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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96347

AVBD-C

22 July 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE (RCS: MACV J3-32)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
APO US Forces 96243

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation HAWTHORNE.
2. (U) Dates of Operation: 2 June thru 20 June 1966
3. (U) Location: KONTUM Province.
4. (U) Command Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (C) Task Organization:

a. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation HAWTHORNE is shown below. This organization remained relatively unchanged throughout the operation, with the following exceptions: (1) 1/5 Cav and A 1/8 Cav came under the operational control of the 1st Brigade on 10 and 8 June 1966 respectively and (2) GVN military and paramilitary forces were attached or under operational coordination with the 1st Brigade during various phases of the operation. The GVN units are listed below in paragraph 6b.

TF 1/327

1/327 Inf
B2/320 Arty
Demo Tm A 326 Engr

TF 2/502

2/502 Inf
C 2/302 Arty
Demo Tm A 326 Engr
IPW Tm
FAC

2/320 Arty (-)

B 1/30 Arty

Spt Bn (-)

Bde Troops

HHC (-)
A 2/17 Cav
A 326 Engr (-)
LRRP
Scty Plat
MP Plat (-)
1/101 Avn Sec
20 Chem Det
HE-1 245 Psy Ops Co
181 MI Det
3 RRU

GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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b. During Operation HAWTHORNE, the 1/42 Inf Regt (ARVN) and 21st Ranger Bn (ARVN) were integrated as maneuver elements with the 1st Brigade through mutual coordination between the Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and the 24th Special Tactical Zone (ARVN). Through additional coordination the operation of nine CIDG companies and one RF company were integrated into the Brigade's scheme of maneuver. These ARVN units served as maneuver elements, protected radio relay sites, provided convoy security, protected artillery batteries and Brigade base camp, and screened flanks of attacking units. In addition, ten (10) Apache Patrols provided information from long range patrols conducted in the TAOR.

c. TF 2/527 Inf remained detached from the 1st Brigade and was attached to the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) in TUY HOA on Operation NATHAN HALE.

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. 2/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.

b. B 1/30 (OPCON): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

c. 10th Army Aviation Battalion: Provided helicopters for airmobile assaults throughout the operation. In addition, the unit flew daily resupply missions and provided armed helicopter support for the operation.

d. 147th Avn Co provided general support with five CH-47 helicopters.

e. 219th Avn Co provided direct support with five C-1 aircraft.

f. 5th Air Commando Squadron provided airlift support for Psy War Ops.

g. 245th Psy Ops Co provided one loudspeaker team and one leaflet dissemination team in direct support.

h. 7th USAF: Flew 306 Tactical Air missions for 463 sorties. The results of the above missions include 16 VC KBA (BC), 36 VC KBA (Est), 29 structures destroyed, 10 structures damaged, 8 automatic weapons sites destroyed, 11 bunkers destroyed, and 4 secondary explosions.

i. Strategic Air Command, USAF: Flew two B-52 missions for 36 sorties in support of the operation. These missions resulted in 22 KBA (BC) and 200 KBA (Est).

j. 498th Medical Detachment (Airmobile): Provided continuous medical evacuation for the Brigade throughout the operation.


8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 2, Intelligence.

9. (U) Mission: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of DAK TO, TOU MORONG, TAN CANH and assist in the withdrawal of the TOU MORONG Regional Force outpost.

10. (U) Concept of Operations: Operation HAWTHORNE was conducted in two phases. See Inclosure 3, 4A and 4B, Operations Overlays.

a. Phase I (2 June - 6 June 1966): This phase consisted on a three-pronged converging attack by the 1/327 Inf, the 21st Ranger Bn (ARVN) and the 1/42 Inf Regt (ARVN) to relieve the besieged Regional Force outpost at TOU MORONG.

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b. Phase II (6 June - 20 June 1966): This phase consisted of a double envelopment of the enemy located in the ridges northeast of TOU MORONG by the 1/327 Inf and 2/502 Inf. Subsequently, the 1/42 Inf Regt (ARVN), B 2/327 Inf and 1/5 Cav were inserted in an attempt to encircle the enemy, then identified as the 24th NVA Regt. A massive B-52 strike was then delivered on 13 June 1966. Following the B-52 strike, an exploitation by airmobile and ground attack was launched, and search and destroy operations were conducted through 20 June.

11. (C) Execution:

a. The Brigade (-) began deployment from the CHEO REO area by C-130 aircraft on 29 May 1966 and closed into DAK TO on 3 June 1966. A total of 201 sorties were utilized. On 2 June 1966, the 2/502 Inf displaced from PLEIKU to DAK TO by CV-2 aircraft and convoy.

b. Phase I: On 2 June 1966, the 1/42 Inf Regt (ARVN) began an attack north along Highway 14 toward TOU MORONG and encountered an enemy force of an estimated company size. On 3 June 1966, the 1/327 Inf and 21st Ranger Bn (ARVN) conducted airmobile assaults and swept to the south. This three-pronged converging attack was executed to relieve the besieged Regional Forces outpost at TOU MORONG. To insure the uninterrupted advance of the 1/42 Inf Regt (ARVN) after it was attacked on 2 June and to provide artillery support for the 1/327 Inf, 105 mm howitzer battery and a rifle company were lifted by helicopter ahead of the 1/42 Inf Regt (ARVN) along the ARVN Battalion's axis of advance. This force became lightly engaged on the evening of 3 and 4 June having landed just to the rear of the force in contact with the 1/42 Inf Regt (ARVN). On 5 June 1966, the three battalions converged on TOU MORONG with the 1/327 Inf securing the terrain northeast of the TOU MORONG outpost and the 1/42 Inf Regt (ARVN) and 21st Ranger Battalion (ARVN) linking up and effecting relief of the garrison. Without further incident, the TOU MORONG garrison was withdrawn and returned mid-afternoon of 6 June 1966 to the vicinity of DAK TO along the 1/42 Inf Regt (ARVN) and the 21st Ranger Battalion (ARVN). The 1/327 Inf remained at TOU MORONG and the supporting 105mm howitzer battery and the rifle company as security remained in the valley four kilometers to the west of TOU MORONG.

c. Phase II: The evening of 6 June 1966, the 1/327 Inf made light contact with the enemy, and early the morning of 7 June 1966 the artillery battery and defending rifle company were heavily attacked with mortar fire, grenades, and a close-in assault by NVA forces. The fight lasted until 0845 hours when the NVA force withdrew suffering heavy casualties. On 7 June 1966, the 1/327 Inf attacked north in two columns and met strong resistance. At this time, the 2/502 Inf was released as I FFORCEV reserve and immediately deployed in an airmobile assault to envelop the enemy's northern flank. From 7 through 10 June 1966, heavy contact was made with the enemy almost continuously as the 1/327 Inf and 2/502 Inf sought to dislodge the NVA forces from entrenched position in the dense bamboo jungle. One rifle company was released from the 2/327 Inf at TUY HOA and was inserted into the northeast quadrant to seal off enemy escape routes. The 1/5 Cav was also made available to the Commanding General, 1st Brigade on 10 June 1966 and together with one CIDG company took up positions along the northeast and east which appeared to be the enemy's most likely exfiltration route. The 1/42 Inf Regt (ARVN) was made available by the 24th Tactical Zone Commander and helilifted into the area to join the fight. Pressure was brought to bear on the enemy on all sides. As the size, intent and location of the enemy force became clear, a decision was made to request a B-52 strike on the fixed enemy. The strike was requested for 0800 hours 13 June 1966 to provide time to evacuate friendly casualties and readjust front line positions behind the three

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kilometer safety line. An elaborate artillery and air fire support plan was developed to keep the enemy engaged from 11 through 13 June 1966. The ARVN battalion was redeployed on 12 June to positions east of TOU MORONG to block possible enemy exfiltration. Thirty minutes prior to the strike, 900 CS grenades were dropped into the center of the target area, covering about one square kilometer. Between 0820 and 0847 hours 13 June 1966, the B-52 strike was launched precisely on target. Following the strike, enemy resistance crumbled and the 1/327 Inf, 2/502 Inf, 1/5 Cav, 1/42 Inf Regt (ARVN) and CIDG elements immediately exploited the objective area by helicopter and overland movement. Thirty minutes following the B-52 strike, one rifle company from 2/502 Inf had been helilifted into the B-52 target area. Large numbers of VC KIA's, weapons and equipment were found in the area. The 2/502 Inf located and captured 15 dazed NVA personnel. On 15 June elements of the 2/502 Inf and 1/5 Cav engaged a Co size VC force north of the B-52 strike and the enemy broke contact following tactical air strikes. In the final phase of the operation, the 1/5 Cav assaulted the valley northwest of the strike area and swept southeast to pick up enemy stragglers. On 15 June 1966, the 1/327 Inf made an end sweep around the south of TOU MORONG with expectations of over-running an enemy hospital. Neither operations produced any sizeable contact.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division succeeded in its mission to find, fix, and destroy Viet Cong forces in the DAK TO, TAN CANH and TOU MORONG area.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during Operation HAWTHORNE.

(1) Personnel Losses:

479	VC KIA (BC)
506	VC KIA (EST)
52	VC KBA (BC)
209	VC KBA (EST)
10	VC WIA (EST)
22	VCC
0	VCS

(2) Weapons Captured:


<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURE</u>
M-79	1	US
M-72	1	US
Mauser "98" Rifle	2	German
Luger, 9mm, Pistol	1	German
SKS Carbine	19	Chicom
AK-47	51	Chicom
Flare Pistol	1	Chicom
RPG-2 Rocket Launcher	13	Chicom
12.7mm Barrels & Sight	3	Chicom
RPD LMG	8	Chicom
7.62mm TOKAREV Pistol	1	Russian
Rifle	11	Unknown

Total 112

(3) Ammunition:

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
12.7mm	3,000 rds
82mm Mortar	35 rds
75mm	3 rds

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4,0mm 20 rds
RPG-2 25 rds
Small Arms 10,000 rds

(4) Signal Equipment:

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Commo Wire	300 Ft
Field Phones (Chicom)	2

(5) Explosives:

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
TNT - 1/2 lb block	190
Claymore Mines (Chicom)	2
Land Mines	1
Hand Grenades	102

(6) Clothing:

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Trousers	48
Shirts	75
Shoes	12 pr

(7) Food:

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Rice	22 tons

(8) Medical Supplies:

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Medical Kit (Chicom)	5
Bandages, drugs, pills, surgical equipment	Numerous

(9) Miscellaneous:

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Load Bearing Equipment	57
Rucksacks	83
Entrenching Tool	23
Bicycle	18

(10) Camps Destroyed:

<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>SIZE</u>
ZB151340	Company to Battalion
ZB118371	Company
ZB139419	Company
ZB120388	Battalion
ZB133365	Battalion

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(11) AW Positions Destroyed: 8.

13. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 1, Personnel and Administration.

b. Logistics: See Inclosure 5, Logistics.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. M-79 cannister round: The conventional high explosive M-79 round was found to have limited value in the thick bamboo jungles, since the round could not penetrate the undergrowth. The XM576MP cannister round for the M-79 Grenade Launcher, however, proved to be highly effective in penetrating the bamboo. The shot pattern at 100 yards provides an extremely high number of first-round kills. The use of this round together with the 60mm Mortar was effective in discouraging "hugging" tactics of the enemy in dense jungle.

b. B-52 target exploitation: Immediate exploitation of the B-52 target with airmobile assaults following a strike proved advantageous. It enabled the exploiting unit to capture the surviving stunned enemy before they had a chance to evacuate the area. The search of the target area must be systematic. Adequate search time must be allocated to permit uncovering the maximum number of enemy weapons and equipment. Digging may be required since the enemy may have hastily attempted to hide equipment.

c. Demolitions: Cratering charges are more effective than TNT or C-4 for the destruction of tunnels, fortifications and caches. Although cratering charges are awkward and not easily transportable by foot mobile elements, the charge is very stable and can easily be delivered to an area by employing free-fall techniques from a hovering helicopter.

d. CH-47 "piggy-back" loads: Airlifting of artillery units by CH-47 helicopters can be expedited through the use of "piggy-back" sling loads. This technique reduces the time and number of sorties required.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Polaroid camera: The addition of a Polaroid camera to the TOE at brigade level would assist in gathering and disseminating timely information. They would be useful in obtaining accurate reports, intelligence and historical information. Polaroid camera could also be effectively used in Psychological Warfare operations to take immediate pictures of ralliers to be used on specialized leaflets.

(2) Supply of attached CIDG units: Most CIDG personnel are armed with either the caliber .45 M3A1 SMG or caliber .30 Carbine and provisions must be made for having such ammunition immediately available for resupply. CIDG personnel prefer to be given fish and rice (their normal diet) rather than C-rations. These two resupply matters should be handled through Special Forces advisors and not by direct resupply by the Brigade S-4.

(3) Helicopter winch systems: Many missions require the use of helicopters with a winch capability. The hoist on the UH-1D med-evac needs to be modified to increase its reliability. The hoist of the CH-47 is adequate but is too slow for personnel evacuation. The hoist of the Marine Corps CH-46

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is adequate. However, we believe the AF HH-43 is the best means available. Air Force and Marine helicopters can be used if available and only on a mission basis. Consideration should be given to providing the Brigade two HH-43 helicopters until the UH-1D has been modified to provide for reliable extraction.

(4) Assignment of utility aircraft to the Infantry Battalion: It has been found useful to attach two UH-1D helicopters, when availability permits, to each of the Infantry Battalions for use under the direct control of the battalion commander. The assignment of those utility helicopters can provide the commander flexibility for resupply, liaison, medical evacuation and small unit troop movements.

(5) Construction and improvement of landing zones: The absence of natural landing zones is a serious problem in dense terrain. A more systematic and faster method of clearing and expanding landing zones must be established. The attachment of engineer LZ clearing squads to each assaulting battalion has proved effective.

(6) Tactical air and artillery support: Continuous and simultaneous artillery and tactical air support of the same target area continues to be a problem. A possible solution would be to place a UHF (AN/VRC-24) radio in the artillery FDC and to have an artillery FO accompany the FAC. The FO would be equipped with an AN/PRC-25 radio. This would provide continuous communications between the artillery FDC, ALO, FAC's and fighter pilots and thus permit direct coordination.

(7) Flame throwers: Flame throwers have been found to be too cumbersome to be carried by elements maneuvering by foot in dense jungle terrain. Flame throwers should be flown into the objective area as required. Support Battalion with the assistance of the 20th Chemical Detachment has been given the responsibility for maintaining three portable flame throwers in a ready, charged state to be issued to the using unit on short notice.

(8) POW's: In Operation HAWTHORNE, prisoners were not captured until late in the operation. Individual soldiers must be impressed with the importance of capturing prisoners. They are inclined to be too quick on the trigger.

(9) Psychological Warfare:

(a) One school trained Psychological Warfare officer should be assigned to the Brigade. Additionally, a small Psy Ops detachment with the capability of printing, packaging and delivering leaflets should be attached to the Brigade. This would increase the efficiency of Psy Ops in the Brigade and would reduce the time required to accomplish a mission.


(b) The split responsibility between the Army and the Air Force at Brigade level creates a problem. The ground tactical commander should have command of all Psy War activities in order that they be immediately responsive to the changing situation.

(c) Consideration should be given to establishing a FWMF POW Command which would insure treatment of prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Such an effort should be publicized and extensively to include all news media, leaflets and broadcasts.

b. Highlights of Operation:

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(1) Maintenance of contact with enemy: Continuous contact was maintained with the enemy force from the evening of 6 June until the screening forces broke contact on 12 June. Immediately following the strike, contact was reestablished while mopping up isolated pockets for several days thereafter.

(2) Fire power: The Brigade employed the equivalent of 1.6 KT of air and artillery ordnance (27,000 rounds of artillery). Of the 499 air sorties, 160 were "sky spot". It is believed that the NVA was dealt a psychological blow to its monsoon offensive by employing close air support around the clock. The Arc Light strike is considered to have been an outstanding example of the use of the B-52 in a close support role.

(3) Maneuver: The double envelopment, with major forces attacking the enemy from the south and north, together with massive use of fire power, is the most successful tactic we have employed. This was the same tactic employed so successfully in the past at Bu Gia Mep in Operation AUSTIN 6. Rapid exploitation of B-52 strikes by an airmobile operation in the center of the target area was effective.

(4) Operation with ARVN forces: In addition to Major ARVN forces, the Brigade was assisted by nine CIDG companies, one Regional Forces company, and one ARVN scout company. Ten apache patrols were also employed. The Special Forces A and B teams in Kontum Province are considered to be the most effective, responsive, and productive encountered in operations in eight provinces during the past six months. The A Team leaders are an outstanding group.

(5) Enemy: The enemy proved to be disciplined, well-trained, tenacious fighters. Excellent camouflage, field fortifications, and battlefield police were demonstrated. One weakness noticed was a lack of flexibility. The attempted ambush of the ARVN battalion on 3 June was practically a repeat of the operation last year.

(6) Psychological Operations: The initial support was weak but gradually improved. A total of 6¹/₂ million leaflets were dropped and 36 hours of loudspeaker time was utilized. Four CHIEU HOI rallies were directly credited to the broadcasts.

(7) Mobility: During the operation nearly 15,000 passengers were moved and 33 airmobile assaults were made; eight of the assaults were of Battalion size. In addition, 1 and 1/5 artillery batteries were moved into firing position to support the operation.

16. (C) Recommendations:

- a. That consideration be given to establishing and publicizing a "FWMF Prisoner of War Command."
- b. That the manufacture and issue of the XM576MP round for the M-79 and the one-shot flame thrower be expedited.
- c. That the hoists on the UH-1D and CH-47 helicopters be modified to increase reliability and speed of operation.
- d. That Polaroid cameras be included in the TOE at Brigade level for use in psychological operations and investigations.
- e. That the Brigade be provided with one school trained Psychologic:

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Warefare Officer and a small Psy Ops detachment capable of printing, packaging and delivering leaflets.

/s/ Willard Pearson
/t/ WILLARD PEARSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Inclosures

- 1 - Personnel
- 2 - Intelligence
- 3 - Operation Schematic Phase I
- 4 - Operation Schematic Phase II
- 5 - Logistics
- 6 - Commo
- 7 - Civil Affairs
- 8 - Psychological Warfare
- 9 - Artillery

Distribution:

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- 1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J3A3)
- 1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J2)
- 2 - CG, USARV
- 1 - CG, USARV (ATTN: AVC Historical Division)
- 2 - CG, I FFORCEV
- 2 - CG, 101ST Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
- 1 - CG
- 1 - DCO
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Major, AGC
Adjutant General

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
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PK: J.M. NNA Date: 8/18

THE BATTLE OF TOUMORONG
FIGURE 3



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 BY: JMM

Inclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to After Action Reports, Operation HAWTHORNE.

1. (C) Unit Strengths:

a. Beginning of Operation HAWTHORNE.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

Authorized	4490
Assigned	5840
Joined not Assigned	116
Present for Duty	5252
Not Present for Duty	472
Air Head Strength	2398
Base Camp	1793
Tuy Hoa	1061

(2) The assigned strength was 130% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 119% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 339 were hospitalized personnel.

b. Conclusion of Operation HAWTHORNE

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

Authorized	4490
Assigned	5749
Joined not Assigned	115
Present for Duty	4703
Not Present for Duty	931
Air Head Strength	2431
Base Camp	1527
Tuy Hoa	755

(2) The assigned was 128% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 421 were hospitalized personnel.

c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

(1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, CONUS, and/or even discharged from the US Army without notification to the losing unit.

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(2) The present strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (EDCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pipeline".

(3) EDCSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit.

2. (C) Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
1/327	27	135
2/502	16	71
2/320	4	24
A/326	1	6
A 2/17	0	2
Spt Bn	0	1
TOTAL	48	239

b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

KIA	232
WIA	1207
MIA	2

3. (C) Personnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows:


1/327	108
2/502	118
2/320	22


b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical MOS were assigned as follows:

Plat Ldrs	11
Plat Sgts	10
Locators	2
Med Ops Assts	2
Medics	5

c. Emergency requisitions for continuing critical MOS shortage were submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.

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Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Reports, Operation HAWTHORNE

1. (C) Terrain: The area of operations consisted of mountainous terrain rising to heights of 2380 meters. The vegetation, varying between open forest with heavy undergrowth and rain forest with a dense jungle canopy, limited observation and fields of fire, while providing excellent cover and concealment. Highway 14 was the principal north-south avenue of approach, while well defined trails (YB 806670 to ZB 106650, YB 650620 to ZB 100650, YB 810150 to AS 830160) provided the principal east-west avenues. The terrain favored enemy infiltration operations by providing concealment from aerial observation and restricted our operations with a lack of landing zones.

2. (U) Weather: The southwest monsoon dominated the weather, although there was less rain and cloudiness than expected. High winds occurred infrequently, but low cloud conditions and rain began late each afternoon and lasted until early the following morning. The weather limited aerial activity and restricted visibility during early morning hours when ground fog was prevalent. These weather conditions generally favored the enemy by concealing his activity and movement from aerial observation.

3. (C) At the beginning of Operation HAWTHORNE, the following information was available regarding the enemy activity:

a. Major VC infiltration routes crossed the Cambodian and Laotian borders in this area.

b. Three NVA ralliers at DAK TO, who said they were platoon leaders in the 88th NVA Regiment, reported their unit to be at YB 7845 with a reconnaissance element at TAN CANH (18 May 1966) preparing for an attack on that village.

c. A rallier from the 4th Bn 24th NVA Regiment reported his battalion at ZB 012332.

d. A captured diary disclosed VC plans of another DIEN BIEN PHU somewhere in the highlands, with the main axis in KONTUM Province.

e. Other information led to the belief that one battalion of the 24th NVA Regiment was north of TOU MORONG (ZB 135354) and two battalions were southwest of TOU MORONG (ZB 1225).

f. TOU MORONG had received sporadic small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar harrassing attacks from the north from 22 May to 28 May 1966.

4. (C) During the operation, the intelligence situation was developed through front line contact.

a. Enemy prisoners and documents gave the identification of engaged units as the 4th, 5th and 6th battalions of the 24th NVA Regiment.

b. The enemy was located by moving units into the TOU MORONG area after an artillery outpost had been attacked on the morning of 7 June 1966. This front line contact was the principal source of information about the enemy's location from 7 June until the end of the operation.

5. (C) Results:

a. Initial Order of Battle:

(1) Prior to the arrival of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in the DAK TO area, it was believed that two NVA Regiments were preparing for an attack on the TOU MORONG outpost.

(2) Ralliers and prisoners indicated that these units were the 24th and 88th NVA Regiments. Ralliers indicated that the 24th was located in the immediate TOU MORONG area and the 88th was located in Laos.

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Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE

(3) Total enemy strength in the area of interest was estimated to be 4000 NVA personnel and 2700 Viet Cong local force and guerrilla personnel.

(4) Initial enemy disposition:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVALUATION</u>
24th NVA Regt	Vic TOU MORONG	2000	-	Unconf Prob
U/I Bn 24th Reg	ZB 1237	400	26 May	Unconf Prob
2 U/I Bns:				
24th Regt	ZB1225	800	26 May	Unconf Prob
83th NVA Regt	YB 7845	1200	28 May	Unconf Poss
200 HW Bn (MF)	YB 9363	200	29 May	Confirmed
304 Bn (MF)	ZB 2326	210	29 May	Confirmed
8-10 LF Cos	Scattered	600	-	-
Guerrillas	Scattered	2100	-	-

b. OB Summary and Findings:

(1) Units identified by POW's:

(a) 24th NVA Regt, 304th NVA Div

4th Bn Cos 1, 2, 3
5th Bn, Cos 6, 7, 8, & 10
6th Bn, Cos 11, 12, & 13
17th Combat Support Co
19th Engr Co
20th Med Evac Co
21st AS Co
22d Trans Co

(2) Units identified by documents:

K5 - 5th Bn 24th NVA Regt
Cong Troung 24 - Worksite 24 - 24th NVA Regt
Cong Troung 6 - Agricultural Site 6
H-1
T-28
KB-1
KB-5
I-A
TV - Unlocated PW Compound

(3) POW's stated that a major base complex and the 304th Div Hq was located in Tasent, Laos where the regiment stayed for approximately one month before entering South Vietnam.

(4) The mission of the 24th Regt was to attack DAK TO and TOU MORONG and ambush ARVN relief forces. Ralliers from the 24th and 88th Regts stated that the 88th was to coordinate with the 24th Regt in these attacks.

(5) In engagements with the 24th NVA Regt in the TOU MORONG vicinity between 9 and 13 June 1966, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division rendered this NVA Unit ineffective as a combat force. Casualties to the 24th Regt were 1246 killed by body count and estimate. It is probable that it will be several months before that the unit can obtain replacements and again become effective as a combat unit.

(6) Morale of the NVA troops is reported to be low as a result of the extreme difficulties encountered during infiltration, lack of medical supplies, lack of food, high malaria rate, and fear of friendly air attacks and artillery fire.

(7) Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 2 lists the final order of battle of enemy forces in KNOTUM PROV.

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By: J.M. HAVA Date: 1/1/82

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Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE

(8) Inclosure 2 to Inclosure 2 gives the composition, disposition and strength of the 24th NVA Regt.

c. VC personnel and equipment losses are shown in paragraph 12b to the basic After Action Report.

6. Intelligence Analysis, Lessons Learned:

a. Analysis:

(1) The DAK TO, TOU MORONG, DAK SUT area is a major VC base area as indicated by the degree of resistance and nature of defenses found.

(2) The VC planned a major offensive in the DAK TO, TOU MORONG, DAK SUT area as indicated by their abortive attack on 7 June 1966 as well as the aggressive action of their units on 9, 10 and 11 June.

(3) The VC plan in the DAK TO, TOU MORONG, DAK SUT area has been set back as indicated by the fifty percent or more casualties taken by the 24th NVA Regt.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Immediate deployment of IPW teams to points of VC capture enhances the timeliness of information gained and negates the possibility of false or misleading information gained by untrained interrogators.

(2) Enemy forces in the area are better supplied and bolder than those encountered in other parts of the II Corps area. They are more prone to stand and fight and will readily reinforce an engaged unit. This was displayed when C 2/502 encountered a reinforced VC platoon which was subsequently supported by a battalion size force.

(3) North Vietnamese map coverage of the operational area should be provided to IPW teams and front line battalions. Frequently captives can read their own maps when they cannot read ours.

(4) Trail studies verified by ground reports should be developed for the Brigade's own use and other US, ARVN and FVMAF units.

(5) Aggressive visual reconnaissance flown by the 219th Avn Co provided information on enemy activity throughout the TAOR. In 145 hours of visual reconnaissance flown, 240 significant sightings were reported to the S-2. This has proved to be an excellent method of gathering intelligence information while units are in major conflict.

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NAVA, Date: 8/18/88

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Inclosure 1 (Final Order of Battle of Enemy Forces in Kontum Province)
to Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation HAWTHORNE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>EVALUATION</u>
24th NVA Regt	Unlocated	800	Confirmed
U/I Bn 24th	ZB 1752	(200)	"
U/I Bn 24th	ZB 1455	(200)	"
U/I Bn 24th	ZB 1924	(200)	"
88th NVA Regt	YB 8535	1200	Unconf Prob
VMC Co	YB 9613	100	Unconfirmed
303B NVA Infil Grp	ZB 2210	200	"
303B NVA Infil Grp	AS 8305	100	"
2 VMC Cos	ZB 1812	160	"
U/I Bn	ZB 1409	200	"

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
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Inclosure 2 (Composition, Disposition, and Strength of the 24th NVA Regt) to Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE

1. (C) Composition:



304 Div - Code name - CONG TRUONG 6

24th Regt - Code name - CONG TRUONG SA BINH

1st Bn - K-4

2nd Bn - K-5

3rd Bn - K-6

Prior to infiltration 24th Regt, designated 42, infiltrated as 6th Regiment, and now established as 24th NVA Regt, 304th Division.

2. (C) Disposition: 24th Regt, located in Kontum Province, with one battalion north of Tou Morong and two battalions southwest of Tou Morong vic ZB 1225.

3. (C) Strength: The 24th Regt, 304th NVA Div (NVA) has an actual TOE strength of about 2000 personnel. It is estimated to be approximately 50% strength at present time. Total NVA losses as a result of Operation HAWTHORNE were approximately 1000.

17 SUPPORT

19

20

21

22

82MM

75MM

INTEL

RECON

SECURITY GUARD

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4. (C) Tactics: The NVA plan to attack Dak To was a three phase plan to begin during monsoon season.

Phase I. To penetrate the Montagnard village and strategic hamlet, to cut communications along Hwy #14, and to prepare ambushes along Hwy #14 (Dak To - Tou Morong).

Phase II. To neutralize enemy forces by coordinating with friendly units of Nong Truong 3 or another Nong Truong (?) in order to encircle Dak To (Applying the tactics used in the Duc Co plan); to tire the defensive forces by keeping constant pressure on them, forcing a withdrawal, and thus preparing an attack on the reinforcing column.

Phase III. When the monsoon rains become too heavy for the Air Force to resupply the defenses, the VC will close in and capture Dak To.

5. (C) Training:

a. VC training area located YA 962816.

b. Training of the North Vietnamese soldier:

(1) Infantry training: The basis of all instruction for the NVA soldier is Infantry. Personnel of all arms receive infantry training, including guerrilla and infiltration tactics. Emphasis is placed upon natural and artificial obstacles, and effective individual marksmanship. Experimentation is encouraged for solving tactical problems.

(2) Artillery training: Both tactical and technical training is covered. Mortars are considered artillery. Due to low literacy technical training is limited.

6. (C) Logistics:


a. Installations:

YA 629827	Poss commo/liaison and supply point
YB 659400	Prob storage and rice area
YA 637754	Poss supply storage and VC rest area
YB 930160	Susp VC base area
YB 909372	Poss supply point
AS 796255	Poss rice and granary storage
AS 830255	Poss way station
AS 815383	Poss supply point
AS 979439	Camp
YA 962816	Training area
ZB 138500	Pw camp
YA 729853	Hospital
YA 667485	Company sized rest area
YB 8844	Rice storage

Across Cambodian Border:

YA 565676	Ordnance
YA 578596	Ordnance
YA 729853	Hospital
YA 600811	Border crossing point
YA 660670	Commo/liaison station
YA 531635	Poss border crossing point
YB 669503	Billeting and storage

b. Poor transportation and lack of resources constitutes a slow system of resupply and consequently the troops receive a minimal amount of food and clothing. Ammunition makes the heaviest demands upon the supply services.

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c. NVA enlistee is issued:

2 set fatigues (khaki)
 1 piece of nylon for a raincoat (over 2 meters)
 1 hammock
 1 pair sandals
 1 hat
 1 canteen
 1 belt
 1 bowl, 1 spoon

7. (C) Combat Efficiency: Moral is low due to personnel losses, lack of food and medicines, and fear of combat. Combat effectiveness: 24th NVA Regt can be considered ineffective until replacements or reinforcements can be attained.

8. (C) Miscellaneous:

a. Infiltration: 24th Regiment code name SONG CAU Group. This infiltration group was divided into numerous small segments. The time lag between each element was two days march. 30 November 1965 a departure ceremony was held and the first element departed, and arrived in Kontum Province 23 June 1966. Recon platoon went ahead to locate Regimental position.

1st Element: 4th Bn, medical company, 19th Transportation Company and Recon Platoon.

2nd Element: 5th Bn, numerous subordinate units and Regimental Headquarters element.

3rd Element: 6th Bn, remaining subordinate units and Regimental HQS.

b. Personalities:


Regt CO	Maj THUONG
Regt XO	Maj RANG
4th Bn CO	Sr Capt NHOUG
XO	Capt VAY
PO	Sr Capt CUONG
1st Co CO	Lt KHIET
XO	Lt DAI
PO	Lt MAN
APO	Lt DAO
2nd Co CO	BUI VAN PHON
4th Co PO	Lt Y
5th Bn CO	Capt TRUNG
XO	Capt NINH
PO	Capt AN
APO	TRUNG
6th Co CO	Lt DUC
7th Co CO	Lt HA
8th Co CO	Lt BACH
10th Co CO	Lt NOI
6th Bn CO	CHU BIN TAN
XO	MINH
PO	NG LANG

c. Weapons in an NVA Battalion:

TYPE	NUMBER
75mm DKZ	4
82mm DKP	4
12.7 MG	9
7.62 MG	4
AK-47	Per Infantry
SKS	
RPG-2 RL	1 per squad
Grenades	2 per individual


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The above is an approximate weapons type and number throughout the 4th, 5th and 6th Bn, 24th Regt, 304th Div.



INCLOSURE 3 (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE I, 2-6 JUNE 1966,
 TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,
 OPERATION HAWTHORNE.


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
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 AUTHORITY: 87354
 DATE: 11/10/2001
 BY: NAVA, GUP/110

INCLOSURE 4 A (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE I, 7-10 JUNE 1966)
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,
OPERATION HAWTHORNE.



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NND 873544
DATE 11/11/01
BY NAVA, DDP/110

ENCLOSURE 4 B, OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE II, 10-15 JUNE 1963;
 TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,
 OPERATION HAWTHORNE. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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Inclosure 5 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation HAWTHORNE

1. (C) ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT:

a. Support Battalion:

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided the command and control of Support Battalion (Forward). It was organized into command, operations, communications, and movement control sections.

(2) Supply Detachment: Was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a rigger section and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team.

(3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive, signal and quartermaster equipment. It was organized into a shop office, and a recovery and contact team.

(4) Medical Company (-): A clearing station was established with a twenty bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, emergency treatment section, and a dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Forward Support Detachment (T F DONNLEY). Nha Trang Support Command accompanied the Brigade from CHEO RIO to DAK TO. It was replaced by Forward Support Detachment (T F STINSON) QUI NHON Support Command. This Forward Support Detachment (FSD) was collocated with Supply Company, Support Battalion, and was responsible for receiving and stocking Class I, III and V and for issue of Class III to aviation units. The FSD was extremely cooperative and responsive throughout the operation even though the consumption rates and usage factors, particularly in Class III and V, were far above average on several occasions. When aerial resupply proved inadequate to meet all requirements, overland resupply was effected promptly and efficiently. The Deputy Commander, QUI NHON Support Command, visited the Support Battalion (Fwd) almost daily, and was instrumental in providing the excellent support received.

(2) 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided two airmobile companies and CV-2 aircraft to support tactical and logistical operations. The CV-2 aircraft were used to transport supplies, repair parts, and personnel to and from the forward area. Aircraft sorties allocated were not sufficient to support the logistics plan on all occasions due primarily to large numbers of replacements and returnees transported to and from the forward area.

(3) CH-47 helicopter support was provided by 147th Aviation Company (Airmobile Medium) and 1st Cav Div (Airmobile).

(4) 498th Aviation Company: Provided medical aeroevacuation throughout the operation.

2. (C) MATERIEL AND SERVICES:


a. Supply:

(1) Class I: A total of 107 short tons of B rations and 70 tons of Meals Combat Individual Type C were issued during the operation. An adequate supply of "B" rations were received and "A" ration meats were issued in sufficient quantities to supplement every meal of B rations. However, fresh vegetables were not supplied and fresh fruit and bread were extremely limited.

(2) Class II & IV: Class II & IV supplies were shipped from Brigade Support Battalion in PHAN RANG and QUI NHON area Support command. The following items were required in greater quantities than

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normal: Batteries (BA 386, BA 30), concertina wire, sand bags, poncho liners, and insect repellent.

(3) Class III: 165 tons of Class III and IIIA were issued during the operation (excluding JP-4), to include 36,100 gallons of MOGAS, 8,750 gallons of DIESEL, and 7,150 gallons of AVGAS (115/145). Supporting aviation units used 323,800 gallons of JP-4 (955 tons).

(4) Class V: 819.5 short tons of Class V were issued during the operation of which 68 short tons were issued to elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The following items were in short supply during the operation:

- (a) Hand-held Flares
- (b) White Star Clusters
- (c) Green Star Clusters
- (d) White Star Parachute Flares

Tactical emergency resupply was used during the heaviest fighting to maintain the brigade basic load of 105mm Howitzer and 155mm Howitzer ammunition. The brigade requested and received an increase in the Available Supply Rate from 20 rounds to 40 rounds for 105mm Howitzer ammunition during the period 8 - 12 June 1966. Two lots of 105mm Howitzer ammunition were suspended. The Brigade and Forward Support Detachment, QUI NHON area Support Command had a total of 4100 rounds of ammunition on hand that were suspended.

(5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated a water point at TAN CANH using one 600 GPH Erdalator initially, replacing it with a 1500 GPH Erdalator airlifted from PHAN RANG.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detachment received 56 automotive, 117 signal, 94 armament, 16 instrument, 2 quartermaster and 21 engineer job orders. All but 3 signal, 4 engineer and 2 quartermaster jobs were completed. The shortage of spare parts for generators noted in previous reports still exists.

c. Ground Transportation: A total of one hundred and seventy 2½ ton truck requirements were filled during the operation.

d. Air Transportation:

(1) Fixed Wing: CV-2 aircraft supporting the Brigade flew 73 sorties for a total of 1,215 passengers and 106.6 short tons of cargo.

(2) Rotary Wing: Throughout the operation both UH-1D and CH-47 helicopters proved invaluable in aerial resupply operations of committed forces. Two UH-1D were placed in direct support of the Infantry Battalions and proved to be an extremely efficient method of providing tactical and administrative support to units. The use of the CH-47 reduced the time required for resupply from that required by the UH-1D and released the UH-1D's for support of tactical operations.

(3) Army aircraft lifted a total of 392.18 short tons of supplies in the forward area. Attached at Inclosure I is the daily aerial resupply tonnage by class of supply during Operation HAWTHORNE.

e. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration was provided by 148th Quartermaster Company, an element of the QUI NHCN Area Support Command.

(2) Bath: 148th Quartermaster Company provided a bath unit in the DAK TO area.

(3) Laundry: An inoperable laundry unit was initially deployed to the area of operation. Upon receipt of necessary repair

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parts, the unit was repaired and the Brigade received excellent service for the remainder of the operation.

3. (C) MEDICAL:

a. The sanitation of mess halls, latrines and units areas required command emphasis to achieve minimum acceptable standards, however, health and hygiene remained excellent considering the operational environment. Two Medical Evacuation Helicopters, not equipped with winch, were made available to the Brigade. These proved unsatisfactory for extraction of seriously wounded personnel from mountainous or heavily forested terrain. Therefore, a request was made, and honored, for two Air Force CH 43 (Hueys) and two Marine CH 46 helicopters for this purpose.

b. Patients Treated:

(1) WIA	212
(2) Non-battle Injury	172
(3) Disease	313 (7 Malaria)
Total Treated	715

c. Returned to duty 420

d. Evacuated to hospital 282

e. Remain in holding 13

f. Hospitalized personnel (battle injuries) categorized by wounds are as follows:

(1) Head	30
(2) Chest	10
(3) Upper extremities	68
(4) Lower extremities	81
(5) Abdomen	6
(6) Back	17
TOTAL	212

4. (C) SUMMARY:

a. Supply operations were simplified by collocating the Forward Support Detachment, Q I NHON Support Command and Brigade Support Battalion. Common supply points were used for Class I, III, and V. Support Battalion, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division provided Class II and IV supply.


b. The Brigade made extensive use of the CH-47 helicopter for resupply. It proved a substantial increase in carrying capacity over that of the UH-1D and therefore reduced time required for aerial resupply.

c. Water supply in the DAK TO area was a problem initially because the 600 GPH Erdalator did not function properly. A truck mounted 1500 GPH Erdalator was dismantled, brought forward from PHAN RANG and reassembled. This equipment proved a trouble free, completely adequate supply of water.

d. Hoist Helicopters: Operations in mountainous and/or heavily forested terrain has placed increased reliance upon medical evacuation aircraft with a hoist capability.

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5. (U) CONCLUSIONS:

- a. Duplication of effort reduced by collocating the Area Forward Support Detachment with the organic Forward Support Element.
- b. Plans for provision of MEDVAC helicopters with a hoist capability must be made prior to an operation.
- c. CH-47 Helicopters are invaluable in aerial resupply operation.

6. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Organic and Supporting logistical agencies continue to collocate in future operations.
- b. Provisions be made for MEDEVAC Helicopters with a hoist capability to support the Brigade during future operations.
- c. CH-47 helicopters be made available for resupply missions during future operation.

1 Incl

Air Resupply Data - Operation HAWTHORNE

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Inclosure 1 (Air Resupply Data - Operation HAWTHORNE) - to Inclosure 5
(Logistics) to After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE

	CLASS I		CLASS V		MISC & WATER	
	POUNDS	S-TONS	POUNDS	S-TONS	POUNDS	S-TONS
2 June	1,000	.50	10,000	5.00	2,500	1.25
3 June	1,500	.75	10,000	5.00	2,000	2.00
4 June	—	—	59,000	29.50	—	—
5 June	700	.35	30,000	15.00	350	.18
6 June	2,900	1.45	1,250	.62	4,250	2.12
7 June	1,200	.60	72,700	36.35	300	.15
8 June	900	.45	30,600	15.30	—	—
9 June	1,500	.75	27,000	13.50	4,300	2.15
10 June	6,000	3.00	6,400	3.20	150	.08
11 June	9,550	4.77	10,730	5.11	6,580	3.29
12 June	10,975	5.49	46,490	23.24	7,050	3.52
13 June	10,950	5.47	49,020	24.51	8,330	4.16
14 June	8,850	4.42	39,190	18.55	8,950	4.47
15 June	12,950	6.47	64,950	32.47	6,860	3.43
16 June	8,150	4.07	69,090	34.54	7,310	3.65
17 June	6,850	3.47	49,930	21.96	8,860	4.34
18 June	5,850	2.92	33,750	16.87	8,000	4.00
19 June	5,050	2.52	4,250	2.12	5,630	2.81
20 June	500	.25	—	—	—	—
TOT.L	95,375	47.70	607,850	302.84	81,240	41.60

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Inclosure 6 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation HAWTHORNE

1. (C) Background:

Operation HAWTHORNE was conducted in the area north of DAK TO, to disrupt and destroy NVA elements believed to be in the area. The Brigade signal elements provided the command communications for the Brigade and terminated the systems provided by the Corps signal units.

2. (C) Operations:

a. VHF Section - The Brigade VHF was not committed until 12 June when one system was installed to the Artillery Forward FDC. This system provided telephone communications to the forward artillery elements and also to adjacent infantry units.

b. Communications Center Section - A secure teletype circuit was operated between the Brigade and I Force V. This was supplemented by secure radio teletype circuits to NHA TRUNG, TUY HOA, PHAN RANG; and during the initial phases of the operation, CHEO REO and PLEIKU.

c. Switchboard and Wire Sections - The wire section laid a total of 56 miles of wire, 12 miles in the Brigade Command Post complex and 44 miles in long lines. All Command Post lines were underground and all long lines overhead. The switchboard terminated 62 common user circuits and an additional 12 sole user circuits were installed. This system provided telephone service to all units and facilities in the area and long distance trunks in the Corps area system.

d. FM Radio Station - Operated two FM nets to reduce the traffic on the Operation Intelligence Net. Used automatic retransmission FM relay station at TOU NORONG vicinity coordinates ZB 138357.

e. Maintenance Section - The number of TT-4 teletypewriters in support maintenance has become critical.

3. (C) Problem Areas:

a. Shortage of replacement personnel in the Wire, Switchboard, and Communication Center Sections is a serious problem. Communication Center personnel are especially critical because of the security clearance requirements.


b. Power surges on VHF equipment burned out components of two AN/TCC-3 Telephone Carrier Terminals and burned out several complete sets of fuses in the AN/ARC-68 Terminals. The unreliability of the PE-75 Generators on hand is causing many problems. Only one of the twelve 3KW AC Generators placed on a priority requisition in November 1965 has been issued.

c. Improper siting of the VHF terminal at the forward artillery location caused several system outages. Closer coordination with supported units stressing the importance of proper siting will be made on future operations.

4. Lessons Learned:

a. When there are a large number of attachments to the Brigade, a second Operation Intelligence Net will reduce traffic on the primary Operation Intelligence Net, thus improving operation. This second net can be operated on the Command Net Frequency.

b. When an automatic retransmission FM relay station is being used during an operation and it is located in a central location, it should remain at this location throughout operations in the area to insure adequate communications to the combat elements.

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Inclosure 7 (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
HAWTHORNE

1. (U) Public Information:

a. The following civilian news correspondents visited the Brigade:

- (1) David Snell - ABC News Team.
- (2) Ron Headford - ABC News Team.
- (3) Frank Eddy - ABC News Team.
- (4) Keyes Beech - Chicago Daily News.
- (5) Charles Mohr - New York Times.
- (6) Al Chang - Associated Press.
- (7) Lim Young Choul - NBC News.
- (8) Warren Bosworth - Dallas Times Herald.
- (9) Max Hanceav - CBS News
- (10) Leon Daniel - UPI
- (11) Udo Mesch - CBS News Team.
- (12) Bill Stout - CBS News Team.
- (13) Claudi Bellanger - CBS News Team.
- (14) William J. Cock - Newsweek.
- (15) Ian Brodie - London Daily Express.
- (16) Steve Van Meter - UPI
- (17) Jack Boird - Stars and Stripes.
- (18) Howard Tuckner - NBC News Team.
- (19) Vo Huynh - NBC News Team.
- (20) Vi Giac - NBC News Team.
- (21) Bill Reilly - UPI (audio)
- (22) Art Zich - Time Magazine
- (23) Paul Hemphill - Atlanta Journal.
- (24) Bill Bowles - Charleston News and Courier.
- (25) Rick Morrian - AP
- (26) Bob Ohnen - AP
- (27) Neil Hickey - TV Europe.
- (28) Francis Faulkner - UPI
- (29) Ward Just - Washington Post.

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Inclosure 7 (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation H.A.T.HORIE

- (30) Dean Brayless - NBC News Team.
 - (31) Schidnara - NBC News Team.
 - (32) Siguihi - NBC News Team.
 - (33) Vo Suu - NBC News Team.
 - (34) Brig Gen (Ret) S. L. A. Marshall - Novelist.
- b. The following military correspondents visited the Brigade:
- (1) Sgt. Macedo - IFV.
 - (2) Sgt. Wallace - MLCV-IO.
- c. Major publicity was obtained concerning the Brigade's activities to include all Television Networks, wire services, and news magazines throughout the Free World.
- d. Ward Just (Washington Post) was wounded by grenade fragments while with the 1/327th Tiger Force and was evacuated to NHA TRANG.
- e. The Information Office obtained electrical lighting and a press tent during this operation.
- f. Photographic processing was improved through the use of the M-67 Dark Room.


2. (U) Command Information:

- a. The receipt and distribution of command information newspapers continued to be generally late. This is a problem under continuous study for improvement.
- b. The Diplomat & Warrior was published by letterpress for the first time during Operation H.A.T.HORIE.

3. (U) Summary: Public exposure of the Brigade continued to improve with a significant increase in the percentage of copy released and subsequently printed.

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
Inclosure 8 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation HAWTHORNE

1. (U) Psychological Objective: Psychological warfare activities were orientated and directed toward enemy units in the operational area.

2. (C) Operation HAWTHORNE:

a. Leaflets: A total of 6,615,000 leaflets of the type indicated were dropped on the dates show.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Method</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Type</u>
2 June	C-47	20,000	Safe Conduct Pass
		120,000	28th Special
		130,000	Eagle Strike
		20,000	NVA
		20,000	Weapons Reward
4 June	C-47	15,000	Chieu Hoi
		20,000	Safe Conduct Pass
		40,000	Eagle Strike
		120,000	NVA
5 June	C-47	40,000	28th Regt Special
		600,000	Chieu Hoi
		50,000	Chieu Hoi
6 June	U-10	50,000	Weapons Reward
		100,000	Safe Conduct Pass
		80,000	Chieu Hoi
7 June	U-10	20,000	Chieu Hoi
		20,000	Chieu Hoi
		20,000	Safe Conduct Pass
8 June	U-10	60,000	Chieu Hoi
9 June	U-10	200,000	Eagle Strike
		660,000	Chieu Hoi
		40,000	Safe Conduct Pass
10 June	U-10	60,000	Air Superiority
		60,000	Weapons Reward
11 June	U-10	40,000	Chieu Hoi
		40,000	Demoralization

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Inclosure 8 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation HAWTHORNE

13 June	U-10 & UH-1B	80,000	B-52 Strike
		150,000	Chieu Hoi
		120,000	Demoralization
		20,000	Eagle Strike
		20,000	Safe Conduct Pass
14 June	U-10	40,000	Chieu Hoi
		30,000	Eagle Strike
		45,000	Demoralization
15 June	U-10	40,000	Du Co Poem
		360,000	Chieu Hoi
		50,000	NVA
16 June	U-10	80,000	Chieu Hoi
		120,000	Demoralization
		160,000	NVA
17 June	U-10 C-47	80,000	NVA
		300,000	Chieu Hoi
		300,000	Demoralization
18 June	C-47	200,000	Demoralization
		200,000	Eagle Strike
		200,000	NVA
		40,000	24th Regt Special
19 June	C-47	200,000	Chieu Hoi
		200,000	Eagle Strike
		400,000	Du Co Poem
	U-10	100,000	Chieu Hoi
		100,000	Du Co Poem
		25,000	Eagle Strike
20 June	U-10	10,000	Du Co Poem
		200,000	Chieu Hoi
		80,000	Eagle Strike

b. Loudspeaker: A total of 35 hours 45 minutes of loudspeaker appeals were flown by USAF U-10, and C-47 aircraft on 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, and 20th June. The theme of all appeals was Chieu Hoi and demoralization. A total of three special tapes were made during the operation.

c. Summary: Two personalized, specialized, and localized leaflets and three special tapes were directed toward enemy units in the operational area (Inclosure 1 and 2). It is believed that psychological operations, together with the violent offensive nature of the tactical situation contributed extensively to the demoralization of surviving enemy personnel. By the closing date of the operation, a total of four ralliers had surrendered themselves to Brigade personnel.

d. Lessons Learned:

(1) When new leaflets are produced, particularly special leaflets, at least 200 copies of the translation should be included, as a matter of course. These copies will be used as handouts to VIP visitors.

(2) Leaflet boxes should be coated with some water resistant substance i.e. plastic, wax, etc, etc, and more securely bound as a greater precaution against inclement weather.

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Inclosure 8 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation H.W.THORRE

(3) An example of contents should be clearly displayed on the outside of all leaflet boxes along with the amount and general classification (Chieu Hoi, demoralization, reward, MVA, etc.).


(4) The Psychological Operations Officer should have a comprehensive up to date catalogue of leaflets available to him.

(5) An augmentation to the Brigade of one Psy War school trained officer and two NVA has been approved and personnel should be requisitioned and assigned on an expedited basis.

(6) The U-10 aircraft should be stationed at the Brigade CP.

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Inclosure 9 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE

1. (C) Mission: 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery DS of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. "B" Battery, 1st Battalion (Towed) 30th Artillery reinforce 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery.

2. (C) Execution:

a. On 2 June B1/30 Arty displaced from ZB040227 at 0100 hrs to ZB059309 closing at 1530 hrs in support of operation by 1/327 Inf. At 022015 hrs B1/30's perimeter received light probe resulting in one (1) VC KIA (BC). There were no friendly casualties.

b. On 3 June Btry B displaced from ZB040227 by CH-47 starting at 1837 hrs. Btry used 13 sorties; closed ZB090348 at 1930 hrs where they fired 3 registrations, 38 targets of opportunity, 43 marking missions, 11 area illumination missions, 15 preparations, 16 defensive concentrations, 3 screening missions, 361 H&I targets in support of 1/327 Inf and 2/502 Inf.

c. On 4 June B1/30 Arty displaced by road to ZB084344 starting at 1600 hrs and closing at 1845 hrs to reinforce the fires of Btry B in support of 1/327 Inf. In this position B1/30 Arty fired 61 missions expending 115 rounds reinforcing the fires of Btry B.

d. On 6 June B1/30 Arty displaced to ZB014218 by road starting at 1515 hrs and closing at 1735 hrs.


e. At 0200 Hrs 7 June Btry B was attacked by an estimated Battalion of the North Vietnamese Army. One platoon of B1/30 Arty displaced to ZB041227 at 0400 hrs where they fired 199 rounds in support of the defense of Btry B. The battle continued until 0845 hrs when the enemy broke contact. Friendly losses were 3 KIA, 21 WIA, 1 - M102 Howitzer damaged, 1 - M151 destroyed, 3 - 2½ ton trucks damaged, 3 - panoramic telescopes damaged, 1 - M-2 aiming circle destroyed, and 1 AN/VRC-46 radio destroyed. Enemy losses were 87 KIA (BC), 11 - Chi Con grenades, 5 - M26 grenades, 4 rocket launchers and 3 AK-47 rifles. At 0800 hrs Btry C displaced to ZB 060266 closing at 0900 hrs to render further support to the defenses of Btry B. At 1115 hrs B1/30 Arty (-) displaced to ZB060266 closing at 1145 hrs to reinforce fires of Btry C.

f. On 8 June B1/30 Arty displaced to ZB090346 by road starting at 1225 hrs and closing at 1500 hrs to reinforce fires of Btry B. Btry A moved to ZB090346 by road starting at 1807 hrs, and closing at 1905 hrs. In this position B1/30 Arty fired 3 registrations, 11 preparations, 3 illumination missions, 18 targets of opportunity and 210 H&I missions. Btry A fired 3 registrations, 16 marking missions, 30 targets of opportunity, 6 illumination missions, 6 preparations, 9 defensive concentrations, 1 screening mission, and 186 H&I's.

g. At 130100 hrs task force 2/320 Arty was formed and given the additional missions of providing security and convoy escort on Route YELLOW. The task force consisted of the 2/320th Arty, B1/30 Arty, 1 CIDG Company, 2 platoons A2/17 Cav, and 1 platoon A/326 Engrs. The route was initially secured by using strong points along the route manned by the CIDG company. On 13 June a mine was discovered on the route, and it was determined that better route security could be provided by indirect fire. From 13 June until 20 June the route was secured during darkness by a heavy H&I program. There were no mining incidents after 13 June.

h. On 19 June Btry A displaced to ZB041227 at 1255 hrs.

i. On 20 June Btry B and B1/30 Arty displaced to ZB060266 closing at 1840 hrs and 1807 hrs respectively.

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Inclosure 9 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation H.WITHORNE

3. (C) Supply and Administration: Originally the batteries deployed with (3) days rations and a basic load of class V. Batteries were resupplied both by convoy and helicopter thereafter due to the tactical situation.

4. (C) Problem Areas:

a. Security of main supply routes: In the initial phase of the operation, TF 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery was formed and consisted of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery Battalion, one CIDG company, two Cavalry platoons, and one Engineer platoon. The mission of the attached elements was to provide security for the battalion firing position and to provide security along the resupply route from Dak To to the battalion firing position. After a mining incident on the resupply route it was decided to pull all of the security elements in around the battalion firing positions every night and to secure the road at night with a heavy program of VT fuze H&I fires. This scheme proved to be very effective for it not only prevented future mining incidents, but also allowed for greater security of the firing positions.

b. Security of Battery Firing Positions: It was found during this operation that a very close perimeter defense is essential to battery security. The perimeter should be far enough from the firing positions to prevent hand grenades from reaching the gun crews and yet close enough to permit a high degree of control of the perimeter force in order to facilitate direct artillery fire against the enemy. During the NVA attack on B Battery, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery, the inability to locate the infantry security elements prevented the use of the Beehive round. It is recommended that the security elements with the artillery be placed under the operational control of the artillery commander.

c. Tac Air, Artillery, Infantry Coordination: As in past operations of the complexity of this operation, unnecessary lulls in the firing of artillery and Tac Air occurred. This can be attributed to many factors, some of which are: Lack of control by the ground force commander, poor timing on the part of the artillery FO, mission saturation of the artillery FDC, and communication difficulties. Upon completion of this operation all artillery INO's, FO's and the artillery S-3 were assembled and this problem was discussed in detail. A detailed list of causes and recommended solutions is being prepared for discussion with all personnel concerned.

d. Mishandling of Artillery Ammunition: This is a subject that requires constant command supervision. Ammo handlers, if not properly supervised, will damage ammunition. Helicopter lifts to resupply firing batteries are particularly damaging to ammunition because of the speed with which loading and unloading must be accomplished. Damaged ammunition could be the cause of some of the muzzle bursts that have occurred in RVN.

5. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. Pull all of the security elements in and around the artillery firing positions at night and secure the area around the positions with heavy H&I fires.

b. It was found that by covering main supply routes with VT on the road and quick (Q) on the sides of the road, main supply routes were more rapidly opened in the morning.

c. Surface movement: Only one battery displacement during the entire operation was made by helicopter. All other displacements were overland moves. It was learned that by using the available few vehicles within this battalion. Support Battalion and the attached 155 prime movers

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Inclosure 9 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
HAWTHORNE

that all batteries could be moved overland expeditiously and without incident.
The conclusion is that it is not necessary for this battalion to have prime
movers for each howitzer as it was originally believed.

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