor: A program of citing personnel in Brigade General Orders for valor in combat progressed during the period. Purpose of this program is to provide immediate recognition of valorous acts, thereby boosting morale and providing greater incentive. Copies of these orders are provided to individuals, placed in their official files, and serve as a check list on the subsequent submission of awards. The program was well received by the unit commanders.

e. (U) Personnel Planning. Planning was initiated during the period in the following areas:

a. Centralized administration of officers' and noncommissioned officers' messes at the Base Camp area under the supervision of the Deputy Installation Coordinator.

b. Establishment of a formalized program of activities to be conducted by the three newly arrived Red Cross girls. Program will include crafts and hobbies activities and visits to units for distribution of literature.

c. Comprehensive water safety program.

d. Compilation of a Command Statistics Book which indicates, by month, statistical data covering various areas of personnel interest such as savings program, IG complaints, criminal offenses, AWOLs, courts martial, reenlistments, malaria, etc.

e. Personal letters to be sent to the next of kin of all newly assigned personnel within the first seven days of arrival. These letters will be signed by the commanding general and include a picture of each man.

Inclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations after Action Report, Operation FILLMORE (contd).

f. Personal letters from the commanding general to be sent to personnel of the command wounded in action.

5. (U) Problem Areas. Problem areas encountered during the reporting period included the following:

a. Recommendations for awards of the Purple Heart submitted as long ago as October 1965 have not been acted upon. Awards files have been screened and the necessary data provided to USARV. To overcome this difficulty in the future, the Brigade requested and obtained authority to award the Purple Heart.

b. Receipt of orders on personnel evacuated through medical channels are seldom received promptly. As a result, personnel continued to be maintained on Brigade rosters after departure from Vietnam. USARV apprised of problem and it is under review.

c. Morale. Morale remained "Excellent" throughout the period.

1. ( ) Terrain: The terrain in the area of operations consisted of heavily jungled mountains in the west around DONG TRE, and flat paddy land and sandy beaches along the coast. Numerous LZ's were available throughout the area. Observation and fields of fire were generally limited or non-existent in the mountainous jungle, but ranged from fair to good throughout the remainder of the area. Cover and concealment varied from good to excellent in the mountains, but only from poor to fair elsewhere. Principal avenues of approach were the KHEB River from the northwest, the CAI River and Highway 1 from the north. In general, the predominantly open terrain prevented the enemy from massing and restricted his movement during daylight hours. Vehicular movement was possible only in the flat lands and was further restricted to the existing road net. Foot movement was possible in all areas but was restricted by the jungle and the flooded paddy.

2. ( ) Weather: The weather in the area of operations was characterized by the transition from the NE to SE monsoons. There was very little ground mist, and cloud cover occurred only during early morning and late evening. Weather had little or no effect on enemy operations. The relatively clear weather favored the use of helicopters and visual aerial reconnaissance.

3. ( ) Enemy Dispositions: Initially the third Inter-Province Headquarters and the 5th Bn, 95th NVA Regt were located west of TUY AN and two (2) unidentified, unconfirmed battalions were reported to be in the vicinity of DONG TRE. The 4th and 5th Battalions of the 95th NVA Regiment were reported to be located in the KI ROI Mountains south of TUY HOA. No significant enemy displacement was noted as a result of US operations around the DONG TRE, TUY AN and KI ROI Mountain areas.

4. ( ) Results:

a. Order of Battle:

(1) Units identified by COMUSMACV:

18th Co Sig Co, 95th NVA Regt.  
 19th Co Regt Co, 95th NVA Regt.  
 21st Co Recon Co, 95th NVA Regt.  
 377th Bn, AM 377 Co, 85th Provincial En.  
 DKG Bn A, KI DKG Co, 25th Provincial En.  
 "Tiger" Plt, Son Hoa Dist.  
 B-n Co, Son Hoa Dist.

(2) No new units were identified by documents during Operation FILLMORE.

(3) VCC reported that the 95th NVA Regiment was at approximately 50% strength with very few morale.

(4) One squad of SON HOA District local guerrillas surrendered with weapons.

b. VC equipment losses:

(1) Weapons Captured:

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
(a) United States Manufactured:	
Shotgun, 12 gauge	1
Rifle, US, M16, cal .30-06	1
Carbine, US, M1, cal .30	1
Submachine gun, M3, cal .45	2
Rifle, US, M1, Grend, cal .30-06	2
Submachine gun, Thompson, cal .45	2
pistol, US, M1911, cal .45	1

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Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report,  
Operation FILLMORE.

<u>Description</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
(b) German Manufactured:	
Rifle, Mauser 98, cal 7.92mm	20
(a) French Manufactured:	
Rifle, MAS 1926, cal 7.5mm	2
(2) Food:	
Rice destroyed	3½ tons
Corn destroyed	¼ ton
(3) Camps or Buildings Destroyed (unless noted):	
Structures	69
Structures damaged	17
(4) Signal Equipment (damaged beyond repair):	
EC-1	3
EC-6	1
Loudspeaker	3
(5) Munitions and Equipment:	
Grenades (various types)	800
Grenade launcher	2
(6) Miscellaneous:	
Picnics	22
Sewing machines	3
Bianchets	30
Small quantities:	Medical supplies
	Uniforms
	Documents

5. ( ) Significant VC Incidents and Losses:

- a. 270810H Mar via CG344246 - captured 3 wounded VC. One VC was from 19th Regt Co, 95th NVA Regt, who indicated that the 4th and 5th Bns had merged due to battle losses.
- b. 281335H Mar via CG997608 - LRR team made contact with estimated VC Co resulting in 12 VC KIA during extraction.
- c. 291905H Mar via DG 987722 - LRR team made contact with estimated VC Co resulting in 3 VC KIA (2C) prior to extraction.
- d. 020600H Apr at HC998697 - 1/227 Inf patrol made contact with 15-20 VC, was forced to extract.
- e. 071202H - 071830H Apr at CG025635 - 1/227 Inf engaged VC Co (3 or identified as the 3rd Co, 8th Bn) resulting in 35 VC KIA (2C), 4 weapons and 200 grenades captured.

6. ( ) Committed and Reinforcing Viet Cong Units in the Area of Operations:

- a. Committed and reinforcing Viet Cong units in the area south of east-west grid line 80 and north of east-west grid line 60 consisted of approximately 2,500 personnel organized into a total of one Main Force battalion, one NVA battalion, two Regional Force battalions, ten separate companies and ten separate platoons.

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 Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report,  
 Operation LINHON.

b. Viet Cong unconfirmed reinforcing capability consisted of two Region Force battalions with a total strength of 750 personnel.

c. Disposition of Viet Cong committed units (Confirmed):


<u>IDENT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
6th Bn, 29th L Regt	CG019641	21 Mar 66	300(Orig)	4-32 mort, 2-DK2 57 RR, 1-LMG
85th Bn	CG031755	26 Mar 66	400(Orig)	1-60 mort, 1-LMG, 1-120
4th Bn, 29th L Regt 29th L Regt	Vic CG0631	21 Mar 66	460(Combined)	12-LF, Unknown

d. Disposition of Viet Cong committed units (Unconfirmed, possible):

<u>IDENT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
30th Bn, 1st RF Regt	DC091666	22 Mar 66	350	3-60 mort, 2-81 mort, 3-DK2 57 RR, 5-120
U/I Co	DC090795	27 Mar 66	75-100	Unknown
U/I Co	DC022784	23 Mar 66	"	"
U/I Co	DC088765	"	"	"
U/I Co	DC087000	"	"	"
U/I Co	DC090000	25 Mar 66	"	"
U/I Co	CG073712	12 Mar 66	"	"
U/I Co	CG056002	11 Mar 66	"	"
U/I Co	CG167003	18 Mar 66	"	"
2 U/I Co's	CG011037	11 Mar 66	175-200	"
U/I Plat	CG000929	23 Mar 66	25	"
U/I Plat	CG009721	13 Mar 66	25	"
U/I Plat	CG012772	27 Mar 66	25	"
U/I Plat	DC072000	12 Mar 66	25	"
U/I Plat	CG070001	20 Mar 66	35	"
U/I Plat	CG110060	18 Mar 66	40	"
U/I Plat	DC002647	29 Mar 66	25	"
2 U/I Plat's	DC000538	22 Mar 66	50	"
U/I Plat	CG095799	18 Mar 66	25	"



Enclosure 3 (Operation Overlay) to Combat Operations  
 After Action Report, Operation TILMFORE



Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report,  
Operation FILLMORE

1. ( ) ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT:

a. Support Battalion.

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided command and control for Support Battalion (Forward). It was organized into a command, operations, communications, and movements control section.

(2) Supply Detachment: It was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a parachute rigging section.

(3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive and signal equipment. It was organized into a shop office, a recovery and a contact team.

(4) Medical Company (-): A clearing station was established with a twenty bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, an emergency treatment section, and dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Forward Support Detachment, MIA TRUNG Support Command: Provided area logistics support for all units participating in FILLMORE. This element was extremely cooperative and responsive throughout the operation.

(2) 135th Aviation Company: Provided CV-2 aircraft to transport supplies, repair parts, and personnel to and from the forward area.

(3) 147th Aviation Company (Innoble) provided three CH-47 helicopters.

(4) 196th Aviation Company: Provided medical air evacuation throughout the operation.

2. ( ) AMMUNITION AND SERVICES:

a. Supply: Forward Support Detachment, MIA TRUNG Support Command provided supply point distribution to Support Battalion, which in turn, provided supply point distribution to Brigade units.

(1) Class I: "B" ration meals and Meal, Combat, Individual were consumed during the operation. Supplements to the "B" ration, consisting of fresh meat, bread, and some vegetables were issued daily. A five day stock level of Meal, Combat, Individual was maintained by the MIA TRUNG Forward Support Detachment and Support Battalion supply point. There were 202 short tons of "B" rations and 37 short tons of Meal, Combat, Individual issued.

(2) Class II & IV: The Support Battalion (Rear), MIA TRUNG provided class II & IV items. 15 short tons were issued during the operation. Certain dry cell batteries remained difficult to obtain.

(3) Class III: The MIA TRUNG Forward Support Detachment provided all types of class III items. 90 short tons of POL were issued during the operation, to include 13,000 gallons AVIATION, 5,535 gallons DIESEL, and 1,225 gallons WMS. Oils were plentiful; grease was in short supply, but did not affect brigade operations.

(4) Class V: 232 short tons were issued. The Brigade entered the operation with its basic load. The Forward Support Detachment, MIA TRUNG Support Command, maintained a 15 day stock level. Support Battalion authenticated transportation orders and the Forward Support Detachment, MIA TRUNG Support Command received, stored, and issued all ammunition. The

*MIA TRUNG  
ACTION*

*SUB  
ACTION*

*9*

Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report,  
Operation FILLMORE

entire basic load for one infantry battalion and one artillery battery was banded and palletized in the Brigade Class 7 supply point for immediate deployment with the Brigade reserve.

(5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion established a water point via TUY HOA.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detachment processed 27 automotive, 67 signal, 77 armament, 37 instrument, and 25 sweeper job orders. All but 4 automotive, 3 signal, 1 instrument, and 1 sweeper job were completed.

c. Transportation:

(1) Ground Transportation: The 2 1/2 ton trucks of Support Battalion were used on 181 missions.

(2) Air Transportation:

(a) Fixed Wing: The two CV-2's supporting the Brigade flew 113 sorties and carried a total of 926 PAX and 107 short tons of cargo.

(b) Rotary Wing: (Helicopter resupply)

1 UH-1H helicopters were used extensively to resupply committed forces.

2 Use of slings and nets was a particularly effective method of resupply, reducing aircraft ground time for loading and off loading to a minimum.

3 Helicopters lifted a total of 112 short tons of supplies in support of the Brigade. Attached as Inclosure 1 is the daily helicopter resupply tonnage by class of supply.

d. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration was provided by 148th Quartermaster Company.

(2) Bath: 148th Quartermaster Company provided a bath unit via TUY HOA.

(3) Laundry: 148th Quartermaster Company provided laundry service.

3. ( ) MEDICAL:

a. The sanitation of mess halls, latrines and unit areas was good. Health and hygiene were at a high level. Unit areas were sprayed with a mixture of DDT by M38A1C vehicles, converted for spray purposes, to suppress insects.

b. Patients treated:

(1) MIA	61
(2) Non-Battle Injury	95
(3) Disease	457 (33 malaria)
Total Treated	613
(4) LON	1

**Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operation After Action Report,  
Company 100th**

(5) Returned to duty	412
(6) Evacuated to hospital	194
(7) Remain in holding	6

8. The hospitalized personnel are categorized by wounds

(1) Head	5
(2) Chest	7
(3) Abdomen	2
(4) Upper extremities	21
(5) Lower extremities	21
(6) Back	5

9. ( ) SUMMARY: No significant logistical problems developed during the operation. The Forward Support Detachment, 100th TRNG, Support Command provided excellent support.

10. ( ) CONCLUSION: Slings and nets provide the best and most rapid means of aerial resupply.

Inclosure 5 (Civic Action) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation  
PILLMORE

1. (U) In the category of Health and Sanitation a total of 1,910 Vietnamese were treated by Brigade medical personnel. The conduct of the 1st Brigade during the two prior operations seemed to convince the people that we were there to help them, and explains the large attendance at Brigade sponsored sick calls.

2. (U) Repairing roads and bridges turned out to be the major project during the operation. A total of 88 kilometers were repaired along National Route 1 and Interprovincial Route 7 by Co A/326 Engr.

3. (U) Transportation continued to be provided for the rice harvest. Along with transporting workers to and from the harvest, the 1/327 Inf gave food and medical treatment to approximately 100 refugees and assisted in their relocation to the District Headquarters.

4. (U) In the "Back to the Village" campaign, designed to return refugees back to their former homes after clearing the area of Viet Cong, the 1st Brigade assisted by repairing roads and bridges, and by providing security for the movement of the refugees.

5. (U) On 7 April, thirty-two US weapons, captured from the Viet Cong and restored, were presented to the Province Chief for use in RF/FF units.

Inlosure 6 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action Report,  
Operation FILLMORE

1. ( ) Background:

The Brigade Signal elements had the mission of providing internal communications in support of Brigade tactical operations. The signal elements installed, operated, and maintained the Brigade Communication Center, FM and AM Net Control Stations, and the Brigade Switch Board and wire system. Voice circuits were installed, when possible, to subordinate units within the Brigade, primarily to the Infantry Battalions train areas.

2. ( ) Operations:

a. VHF Section - Provided 4 telephone circuits to the 2/320 TAC CP and 2 telephone circuits to the 2/322 TAC CP, tying these lines in with both the Brigade Headquarters, and the Brigade Area System.

b. Communications Center Section - Terminated and secure teletype circuit from I AFJLMLV and handled all messages received by supporting HF radioteletype terminals. Provided air courier service to the TAC CPs.

c. Switchboard and Wire Section - Provided area support including lines to both the battalion forward and rear elements, all subordinate supporting, and adjacent units. The switchboard terminated 47 common user subscribers.

d. AM Radio Section - Operated automatic retransmission relay station on Hill 391 for Brigade Operations Intelligence Net and Brigade Administration Logistics Net. There were no difficulties encountered.

e. Maintenance Section - PE-75 Generators required considerable maintenance.

3. (U) Lesson Learned:

Need replacements for PE-75 Generators.

PERKIN  
Brig Gen

OFFICIAL:

ROSENBLUM  
S-3

Inclosure 7 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE

1. ( ) Background: The 2d Bn, 320th Artillery (105 mm) (Airborne), attached to 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, provided direct support to the Bde in all phases of Operation FILLMORE. Reinforcing fires were furnished by Btry "B", 1st Bn, 30th Arty (155 mm towed).

2. ( ) Summary of Operations:

a. Initial displacement in this operation was that of Btry "B" to area TORNAKO, coord CQ166140, to furnish support to the 2/327 Inf Bn operating in area THUND R and along axis GREEN. Btry "B" displaced to area TORNADO by CH-47 helicopter with movement commencing at 261549 hrs Mar 66 and closing at 270000 hrs Mar 66. The Bn (-) and Btry "B", 1/30 Arty remained in firing position via coord CQ0835 with the Bn Base camp at Tuy Hoa North Airfield coord CQ123483. On 29 Mar Btry "B" rejoined the Bn at coord CQ0835, again moving by CH-47 and closing 291746 hrs Mar 66.

b. While in the above positions the Bn fired extensive M&I fires nightly to assist in the psy war demoralization and surrender program conducted by the Brigade. A recapitulation of missions fired, ammunition expended, and results achieved is at Inclosure 2.

c. As the 7/502 Inf pushed east, Btry "C" was displaced to coord CQ199340, closing 311135 hrs Mar 66 to insure continuous support to the Infantry.

d. On 1 Apr Btry "A" displaced to Tuy Hoa North Airfield, coord CQ 153485 closing at 011515 hrs in preparation for movement by CV-2 a/c to Dong Tre, coord BC919693, and closed there 021230 hrs Apr 66. From that position Btry "A" furnished direct support to 1/327 Inf Bn and CIDG Forces (Dong Tre) during joint S&D operations conducted in Dong Tre area.

e. On 2 Apr 66, the Bn (- Btry A) commenced displacement to firing positions via coord CQ105685, Tuy An. Btry "B" 2/320th Arty and 1 plt of Btry "C" 1/30 Arty furnished fire support for this road movement from firing positions via coord CQ136583. The Bn (- M&I) and Btry "B" 1/30 Arty were closed Tuy An area by 031350 hrs Apr 66 where continuous direct support was furnished to 2/327 Inf operating in area D.R.MOUTH and an extensive M&I program carried out. The attached searchlight section was employed via coord CQ135583 with Btry "C" but had very limited use due to lack of suitable targets.

f. On 7 Apr 66 the Bn commenced movement to close back in Tuy Hoa area in preparation for movement as per OPORD 84-66.

Inclosure 1 (Positions Occupied) to Inclosure 7 (Artillery) to Combat Operations  
 After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE

POSITIONS OCCUPIED

Battery	Coordinates	Date
A	QQ141543	27 Mar 66
B	QQ166240	27 Mar 66
C	QQ078347	27 Mar 66
B/1/30	QQ078347	27 Mar 66
"	QQ079347	28 Mar 66
B	QQ077347	29 Mar 66
C	QQ159360	31 Mar 66
A	QQ153485	1 Apr 66
A	QQ919693	2 Apr 66
B	QQ105685	2 Apr 66
C	QQ135585	2 Apr 66
1 Plt B/1/30	QQ105685	2 Apr 66
1 Plt B/1/30	QQ136583	2 Apr 66
C	QQ136583	3 Apr 66
B/1/30	QQ105685	3 Apr 66
C	QQ214416	7 Apr 66



Inclousure 2 (Summary of Missions Fired) to Inclousure 7 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FILLMORE

MISSIONS FIRED

1. Total No of missions fired: 1314.
2. Total No of rounds expended: 9364.
3. Total No of registrations conducted: 33.
4. Total No of H&I missions fired: 1091.
5. Total No of rounds expended on H&I's: 5346.

Subsistence: 57 VC KIA (EO)  
2 VC WIA  
16 A/W or sniper silenced  
1 Building destroyed  
1 Village left burning  
1 Secondary explosion

On 29 Mar 66 Major General Critz fired the Bn's 75,000 rd at "A" Btry location.