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COMMANDER

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM



AD-A955 145

# COMMAND HISTORY

## VOLUME II

### 1968

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Saigon, Vietnam

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)  This Volume II, Command History, 1968, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam contains Letter of Promulgation, Title Page, and Table of Contents, consisting of 7 Index Pages. Following are: Chapter VII- Intelligence (Page 569-590), Chapter VIII - Psychological Operations (Page 591-614), Chapter IX - Logistics (Page 615-742), Chapter X - Research & Development (Page 743-776),		

TABLE OF CONTENTS :

(Volume II)

	Page
Letter of Promulgation . . . . .	i
Title Page . . . . .	v
Table of Contents . . . . .	vii
List of Illustrations . . . . .	ix
 Chapter	
VII. <u>INTELLIGENCE</u> ; )	
General . . . . .	569
The 1968 Collection Program . . . . .	581
VIII. <u>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS</u> ; )	
Organization . . . . .	591
PSYOP Media . . . . .	597
PSYOP Programs . . . . .	604
IX. <u>LOGISTICS</u> ; )	
General . . . . .	615
Classes . . . . .	624
Services . . . . .	639
Maintenance . . . . .	641
Transportation and Lines of Communications (LOC) . . . . .	646
Construction . . . . .	670
Port Development and Operations in RVN . . . . .	680
Medical . . . . .	699
Military Assistance Service Funding Program . . . . .	706
Communications . . . . .	713
X. <u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u> ; )	
Organization and Policy . . . . .	743
Finding the Enemy . . . . .	747
Search and Attack System . . . . .	752
Mobility . . . . .	756
Artillery/Mortar/Rocket/Countermeasures . . . . .	759
Munitions and Weapons Systems . . . . .	763
Communications . . . . .	770

CONT.

Chapter	Page
XI. <u>CONTINGENCY PLANS AND SPECIAL STUDIES</u> ;	
Contingency Plans . . . . .	777
Special Studies . . . . .	782
XII. <u>SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS AND SELECTED TOPICS</u> ;	
Morale and Welfare . . . . .	799
Discipline, Law, and Order . . . . .	836
Prisoners of War . . . . .	841
Security . . . . .	860
The Tax Problem . . . . .	866
Project MACONOMY . . . . .	869
Annexes	
A. <u>TET OFFENSIVE IN RETROSPECT</u> ; . . . . .	881
B. <u>ANTI-INFILTRATION BARRIER</u> ; . . . . .	911
C. <u>OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRESS RELATIONS AND PROBLEMS</u> ; . . . . .	935
D. <u>LIST OF GROUND OPERATIONS BY CORPS TACTICAL ZONE</u> ; . . . . .	997
E. <u>COMMANDERS AND PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICERS</u> . . . . .	1017
F. SOG (LIMDIS) DISTRIBUTED SEPARATELY	
CHRONOLOGY . . . . .	1025
GLOSSARY . . . . .	1067
INDEX . . . . .	1083

Chapter XI - Contingency Plans & Special Studies - (Page 777-798),  
 Chapter XII - Special Problem Areas and Selected Topics - (Page 799-880),  
 Following each Chapter are numbered footnotes to the information contained  
 indicating the sources for that information.

Following Chapter XII are:

- Annex A - Page 881-910, TET Offensive in Retrospect w/Footnotes numbered.
- Annex B - Page 911-934, Anti-Infiltration Barrier w/Footnotes numbered.
- Annex C - Page 935-996, Office of Information & Press Relations and  
 Problems, w/Footnotes numbered indicating sources of information.
- Annex D - Page 997-1016, List of Ground Operations by Corps, Tactical  
 Zone w/Footnotes following.
- Annex E - Page 1017-1024, Commanders & Principal Staff Officers (named).

Following Annexes A-E are:

- Chronology - (Page 1025-1066),
- Glossary - (Page 1067-1082),
- Index - (Page 1083-1120).

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DEPT OF THE ARMY	21 thru 30	12 & 13
DEPT OF THE NAVY	31 thru 40	6 & 7
DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE	41 thru 50	14 & 15
COMMANDANT, USMC	51 thru 55	10 & 11
COMMANDANT, USCG	56 & 57	
CINCEUR	58	
CINCSO	59	
CINCAL	60	
CINCSTRIKE	61	
CINCSAC	62	
COMUS JAPAN	63	
COMUS KOREA	64	
COMUSMACTHAI	65	
CINCUSARPAC	66. & 67	
CINCPACFLT	68	
CINCPACAF	69	
CG, FMFPAC	70	
COMSEVENTHFLT	71	
CG, USACDC	72	
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE	73	
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES	74	
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE	75	
US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE*	76	
AIR UNIVERSITY	77	
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE	78	
USA CGSC	79	
USMC C&SC	80	
USMA	81	
USNA	82	
USAFA	83	
AMEMB, SAIGON	84	
CDR, 7TH AF	85	
CG, USARV	86 thru 89	
COMNAVFORV	90	
CG, III MAF	91	
CG, I FORCEV	92	

Continued

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	<u>Command History</u>	<u>Annex F</u>
CG, II FFORCEV	93	
CG, DMAC	94	
CG, I LOG COMB	95	
CG, XXIV CORPS	96	
 <u>MACV STAFF:</u>		
MACJ03	97	
MACJ2	98 & 99	
MACJ3	100, 101, 102	
MACJ4	103	
MACJ5	104	21
MACJ6	105	
MACCORDS	106	
MACMD	107	
MACSOG	108	23 thru 34
MACJ031 (Military History Branch)	109 thru 120	22



## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

(Volume II)

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
VII-1	COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTER, VIETNAM	573
VII-2	DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION PROCESS	575
VII-3	FLOW OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS TO CDEC	576
VII-4	DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION AT CDEC 1968	577
VII-5	1968 PRIORITIES & OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS	583
VII-6	EXAMPLES, PRIORITIES, EEI, INDICATORS, & SOR	584
VII-7	INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGENCIES	585
VIII-1	PSYWAR AERIAL OPERATIONS	603
IX-1	SUPPLY CLASS III	632
IX-2	US ARMY MORTUARY - TSN	642
IX-3	US ARMY MORTUARY - DA NANG	643
IX-4	SECURITY STATUS ESSENTIAL MILITARY ROADS AS OF 31 Dec 68	654
IX-5	SECURITY STATUS RAILROADS AS OF 31 Dec 68	661
IX-6	PORTS, LAND LOGS AND MAJOR LOGISTIC COMMANDS	682
IX-7	439L AND IWCS THRU PHASE 3	714
IX-8	DIAL CENTRAL OFFICES	717
IX-9	AUTODIN	719
IX-10	AUTOSEVOCOM	722
IX-11	MARS STATIONS TRAFFIC - 1968	725
XII-1	AMERICAN RED CROSS LOCATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM	831
A-1	ENEMY TET OFFENSIVE 29 Jan - 4 Feb 68	882
B-1	ORIGINAL DYE MARKER CONCEPT	913
B-2	ANTI-INFILTRATION SUBSYSTEMS	920
C-1	MACV OFFICE OF INFORMATION	936
D-1	TIME FRAME OF GROUND OPERATIONS IN I CTZ	998
D-2	TIME FRAME OF GROUND OPERATIONS IN II CTZ	1005
D-3	TIME FRAME OF GROUND OPERATIONS IN III CTZ	1009
D-4	TIME FRAME OF GROUND OPERATIONS IN IV CTZ	1012

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CHAPTER VII  
INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL

(C) The politico-military balance sheet in SVN as 1965 began was significantly in the enemy's favor and presented a formidable challenge for USMACV. Many major changes and improvements in the overall military posture occurred following that time. This discussion will be concerned primarily with the improvements and activities of military intelligence in SVN.

(U) Between February 1962 and July 1965, MACV, with a small J2 organization plus an advisory role in intelligence, did not have the intelligence units, specialists, communications, equipment, or facilities to acquire and process timely information in order to have an adequate data base for valid intelligence. This became critical during July 1965 and remained so through September 1966 which was the period of the US buildup in SVN. MACV intelligence personnel, particularly those in the field, relied on their counterparts for this type information but only had a limited capability of accurately assessing it. To develop an adequate data base, it required manpower, organization, and timely access to information in order to produce the intelligence needed by the tactical commander. Working together, rather than merely providing advice and guidance, was considered the best method of improving the GVN intelligence organization. The reasons for this were numerous: our Vietnamese counterparts had sovereign control over all sources of information--they controlled the basic files and archives; they had long experience based on fighting the common enemy; their language capability to interrogate detainees and to read documents was an obvious asset; their insight into and an understanding of the enemy and their own people was important; and they remained on the job for years, thereby adding to the continuity of US efforts and data base.

(C) On 27 September 1965, a much needed agreement was concluded between COMUSMACV and the CJCS, RVNAF which authorized the conduct, throughout USMACV and RVNAF, of a combined effort in questioning of captives and in the exploitation of enemy documents. The agreement recognized that US participation in combat operations required a greater US participation in the field of intelligence. Under the terms of the agreement, all military interrogation and document exploitation activities were to be conducted on a combined basis. As a result of this compact, the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) was established. 1

(U) A survey of the intelligence collection resources, principally the 525th Military Intelligence Group (MIGP), was completed on 17 December 1967. The concept of operations was to combine the existing assets of the 135th and 149th MIGPs and reconfigure these elements into separate battalions under one single unit, the 525th MIGP. There were 5 battalions, one for each CTZ and one for the CMD. These were integrated battalions comprising a counterintelligence element, a small collection element specifically keyed to support the US divisions and separate brigades in each CTZ, an advisory element for the 101 ARVN Unit (formerly ARVN 924th Support Group), and one officer to coordinate the collection effort in each of the 44 provinces. The latter was necessary to exploit an area heretofore inadequately covered. The battalion commander coordinated the activities in his area, to ensure that all consumers benefited from the

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total collection structure. Tactical support personnel of these battalions were solely responsive to requirements emanating from division G2s and brigade S2s. A separate special operations battalion was formed for strategic high level operations targeted against CCSVN and other high priority MACV targets. The elimination of two headquarters from the 519th MI Bn was achieved by a previous action to combine elements supporting the Combined Intelligence Centers in Saigon. Numerous other intervening headquarters between the intelligence collector and user were removed and a greater field capability was provided through integrated field oriented commands. Deficiencies were corrected by deleting eight headquarters, by consolidating efforts of the 519th MI Bn, and by consolidating the counterintelligence and collection efforts. <sup>2</sup>

(C) Within the CTZ, there was the Vietnamese Corps G2 and his MI detachment, the US G2 and his MI detachment, and a combined interrogation center. The division tactical level was similarly organized. However, the Vietnamese division G2s also had reconnaissance companies supporting them. Additional intelligence collecting support was provided by the ROK Division and the Australian Task Force.

(C) A very significant action of the combined intelligence effort in Vietnam was the deployment of Vietnamese MI detachments in support of US and other FWMAF and combat units. These detachments complimented US/FWMAF efforts by providing school-trained language and local dialects. They were also knowledgeable of the terrain, customs, and habits of the people. This program was established by an agreement concluded between the US and the RVNAF in January 1966. Subsequently, the RVNAF signed separate agreements with the ROK and Australian forces. In accordance with these agreements, RVNAF provided MI detachments to support US and other FWMAF divisions and separate brigades. Priority of assignment was determined by COMUSMACV.

(C) Adequate numbers of trained personnel were not available when this program was initiated, therefore, reduced strength organizations were deployed. The immediate need for support in the specialties of interrogation and document analysis were given primary consideration. In these fields, particularly, a strong emphasis on continuity and native ability was paramount and this was provided by trained Vietnamese intelligence personnel. As personnel were made available and trained in intelligence specialties, they formed reduced strength detachments. The detachments were then employed in support of US or other FWMAF elements. When employed with the Allied intelligence detachments, they reacted to the direction of the Allied Commander.

(U) Some of the major benefits of the combined intelligence program were: reaction--school-trained Vietnamese intelligence personnel were immediately available to exploit captured documents and to interrogate captured enemy personnel in the tactical area; timeliness--intelligence personnel were able to recognize and separate the unimportant documents and prisoners, thus providing for concentrated exploitation of personnel and materiel of importance to the tactical situation; liaison--G2s stated that their supporting ARVN detachment commanders established and maintained a rapport with the local RF/PF, National Police, military security service, and provincial government authorities that could not otherwise have been achieved; training--simply stated, we learned from the Vietnamese and the Vietnamese learned from us; and continuity--this element offered the FWMAF commander, and new replacements arriving, a continuity of effort and direction which otherwise would not have been available.

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(C) In line with the "combined intelligence approach," MACV established four Combined Intelligence Centers in the Saigon area. The largest of these was CICV which became the major intelligence production facility for both MACV and ARVN. The Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) was also established and occupied its new facility, adjacent to CICV, during October 1966. To round out the data gathering force, the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC) and the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC) were made operational. CMIC, as its name implied, provided intelligence through interrogation, while CMEC was responsible for data concerning the enemy order of battle. Additionally, civilian level support was provided by the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and the National Interrogation Center (NIC).<sup>3</sup>

#### Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam

(U) As the tempo of the war in Vietnam increased and as full-strength US military units were committed to deter the aggression, the intelligence base was expanded and improved to meet stepped-up support requirements. Thousands of facts and figures concerning every aspect of the enemy's position, past, present, future, had to be constantly analyzed to meet strategic and immediate tactical requirements. To assist in the accomplishment of this comprehensive intelligence production effort, CICV was established in November 1965 as a joint US/ARVN function and was largely responsible for maintaining a tremendous data base and keeping it up to date. It was manned by intelligence personnel specialists from the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and Vietnamese Army personnel. CICV was an around-the-clock intelligence operation. During the latter portion of 1967, the internal production capability of MACJ2 was greatly enhanced through an action which merged the US element of the CICV and the Production Division of J2. This merger of the major US production activities of J2 provided for a more efficient utilization of manpower by combining the effort under a single managerial system.

(U) The mission of CICV was to prepare and maintain an all-source intelligence data base for use by MACV and/or JGS, as appropriate, and to produce and disseminate that intelligence required by COMUSMACV or JGS which was within the scope of the functions charged to the division. These functions included:

1. Production of strategic intelligence through research and analysis of military/political, military/economic, military/sociological, and military/psychological subjects in SEASIA. These functions were eliminated as of 26 December 1968 when CICV's Strategic Research and Analysis branch (SRA) became an independent organization.
2. Analysis of selected areas in SEASIA (see note above).
3. Provision of intelligence derived from and concerned with land forms, geology, soils, vegetation, drainage, climate, lines of communication, routes and avenues of approach, and man-made features.
4. Propagation of the enemy order of battle on VC and NVA forces in the RVN and other designated forces in SEASIA, to include identification, strength, structure, subordination, logistics, personnel, disposition, weapons capabilities, combat effectiveness, infiltration, tactics, and training of units.

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5. Preparation of interpretations of multi-sensor imagery for the purpose of producing intelligence in the form of bomb damage assessment, enemy defense overlays, lines of communication studies, detailed interpretation reports and other special studies.

6. Development of targets for maximum utilization of aerial bombardment and other offensive action.

7. Formulation of technical intelligence concerning enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and technical order of battle.

(U) As a means of accomplishing the mission and meeting the functional requirements, nine branches (Figure VII-1) were created and headed by the Director's Office:

1. The Support Branch was responsible for the administration, maintenance supply, center security, and distribution for the center. The branch also staffed and operated the automatic data processing center which included data on airfields, drop zones (DZ), bridges, enemy installations, and VC infrastructure and order of battle information.

2. CICV's Operations Branch served as the production control and coordination unit. It was responsible for reports, statistics, and editorial functions. Generally, it was charged with handling and processing all information coming in or leaving the center.

3. The Strategic Research and Analysis Branch handled political, economic, sociological, and psychological aspects of the conflict. Particular attention was devoted to the US military and pacification goals. As of 26 December 1968, SRA became an independent organization.

4. CICV's Operations Research Center was established to provide a statistical analysis and research capability. Its function was to coordinate major statistical projects. As of 26 December 1968, this function was assumed by the Operations Branch and the Operations Research Center was abolished.

5. The Area Analysis Branch produced intelligence relating to geography, weather, and man-made features. A major product of this branch was the compilation of Tactical Scale Studies which were keyed to the AMS 1:50,000 scale charts. The entire country of SVN was covered and these charts were used by field units for operations.

6. The Targets Acquisition Branch maintained intelligence of enemy activity throughout RVN. Such information was used for selection of ground operations and B-52 air strikes.

7. The Order of Battle Branch, an extremely large branch, was responsible for identification, location, strength, and disposition of all enemy units down to the local force companies and platoons. The branch included four sections: Ground OB, OB Studies, OB Logistics, and OB Out-Country.


8. CICV's Imagery Interpretation Branch reviewed photographic, infrared, and radar imagery, extracting intelligence information for publication in special reports, photo studies, and as supplemental tactical scale and special forces camp studies.

9. The establishment of the CMEC is discussed separately in this chapter. 4

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**COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTER VIETNAM**



\*AS OF 26 DECEMBER 1968 SRA BECAME AN INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATION AND WAS REMOVED FROM THE CICV ORGANIZATION CHART.

\*\*AS OF 26 DECEMBER 1968 THE OPERATIONS RESEARCH CENTER WAS REMOVED FROM CICV'S ORGANIZATION CHART. THE OPERATIONS BRANCH ASSUMED THE ORC'S FUNCTIONS.

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FIGURE VII-1

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## Combined Documents Exploitation Center


(C) Prior to October 1965, the captured document exploitation program was primarily a function of RVNAF. US participation in this effort was primarily advisory in nature, performed by approximately eight US military and 30 LN translators. However, as the conflict intensified, the value of captured enemy documents as one of the primary intelligence sources, became readily apparent. It also became apparent that there was a need for implementation of a top level, combined US/RVNAF documents exploitation program. On 1 October 1965, CDEC was established and necessary actions to enlarge and improve the program were undertaken. A year later the center was relocated in a newly constructed facility and the personnel strength was increased to 44 US military, 77 LN civilians, and 28 RVNAF personnel. By July 1968, the Center's authorized personnel strength was more than 350. The activities were guided by a US and RVNAF co-directorate operating under the staff supervision of the MACJ2 and J2/JGS respectively. 5

(C) CDEC had the mission of supporting all units of the US, RVN, and FWFMAF by providing them, on a timely basis, with raw information of intelligence value derived from captured enemy documents. Throughout 1968, initial stages of document exploitation commenced when documents arrived at CDEC (Figure VII-2). Documents arrived at CDEC from many sources and in every conceivable type of container ranging from sandbags and cans to trailer loads. They were usually delivered via established message centers, mail channel, or courier system (Figure VII-3). During the period 1 January to 31 December 1968, CDEC received 3,988,672 pages of captured documents from field units (Figure VII-4). Documents arriving at the center were carefully screened by highly qualified Vietnamese civilian intelligence specialists. During this phase, the documents were segregated into five categories, "A" through "E", to establish priorities for exploitation and disposition. The categories were defined as follows:

1. Type "A" documents contained highly significant information such as the location of minefields, planned ambushes, and impending attacks. Documents in this category received immediate processing. The intelligence obtained was returned to the capturing unit and disseminated to appropriate commands and staff sections by electrical messages of "Immediate" or "Flash" precedence.
2. Type "B" documents comprised intelligence information of value to field commanders and staff sections, but the information was not of sufficient urgency to be classified as Type "A". The majority of the documents processed by CDEC were classified Type "B". During the two month period immediately following the 1968 VC/NVA Tet Offensive, CDEC processed more than half a million pages of captured enemy documents, of which approximately 50,000 pages (10%) were considered to be of intelligence value and almost all of which were Type "B" documents.
3. Type "C" documents contained information of marginal intelligence value.
4. Type "D" documents, primarily propaganda materials, were exploited by the center only if they contained new or significant information. Normally, material of this nature was forwarded to the appropriate information or psychological warfare agency for exploitation.
5. Type "E" documents, those containing information on the enemy communication system, were passed on to the appropriate communications intelligence agencies for detailed processing.

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FIGURE VII-2





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DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION AT CDEC 1968

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PAGES RECEIVED</u>	<u>PAGES EXPLOITED</u>	<u>PAGES TRANSLATED</u>	<u>BULLETINS PUBLISHED</u>
Jan 68	243,864	19,434	3,705	532
Feb 68	399,447	39,117	2,625	657
Mar 68	352,378	34,488	7,080	949
Apr 68	419,304	33,326	9,112	1,075
May 68	416,411	36,244	11,901	974
Jun 68	318,730	44,261	12,480	921
Jul 68	293,671	53,682	14,320	1,199
Aug 68	316,524	37,034	11,357	1,026
Sep 68	166,194	24,143	2,278	732
Oct 68	265,856	31,848	11,836	791
Nov 68	344,812	21,539	1,787	691
Dec 68	451,481	33,412	6,686	861
TOTALS	3,988,672	408,529	95,167	10,368

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FIGURE VII-4

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(C) Upon completion of the screening process, documents selected for exploitation (Types "A" and "B") were passed to document evaluators who drafted summaries in English and Vietnamese. The summaries were then edited and published daily as CDEC bulletins. Abstracts of significant documents were published in a daily message format while information from Type "A" documents was expeditiously disseminated by spot reports.

(C) To assist with the rapid intelligence collection effort, CDEC developed the concept of the GO TEAM. These teams were available to provide special support to major tactical commands. During Operations CEDAR FALLS (Jan 1967) and JUNCTION CITY (Feb-May 1967), three CDEC GO TEAMS were provided. Field commanders were furnished on-the-spot oral summaries and immediate readouts of highly significant documents. Selected documents were expeditiously evacuated to CDEC where couriers were able to wait for readouts on significant documents and return to their units with the findings. 6

(C) In addition to processing captured enemy correspondence and publications, CDEC also processed captured enemy films and voice tapes. Information gleaned from these items was published in message and CDEC bulletin format and received wide dissemination to users in- and out-of-country. Captured films and tapes were physically made available to tactical units and intelligence staff sections on a temporary loan basis.

(C) Recognizing the need to rapidly and efficiently handle large amounts of raw intelligence in support of the expanding intelligence requirements in Vietnam, the US element of CDEC was equipped with an Automatic Document Storage and Retrieval System (ADSR). This system was incorporated into the DOD Worldwide Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS). The mission of the ADSR at CDEC was to store, on annotated microfilm, all intelligence documents pertaining to the SEASIA theater and to automatically produce, upon request, any of more than a million documents as required by field commanders and staff agencies. Documents containing information to satisfy queries were retrieved in one of several ways: images on a viewing screen, on hard copies, coded 35mm microfilm, and on uncoded 16mm microfilm. The final form of document storage at CDEC was the archives, which were maintained by the ARVN element of CDEC. Since enemy documents captured in the RVN legally belonged to the Vietnamese government, the archives at CDEC served as the central repository for captured enemy documents.

(C) CDEC's library also contained interrogation reports of CMIC, the NIC, field commands, intelligence information reports, agent reports, intelligence summaries, and periodic intelligence reports. Therefore, to facilitate the daily operations at CDEC, it became necessary to develop a series of reference publications. Though not a mission function, in-house training requirements, coupled with command and field intelligence needs, made it mandatory to develop such a series. Publications resulting were the VC Terminology Glossary, VC Terminology for Irregular Forces, Identification of VC and NVA Documents and VC/NVA Cover Designations and Letter Box Numbers. 7

Combined Military Interrogation Center

(U) US interrogation personnel assigned to RVN prior to 1966 did not have specific guidelines to assist them in interrogation of Vietnamese in a counter-insurgency environment. During the period 1966-67, CMIC personnel greatly assisted in the establishment of an organized

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military interrogation effort in Vietnam. During this time, CMIC established guidelines for the achievement of a high level of interrogation proficiency.

(U) The concept of a Combined Interrogation Center was originated by MG J. A. McChristian, MACJ2 in 1966. From the time of inception to February 1967, CMIC operated under field conditions. Initially, the center was plagued by a shortage of qualified personnel and adequate interrogation facilities. By May 1966 the facilities problem was well on its way to being solved with construction of a new CMIC compound located at #2 T Hien Thanh Street, Saigon. The new CMIC compound afforded larger and improved facilities in addition to increased security for both CMIC sources and activities. Upon completion, the CMIC compound included, for the first time, office space for both US and ARVN elements, separate interrogation facilities for PWs and Hoi Chanhs, and solitary confinement cells and living space for approximately 20 returnees. With this construction, and the arrival of additional interrogator personnel in 1967, CMIC was able to assume a key position in the intelligence structure of MACJ2.

(U) The principle mission of CMIC was to exploit selected VC/NVA prisoners and returnees on requirements levied by MACJ2, JGS, and other higher headquarters, CMIC also had the mission of publishing and distributing reports based on interrogations. CMIC performed a secondary mission of providing teams to render interrogation, training, assistance to field units, and to coordinate interrogation activities throughout RVN.

(U) Since the CMIC was manned only by three US personnel in an advisory status during most of 1966, reports of interrogations were largely the responsibility of the RVNAF element at the Center. After the US element was organized and administrative procedures established, the US element went into full operation and began to publish its own interrogation reports. No records were kept for the remaining months of 1966; however, during 1967, the Center's first full year of productivity as a "combined" center, the US element produced 288 knowledgeable briefs, conducted 3,159 interrogations, and published 1,999 interrogation reports. The following year, 1968, the Center's activity increased significantly. A total of 950 knowledgeable briefs were published, 3,720 interrogations conducted, and 3,946 interrogations were distributed. Among significant personalities interrogated at the CMIC by US personnel were a colonel, two lieutenant colonels, six majors, and 21 senior captains. In addition, during the period 1 January 1966 to 21 December 1967, over 150 interrogation teams were dispatched to assist field units.

(U) This field support was noticeable in many of the 1966 operations. Some examples were the VAN BUREN, PAUL REVERE, and ATTLEBORO Operations. Two of the most significant operations conducted during 1967, CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY, were initiated primarily as a result of information gained during the interrogation effort of CMIC. In February 1968, the US element, CMIC interrogations revealed the location of COSVN Headquarters. As a result, very effective B-52 strikes were initiated by the Air Force against the site.

(U) CMIC also performed interrogations involving highly technical subjects such as medicine, communications, and chemical warfare; maintained dossiers on all knowledgeable sources captured or returned in RVN since January 1965; organized and was responsible for the interrogation of returnees at Chieu Hoi centers; published an Exploitation Guide containing detailed

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questions to be levied on sources acquired during the conduct of the counter-insurgency effort; united the US/ARVN intelligence collection effort; and was instrumental in the development of interrogation techniques that blended themselves to the cultural background of Vietnam. 8

#### Combined Materiel Exploitation Center

(S) An agreement between the US and RVN calling for a combined captured enemy materiel exploitation program was completed on 15 June 1966. This program included all activities pertaining to the collection, evaluation, exploitation, and reporting of captured materiel. It also provided for the creation of the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC). On 14 December 1966, CMEC was formally established at the Tan Son Nhut military complex. Unification of six separate technical detachments were: the 521st Medical Detachment, 590th Quartermaster Detachment, 18th Signal Detachment, 18th Chemical Detachment, 371st Engineer Detachment, and the 528th Ordnance Detachment. J2, JGS provided a 30-man Vietnamese element to work as the ARVN counterpart of CMEC and CMEC was placed under the operational control of MACJ2. And, on 15 September, the Technical Intelligence Branch was incorporated into CMEC.

(S) CMEC's mission was to provide technical intelligence concerning enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities and to maintain order of battle. The organization provided intelligence on the enemy's signal, medical, transportation, ordnance, quartermaster, and chemical capabilities. The technical intelligence detachments of CMEC maintained several files in the automatic data processing (ADP) data base. These were used to provide DIA, CINCPAC, MACV, and USARV with a comprehensive analysis of activities associated with enemy materiel.

(U) The functions of CMEC included:

1. Examining, identifying, classifying, and evaluating captured enemy materiel.
2. Preparing and disseminating technical intelligence reports, summaries, and analyses concerning captured enemy materiel.
3. Operating the CMEC for a coordinated, combined technical intelligence and materiel exploitation program with the RVN.
4. Evacuating captured enemy materiel to CONUS agencies as required.

(S) Preliminary examination and reporting of selected captured materiel was accomplished in the tactical area by one of five field teams that was permanently based in its respective CTZ. Reporting at this level was slanted toward information which was of immediate tactical value. Operations of these teams extended to the capturing unit level. In addition to the examination and reporting functions, field teams coordinated evacuation of materiel and conducted materiel screening operations to insure that only items of intelligence significance were evacuated. 9

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## THE 1968 COLLECTION PROGRAM

### General

(S) The MACV area of intelligence interest comprised SVN, NVN, Cambodia, Laos, and Southern China (Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan Provinces). However, MACV's area of interest and area of actual collection differed. The area of collection only covered SVN, NVN, Cambodia (east of a line down the Mekong River from the Laotian border to Phnom Penh, to the Gulf of Thailand at Sre Amble), and Laos (east of a line Muong Phine - and the Se Kong River).<sup>10</sup>

### Intelligence Deterrents

(S) From the beginning, the intelligence collection effort in Vietnam was faced with certain deterrents. In accordance with national policy, certain out-of-country reconnaissance flights required concurrence, coordination, and approval of CINCPAC, CINCSAC, or JCS.

(S) Various ethnic groupings in Vietnam consisted of the Vietnamese majority and the relatively large unassimilated ethnographic minority groups consisting of the Montagnards, Chinese, and Khmer Kampuchea Krom. The Montagnard mountain tribesmen represented the most dissident element of these groups. The tribesmen, whose many languages had no ethnological relationship to Vietnamese, had no basic loyalty to any government. The Chinese group represented a middle class that desired to remain aloof from RVN politics. The Khmer Kampuchea Krom of the lower Delta area and the Cambodian border also had no basic loyalty to any government.

(S) Of all the religious beliefs in RVN, Buddhism was in the majority, with Catholicism second in dominance. Two additional small but organized groups were the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. All four groups were important as political forces. Militant Buddhist leaders gained some of their political and social objectives through a series of upheavals and posed a threat to GVN efforts against the VC.

(S) RVN was divided topographically into three distinct areas: the mountains and plateaus of central Vietnam, the narrow coastal plain, and the southern delta region. The mountains reached heights of 2,000 meters and were covered by dense jungle or extensive forests. Most of the mountain area was poor to impassable for vehicular traffic. The coastal plain was fair for traveling north and south, while vehicular movement in the delta area was extremely limited except for the Saigon/Cholon area.

(S) A monsoon-type of climate existed in Vietnam and was an important consideration in the military operations of the area. The rainy season in the southern portion extended from May through November, while along the northern coastal plain, the rainy season lasted from October to April. During the height of the rainy season, many of the rural regions became impassable to normal traffic except along major roadways and waterways.

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#### Development of Sources

(S) Faced with this variety of deterrents, MACJ2 established a program for the development of sources. US personnel were ordered to Vietnam to man tactical interrogation centers because direct US participation gave more rapid, direct response to US requirements. In 1966 a new center was built to house the joint US/RVNAF interrogations activities. It provided better and more humane treatment for captives and returnees. In addition, volume was increased, accuracy improved, efficiency was enhanced, and the system became more responsive. US advisors were instructed to build a closer liaison with their RVNAF counterparts and, at the same time, emphasize the importance of intelligence collecting and reporting. Concurrently, all US military and civilian personnel were reminded that they were sources of information and responsible for reporting such information.

(S) Intelligence contacts were made in many ways. Some were made under the cover of commercial contacts or from businessmen on a social and professional basis. Government officials and political figures established contacts through normal liaison and attendance at social affairs. Numerous low level sources were developed with agent nets operated by the Vietnamese political division chief down to the district level. Religious leaders also proved to be a source of information. However, extreme care had to be taken since many of the important religious personalities were involved in political intrigues. <sup>11</sup>

#### Special Collection Program

(C) The exploitation phase of the 1967 Collection Program (developed in July 1966) was based on three basic components: first, a successful combined interrogation program was developed; second, a lucrative combined exploitation system had been placed into operation; and last, combined material exploitation was achieved. MACV developed and implemented three special intelligence collection programs designed to focus attention on specific areas and activities of intelligence interest. The first of these special programs emphasized and coordinated collection activities in RVN and the Cambodian border area. Another program directed increased surveillance of the Vietnamese coast in support of MARKET TIME anti-infiltration operations. The third special program was targeted against the VC infrastructure throughout Vietnam. <sup>12</sup>

(S) During 1968, MACJ2 continued to improve its enemy intelligence collection effort. The 1968 Intelligence Collection Plan was designed to integrate the intelligence requirements of MACV, assign them priorities, and provide for changes in requirements and priorities, as well as establishing Other Intelligence Requirements (OIR) (Figure VII-5). The inclusion of Essential Elements of Information (EEI), Indicators (IND), and Specific Orders and Requirements (SOR) (Figure VII-6) was designed for the purpose of elaborating on MACV's standing collection requirements. Collectors were selected for different EEI, OIR, and SOR with the objective of making the most effective use of the command's assets (Figure VII-7). No one agency was assigned the mission of answering all questions of the EEI, OIR, and SOR but the assignment of collection tasks did not lessen or negate the responsibility of collectors to report information pertinent to other requirements which were obtained in the course of their collection activities. <sup>13</sup>

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1968 PRIORITIES &  
OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

PRIORITIES

- PRIORITY 1: What are the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the enemy force structure in South Vietnam, the Laos Corridor, Cambodia, the DMZ, and north to the Northern boundary of MR4, and in South Vietnam territorial waters to a distance of 10 miles off shore?
- PRIORITY 2: Will other Communist powers intervene militarily in the war? If so, when, where, in what strength, with what mission, and by what routes?
- PRIORITY 3: What is the extent and nature of outside support to the enemy in South Vietnam?

OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

- OIR/1: When, where, and in what strength will the enemy attack?
- OIR/2: Where are the enemy's base areas located?
- OIR/3: Will the enemy receive additional weapons systems? If so, what types, in what quantity, when and where?
- OIR/4: What and where are the enemy's main lines of communication in SVN?
- OIR/5: What is the command and control structure of the VC/NVA forces in SVN?
- OIR/6: What is the enemy capability to provide replacements/fillers to existing units in SVN?
- OIR/7: What VC political activities and campaigns are being conducted in SVN?
- OIR/8: What are the enemy's plans to counter the Revolutionary Development Program?
- OIR/9: Where are US, ARVN, and FWMAF prisoners of war located?
- OIR/10: What are the enemies' capabilities and intentions to sabotage US facilities?
- OIR/11: What is the nature of the subversion and espionage threat directed against US personnel in SVN?

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FIGURE VII-5



**EXAMPLES  
PRIORITIES, EEL, INDICATORS, & SOR**

PRIORITY 1	EEL	INDICATOR	WHEN, WHERE, AND IN WHAT STRENGTH WILL THE ENEMY ATTACK SOR
------------	-----	-----------	---

- |    |  |    |   |
|----|--|----|---|
| 1. | Establishment of forward headquarters near likely objective area. Passing of Local Force and Guerrilla units to OPCON higher headquarters. | 1. | Report appearance of new headquarters and changes of subordination of Local Force and Guerrilla units.  |
| 2. | Upgrading of Local Force and Guerrilla units in likely objective areas.  | 1. | Report changes in designation and subordination of Local Force and Guerrilla units.   |
| 3. | Movement of enemy units into likely objective areas; presence of new or additional artillery, anti-aircraft, and sapper units in the area. | 1. | Report appearances of new units, increased artillery and anti-aircraft fires, and sapper activity.  |
| 4. | Increased counter-intelligence/counterterroconnaisance activity.   | 1. | Report increase in false reports of unit presence or activity, increased the attacks on friendly patrols and Opns, decrease in numbers of <u>Hoi Chanh</u> s and PWs. |
| 5. | Increased intelligence and reconnaissane activity.   | 1. | Report increase in espionage and reconnaissane activity, especially that in coordination with agents or units normally deployed in the area.                          |

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FIGURE VII-6

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## INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGENCIES

SA4CZ	Army Advisory Group IV Corps Tactical Zone	MATTLO	Military Attache Liaison Office
5SFGP	5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	CMIC	Combined Military Interrogation Center
525MI	525th Military Intelligence Group	CMEC	Combined Materiel Exploitation Center
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam	CDEC	Combined Document Exploitation Center
NAVFORV	Naval Forces, Vietnam		
7AF	7th Air Force (to include 131st SAS)	SACMD	Army Advisory Detachment Capitol Military District Special Zone
III MAF	III Marine Amphibious Force		
I FFORCEV	I Field Force Vietnam	SA/AB	Army Advisory Detachment Airborne Division
II FFORCEV	II Field Force Vietnam		
TRU	Technical Research Unit	SARS	Army Advisory Detachment Railway Security
DLA	Defense Intelligence Agency	OSA	Office Special Asst American Embassy, Saigon
		PACOM	Pacific Command

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FIGURE VII-7

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Special Collection Programs - 1968

(S) KEY WEST (U): The intelligence collection program "Surface-to-Surface Missiles," nicknamed KEY WEST, dated 17 January 1968, was the first special collection program of the year. It was developed to detect the movement or emplacement of surface-to-surface missiles and tactical rockets in NVN, Laos, and Cambodia.

(C) CORRAL (U): A revised and updated collection program, "VC Political Order of Battle," short title CORRAL, was published on 27 January 1968. CORRAL intensified and coordinated intelligence collection activities directed at the VC political infrastructure. It provided for reporting through military channels which insured the largest possible infrastructure data base and it supported operations directed against the VC political infrastructure. 14

(C) RITZ (U): A revised and updated collection program, "VC Irregular Forces," dubbed RITZ, was published on 2 February 1968. RITZ intensified and coordinated intelligence collection activities directed at the VC Irregular Forces and their ability to increase their regular force strength.

(C) OPERATION CROSS LINK (U): In late February 1968, at the direction of the Deputy J2, a liaison element (two Officers) was established between MACJ2 and the Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador, US Embassy, Saigon. The purpose was to facilitate and expedite the exchange of intelligence and information between these offices. The project was named OPERATION CROSS LINK. One of the J2 representatives served at the Operations Center of the Embassy on a 24-hour basis. The representative was in continuous contact with the Saigon Warning Center Analyst at Counter-intelligence Information Base (CIB) secure area. The primary purpose of the two-man liaison team was to enhance the CIB capability of continuous updating of the tactical situation in and around Saigon.

(TS) DORSAL FIN (U): On 24 February 1968, a DF was submitted to the J2 by the Director of Combat Intelligence presenting a plan for utilization of the OV-1 SLAR in-flight readout to pinpoint the location of vehicles or sampans inside Cambodia that were being utilized at night to support VC/NVA activity in RVN. The location of these vehicles or sampans, as determined by the SLAR Moving Target Indicator (MTI) in-flight readout, were passed to the Air Force photo aircraft which made night runs on the area. This was designed to provide positive photographic evidence of the use of Cambodia as a sanctuary and base of supply for the VC/NVA. Coordination was made with 7AF and concurrence was obtained. COMUSMACV sent a message to CINCPAC requesting approval for the plan on 28 February and requesting 10 additional DORSAL FIN sorties per month for night operations. The initial area of operations was the Parrot's Beak. 15

(S) VESUVIUS ONE (U): MACJ213 letter, 9 February 1968, changed the Intelligence Collection Program "Cambodia," coded NANTUCKET to VESUVIUS ONE, a joint Department of State/MACV collection plan, which was designed to expose the enemy's use of Cambodia. Examples of this were VESUVIUS Package #8, July 1968, which dealt with the enemy activity in the Nam Lyr Mountains--Base Area 740, and report #9, September 1968, which documented enemy use of the Seven Mountains area of Cambodia. Approved VESUVIUS intelligence reports evidencing VC/NVA use of Cambodia were forwarded to Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia for his consideration and possible action. 16

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(C) VOLUNTEER INFORMANT PROGRAM (U): Staff preparation and coordination of the revised Volunteer Informant Program, short title VIP, were completed in March 1968. The actions resulted in publication of MACV Dir 381-2 of 19 March 1968. This revised and updated the original VIP Directive, and included CG, USARV and CDR, 7AF among the implementing commanders. VIP results for CY68 were good. The 1968 Combined Campaign Plan had set a goal of tripling the number of monthly informants. Based on the December 1967 figure of 497 informants, this involved an increase to 1,500 informants per month. The goal was exceeded in every month since August 1968. The average for the Third Quarter recorded over 1,600 monthly informants, and this number passed 2,000 in the Fourth Quarter of CY68. Over 15,000 informants were recorded under the VIP during 1968. Information derived from these informants led to 3,437 enemy killed and 1,197 captured. It also resulted in capture or recovery of over 50,000 rounds of ordnance and more than 2,000 weapons. The cost of the program for the entire year was only \$135,724. Almost all US tactical units in-country implement this program and particularly in the Fourth Quarter of the CY the VIP began to receive strong emphasis from advisory elements in the attack on VCI. The program has become one of the most flexible and widespread intelligence resources available country-wide to all US tactical and advisory elements.

(S) MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION OF CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONAL PROPOSALS (U): Staff preparation and coordination of Military Intelligence Coordination of Clandestine Intelligence Operational Proposals, COCIOP, were completed in March 1968. The actions resulted in the publication of MACV Dir No. 381-10 of 23 March 1968. The directive prescribed policy, responsibility, and procedures for coordinating all US military clandestine operations. 17

(C) RED FOX (U): On 31 March 1968, the program "Logistical Troop Buildup-Tri-Border Area and Plei Trap Valley," was activated. Entitled RED FOX, the program tasked MACV collection assets, on a priority basis, to furnish intelligence concerning the probability of an enemy logistical buildup in the western highlands of Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. It also placed special emphasis on a "new" enemy road network that was being extended south from the tri-border area through the Plei Trap Valley in western Kontum Province. RED FOX was cancelled on 24 July 1968 because of a determination that the requirements of the program had been fulfilled. 18

(C) RAPID SHAVE (U): "Intensified Collection in III CTZ," short title RAPID SHAVE, was initiated in late April 1968, prior to the Second General Offensive. It provided information concerning the enemy's timing, routes of approach, use of staging areas, and movements in III CTZ. In view of a buildup of indicators that pointed toward a third major offensive in III CTZ, the program was supplemented in early August.

(C) RED SPONGE (U): Promulgated on 29 May 1968, RED SPONGE intensified collection against the 2d NVA Division and its subordinate units. The program required MACV to furnish intelligence concerning the location, composition, mission, and intentions of the 2d NVA Division. RED SPONGE was cancelled on 3 August 1968 because the 2d NVA Division reverted to a more conventional pattern of activity. It was determined that the special collection emphasis provided by this program was no longer necessary. 19

(C) RED PEPPER (U): A special intelligence collection program, RED PEPPER, which intensified collection against NVA units in the Khe Sanh/DMZ geographic area was disseminated

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by message on 9 June 1968. It directed efforts to identify and measure the capabilities and intentions of the 308th NVA Division and any other units operating in or enroute to the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. Collection responsibilities centered on the units in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. On 10 June, the program was supplemented by a detailed Special Intelligence Collection Requirement (SICR) which expounded on the requirements used in the exploitation of PWs, detainees, and Ho Chi Chanhs having knowledge of the 308th and 312th NVA Divisions or other units operating in the KSCB. RED PEPPER was cancelled on 16 September 1968 when it was discovered that collection emphasis messages provided a more effective means of meeting the requirements in this area. 20

(C) BANISH BAY (U): A new intelligence program entitled BANISH BAY was published on 9 July 1968. This program replaced the RITZ program. In addition to collection against the VC guerrilla forces, BANISH BAY also provided for coverage of VC local force companies and platoons, administrative service units, and recruitment activities. As did the RITZ program, BANISH BAY included a requirement for consolidated quarterly reporting. 21

(S) BLACK BEARD (U): COMUSMACV directed an expanded intelligence collection program on Cambodia with the guidance that existing collection restrictions were not to be considered. During September 1968, the Intelligence Production Directorate prepared a general concept of the new program and the specific EEI for the entire area of interest. The Combat Intelligence Directorate prepared the overall implementing directive for the program, subsequently titled BLACK BEARD. This program superseded NANTUCKET and VESUVIUS ONE. The Plan called for an expanded geographic intelligence collection coverage of Cambodia by all assets available to MACV. It directed coordinated collection against specific requirements and information gaps related to VC/NVA activities in Cambodia with specific emphasis directed toward evidence of arms and ammunition being transhipped from major ports of Cambodia to border areas of South Vietnam; infiltration of NVN personnel and equipment through Cambodia; VC/NVA base camps and sanctuaries in Cambodia; and Cambodian government complicity in support rendered to VC/NVA forces. 22

(S) DOUBLE CROSS (U): The intelligence collection program, DOUBLE CROSS, implemented a priority collection effort to establish positive indications of the presence of NVA forces in the DMZ subsequent to 1 November 1968. With the advent of this program, clandestine agent agents, operating both unilaterally and bilaterally, were dispatched to the area of interest to respond to collection requirements. During November, a total of 17 separate reports were received, indicating enemy locations, strengths, armament, and activities. 23

(C) BIG MACK (U): On 28 November, COMUSMACV approved a new program, BIG MACK. This program was directed towards an increased effort for data collection and collation of J2 and CORDS requirements for intelligence information relative to the VCI, guerrilla forces, local forces, administrative service units, and in-country recruitment. This program replaced CORRAL and BANISH BAY. 24

(S) LARGE CRATER (U): The collection program, Transmittal of Special Collection Program, Northern I CTZ, DMZ and Northern Vietnam Panhandle, short title: LARGE CRATER, was published on 16 December. This program was similar to DOUBLE CROSS but did not cancel it. LARGE CRATER was designed to gather information concerning VC/NVA activities in the vicinity of northern I CTZ and the northern panhandle. At the time the program was implemented enemy activity was minimal and the program was to record the enemy's ground-work for a return-in-force. 25

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22. Rpt (S), MACJ251, 20 Sep 68, Subj: Historical Summary, Oct (U), Gp-3; Ltr (S), MACJ-212-2 to USARV, et al., 17 Oct 68, Subj: BLACK BEARD (U), Gp-3; Rpt (S), MACJ251, 23 Oct 68, Subj: Historical Summary, Sep (U), Gp-3.
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## CHAPTER VIII

### PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

#### ORGANIZATION

##### Introduction

(U) During 1968, MACV Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Vietnam were extensive. They had come to be recognized as an effective weapon in the military arsenal. To meet the spectrum of expanding PSYOP activities, military/civilian units were activated and Army units expanded. Unique interactions of civilian and military organizations and personnel became precedent in Vietnam as a result of PSYOP needs.

(U) Campaigns of extraordinary magnitude were conducted. Leaflet production surpassed even the highest estimates of capability. The war of words and thoughts took innumerable forms, required vast resources, reached into countless communities, and commanded the attention of the scientist, the technician, and the soldier.

(U) The organizations involved in PSYOP in Vietnam during 1968 were as follows:

##### Joint United States Public Affairs Office

(U) By a decision of the National Security Council in May 1965, the responsibility for all US PSYOP in Vietnam was delegated to the Director of United States Information Agency (USIA). The Director carried out his responsibilities through the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) which was an altered and expanded form of the United States Information Service in Vietnam. Although JUSPAO was primarily a civilian organization, many of its personnel were military assigned through MACV. Selected foreign service officers were also assigned. 1

##### MACV Psychological Operations Directorate

(U) The major PSYOP responsibility in HQ MACV was performed by the MACV PSYOP Directorate (MACPD) which employed Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel and operated under the staff supervision of the ACoS, J3. It was a relatively unique military organization because it served in both an advisory role to RVNAF and a supervisory role to US forces. In November, MACPD became MACJ3-11, the PSYOP Division of ACoS, J3.

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(U) The missions of this office were:

1. Advised COMUSMACV and MACV staff on psychological operations and the psychological implications of military operations.
2. Exercised staff supervision for COMUSMACV over Headquarters, 4th US Army PSYOP Group.
3. Served as senior advisor to the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) of the RVNAF and provided staff guidance for subordinate US military advisory teams in RVNAF units in matters relating to political warfare.
4. Served as the MACV staff focal point for PSYOP support and assistance to the major subordinate commands of MACV through appropriate military channels.
5. Served as point of contact between JUSPAO and COMUSMACV for PSYOP matters pertaining to military operations.

## CORDS Psychological Operations Division

(U) Throughout most of the year, a Psychological Operations Division (POD) had operated under the staff supervision of ACofS CORDS. The POD:

1. Coordinated and supervised all PSYOP in support of civil operations and revolutionary development.
2. Arranged for PSYOP support of other MACCORDS divisions.
3. Served as point of contact for PSYOP matters pertaining to civil operations and revolutionary development between JUSPAO and COMUSMACV.
4. Provided media and administrative support to the CORDS psychological advisors at region and province level with budgetary, personnel, and media services from JUSPAO.
5. Served as the MACV staff focal point for PSYOP support and assistance to civil operations and revolutionary development.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Since much of POD's responsibilities were also duplicated at JUSPAO and MACPD level, POD was eliminated from the CORDS structure in mid-October 1968 and, for coordination purposes, a Senior PSYOP Advisor was named to assist ACofS, CORDS.

## US Army Units

### 4th PSYOP Group

(U) The 4th PSYOP Group had been activated on 1 December 1967, with headquarters in

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Saigon. Its assigned mission was to conduct PSYOP in support of joint and combined insurgency operations and such other operations for which it had responsibility. The subordinate units of the Group were the 7th PSYOP Battalion which was employed in I CTZ with headquarters in Da Nang; the 8th in II CTZ with headquarters at Nha Trang; the 6th in III CTZ with headquarters in Bien Hoa; and the 10th Battalion in IV CTZ with headquarters in Can Tho.

(U) Each battalion of the 4th PSYOP Group was equipped with a Propaganda Development Center (PDC), an organizational innovation designed to facilitate and improve the systematic development of propaganda. The mission of the PDC was to identify psychological vulnerabilities existing within target audiences, assess conditions within the audiences which might have a bearing on their susceptibility to propaganda, and develop appropriate materials based on the above assessments. Finally, after dissemination of the materials, the PDC was charged with analyzing the effect of the propaganda, determining strengths and weakness, and then developing techniques for improving future propaganda appeals.<sup>3</sup>

### 7th PSYOP Group

(U) The 7th PSYOP Group, located on Okinawa, supervised a widely scattered organization. Its 15th PSYOP Detachment and 14th PSYOP Battalion were two on-island (Okinawa) forces available to the commander; the 15th PSYOP Detachment was the strategic PSYOP base and the 14th PSYOP Battalion was the tactical deployable element. The Japan Detachment, located at Camp Drake, Japan, had as its major mission the responsibility of maintaining liaison with the US Army AG Printing and Publications Center (PPC). The Korea Detachment, the largest off-island detachment of the group, had the Voice of the UN Command (VUNC) as its major mission. The Vietnam Detachment, located in Saigon, maintained liaison between the 7th PSYOP Group and the various PSYOP agencies located in the RVN but the primary effort of this detachment was to expedite the printing of propaganda material developed by US/ Allied forces.

(U) The mission of the 7th PSYOP Group was to provide PSYOP support throughout the Pacific Command. One of the major operations of the 7th PSYOP Group was the VUNC which was a strategic radio operation broadcasting over 20 hours daily to audiences in North Korea and Communist China.

(U) In addition to the PSYOP Group structure and organization, PSYOP officers were placed with the operating units at brigade, division, and field force levels. PSYOP at these levels were conducted under the supervision of the Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) staff element.

### US Air Force

(U) The PSYOP role of the Air Force was carried out in several ways but the chief among these were its civic action roles, Air Commando Wing, and POLWAR advisors on the Air Force Advisory Teams. Additionally, Air Force personnel played prominent roles on the MACPD staff.

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## Air Force Advisory Group

(U) The Senior Advisor to VNAF on POLWAR was responsible to the Chief, Air Force Advisory Group (AFAG), for the preparation and dissemination of Advisory Group information media. He coordinated AFAG POLWAR activities and provided staff guidance to the Air Force Advisory Teams (AFAT) in matters pertaining to their POLWAR programs. He advised, assisted, and supported the VNAF DCS for POLWAR in the development of PSYOP and civic action plans and programs, to include POLWAR planning and control; propaganda development, production and dissemination; development of POLWAR instructional programs; morale, welfare and social activities; and the Chieu Hoi program. He also advised and assisted in base and community security activities.

## Air Commando Wing

(U) The Commander of the 14th Air Commando Wing (ACW) at Nha Trang Air Base conducted PSYOP for the Cmdr 7AF. The 5th and 9th Air Commando Squadrons (ACS), had aircraft and crews stationed at Binh Thuy, Nha Trang, Da Nang, Pleiku, and Bien Hoa. Aircraft used for leaflet drops and loudspeaker operations were the 02B Super Skymaster, U-10 Courier, and C-47 Skytrain.

## US Marines

(U) There was an acute awareness of PSYOP among personnel of the USMC. In Vietnam the program was particularly active, both in civic action and in propaganda roles. Additionally, III MAF had established a short course for incoming personnel which briefed them on customs and expected behavior. This emphasis at the action level was considered to have the most positive effect.

(U) Marine PSYOP personnel were assigned down through regiment and battalion level where they performed both the civic action and the PSYOP functions. The use of Armed Propaganda Teams and Kit Carson's (Hoi Chanh) was well programmed and effective.

## US Naval Forces

(U) The US Navy was responsible for conducting PSYOP throughout the coastal and riverine areas of SVN. The target audiences were the Vietnamese living in these areas and traversing the waterways. Naval patrol boat personnel met, face-to-face, approximately 300,000 water travelers each month while performing population and resources control. The Navy had three major and one minor task forces performing population and resources control, offensive operations, and PSYOP in Vietnam:

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1. The Coastal Surveillance Force engaged in anti-infiltration operations along the coast from the DMZ to the Cambodian border.
2. The River Patrol Force was responsible for patrolling the rivers in III and IV CTZ, including inspection of Vietnamese water traffic.
3. The Mobile Riverine Force conducted offensive operations throughout the Delta in conjunction with the US Army.
4. Task Force CLEARWATER was responsible for patrols on the Perfume and Cua Viet Rivers in the vicinity of Hue in I CTZ. The prime PSYOP capabilities of the Navy were hand distribution of PSYOP materials and conduct of waterborne loudspeaker broadcasts. There were one hundred and twenty 350-watt loudspeakers mounted on various types of craft.

(U) PSYOP officers in the field were supported by JUSPAO, Vietnam Information Service (VIS), USA PSYOP battalions, and CORDS representatives. They worked closely with US PSYOP advisors, ARVN, VNN, Naval Intelligence Liaison Officers, sector and Free World forces.

## Naval Advisory Group

(U) The VNN conducted PSYOP in the coastal and riverine areas of the country. Cooperation between US and VN PSYOP personnel was a prerequisite for positive accomplishment of the respective missions. There were 14 USN PSYOP advisors working with the VNN. Junks and river assault craft were used as loudspeaker platforms while the primary patrol missions were performed.

## Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces:

(U) The PSYOP structure of the GVN differed from the US organization in that the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) which encompassed the media in support of the RVNAF, included the functions of PSYWAR, Political Indoctrination, Social Services, Chaplain Services, Military Security Service, Information Service and the Political Warfare College. In this concept, borrowed from the successful model of Free China, the principal targets of the POLWAR effort were, in order:

1. Friendly troops and their dependents.
2. The civilian population under GVN control.
3. VC/NVA forces and the civilian population of enemy controlled or contested areas.

(U) As a result of this different focus, the conventional PSYOP capabilities of RVNAF were but a part of their POLWAR effort and the one with relatively low priority. For this reason, US PSYOP personnel were cautioned not to consider RVNAF POLWAR battalions as equivalent in function to US PSYOP battalions.

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## Political Warfare Battalions

(U) The POLWAR Battalion:

1. Conducted PSYWAR operations in support of the RVNAF Corps and CMD.
2. Conducted civic action and morale programs for the RVNAF and civilian population.
3. Supported the consolidation and internal security phases of rural construction operations.
4. Provided civil affairs capabilities to control, administer, and provide aid for civil population affected by operations.
5. Were responsible for tactical leaflet support in the four Corps.

(U) The 10th, 20th, 30th, and 40th POLWAR Battalion, located in I, II, III, and IV Corps respectively, were under the operational control of the respective Corps Commanders. The 50th POLWAR Battalion in Saigon was under the operational control of the Chief, GPWD. It was responsible for conducting political warfare operations in the CMD and acted as a general reserve.

(U) An effective feature of the POLWAR Battalion was its audio-visual teams which were used in support of tactical and consolidation operations. The teams hand-delivered leaflets to hamlet and village residents, made loudspeaker broadcasts and held outdoor film showings for people in rural areas. The teams were often of great assistance to US units because of their language capability.

## The Political Warfare College

(U) The POLWAR College:

1. Provided a college level educational program so as to graduate active duty, regular RVNAF POLWAR officers.
2. Provided POLWAR Branch training for RVNAF officers.
3. Organized and directed POLWAR specialist training as required.

Its curriculum was based on a university level program in political science. The college was located in DaLat with a planned enrollment in 1968 of 379 cadets in the two-year (war shortened) course and 475 students in the three month course for POLWAR Branch training. 4

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## PSYOP MEDIA

### Face-to-Face Propaganda

(U) Effective PSYOP depends on getting a predetermined message across to a target audience in the most effective way. The degree to which a target may be influenced is directly proportional to the proximity of the communicator and the target, both geographically and socially. Face-to-face communications are most effective and were exploited to the highest degree during 1968. Other forms of communications pick up the slack when large audiences need immediate information or where the audience is not readily accessible. As a medium of PSYOP, face-to-face communications include rallies, speeches, civic action, agitation; in short, the range of activities in which people communicate verbally in direct person-to-person situations. PSYOP activities which employed this technique during 1968 were:

#### Armed Propaganda Teams (APT)

(U) APTs were made up of ralliers under the Chieu Hoi program. They were not available or active in every location and their operations were controlled by the GVN provincial authorities with the support of US advisors. The teams provided their own protection and proved most effective in obtaining ralliers, frequently by interacting with the families of known VC. <sup>5</sup>

#### Culture Drama Teams

(U) Organic to the GPWD was a Central Culture Group. This group was composed of all types of entertainers and provided culture drama shows for RVNAF, primarily in the CMD. Organic to each POLWAR battalion in the four Corps was a Culture Platoon which provided entertainment throughout the Corps area in the form of songs, dramas, dances, and similar activities. In the remote areas, these platoons often provided the only source of entertainment for the people. <sup>6</sup>

#### Mobile Training Teams

(U) Mobile Training Teams provided on-site indoctrination training for the Popular Forces in each of the four CTZs. The training was accomplished by District Cadres augmented by Province and National Cadres. Each training cycle was monitored and reports on training, welfare, and morale furnished to interested agencies. The purpose of the teams was to promote solidarity and morale in the Popular Forces. <sup>7</sup>

#### Medical Civic Action Program

(U) The Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) was part of the socio-economic development plan for Vietnam sponsored by the government and executed with active voluntary participation of the local population. The basic intent of MEDCAP was to establish and maintain a continuing spirit of mutual respect and cooperation between the military and civilian population by providing basic medical care to the people living in the rural and often VC-infested villages and hamlets.

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1. MEDCAP I. MACV medical advisory personnel and US Special Forces medical personnel assisted RVNAF personnel in providing medical treatment to Vietnamese civilians located in remote areas. These areas may or may not have been under government control.
2. MEDCAP II. This effort was conducted by US or FWMAF personnel. Medical treatment was rendered by medical units or medical elements of battalion or larger size units with a capability to perform civic action in addition to its primary mission.

### Military Provincial Health Assistance Program

(U) The Military Provincial Health Assistance Program teams, composed of US military personnel, provided assistance to GVN Ministry of Health facilities and public health programs. The teams provided direct medical care and health services to Vietnamese civilians and worked with Vietnamese medical personnel to augment, develop, and expand their capabilities in clinical care, preventive medicine, and public health programs. <sup>8</sup>

### Village Assistance Teams (VATS)

(U) Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, established 15 VATS who lived and worked with the Vietnamese people in the city of Da Nang. The teams worked on community projects as requested by local officials and as approved by the Civic Action Office.

(U) The entire program was based on the self-help principle. Technical advice and materials were provided by the VATS but the initiative and labor had to come from the people.

(U) The objectives of the program were to promote the GVN image, to create a better understanding between Americans and Vietnamese, to raise the standard of living, to build community spirit and unity, and in general to help the people help themselves. <sup>9</sup>

### Seabee Teams

(U) There were fifteen 13-man Seabee Construction Teams working in support of Revolutionary Development at the province level. The program was carried out on the basis of a project agreement between USAID and the Navy. The primary purpose of the Seabee program was to supplement the GVN provincial construction capability in support of Revolutionary Development, thus helping to provide manpower to alleviate construction problems which in the past had hindered implementation of many Revolutionary Development projects. Projects were jointly planned by the Provincial Government and CORDS and approved by the Seabees. The secondary function of the teams was to augment the pool of skilled manpower available by giving locally hired personnel on-the-job training in construction techniques, equipment, and maintenance and repair. Every effort was made to utilize the maximum number of refugees and Hoi Chanhs in these training programs. <sup>10</sup>

### Country Fairs

(U) These activities were supplemental to cordon-and-search operations. While the search of the village was conducted, the people were assembled in a designated area nearby. There they were provided basic medical care, received food or other basic necessities through on-the-spot distribution, and were informed/entertained with propaganda messages in the form

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of Cultural Drama Teams. The need for the operation and the part the villagers had to play in uncovering VC were carefully explained. Besides providing positive assistance to the villagers, these supplemental activities tended to soften the harsher military aspects of the cordon-and-search operation.

### Revolutionary Development Cadre

(U) The aim of the Revolutionary Development Cadre program was to bring social, political, and economic reform to the countryside and it was the major mechanism utilized to decrease the support of the insurgency and win the people's confidence and loyalty for GVN. There were over 13,000,000 rural people living in 44 provinces, 234 districts, 2,600 villages, and 13,000 hamlets that were the target of the Revolutionary Development Cadre operation. As of 27 January 1968, there were 553 Revolutionary Development Cadre groups with a total strength of 29,161. 11

### Loudspeaker Operations in Vietnam

(U) The use of loudspeakers in the execution of PSYOP in support of military operations offered the opportunity to capitalize on enemy vulnerabilities in many unique ways. Mounted on trucks or aircraft, these loudspeakers presented news, music, and appeals by Hoi Chanhs to many people.

1. Chieu Hoi Tapes - Chieu Hoi appeals by Hoi Chanhs required a special effort to fully realize their potential. The rallier would identify himself, his home village, his former comrades, his unit, and the area where his unit operated. This approach would establish the credibility of the speaker. The rallier would then state his reason or reasons for rallying since this rationale would probably apply to his comrades. In addition, he described how he had rallied unless this disclosure would compromise the means used. Finally, he stated how he had been received and treated and closed with a direct appeal for his former comrades to join him.

2. News - Broadcasting news of national events and occurrences proved to be PSYOP. People in localities remote from urban areas seldom saw a newspaper and radios were scarce. Thus, news via loudspeakers was both novel and important.

3. Music - The technique of adding music to NVA Chieu Hoi loudspeaker appeals was found to be an effective device for maintaining attention. Popular North Vietnamese folk songs were intermixed with the narration to improve the overall effectiveness of the appeal.

### Radio and Television

(U) Radio communication was developed as a powerful device in the cause of propaganda. The war of words via the air waves has been an almost continuous process among nations. The addition of pictures to broadcasts with the invention of television generated an even more powerful medium for propaganda. Television, however, was quite limited in range.

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(U) The effectiveness of radio propaganda was reflected in the countermeasures devised to control its reception by the target audience. One such method was "jamming," which distorts or interferes with the received signal. The act of jamming, however, tended to add credibility to those portions of the message received. The use of radios locked to a specific frequency, such as the mini-radio distributed by the GVN in the Pleiku area, was another control method. A more subtle form was the use of radios which permitted a selection of frequencies but provided the best reception at the desired frequency. The idea was that the signal with best reception normally had the psychological advantage.

## Vietnam Radio

(U) The importance of radios in Vietnam was revealed in several surveys of attitudes completed by JUSPAO. For example, post-election studies indicated that the overwhelming majority of voters received the bulk of information before and after the election via radio. With thousands of inexpensive transistor receivers in Vietnam, the propagandizing potential of radio was obvious. The well-equipped national radio network in Vietnam made it possible to beam an excellent signal to all the major cities and practically all the rural areas as well.

## Mini-Radio Program

(S) Small transistor radios were manufactured which were "locked" to a single frequency. These well-made but relatively inexpensive radios were distributed in the II CTZ area, primarily in the region around Pleiku. Although packaged for free-fall aerial delivery, the radios were largely distributed by being placed along trails travelled by the VC, handed to members of known VC families, and distributed in hamlets and villages inhabited by or close to target audiences.

(C) The Pleiku Military PSYOP Radio Project began operation on 20 January 1968 when a 50 KW transmitter went on the air for about six hours of broadcast per day under the YELLOW BIRD plan. Under this plan and subsequent combined agreements, the RVNAF (JCS/GPWD) was responsible for programming and transmitter security. The USMACV (1 FFORCEV/Advisory Team 21) was responsible for technical operation of the transmitter and delivery of mini-radio receivers to target audiences.

(C) The Pleiku military PSYOP radio station was attacked by the enemy on 24 March and received extensive damage. It was dismantled and returned to CONUS for repair. By mid-year, efforts were underway to have DA ship a replacement AN/TRT-22 by air from Fort Bragg, N.C. As an interim measure, a small 400-watt radio transmitter was operated from the Pleiku site. Its effective range, however, was limited to Pleiku City.

## Vietnamese Television

(U) In RVN, television was used in a concerted PSYOP effort in a wartime situation for the first time in history.

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(U) Vietnamese television was first aired during the Tet season of 1966. An hour of pre-recorded programming was broadcasted from a specially configured Navy C-121 aircraft circling the Saigon area. This naval operation was labelled "Project JENNY." The schedule soon grew to a full evening of programming every night of the week, and the facilities were expanded to include a full-scale, two-studio television station in Saigon. With the commissioning of the ground station in Saigon, "Project JENNY" TV aircraft operated in the Mekong Delta over Can Tho and in the central highlands over Qui Nhon. Since the opening of the ground station in Can Tho, "Project JENNY" has concentrated its operation in the central highlands region, providing approximately four hours of television programming nightly to the inhabitants of that region.

(U) The station, THVN, Channel 9, was under the control of the Ministry of Information but other government agencies were allocated blocks of time on the program schedule. Programming consisted of news, information features, variety shows, children's shows, women's shows, interviews, special public events, and sports. Much of the programming had PSYOP significance.

(U) One of the GVN agencies given TV time for PSYOP purposes was RV11.F. The program usually consisted of military operational news, newsreels, indoctrination films, training films, interviews, informational features, and entertainment by various cultural groups. A significant portion of the entertainment was songs, dances, and dramatic presentations with anti-Communist themes and/or themes related to Vietnamese military life and activities.

(U) At the outbreak of 1968 Tet emergency, the PSYWAR Department provided THVN with an up-to-date newsreel each night. The film was from footage obtained throughout SVN by combat photography from the GPWD. These newsreels ranged in length from eight to thirty minute minutes. <sup>12</sup>

### Newspapers

(U) Newspapers were an especially effective psychological propaganda medium. The JUSPAO Free South paper, MIEN NAM TU-DO, although addressed primarily to the VC audience, was popular in both enemy and friendly areas. <sup>13</sup>

(U) TIEN TUYEN (Frontline) was a daily newspaper published by the PSYWAR Department and distributed in Saigon. Normal circulation was 20,000 copies daily. Since all newspapers in the Saigon area ceased publication at the beginning of the Tet Offensive with the exception of TIEN TUYEN, the paper increased its circulation to 33,000 daily. Of the 35,000 copies, 1,000 - 1,500 were distributed to each of the four CTZs. Cholon, normally served by 11 Chinese language dailies, was virtually without information. To fill this void, the PSYWAR Department published an additional 6,000 copies daily of an abridged edition of TIEN TUYEN in Chinese. These were distributed free throughout the Chinese sections of Cholon. By the use of combat reporters and photographs, TIEN TUYEN provided the people of the Saigon / Cholon area with the most up-to-date news and commentary available. <sup>14</sup>

(U) Allied to the newspaper itself, was the news sheet leaflet. The news sheet had a format which copied that of a newspaper.

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(U) Posters were an important component in a multi-media campaign. Development and preparation of posters usually required a concerted, professional effort. The Field Development Division of JUSPAO was instrumental in the completion of many posters not only excellent as propaganda but in art form as well.

(U) The news pictorial, when well-balanced photographically, were catching and held attention well. Artistic presentations, such as those developed for Tet, had a lasting value in the household. A series of posters presenting heroes from Vietnamese history was so popular that at least a portion of the printing run was "diverted" to stalls in town where they sold quite well.

## Movies

(U) Since it is common for the audience to identify psychologically with the actor in a movie, the cinema was an excellent propaganda medium. Some movies were used which were specially prepared to effect a propaganda message. Others fell into the category of animated cartoons, westerns, dramatic shows, etc. The animated cartoons and westerns seemed to have an advantage of universality of meaning. Audiences in Vietnam who had no understanding of the dialogue were captivated by the antics of Mickey Mouse and Hopalong Cassidy.

## "Devices"

(U) The PSYOP effort in Vietnam managed to avoid the extensive use of "gimmickry" despite an endless stream of suggestions. Some of the novel devices used, however, are noted below:

1. Cartoon books. The simplicity of the texts and/or pictures made this medium especially effective by conveying the message to a relatively illiterate audience. Cartoon books were published and distributed in sizes ranging from 4x5 inch, six-page pamphlets to 8x10.5 inch, multiple-page booklets. Relative size versus effectiveness was not evaluated although it was believed that smaller sizes with from six to ten pages were most effective.

2. Photo Display. These exhibits appeared to be effective only in the larger urban areas where a continuing transitory population would insure a large enough audience to justify the effort and expense. The use of extensively illustrated posters with brief texts, such as in the GFWD daily issue or the JUSPAO I Corps wall display, were more suitable for rural villages and hamlets.

3. Billboards. The billboard was extensively used to convey Chieu Hoi messages as well as other themes. Banners and streamers were similarly used.

4. Gift Packets. Gifts were air dropped or distributed as an adjunct to patrols or waterborne operations. Even though the gifts were often confiscated, the act of giving was contrasted with the act of taking by the enemy. Toys, soap, writing paper, clothes, and food were useful for reinforcing the message. These gifts could be contained in a plastic bag upon which a message was imprinted.

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PSYWAR AERIAL OPERATIONS

MONTH 1967	LEAFLETS DROPPED (MILLIONS)		PSYWAR SORTIES FLOWN (SVN)	AERIAL LDFPKR HRS (SVN)
	SVN	LAOS		
TOTAL	5806.7	191.5	15,381	16,269
1968				
JAN	745.1	28.6	4,881	1,913
FEB	495.7	27.1	3,007	1,536
MAR	652.1	27.2	3,751	1,689
APR	606.6	30.0	3,293	1,252
MAY	641.5	25.8	3,259	1,798
JUN	520.5	32.4	3,345	1,965
JUL	527.6	33.2	3,194	2,195
AUG	674.0	12.8	4,017	2,454
SEP	639.0	12.6	3,671	2,412
OCT	640.5	12.2	3,856	2,444
NOV	713.1	12.1	3,652	2,031
DEC	783.6	43.6	4,168	3,000
TOTAL	7,699.6	297.8	44,114	24,889

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FIGURE VIII-1

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5. Ensigns. A particularly effective device was employed by the US/VN Navies. During the routine patrols and surface vessel inspections, new Vietnamese ensigns were distributed to replace those that were tattered or missing. This gift had valuable symbolic meaning of identification with the GVN.

### Leaflets

(U) Perhaps the best known PSYOP medium is the leaflet. These were employed in astronomical numbers throughout SVN and the extended battle area. For example, a total of 1,892,989,909 leaflets were dropped over SVN and 5,139 hours of aerial loudspeaker time was logged during 11,639 sorties by US/FWN/VN Air Force aircraft during the first calendar quarter of 1968. Besides aerial drops, leaflets were disseminated by hand, carried aloft by balloons and distributed by the wind-drift method or delivered by artillery projectile. All methods were employed, although dissemination was usually by aircraft or by hand since the vagaries of the wind were not dependable and the artillery shell could sometimes be more lethal than persuasive. Actually, the aerial dissemination of leaflets was refined to a science. It was determined by a John Hopkins University study, for example, that an average of 18 leaflets per 1,000 square meters of target should be used for village, town, and city type targets. This figure could range from 6 (for low population density, low building density, etc.) to as many as 30 (for high population density, etc.) per 1,000 square meters. The most efficient leaflet size and paper weight was determined to be the same 6x3 inches, 20-pound paper which was used for the Safe Conduct pass in RVN. 15

### PSYOP PROGRAMS

(U) At any given time throughout 1968, a multitude of PSYOP programs, both tactical and strategic, were being conducted in Vietnam. Major programs of the year included the following

#### Chieu Hoi Inducement Programs

(U) The Chieu Hoi Inducement Program consisted of all activities designed to cause members of the VC and their supporters to return to the side of the legitimate government of RVN. Also referred to as the "Open Arms" Program, its name can be traced to the 14th century when King Le Loi led the Vietnamese in their struggle against the Ming dynasty of China. Amnesty was offered to certain civil prisoners if they would fight for King Le Loi against the Ming. The amnesty offer included a phrase similar to "Chieu Hoi." The phrase is a combination of two verbs "to welcome" and "to return." The Vietnamese customarily celebrate Le Loi's victory on the 22d day of the 8th lunar month (late September is the approximate Gregorian calendar equivalent) but history behind the Chieu Hoi phrase is not widely known. 16

(U) Experience with the Chieu Hoi Program between April 1963, when President Diem instituted it, and the beginning of CY 1968 had indicated that an intense PSYOP effort during the

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Vietnamese Tet holidays usually produced an increased number of Hoi Chanhs, the name for VC personnel who rallied to the GVN through the Chieu Hoi Program. Accordingly, the 1968 pre-Tet phase of the 1968 plan was put through as scheduled. The opening of the Tet Offensive, however, temporarily scuttled the program. Temporarily, local PSYOP resources had to be diverted to support operations against the enemy attacks.

(U) Because of the Tet Offensive, which the enemy consistently claimed as a military and psychological victory, the Chieu Hoi Program slipped below the predicted figures during the first few months. It rallied again later on, particularly towards the end of the year, when the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) got underway. The monthly figures for the year were as follows:

Jan	1,179	Jul	1,844
Feb	763	Aug	1,451
Mar	599	Sep	1,374
Apr	1,060	Oct	2,381
May	1,039	Nov	2,269
Jun	1,064	Dec	3,148

(Source: Operations section, PSYOPs Division, HQ MACV)

### Dai Doan Ket Program

(U) The Dai Doan Ket Program, named after a Vietnamese general who defeated an army of Chinese in 1284, extended the Chieu Hoi Program into the ranks of middle and higher level cadre of the VC and civilian infrastructure of the NLF. The Chieu Hoi Program had not been successful in this area as it did not offer to the returnee positions in the society of SVN comparable with those that they held in the VC/NLF. Most officers and high-ranking Party officials of the VC/NLF rose from the peasantry to their ranks and they were not inclined to revert to peasant status. In the Dai Doan Ket Program, GVN agreed to accept high-ranking returnees and cooperate in placing them in responsible positions. The GVN also accorded the returnees all the political rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The psychological objective of the program was to gain national support for all aspects of the Dai Doan Ket Program and to help destroy the infrastructure of the VC/NLF. It was also meant to help in developing confidence in the GVN. 17

### B-52 Followup Program

(U) The B-52 Followup Program was an extensive leaflet operation conducted in SVN to take advantage of the tremendous psychological vulnerability potential created by the bombing strikes of the B-52. It took advantage of the great shock the enemy suffered when he was

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caught in a B-52 raid. Within four hours following the attack, leaflets were dropped into the area informing the enemy that he had just experienced the effects of a B-52 mission. The leaflet showed him a picture of the bomber which he seldom saw or heard because of the altitude at which it struck and reminded him that the B-52 would return to strike his unit again. The leaflets urged him to use the safe conduct pass, which was dropped with the other leaflets, and rally to the GVN.

### NVA Personnel in SVN

(U) During 1968, an active program targeted against the NVA troops in SVN was conducted. It was designed to create doubts and fears in the minds of the NVA troops about their chances of survival, the dangers of injury and disease, burial in unmarked graves, the hopelessness of their situation, the fates of their relatives and friends in NVN, and about the competence and good faith in their commanders--the Hanoi authorities and the Lao Dong Party. The objective of the program was to lower morale, decrease combat effectiveness, increase disaffection with the military leadership, the party, and Hanoi authorities and foster defections and surrender. It was a logical extension of the psychological efforts directed at the NVA forces during their infiltration to the South.

### Youth Exploitation Program

(U) The growing toll of casualties, coupled with the loss of high density population areas in SVN, markedly affected the recruiting policy of VC/NVA forces. Ever more frequently they reached down among those under the age of 18. Children at the age of 12 were occasionally impressed as ammo bearers or supply handlers and ten year olds were sometimes trained for VC hamlet defense. The youth recruited for combat duty were quite often poorly trained, away from home for the first time, and frequently under forced servitude. After the initial exhilaration of being accorded the "rites of manhood" and provided with a real weapon, the young soldier was easily disillusioned by the realities of military activities. At this time he became the target for propaganda of the Youth Exploitation Program. The objectives of the program were to exploit the fear of the unknown; fear of death, homesickness, and family needs; sickness and inadequate medical facilities; and improper social and vocational development. A related part of the program was targeted on the parents and elders, informing them of the Chieu Hoi Program and encouraging them to influence their children to rally to the GVN.

### Weapons Reward Programs

(U) In addition to the widely advertised reward program for weapons returned by the Chieu Hoi ralliers and for Hoi Chanhs bringing in other Hoi Chanhs, there were several

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similar programs directed at other target audiences in SVN. In these efforts, money and/or gifts were offered for the retrieval of weapons and ordnance. The III MAF had a successful Weapons Reward Program of long standing. Other programs were sponsored in each of the CTZs, by the 5th SFG, and by GVN organizations as well. Closely allied with the Weapons Reward Programs were programs offering rewards for materials and/or information of intelligence value. 18

#### Support of GVN Programs

(U) During 1968, JUSPAO and MACV strongly supported several PSYOP oriented programs initiated by the GVN. Of this group, the National Identity Registration Program, the Nguyen Trai Campaign, the Phung Hoang (PHOENIX) Program, Operation Momentum, and the Special Chieu Hoi Campaign, were of major significance.

(U) The Special Chieu Hoi Campaign was inaugurated on 15 August under a title meaning "New Source of Life." Basically, the plan involved the utilization of high-ranking Chieu Hoi defectors to travel throughout the republic, lecturing and holding seminars. The advantages of this face-to-face contact by people who knew both sides of the story were obvious. JUSPAO and MACV support of this important program included preparation of leaflets and tapes advertising the appearances, assistance in scheduling, and, of course, exploiting the effect of these lectures and seminars. 19

(C) The Phung Hoang (PHOENIX) Program, which received considerable emphasis throughout the year, was directed against the VCI. Designed to harass, disrupt, and induce surrender or defection of the VCI, it relied heavily on the South Vietnamese citizen in identifying and locating members of the VCI.

(C) JUSPAO and MACV support of this program was very extensive, not only in providing means, such as leaflets, loudspeakers and the like, but also in setting up ground rules which would make optimum use of the various methods of inducements. Among other things, these included suggestions for emphasis on patriotism, the concept of the VC leader as a "fugitive interest" of the people to provide their government with information of the "criminals." 20

(C). The Nguyen Trai Campaign, which began on 1 October, was an intensive, countrywide POLWAR/PSYOP campaign keyed to exploiting VC/NVA defeats, RVNAF victories, and GVN progress in pacification. The program, noteworthy more for its scope and intensity rather than its techniques, stressed the growing viability of the GVN as compared to the unfavorable kill ration and vulnerability of VC/NVA and the hopelessness of the latter's cause. Since leaflets and loudspeaker tapes played an important part in this campaign, JUSPAO and MACV provided materiel as well as technical assistance. 21

(U) On 15 September 1968, the GVN began a new National Identity Registration Program. This program, scheduled to last three years, was designed to reregister RVN citizens under more rigid controls than were used in the past. This, it was felt, was necessary to ferret

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out those with forged or illegally obtained ID cards. At the same time, it would give the government a broader basis for effective control, the maintenance of records, and the future development of the nation. PSYOPS was involved because it was deemed essential to "persuade" the people that the program would benefit them individually and collectively. To this end, leaflets were designed and distributed, tapes and motion pictures concerning the program were made, and frequent and favorable comments about the program were made over local television and radio stations.

(S) One of the most timely and ambitious of the RVN programs, and hence the one requiring most PSYOP support, was the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). The program had as its stated objectives the upgrading of 1,000 D&E category hamlets to the C category by 31 January 1969, neutralization of 3,000 VCI each month, the rallying of at least 5,000 Hoi Chanh by 31 January, and the expansion of the Peoples Self-Defense Organization to one million, of which at least 200,000 would be armed. To this end, the program would expand the information and propaganda campaign to exploit enemy failures and demonstrate GVN initiative in attempting to end the war in victory. 22

(S) Like the other GVN programs, the APC (code name Operation Momentum in US circles) received massive JUSPAO/MACV support. In this instance, US support was particularly important since the program was initiated just after the bomb halt when both sides automatically upgraded those programs designed to win over large segments of the population.

(S) While some of APC's objectives seemed beyond the immediate means to achieve them, the program seemed to hold considerable promise, particularly if momentum could be built up. As one MACV message put it:

It is essential that momentum in PSYOP support to GVN programs . . . be maintained, and increased with respect to particular objectives of the Accelerated Pacification Program. Success of the APC will depend in part on the 'snowball effect' in which accomplishment--the fact of new populations coming under effective GVN administration--will be in itself the best PSYOP material for further success. 23

#### Operation STOPS OUT (U)

(TS) On 2 November 1968, COMUSMACV called for a "fresh dynamic psychological operations program, targeted to the current situation." This program, which would involve "new ideas, new themes, and maximum emphasis" was to be more than just an acceleration of previous campaigns, including support of the GVN programs mentioned in the previous section. Quite literally, it was a "special pacification offensive," reflecting the fact that the VC/NVA had been hurt badly in 1968, that the US/GVN position vis-a-vis the enemy was growing more and more favorable. The "current situation" in other words, gave the US/GVN a psychological advantage worth exploiting. 24

(TS) In keeping with the parameters set by COMUSMACV, MACV set about devising a program which would also harmonize with JUSPAO/MACV directives on supporting the GVN programs and on selling the VN population on the idea that the bomb halt was a wise move. The result was an operation tentatively titled STOPS OUT which was presented to COMUS on

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4 December.

(TS) The proposed program obviously had impressive scope and depth. Specific target audiences included VC and NVA personnel in SVN, Laos, and Cambodia (including VC families in the South), the civilian population in both friendly and enemy controlled portions of SVN, the civil population of the major urban areas, and even members of RVNAF. Within that vast audience, which included almost everyone connected with the war in one way or another, the following ambitious objectives were set:

1. Convince target audience that GVN/FWMAF is winning the war.
2. Inform target audience that they should not die a needless death.
3. Convince the target audience of strength of GVN.
4. Convince target audience to support GVN and oppose Communist Organizations.
5. Inform target audience that bombing halt is a step toward peace and was made from a position of strength.
6. Convince target audience that United States is not withdrawing from Vietnam, and that US support for GVN is as great as ever.
7. To induce low morale and cause VC/NVA desertion and defections by exploitation of the Communist imposed three denials (sex, marriage, children.)

(TS) To achieve these objectives, the proposed program called for exploiting subtle yet powerful arguments. The possible resumption of bombing for example, could be a powerful point to make as would be the fact that the aircraft delivering leaflets to that effect could also be delivering bombs if the US were so inclined. Even more subtle were suggestions for exploiting VC/NVA losses by pointing out the kill ratio and asking where the vanished comrades in arms have gone if they were not killed or made prisoners. Also, the suggestion that strong effective forces, such as the VC/NVA claimed to be, would not need to hide in sanctuaries, implied that the fine talk about strength and ultimate victory was fiction. At the same time, of course, the propaganda would emphasize the growing strength, prosperity and stability of the GVN, again with the strong implication that the tide had turned, that the enemy situation was hopeless and it would be foolish not to recognize it.

(TS) Another subtle but potentially powerful aspect of the program involved emphasis on the Communist denial of sex, marriage, and children to VC/NVA soldiers. By implication, the Communists were running counter to man's physical and mental needs and contrary to the traditional Far Eastern emphasis on family. These denials were unjust and intolerable, particularly when the cause for which the sacrifices were being made was a failing one.

(TS) Perhaps the most subtle of all the recommended efforts, however, was one which was sometimes called the "black and grey effort." This portion of the program called for attacks on "selected audiences with themes that cannot be used by attributable sources or can be more effectively used by non-attributable sources." The US/GVN forces, in other words,

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could use sensitive bits of real and presumed information to implant fears and eventually develop that which is feared. The rift between VC and NVA personnel (with the suggestion that the NVA has returned to sanctuaries and left the VC to bear the brunt), the possibility of a Chinese takeover, and the fear in Cambodia and Laos of permanent NVA encroachment were suggestions listed in the proposal.

(TS) Few of the many ideas and suggestions contained in the proposal were actually new to PSYOP, either in intent or technique. What made the program so important was the scope and magnitude it envisioned and, because of its relationship to the "current situation," its obvious potential. "The concept of operation," a briefing officer told COMUSMACV,

calls for a full-scale PSYOP effort to exploit the current tactical and strategic situation as well as the bombing halt. The operation will last an undetermined period of time and will employ all media available both in and out-of-country. Leaflet operations will be expanded and intensified . . . . Themes developed specifically for this program will be integrated into existing programs, such as the previously discussed APC, Phung Hoang (Phoenix) and Nguyen Trai.

(TS) Potential gains under the proposed program were obviously enormous, if only because man's capacity to wage war is so closely tied to his willingness to do so. In the program envisioned, great and powerful forces, such as nationalism, a soldier's individual pride, his manhood, sacrifices already made, and the inherent love of family were to be matched against enemy losses too high to hide and US/CVN military might too conspicuous to miss. A very likely result would be an undeniable credibility gap between that which the enemy promised and that which he was able to deliver. In this way, lost faith in the cause and unwillingness to fight could be implanted and nourished. The happy result then would be a distinct weakening of the enemy's capacity and willingness to make war.

#### Out-of-Country PSYOP Efforts

#### FRANTIC GOAT (U)

(S) FRANTIC GOAT was an overt aerial leaflet operation against selected targets in NVN. It was designed to reinforce the effects of air strikes and to accomplish psychological objectives not necessarily related to air strikes. These operations sought to motivate the NVN population to return US evaders or PWs, unharmed, to US authorities, and to create doubts and fears in the minds of NVA troops training for duty in SVN. The program also sought to establish in the minds of the civilian population of NVN that the Lao Dong Party and the Hanoi authorities were responsible for the war, their miserable situation, and the fate of their relatives and friends. Another objective was to demonstrate to the civilian population of NVN that SVN was peaceful and prosperous in contrast to the poverty and danger in which they lived. SVN was pictured as a land where wages were high, food and clothing plentiful, motorbikes and bicycles

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everywhere, new buildings, schools, and new industries springing up all over the country. At no time, however, even by inference, was the population urged to overthrow the Hanoi regime.

CAMEL PATH (U)

(TS) CAMEL PATH was a leaflet operation against NVA/VC forces using Cambodian territory as a sanctuary and route of infiltration into SVN. Its objectives were to lower the morale of the enemy forces, create friction between cadre and soldiers, and encourage malingering, desertion, or defection of enemy personnel. It was also used to create a spoiling effect on impending enemy operations and to counter Hanoi's claims of NVA/VC "victories" and "liberation" of large portions of SVN. Stringent rules governed its operations because of the highly sensitive nature of this campaign.

TRAIL CAMPAIGN (U)

(S) TRAIL CAMPAIGN provided a means of exposing NVA forces to PSYWAR operations while they were in the process of infiltrating into SVN. The program was conducted in the southern regions of NVN and the eastern half of the Lactian Panhandle. Targets selected for leaflet coverage consisted of infiltration routes and trails, staging areas, way stations, bivouac and storage areas, truck parks, and infiltration check points. Leaflet delivery in Laos was accomplished mainly by C-47 aircraft. As the threat to aircraft increase, however, greater use of leaflet dissemination by high performance aircraft and the C-130 was indicated, as in the case of dissemination of leaflets in the southern area of NVN. 25

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## CHAPTER IX

### LOGISTICS

#### GENERAL

Logistics, in a time of war, can be described as the management science of how best to apply limited resources to unlimited and often unpredictable requirements. Our logistical power derives from our capability to get there first with the most. This power we strive to establish, to enhance, and to preserve.

The objective of this command is to provide responsive, efficient, and timely logistic support for combat operations. Our management aim is to optimize the utilization of men, money, and materials in achieving this objective. As we pursue this aim we will do nothing to degrade our capability to support combat operations, nor will we look for economies which can be achieved only at the expense of the soldier in battle. <sup>1</sup>

#### Transition to 1968

(U) The year 1967 closed with the overall logistic posture for all classes of supply throughout RVN being fully responsive to the requirements of the operating forces. Demands were consistently met despite the increased tempo of operations and the continued military buildup.

(C) The supply system continued to meet demands as 1968 began. COMUSMACV in a message to CINCPAC stated that a continuous review and analysis of objectives, stockage levels and purification of stocks in Class I, II, and IV were being made and improved management procedures were being placed into effect. He suggested that, while statistics tended to indicate shortages from time to time, these shortages were transitory in nature and were not restricting combat operations. Class III monthly consumption, for example, had increased slightly above storage tankage capability, requiring a combination of close management and tanker scheduling to provide the POL where and when it was needed. On the other hand, Class V stockage of both ground and air munitions remained favorable. <sup>2</sup>

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#### 1968 Over-view

(C) The overall logistics situation in RVN remained satisfactory throughout 1968. US logistics met the requirements of the US elements. RVNAF logistics were able to meet the majority of their requirements.

(C) Although some equipment and supply shortages existed during the first quarter of 1968, emergency resupply actions were taken as required to provide sufficient support for combat operations. The interdiction of LOC during this period dictated maximum use of air transport. Because air transport available to RVNAF was limited, major reliance was placed on US aircraft resources. Shortages of barrier material, petroleum products, and certain types of ammunition existed countrywide; however, resupply from RVNAF base and field depots and in-country US sources helped to alleviate these shortages. Expedited supply action on certain critical items was requested from CONUS to reestablish a satisfactory overall supply posture within RVNAF.

(C) Increased combat activity in May created some equipment and supply shortages. Again, emergency resupply action provided sufficient support for combat operations. Emphasis during July, August, and September was placed on upgrading and improving the quality of RVNAF logistic support. While increased quantities of modern weapons and equipment were made available during this period, shortages remained in weapons, modern radios, and motor vehicles, particularly in the RF/PF.

(U) In retrospect, the logistic posture in RVN during 1968 showed continued improvement over the preceding years. Significant advances were made in all areas of supply, construction, hospitalization and evacuation, maintenance, and transportation. Programs to provide more effective and responsive support to US forces were initiated. Added emphasis was placed on RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program.

#### The Logistic Concept

(U) Logistic support in RVN was based on the major logistical facilities that were established in RVN, as well as on the availability of air, land, and sea transportation. Logistics support of US forces in Vietnam was organized essentially on an area basis. COMNAVFORV was responsible for common-item logistics support in the I CTZ and the CG, USARV had responsibility for II, III, and IV CTZs.

#### I Corps Tactical Zone

(U) US forces in I CTZ were provided common-item support by COMNAVFORV. NAVSUPPORT, Da Nang had been established as the wholesale supplier of common-item supplies for I CTZ. The Force Logistics Command of III MAF operated the support groups at Da Nang and smaller support units at Chu Lai, Dong Ha, and Hue/Phu Bai. 1st Log Cmd provided the Army in I CTZ with peculiar support through the Da Nang Support Command, with direct support activities at Chu Lai and other locations as required. Da Nang Support Command also supplemented Naval Support Activity Da Nang (NSAD), as required, to provide common support.

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In addition, it operated pipelines and conducted Logistics-Over-The-Shore (LOTS) operations at Wunder Beach (Vicinity of Than My Thuy). Support for items limited to units of a particular branch of service was provided by that service.

### II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones

(U) US forces located in II, III, and IV CTZ were provided common-item support by the CG, USARV. The CG, USARV was charged with the Army's logistic responsibilities and exercised command over three major support commands located at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon. Each one of these support commands operated a major depot complex to provide wholesale or general support level supplies, maintenance, and services in its area of assignment. Local support groups were established at key locations to provide retail or direct support level supplies, maintenance, and services in areas of major troop populations. Support for items peculiar to a particular service was provided by that service.

### US Support of Free World Forces

(U) The US provided combat service support to FWMAF in accordance with bilateral arrangements. The responsibility for providing such support rested with the US component commanders in whose area these forces were operating.

### RVN Support of Free World Forces

(U) FWMAF MAP-peculiar items were provided by RVNAF in accordance with arrangements agreed upon by the national authorities involved.

### Logistics Responsibilities

(U) There was no change in logistics responsibilities in 1968. JCS Pub 3 provided that each service was responsible for logistical support of its own forces in a unified command except, of course, when agreement or assignment as common-servicing or cross-servicing provided otherwise.

1. MACV Directives 10-11, 405-1, 405-2, and 405-3 assigned logistical tasks in RVN as follows:
  - a. COMNAVFORV - For US military logistic support operations at ports and beaches in I CTZ; and for common-item support, base development (exclusive of air bases assigned to USAF), and real estate services to US and FWMAF in I CTZ; and for Navy-peculiar support to USN and Coast Guard units throughout RVN.
  - b. CG, USARV - For common supply and common service support to all US and FWMAF in II, III, and IV CTZ; for base development (exclusive of air bases assigned to USAF) and real estate services in these CTZs; and for Army-peculiar supply support throughout RVN.

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c. Commander, 7AF and CG, III MAF - For service peculiar support throughout RVN. Cdr 7AF was responsible for base development and real estate services at air bases where USAF has primary responsibility.

2. MACV Directive 701-9 established responsibilities for logistical support of US/FW forces when redeployed between NAVFORV support area (I CTZ) and USARV support area (II, III, and IV CTZ). This directive defined and outlined:

a. Common Items - Class I, III and selected II and IV items as agreed upon by the component commanders concerned.

b. Service - peculiar - All items required by a service not included in paragraph 2a above.

c. Redeployment - Movement of a unit from its original deployment area. This included units diverted prior to arrival in-country as well as the units moved within country.

d. Procedures - Procedures were established for support of US/FW forces which were deployed between NAVFORV and USARV support areas on a permanent basis, or when redeployment was for contingency operations, and the unit would be returned to home base after operations were terminated. <sup>4</sup>

#### Logistics Buildup in Northern I CTZ

#### Force Deployments

(C) Beginning in January 1968 the buildup of Army forces in Northern I CTZ placed the requirement on USARV to deploy initial force packages to support a two-division force. This initial deployment was on an emergency basis. Later requirements to support Army forces resulted in USARV deploying a total of 65 support units to northern I CTZ. In order to meet this requirement, it was necessary to deploy USARV units from II, III, and IV CTZs, thereby reducing the support capability available to those areas. Of this total support furnished, five units provided direct support of the Navy/Marines, and nine additional units provided some support in an area considered to be a Navy/Marine responsibility. These areas were identified as POL, Lighterage, Terminal Service, and Logistics-Over-The-Shore.

(S) The deployment of the 27th Mar RLT and the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div, as well as redeployments to northern I CTZ from within RVN, generated an urgent requirement for Army and Navy support forces. Increased airlift requirements associated with redeployment and resupply of the forces created an urgent need for AF personnel. COMUSMACV requested immediate deployment of combat service support units totaling 1,197 Army, 1,685 Navy, and 434 Air Force spaces. <sup>5</sup>

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Logistics-Over-The-Shore (LOTS) Operation, I CTZ (Than My Thuy Port)

(C) With the rapid buildup of troops in the northern I CTZ area, the shipment of supplies into the area became critical. Shipment by land over Route 1, by sea through Hue/Tan My, Dong Ha and Cua Viet, and by air through Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, and Hue/Phu Bai, had reached a saturation point. To gain flexibility and reserve capacity, a LOTS operation was to be developed at Than My Thuy, redesignated WUNDER BEACH. The development of this area was to be integrated with the movement of the 14th Engr Bn to I CTZ. The 3d NCB was tasked to begin construction of the beach road from Hai Lang and Route 1 east to the South China Sea. Further hydrographic study revealed the necessity of constructing a causeway at the site. This causeway was completed on 18 March, allowing the 14th Engr Bn to bring their heavy equipment ashore, and start development of the port area. <sup>6</sup>

(S) At the end of February 1968, LOCs into northern I CTZ were limited to the Cua Viet/Dong Ha complex, the LCU ramps at Hue, and the C-130 airfields at Dong Ha, Quang Tri, and Phu Bai. Lighters transiting the inland waterways to Dong Ha or Hue were subject to small arms attack. Highway 1 was closed at the Hai Van Pass, Phu Loc, and Hue. The channel to Tan My was closed to LSTs due to silting. During March, the following actions were taken to improve the logistic posture in northern I CTZ:

1. Maximum offensive operations were undertaken in the lowlands to clear and protect LOCs.
2. Highway 1 was opened north to Dong Ha on 29 February and north to Hue on 2 March.
3. A LOTS site (WUNDER BEACH) was established at Than My Thuy and commenced operations on 5 March.
4. Additional LCU ramps were installed at Dong Ha.
5. The channel to Tan My was dredged, permitting LSTs to again enter the port.

(S) By these actions, the daily resupply capability into northern I CTZ rose from slightly over 3,000 STON at the beginning of the month to over 5,000 STON at the end of the month. <sup>7</sup>

Interim SHEDS Proposal

(S) In February 1968, the logistic situation in northern I CTZ was so critical that the off-loading of cargo ships by helicopter was considered as a means of resupply. CINCPAC recommended that a Ship Helicopter Extended Delivery System (SHEDS) type operation be investigated for possible use and queried JCS as to availability of additional heavy-lift helicopters for this purpose.

(S) By the end of March, the logistic posture in northern I CTZ had improved to an extent where it was considered impractical to utilize critical heavy-lift helicopter assets for the

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discharging of cargo ships. For this reason, it was recommended to CINCPAC that an interim SHEDS type operation not be instituted.

(S) CINCPAC concurred, but requested that a contingency plan for an interim SHEDS type operation be developed. As a result, COMNAVFORV Oplan 106-68, dated 28 April 1968, was prepared for such a contingency. <sup>8</sup>

(C) In May 1968, USARV requested that the units and water craft described below, be released from I CTZ for redeployment to II, III, and IV CTZ:

- |                                      |   |          |
|--------------------------------------|---|----------|
| 1. 5th Terminal Command Det          | - | Sa Huynh |
| 2. POL Platoon, 148th S&S Co         | - | N. I CTZ |
| 3. 329th Trans Co (Hvy Boat) (Reinf) | - | Da Nang  |
| 4. 565th Trans Co (Terminal Service) | - | Da Nang  |
| 5. 5 LCM-8s                          | - | Da Nang  |

(C) The purpose of this move was to provide the capability to operate and maintain POL facilities under construction in II and III CTZ. At the same time, it would provide the boat assets necessary to satisfy transportation requirements in support of current and programmed troop increases in IV CTZ. <sup>9</sup>

#### Logistical Support - IV CTZ

(C) In early May, a study was initiated to review the overall logistic plans for support of US troops in the Delta. The areas of engineer, medical, signal, aviation, postal service, post exchange, and the 1st Log Cmd support in the Delta were reviewed. Some of the major problem areas were a lack of transportation assets, distribution of supplies, transmission of requisitions, and lack of storage facilities at Vung Tau and Can Tho.

(C) The following major recommendations were made to increase the logistical support:

1. Vung Tau be designated a "sub-depot storage site" of the 306th Field Depot. This would authorize construction of additional cold, covered, and open storage facilities.
2. A logistical supply point be established at Binh Thuy.
3. Expand operations of the Traffic Management Agency (TMA) at Can Tho, to include commitment authority of all service logistical transportation assets.
4. Provide two additional C-123 aircraft for weekly scheduled flights out of Can Tho Airfield to increase the airlift capability for transportation movements to the Delta.
5. Evaluate the availability of in-country boat assets with a view toward returning heavy and medium USARV boat assets from I CTZ.

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6. Provide additional terminal service capabilities to Vinh Long, Can Tho and Dong Tam upon return of the 565th Trans Co (Terminal Service) from I CTZ.

7. Establish a 20 percent maintenance float criteria at the Binh Thuy (Can Tho) Supply Point, to include stockage of generators, pumps, and outboard motors. Establish a 5 percent maintenance float of major components of signal equipment at this supply point.

(C) With the implementation of the approved recommendations of this study, the logistical support in the Delta would be adequate in the future.

(C) During the month of July, action was taken to implement the approved recommendations of the above study. The 565th Trans Co (Terminal Service) deployed to the Saigon Support Command from I CTZ. The company was then reorganized into a terminal transfer company and charged with providing one terminal transfer platoon at each of the three ports of Dong Tam, Vinh Long, and Binh Thuy. At the same time, MACV expanded operations of the TMA at Can Tho to include commitment authority of all service logistical transportation assets.

(C) The 5 percent maintenance float for major components of signal equipment was requisitioned and the 20 percent maintenance float for generator pumps and outboard motors was scheduled for installation.

(C) In order to increase the intra-Delta transportation assets, the 231st Trans Co (Medium Boat) planned deployment area was changed to IV CTZ from I CTZ.

(C) Air shipments of post exchange merchandise to the Delta were increased from 50,000 to 80,000 pounds per week, while the remaining PX cargo continued to be transported by water LOC.

(C) Several additional actions were taken to improve the logistical support in the Delta. One was the establishment of "country stores" at each of the 16 sectors in the Delta. These stores, operated by the 1st Log Cmd, stocked all classes of supply. They also assisted in requisition processing, thereby providing control of intransit supplies, and providing organizational maintenance.

(C) Operation RAPID ARROW was initiated in May 1968 to provide a one-time fill of authorized equipment shortages to the 93 MACV advisory teams in IV CTZ. <sup>10</sup>

#### Transfer of Logistics Advisory Effort

(J) Effective 15 March 1968, the operational control of the logistics advisory effort with ARVN was transferred from USARV to Hq MACV. All personnel assigned to USARV-MA were also reassigned to Hq MACV.

(U) The logistic responsibilities for MACV staff elements were delegated as follows:

1. MACMA - the preparation of the Army Military Assistance Service Funding Plan and Program.

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2. MACT - was given the technical school advisory effort.
3. MACJ6 - assigned the responsibility for the signal personnel, technical training, organization, and pictorial advisory effort.
4. MACJ4 - was given the responsibility for the logistics management advisory effort.
5. All Technical Service Advisory Divisions and Area Logistics Command Advisory Teams were assigned to MACJ4 and remained in place. <sup>11</sup>

## ARVN Support Through US Logistics System

(U) COMUSMACV notified CINCPAC in October that a study had been completed to determine the most feasible and expeditious method of mating ARVN requirements to the US in-country logistics system. This study indicated that immediate requirements could be met by having ARVN submit requisitions for items stocked by USARV directly to US Army Inventory Control Center Vietnam (USAICCV) for processing.

(U) Under this concept, card decks of ARVN Requisition Objectives (RO) would be submitted for matching with in-country assets. A determination of requisitions could then be made, submitted, and filled. Requisitions that could not be filled would be forwarded to the 2d Log Comd for processing through the US system. At the same time, the minimum stock levels at which issues to ARVN could still be made would be determined to insure uninterrupted support of US forces. Also, ARVN RO would continue to be maintained at their base depots, and it was planned that requirements placed on USARV would be coded as non-recurring, thus assuring no increase in USARV RO.

(U) There were several advantages to be realized from this system:

1. Upon implementation of the Simplified Supply System (SSS) it was envisioned that no additional personnel would be required.
2. Required no additional equipment or facilities.
3. Provided immediate access to available materiel.
4. Reduced order/ship time for available items.
5. Maximised use of available US resources.
6. Would not impair development of a self-sufficient RVNAF.

(U) COMUSMACV requested comments from CINCPAC on the proposed concept and, at year's end, was awaiting approval in principle. <sup>12</sup>

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### Emergency Resupply of RVNAF

(U) On 11 February 1968, COMUSMACV announced a policy for emergency resupply of RVNAF. This policy granted RVNAF units equal priority with US units for Class I, II, and IV repairs, parts, and fortification materials and Class III and V material when emergency conditions prevailed, and when resupply could not be obtained from RVNAF sources. The purpose of the policy was to facilitate resupply of RVNAF under emergency conditions such as were experienced during the first few days of the Tet Offensive.

(U) This policy was revised in March in accordance with the following guidelines:

1. Implementation of the policy must be exercised with prudence, since the US's basic objective was to establish a responsive RVNAF logistics system.

2. Each advisor concerned must be assured that a tactical emergency does exist and that the RVNAF logistics system cannot respond in time to meet the requirement. <sup>13</sup>

### Airdrop Capability

(S) At the beginning of 1968, MACV possessed an airdrop capability of approximately 600 STON per day for 14 days. The assets, including both riggers and airdrop equipment, were located at Cam Ranh Bay, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang. Backup air items had been requested, with an expected delivery date in February.

(S) The need for this capability was clearly evident in February when a total of 4,400 STON of supplies were airdropped in RVN. (Approximately 2,200 STON were dropped into the besieged combat base at Khe Sanh). The daily average airdrop for the month was 150 STON per day. Backup airdrop items in Okinawa were thus called forward to maintain the in-country capability of 600 STON a day for 14 days.

(S) The amount of supplies airdropped continued to rise in March. A total of 5,418 STON were airdropped, approximately half of which went to Khe Sanh. As a result, a new supply requirement was established, calling for an airdrop equipment capability of 7,000 STON per month with an operating resupply level of 30 days.

(S) Although the total tonnage of airdropped supplies decreased in April, the figure was still significant. In addition to Khe Sanh, Operation DELAWARE was supported.

(S) The daily average airdrop decreased to 47 STON per day in May. Organic resources of the 1st Log Cmd were able to handle this decreased airdrop without additional support. Therefore, a platoon TDY from Japan since January to augment USARV's rigging capability was returned to its parent organization.

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(S) Throughout the year, supplies were dropped using the CDS, ARC LAPES, or free-fall methods. Monthly statistics for the year are as follows: <sup>14</sup>

<u>Month</u>	<u>STON</u>
Jan	0
Feb	4400
Mar	5418
Apr	3084
May	1463
Jun	1475
Jul	0
Aug	524.9
Sep	436
Oct	515
Nov	16.75
Dec	0
Total:	<u>17,332.65</u>

#### CLASSES OF SUPPLY

##### Class I

(U) The stockage objective of NAVSUPPACT at Da Nang was to obtain and maintain on hand 45 days "R", 90 days "S", and 120-days "MCI" Class I supplies for I CTZ. Toward this goal, stocks of "R" rations increased from 10-days on hand in January to 16 days at the end of February. However, heavy demands throughout the quarter and a slippage of ship schedules resulted in a decrease to 13-days of stock on hand at the end of March. This represented 29 percent of the stockage objective.

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1. S - Rations - There was also a heavy demand for S rations throughout the first quarter that decreased the stock on hand from 71 days to 17 days.

2. MCI - Rations - Stocks on hand declined from the 85-days at the end of 1967 to 2 days by the end of March 1968. The impact of the population buildup in I CTZ was primarily responsible for the decline. During March, for example, 7,964,200 meals were issued, an 89 percent increase over February issues. The 54,063 increase in I CTZ strength during the period contributed heavily to the draw-down on stocks.

(U) The percent of stockage objective on hand was expected to remain low until the receipt of outstanding orders.

(U) The stockage objective (S/O) in II, III, and IV CTZ depots was to obtain and maintain on hand 28-days "R", 56-days "S", and 10-days "MCI" Class I supplies.

1. "R" Rations - "R" rations stocks declined from a high of 31 days on hand in January to 21 days on hand by the end of March.

2. "S" Rations - A January - February decrease was the result of reduced requisitioning to approach the approval level. Stocks on hand increased in March, however, to 46-days or 82 percent of the objective.

3. "MCI" Rations - "MCI" rations increased to 30 percent of the objective by the end of March. This gain was due to increased requisitioning by USARV in anticipation of approval of their recommended increase in authorized stockage objective from 10 to 15 days on a test basis.

(U) The Class I stock position in II, III, and IV CTZ remained satisfactory. <sup>15</sup>

(C) The arrival of the Refrigerator Storage Ship SS Contest on 25 March 1968 augmented the Da Nang refrigerator space by 344,000 cubic feet. The 506th Field Depot, Saigon added 41,884 gross cubic feet of capacity and 45,600 cubic feet of refrigerator space were placed in operations at Chu Lai. Total refrigeration storage available on 31 August was 2,853,904 cubic feet. This compared with a required refrigeration storage capacity of 2,889,112 cubic feet.

(C) Class I stockage position continued to improve in I CTZ. The lowest percentages of stockage objective remained MCI rations, with 54 percent at the end of August. S and MCI rations remained in excellent overall stockage position in II, III, and IV Corps, with the on-hand slightly exceeding the stockage objective in R and MCI rations. <sup>16</sup>

(C) As of the end of December, the general Class I supply situation in USARV was in a good and fairly stable status. Refrigerated subsistence on hand remained three days over the stockage objective. Non-refrigerated subsistence was two days over the S/O. MCI rations, although decreasing during the month, remained 10 days over the S/O. This ten day overage was a result of receiving shipments that were scheduled to arrive in February and March 1969. STOP/SEE Action was initiated. If consumption continued as anticipated, the on-hand stocks would be in line with the authorized S/O by the end of March 1969. The overall stock position of NAVFORV was satisfactory, although on-hand refrigerated subsistence was below S/O.

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1. USARV: The December figures, in days of supply, were based on the total strength to be supported (an estimated 419,000 US/FWMAF):

	<u>S/O</u>	<u>O/H</u>
Refrigerated (R)	28	31
Non-Refrigerated (S)	56	58
Meal, Combat Individual (MCI)	15	25

2. NAVFORV: The following December figures, in days of supply, were based on consumption data: (Strength supported by NAVFORV 185,610).

	<u>Da Nang</u>		<u>Chu Lai</u>	
	<u>S/O</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>S/O</u>	<u>O/H</u>
Refrigerated (R)	45	19	18	8
Non-Refrigerated (S)	90	126	90	75
Meal, Combat Individual (MCI)	120	118	90	103

(C) Required refrigerated storage had increased at the end of the year to 2,945,600 cu. ft. The storage available had decreased, however, to 2,405,843 cu. ft. primarily because of the release of floating refrigerated reefer storage. 17

Conversion of Nonappropriated Fund Messes to Field Ration Messes

(U) The conversion of NAF messes to Field Ration Messes had been directed by MACV on 16 December 1966. Significant progress was made during 1968, with the last NAF in the conversion program, a 7AF NAF Mess, scheduled for reduction to a snack bar type operation in early 1969. Further discussion of this problem can be found in Chapter XII, Special Problems and Selected Topics. 18

Class II and IV

(U) There were four primary depots in RVN: Saigon, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay were administered by 1st Log Cmd for II, III, and IV CTZ, and NSA Da Nang for I CTZ.

(U) The Saigon depot continued to increase effectiveness throughout the first three months of 1968. Demand satisfaction rose from 48 percent in January to 50.2 percent in March. Total demands received at the Saigon depot reflected a downward trend, with a low of 74,494 demands being received in March.

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(U) Authorized stockage list (ASL) items stocked at Qui Nhon decreased from 91,992 at the end of December 1967 to 70,477 at the end of March 1968. Demand satisfaction dropped to 47.7 percent in January but rose to 52.3 percent in March. Total demands fluctuated throughout the quarter, reaching a high of 89,027. This was primarily due to the tactical situation at the time.

(U) Cam Ranh Bay showed considerable improvement throughout the first three months of 1968. Demand satisfaction rose to 67.4 percent in March. Indeed, Cam Ranh Bay had the lowest zero balance rate of the three USARV depots.

(U) NSA Da Nang demands and issues showed a strong upward trend with demands reaching 90,517 requests during March. Although net effectiveness had dropped slightly in February due to the impact of increased support requirements, the percentage rose in March to 90.8 percent. <sup>19</sup>

(C) Class II and IV posture remained satisfactory overall throughout the second and third quarter of 1968. The net effectiveness of NSA Da Nang declined to an average of 89.3 percent. USARV depots combined in II, III, and IV CTZ showed a demand satisfaction rate of 48.3 percent for Class II, IV, VII and IX supplies. This was down 7.1 percent from the second quarter average. <sup>20</sup>

(U) As the year ended, no significant problems were noted in these classes of supply. Project Counter (Army) and Rapid Area Supply Teams (Air Force) provided management assistance where needed. The Army installed the USARPAC Standard Supply Systems and Financial Inventory Accounting in the Inventory Control Center, Vietnam, (ICCV). The initiation of Project STOP/SEE prevented unneeded bulk items from entering RVN. Close management of excess materials by all services and improvements in their distribution resulted in substantial quantities of these materials being transferred on an inter-service basis. <sup>21</sup>

Critical Items

(C) 7AF had no items in a critical supply status during 1968. USARV, NAVFORV, and III MAF, however, all experienced items in short supply at various times of the year.

(C) The following items in USARV appeared most frequently on the critical list:

1. 400 gallon water trailers - This item remained in a critical supply status because of vast water requirements in RVN. Receipts during the year helped to balance battle losses but were not sufficient to overcome initial shortages. The receipt of 210 water trailers in late October finally alleviated the problem.

2. AN/PRC-25 Radios - In February USARV reported a shortage of approximately 2,000 of these radios. During the first five months of the year 507 AN/PRC-25's were received from CONUS, however, this gain was almost entirely offset by 474 combat losses. In the June meeting of DADAC, USARV was allocated 1075 of these radios with programmed arrivals in September and October. By the end of the year, this item was being replaced by the AN/PRC-77.

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3. Tactical Generators - This item remained on the critical list for the first nine months while authorizations and on-hand quantities were brought into better balance through coordination. There remained no provisions in the Closed Loop Program for support of MACV elements until the latter part of the year. Closed Loop assets continued to be deleted in favor of Government furnished contractor-operated equipment.

(C) Protective masks became a critical item in III MAF in June. A major supply was received in September but it was not enough to completely eliminate this shortage. Also, tire shortages in size 11.00 x 15 appeared on the June critical list and the shortage continued to increase over the next few months. Both tires and protective masks were still on the critical list in December.

(C) In NAVFORV a shortage of portable 6KW ONAN generators and associated repair parts was noted in August, and continued for several months to be a serious problem affecting PCF operations. <sup>22</sup>

M-551 Sheridans

(C) COMUSMACV approved a MACV staff study on the Sheridan Weapons System in Vietnam on 22 August. On 24 August, he directed CG, USARV to implement the recommendations of the study and to take action to obtain the Maintenance Support Plan and prepare the Mission Support Plan required for detailed logistical planning. COMUSMACV desired that a responsive priority supply system similar to the "stove pipe" system used in support of the Hawk air defense equipment be considered. This supply system would be operational until such time as in-country operational experience and repair parts stockage levels clearly indicated that a high rate of equipment operability for the M-551 could be assured. The maximum Not Operational Ready Supply (NORS) rate would be 15 percent. <sup>23</sup>

(U) In response to CG USARV's proposal for support of M-551 Sheridan, COMUSMACV commented on 12 October: <sup>24</sup>

While it is along different lines than the 'stovepipe' system I have seen used successfully on other weapons' system, I am more interested in the results than the system. My concern is that we will be able to adequately support this new item in its initial months in SVN.

(S) CG, USARV was informed by DA that 60 M-551 Sheridans would arrive in RVN in January 1969. Consequently, USARV recommended that the initial distribution of Sheridans be as follows:

27 to 1/4 Cav	1st Inv Div
27 to 3/4 Cav	25th Inf Div
o to	Maintenance Float

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This recommendation was in line with guidance that Phase I distribution of this system would be to M-48 tank equipped armored cavalry troops in IV CTZ, followed by similar units in III, I, and II CTZ in that order. COMUSMACV concurred on 2 December. 25

(C) CINCUSARPAC and COMUSMACV were advised by DA on 6 December that a new plan of deployment of the M-551 Sheridan to SEA would be effective in January. The deployment to USARV would be accomplished in two phases. Phase I would consist of 55 vehicles (54 TOE and 1 Float) with delivery date of 31 January 1969. Phase II would be contingent on the results of the theater evaluation, but would involve 342 vehicles (306 TOE and 36 float) delivered in increments. Final delivery was to be accomplished by 31 December 1969; replacement for combat losses would be deployed along with quantities noted above.

(C) The plans called for each M-551 Sheridan to be modified with belly armor, commanders' gun shields, 1 KW searchlight, and a closed breech scavenger system. Plans also called for a 45 day stockage objective. Repair parts would be available in-theater, concurrent with the arrival of the vehicles. 26

#### M-16 Rifle

(S) The issue of M16A1 rifles to RVNAF continued to be of prime importance among US logistical objectives. Late in January 1968, for example, COMUSMACV stated in a message to CINCPAC that the M-16 requirement for all in-country Philippine, Thai, and Vietnamese forces amounted to 591,958. This figure included a 3 percent maintenance float over a 3 percent attrition rate but did not include the 141,535 M-16 rifles already authorized and programmed. These figures reflected the requirements for a follow-on to the existing program to standardize weapons systems for combat units proposed for FY69, FY70, and eventually all elements of RVNAF. 27

(S) JCS assured CINCPAC in March that increased production of the M-16 rifle had been approved. Colt Firearms was scheduled to produce 50,000 rifles per month by June 1969. A second source would be developed in August 1969 and reach a monthly production of 25,000 by June 1970. The third source of rifles would become available in January 1969, and reach a monthly production of 25,000 by October 1969. These three sources would then represent the maximum production available. 28

(S) In April, COMUSMACV recommended that the current 50/50 split of monthly incoming M-16 assets between USARV and RVNAF be changed to a 25/75 ratio in favor of RVNAF. This revised allocation, COMUSMACV suggested, would complete the allocation of M-16s to ARVN combat units by the end of FY68. The reason for this request was to capitalize on RVNAF morale and aggressiveness, which was above pre-1968 level, and to lend impetus to RVNAF operations by expediting the issue of these advanced weapons. CINCPAC was also informed that it was considered essential to begin an early issue of the M-16s to RF/PF combat units. 29

(S) DA responded to COMUSMACV's proposal on 16 April stating that the 25/75 issue of M-16 rifles had been studied and the proposed distribution forwarded to JCS for approval. DA added, however, that the existing 5.56mm ammunition production and assets, projected through lead-time, would not support the increased weapons density for RVNAF and RF/PF at the approved Resupply Rate (RSR) of 8 ball and 1 tracer. DA therefore recommended that consideration be given to a reduced RVNAF stockage objective from 90 days to 45 days and a lesser RSR

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(2 to 4) for M-16s in the hands of RF/PF. DA noted that this plan would cause a delay in the issue of M-16 rifles to US support forces and could raise questions with Congress. <sup>30</sup>

(S) COMUSMACV concurred with DA's proposed order of priority of issue. He did not believe, however, that the 45 day stockage level would be adequate since the broad in-country dispersion of assets and unique distribution problems required a 90-day stockage objective. The RSR of 8 to 1 was only for ARVN and included training. The initial RSR for RF/PF of 2.4 rds/wpn/day for ball and .6 rds/wpn/day for tracers was believed sufficient, providing arrangements were made for training and initial basic load. COMUSMACV responded to the possible political questions by stating that the delay in equipping US support elements was part of the price that must be paid in getting RVNAF to assume a continually greater proportion of the military effort in SVN. <sup>31</sup>

(S) On 9 May, JCS approved the 25/75 split of assets through November 1968, at which time distribution would revert to a 50/50 basis. COMUSMACV was also given authority to tailor distribution of weapons arriving in-country.

(S) By the end of FY68, sufficient M-16 rifles were delivered to arm all Marine, Airborne Infantry, and Ranger battalions in RVNAF. These weapons were also issued to all mechanized rifle troops, recon companies, highland scout units, and Special Forces teams. Total M-16 rifles delivered to RVNAF by 30 June was 113,477. <sup>32</sup>

(S) COMUSMACV informed AMEMB that, as of 30 June, the issue of M-16 rifles to ARVN maneuver battalions had been completed. The next priority would be the RF/PF, PRU and advisors of Saigon/Gia Dinh. A total of 1,530 of the weapons had already been issued and an additional 27,487 M-16s required in Saigon/Gia Dinh would be completed by early August. <sup>33</sup>

(C) Priorities for issue of M-16 rifles to be received during FY69 and FY70 were established in July and followed a geographical basis. COMUSMACV approved priorities for issue to CMD, IV CTZ, I CTZ, III CTZ, and II CTZ in that order. <sup>34</sup>

(C) A significant acceleration occurred in the M-16 Rifle program in October with the decision by the Secretary of the Army to augment the RVNAF allocations by 53,600 weapons. The receipt of these additional M-16s, which were originally intended for training in CONUS, would permit completion of the original FY69 program by 30 April 1969, two months earlier than forecast.

(C) A major deviation from the established priority-issue order of CMD, IV CTZ, balance of III CTZ, and II CTZ was approved. This provided for an advance issue of approximately 18,000 weapons to certain III CTZ RF/PF and CIDG elements. The change was necessitated by "tactical requirements." <sup>35</sup> In October, US advisors throughout SVN were issued some 4,856 M-16 rifles. This was the result of a new policy of equipping all in-coming US advisors with this weapon.

(C) The status of M-16 issues from RVNAF allocations on 31 December 1968 was as follows: <sup>36</sup>

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	<u>Issued</u>	<u>To be Issued</u>	<u>Authorized</u>
FY67	9,731	--	9,731
FY68	108,710	---	108,710
FY69	161,937	125,234	287,171
FY70	---	321,564	321,564
Totals:	280,378	446,798	727,176
(Plus 5,120 issued to CIDG from earlier non-RVNAF allocations)			5,120
		Total Requirement	732,296

Class III

(S) Overall, the tankage objective for 1968 totaled 4.55 million barrels of combined military and commercial stores. This was the computed amount required to provide a 30-day storage objective for Program 5 Forces and to establish Cam Ranh Bay as a major distribution center (Figure IX-1).

(S) The capability to distribute bulk petroleum to and within RVN continued to increase from the beginning of the year due to improved methods and added facilities, including additional pipelines and storage tanks. Nevertheless, the consumption rate in the first quarter of 1968 slightly exceeded the 3,324,700 barrel/month available tankage. <sup>37</sup>

(S) No significant losses of POL or damage to major POL facilities were experienced during the Tet Offensive. Increased enemy activities failed to hinder operations at military terminals or interrupt the unloading of vessels. Minor difficulties were encountered, however, with inland distribution. This occurred mainly in the Saigon area and the IV CTZ area which were serviced primarily by commercial oil companies. Curfew restrictions on indigenous personnel limited commercial truck and vessel deliveries, and service was considerably hampered by enemy interdiction of highways and waterways. As the tempo of the Tet Offensive decreased, the military helped the commercial firms to restore and improve their services. River resupply routes in northern I CTZ were opened early in March, and some commercial truck deliveries northward on Route 1 from Esso's Da Nang terminal began in the same period.

(S) The limited POL stock situation in IV CTZ began to show signs of improvement in March. The Army provided YOGs and tank trucks to speed up deliveries and bulk POL was brought to some Delta locations by commercial truck drivers for the first time since Tet. A plan was initiated to carry bulk POL to the Can Tho terminals via the Bassac River. This procedure would cut tanker turnaround time by two days. Enemy reaction, however, continued. On 30 March the Esso tanker Christage came under rocket and small arms fire near Can Tho. Though one death and several injuries resulted, damage to the tanker was light. During that same month, the Cua Viet POL bag farm in I CTZ was heavily damaged by enemy artillery. Numerous POL bags were destroyed but the farm was back in operation in four days and the stock status in northern I CTZ was always able to meet demands.

(S) Enemy action in May forced the abandonment of the Wunder Beach-Quang Tri pipeline. The line was left in place as a backup bulk POL distribution system in the event the waterway between Cua Viet and Dong Ha was interdicted.










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


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### SUPPLY CLASS III

#### LEGEND

-  COMMERCIAL STORAGE
-  PLANNED (OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION) STORAGE (MIL OR COMM)
-  MILITARY STORAGE (STEEL)
-  TANKER
-  TRUCK
-  COASTAL TANKER / BARGE
-  PIPELINE
-  PLANNED PIPELINE
-  TAN MY - HUE QUAL PIPELINE



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FIGURE IX-1

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(S) Meanwhile, the buildup of forces in I CTZ during the first three months of the year necessitated the development of a bulk POL distribution system for the northern portion of the zone. This system consisted of two 6-inch pipelines (one from Tan My to Phu Bai via Hue and the other from Tan My to Quang Tri via Hue) and a line between Quang Tri and Dong Ha. Construction on this ambitious project started in March.

(C) In June, MACV tasked the Army with supply responsibility for JP-5 support of Navy helicopters operating from repair barges in the Delta. This marked the first time JP-5 would be stored and issued at an inland location in RVN. <sup>38</sup>

(S) Responsibilities for the operation and maintenance of the new northern I CTZ pipelines and facilities were assigned by COMUSMACV in July. CG, USARV was directed to assume initial responsibility for operating the lines once they were activated. Later, the Navy was to operate the bulk terminal at Tan My together with all waterway bulk fuel distribution. The Navy would also provide repair parts support for Navy-peculiar equipment installed in the pipeline system. The Army was thus scheduled to operate and maintain the Tan My-Hue-Quang Tri, and the three new pipelines as well as pump stations and bulk terminals at Camp Evans and Quang Tri. All fuel tank trucks belonged to the Army but could be supplemented by the USMC as required. The bulk terminals and associated facilities at Cua Viet, Dong Ha, and Phu Bai would be operated and maintained by the USMC. <sup>39</sup>

(U) The T-1 tanker California Standard in use in I CTZ was released from RVN service in October. The Pataluna, stationed in II CTZ, relieved the California Standard. These moves reduced RVN T-1 tanker assignments from 4 to 3, at a projected annual savings of 1.2 million dollars.

(C) POL storage and handling facilities continued to increase throughout the year. In October, bulk tankage storage exceeded the consumption rate for the first time, with the consumption amounting to 3,500,500 bbls for the month and tankage capability to 3,739,300 bbls. In December consumption dropped slightly to 3,459,500 bbls while the bulk tankage grew to 3,798,300 bbls. <sup>40</sup>

#### Class V and VA

(S) The supply of Class V and Class VA ammunition in RVN at the beginning of 1968 was more than adequate to support all operational commitments. Indeed, in 7AF the air munition posture had reached the point where resupply could replace munitions used and, at the same time, allow for the maintenance of adequate stock levels. At the end of January 1968 USARV had eleven items under ASR management, up three from the previous month. Ammunition receipts exceeded expenditures, thereby increasing stockage levels. In III MAF and NAVFORV, ammunition assets were sufficient to meet requirements.

(S) The Tet Offensive in February caused heavy drawdowns on many items of ammunition. Also, a number of enemy initiated incidents resulted in an increased loss of ammunition. The 7AF Ammunition Control Point at Tan Son Nhut was hit by a 122mm rocket on 19 February, causing extensive damage. USARV lost 7,204 STON, valued at \$9,100,032 due to enemy incursions. However, even though the tonnage and dollar value figures were significant, the overall effect on the theater Class V stockage position was minimal.

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(U) During the year, certain Class V items were placed on available supply rates (ASR) in order to conserve assets and achieve dollar savings within USARV, III MAF and RVNAF. The number of ASR controlled items averaged about 16 per month out of a total of approximately 200 authorized items. Because of insufficient production, five line items of this total remained on ASR in order to achieve dollar savings and increase stockage levels.

(C) ARVN had a 90-day stockage objective. The ARVN expansion and modernization program, with its increased weapon densities, resulted in additional basic loads. Also, ARVN's increased participation in combat operations necessitated an increase in their RSRs. The result was a relatively low stockage position but one that was expected to improve by January 1969.

(U) Storage areas in RVN varied from good to poor, with 99 percent of all storage space open and uncovered. In sandy beach storage areas, the instability of the base and barricades were basically unsatisfactory, while in forward areas, storage was improved by using modular concept developed by the Air Force and approved for Army use in RVN by USARPAC. At the same time, efforts were made to reduce the deterioration of slow moving items. One such effort included reducing these stocks to the lowest level consistent with operational requirements. 41

Five-by-Five Plan

(C) MACV Five-by-Five Plan was designed to reduce expenditure rates of several high dollar, high usage ordnance items, i. e., 81mm HE, 4.2" HE, 105mm HE, 155mm HE, and 8" HE ammunition. Toward this goal, COMUSMACV established management control Available Supply Rates (ASR) at 90 percent of the existing expenditure rates. Of the 10 percent saving, five percent went to major commanders to use, if required, for tactical emergencies. The other five percent would be retained within the supply system to build stockage levels. In all cases the management ASRs were below the approved RSRs. The Five-by-Five Plan was implemented with the 24 July - 24 August 1968 allocation period for USARV and the 1 - 31 August 1968 period for III MAF. During the period August - November 1968, the following savings were attributed to the Plan:

1. III MAF -----\$ 4,799,493.00
2. USARV -----\$32,058,958.00  
\$36,858,451.00

(C) During November 1968, a DA Team conducted a rate review of USARV high dollar/high usage items. New rates were established which were lower than the Five-by-Five ASRs. III MAF rates, controlled by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, were also changed and in many cases were also lower than the Five-by-Five Plan rates. Consequently, the Five-by-Five Plan was terminated as of 31 December 1968. 42

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Production of Critical Munitions

(S) In March, CINCUSARPAC expressed concern to DA about several critical munitions. An analysis of current and projected assets, he said, indicated that scheduled production would not meet the requirements of the theater. He then identified these munitions as:

- CTG 40mm HE.
- CTG 105mm HE.
- Fuse PD (81mm, 105mm, 4. 2in)
- CTG 175mm HE.
- CTG 7.62 (4 & 1 - minigun)
- Grenade Hand Frag
- CTG 105mm Illum
- CTG 81mm Illum
- CTG 4. 2" Illum
- CTG 81mm HE
- Sig Illum White Star Cluster
- Grenade Hand Smk Yellow
- Grenade Hand Smk Violet
- CTG 40mm (Multishot)

(S) A number of these items, CINCUSARPAC went on to say, were under ASR control in USARV with the possibility that additional items would be added in the near future. Immediate action, therefore, was necessary to increase production of the above critical items.

(S) DA was informed by CINCPAC on 12 April that USARV's on-hand stockage and off-shore reserve of the fourteen items listed as critical were below authorized levels and were still decreasing. The off-shore reserve status, for example, on 12 April was:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Authorized Level</u>	<u>On Hand</u>
40mm HE	1,007,490	6,318
105mm HE	1,111,320	195,629
Fuse PD	1,398,510	16

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<u>Item</u>	<u>Authorized Level</u>	<u>On Hand</u>
175mm HE	77,700	52
7.62 MLB 4&1 (Minigun)	32,820,000	0
Grenade Hand Frag	267,300	5,025
105mm Illum	67,350	36
81mm Illum	88,500	713
4.2 Illum	30,330	163
81mm HE	421,500	23,447
Sig Illum	25,740	2,349
Grenade Hand	106,920	9
40mm Multi-Shot	397,740	0

(S) CINCPAC emphasized the necessity of maintaining the off-shore reserve at authorized levels and requested all possible action be taken to rapidly buildup the off-shore reserve.

(S) On the same date CINCPAC informed CINCUSARPAC that ground munitions were under continuous review by DA and that OSD had been asked to provide additional funding for increased production in the FY68 program. OSD had also been asked for funds to expand production facilities of these items.

(S) A conference was held at USARPAC on 18-19 April for the purpose of reviewing SEA requirements for munitions and comparing these requirements against CONUS productions and allocations. Most of the items under ASR management were production limited in CONUS. DA indicated it would increase allocations and/or production where possible as a result of this conference throughout FY68 and early FY69. However, budget limitations and other high priority requirements dictated maintaining items on ASR and prudent use of ammunition in RVN.

(S) For example, in order to alleviate the shortage of Proj. 175mm HE in RVN, DA made the decision to transfer 65,000 rounds of this ammunition from Europe. The receipt of these assets in August allowed the ASR to be maintained at 26.0 R/W/D. By the end of the year, 175mm HE ammunition was removed from ASR management. Ammunition production of critical items showed considerable improvement at year's end although 12 items still remained under ASR management. <sup>43</sup>

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Beehive Ammunition

(C) In July 1968, CINCPAC requested information from COMUSMACV about the employment and effectiveness of Beehive ammunition in Vietnam. In response, COMUSMACV replied on 5 August that the CTG 90mm XM 590 W/F XM 711 (RR), CTG 105mm XM 546 W/F XM 53662 (105 How), CTG 106mm 581 W/F XM 592 E1 (RR), and CTG 90mm XM 580 W/F XM571 (TK) had indeed been highly effective, particularly against massed personnel targets in open terrain. In support of this conclusion, COMUSMACV offered the following facts:

1. It was often decisive in gaining fire superiority.
2. Excellent preparatory fire was possible prior to assault.
3. Due to its dispersion characteristics, Beehive ammunition destroyed enemy soldiers who would have been comparatively safe from near misses of HE ammunition.
4. It provided excellent coverage of suspected ambush sites when used in a reconnaissance by fire role.
5. Streets, alleys and similar access routes could be effectively cleared with it, as proven in the Hue City operation.
6. It was effective against enemy sampans and other river craft, frequently killing all personnel aboard without seriously damaging vessels and cargo.
7. Devastating results were obtained when used against enemy positions and snipers in tree lines.
8. When moving through uncovered areas with tanks and ONTOS, it has been found advantageous to have a round in the chamber set for missile action.
9. Beehive was impractical for dismounted operations in heavy jungle or swampy terrain, due to the weight of the weapons system. This sometimes restricted Beehive ammunition to a defensive role because, in such situations, the weight and bulkiness of the delivery system was not a disadvantage.
10. Beehive could be of optimum advantage at night since the dispersion of the round eliminated the necessity for pinpoint accuracy.

(C) COMUSMACV also stated that Beehive ammunition was highly susceptible to moisture, requiring that it be carried in the packing container to keep it dry. This requirement had a tendency to slow crew reaction time and increase weight. COMUSMACV felt that gun crews designated to fire this type of round should be given an assigned sector of fire and the signal to fire must be understood by all. <sup>44</sup>

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CS Munitions

(C) COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC in March that intensified combat operations had led to an increased employment of CS munitions in RVN, albeit under the specific guidance and control of COMUSMACV. Specifically the E158 CS cluster, 40mm CS grenade, and 4.2" mortar CS projectile had been used purposely in limited quantities, for evaluation. Based on this "initial" evaluation by III MAF, I and II FFORCEV, COMUSMACV recommended that production of these CS munitions be increased so as to meet the following recommended RSRs.

	<u>E-158 Cluster</u>	<u>40mm CS Gren</u>	<u>4.2" CS Proj</u>
USARV and FWMAF	40 rds/bde/mo	.045 RWD	4.0 RWD
III MAF	10 rds/bn/mo	.2 RWD	4.0 RWD
RVNAF	40 rds/div/mo	.045 RWD	1.0 RWD

(C) In support of this recommendation, COMUSMACV supplied the following rationale:

1. These CS munitions provide friendly units greater flexibility and operational capabilities. Indeed, the units now have a means of increasing the enemy's vulnerability by driving him from fortified positions to areas where he is more vulnerable to attack by air, artillery, and ground forces. This procedure also results in decreased friendly vulnerability and casualties.

2. In the offensive role, these munitions have been used against fortified positions, bunker and tunnel complexes, suppressing sniper fire, covering friendly movement, breaking contact, and blocking escape routes. They have been used on targets in populated areas, on mortar and rocket positions, for the preparation of LZs, and to neutralize the enemy when he attempted to use innocent civilians as shields.

3. In the defensive role, these CS munitions have been used at night to break up an assaulting force.

4. The 4.2" mortar and 40mm grenade CS munitions provide a means for attacking point targets and the E-158 cluster provides an accurate means of saturating an area target.

(C) Specific examples of how the effectiveness of CS munitions contributed to the success of tactical operations:

1. The 5th Bn, 60th Inf (Mech) engaged two VC companies in heavily fortified bunkers. After air and artillery preparation, an assault was made by the 5th Bn, 60 Inf (Mech) which failed to penetrate the enemy position. Four (4) E-158 clusters were used, followed by artillery. Enemy firing ceased and when the area was swept, 86 bodies were found.

2. A number of 4.2" mortar CS projectiles were used to break up a night assault on the defensive perimeter of the 2d Bn, 39th Inf. Members of the unit were of the opinion the CS munitions had broken the assault and prevented the VC from overrunning their position.

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(C) COMUSMACV stated that all indications were that the use of CS munitions had provided excellent results and clearly indicated the value of and urgent need for CS munitions in SVN.

(C) The status of these CS munitions at the end of the year was as follows:

1. E198 (XM15) Cluster - This heliborne munition was being produced at a rate meeting Vietnam requirements. It was removed from ASR control in July 1968. The RSR was 1.4 rounds per brigade per day.
2. 40mm CS Grenade - The monthly requirement of 55,000 rounds was scheduled to be met in early 1969 with deliveries during December 1968. Delivery did not materialize, however, as production slippage was encountered. All grenades that were in-country had been recalled from the field commanders and were held at Long Binh under MACV contingency control.
3. 4.2 inch CS Projectile - Operation evaluation of this munition was complete with an RSR of 2.5 RWD approved. Operational quantities were scheduled to arrive in Vietnam in January 1969. <sup>35</sup>

## SERVICES

### Laundry Services

(U) Monthly laundry requirements in the first quarter of 1968 were estimated at approximately 31,500,000 lbs of which roughly 65 percent was handled by the military and 35 percent by indigenous services. In general, laundry services were provided by:

1. Mobile field laundries.
2. Unit contract laundries.
3. Individual contract services.
4. Use of unit washing machines.

(U) Field laundries, as the name implies, provided service to units in the field; however, they were also used to supplement other facilities and equipment in garrison. Contract laundries, both unit and individual, provided service on an area basis to Saigon, Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Chu Lai, Phu Bai, Nha Trang, Soc Trang, Vinh Long, Can Tho, Pleiku, Vung Tau, An Khe, Cu Chi, Tuy Hoa, and Qui Nhon. Unit washing machines were common but also proved largely unsatisfactory. <sup>46</sup>

(U) Laundry continued as a major service requirement throughout the year, although there were surge periods. During the month of February, for example, the Saigon Support Command experienced a 50 percent increase in field laundry production due to the closing of commercial contractor facilities as a result of the Tet Offensive. Also, the buildup of forces

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in the I CTZ resulted in a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request being approved to provide additional funds to the existing Navy contract in Da Nang to support Army troops in that area. Finally, in 7AF, four portakamp laundry trailers were destroyed during a mortar attack at Binh Thuy on 14 April. The replacement of these units was effected by 7AF/13AF Laundry Tech Reps from in-theater excess assets. 47

#### Ice Plants

(U) By the end of March 1968, the ice production capability in MACV totaled 570 tons per day. This was supplemented by local purchases to satisfy a total estimated force requirement of about 1,880 tons per day. The program to supply ice to the forces in Vietnam included five ice plants with a daily capacity of 3, 6, 5, 10, and 15 tons respectively. In addition, ice cube machines with capacities varying from 200 to 2,500 lbs per day were in operation at mess facilities throughout RVN. 48

#### Property Disposal

(U) USARV (1st Log Cmd), utilizing the seven property disposal yards in Saigon, Long Binh, Vung Tau, Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang, had basic responsibility for in-country disposal of surplus US property. At the same time, the Foreign Excess Sales Office (FESO) had responsibility for foreign sales.

(C) The US State Department had given approval to reinstitute in-country sales after 1 November 1967. Responsibility for disposal operations was assumed by 1st Log Cmd due to the AMEMB having insufficient manpower to handle the job. 1st Log Cmd disposal operations continued with relative ease throughout the year, although there was some question over end-use checks of material. Nevertheless, during the year, 1st Log Cmd ran more than 24 sales with proceeds amounting to over two and one half million dollars. At year's end, disposal yard inventory was down to 74,706.8 STONS.

(C) Foreign sales of surplus property presented something of a problem. Although numerous meetings had been held between 1st Log Cmd and USG representatives, and representatives of the GVN, the Country-to-Country Agreement on disposal of excess, salvage, and scrap property remained in GVN hands, unsigned. This situation hampered the many sales since purchasers could expect export difficulties. In fact, delays in obtaining necessary permissive documents caused the USG to default up to 21 purchasers for failure to remove the property in the required time. This block, however, was partially removed on 9 November when, after two years of negotiations, the US and RVN concluded a country-to-country agreement. A particularly important facet of this agreement was the willingness of the government of RVN to set aside its claims to export taxes on US goods purchased by other countries for use outside RVN. 49

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#### Mortuary Services

(U) During 1968 USARV operated two mortuaries in RVN; one was located at Tan Son Nhut and the second at Da Nang. The mortuaries provided services to all US and FWMAF in Vietnam on a non-reimbursable basis and in an emergency could process 50 to 60 remains per day for an extended period of time. Services rendered at US Army mortuaries at Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang for 1968 totaled 17, 101. (See Figures IX-2 and IX-3). 50

#### MAINTENANCE

(C) During 1968, in-country maintenance continued to be adequate to support all operational requirements. Despite an overall improvement in the maintenance of unit equipment, some maintenance problems existed. The aging of material handling equipment (MHE), lack of spare parts, and shortages of skilled personnel experienced by all services, restricted mission effectiveness of MHE. To improve the posture, a command vehicle improvement program was initiated which included off-shore maintenance support, use of local nationals to release skilled personnel from semi-skilled duties, continued use of Interservice Support Agreements (ISSA) and aggressive training programs.

(U) The rapid growth and the modernization of advisory teams naturally resulted in many maintenance headaches and culminated in a maintenance support program being established for advisory teams. Essentially, this program consisted of using contact teams from the 1st Logistical Command maintenance units to provide needed support.

(C) USARV's Red Ball Express System continued to be effective in reducing Not Operationally Ready Supply (NORS) on USARV equipment. A plan to expand Red Ball Aerial Ports of Embarkation (APOE) to include Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang was instituted on a trial basis and proved effective.

#### Captured Enemy Weapons Program

(C) COMUSMACV expressed concern in February that weapons captured by US forces were not under positive control. During 1967, for example, accountability and control had been lost for 40 percent of the weapons captured by US forces. As a result of COMUS' concern, a monthly review and reporting system, following component command/III MAF command channels, was implemented. The new program for control and disposal resulted in proper accounting for 94 percent of the weapons captured in 1968. 51

#### Seventh Air Force

(S) The requirement to keep over 1,000 aircraft operational demanded a tremendous maintenance effort on the part of all 7AF maintenance personnel, particularly since the Operational

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## US ARMY MORTUARY TSN

<u>Month</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Othe</u>
Jan	558	6	4	4	12	27
Feb	1,022	35	13	7	33	83
Mar	713	22	11	4	6	28
Apr	562	7	14	0	14	52
May	923	22	14	6	11	66
Jun	516	13	11	3	11	36
Jul	359	9	12	3	5	38
Aug	525	9	14	0	7	27
Sep	535	9	8	1	4	63
Oct	357	213	31	24	10	31
Nov	497	8	32	2	9	52
Dec	468	9	11	2	8	50
TOTAL	7,035	362	175	56	130	553

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FIGURE IX-2

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## US ARMY MORTUARY DA NANG

<u>Month</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Other</u>
Jan	188	2	28	303	1	22
Feb	454	4	48	638	10	57
Mar	395	2	50	470	1	54
Apr	395	2	38	441	2	70
May	494	3	50	670	2	27
Jun	234	4	32	571	0	38
Jul	217	2	16	329	0	24
Aug	260	4	18	340	0	24
Sep	215	2	19	374	1	14
Oct	171	2	12	175	0	21
Nov	96	2	17	227	3	23
Dec	<u>93</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>224</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>24</u>
TOTAL	3,212	34	363	4,762	21	398

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FIGURE EX-3

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Readiness (OR) objective for all 7AF aircraft was 71 percent with a Not Operationally Ready Maintenance (NORM) rate of 24 percent or less. During 1968, the OR and NORMs fluctuated for all aircraft but generally attained AF goals with the exception of the F-4 C/D. This complex aircraft, except for the months of June, August and December, failed to meet 7AF standards. The high NORM was attributed to engine systems, time compliance technical orders, declassification and reclassification of radar sets, inspection of transfer aircraft, and battle damage. <sup>52</sup>

#### United States Army, Vietnam

(S) USARV operated approximately 3,800 aircraft of some 19 different types, the great majority of them being helicopters. The operational readiness rates of these aircraft fluctuated throughout the year.

(C) USARV's primary mission aircraft, the UH-1D/H and CH-47, had OR objectives of 78 percent and 65 percent respectively. The OR rate on the combined UH-1D/H fleet gradually decreased during the early part of the year and, at the end of the first quarter, was 7 percent below the standard. This decrease in the OR rate was generally attributed to an increase in both NORS and NORM, with the NORM being the primary problem. Installation of avionics retrofit Modification Work Orders (MWO), engine changes, and battle damage were contributing factors to the high NORM. Improvement in the OR rate was noted in July, being only 2.9 percent below the 78 percent goal.

(C) The OR rate on CH-47 aircraft decreased from the fourth quarter of 1967, due primarily to a high NORM rate caused by the in-processing of 34 additional air frames and battle damage repair. Though the average OR rate was 5.6 percent below the standard for the first three months of 1968, definite improvement was noted by the end of July. <sup>53</sup>

(S) In August, CG, 4th Inf Div informed COMUSMACV of acute helicopter maintenance problems experienced by the 4th Inf Div. The Division had 42 helicopters deadlined at that time and had been unable to keep more than approximately 65 percent of them in flyable status. The major cause for the high deadline rate was inability to obtain parts. This problem proved to be only temporary. A concerted effort was made by USARV and the 4th Inf Div to solve the spare parts problem. USARV provided guidance which materially improved the status of the helicopter fleet. By the end of the month the OR rate had risen to 70 percent from the earlier figure of 64 percent. The 4th Inf Div had no significant helicopter problems the remainder of the year and their helicopter status was comparable to the USARV averages. <sup>54</sup>

#### Track and Wheeled Vehicles

(S) The 4th Inf Div experienced considerable problems with fuel cells on M113 APCs. Investigation of the problem revealed that eight of the 28 M113s in the Division were deadlined in August because of cracked fuel cells. Twenty-two fuel cell repair kits were in Red Ball requisition for the 149th Maint Co, Pleiku, and an additional 20 kits per month were scheduled. Apparently no other units were experiencing problems of this type. The M113 picture had improved by the end of August with the arrival of 15 vehicles in Qui Nhon destined for the 4th Inf Div. <sup>55</sup>

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#### T53-L-13 Engines

(U) A critical shortage of T53-L-13 engines existed in RVN in April resulting from a use rate which exceeded the programmed closed loop rebuild rate. Contributing factors were damage incurred during the Tet Offensive and the achievement of only 2/3 of the programmed time between overhaul (TBO) rate. Command emphasis was placed on this problem and steps were taken to reduce losses due to foreign object damage and to improve maintenance/utilization planning.

(C) The decision was made in May that DA would control this program and resulted in this item's removal from the closed loop and intensive management system. <sup>56</sup>

#### Recovery Vehicles, M88 and M578

(C) Excessive deadline rates on recovery vehicles imposed additional workloads on field maintenance operations and restricted recovery operations of combat vehicles and self-propelled artillery. The major causes of the high deadline rate were the relatively low density in RVN, constant usage, over age, and worldwide shortage of parts. The OR rate for the M88 improved by 11.3 percent during November with an average of 15 of the 95 vehicles on hand deadline. The M578 declined in OR rate by 3.9 percent with an average of 15 of the 68 M578s on hand deadline. <sup>57</sup>

### III Marine Amphibious Force

(C) The maintenance program in III MAF remained adequate to support the assigned mission. In December 1967, CG, FMFPAC had directed that all equipment deadline in III MAF Force Logistics Command shops beyond 30 days be evacuated to Third Force Service Regiment. A total of 517 items qualified for evacuation at the inception of the program. By the end of January 1968, the overall deadline rate of combat essential equipment had decreased to 3.1 percent compared to the preceding month's 4.4 percent deadline rate. The deadline rate for 1968 then fluctuated from a high of 3.8 percent in February to a low of 2.1 percent in September.

(S) Marine aircraft NORM and OR rates fluctuated throughout the year. Specific causes of some of the principal aircraft and helicopter problems (A6A, EA6A, Ch-46 A/D, UH1E) were systems malfunctions, trouble-shooting and systems wiring, battle damage, and engine changes. <sup>58</sup>

### US Naval Forces, Vietnam

(S) Navy maintenance supported operations in RVN both in- and out-of-country. SEVEN-THFLT ships were provided general maintenance support repair work and dry docking at the US Naval Ships Repair Facilities in Yokosuka, Subic Bay, Guam, and at Ship Repair Department of Fleet Activities, Sasebo, Japan. Commercial facilities in Singapore also provided some overhaul maintenance. The hundreds of in-country patrol, logistic, and service craft were supported by the US Naval Support Activities at Saigon and Da Nang. Repair craft and

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mobile support bases were utilized extensively. The Navy provided all US and FWMAF military bases in I CTZ with repair and utilities maintenance. Considerable vehicle maintenance was also included. The maintenance effort adequately supported the mission throughout the year. <sup>59</sup>

(U) Vehicle maintenance was the major problem for NAVFORV during 1968. OR rates ranged from a low of 50 percent for 15 ton trailers in July to a high of 88 percent for 15 ton tractors in February. Most of the deadlined equipment was awaiting parts. Although NORM fluctuated during 1968, approximately 50 percent of the cargo vehicles carried under NORM were in the shop for preventive maintenance much of this period. <sup>60</sup>

## TRANSPORTATION AND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

### General

(C) Highway movements increased in 1968. Contributing factors to this increase were the improvement in security condition GREEN highways and the additional utilization realized by the conversion of five light truck companies to medium truck companies in August 1968. Rail movements showed an increase over 1967 despite repeated interdiction of rail facilities. Common Service Air Lift System (CSAS) movements increased from a monthly average of 86,025 STON during 1967 to 107,173 STON in 1968. Port performance was improved. Retrograde cargo movements by air and sea averaged 42,869 STON monthly during 1968.

(U) The Transportation Management Agency (TMA) instigated improved managerial techniques and programs which measured responsiveness to shippers; insured that only valid requirements were moved, especially by premium transportation; and gained maximum utilization of transportation assets, resulting in increased efficiency and economy. Additional Traffic Region Headquarters, established at Cam Ranh Bay and Can Tho, and expanded liaison with the Logistical Support Commands, shipping activities, and other carriers, provided better shipper responsiveness. <sup>61</sup>

(U) An example of the smooth working effectiveness of transportation efforts was aptly demonstrated in Operation LIBERTY CANYON. This operation consisted of the movement of the 1st Cav (AM) Div from I CTZ to III CTZ. The movement commenced on 28 October 1968 and terminated on 13 November 1968.

(S) In support of LIBERTY CANYON, the 834th Air Div moved a total of 11,662 passengers and 3,102 STONS of cargo, utilizing 436 C-130 sorties. In addition, 140 logistical sorties were flown to replenish supplies consumed prior to the conclusion of the operation. MSTSO-Vietnam moved 2,121 passengers and 35,059 M/TONS of cargo. The Seventh Fleet support of LIBERTY CANYON accomplished the movement of 2,063 passengers and 24,762 M/TONS of cargo. TMA coordinated the move. COMUSMACV commended all personnel involved in the successful completion of LIBERTY CANYON and stated that it was "tangible proof of our capability to perform joint movement operations." <sup>62</sup>

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(U) In 1968, a fully coordinated highway restoration program was planned and programmed through completion. Over 805 km of highway restoration was completed against a combined 1967 and 1968 target of 10 km; another 820 km were under construction. Significant progress was made on restoration of the Vietnamese Railroad System (VNRS), nearly 50 percent of the main line was restored and operating.

(U) The outlook for 1969 was bright. Tonnage moved by highway and rail was expected to increase. CSAS movements should remain constant. With the buildup completed, the monthly port performance should remain constant or decrease slightly. Completed construction of an additional 1,200 km of highways and the restoration of more of the VNRS was expected to materialize in 1969. 63

#### Establishment of the Lines of Communication (LOC) Division

(U) It became apparent late in the final quarter of 1967 that emphasis was shifting from base development to LOCs. Thus, while the organization of the MACV Construction Directorate was well suited to the management of the base development mission, it was not as responsive to LOC construction management. As a consequence, establishment of a LOC Division within the Construction Directorate and elimination of the Construction Management Division had been approved by the Director of Construction in December 1967.

(U) On 1 January 1968 the LOC Division was formed, less the Advisory Branch. On the same date the Construction Management Division was dissolved. The functions were redistributed to give the LOC Division full responsibility for supervision of construction planning, programming, and supervision of roads, railroads, waterways, and dredging. 64

#### Emphasis on Lines of Communication

(S) The enemy Tet Offensive had resulted in serious disruption of the LOCs in RVN. This was especially true in the case of the railroads and the highway system. Significant psychological, economic, and military gains could be realized by the quick restoration of key roads and waterways. The rapid restoration of key economic life lines would revitalize the RVN economy by restoring the flow of food, commerce, and the population. COMUSMACV expressed his concern to his commanders on 4 February by directing full effort and resources towards opening, securing, rehabilitating, and maintaining land and water LOCs to facilitate the free uninhibited flow of commerce and population to assist military operations. Towards this end, engineer tasks were reevaluated to divert those of lower priority to LOC missions. 65

#### Highways

(S) A great deal of overall improvement in the highway system in RVN was noted by the end of 1967. A total of 3,765 km of national and provincial highway system was in operation in the Republic. However, only 2,293 km (60.9 percent of the system) was considered in the GREEN or safe category as 1968 began. There was still much to be done in the way of security and restoration to achieve the goals established by the 1968 Combined Campaign Plan. The security goals were 2,747 km GREEN and 1,018 km AMBER for essential national inter-provin-

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cial, provincial, and supplementary military highways. (GREEN - Open - controlled by RVN/US/FWMAF during daylight hours with minimum security measures. AMBER - Open - Used by RVN/US/FWMAF during daylight hours with thorough security measures. RED - Closed - Requires major military operations or engineering efforts to open.) The restoration priorities were to be established by the Combined Central Highway and Waterway Committee. <sup>66</sup>

#### Hq MACV Assumption of the Highway Civil Advisory Function

(U) On 1 February 1968 Hq MACV assumed responsibility for the Highway Civil Advisory Function from USAID. A major purpose of the transfer of function was to provide responsive centralized control of the various elements of the road and highway program in Vietnam.

(U) The Director of Construction (MACDC) was given the following responsibilities:

1. Provide advisory support to the Director General of Highways (DGOH), the five District Engineers and their respective staffs, and the Public Works Chief of each province on all matters pertaining to the national and inter-provincial highway system.
2. Develop the annual AID/DOD highway program in coordination with USAID.
3. Provide advisory support of the Highway Training Center at Suoi-Lo-O and such other training activities as were centrally funded and controlled.
4. Provide advisory support of the highway construction equipment maintenance and repair program charged to the Director General of Highways.
5. Consideration of equipment requirements for provincial and lesser roads in executing his advisory function.
6. Integration of civil and military major highway programs, giving due consideration to organizational capabilities, funding limits, requirements for long-range development of the DGOH, and guidance from the Combined Central Highway and Waterway Committee.

(U) MACCORDS retained responsibility for:

1. Development and implementation of an annual provincial and lesser roads program; for the improvement of provincial, village, and unclassified local roads. (With MORD, MPW, and USAID).
2. Coordination with MACDC on the program to provide and maintain MPW highway equipment.
3. Provision of advisory support on provincial and lesser roads through CORDS Regional Engineers.

(U) All personnel responsible for advisory support of the DGOH, the District Engineers, and members of their staffs on matters dealing primarily with the national and inter-provincial highway system, the central training mission and the equipment maintenance and repair program were to be assigned to the Advisory Branch, LOC Division, MACDC. <sup>67</sup>

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## USAID and AID/DOD Funding Support of the Highway Program

(U) USAID assumed an advisory and assistance mission to the GVN Directorate General of Highways beginning in 1962. Highway maintenance projects and support of the equipment and facilities for this maintenance were funded by USAID. Although this mission was then assumed by MACV, USAID documentation continued in use.

(U) In January, 1968, the two annual USAID preliminary documents necessary for project approval were completed. The first of the documents, known as the Sectoral Plan, established goals and objectives. It was essentially a policy paper and furnished official guidance for preparing the second document known as the Country Assistance Program (CAP). This budgeted funds for program expenditures as detailed in the working papers: the Project Agreement, and the ancillary Project Implementation Orders for each activity. Publication of these documents was completed in June 1968.

(U) The USAID program supported four continuing type projects which were funded as follows:

An Giang Quarry	\$ 2,660,000
Equipment Repair Contract	2,200,000
Technical Services Contract	370,000
DGON Commodities and Advisory personnel	<u>1,530,000</u>
	\$ 6,760,000

(U) In addition, under separate documentation, USAID provided \$3,000,000 for a project to rehabilitate the city streets in Nha Trang. Further, to complement the construction effort, USAID separately funded an additional \$141,000 for building rehabilitation, commodities support, and personnel staffing of a National Equipment Training Center at Suoi Lo O, on the north edge of Saigon.

(U) After the close of the year it was determined that the first contractual-year of operations in An Giang Quarry and for the Equipment Repair Contract would cost less than the estimates. The totals could therefore be revised to:

An Giang Quarry	\$ 1,110,000
Equipment Repair Contract	1,500,000
Technical Services	370,000
DGON Commodities and Advisory personnel	1,530,000
Nha Trang Streets	3,000,000
National Training School	<u>141,000</u>
	\$ 7,651,000

(U) Concurrent with the USAID program another program had been instituted in 1967: The AID/DOD Realignment Program. The principal objective of this program was to fund highway construction by contractor forces, supplementing the troop construction being carried on in the less secure areas using DOD funds. This program also assisted in the GVN advisory mission and commodities support.

(U) The AID/DOD program was budgeted through USAID/Vietnam. USAID documentation was used and a separate Project Agreement titled "Highways Improvements" accounted for the funds for the program. This document was also the instrument for reimbursement of USAID

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budgeted funds by DOD. The original FY68 budget was as follows:

Advisory Effort	\$ 400,000
Engineering A&E Services	900,000
Saigon Convoy Routes	2,400,000
Route 4 Repair	3,500,000
Tan Thuan Bridge	500,000
Commodities	<u>3,000,000</u>
	\$10,700,000

(U) In June 1968 additional funds were made available from the AID/DOD Reimbursable Program. The increased funding was applied to some of the existing activities and added the prestress facility at Chau Thoi, north of Saigon. The new totals were:

Advisory Effort	\$ 400,000
Engineering A&E Services	2,400,000
Saigon Convoy Routes	3,940,000
Route 4 Repairs	8,640,000
Tan Thuan Bridge	500,000
Prestress Facilities	2,000,000
Commodities	<u>3,460,000</u>
	\$21,340,000

(U) American Aid Chapter Support: The MACDC-managed advisory mission assisted the Directorate of Highways, RVN, in their program of road and bridge maintenance. The annual budget allotted to DGOH by the Directorate General for Budget and Foreign Aid of GVN amounted to 750,000,000 piasters (conversion rate: 118 piasters to the dollar).

(U) MILCON. In FY68 the MILCON package for the LOC program consisted of \$10.8 million (68 regular) for the Navy and \$1.0 million of 68 Regular and \$16.7 million of 68 Contingency assigned to the Army, but controlled by MACV. The Contingency funds were used to support both Army and Navy projects. In FY69 \$30.8 million of Army MILCON funding was added to the program and \$3.0 million Navy. Of this total of \$62.3 million, \$35.7 million was used for troop unit construction and \$26.6 million for contract construction of roads and bridges.

(U) OMA. Army OMA funds in the amount of \$76.0 million were applied to the LOC program in II, III and IV CTZ in FY68 to support combat operations requirements for improved roads. An additional \$19.8 million of FY69 OMA funds were programmed. Of the total amount \$69.8 million was for contract work and the remainder supported troop work.

(U) OPN. Navy OPN funds were utilized in I CTZ to procure materials for troop unit construction of roads and bridges. In FY68 \$10.0 million was utilized in the LOC program and in FY69 another \$14.8 million was programmed.

(U) The objectives of the combined highway program funding were:

1. Improve capabilities of the Directorate of Highways through procurement of commodities, equipment repair services, and technical guidance.

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2. Through contract and military forces, improve to acceptable standards priority sections of National and Inter-provincial Routes and rehabilitate Saigon area convoy routes.
3. Through contract services, improve deteriorated priority streets in Saigon, Nha Trang.
4. Through contract services, develop the An Giang Quarry to relieve the critical shortage of crushed rock in the Delta area to promote improvement of its highways and bridges.
5. Assist provincial roads sector through equipment repair mobile teams and procurement of commodities.
6. Through commodity and advisory services, assist the Directorate of Highways to train equipment operators and mechanics through the National Training Center.
7. Fund restoration a total of 2288 kilometers of National and Inter-provincial Highways through FY69 as follows: 68

I CTZ	511 km
II CTZ	1114
III CTZ	444
IV CTZ	<u>219</u>
	2288 km

### I CTZ

(U) The significant land LOCs in I CTZ included: QL-9, leading west from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh; QL-1, along the coast from the DMZ to the I/II CTZ border; and Route 551, between Hue and the Tan My Port. The Third Naval Construction Brigade was scheduled to commence a restoration program on sections of these highways in the latter part of March, with the primary effort in the first two months devoted to assembling equipment and getting the rock quarries in full operation. However, the lack of security during the Tet Offensive naturally delayed the program somewhat. Not until the month of April was restoration started along approximately 75 miles of primary LOCs in I CTZ. Also, the perennial shortage of crushed rock in northern I CTZ soon proved a major problem. Earlier in the year, arrangements had been made to barge rock north from Da Nang but even this was not enough.

(U) Despite sabotage and interdictions, significant progress was made in upgrading, paving, bridge repair, and construction on the primary road system in I CTZ. Two important bridges on QL-1 were sabotaged in early April, a 740 foot timber bridge and the 394 foot Truoi Bridge, both between Phu Bai and Phu Loc. The smaller bridge was repaired in 48 hours; however, the larger bridge required major repair. Meanwhile, minor incidents occurred at the rate of one or two per week, mainly in the vicinity of the Hai Van Pass.

(U) During the months of July, August, and September, military and RMK/BRJ construction engineers continued restoration and upgrading efforts. By the end of September, 105 km of roadway out of the 120 km started in the spring of 1968 had been restored or upgraded to MACV standards, although not without difficulty. Despite the installation of 400 TPH crushers at Da Nang, Black Rock Quarry, and Freedom Hill, the shortage of crushed rock in I CTZ remained

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a problem. Also, rains in September from typhoon "Bess" flooded I Corps from Da Nang north to the DMZ. Flood damage was extensive, particularly in the Hai Van Pass where several culverts were washed out or undermined.

(U) During the fall, engineer units and RMK/BRJ continued restoration and upgrading effort along all priority highways. By the end of December, 167 km of roadway had been restored or upgraded to MACV standards.

(C) By the end of the year, of the 515 km of essential roads in I CTZ, 75.5 percent were considered in the safe or GREEN category. RED category highways amounted to 5.8 percent.

### II CTZ

(U) There were five principal roads in II CTZ: QL-1 extending from I/II CTZ border along the coast through Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, and Phan Rang to the III Corps border; QL-11 between Phan Rang and Dalat; QL-14, extending north from Dao Thong to Dak To; QL-19 leading east from Pleiku to an intersection with QL-1 about ten miles north of Qui Nhon; and QL-20 extending southwest from Dalat to the III Corps border. Considerable work was accomplished on sections of QL-1 and QL-19 during the first quarter of 1968. Although QL-11 and QL-20 were also considered important economic and logistic routes, they were not considered as critical. No major restoration was planned on these routes in 1968 but normal maintenance was performed.

(U) During the second quarter, the rate of interdictions was low, incidents occurring only once every ten days on the average. QL-20 was closed on one occasion for a four-day period due to sabotage to the road and bridges.

(U) Highway restoration and improvement lagged in II CTZ in the latter part of the year due mainly to a number of storms causing road inundation and flood damage.

(C) At the end of 1968, there were 1722 km of military essential highways operational in II CTZ, 53.7 percent in the GREEN category with the remainder in the AMBER status. Of the 1722 kms of essential highway, 340 km have been upgraded to MACV standards.

### III CTZ

(U) Principal roads in III CTZ were: QL-1, extending from the border of II CTZ through Bien Hoa and Saigon; QL-4, extending from Saigon to the IV CTZ; and QL-15, extending from Long Binh to Vung Tau. The LOC program in III CTZ was accomplished by both contractor and troop effort.

(U) Considerable work was accomplished by the end of June on the City of Saigon streets. Approximately 20 percent of the total paving planned for FY68 was completed. This included Cach Mang, Hai Ba Trung, and the MACV access road. Seventeen miles of city streets remained to be paved.

(U) The Newport Bridge sustained serious damage in May and was closed until repairs by OICC contractor forces had been completed on 8 June.

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(U) Excellent progress was made in the restoration of QL-4 from Saigon to My Tho. However, the Ben Luc bridge was interdicted on three separate occasions, 3 March, 30 June and 3 October, which delayed the overall completion of paving. (See Chapter XII for Details).

(U) Considerable progress was made in III CTZ in the fourth quarter of 1968. The restoration of QL-1 from Bien Hoa to Xuan Loc was completed to the intersection with QL-20. QL-4 from Saigon to My Tho had been paved and 38 percent of the work on the Saigon city streets slated for restoration had been completed.

(U) On 6 November, the Phyloung bridge on MSR 25 was interdicted. Repairs were expected to be completed by 25 January 1969.

(C) At year's end, there were 1050 km of essential roads in III CTZ with 65.1 percent considered in the GREEN category. Also, 272 kms of these essential roads were restored to MACV standards.

#### IV CTZ

(U) The road network in IV Corps consists mainly of inter-provincial roads and one national highway. The national highway, QL-4 was the main supply route into the Delta. This road was narrow, low and in need of repair. Besides the rain and traffic contributing to the deterioration of Route 4, interdiction by the enemy had played a major role in its degradation, especially between My Tho and My Thuan.

(U) In January 1968, plans were made to restore QL-4 from the My Tho Junction to the My Thuan Ferry using the civilian construction from RMK/BRJ. Work was to begin immediately after the Tet holiday. However, activities by the VC during the Tet Offensive and the continued threat after Tet changed these plans. Since the contractor felt the area was not secure enough to move equipment and unarmed work parties onto the road, the mission of maintaining the road fell to II FFORCEV, rather than the contractor, on 5 March 1968. For the next three months work continued without interruption. The engineer companies bivouacked along the road while elements of the 9th Inf Div provided security for the work sites. By 1 July, the project was 90 percent complete.

(U) During the last three months of 1968, increased emphasis was placed on highway restoration in the Delta. Engineer troop units and contractor efforts were diverted from I and III CTZ to IV CTZ. This emphasis resulted in the funding of approximately 176 km of highways in the IV CTZ during the fourth quarter of 1968.

(C) At the end of December, 54.3 percent of the highway system in IV CTZ was in the GREEN category; 45.7 percent was considered AMBER. (See Figure IX-4)


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### SECURITY STATUS ESSENTIAL MILITARY ROADS

AS OF 31DEC68

- CONTROLLED BY RVN/US/PWMAF DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS WITH MINIMUM SECURITY MEASURES
- USED BY RVN/US/PWMAF DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS WITH THOROUGH SECURITY MEASURES
- REQUIRES MAJOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OR ENGINEERING EFFORTS TO OPEN



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FIGURE IX-4

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Security Status

(C) The security status of the RVN highway system in 1968, by months, was as follows:<sup>69</sup>

	<u>PERCENT GREEN</u>	<u>PERCENT AMBER</u>	<u>PERCENT RED</u>
Jan	42.5	53.1	4.4
Feb	37.6	53.9	8.5
Mar	46.1	46.1	7.8
Apr	48.2	45.4	6.4
May	46.3	49.5	4.2
Jun	52.9	44.2	2.9
Jul	54.9	43.6	1.5
Aug	51.7	46.8	1.5
Sep	54.1	44.0	1.9
Oct	56.3	41.8	1.9
Nov	57.4	40.7	1.9
Dec	59.0	39.1	1.9

Highway Performance

(C) Cargo movement by highway increased slightly during the first three months of 1968 as compared to that of the previous quarter. A total of 3,579,606 STONS were moved, with the preponderance of it being dry cargo. There was a large increase of cargo moved by motor transport during the second quarter of 1968 with some 4,006,011 STONS transported. The month of June set a new high for the first six months of the year, and it was significant that the percentage of cargo by local haul increased to 32.8 percent.

(C) Except for a slight drop in September, the amount of cargo transported by motor transport continued to increase. A high for the year was established in December with 1,532,302 STONS of cargo transported. This represented a significant increase over the previous month, primarily due to the III MAF increase in line haul highway movements. Line haul accounted for 28.0 percent of the total tonnage moved, local haul 26.7 percent, and port and beach clearance the remaining 45.3 percent.

(C) The highway performance by month was as follows: <sup>70</sup>

	<u>Cargo in STONS</u>
Jan	1,314,925
Feb	1,018,519
Mar	1,246,163
Apr	1,326,286
May	1,326,275
Jun	1,353,449
Jul	1,318,103
Aug	1,376,964

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Cargo in STONS

Sept	1,147,640
Oct	1,408,025
Nov	1,475,140
Dec	1,532,302

Significant Events

(C) In January 1968, a plan was conceived to run a convoy from Saigon to Dong Ha to prove to the civilian population of SVN that Route 1 was open and secure. An ARVN convoy of 60 vehicles departed Saigon on 17 January. The convoy arrived at Quang Tri City on 24 January where a ceremony was held by CG, ARVN I Corps. The convoy then proceeded to its final destination of Dong Ha and arrived the same date. Ten trucks from the original convoy made the entire trip, while others joined or left at various stopovers along the route. The only incident of note took place at Hai Van Pass where the convoy received enemy mortar fire.

(U) A US convoy, consisting of 23 vehicles from the 267th and the 707th Signal Companies, traveled from Long Binh to Can Tho in November. The convoy followed an ARVN convoy which provided local security. This was one of the very few US convoys which has been recorded as making this trip. 71

Railroads

General

(C) The Vietnamese National Railway System (VNRS) consisted of 1,239.6 km of main and branch line from Saigon to Dong Ha. However, at the end of 1967 only 39 percent of this was operational. No overall utilization objective for the VNRS had been established because of the limited operational segments available in the system. Only after the clearly defined and phased goal of restoration/rehabilitation of the VNRS, contained in the 1968 Combined Campaign Plan (AB 143), were met could utilization objectives be established.

(C) The average STON of general cargo hauled in 1967 had been 20,587 per month. Although the tonnage for December 1967 was slightly below this average, the general forecast for the first quarter of 1968 had been for a continuing increase in general tonnage. It was anticipated that rail use would increase by clearing cargo from the Port of Saigon to nearby supply depots (Long Binh and Di An), increased rail movement of cargo for Phu Cat from Qui Nhon, and the shipment of vegetables from Dalat to Ba Nhoi and Nha Trang. Nevertheless, utilization would remain limited until the restoration/rehabilitation of the main branch lines was completed and through-train service was available. 72

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1968 Railroad Goals

(S) The 1968 Combined Campaign Plan established the following desired rail security and restoration goals for the VNRS: <sup>73</sup>

1. Security goal GREEN for the following main and branch line segments:

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>Main Line Segment</u>	<u>Distance</u>
I	Da Nang - Lien Chieu	15 km
II	Tang Vinh - Phu Cat	40 km
II	Thap Cham - Chi Thanh	237 km
III	Saigon - Long Khanh (Xuan Loc)	81 km

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>Branch Line Segment</u>	<u>Distance</u>
II	Phan Thiet - Muong Man	12 km
II	Dalat - Thap Cham	84 km
II	Nha Be - Ba Ngoi	5 km
II	Dieu Tri - Qui Nhon	10 km

2. Security goal AMBER for the following designated main line segments:

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>Main Line Segment</u>	<u>Distance</u>
II	Phu Cat - I/II CTZ Boundary	73 km
II	Chi Thanh - Tang Vinh	60 km
II	II/III CTZ Boundary - Thap Cham	160 km
III	Xuan Loc - III/II CTZ Boundary	82 km

Restoration and Progress in 1968

(C) Although the first quarter of 1968 opened on an optimistic note, railroad restoration made little progress, primarily due to the Tet Offensive. Enemy activities directed against the railroad during this period more than doubled over the last quarter of 1967 and were more than five times as great as the same period in 1967. An analysis of the incidents revealed that

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there was an increase in the number of incidents just prior to Tet; however, the real impact against the VNRS was not felt until the Tet Offensive had begun to run out of steam.

1. I CTZ. There were 14 incidents in the I CTZ. The enemy succeeded in destroying five bridges, none of which affected the operational line. Also, one railroad bridge was destroyed by friendly air when it was discovered that the enemy was using it for resupply. Eight attacks resulted in extensive damage to railroad facilities at Hue and Truoi.

2. II CTZ. A total of 51 enemy initiated incidents occurred in the II CTZ. One of the main targets was the pipeline that runs on the railroad right of way from Route 19 to Phu Cat Air Base. The pipeline was set on fire eleven times, causing extensive damage to the railroad and bridges. The branch line between Thap Cham and Dalat received a great preponderance of enemy attention. The VC sabotaged 17 bridges, mined the track, and attacked five trains.

3. III CTZ. Enemy incidents in the III CTZ were mainly concerned with destroying and mining the track. In one case 200 meters of track were completely dismantled.

(U) No trains were operated during the period 29 January - 17 February. As the intensity of the Tet Offensive lessened, the railroad repair trains commenced reopening the lines that had been operational prior to the offensive. <sup>74</sup>

(S) In early 1968, the necessity for opening and maintaining all LOCs in northern I Corps became more apparent with the increase in support requirements generated by the movement of forces into the area. Consequently, COMUSMACV informed CG, III MAF, on 5 March 1968 of his belief that greater dependence should be placed upon overland LOCs into northern I CTZ. Of particular concern was the vulnerability of Cua Viet to enemy artillery and the severe sifting conditions that prevailed at both Cua Viet and Tan My. On the other hand, the opening of the railroad from Da Nang to Hue would increase the daily military resupply capability in the area by 800 to 1,000 STON. COMUSMACV also felt that the opening of the railroad would be a tangible symbol to the Vietnamese people of the GVN's control of the area.

(S) An engineering feasibility study for activating the railroad was conducted by MACV. It was estimated that the restoration of the Da Nang to Hue portion could be completed within 70 days, using in-country assets. The first important link from Da Nang to Lang Co could be opened in less than 15 days. In order to exploit the highway to the maximum and overcome the tonnage limitation imposed by the Hai Van Pass, a Terminal Transfer Unit could be established at Lang Co to transfer cargo from rail to highway. This study, however, was based on the assumptions of no further damage to the railroad and the establishment of adequate security.

(S) In March, COMUSMACV sent a letter to JGS, RVN/ , formally requesting assistance of the Vietnamese in the Da Nang to Hue railway project. He further recommended that the I Corps Commander be approached on the matter, and that a combined plan be developed for opening and providing security of the railroad. <sup>75</sup>

(C) A meeting was held at JGS Headquarters on 21 March 1968 to discuss restoration problems. At this meeting, I Corps was directed to coordinate with US Armed Forces in the region in the preparation of security plans for opening the railroad. <sup>76</sup>

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(U) On 22 April, during the FY69 budget hearing before the House Subcommittee for Defense Appropriations, the subject of alleged theft of railway equipment in Vietnam was discussed. A news item, appearing in the 10 April 68 issue of The Washington Post, had charged that South Vietnamese soldiers, aided by police and some government officials in the northern provinces, had stolen more than 12.6 miles of railroad track and equipment valued at 11.6 million dollars. The theft was reported to have taken place in February after the Tet Offensive and came just as the railroad was needed and every effort was being made to reopen it. A preliminary response provided to the Subcommittee, in essence, affirmed that several miles of rail and metal cross ties had been removed from the railroad in the vicinity of Quang Tri. It stated that the railroad was inoperable and asserted that certain ARVN units had removed the material without authorization. The ARVN units used the material to provide emergency reinforcements in their bunkers during the NVA/VC Winter/Spring Offensive in the Khe Sanh-Quang Tri-Hue area. Where possible, the rails were in the process of being recovered and returned to the railroad. In any event, the material did not go to the VC or to NVN. 77

(C) On 26 April 1968, COMUSMACV dispatched a letter to the CJCS, RVNAF expressing concern over the reported dismantling and removal of portions of railroad track and other VNRS facilities, COMUSMACV stated he was asking CG, III MAF to investigate the allegations and suggested that CJCS have CG, I Corps conduct a similar investigation. COMUSMACV further stated that deliberate damage of the type reported could have a most regrettable effect on future US funding of the railroad program. 78

(S) On 7 May COMUSMACV directed CG, III MAF, in coordination with CG, I Corps and VNRS, to restore the railroad from Da Nang to Hue to operational condition. He announced that the VNRS had material available and was ready to commence restoration on a week's notice. Security of repair trains and repair sites would be provided by the Vietnamese Military Railway Service (MRS), 1st Rail Security Battalion, from Da Nang.

(S) COMUSMACV reemphasized that the closure of either the Hue/Tan My or Dong Ha/Cua Viet port complexes could seriously hamper combat forces in northern I CTZ; therefore, secure land LOCs, both highway and rail, must be maintained into the area. In addition to the military advantage of providing an alternate and economic means of resupply, the reopening of the railroad would be a political advantage and provide an impetus to the civilian economy. 79

(S) The CG, III MAF replied to the above directive on 20 May with a proposed plan based on concurrent progress on railroad bed and bridges and continuous availability of construction materials. He also wanted the plan of restoration to be developed relative to D-Day which would be designated as the day security forces would be in position and actual construction commence. 80

(C) D-Day was later established as 15 July 1968 and the combined plan for the restoration of the Da Nang to Hue segment of the VNRS was implemented. 81

(S) On the same date, JCS notified I CTZ that effective 1 August 1968 six RF companies would be assigned to I CTZ to provide security for the construction of this section of the railroad. 82

(C) The importance of restoration and utilization of the VNRS was further emphasized in June with a letter from CofS, MACV to CofS JCS, RVNAF in which he urged maximum use of existing operational facilities from Saigon to Di An and Saigon to Ho Nai. The low tonnage

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transported by rail since the Tet Offensive, in comparison to its capability in these two segments, was due to the lack of security. Utilization of the railroads to the fullest would serve the military with a low cost, dependable means of transportation which could not be duplicated by air or highway. It would also help to reduce truck convoys and highway congestion in the Saigon area. <sup>83</sup>

(U) In II CTZ, restoration work between Phu Cat and Thap Cham was completed in the third quarter of 1968 with the exception of five kilometers in the vicinity of La Hoi and the bypass at Tuy Hoa Air Base. This portion was scheduled to be completed in November. Restoration south of Thap Cham was completed to Ca Na with the remaining portion to the II/III CTZ boundary expected to be finished early in 1969. The rail line between Saigon and Xuan Loc was restored, and work between Xuan Loc and the II/III CTZ boundary was scheduled to start in early 1969. <sup>84</sup>

(U) Although important progress was made throughout the latter part of the year, security continued to be a problem. Interdiction increased significantly in November resulting in damaged locomotives, rolling stock units, and bridges. Extremely heavy rains caused track washout and landslides which temporarily closed sections of the track. Nevertheless, several USA funded projects were initiated in November which included restoration of the M&M spur in Saigon and the spur to the Long Binh military installation. <sup>85</sup>

(C) Despite interdictions for 1968 averaging 15 per month as compared to 8 per month during 1967, operational trackage increased to 540 kilometers. This represented approximately 45 percent of the railway system. <sup>86</sup>

(U) Primarily because of security problems, the year ended with restoration goals and security status below what had been hoped for. However, with MACV and the GVN placing increased emphasis on the restoration and use of the VNRS, 1969 was expected to produce significant improvements.

(C) The security status on 31 December was as follows: <sup>87</sup>

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>GREEN</u>	<u>AMBER</u>	<u>RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
I	0	63.0	334.6	397.6
II	182.2	208.8	288.5	679.5
III	41.7	38.6	82.2	162.5
Total	223.9	310.4	705.3	1239.6
Percent	18.1	25.0	56.9	

(See Figure IX-5)


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## SECURITY STATUS RAILROADS

AS OF - 31 DEC 68

- ( SECURE ): CONTROLLED BY RVN/US/PWMAF DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS WITH MINIMUM SECURITY MEASURES.
- ( OPEN ): USED BY RVN/US/PWMAF DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS WITH THOROUGH SECURITY MEASURES.
- ( CLOSED ): REQUIRES MAJOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OR ENGINEERING EFFORTS TO OPEN.



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FIGURE IX-5

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Rail Performance

(C) Statistically, the rail traffic for the year reflected the aftermath of Tet and MACV/GVN aspirations to get the stock rolling again. Thus, while the January 1968 figure was above the average traffic of the previous six months, there was a drastic drop during Tet, followed by a rapid buildup as the country got back on its feet.

(U) Tonnage transported by rail remained fairly consistent during the remainder of the year, reaching a high point in August with 49,508 STON.

(C) Rail performance for the year was as follows: <sup>88</sup>

Cargo hauled in 1968

<u>Month</u>	<u>STON</u>
Jan	18,140
Feb	44
Mar	7,516
Apr	20,054
May	25,865
Jun	12,745
Jul	42,465
Aug	49,508
Sep	40,521.1
Oct	48,076.1
Nov	39,903.5
Dec	31,826

(U) On 15 December the VNRS initiated scheduled rail service on the 322 km rail line between Qui Nhon and Phan Rang, the first time scheduled rail service had been offered over any route since 1964. The rail service was available for military and civilian uses and was scheduled to handle both cargo and passenger traffic. <sup>89</sup>

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Port Performance

General

(C) During 1967, an average of 1,025,000 STON of cargo per month was handled by RVN ports. The total cargo handled in the first three months of 1968 was higher than forecasted requirements and averaged out to 1,174,333 STON per month.

(C) The daily average number of ships in RVN waters during January, February, and March was 59, 75, and 64 respectively. The average number of days in-country for these ships was 14.1, 15.4, and 16.5 days for each month of the first quarter. Although the average number of days in-country increased, it was due to increased ship multiple port calls, more shipments of retrograde cargo and influxes of Class V shipments. The average number of ships in-country fluctuated throughout the year, but was down to 42 in December. By the end of the year, the average number of days in-country had dropped to 10.5. Sealand containership service, operating on a 15 day frequency schedule, was available at the four major military port facilities at Newport, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon and Da Nang. Gantry cranes were introduced at Cam Ranh Bay for loading and unloading containers. 90

Da Nang

(C) Actual cargo handled during the first quarter at Da Nang exceeded the projected capability. The increase in cargo available for discharge and the marked increase in out-load cargo resulted in an all-time high of 309,800 STON handled in March. The continued increase in personnel and buildup of facilities in I CTZ generated requirements for greater quantities of cargo. As a consequence, the March tonnage was exceeded in every month for the remainder of the year.

(C) Total cargo tonnage (STON) handled at the port of Da Nang in 1968 was as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>USAID</u>
Jan	306,744	2,075
Feb	258,823	564
Mar	308,233	1,581
Apr	366,608	5,433
May	376,000	3,900
Jun	324,051	4,458
Jul	338,745	10,241
Aug	340,170	2,837

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<u>Month</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>USAID</u>
Sep	315,316	2,787
Oct	369,601	2,397
Nov	340,527	3,567
Dec	355,300	1,987

Saigon Military Operations

(C) The most pronounced feature of the port of Saigon performance in early 1968 was the reduction in USAID tonnages handled by the military. This resulted from the return of responsibility for handling of all bulk products to the GVN, beginning in August 1967. This action neither increased nor decreased military capability, since cargo was handled by civilian stevedore contract at piers located in the commercial port. Performance dropped considerably in February compared to the previous month because of the tactical situation following the Tet Offensive. The curfew initially placed the burden upon military personnel for all operations and restricted discharge, port clearance, and depot reception capability. Although total military cargo handled remained fairly constant throughout the year, USAID cargo increased in the last quarter of the year to reach a peak in December of 14,764 STON.

(C) Total cargo tonnage (STON) handled at the Saigon complex in 1968 was as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>USAID</u>
Jan	299,046	7,269
Feb	220,475	3,175
Mar	314,332	9,890
Apr	319,780	10,928
May	275,386	9,100
Jun	267,400	7,900
Jul	285,300	3,500
Aug	272,800	9,400
Sep	262,192	7,500
Oct	262,909	11,434
Nov	274,964	13,185
Dec	253,535	14,764

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Qui Nhon

(C) Total cargo tonnage (STON) handled at the Qui Nhon complex in 1968 was as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>USAID</u>
Jan	168,029	
Feb	140,373	
Mar	176,142	
Apr	160,878	703
May	168,400	
Jun	168,056	
Jul	146,900	
Aug	134,100	
Sep	139,300	
Oct	137,210	
Nov	117,953	
Dec	110,149	

Cam Ranh Bay

(C) Total cargo tonnage (STON) handled at the port of Cam Ranh Bay in 1968 was as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>USAID</u>
Jan	199,378	
Feb	165,676	
Mar	205,357	
Apr	181,418	
May	182,600	
Jun	181,960	
Jul	204,731	

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<u>Month</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>USAID</u>
Aug	223,065	
Sep	189,111	
Oct	228,010	
Nov	225,392	
Dec	216,112	

Intra-coastal Shipping

(C) Intra-coastal shipping assets, LCM, LCU, and service controlled barges, had first been introduced in RVN in 1965 to conduct lighterage operations at ports where deep draft pier facilities were under construction. LCMs were used almost exclusively for conventional lighterage operations. The LCUs, however, were used principally in an intra-coastal role. Service owned/contracted barges were used more for intra-coastal movement of cargo to out-ports and less in the intra-port lighterage role, while barges were--and still are--used extensively for lighterage of ammunition within the port complexes. LST assets were utilized where shallow draft vessels were required to provide sealift of personnel, supplies, and equipment to port areas or on the RVN coast by over the beach operations. The Alaska Barge and Transport, Inc. (AB&T), commercial contractor, operated barges and tugs to supplement the LST intra-coastal capability. <sup>91</sup>

(C) The monthly total of cargo (STON) moved by intra-coastal sealift in 1968 was as follows:

Jan	266,344
Feb	226,588
Mar	346,379
Apr	427,405
May	382,256
Jun	359,279
Jul	351,003
Aug	366,263
Sep	364,845
Oct	348,469

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Nov	358,647
Dec	421,230

(C) The large increase in total cargo handled in March was due to increased requirements generated by the shifting of tactical forces to I CTZ. The development of the highway improvement program in the Delta, which required the movement of large quantities of rock and gravel, required sizeable tonnage movements throughout the remainder of the year. 92

Sealand

(U) Sealand containership service had been introduced in RVN when the SS Bienville arrived at Da Nang on 1 August 1967. This ship, with 228 containers aboard, was one of seven ships chartered to carry an estimated 720,000 MTON of cargo from West Coast CONUS ports to RVN each year under a \$70 million two-year contract.

(U) A shuttle service, consisting of a 226-container, C-2 type ship running between Cam Ranh Bay, Saigon, and Qui Nhon was also established. Service to Cam Ranh Bay commenced in November 1967 with the arrival of the C-4 SS Oakland with 607 containers.

(U) Utilization of Sealand service was an efficient, effective, and secure method of moving cargo to RVN. Empty containers were filled with retrograde cargo prior to return to CONUS. Approximately four to five percent of all cargo received from CONUS was carried by Sealand containership.

(U) The following summary lists the total incoming cargo delivered by Sealand containerships to Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay from West Coast ports in 1968: 93

<u>Month</u>	<u>STON</u>
Jan	27,164
Feb	29,084
Mar	23,883
Apr	26,482
May	24,837
Jun	20,747
Jul	26,608
Aug	27,553
Sep	26,917

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<u>Month</u>	<u>STON</u>
Oct	29,418
Nov	32,697
Dec	55,899

Intra-Country Airlift

(U) The MACV Common Service Airlift System (CSAS) continued to improve its efficiency and effectiveness as 1968 began. During the Tet Offensive, the system experienced disruption in normal resupply operations which lasted throughout February and part of March. Surge requirements resulted in increased emergency requirements, overcrowded aircraft parking areas, maintenance delays, and compounded aerial port handling problems. Cargo movement, however, was only temporarily disrupted and recovery was swift and effective.

(C) The Tet Offensive and increased tactical operations caused JCS to direct the deployment of two CF-130 STRIKE C-130 squadrons, in a TDY status, to augment the 315th Air Div in support of RVN. In-country C-130 aircraft requirements reached a peak of 96 during February, March, and April 1968, 24 aircraft higher than the pre-Tet baseline of 72. Subsequent actions reduced the in-country requirement to a level of 78 C-130 aircraft by July. <sup>94</sup>

(C) CSAS movements increased in 1968 in comparison to 1967: from a monthly average of 86,025 STON to 107,173 STON. This average was expected to remain about constant in 1969. <sup>95</sup>

(C) Airlift performance by month for 1968 was as follows: <sup>96</sup>

<u>Month</u>	<u>CSAS Cargo STON</u>	<u>Passengers</u>	<u>DEDICATED C-7A Cargo STON</u>
Jan	98,895	228,827	7,285
Feb	67,532	196,314	7,480
Mar	83,923	266,408	8,360
Apr.	79,607	260,207	9,341
May	76,076	266,367	9,298
Jun	75,001	267,665	8,966
Jul	72,865	283,716	10,072
Aug	77,827	282,914	8,833

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<u>Month</u>	<u>CSAS Cargo STON</u>	<u>Passengers</u>	<u>DEDICATED C-7A Cargo STON</u>
Sep	74,192	290,792	7,510
Oct	74,794	304,588	6,929
Nov	76,263	291,230	6,919
Dec	74,195	314,164	8,696

Military Airlift Command

(U) Throughout 1968, the Military Airlift Command (MAC) provided CONUS and off-shore strategic airlift support to RVN and interfaced with the MACV CSAS. Indeed, MAC channels were a vital link in the airlift support provided MACV elements.

(U) In order to provide the optimum strategic airlift to RVN, three objectives were sought and achieved.

1. Utilization of an aerial port as near as possible to the user to provide expedient delivery of passengers and cargo.
2. Reduction of requirement for critical in-country airlift needed for tactical airlift support.
3. Reduction of congestion at Tan Son Nhut.

(U) MAC passenger channel operations used four aerial ports: Da Nang for I CTZ, Cam Ranh Bay for II CTZ, and Tan Son Nhut (Saigon) and Bien Hoa for III and IV CTZ. In addition, service to both East and West Coast of the United States and selected off-shore stations was available.

(U) Five aerial ports were used for MAC cargo channel operations: Da Nang in I CTZ; Pleiku, Phu Cat, and Cam Ranh Bay for II CTZ; and Tan Son Nhut for III and IV CTZ. Besides East and West Coast service to CONUS, service was also available to central United States and selected off-shore stations.

(U) MAC channel traffic represented approximately 20 percent of the total airlift workload in RVN. <sup>97</sup>

(U) In November, two MAC round trip flights from Saigon to Seoul were added to support the requirements of ROK forces. The additional flights were to be used for the movement of PCS/TDY passengers and an increase in the Korean special leave program. A new MAC channel became effective on 1 December, which operated every other day from Kadena AFB-Clark AFB-Cam Ranh Bay-Bangkok-Clark AFB-Kadena AFB. The aircraft utilized were B-727s with a mixed configuration of 61 passengers and two pallets of cargo. Additionally,

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seven one-way and four round trip missions between Saigon and Bangkok were added. These services were expected to satisfy RVN-Thailand requirements originating in RVN, with the exception of ammunition which could not be landed in Bangkok. Though these new missions replaced the C-130 (cancelled 1 Dec 68), it was expected that C-130 airlift would continue to be requested on a trip-by-trip basis. The implementation of the approved Bien Hoa-Travis AFB channel was expected in February 1969. No additional MAC airlift channels in connection with RVN support were visualized at year's end. 98

## CONSTRUCTION

### General

(U) Most programmed military construction programs had been completed in 1967. In the spring of that year, Newport, Saigon was completed, essentially finishing the deep draft port construction effort. In the same period, the shipping backlog was reduced to zero. The reduced military construction fund level in 1967, \$400,000,000 as compared to \$850,000,000 in 1966, reflected that the greatest part of the construction effort had been finished.

(U) Between 1 January 1965 and 1 January 1968, funds totaling 1.48 billion dollars had been provided for Military Construction (MILCON) in RVN for all US services. By the end of 1968, the total MILCON funds had grown to 1.71 billion dollars and, as a result of the construction effort for the year, 72 percent of this program was completed. The FY69 MILCON Program was approved for 159 million dollars; however, only 65.5 million of this amount was allocated by 31 December 1968. The plan for 1969 anticipated obligating all remaining prior year MILCON funds and the entire approved FY69 MILCON Program, if fully allocated by 30 June 1969.

(U) A concerted effort was made during 1968 to improve the posture of the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) construction for RVNAF. Units were given higher priorities in order to complete necessary facilities. Seventy percent of the total 131 million dollars of MASF and MAP funded construction in support of RVNAF had been completed. 99

(C) At year's end a change in the construction policy in RVN was dictated by partial apportionment of FY69 Military Construction funds, indications that the balance of FY69 funds would be withheld until 1 July 1969, and the relatively small construction program for FY70 as proposed by JCS. COMUSMACV directed that all new construction would be reviewed by MACV on the basis of urgency and essentiality to: 100

1. Provide operational support.
2. Enhance the military capability of RVNAF.
3. Support pacification.

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4. Provide priority LOCs.
5. Support plans for T-Day.

(S) The construction effort was severely degraded during the Tet Offensive. The tactical situation at most job sites plus cutriews and stringent security precautions combined to deny access of the contractor's local personnel to their jobs. Consequently, a nearly 30-day delay in work completion was experienced. Some engineer work was delayed as well, with the diversion of effort to field fortification and combat support missions. 101

(S) Significant major construction programs completed in 1968 were as follows: 102

1. A 193,000 bbl POL storage tank farm at Qui Nhon.
2. A 50,000 bbl POL storage tank farm at Pleiku.
3. Marine POL terminal at Cam Ranh Bay (includes 1400' POL jetty, three 12" and two 8" pipelines--each five miles in length, a 200,000 bbl tank farm, and mooring facilities).
4. Port facilities at Dong Tam (LST ramp, an LCU ramp, and two barge points).
5. POL pipeline, Tan My to Quang Tri.
6. ASP #2, Da Nang.
7. Three military hospitals (CWC) located at Da Nang (400 beds), Chu Lai (300 beds), and Can Tho (400 beds).
8. Highway bridge at Cam Ranh Bay.
9. LST ammo ramps at Can Ranh Bay.
10. LOX facility at Tan Son Nhut.
11. 10,000 foot parallel runway, Bien Hoa.
12. 31,000 square yard hot cargo area, Bien Hoa.
13. Finance building (26,880 sq. ft.), Long Binh.

#### Aircraft Shelters

(S) In February 1968, CINCPAC expressed concern over the many US aircraft that had been destroyed or damaged as a result of enemy ground attacks against US airfields in SVN. In order to reduce the losses sustained in such attacks, he requested that COMUSMACV review programs developed by PACOM component commanders and submit comments and recommendations to CINCPAC. CINCPAC desired that the program be divided into two priority groups.

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Priority one would include protective shelters for tactical aircraft in areas of greatest threat. Programs were to be developed within current funds to enable the earliest possible accomplishment. Priority two would include protective aircraft shelters in areas of lesser danger using follow-on funding.

(S) Component commanders' comments and plans were as follows:

1. A USARV study revealed that major damage to Army aircraft had occurred where aircraft were not parked in revetments. At the same time, the best information indicated that only a small part of the damage would have been avoided if the aircraft had had overhead shelters. USARV's aircraft fleet was large and frequently deployed. It often operated from expedient airfields. USARV considered the expense and effort involved to erect covered shelters was of such magnitude that it was not justified at this time.

2. The PACAF proposal was to erect an overhead double corrugated, steel arch, rigid frame structure covered by 18 inches of concrete. Their needs were estimated to be 575 shelters for priority I aircraft (tactical fighters) and 155 for priority II (other than tactical). The total program would cost \$101,584,000.

3. The Navy's program included a covered revetment for each single and multi-engine fixed wing aircraft and for every two-rotary wing aircraft. Their requirements listed 354 shelters under priority I and 47 under priority II at a total cost of \$61,390,000. It was the intention of the Navy to enter into procurement along with the Air Force based on the metal arch type shelter, though other hardened shelter concepts were under investigation.

(S) After careful consideration and further investigation into the type of covered revetments needed to provide necessary protection against delay fuses, COMUSMACV commented to CINCPAC that:

1. USARV's approach to protection of aircraft was concurred in.

2. COMUSMACV concurred with the Air Force's requirement for aircraft protection but recommended a re-evaluation of the adequacy of protection provided by the proposed structures.

3. The Navy's proposed program had his concurrence except that priority I aircraft should be limited to tactical fighters.

(S) COMUSMACV recommended that an evaluation be made of alternate methods of aircraft protection to include increased space for dispersal, adequate numbers of bin type revetments, increased height of revetment walls, and movable barriers to enclose the open ends of bin type revetments.

(S) CINCPAC concurred with the MACV recommendations in June. Citing the questionable degree of protection afforded and the large construction effort involved, however, CINCPAC recommended further study of alternate protective systems in the accomplishment of an overhead shelter construction program.

(C) COMUSMACV learned in July that 565 aircraft shelters would be procured using FY68 SECDEF funds provided to the Air Force. The latter, acting as executive agent, would procure the aircraft shelters for RVN.

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(S) Shelters were reallocated in accordance with the following chart: 103

<u>Base</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>VNAF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Da Nang	78	68	18	164
Chu Lai	0	143	0	143
Tan Son Nhut	44	0	0	44
Bien Hoa	85	0	18	103
Var Locs	111	0	0	111
Total:	318	211	36	565

(S) A further allocation of the 565 shelters was made which provided 400 shelters to the Air Force and 165 to the Navy. Included in the Air Force allocation was 36 shelters for VNAF aircraft at Bien Hoa and Da Nang.

(S) Later in the year Air Force troop units began erecting MARWAIS type steel arch shelters at the high threat bases, Da Nang, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut. By the end of December a total of 115 such shelters were in place. The concrete overshell, however, was left to be installed by the OICC contractor.

(S) Meanwhile, NAVFORV performed a cost-effectiveness study of Navy shelter requirements in I CTZ, concluding that a total of 66 shelters were sufficient instead of the earlier estimate of 200. This conflicted with a previous study of the problem by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. By year's end, the final decision on the revised Navy shelter program was delayed awaiting review and comments by CG, III MAF. 104

#### Defensive Uses of Chain Link Fence

(C) In January 1968 an in-country study was conducted which analyzed the results of the test firings of RPG-2 and RPG-7 anti-tank launchers against typical sandbag bunkers in use in SVN. The purpose of the study was to find a method for protecting friendly bunkers against increased enemy use of the launchers. A report of the tests stated:

Both weapons were tested against several types of supported and unsupported sandbag bunkers with and without the use of standoff material. Chain link fence, pierced steel planking, and nylon netting was used as the standoff materials. The chain link fence was found to be the most suitable material due to the ease of erection, visibility afforded to the occupants, and efficiency in reducing effects of the shaped charges....

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On 1 June 1968, USARV stated that action was being taken to procure and stock chain link fence to be issued to selected units for standoff protection against RPG rocket rounds. Because the estimated time for arrival of the material would be three to five months, USARV requested authorization to release up to 20 miles from construction stocks. Concurrently, MACV published a Technical Bulletin incorporating the change in the standard security fence and making allowances for the defensive use of chain link fence. The control for stocking and issuing of the fencing for defensive applications was handled by the component services within the purview of their individual programs. However, MACV monitored the use of the fencing. 105

#### Observation Towers

(U) The service components had been requested in August 1967 to submit their requirements for modular steel observation towers up to 60 feet in height. The tower parts were to be fabricated by contract and the towers were to be assembled and erected by the requesting component. 7AF, however, had no requirement for the towers. COMNAVFORV requested 73 for use by III MAF, and USARV requested 226. Due to lack of funds, however, the USARV requirement was later reduced to 102. In addition, production on the towers was slowed because of deterioration in security at Thu Duc during the Tet Offensive. Also, higher priority jobs, such as the hardening of facilities at MACV, took part of the labor force. The order for the 73 towers for III MAF was completed on 16 May 1968 and for the 102 towers for USARV in the third quarter of 1968. A follow-on project was issued for four additional 60 foot towers and sixty-nine 10 foot extensions, with fabrications beginning in September 1968 and construction finished on 31 November 1968. This completed the observation tower program. 106

#### Delta Transportation Plan

(C) This plan, approved by COMUSMACV in late 1967, and scheduled for implementation on 1 January 1968, called for construction of 12 barge offloading points, seven to be constructed by USARV and five by ARVN. As each offloading point was completed rock would be brought in to form a stockpile. Rock would then be issued from these stockpiles to authorized customers. Control was necessary because rock, while not a critical resource countrywide, was critical in the Delta region. Accordingly, the IV Corps was tasked to exercise both allocation and physical control of the required rock and, since the greatest part of the rock resources was earmarked for road development, the highway coordinating committee assumed control responsibility. This responsibility was later transferred to MACDC.

(C) The barge offloading points were originally scheduled for completion in July 1968 but due to various delays such as the Tet Offensive, material shortages and lack of construction capability, only eight sites were operational at the end of the year. It was expected that the last site would be completed in May 1969.

(U) Providing equipment at the offloading sites and at the quarries proved the most difficult aspect of the plan to implement. The available equipment was old, obsolete, and in need of extensive repairs. USARV was tasked to put the equipment in operating condition before it was moved to the offloading sites.

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(U) In the first quarter of 1968, 32,000 tons of rock were moved to the Delta. It was expected that 85,000 tons of rock per month could be transported to IV CTZ when all 12 sites were operational; however, the largest quantity delivered during the year was the 58,700 tons delivered in December.

(U) The status of the 12 sites was as follows at the end of 1968. 107

SITE	EST. COMP DATE	Offloading Capability STON/Mo
Dong Tan	Complete	25,000
Cai Be	Complete	2,000
Vinh Long	Complete	6,000
My Tho	Complete	3,000
Tan An	Complete	7,000
Bac Lieu	30 Mar 69	1,000
Long Xuyen	1 Mar 69	2,000
Rach Gia	Feb 69	
Soc Trang	Complete	2,000
Sa Dec	Cancelled	
Coa Lanh	Not Scheduled	
Can Tho	Complete	50,000

## RVNAF Dependent Housing Program

(U) The highly successful RVNAF dependent housing program for 1968 was oriented toward replacing public housing destroyed during Tet. The original program planned for the completion of 2,700 family units, but by using an austere RVNAF/OCE design, 3,480 family units were built by the end of the year and an expanded program for 1969 was developed. 108

### Operation DONG TAM (Hearts United)

(U) On 13 May 1968, COMUSMACV directed the Director of Construction to establish a task force to assist with refugee resettlement in Saigon. COMUSMACV also suggested a strong PSYOP effort to support the operation. A task force staff was assembled on 14 May with a meeting of representatives from GORDS to develop a concept of operations. This concept called

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for work under the general control of the GVN Central Recovery Committee (CRC). The proposal was for assistance with rubble clearance, road building and repair, site development, self-help housing reconstruction assistance, and erection of up to 1,500 family units of temporary housing including water, electricity, and latrine facilities. COMUSMACV approved this concept on 17 May. He reiterated his desire for medical civic action reports and restated the need for full PSYOP coverage. DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS then presented the approved concept to the CRC on 17 May. The committee agreed to US participation, and would assume overall control of the resettlement effort. President Thieu, who attended the briefing, concurred.

(U) The Director of Construction approved the task force organization and personnel were requested from USARV to fill the slots. The ARVN Chief of Engineers assigned two full-time liaison representatives to the headquarters when it opened on 20 May.

(U) The Army's 46th Engr Bn established a bivouac at the Phu Tho Race Track on 19 May 1968. Elements of the battalion, numbering 217 officers and men, set up a prefabrication yard for the production of components for wooden refugee housing. An additional civilian labor force for this yard was hired and numbered 345 personnel by mid-June, later leveling off at 300. By 30 June components for 115 buildings had been completed.

(U) In Saigon's Sixth District, the 301st ARVN Engr Bn began clearing sites on 20 May. The next day they were joined by a team from the 823d Civil Engineering Squadron (this type of USAF unit is known as a "Red Horse" squadron). Although adverse security conditions in the area hampered operations from 26 May to 2 June, 30 family units had been completed by the end of June and work was in progress on 20 more. In the Eighth District, the 46th Engr Bn completed 205 family units by the end of June, despite enemy attacks in the area during the May offensive. In Gia Dinh, even though the area required huge amounts of fill for construction and access roads, Navy Construction Battalion 58 completed 105 family units by June.

(U) Supplies and materials came from many sources: cement was supplied by USAID, laterite and rock from PA&E, lumber by the US Army, concrete pipe from USAID, roofing sheet metal from GVN, and electrical transformers from the Saigon Power Company.

(U) USAID initially obtained one million dollars to fund the project, of which various amounts were set aside (in plasters) to be drawn on as an impress fund and for local purchasing and contracting. 109

#### Civilian War Casualty Hospitals

(C) The construction of the Civilian War Casualty Hospitals (CWCH) (See 1967 MACV Command History) at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Can Tho was delayed during February because of the Tet Offensive. Delays were incurred by the inability of the contractor personnel to get to the construction sites due to the curfew restrictions imposed by the GVN, particularly at Can Tho. Also, MACV was informed by higher headquarters that staffing of the hospitals by US military personnel solely for the treatment of civilian casualties would not be approved. Therefore, it was decided that the hospitals under construction would be US military hospitals treating civilians on a joint occupancy basis. This enabled the hospitals to offset partially the requirement for additional military hospitals in these areas, while still providing treatment to civilians.

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At the same time, this required that the hospitals be raised to meet US standards and an additional \$1.7 million was requested. The improvements were included whenever possible in the construction effort; however, the bulk of the upgrade work had to be accomplished as additional work to the initial construction.

(C) On 4 May 1968, the hospital cantonment at Da Nang was completed and 10 days later all other facilities of the hospital, as originally designed, were completed. The Da Nang hospital was then designated the 95th Evacuation Hospital. During the month of June, the Chu Lai and Can Tho hospitals were completed, as originally designed, and opened for operation, the former on 11 June and the latter on 15 June. The Chu Lai hospital was designated as the 27th Surgical Hospital and the Can Tho hospital was designated as the 29th Evacuation Hospital. <sup>110</sup>

#### Vietnamese National Military Academy Expansion

(U) On 11 February 1968 the MACV Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) was tasked to design and construct five buildings at the Vietnamese National Military Academy (VNMA). Joint support funds amounting to \$VN 800 million were to be provided from the 1968 RVNAF new construction budget. Action was initiated in February to transfer required funds from the GVN defense budget to the OICC; however, on 6 March 1968 the MACV Comptroller learned that the Upper House of the RVN Legislature and Minister of Defense (MOD) desired to postpone the project. In their opinion, only emergency projects should be scheduled at that time. On 21 March, COMUSMACV approved the reprogramming of MASF funds to initiate the required design. This action insured that the design work would be accomplished in the event that the GVN decided to construct the facilities during 1968. As of the end of June, the GVN had still not released the funds due to placing the priority of funding of construction on battle damaged facilities.

(U) A talking paper was prepared for COMUSMACV on the problems being encountered in obtaining the release of the programmed funds from the GVN. The talking paper was delivered on 10 August for presentation at the Mission Council Meeting. As a result of the meeting, the GVN released \$VN 300 million on 27 August 1968. This amount was used to cover construction costs for the Academic Building, Cadet Headquarters, and some of the faculty quarters. As of 31 December 1968, the remaining \$VN 500 million had not been released by GVN. <sup>111</sup>

#### Civilian Defendent Restraint Facilities

(C) On 6 January 1968 funds in the amount of \$2 million were requested from CINCPAC for the procurement of prefab buildings and other long-lead items for the construction of civilian defendent restraining facilities. The total requirement for the two prison additions and seven detention camps was estimated at \$6 million. It was anticipated that the difference of \$4 million would be provided from other sources. As design proceeded, the total estimate for prison and detention facilities was reduced to \$3.83 million. The reduction was made possible by having some items government-furnished or provided by USAID. Of the \$VN 40 million funded in December 1967, approximately \$VN 20 million was available for construction and the remainder was used for design. The following month, however, it was announced that \$VN 100 million in Assistance-in-Kind (AIK) funds were available for detention and prison facilities.

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(C) In January 1968, General Loan, Chief of the National Police, stated that the programmed 500-man detention centers could not be manned adequately and recommended several 30-200-man centers be built near the Prisoner Interrogation Center (PIC). This raised questions of cost again, and of US role in the revised scheme. Thus, as of the end of March 1968, planning on the 500-man centers was held in abeyance.

(C) Design of a 4,000-man project to be built on Con Son Island was completed and the contract was awarded on 14 June 1968. In addition to the contract project, CORDS designed a 4,000-man tent camp on Con Son Island for detainees. By 30 June, the tent facilities were 90 percent complete with a portion of the camp occupied. Contractor effort was slow in starting on the 4,000-man project, (masonry construction) and at the end of the third quarter of 1968, the contract was only five percent complete with forecasted occupancy date of March 1969. 112

#### Expansion of Contractor Force Including Satellite Areas

(U) Approximately 15 March 1968, MACV investigated the feasibility of transferring projects to troops in major enclaves to the RMK-BRJ Construction Company in order to free the troops for accomplishment of projects in more remote areas where the contractors had no forces. As of that time, the contractor force was at the 18,000-man level and had the capability of placing work at the rate of \$18 million per month. This level was based on funds in hand and the amount of usable efficiency. This was considered to be the optimum balance of urgency and efficiency. To raise this 18,000-man level would require additional funds, scope, and criteria.

(U) Two higher levels of the work force, 22,000 and 25,000, were also investigated by MACV with the following results:

1. The 22,000-man level would require an additional \$84 million. However, this figure would permit the contractor to build and maintain the 22,000-man level for a two year period.

2. The 25,000-man level would require \$166 million additional funding which, in turn, would permit MACV to operate at the 25,000-man level for about 27 months. It was also determined that a work force buildup to a 20,000-man level was both feasible and desirable. In general, it was determined to limit the troop-to-contractor transfers to areas where the contractor had a mobilized capability such as Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon, as well as satellite areas such as Chu Lai, Can Tho, Dong Tam, and Vung Tau.

(U) Action to expand the contractor force to a 20,000-22,000 man level was subjected to several restraints during the second quarter of 1968. The difficulty of providing adequate definition and criteria in order to increase the funded workable backlog to a sufficient level to justify the force increase was aggravated by the late receipt of funds. This problem was finally overcome, and a labor force of 21,000 men was targeted for 1 September 1968. During the same quarter, a capability analysis prepared to support submission of the FY70 MILCON Program indicated that a further expansion of the contractor work force to a 24,000-26,000-man level might be required. The GVN general mobilization and problems with Third Country Nationals (TCN) entry permits were expected to hinder the contractors' ability to reach this force level in an expeditious manner.

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(U) On instructions passed down from SECDEF in June 1968, a construction capability review was prepared, based on several levels of possible FY70 programming. The study concluded that the 22,000-man force level, determined during the March 1968 study was still valid. The contractor would be required to commence his phasedown for FY70 funding levels as indicated below:

<u>FY70 Funding Level</u>	<u>Phase-down Commencement Date</u>
\$50 Million	1 Jan 71
\$100 Million	1 Mar 71
\$150 Million	1 Jul 71

Further study of the funds available and the effect of the efforts to obligate construction funds prior to the end of the fiscal year led to the conclusion that the contractors' work force level should be raised to the 25,000-man range. The long-range plan to average a 22,000-man level remained unchanged. This action was expected to result in bringing the maximum projected backlog from almost 11 months to approximately eight months. The contractor force was expected to reach the 25,000-man level by January 1969. <sup>113</sup>

(U) The RMK-BRJ contractor work force status as of 7 December 1968 totalled 23,804 personnel (2,256 US, 1,766 TCN, 19,782 VN). <sup>114</sup>

#### Engineer Troops Strength and Distribution

(C) Engineer troops in RVN at the end of 1968 were as follows:

Army Construction Bns	15
Army Combat Bns	13
Naval Construction Bns (NMCB)	10
Fleet Marine Force Bns	3
Air Force Civil Engineering Squadrons	5

(U) The percentage of troop effort at the end of 1968 was distributed as follows: <sup>115</sup>

	<u>% Army Combat</u>	<u>% Army Construction</u>	<u>NMCB</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>FMF</u>
Opn Spt	54	22	32	0	11
LOC (MIL)	1	6	0	0	0

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	% Army <u>Combat</u>	% Army <u>Construction</u>	<u>NMCB</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>FMF</u>
LOC (Non MIL)	18	21	20	0	44
Base Dev (MIL)	10	29	24	15	0
Base Dev (Non MIL)	17	22	24	85	45
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

#### FY68 Military Construction Contingency Funds

(C) As of the end of the first quarter of FY68, MACV had requested FY68 MILCON funds in the amount of \$81.313 million. Of this total, \$24 million had been approved and funded by SECDEF: \$7.3 million for three CWCHs and \$6.7 million for LOCs. In late March, SECDEF approved another \$14.977 million of contingency requests. At the end of the quarter, \$42.336 million of contingency requests remained unfunded. At the end of the second quarter of FY68, MACV had requested funds in the amount of \$96.143 million and had received \$59.100 million. By the end of September 1968, funds in the amount of \$63.450 million had been approved. 116

#### FY69 Military Construction Program

(C) The FY69 MILCON appropriation bill was passed by Congress on 18 September 1968 and forwarded to the President for signature. The amounts requested for RVN were as follows:

Army	\$130,595,000
Navy	50,925,000
Air Force	<u>13,484,000</u>
Total:	\$195,004,000

However, the bill required a reduction in overall MILCON spending worldwide. Accordingly, the Army intended to allocate only \$94,900,000 of its authorization for the RVN. The Navy and Air Force contemplated no reductions in their allocations. 117

#### PORT DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONS IN RVN

(U) In 1965 there was only one deep water port in Vietnam--Saigon--and a single pier facility at Cam Ranh Bay. Ninety-eight percent of all supplies for our forces were seaborne

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and had to pass through that single and woefully inadequate port. Given the enemy's capability to interdict landlines of communication (LOC) and the expense and limited capability of airlift, rapid port development was of paramount importance.

(U) Starting in 1965, MACV decided to develop four major ports: Da Nang to serve I CTZ, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon to serve II CTZ, and Saigon for III and IV CTZs. Additionally, satellite shallow draft ports along the coast were selected for development. Use of these ports, coupled with the use of intracoastal shipping for lateral distribution of supplies, took advantage of Vietnam's configuration and long coastline. This lateral water LOC permitted high tonnage capacity and relative security compared with the paralleling land LOC. From the deep draft ports, supplies were transhipped to the lesser facilities, using LSTs, landing craft, and barges. From both types of ports, supplies proceeded inland to combat support bases.

(U) Constructing these ports and sub-ports was an enormous task, particularly when it is realized that concomitant with the building of these facilities, supplies to support over one million troops had to be shipped through them. Construction was accomplished in a hostile environment, under the deleterious effects of an unfavorable climate and topography, with material being shipped from as far as 12,000 miles away. The successful completion of this construction effort was a tribute to the military engineers and the civilian engineering consortium who did the job.

(U) While MACV and its subordinate commands and civilian contractors were in the process of building modern ports, there were large shipping backlogs existing at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang during 1965, 1966 and the first part of 1967. At one time during 1966 there were more than 100 ships in a hold status. At that time there were neither the facilities nor the security ashore to accommodate the required depot stock; yet US, FWMAF, and Vietnamese forces were engaged in major combat operations requiring reliable and responsive logistic support. Therefore, during this period of buildup, these ships were in effect floating depots, and as supplies were needed they were called forward from these floating depots.

(U) In 1965 the Port of Saigon had become a source of much concern, both in RVN and the United States. As the economic center of the Republic, Saigon was the bellwether of SVN's economy and an important factor in the US effort to stabilize that economy, and, in turn, the GVN. Congestion in the port manifested itself as soon as large numbers of US and Free World forces arrived. The major logistical problem was clearance of commercial cargo because Saigon was not geared to support a civilian economy and a vast modern war machine.


(U) As first priority, in early 1965, MACV had started the construction of an entirely new port farther up the Saigon River for military cargoes. This construction was designed to solve the ship backlog problem as well as to end the temporary disruption in the civilian economy which large military shipments had caused. MACV, at the same time, took steps to improve the efficiency and organization of the civilian port, including modernization of facilities.

(U) To achieve the operational and managerial progress necessary to bring Saigon Port into the twentieth century and to support the US commitment, MACV had to exercise greater influence over the port. Port operations had to be modernized and functions organized. After lengthy discussions in Washington and within the US Mission, advisory responsibility to the Vietnamese was shifted from USAID to MACV. In September 1966, the 1st Log Cmd was assigned responsibility for port operations, and assumed de facto control, even though the Saigon Port Authority retained de jure control.

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# PORTS, LAND LOC'S AND MAJOR LOGISTIC COMMANDS



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FIGURE IX-6

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(U) During 1966 and 1967, Saigon port operations steadily improved. In these two years, the Saigon Port Authority achieved a gradual self-sufficiency and MACV was able, correspondingly, to reduce the magnitude of the advisory effort. As of the end of 1967, it was planned that in the near future the advisory function to the commercial port would be returned to USAID. A joint MACV-USAID Saigon Port Advisory Plan was published on 1 December 1967. It provided for the orderly transfer of the advisory functions to the Saigon Port Authority from MACV to USAID. When directed, USAID advisory personnel would replace military advisors to the Saigon Port Authority. An effective date of implementation was purposely not specified in the plan as this was to be determined by events and jointly by COMUSMACV, Director USAID, GVN, and higher authority.

(U) While the congestion problem at Saigon was being solved, construction continued on the new military port facility designated "Newport" which was located upstream from the city on the Saigon River. Piers were put into use as they were completed, relieving congestion at the civilian port. Both efforts resulted in a steadily improved situation, and cargoes began to clear more rapidly. By May 1967, the ship backlog at Saigon and elsewhere had been virtually eliminated. Ship turnaround time had been reduced from many weeks to seven days.

(U) Although Saigon Port received the greatest attention because of its economic as well as military importance, the other deep draft ports in RVN were equally vital to the US military effort, and construction at these locations was also rapidly programmed and accomplished. The story at these ports was much the same: construction went hand-in-hand with a continuous increase in throughput. Da Nang, formerly just a lighterage port, was expanded to include six deep water berths and many shallow draft slips and ramps which, by 1968, provided a discharge capacity of 10,660 tons per day. Qui Nhon, by 1968, had four deep draft berths and could handle over 6,000 tons a day. Cam Ranh Bay was developed to the extent that it rivaled many of the world's finest ports, with eight deep draft berths and a daily discharge capacity of close to 7,000 tons as well as 30,000 barrels of POL. The more than a dozen ports and sub-ports built allowed the throughput capability in Vietnam to rise from 370,000 tons per month in late 1965 to 1,200,000 tons per month by the end of 1967, almost a fourfold increase. By January 1968, there were 32 deep draft pier berths for exclusive military use whereas just three years before there had been none for such exclusive use. 118

#### RVN Port Development Status

(C) As of the beginning of 1968, the US effort to establish deep and shallow draft ports to support military operations throughout RVN was largely completed. Construction projects ongoing at the time or in the projected stage could be largely characterized as "finishing touches." Below is listed, port by port from north to south, the status of facilities at the beginning of 1968. The data presented reflects the practical port facility capacity, not actual port throughput capability. 119

1. Hue-Phu Bai/Tan My/Dong Ha/Cua Viet Complex. Hue-Phu Bai/Tan My/Dong Ha/Cua Viet Complex was a lighterage port. Port facilities used for military cargo consisted of 10 LCU ramps and three LST ramps.

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<u>Port Facilities and Capacity:</u>	<u>STON/BBL PER DAY</u>
<u>Shallow Draft:</u>	
a. Five Temporary LCU ramps (Hue)	625
b. Five LCU ramps (Dong Ha)	750
c. Two LST ramps (Cua Viet)	400
d. One barge site (Dong Ha)	150
e. One temporary LST causeway (Tan My)	200
<u>POL Facilities:</u>	
a. One 4" assault line (bottom laid) (Cua Viet)	7,000
b. One 4" assault line (bottom laid) (Tan My)	7,000
<u>Total Facility Capacity:</u>	
a. Cargo	2,125
b. POL	14,000

2. Da Nang. Da Nang was a deep-draft, shallow-draft and lighterage port. Port facilities used for military cargo consisted of two permanent piers, a DeLong pier, nine LST ramps, eight LCU ramps, and a quay wall, and lighterage sites.

<u>Port Facilities and Capacity:</u>	<u>STON/BBL PER DAY</u>
<u>Deep Draft:</u>	
<u>Observation Point:</u>	
a. Two permanent piers (600' x 90')	4,000
b. DeLong pier (600' x 80') (south side limited to 500')	1,200
<u>Shallow Draft:</u>	
a. <u>Museum Site, Da Nang Main</u>	
Two LST ramps	400
-- <u>Bridge Cargo Facility</u>	
(1) Two LST ramps with finger pier	500

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(2) Four LCU ramps	720
(3) Quay Wall (1,600')	1,500
(4) Two barge sites	360
c. <u>Tien Sha Facility, Da Nang East</u>	
(1) Three LST ramps	600
(2) Three LCU ramps	540
(3) Lighterage site	160
d. <u>Ferry Landing, Da Nang East</u>	
(1) Two LST ramps with finger pier	500
(2) One LCU ramp	180

POL Facilities:

a. Two 4" assault lines (Red Beach I)	14,000
b. One 6" assault line (Red Beach I)	15,000
c. Two 10" lines (China Beach)	120,000
d. Two 12" lines (Red Beach II)	160,000

Total Facility Capacity:

a. Cargo	10,660
b. POL	309,000

3. Chu Lai. Chu Lai was a shallow-draft and lighterage port. Port facilities used for military cargo consisted of four LST ramps, three LCU ramps, and a marginal wharf.

Port Facilities and Capacity:

STON/BBL PER DAY

Shallow Draft:

a. Four LST ramps	800
b. Three LCU ramps	540
c. Marginal wharf (700')	700

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POL Facilities:

a. One 4" assault line (outer harbor)	7,000
b. Two 4" assault lines (inner harbor) (used to fill tank trucks and tank trailers)	14,000
c. Moorings with submarine pipeline	
(1) One 8" line	50,000
(2) One 12" line	80,000

Total Facility Capacity:

a. Cargo	2,040
b. POL	151,000

4. Qui Nhon. Qui Nhon Port was a deep-draft, shallow-draft, and lighterage port. Port facilities used for military cargo consisted of a DeLong pier, four temporary LST ramps, a sheet-pile wharf, a boat landing ramp, and the beach. Temporary LST ramps were to be replaced by permanent LST ramps.

Port Facilities and Capacity:

STON/BBL PER DAY

Deep Draft:

DeLong pier (1220' x 80') 3,000

Shallow Draft:

a. Four temporary LST ramps	800
b. Sheet-pile wharf (1200')	1,000
c. Boat landing ramp (LCU/LCM)	600
d. Pontoon LCM pier	875

POL Facilities:

a. One 6" line on pier (commercial)	15,000
b. Two 4" submarine lines (outer harbor)	14,000
c. Two 8" lines on jetty	60,000

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Total Facility Capacity:

a. Cargo	6,275
b. POL	89,000

5. Vung Ro. Vung Ro was a deep-draft, shallow-draft, and lighterage port. Port facilities used for military cargo consisted of a DeLong pier and two temporary LST ramps.

Port Facilities and Capacity

STON/BBL PER DAY

Deep Draft:

DeLong pier (600' x 80')	1,200
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Shallow Draft:

Two LST ramps	400
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POL Facilities:

Two 8" submarine lines	45,000
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Total Facility Capacity:

a. Cargo	1,600
b. POL	45,000

6. Nha Trang. Nha Trang was a shallow-draft and lighterage port. Port facilities used for military cargo consisted of six LST ramps, two barge points, and the beach.

Port Facilities and Capacity:

STON/BBL PER DAY

Shallow Draft:

a. Four temporary LST ramps (one US, three RVNAF)	800
b. Two LST ramps	400
c. Two barge points	300

POL Facilities:

Two 6" lines (commercial)	30,000
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Total Facility Capacity:

a. Cargo	1,500
b. POL	30,000

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7. Cam Ranh Bay. Cam Ranh Bay (CRB) was a deep-draft, shallow-draft, and lighter-age port. Port facilities used for military cargo consisted of one MAP pier, four DeLong piers, four LST ramps, a sheet-pile wharf, a marginal wharf, and beaching areas.

Port Facilities and Capacity: STON/BBL PER DAY

Deep Draft:

a. Two DeLong piers (600' x 80')	2,400
b. One DeLong pier (300' x 90')	720
c. One permanent pier (523' x 39')	600
d. One DeLong pier (armco pier) (450' x 120')	1,000

Shallow Draft:

a. Four LST ramps	800
b. One sheet-pile wharf (600')	600
c. One marginal barge wharf (220' x 80')	300

POL Facilities:

Two 6" lines on jetty (T-2) 30,000

Total Facility Capacity:

a. Cargo	6,420
b. POL	30,000

8. Phan Rang. Phan Rang was a shallow-draft port and was capable of over-the-beach operations. Port facilities used for military cargo consisted of a barge facility and three temporary LST ramps.

Port Facilities and Capacity: STON/BBL PER DAY

Shallow Draft:

a. Three temporary LST ramps	600
b. Sunken barge facility	300

POL Facilities:

Two 8" submarine lines 40,000

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Total Facility Capacity:

a. Cargo	900
b. POL	40,000

9. Vung Tau. Vung Tau was a deep-draft, shallow-draft, and lighterage port. Port facilities used for military cargo consisted of a DeLong pier, an LST ramp, seven barge points, and the beach. The temporary LST ramp was to be replaced by two permanent LST ramps.

Port Facilities and Capacity:

STON/BBL PER DAY

Deep Draft:

DeLong pier (600' x 120') (one side limited to 450')	1,200
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Shallow Draft:

a. One temporary LST ramp	200
b. Two barge points (AB&T)	300
c. Five barge points	750

POL Facilities:

a. Barge discharge facility	7,000
b. Two 4" assault lines (ARVN concrete pier)	14,000

Total Facility Capacity:

a. Cargo	2,450
b. POL	21,000

10. Saigon. Saigon Port Complex was a deep-draft river port including facilities at Saigon, Nha Be, Cat Lai, and Newport. Port facilities, used for military, USAID/CPO, and CIP cargo, consisted of eight deep-draft berths, two LST slips, two LST crane wharves, two LCU/LCM ramps, 10 barge sites, and several deep-draft buoys.

Port Facilities and Capacity:

STON/BBL PER DAY

Deep Draft:

a. Three berths (M&M 1, 2, & 3 - Saigon)	3,000
b. Quay 1 (Fishmarket (K12) Saigon)	750

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c. Quays 1, 2, 3, & 4 (Newport) 4,000

Shallow Draft:

a. Saigon

Four barge sites 450

b. Newport

(1) Two LST slips 400

(2) Two LST crane wharves 200

(3) LCU/LCM ramp 360

(4) Four barge sites 1,250

c. Song Dong Hai

One barge site 150

Ammunition:

a. One barge site (Buu Long) (US/RVNAF) 300

b. Two barge sites w/f cranes (Cogido) 1,200

c. One LCM ramp (Cat Lai (RVNAF) 150

d. One barge site (Bien Thieu) (US/  
RVNAF) (2 crane pads) 500

e. One barge site (Cau Bien Loi) (RVNAF) 600

f. Four barge sites (Tan Tuy Ha) (RVNAF) 600

g. Three mooring buoys (Cat Lai) 1,500

POL Facilities: (military only)

a. Two barge offloading facilities 45,000  
(Long Binh)

b. Two barge offloading facilities 75,000  
(Bien Loi)

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Total Facility Capacity:

a. Cargo	10,560
b. Ammunition	4,850
c. POL	120,000

11. Dong Tam. Dong Tam was a shallow-draft port. Port facilities used for military cargo consisted of an LCU ramp which accommodated two LCUs, an LST ramp, and an interim barge facility.

Port Facilities and Capacity:

STON/BBL PER DAY

Shallow Draft:

a. One permanent LCU ramp (two points)	360
b. One permanent LST ramp	200
c. One temporary barge point	150
d. One barge pier (four points)	600

Total Facility Capacity:

Cargo	1,310
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Port Development - 1968

(C) Port development in 1968 was minor in nature compared to construction completed in past years. This was no more than a direct reflection of the fact that the vast majority of the US construction effort in RVN was past. Below are listed significant accomplishments: 120

1. Hue-Phu Bai/Tan My/Dong Ha/Cua Viet Complex. The five LCU ramps at Hue which were temporary at the beginning of 1968 were permanent facilities by June. The temporary LST causeway at Tan My was removed upon completion of four LST ramps. Cargo capacity increased by 800 STON/day. Also at Tan My, two 8" pipelines were installed, adding 22,000 bbl/day to that facility's POL capacity. Five LCU ramps were added to Dong Ha, doubling its LCU handling rate and cargo capacity. At the Cua Viet, a 6" POL sea line was completed, capable of 9,000 bbl/day. Planned development included a T-2 POL terminal and two 8" pipelines at Tan My with a 60,000 bbl/day capacity, and one 6" POL line with 9,000 bbl/day capacity for the inner harbor.

2. Da Nang. Two 6" assault POL lines at the Lien Chieu Esso Terminal were installed, adding 14,000 bbl/day to that facility. Two new POL lines were planned: one 6" line at Red Beach (9,000 bbl/day) and one 6" pipeline from the Northwest Tank Farm to the Lien Chieu Esso Terminal.

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3. Qui Nhon. A 6" POL line (commercial) and two 4" submarines lines were added, increasing POL capacity to 88,000 bbl/day. An ammunition barge wharf with a capacity of 1,800 STON/day was planned.

4. Nha Trang. The two 6" POL lines were upgraded to 8" and the daily capacity increased from 30,000 to 80,000 bbl.

5. Cam Ranh Bay. The two LST ramps under construction at the beginning of the year were completed and added 500 STON/day to the port's capacity.

6. Saigon. The four shallow-draft barge sites which had a daily capacity of 450 STON were converted to maintenance use and therefore were no longer available for barge discharge. The three mooring buoys at Cat Lai were reclassified as transfer points and no longer represented an ammunition offload facility. The port's ammunition handling capacity fell to an unacceptably low level, and the following action was taken to restore the previous ammunition handling capacity:

a. Bien Hoa. An ammunition barge offloading facility was completed in November. The facility consisted of two 100-foot barge offloading piers and storage hardstand. The Buu Long facility was closed when the new facility at Bien Hoa became operational because it had deteriorated to the extent that it was no longer safe to use.

b. Corido. A new ammunition offloading facility was completed in October. This facility consisted of a 100-foot offloading pier, LCU ramp, and storage hardstand with a daily capacity of 1,500 STON

c. Cat Lai. Meetings were held in August to determine means of increasing ammunition handling capacity at Cat Lai. It was determined that some of the delays were attributable to inadequate ammunition barge offloading facilities and an inadequate deep-draft ship buoy berth anchorage system. To remedy this situation it was decided to provide a stable mooring system for ships to transfer ammunition by barge. This project consisted of replacement of all existing buoys and anchor chains and the installation of heavier anchors. It was also determined that a fourth deep-draft ship buoy berth would be required to minimize interruption of ammunition transfer operations by maintaining the current three-ship discharge operation during completion of this project. At the end of 1968 all material was on order. It was expected that installation of the mooring components would begin in mid-April and be completed by 1 August 1969.

#### Effect of the Tet Offensive on Port Operations

(C) The Tet Offensive seriously affected port operations for a short time during the months of February and March. This was not because of any successful attacks on port facilities but the result of necessary curfews imposed on the civilian population by the GVN. This shortened work hours markedly, particularly in Saigon where long-distance commuting of stevedores and other dockside personnel was common. In all ports, nighttime curfews slowed offloading operations and transshipment of cargoes from dockside to depot areas. Ships once again began backing up in the harbors, awaiting offloading berths or were held up at dockside waiting to

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unload. However, port problems, although of some concern, never reached the size of those of 1965-1967. In all, the backlog was a short term problem.

(C) As of 7 February, after the GVN had partially lifted the 24-hour curfew in the Saigon area, the work schedule in Saigon for contract stevedores was set at 0900-1530 hours and military stevedores worked the remaining part of the day. On 8 February, COMUSMACV was able to state that Saigon Port was meeting its rated daily capability of 3,750 STON by use of both civilian and military stevedores.

(C) There was, however, continued concern on the part of COMUSMACV as the duration of the curfew continued with no apparent end in sight because of continued fighting in the city. The situation was summed up in a memorandum to the AMAMB on 14 February:

There are presently nine military ships on berth in Saigon port which are being only sporadically discharged; seven more are waiting at Cape St. Jacques for a berth at Saigon. Thirteen Saigon-manifested ships have been placed in hold outside RVN waters. In addition, there are eleven commercial ships on berth in Saigon which are being slowly worked, five of which are awaiting a berth. Five more commercial ships are scheduled to arrive at Cape St. Jacques today.

The serious shipping backlog is directly attributable to the curfew restrictions imposed on local national employees which, essentially, curtails cargo clearance by truck and the capability of the depots to receive the cargo.

Unless immediate relaxation of the curfew restrictions is granted the Saigon port congestions will approach the same proportions and will present the same problems we experienced a year ago. I solicit your assistance in securing a relaxation of curfew restrictions, as they affect Saigon port operations. <sup>121</sup>

(C) By the middle of February there was little relaxation in curfew hours, despite an almost complete end to the fighting in Saigon and other port areas. The port situation improved only marginally, and at the end of the second week in February the Embassy summed up the situation in its weekly statement:

The Saigon Port is gradually returning to normal. All ships at the quais are working at least one longshoreman gang. Ships in the stream are not being worked, as barges cannot get to either Cholon or to Thu Duc. The major restriction at this time is the curfew. The port of Da Nang is still under a 24-hour curfew, and no commercial ships are working. Foodstuffs are afloat and available when the curfew is eased. Qui Nhon is under the same restrictions as Da Nang. Nha Trang is reportedly discharging about 500 tons of rice per day. <sup>122</sup>

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(U) On 17 February the 1400 curfew in Saigon was extended to 1700 hours. Until that date, all cargo cleared was accomplished by military drivers. After 17 February civilian truck drivers could be used for a one-shift operation per day. Depot receiving capability, although much improved, continued to be the limiting factor and precluded full utilization of combined military/civilian stevedores. Twenty-four hour offloading operations by civilian stevedores were resumed on 22 February when the GVN lifted the curfew in the Saigon area. 123

(C) Between January and February the decrease in port capability and performance and the rise in discharge workload directly reflected the effects the Tet Offensive had on port operations. Capability was reduced over 16 percent; total cargo handled was reduced by 20 percent; and discharge workload increased by over 24 percent. In summary, the reasons for these reduced capabilities were that commercial stevedores and truck drivers did not report to work during the initial phases of the offensive, curfew at 1400 hours daily further hampered operations even after work resumed, 24-hour operation by civilian stevedores did not resume until 22 February, only military terminal units and military drivers were capable of operating on a 24-hour basis during this period, and no commercial river pilots were available during the Tet period (30 January to 5 February) and, therefore, no ships were berthed/unberthed during this period.

(C) The following actions were taken by MACV to relieve the imbalanced situation:

1. West Coast bookings were reduced by 40 percent.
2. Vessels were diverted for alternate port discharges where possible.
3. Non-priority vessels were diverted to hold areas.
4. Outloading was restricted to cargo already staged, to closed loop items, and to cargo that could be moved by containership service.

(C) The countrywide ship status for February, as compared to the preceding two months was:

Daily Averages

	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>
Ships Working	.35	33	38
Ships Waiting	7	9	14
Ships Holding	4	2	11
Total:	46	44	63

(C) In February, all three shipping status categories increased over January--ships working by 15 percent, ships awaiting by 55.5 percent, and ships holding by 450 percent. 124

(U) By the beginning of April, COMUSMACV was able to summarize the Saigon port situation thusly:

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Saigon port performance continued to reflect an upward trend during this reporting period. The most limiting factors affecting overall performance have been depot reception capability and a general non-availability of commercial barges. Despite these restrictions, throughput has exceeded the rated port capability. The backlog which developed as a result of last month's enemy activity in Saigon has been reduced to a near normal level. On 29 February there were seven ships working, two waiting and seven in hold. As of 23 March there were eight ships working, one waiting, and one in hold. 125

(U) The following complimentary remarks of 20 April, in a message from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador, were directed at MACV:

All here (Washington) highly gratified by outstanding performance at all VN ports in recovering from congestion resulting from VC Tet Offensive. The quick restoration to pre-Tet discharge, clearance and ship turn-around standards is solid evidence that past USAID, GVN and MACV efforts have established practices and procedures that are a credit to all.... 126

### Turnover of Saigon Port Advisory Function to USAID

(U) SECDEF, on 29 August 1967, requested MACV/USAID to prepare a plan for USAID to assume the advisory mission to the Saigon Port Authority (SPA), which was then assigned to the US Army 125th Terminal Transportation Command (TTC). The joint MACV/USAID "Saigon Port Advisory Plan" of 1 December 1967 was published in response to this request. It provided a detailed time-phased plan for transfer of the advisory mission to USAID. Progress made by the SPA subsequent to the publication of the plan led to a reduction in military advisory personnel and direct-hire local nationals. In order to conform to these developments, manning of the proposed USAID advisory organization as outlined in the basic plan, was reduced from 156 to 56 when Change One was issued on 20 May 1968. This joint action greatly increased the eventual budgetary feasibility of transferring the advisory function from MACV to USAID. At that time, COMUSMACV noted to CINCPAC and SECDEF that responsibility for discharge of virtually all USAID-sponsored cargo had been returned to GVN and that, for practical purposes, this advisory area should be under the cognizance of USAID, with the 125th TTC phased out of this function. In view of this development and because of the continuing favorable posture of the Saigon port, COMUSMACV recommended that DOD and USAID Washington be requested by CINCPAC to establish an implementing date for the Saigon Port Advisory Plan. 127

(U) CINCPAC, in considering the above proposal, queried various commands and agencies. USAID proposed that the turnover of advisory responsibility take place at a later (unspecified) date than that of "early in FY-69" as proposed by COMUSMACV. CINCPAC's position as stated to the JCS was:

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The advisory services which MACV provides to Saigon Port Authority with 134 personnel can be performed by 56 USAID personnel.... These advisory functions are not connected with military activity nor with the limited amount of military support provided to the discharge of selected USAID cargo.

The advisory functions involved are more properly the responsibility of USAID than MACV. The continuing favorable posture of Saigon port supports the timeliness of transferring the functions at this time.

(The) recommendation (of USAID) to delay implementation appears to be predicated primarily upon budgetary and personnel ceiling limitations.

Recommend that OSD and AID Washington be requested to establish an implementation date for (the Saigon Port Advisory Plan)... to be effective early in FY69. 128

(C) The controversy concerning transfer of advisory functions to USAID continued until mid-October. At that time, it was agreed between OSD and USAID that the Saigon Port Authority Plan would be executed on 1 November. CG, USARV was tasked to provide the necessary assistance over a six month period to assure successful assumption of advisory responsibilities by USAID. Additionally, USARV was directed to "initiate a contingency plan to assist, advise, or operate the Saigon port as may be necessary in the event of serious port congestion due to enemy action or civil disturbance." 129

#### Measurement of Logistic Progress - RVN Military Port Performance

(C) In January, total military cargo performance in RVN for the third consecutive month exceeded one million STON and was greater than any one month in 1967. This performance continued to be repeated in every month during 1968. Individual port performances did vary slightly depending on tactical demand, weather and, in the early part of the year, the effects of the Tet Offensive. Other than in the first weeks of the Tet Offensive, and then only in Da Nang and Saigon, was there any cause for concern with respect to shipping backlogs. Port performance statistics for 1968 are tabulated below: 130

<u>Month</u>	<u>Cargo Handled (STON)</u>	<u>Average Nr. Ships In-Country</u>	<u>Average Nr. Days Ships In-Country</u>
January	1,237,168	59	14.1
February	1,007,031	75	15.4
March	1,286,292	64	16.5
April	1,384,458	58	11.0
May	1,348,125	44	10.1
June	1,243,713	48	10.8
July	1,310,656	47	9.8
August	1,335,419	52	12.4
September	1,210,568	43	12.2

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<u>Month</u>	<u>Cargo Handled (STON)</u>	<u>Average Nr. Ships In-Country</u>	<u>Average Nr. Days Ships In-Country</u>
October	1,312,003	69	13.9
November	1,281,974	38	11.8
December	1,260,916	42	10.5

**Deep Draft Port for Northern I CTZ at Tan My**

(S) In considering the increased enemy activity in the northern I CTZ and the tenuous state of land, air, and water logistic LOCs in that area, CINCPAC, on 28 February, queried COMUSMACV as to the feasibility of constructing a deep draft port and of expanding VERTREP in Northern I CTZ. On 12 March, CINCPAC queried COMUSMACV specifically as to a deep draft port at Tan My (a point on the coastal lagoon where the Song Hue nears the South China Sea, and where LST ramps were in existence). The substance of this correspondence was:

(MACV Msg 060145Z Mar 68) indicated that a deep draft port is not necessary in the short range to meet the northern I CTZ throughput requirements because of transshipment capability by LST, small craft, air and road.

(But) aerial port throughput is subject to the continued availability of approximately 100 C-130 sorties or equivalent thereof daily for dependable, sustained support.

Rail restoration is costly in terms of money, materials and troops (construction and security) in relation to the limited return. A large inventory of rolling-stock would be required due to the restricted railcar load, maintenance and repair would be time consuming and expensive with little place for field expedient by-passes for damaged areas.

Experience has shown that roads in the northern I CTZ cannot be depended upon for sustained heavy traffic during the NE monsoon season.

The shallow draft or over-the-beach capability at Cua Viet and Thon My Thuy may be very limited or non-existent during the NE monsoon season.

To overcome these limitations and to establish an improved and more reliable throughput capability in northern I CTZ consideration should be given to construction of a deep draft port at Tan My....

CINCPAC also suggested the continued dredging and deepening of the 17-foot Tan My channel to 35 feet, as "this would give a start towards a deep draft port which could then be expeditiously completed with a DeLong Pier if required for the next monsoon season." 131

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(S) Both CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACFLT commented and recommended that a deep draft port be built north of the Hal Van Pass as such was required by the "introduction of a sizeable (friendly) combat force north of the Hal Van Pass" and that the proposal was a "most promising engineering scheme that will provide a more reliable and dependable port throughput in N I CTZ by the next NE monsoon, if possible."

(S) PACNAVFACENCOM was more cautious in his comment on the proposed scheme. He felt that it was "feasible to continue dredging in the LST turning basin at Tan My... However, as evidenced by the difficulty of keeping open a 17-ft deep channel at the mouth of the Perfume River during the monsoon season, extensive protective works would be required to maintain a 35-ft depth in the same location." Preliminary estimates, given secure conditions, were pegged at \$25,000,000 and approximately 12 months. 132

(S) On 27 March, COMUSMACV reviewed the whole logistics situation in northern I CTZ and recommended against the construction of a deep draft port:

OICC, RVN has made a preliminary study on the development of a deep water port in the vicinity of Tan My. As reported... the most promising scheme would appear to be the opening of a new entrance channel south-east of the present LST ramps; however, some form of protective works would be required. In addition, the facilities at Tan My and the access road (Route 551) are not capable of supporting a deep draft port. If such a port is to be developed, an additional access road by-passing Hue, possibly a railroad spur, and increased staging area at Tan My will be required. Preliminary estimates indicate the cost would be in excess of \$90 million and would take 18 to 24 months to complete. Utilization of present channel would be less feasible and work would interfere with operation of LST ramps thus resulting in reduced input during construction phase.

An additional factor is that opening a deep water channel at Tan My would likely cause salt water intrusion in the Hue estuary. This intrusion would have a disruptive effect on the local rice and fishing industries, with the resultant political and economic considerations. Time for negotiation with GVN has not been included in time estimates....

In view of the current and projected capabilities (in Northern I CTZ) it is considered more practical to continue upgrading current facilities, rather than develop a deep draft port at Tan My. Such development would be very costly, with a long lead time, and of little economic value. On the other hand maintaining the highway and reopening the railroad would be a visible sign of increasing security and would provide an impetus to the civilian economy.... 133

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(S) Following up on this recommendation, on 9 April COMUSMACV reiterated to COMNAVFORV that the recommendation not to build a deep draft port in northern I CTZ "was based on the premise that existing logistic facilities in northern I CTZ were sufficient to meet foreseen requirements. Facilities (considered) included the shallow draft ports of Hue/Tan My and Dong Ha/Cua Viet." Therefore, it was noted, that it was essential that the "daily forecasted capabilities of 1800 STON for each of these ports must be maintained throughout the next NE monsoon." COMNAVFORV was requested to insure that facilities there would be adequate for a 2,000 STON/day throughput normally, thus allowing for a ten percent degradation during the northeast monsoon. Particularly important was action to make advanced and detailed planning for maintaining the channel at the Cua Viet and at Tan My open for LST traffic during this season. 134

(S) CINCPACFLT, who had been augmenting northern I CTZ logistical intra-coastal shipping resources with ships and boats of the Amphibious Ready Groups (TG 76.4 and 76.5) and the Seventh Fleet Amphibious Force (TF 76) cautiously noted the "tenuousness of the Cua Viet River/Dong Ha throughput capability and the relative ease with which resupply operations over rail and land LOCs can be temporarily disrupted" and that the Seventh Fleet assets temporarily under the OPCON of COMNAVSUPACT, Da Nang might not always be available. Nevertheless, realizing that the latest engineer estimate indicated that it was not feasible to construct a deep water port in northern I CTZ within an acceptable time frame, CINCPACFLT also recommended that current facilities be upgraded rather than a new deep water port be developed. 135

(S) CINCPAC reviewed the MACV position, comments of others, and those steps taken to insure that the throughput capability of dry cargo in northern I CTZ, as projected, was in excess of foreseeable requirements. Based on this, CINCPAC came to the conclusion that to continue upgrading the shallow draft facilities was the best current solution for introduction of cargo into northern I CTZ. This closed the matter. 136

#### MEDICAL

##### Medical Operations - US/FW

(U) During 1968, the increase in US troop strengths and relocation of tactical units dictated adjustments in the deployment and capabilities of supporting medical facilities. Significant changes were:

1. The 18th Surg Hospital was relocated from Lai Khe to Quang Tri in March and was further moved to Camp Evans in December.
2. In March, the 571st Med Det (Helo Amb) moved from Nha Trang to Phu Bai to augment the 34th Det (Helo Amb) at Chu Lai. Three helicopter detachments arrived in November 1968 and were positioned at Camp Evans, Da Nang, and Tuy Hoa. An additional medical helicopter ambulance (Trn RA) detachment arrived in December to be based at Dong Tam.
3. The 22d Surg Hosp was relocated from Long Binh to Phu Bai in March.

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4. The 67th Med Gp Headquarters was moved from Bien Hoa to Da Nang to provide command and control for the increasing Army medical units in I CTZ.
5. The bed capacity of the Naval Support Activity Hospital at Da Nang was expanded from 400 to 600 beds in March.
6. In July, construction was completed and the 29th Evacuation Hospital became operational at Can Tho.
7. In September, the USS MERCER (APB39) and the USS NUECES (APB40) arrived in IV CTZ to support US and ARVN operations. Each ship was equipped with 37 operating beds and two fully-equipped operating rooms.
8. In September, the 312th Evacuation Hospital arrived to replace the 2d Surgical Hospital at Chu Lai. The 2d Surgical hospital was relocated to Lai Khe.
9. During the fourth quarter of 1968, the 311th and 74th Field Hospitals arrived in-country to provide medical support for PWs.
10. During December, construction was completed on the 100-bed Australian Evacuation Hospital at Vung Tau.
11. The following medical units arrived in RVN during 1968: 137

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ARRIVAL DATE</u>
930th Med Det MB	Long Binh	13 Jan
764th Med Det IE	Cain Ranh	1 Feb
218th Med Det MC	Cholon	4 Mar
27th Surg Hosp	Chu Lai	25 Mar
95th Evac Hosp	Da Nang	25 Mar
238th Med Det KA	Chu Lai	25 Mar
566th Med Co Amb	Da Nang	25 Mar
245th Med Det JV	Long Binh	27 Mar
522d Med Det AF	Long Binh	27 Mar
312th Evac Hosp	Chu Lai	Sep
311th Field Hosp	Qui Nhon	1 Oct
74th Field Hosp	Long Binh	10 Oct

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ARRIVAL DATE</u>
68th Med Det RA	Tuy Hoa	28 Nov
236th Med Det RA	Da Nang	28 Nov
237th Med Det RA	Camp Evans	28 Nov
247th Med Det RA	Dong Tam	21 Dec

Hospital Requirements in the Republic of Vietnam

(S) DEPSECDEF sent a memo to CJCS on 25 May 1968 stating the following:

Recently the Secretary of the Navy and CINCPAC have proposed facilities for 800 additional hospital beds in the Republic of Vietnam. Before acting on this request, I believe a careful examination of the need for these added facilities should be undertaken. While recognizing that top priority for medical personnel and facilities should be provided our forces in Southeast Asia, Program 6 authorizes three additional Army hospitals (1200 beds).

I would appreciate having a comprehensive study of the total hospital beds required in RVN. This review should assume joint hospital usage by the services and should consider the admission rates, surge requirements, geographical location of hospitals and casualties, patient stabilization, accumulation factors, and evacuation policy. You should also review the use of hospital ships and consider the decommissioning of one ship and replacing it with an in-country facility. May I have your study not later than June 15, 1968. I am withholding action on request for additional construction and major medical unit deployments pending receipt of your study.

(S) JCS requested information from CINCPAC to assist in preparing a reply. The report was to include sufficiency of existing facilities from an operating command viewpoint; medical concept of operations, and theater medical policies with reasoning; pertinent medical workload data not available at Military Department level such as support for US civilians, FWMAF, PW, and RVN civilians therefore; prescribed maximum bed occupancy level; and other information deemed appropriate. JCS also requested comment concerning the use of hospital ships and the possibility of considering trade-off against an on-shore facility of equal capacity. <sup>138</sup>

(S) COMUSMACV replied on 7 June that the existing fixed and semi-fixed hospital beds in RVN were not sufficient to provide the benefits of a 30-day evacuation policy. These beds were

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programmed on an austere construction factor of 13.3 beds per 1,000 personnel and, on this basis, the supported strength in RVN as of 1 June 1968 required 9,747 beds. Yet as of 1 June, only 6,300 fixed and semi-fixed beds were available, including the two hospital ships. COMUSMACV further stated that the replacement of a hospital ship with a shore-based medical facility of equal capability was not recommended because: 139

1. Secure real estate was at a premium in the I CTZ and the IV CTZ. In addition, the dredging of sufficient land in the IV CTZ was time-consuming and prohibitive in cost.

2. The hospital ships were self-sufficient, mobile, and presented improved availability under CINCPACFLT's revised scheduling. Moreover, the land mass of RVN was ideally suited for the use of a completely equipped medical treatment facility able to lay off the coast of any particular CTZ as the situation demanded.

(S) On 8 June, CINCPAC informed JCS that decommissioning one hospital ship at that time would deny important life-saving surgical support capability to northern I CTZ. CINCPAC recommended both hospital ships, the USS REPOSE and USS SANCUTARY, be retained and that the 900-bed Navy hospital be approved and deployed. 140

(S) JCS replied in August that an OSD decision of 25 July approved retention of the two hospital ships and an additional Army 400-bed hospital, but disapproved the construction of a 400-bed Navy hospital in Da Nang. OSD further stated that hospital ship capacity should be counted as in-country assets to offset the requirement for a Navy hospital. 141

(S) CINCPAC submitted a reclama to the OSD decision on disapproval of the 400-bed Navy hospital by stating that counting beds in hospital ships as satisfying the 400-bed Navy hospital requirements ashore does not fulfill the specific requirement for hospital beds ashore for the handling of Navy/Marine Corps casualties in I CTZ. The hospital ships were being used to give maximum support. Unless the 400-bed requirement ashore was provided, premature evacuation of casualties to PACOM and CONUS hospitals would have to continue. Furthermore, of necessity, the evacuation of casualties that should be returned to duty in-country within the 30-day evacuation policy would continue, resulting in a marked loss in man-weeks of trained and experienced combat personnel. The Navy hospital at Da Nang, for example, was unable to hold patients more than an average of five to nine days and often less. 142 (Additional information on the hospital ship support for I CTZ can be found in Chapter V, Operations In The Republic Of Vietnam.)

#### Medical Operations - RVNAF

##### Medical Service Force Structure

(C) A reprogramming of RVNAF spaces in FY68 was necessary to support two urgent problems:

1. Phu Quoc Island Hospital: The establishment of a 100-bed hospital at this site was considered necessary to provide medical care to PWs, RVNAF, and civilian residents. Sixty-one spaces were authorized for this purpose. Completion of the physical plant was scheduled for 1 May and supplies, equipment, and personnel were expected on board the same date.

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2. Rehabilitation Center - This center was authorized 80 spaces and was established at Cong Hoa General Hospital to provide prosthetic devices, physical therapy, and occupational therapy to amputees in the RVNAF.

(C) Under the force structure envisioned for FY69-70, an additional 2,486 spaces were requested to revise the Unit Authorization List to support the RVNAF Medical Service reorganization. Medical spaces would then total 9,812.

#### Reorganization of the RVNAF Medical Service

(C) Prior to the 1968 reorganization, control within the RVNAF Medical Service was fragmented: the Surgeon was under the command of the Central Logistics Command and controlled only 38 percent of fixed beds and 10 percent of medical personnel. The ALCs, which did not have a staff surgeon, controlled the balance of the fixed beds and 32 percent of the medical personnel. The remaining resources, except 3 percent belonging to Air Force and Navy, were controlled by the tactical elements.

(C) In August 1967, the Surgeon General, RVNAF, had proposed a reorganization of the RVNAF Medical Service. This recommendation was approved in part on 23 March 1968 to be implemented in 3 phases: 143

1. 1 Jun - 31 Dec 68-- establishment of 28 station hospitals and a medical battalion/airborne division.
2. 1 Jan - 30 Jun 69--10 medical battalions, one per infantry division.
3. 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69--4 medical groups, one in each CTZ.

(C) The proposed reorganization would place the groups and station hospitals under the control of the Surgeon General and authorize technical supervision of tactical medical elements. The action would also substantially reduce the diffused control prevalent in the system at that time. However, at year's end, the reorganization was hardly underway. The Surgeon General remained under the command and control of the CLC, with direct access to the CoS, JGS, although continuing efforts were being made to place the Surgeon General under the staff supervision of the J1, JGS, with direct access to the CoS on technical medical questions.

#### Preventive Medicine Activities

(U) Preventive medicine activities continued to play an important role in RVN in maintaining the health of US and FWMAF. The Preventive Medicine Branch of the MACV Surgeon's Office was concerned with a myriad of tropical diseases in RVN and their prevention, as well as with mess sanitation, water supply, and sewage disposal.

(U) On 23 March, a MACV Directive (40-13) establishing immunization requirements was published. The directive contained specific guidance on required immunizations for international travel and incorporated minor changes in reimmunization requirements for US military personnel in RVN.

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(U) During the month of April, MACV Directive (40-10) concerned with aerial dispersal of insecticides was revised. Limitations were placed on equipment and insecticides that could be used for aerial spray. The directive also provided for direct communications between the Command Surgeon and preventive medicine units in USARV and NAVFORV for coordinating aerial dispersal of insecticides.

(U) Whenever weather conditions were favorable, aerial dispersal of insecticides from C-123 aircraft was accomplished. In the first six months of 1968, a total of 76,355 gallons of insecticide was sprayed on 25 target areas throughout RVN.

(U) The first quarter of 1968 saw a special medical problem arise in the PW camps on Phu Quoc Island. This was the outbreak of beriberi in both new and old prisoners. Investigation disclosed the problem was due to lack of supplementary vitamin wafers containing thiamine which were normally added to the prisoner's rice.

(U) On May 28 and 29, an investigation was made of the frequent outbreaks of diarrhea among MACV advisors in Song Be. Although no specific etiology of these outbreaks was determined, a sanitary inspection of the facilities revealed numerous deficiencies which could have led to contamination of food served in the mess. Recommendations were made for the correction of these deficiencies. No subsequent outbreaks were reported during the remainder of the year.

(U) On 21 and 22 June 1968, an investigation was made of an infectious hepatitis outbreak at MACV Advisory Team 33 at Ban Me Thuot. From 1 May to 18 June 1968 ten cases had occurred, mostly in officer personnel or personnel associated with the officers' club in the compound. The investigation revealed that the probable source of the outbreak was the ice made and handled at the club. Recommendations were made for safer ice handling, as well as for correction of other sanitary deficiencies within the compound. No further infectious hepatitis cases were reported after the inspection and corrective action was taken on the recommendations.

(U) A report from the National Communicable Disease Center of the US Public Health Service indicated that there had been over 2,600 cases of malaria diagnosed in servicemen returning to CONUS from RVN in 1967. Approximately 85 percent of these cases were vivax malaria. Although it was not proven that the taking of the chloroquine - primaquine tablet for eight weeks after departing Vietnam would cure all vivax cases, there was general agreement that the number of these cases could be significantly reduced if the chloroquine-primaquine pills were taken as directed by all returnees. Accordingly, a message went out from the MACV Surgeon in June to all outprocessing centers emphasizing the importance of the malaria debriefing and of stressing to all departing personnel the danger involved to themselves and their families if the returnees failed to take the chloroquine-primaquine pills for 8 weeks after returning to CONUS.

(U) Several new areas were sprayed during the period July-September to include Pleiku, Buon Blech, Quang Tri, and Dong Ha. Quang Tri and Dong Ha were included as emergency spray missions occasioned by an outbreak of encephalitis. In this regard, culicine mosquito counts (the vector for Japanese B encephalitis), which had increased considerably prior to spraying, decreased markedly after the missions.

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(U) A conference on the National Plague Control Program was held on 2-3 September and represented the first coordinated effort on a national scale to develop a preventive medicine approach to plague. Emphasis had previously been placed on control of the disease and epidemics as they occurred. The joint conference was attended by RVN military and civilian representatives as well as those from the US and other FWMA forces.

(U) Emphasis on changing the malaria chemoprophylaxis used by RVNAF was intensified in the last three months of the year as a result of an increase in falciparum malaria in the RVNAF and the Vietnamese civilian population. The MACV Surgeon maintained close coordination with the Chief of Preventive Medicine, Office of the Surgeon, RVNAF, in all matters pertaining to the advisory effort.

(U) As part of the malaria control program, the staff entomology position was filled during the last quarter of the year. This position involved the supervision of the Command, RVNAF, FWMAF and USAID insect and rodent control programs. Also, US and FW forces dispersed a quarterly total of 31,260 gallons of 57 percent malathion on 15 different targets in I, II and III Corps areas. For the year, therefore, a total of 132,990 gallons of 57 percent malathion were used in the aerial spray program. Finally, the C-123 aerial spray program was evaluated by Walter Reed Army Institute of Research--Vietnam. Results proved that the spray particles could penetrate dense jungle foliage and effectively suppress both adult and larvae mosquito populations. 144

## Medical Evacuations

(U) The policy of minimizing direct CONUS evacuations continued during 1968 with 10.2 percent of the total US military evacuations going direct to CONUS. While medical evacuations from RVN in 1968 rose to over 60,000, there was a continual change in the proportion of evacuations for injuries result of hostile actions (IRHA), non-battle injury (NBI), and disease:

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>IRHA</u>	<u>NBI</u>	<u>DISEASE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1967	19,265	5,997	14,821	40,083
1968	33,358	9,226	20,137	62,720

(U) The heavy casualties resulting from the Tet Offensive led to increased IRHA evacuations for the first quarter of 1968. To meet the demands of this heavy outflow, Military Airlift Command and Pacific Air Force had to employ their utmost aerial resources and flexibility. Over 650 patients were evacuated from RVN during one 24-hour period on 9-10 February 68. The February evacuations totaled 7,510 and were the highest ever recorded for a single month.

(U) The enemy offensive in May generated more sustained casualty flow than the Tet Offensive. However, due to experience gained in regulating the large numbers of casualties during Tet, medical regulating was performed in a more expeditious manner. May had the second highest number of medical evacuations out of country for any month of the war (7,051) while the total for the period April-June was the highest (17,329) for any 3 month period of the war.

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(U) In June, the out-of-country evacuation of US personnel via the 25th CSF at Qui Nhon was discontinued. The establishment of a Regulating Center at the NSA Hospital, Da Nang, for the purpose of controlling in-country shifting of Navy and Marine patients assisted in the efficient movement of patients and paralleled the present regulating system of the Army.

(U) A minimum number of specially scheduled aeromedical evacuation aircraft were required after the May offensive due to the effective utilization of existing regularly scheduled aircraft and the redistribution of patient loads to CSFs in-country. Improvements were largely a result of early coordination between all levels of the medical regulating system. 145

## MILITARY ASSISTANCE SERVICE FUNDING PROGRAM

### General

(U) The Military Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) was the name used to refer to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. In 1951 this became the Mutual Defense Security Act. In 1954 the program became known as the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the term MDAP was no longer used. On 25 March 1966, by Executive Order, the support of the Vietnamese effort was transferred from MAP using foreign aid funds, to MASF.

(U) Through Military Assistance Service Funding (MASF), the RVNAF were supplied such equipment and supplies as were required to execute the war. This support grew from \$234.8 million in FY55 to the current high of nearly one billion dollars for FY68. Under MASF the US Military Departments programmed the required material and services for their counterpart services from Operations and Maintenance Funds (O&M). MASF removed the dollar ceiling imposed under MAP, improved supply flexibility, and generally enabled the US Services to be more responsive to RVNAF requirements.

(U) Although dollar ceilings were removed and funding made a function of each US Service, the planning, programming, and accounting for material and services continued to be accomplished using the procedures and formats established by the Department of Defense Military Assistance Manual (DODMAM). These established procedures were followed to assure the continued maintenance of a data base designed to support a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) should hostilities cease and a dollar ceiling under a new MAP be reestablished.

(U) Under MASF, as under MAP, a country plan covering the current US fiscal year and five future years was prepared by the US Country Team. The coordinated plan was forwarded to the Unified Command (CINCPAC) on or before 1 July of each year. The FY69-74 Plan was transmitted to CINCPAC on 26 June 1968.

(U) In addition to the Country Plan, a program for material and services was prepared by the Army, Navy, and Air Force Advisory Elements and forwarded by way of the Services theater command through CINCPAC to the individual Service Program control activity for funding: Army - Army Materiel Command (AMC); Navy - International Logistics Center (ILC); and Air Force - Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC). All programs prepared by ACoS

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Military Assistance Command, Military Assistance (MACMA) Office for ARVN, the Air Force Advisory Group for VNAF, and the Naval Advisory Group for both VNN and VNNMC were based upon the most recent JCS-approved RVNAF Force Structure Plan as supported by current authorization documents, i. e., Tables of Equipment (TOE), Tables of Authorization (TA), and Unit Authorization Lists (UAL). 146

#### Coordination of the AID and MASF Programs

(S) The objective of the MASF Program for the Republic of Vietnam was to provide needed equipment, supplies, and services to the GVN to support their efforts to defeat Communist efforts to seize control of the Government of Vietnam. This goal included the development and maintenance of suitably balanced forces that would become capable of defending the nation against either internal or external aggression, so that a militarily secure posture could exist within which control by the GVN over its territory and people could be extended, consolidated, and sustained. As the program was funded by each Service, the obvious division was on a Service level rather than sub-program elements. The current estimated total for the FY70 joint MASF Program was approximately \$1.2 billion. This value was expected to increase but more definite projections were dependent on force structure decisions to be made by the OSD. The Army sponsored portion emphasized vehicles, communications equipment, assault type small boats, individual and crew-served weapons, follow on spares for communications, automotive equipment, petroleum products, and other material services. The approximate value was \$980 million. The Navy emphasized waterborne craft: 1 DE, 1 LST, 2 PGM, and 83 assorted small craft and boats; motor vehicles; ship spare parts; and other materiel/ services. The approximate value was \$43 million. The Air Force program for FY70 called for procurement of F5A A/C; helicopters and jet engines; supporting operations of aircraft and helo squadrons; communications spare parts; POL products; aircraft spare parts; and other materiel/services. The approximate value was \$180 million. The Marine Corps program emphasized small arms, landing boats, communications spare parts, petroleum products, and other materiel/services. The approximate value was \$47 million.

(S) On 10 September 1968, CINCPAC queried COMUSMACV concerning the relationships between AID and MASF/MAP. Specifically, he was interested in:

1. An examination of common interest or conflict areas between the two programs.
2. Assessment of demands on country, economic, and fiscal resources in relation to the programs.
3. Conclusions/recommendations on articles or services funded under MASF which might be included in USAID Programs.

(S) There were no apparent areas of conflict between AID and MASF/MAP in RVN. The principal areas of common interest were in the field of telecommunications, the village-hamlet radio program, and in construction, repair, and upkeep of LOCs. In the telecommunications field, the possibility of overlap existed. In nearly all cases any fixed communications facility automatically became part of any plan for nation building. This applied to facilities installed under AID, MASF, or one of the US component commands. Coordination of these projects was necessary to reduce duplication and result in standardized equipment.

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(S) There were no articles or services financed under MASF that COMUSMACV felt appropriate for inclusion in the AID Program at the time of the query. Although some commodities such as individual subsistence and textiles might have appeared to be AID type, any financed through MASF were used to satisfy urgent military requirements. For this reason and since the AID Program could not be sufficiently responsive to urgent needs, the current arrangements were considered proper and appropriate. There were areas in which AID efforts to develop local industry, e.g., textile mills, complemented the MASF Program and the MACV efforts to transfer commercial consumables to the GVN budget.

(S) The RVN economy was mobilized for war and virtually all of its own resources were committed to some form of war related action. Approximately 25 percent of the available work force was directly employed in US and GVN official military and civilian programs. Approximately 40 percent of the gross national product of Vietnam was expended on government, military, and civilian programs. Official spending requirements far exceeded governmental revenues of all kinds. The government had committed a large share of its resources in financing programs in concert with or paralleling almost every one of the US civilian and military efforts. There was very little room for new or expanded programs for either the US or the GVN. At that point in time (October 1968) there was no way to estimate the GVN expenditure in USAID program areas during the period 1 July 1969-30 June 1970. The proposed GVN Ministry of Defense Budget for CY69 was \$703 million.

(S) Given the current AID resources and commitment, the one possibility for reduction of MASF support was in the area of commercial consumables. The alternate source of supply of these items was the local economy. Transfers to local procurement were dependent upon the funding capability of the Vietnamese Defense Budget and upon USAID determination of advisability of such procurement. However, it would be difficult to determine which items and what quantities could be effectively transferred to this program.

(S) Since the transfer of the USARV Military Assistance Organization to Headquarters MACV in March 1968, the Army portion of the MASF Program was developed in the office of the ACoS, Military Assistance (MACMA). This programming, developed in close cooperation with the ACoS, J4 technical service advisory divisions, was divided into two major efforts: the Major Item Program and the Dollar Line Program.

1. The Major Item Program was the programming of significant items of equipment (vehicles, weapons, etc.,) for delivery to specific ARVN units to fill authorized allowances and provide replacements for attrition.

2. The MASF Dollar Line Program--a dollar value line--was a program line representing a requirement for certain services, commodities, or a grouping of items of material for which the requirement was measured only in dollars. Items which fell into this category were consumable items, spare parts (weapons and automotive), and medical, ammunition, and construction supplies. The dollar line portion of the FY68 Vietnam Military Assistance funding program attained the \$700 million level. Of this, the most significant portion was the tremendous increase in the ammunition program. At the beginning of FY68, the ammunition program was \$312 million, in April it was increased to \$375 million and in June to \$510 million. The remainder of the FY MASF Dollar Line Program was \$200 million. The FY69 dollar line portion of the ARVN MASF Program was \$600 million programmed, of which \$480 million was for ammunition. 147

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(S) Dollar Line Common Service Items were those items utilized by all services (gasoline, diesel fuel, small arms, ammunition, etc.). By a JCS decision, the US Army was directed to fund and provide Dollar Line Common Service Items utilized by the VNN, VNMC, and VNAF in FY69 through the Army MASF Program. This support amounted to \$42 million. This was an important decision since it provided a central agency with the responsibility for requisitioning, receipting, and disbursement of all common item material making the system more efficient and economical. 148

(C) The factors affecting the amount and composition of the military assistance were:

1. The GVN Defense Budget for 1968, as approved by the US Mission Council, was 63 billion piasters. However, the National Assembly was presented with a request for a military budget of 53 billion piasters. The latter budget was promulgated; but in the aftermath of Tet and the mobilization decree, a supplementary budget was prepared. The eventual military budget for 1968 was approximately SVN 73 billion to support an eventual troop strength of approximately 801,125 men.

2. The US-funded portion of the defense budget amounted to 17.5 billion piasters including SVN 3.5 billion for Assistance-in-Kind. This joint support was intended to fund portions of the defense activities in which the US had critical interest. One aspect of this interest was the program to stimulate domestic industrial production.

3. In the past year substantial improvements were made in the procurement policies of the RVNAF. The bureaucratic difficulties of negotiating contracts with local producers were eased and the procurement branches were much more aware of the types and qualities of commodities already available on their own local markets. In order to give further emphasis to the development of Vietnamese industry the MASF program was reviewed with the intent of elimination of those items which were competitive with Vietnamese industry. This was not only a boon to local industry, but it also resulted in substantial savings to the US Government. Transfers were made from MASF supply to local procurement and the funds required were, in most cases, initially provided from the Joint Support portion of the budget.

4. Local industries could be called upon to supply an increasing quantity of the commercial consumable type of materials for equipping the RVNAF and the requirement in future years would be greater. The much larger portion of military commodities had to be supplied from foreign sources, principally through the MASF program. Approximately 175,000 new troops were to be equipped during the latter half of 1968 and the first months of 1969. Additionally, the current plans required modernization of the arms of almost all of the RVNAF units; these also to be from MASF sources.

5. The use of MASF-furnished construction equipment by the ARVN engineers had been an important factor in the military, economic, and political development of Vietnam. Projects accomplished with this equipment and with construction materials frequently had beneficial economical and political contributions in addition to their military purposes. The ARVN engineers accomplished an increasingly large percentage of the work required to keep an increasingly large percentage of the work required to keep national and inter-provincial roads open, particularly in those areas where Viet Cong activity prevented or hindered work by the Ministry of Public Works. 149

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## Commercial Consumables

(U) Commercial consumables were those items which, in addition to military use, were used and traded in normal civilian enterprise and which were manufactured in RVN. Examples were paint, nails, lumber, construction materials, batteries, clothing, and camelback for recapped tires, to name a few. Normally, the US was prohibited from providing commercial consumables under military assistance. An exception had been made for Vietnam, however, provided such items were transferred to GVN support as soon as possible; thus MACV had a formal program called the Commercial Consumables Transfer Program. Its objectives were to enhance the industrial development of the RVN and to reduce military assistance costs through the progressive shifting of commercial consumables from MASF to GVN support.

(U) MACV desired to implement this program without jeopardizing the continuous support of RVNAF and so informed CoS JGS on 18 July 1968. The MACV procedures were as follows:

1. USAID made a market survey and determined the potential of local industry to produce the items needed.
2. Taking into consideration ceilings on the gross GVN Defense Budget and also ceilings on available joint support credits, MACV advisors, working with their Vietnamese counterparts, prepared a budget proposal which included funds for the procurement of specific quantities of commercial consumables. US technical services advisors then reviewed the overall RVNAF requirements for such items and programmed through MASF the quantities which exceeded either the capacity of local industry or the funds available in the MACV-approved GVN defense budget.

(U) Once an item was included in the Commercial Consumables Transfer Program, it was very important that prompt procurement action be taken by the RVNAF technical service involved for the following reasons:

1. There would be a relatively even demand placed on the local manufacturers.
2. This would reduce the peaks in depot activities such as receipt, inspection, and storage.
3. Local deliveries would be coordinated with shipments arriving from the US.
4. But most importantly, such actions would show that commercial consumables were being properly managed by both US officials and their Vietnamese counterparts.

(U) It appeared to COMUSMACV that there must be some method whereby this program could be effectively managed to the satisfaction of all concerned. Without such a method, US Military Assistance officials would have little choice but to curtail the procurement of such items in the US, thus risking a possible shortage of consumables at some point in the future which conceivably could affect the war effort. On the US side, MACV had established a Committee for the Commercial Consumables Transfer Program. This committee identified objectives and developed criteria in the management of this program. In addition, through budget guidelines provided the Minister of National Defense annually, a list of items

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recommended by this committee for local procurement was included. It was important that procurement activities of the RVNAF technical services followed these guidelines in the joint effort during the budget preparator and execution phases.

(U) Again in October it was necessary for COMUSMACV to bring the commercial consumables problem to the attention of the Ministry of National Defense. The 1968 GVN Defense Budget actions taken by the Council of Ministers did not provide adequate funding for procurement of required items from in-country sources, and should have provided more financial support for procurement of commercial consumables available from SVN resources. This was an immediate way to achieve both military and economic objectives. It could have assisted the SVN civilian sector where a capability existed and could be readily put to use without seriously interfering with commercial consumption. The Council of Ministers had reduced the budget for certain consumable items for which such an in-country capability existed. This action resulted in Vietnamese industries operating at a substantially reduced capacity and had affected the employment opportunity of skilled workers due to lack of orders. In each case, the US provided Joint Support at no cost to the GVN which, if not used by December 1968 for this purpose, would be withdrawn. Allied with this problem, the GVN had imposed taxes and other accessorial charges on items that the RVNAF procured both in-country and out-of-country and this had resulted in the cost of some items increasing by as much as 300 percent. The proposed GVN CY69 Defense Budget funding level had been established at 83.0 billion piasters. The GVN Defense Budget as developed by MACV placed emphasis on minimum requirements necessary to support the 1969 campaign plan, the projected force structure, and local procurement of commercial consumables where in-country capabilities existed in order to reduce the MASF procured items being furnished RVNAF. The US Mission Council approved the GVN Defense Budget on 18 November 1968 at a funding level of 95.1 billion piasters including Joint Support funds of 14.8 billion piasters. The Joint Support Funds were placed in the areas that emphasized the purchase of commercial consumables. The Minister of Finance limited the GVN Defense Budget submission to 85 billion piasters; however, he had recognized that amount was not sufficient and had requested that a supplemental budget be submitted in February 1969 that will raise the funding level of the GVN Defense Budget to that approved by the US Mission Council. 150

### Management Information System

(U) In early June 1968 work was commenced on a Management Information System that was designed to answer the following questions:

1. What equipment is ARVN authorized?
2. What authorized it?
3. What did it cost?
4. How much equipment does ARVN have now?

Past force structure modifications and equipment changes had been accomplished by manually reviewing unit and equipment authorization documents and developing equipment requirements

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and cost data. This was a slow and often inaccurate process. These difficulties were further emphasized by the impact of the FY69 force structure increase and ARVN modernization plan. The increase in strength and modernization of equipment affected every unit in ARVN.

(U) A complete revision of all authorization documents was required to determine cost data and equipment requirements. Additionally, a requirement was levied for developing this data by category of units so that priorities could be established for combat, combat support and combat service support. The data base for authorization information was derived from Unit Authorization Lists (UALs), Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE), Tables of Authorization (TA), special authorizations, and calculated authorizations which included maintenance, float, and attrition. The asset data was derived by combining the equipment on hand, receiving reports, programmed-undelivered equipment, and losses. This new system was designed to be responsive to the requirements of CINCPAC and the JCS. It was designed to provide more information, faster, with better accuracy, while at the same time being more versatile and responsive to change. The current punch card system produced two reports whereas the new system was designed to produce three. The new ARVN unit equipment list was to be essentially a listing of the equipment authorized by each TOE, TA, or special authorization. The new system, usable by 1 November 1968 and fully operational by the end of that month, provided MACV with the capability to respond quickly and accurately to requests for data, provide a common accurate data base for future modifications to the ARVN force structure and equipment authorization, and serve as the basis for data submission to DA. The system was initially to encompass only ARVN, but it was to be expanded at a later date to include the VNN, VNAF and VNMC. This would then give a comprehensive data base for all of RVNAF. 151

#### Project "OBN"

(S) Project "OBN" was the designation of a supply plan designed to move material to Okinawa and provide a stockpile of assets for the outfitting of a ROK Light Infantry Division. However, on 11 July 1968, DA released control of the "OBN" assets to CINCUSARPAC with the priority of issue to the RVNAF Modernization and Improvement Program. MACV screened the "OBN" assets, selecting approximately 60 percent of the total line items. The selections were forwarded on 21 August. Subsequent screening action was taken by USARV, with selections submitted on 1 September and 27 September 1968. Later in October, because of the urgency of meeting RVNAF unit activation requirements, MACV acted to select additional "OBN" assets which would serve as acceptable substitutes for RVNAF material requirements. Because these later selections included some selections previously made by USARV, CINCUSARPAC on 16 October requested a final firm selection list from MACV.

(C) On 8 November 1968, a firm listing of "OBN" selections was forwarded by MACV. This list was the outcome of intense screening actions by the Technical Services. The action considered all assets necessary to satisfy Phase I Force structure increase equipment requirements, as well as prior year Modernization and Improvement Program needs. The final submission did not appreciably change the selection percentage as additions and deletions counterbalanced each other. 152

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## COMMUNICATIONS

### Introduction

(U) A modern and effective communications system for command and control was vital to the success of military operations and pacification and in the support efforts of the troops in the field. Throughout RVN and the Pacific area, the complexity of the area war, the fluid nature of operations, and the speed required by airmobile operations and air, artillery and naval gunfire support demanded a highly flexible and responsive communications network. To achieve the required high degree of command and control, the US built a comprehensive system of communications lines in RVN. Submarine cable links along the VN coastline (Project 439L) and to our other bases in SEASIA were laid in 1966 and became operational in 1967, providing US forces with many high-quality voice channels. Within SVN and across the Pacific, and to bases in Thailand and the Philippines, armed forces communications branches and civilian engineers, prior to 1968, had teamed together and created a vast network of multi-channel tropospheric scatter systems, both line-of-sight and diffraction microwave. In addition, communications via satellite relay were employed. These systems interconnected all major installations. Tens of thousands of telephone links were established, and by the end of 1967, were in the process of becoming fully automated. <sup>153</sup>

### SEASIA Wideband System (SEAWBS)

(U) During the first quarter of 1968, the government accepted from Page Communication Engineers one Phase I link and six Phase II links of the Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS). This action completed Phases I and II of IWCS. Phase I was completed with the acceptance of the Vung Tau/Vung Chua link on 25 January and Phase II was completed with the acceptance of the Vung Tau/Long Binh link on 29 February. Completion of Phases I and II of IWCS marked a communication milestone in that it extended high quality, multi-channel communications throughout SVN as far north as Hue and south to major cities in the Mekong Delta and across the border into Thailand. See Figure IX-7 for IWCS netting.

(U) On 28 March government-observed testing of IWCS Phase III system expansion began with the Long Binh/Bien Hoa link. In the same period, numerous IWCS Phase II link activations permitted deactivations, new activations and reconfigurations of critical transportable/tactical assets of the IWCS. Fortunately, this allowed support of the heavy troop buildup and unit relocations within I CTZ caused by the Tet Offensive and the massive enemy buildup in the area of the DMZ and the Khe Sanh Combat Base. <sup>154</sup>

(U) During the second quarter of the year, one Phase III link was accepted, that from MACV to Long Binh, and three others were upgraded. Construction and installation of all new Phase III sites, as well as existing sites which were being upgraded, were underway during the quarter, except for four locations that were approved for transportable communications systems. These four locations were Dong Ha, Di An, Sa Dec, and Dong Ba Thien.

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(U) As the quarter ended, MACJ6 was making final preparations for the IWCS Phase IV plan. This phase would, when written, approved and implemented, fulfill the unsatisfied circuit requirements of both MACV and MACTHAI. 155

(C) During the third quarter of 1968, seven completely new Phase III links of SEAWBS were accepted, two previously activated links were upgraded, and one line which had been damaged (Vung Tau/Phan Thiet) was repaired. The two upgrades were the Vung Chua/Monkey Mountain and Da Nang/Da Nang CBL Head links. The new links were:

Can Tho/Soc Trang	Phu Lam/Dong Tam
Can Tho/Long Xuyen	Nha Trang/Ninh Hoa
Vung Chua/Quoi Nhon ROK	Cu Chi/Phu Loi
Dong Tam/Vinh Long	

(C) Construction and installation were underway at the remaining Phase III sites and at those existing Phase I and II sites which were authorized for upgrading. Planning was also underway to prepare site locations for four IWCS microwave transportable terminals (AN/TSC-82). This program started its implementation phase on 1 September and was expected to be completed over a six month period. Activation of the first TSC-82 was scheduled for February 1969 at Dong Ha.

(C) During the quarter, CINCPAC approved the MACV/MACTHAI Joint Cross Border Circuit Requirements, the intracountry (RVN) revised long lines circuit requirements, and the urgent communications requirements submitted by MACV. These three actions were forwarded to JCS for validation and tasking for implementation. JCS directed DCA to prepare separate documentation for the implementation of the urgent communication requirements. This implementation plan was reviewed by CINCPAC and the military departments involved and forwarded to OSD for approval and funding action. JCS also directed DCA to prepare the subsystem project plan for IWCS Phase IV, which would be the plan to accommodate the unsatisfied circuit requirements of MACV and MACTHAI. This plan was in final preparation at the end of the third quarter. The Phase IV subsystem project plan, which was prepared by DCA in accordance with MACV/MACTHAI validated requirements, was delayed at the OSD level for funding, mainly due to the large amount of money required for the fixed communications suggested. DCA did propose an alternate plan that would provide the same amount of communication capacity based on the validated requirement. This alternate plan was comprised of completely recoverable transportable terminals utilizing the satellite communications approach. A working group meeting was held in Washington in late 1968 to finalize this plan.

(U) During this same period, numerous transportable/tactical communication systems were reconfigured or deactivated and new ones activated to provide the best possible communications support. Most critical was the upgrade of the Can Tho/Phu Quoc Island communications link which resulted in the replacement of the Can Tho/Rach Gia link. Other activations during this time were a link in I CTZ from Quang Tri Air Base to Dong Ha and a 24-channel troposcatter link from Ban Me Thuot to Lang Bian Mountain. 156

(U) During the last quarter, the government accepted 10 new Phase III links: Can Tho/Vinh Long, Tuy Hoa/Vung Chau, Long Binh/Phu Loi, Phu Bai/Quang Tri, Long Xuyen/Rach Gia,

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Yung Chua/Phu Bai, Can Tho/Binh Thuy, Long Binh/Tay Ninh, Soc Trang/Bac Lieu, and Bac Lieu/Ca Mau. At the end of the year there remained only one IWCS Phase III link to be accepted--Yung Chau/Nha Trang.

(C) In November, DOD, by memorandum to DCA, reidentified the SEASIA telecommunications systems as the "Integrated Communications System, Southeast Asia (ICS-SEA)." This replaced the term SEAWBS and includes the 439L cable system as well as the IWCS, and all other systems that are part of the DCS in SEASIA.

(C) A consolidated effort was started through Joint and Army channels to rearrange the IWCS channel ends. MACV and USARV initiated the rearrangement by tasking the 1st Sig Bde to relocate multiplex equipment into Quang Tri and Phu Bai to increase the channel drop capability. To accomplish this, the 1st Sig Bde organized a military team to install the required equipment. This rearrangement was nearing completion at the end of December, and it was expected that this would be the first of many relocations by this and other military teams that would improve the flexibility of the IWCS to be more responsive to the fluid requirements.

(C) The program initiated during the third quarter to prepare for IWCS transportable equipment bore fruit in early December when site concurrence was received and work began at Sa Dec and Dong Ha. Pads had been completed during October and the first TSC-82 was due in-country in early 1969. 157

#### Dial Control Office (DCO)

(U) The DCO system being installed throughout SVN starting in 1967, was a system by which designated telephone subscribers, once connected to the system, would be able to call other subscribers directly rather than via a switchboard operator. The size of the system can be readily gathered from Figure IX-8.

(U) Central offices at Chu Lai, Nha Trang, Phu Bai, and Cu Chi were completed and placed in operation during the first three months of 1968. Work at Da Nang, Binh Thuy, and Marble Mountain continued, although at these locations and many others, it was slowed due to heavy fighting and the requirement to pull off personnel for base defense and such necessary but pedestrian tasks as sandbag filling. In the same period, a 1,500 line expansion at Bien Hoa was commenced and the 1,000 line expansion at Qui Nhon was determined to be no longer required, resulting in cancellation of that project. A 2,000 line expansion of the Long Binh DCO was also completed. 158


(U) In the second quarter of 1968, activation of a DCO with 2,500 lines of a programmed 4,000 was accomplished at Da Nang. Bien Hoa DCO was expanded from 1,500 lines to 3,000 and the Phan Rang DCO was expanded from 1,000 to 1,500 lines. Due to a projected change in population density at Bear Cat, the 1,000 line DCO there was reevaluated and cancelled as being no longer a valid requirement. 159

(C) In the third quarter, the Da Nang East Dial Telephone Exchange (DTE) with a capacity of 2,000 lines was completed and put into operation. As of the end of September, the following telephone capability was operational: 160

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DIAL CENTRAL OFFICES



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FIGURE IX-8

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	<u>No. of DTEs</u>	<u>Total Capacity in Lines</u>
Army	21	25,260
Navy/Marines	6	6,300
Air Force	<u>10</u>	<u>20,600</u>
TOTAL	37	52,160

(C) Construction and expansion of the DTE system progressed during the last quarter, and exchanges were activated and existing exchanges reconfigured as required to provide the best possible service. A number of other DTEs were in varying stages of expansion and construction. At year's end, there were 36 DTEs in service with a capacity of 52,760 lines. 161

Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone Service (SEASIA ATS) (Tandem Switches)\*

(C) During the third quarter of 1968 building construction neared completion on the SEASIA ATS program. Installation of switching equipment was completed at Bang Pla, Thailand and was in progress at Korat, Thailand and at Can Tho and Da Nang, RVN. Test and acceptance work was underway at Bang Pla. The Joint Cutover Integrated Working Group completed the master cutover plan and the detailed cutover plan for Bang Pla. Resolution of the question of management of the SEASIA ATS by the Defense Communications Agency--Southeast Asia Mainland was effected and Defense Communications Agency Pacific was expected to forward changes to the system plans. Upon receipt of these updated system plans, the joint MACV/MACTHAI Directive for SEASIA ATA management would be published. 162

(C) In November, the SEASIA ATS achieved a significant milestone in the completion and successful cutover into operation of the first tandem switching center at Bang Pla, Thailand. The remaining switches were in various stages of completion at the end of 1968, and it was expected that the program would be completed by late 1969. 163


Automatic Digital Data Network (AUTODIN)

(U) The Phu Lam Automatic Digital Message Switching Center (ADMSC) of the AUTODIN was successfully cutover to live traffic on 25 March. This action wrote a new chapter in communications history as this multi-million dollar switch was the first of its kind ever to be installed in a combat zone. Its significance was that it allowed field commanders to have urgently needed real-time message processing. Concurrent with this action, the Interim AUTODIN and the Final AUTODIN for RVN were interfaced and became a single integrated system. At the end of the quarter, the Phu Lam Automatic switch was serving seven subscribers and three interswitch trunks and was processing 20,000 messages a day. By the end of June, Phu Lam was serving 16 subscribers and five interswitch trunks and processing 35,000 messages a day. 164

\*A background explanation of the Tandem Switch System may be found in previous MACV histories.

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FIGURE IX-9



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(U) The Nha Trang automatic switch was activated on 3 June. By the end of that month it was serving seven subscribers and four interswitch trunks and was processing 20,000 messages a day. Two subscriber terminals were activated off the Phu Lam switch during the month of July. As of 31 July, the switch was serving 17 subscribers and five interswitch trunks. The average volume was 36,000 messages a day. At the Nha Trang switch, two subscriber terminals were also activated in July, providing service to eight subscribers and four interswitch trunks. The average daily message processing load there was in the order of 18,000.

(U) In September, the Phu Lam switch was serving an additional five subscribers, for a total of 22; and one more interswitch trunk for a total of six. Message traffic in the two months since activation had risen to a daily average of 39,000. The Nha Trang switch at this time was serving 18 subscribers and four interswitch trunks, and was handling 23,000 messages daily. Also in September, an AUTODIN restoral plan, designed to insure adequate communications during periods of major switch outages, was approved and promulgation was awaiting the emplacement of the necessary crypto material.<sup>165</sup>

(U) Progress continued during the final quarter of 1968. At the end of the year, the Phu Lam switch was serving 28 subscribers and six interswitch trunks with an average traffic volume of 37,000. Nha Trang, now serving 19 subscribers, was handling in excess of 25,000 messages daily.

(U) During October, notice had been received from DCA that the first shipment of low-speed Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment (DSTE) would arrive in RVN during December. Because of conflicting information as to which subscribers would receive the initial distribution of this new equipment, CINCOPAC, at the request of COMUSMACV, provided a listing, by priority, of subscribers scheduled to become DSTE stations. This listing was provided to component commanders and action had been initiated to insure that the DSTE sites were adequately prepared for transition to these new terminals.<sup>166</sup>

#### TALK QUICK

(C) In April 1965, CINCOPAC had stated his most urgent secure voice requirements to JCS. DCA was then directed to prepare a plan to satisfy these requirements. Immediate needs in SEASIA required that an interim plan be prepared, and this was dubbed TALK QUICK. TALK QUICK was an expedited measure to provide secure voice communications to a limited number of PACOM-wide subscribers and had a target date of 1 October 1965. It was designed to be compatible with the planned follow-on worldwide secure voice system, AUTOSEVOCOM (Automatic Secure Voice Communications). In SEASIA, TALK QUICK provided for 24 wideband subscribers in the Saigon/Tan Son Nhut area, seven up-country subscribers in RVN and seven narrowband subscribers in Thailand and Laos. A switch was installed at Tan Son Nhut capable of switching wideband subscribers to wideband subscribers and of performing interface with narrowband subscribers. Access to TALK QUICK for narrowband subscribers and PACOM-wide subscribers was via the Joint Overseas Switch located at Phu Lam.

(C) The wideband switch serving local Saigon/Tan Son Nhut subscribers became operational and was turned over for subscriber use on 15 November 1965. The overseas portion of the

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secure voice system provided service to and from PACOM commands. It became operational and was turned over to subscribers on 1 January 1966. The seven up-country narrowband subscriber subsystems became operational and were turned over for use in May 1966. Test and acceptance of the TALK QUICK system was completed on 30 June 1966.

(C) Absorption of the TALK QUICK system by AUTOSEVOCOM required three actions:

1. Modification of narrowband equipment for compatibility in signalling.
2. Providing Saigon/Tan Son Nhut subscribers with automatic switch service.
3. Modification of the TALK QUICK switch at Tan Son Nhut and its relocation to Long Binh as an AUTOSEVOCOM asset. These tasks were completed, and final cutover of subscribers to AUTOSEVOCOM was effected by 1 May 1968, at which time TALK QUICK was deactivated.<sup>167</sup>

#### Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM)

(C) AUTOSEVOCOM is the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) managed integrated worldwide strategic secure voice communications system. It encompasses all secure voice requirements except those communication systems organic to the tactical forces and those communication systems organic to the tactical forces and those systems specifically authorized by SECDEF for establishment outside of the AUTOSEVOCOM system. SEASIA, and RVN in particular, received priority emphasis by DOD and JCS for expedited system implementation. The RVN subscriber requirements to be fulfilled by implementation of AUTOSEVOCOM would, when established, provide COMUSMACV and other major in-country commanders with direct secure voice access to their field commanders.


(C) In AUTOSEVOCOM, the KY-3 was used for wideband subscriber terminals and the HG-13 equipments were pared for narrowband terminals. The primary switch was the AN/FTC-31, a Philco-Ford produced, 80-subscriber, 20-trunk automatic switch which allowed direct dialing for local wideband subscribers. An adjacent operator-attended console, called a SEVAC (Secure Voice Access Console), provided an interface capability between wideband local subscribers and long-distance narrow band calls. DCA exercised control through Net Control Stations. Hawaii served as the Pacific area control station, while in RVN the control station was at Saigon.

(C) Implementation of AUTOSEVOCOM was initially scheduled in four phases, but this plan had been revised as follows:

1. Phase I (FY67-68) would provide secure voice service to 216 Priority 1 and 2 subscribers in RVN.
2. Phase II, reduced from 2,000 to 400 terminals world-wide, would be considered as a subsequent and final part of Phase I. RVN would receive 30 of these terminals, and 30 Phase II subscribers had been validated to CINCPAC.
3. Follow-on phases would be engineered later as required. At the end of 1968, there were no plans or probable time frame for this.

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FIGURE IX-10

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(C) System configuration (See Figure DK-10) in RVN provided for local switching centers at 14 locations for 178 subscribers, 28 of whom would be served by individual terminals. The Saigon local switching center was the only one to be an automatic dial switch. The up-country switches were designed to be manually operated. Access between switches and to out-of-country subscribers was to be through the Phu Lam Joint Overseas Switch.

(C) The 1st Sig Bde, under STRATCOM, was responsible for implementation of Phase I within RVN and Thailand. Operations and maintenance personnel for the system, except for four sites run by 7AF, were Army personnel organized into a special AUTOSEVOCOM Company under the operational control of a Regional Communications Group. 168

(C) The automatic dial switch serving 50 Saigon/Tan Son Nhut subscribers was operational at the beginning of 1968, having been turned over for subscriber use on 17 July 1967. Prior to this, on 1 May 1967, the last 10 subscribers to AUTOSEVOCOM from the former TALK QUICK terminals had been absorbed by the AUTOSEVOCOM program and the TALK QUICK switch was deactivated.

(C) Smaller, operator-attended Secure Voice Cordless Switchboards (SECORD), capable of terminating 16 subscribers, were installed at selected sites throughout RVN to serve local subscribers in any combination of wideband and narrowband terminals. The first five SECORD switches at Dong Ha, Phan Rang, Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Monkey Mountain were scheduled to be operational by 30 June 1968, providing secure voice service to 47 subscribers. The Saigon AN/FTC-31 was fully operational, serving 76 validated subscribers. At mid-year, SECORDs at eight other sites were under various phases of construction and scheduled to be completed by 15 October.

(C) By the beginning of September, SECORDs were operational at Phan Rang, Dong Ha and Phu Bai, serving ten subscribers. By the first part of October, it was expected that contractor teams would finish installing switch equipment at Chu Lai, Long Binh and Bien Hoa and that the Da Nang SECORD, serving 24 subscribers, would be operational by 15 September. Construction of other sites at Pleiku, Nha Trang, Can Tho, Monkey Mountain, and Cam Ranh Bay was proceeding with difficulty in the third quarter, due to the lack of critical materials furnished by construction agencies. As a result, an accelerated construction and installation program was underway to complete all contractor installation by the end of October, as further delay would result in the removal of contractor teams from RVN and thus throw the burden of installation on the military component commands.

(C) By the end of 1968, SECORDs were also operational at Da Nang, Monkey Mountain, Bien Hoa, Long Binh, Cam Ranh Bay, Chu Lai, and Can Tho. A total of 65 subscribers were being served throughout RVN and additional subscribers would be activated as security inspections were completed. The sites at Pleiku, Nha Trang and Qui Nhon were 95 percent complete and were awaiting delivery of power panels before becoming operational. Construction at these sites had been by troop effort and had experienced difficulties because of equipment and material shortages. 169

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## Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS)

(U) The MARS in RVN was authorized by the GVN Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note Nr. 5726 of 25 November 1965 in reply to AMEMB Saigon Note 11r. 12E of 12 November. As of the end of January 1968, there were 64 MARS stations authorized in RVN, 62 of which were in operation. By service these stations were:

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Operational</u>
Air Force	12	12
Army	32	31
Navy	<u>20</u>	<u>19</u>
TOTAL	64	62

(U) Phone patches from hospital bedside and direct and messenger service continued to be highly popular as in past years. MARS statistics for 1968 are shown in Figure DK-11.

(U) MACV MARS was continually monitored and stations were relocated, activated, or deactivated, as required, to provide MARS service to the greatest possible number of personnel. Year-end figures showed five additional stations authorized and three additional stations in operation. MARS stations, by service, on 31 December were:

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Operational</u>
Air Force	13	13
Army	36	35
Navy	<u>24</u>	<u>19</u>
TOTAL	73	67


(U) Total traffic since the inception of MARS in RVN was 845,452 at the end of 1967 and had risen to 1,199,974 by the end of the first half of 1968. By 31 December, this figure was 1,566,264 an increase of almost 100 percent during the year. 170

(U) The only authorized amateur radio operations in RVN were in conjunction with the MARS program, and incidents of illegal amateur radio operation carried international implications and put this program in jeopardy. MACV Directives 105-6 and 105-16 detailed this. In 1968, MACJ6 continued to monitor unauthorized amateur radio operation incidents and to provide guidance to component commanders to prevent such from occurring. 171

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MARS STATIONS TRAFFIC - 1968



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FIGURE IX-11

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Tet Offensive

(S) The Tet Offensive of January-February caused many temporary disruptions in communication services throughout RVN, but none of a nature so serious that operational requirements were seriously affected. Damage and disruption were limited to land lines. However, on 8 February, due to the greatly increased amount of both voice and written traffic during the country-wide enemy attacks, it was necessary for MACV to impose MINIMIZE on all telephone, data and teletypewriter traffic within RVN. The results of this imposition were mixed. The average daily volume of traffic originated by the MACV staff was 31 percent less in February than it had been in January, but the trend in precedence assignments was unsatisfactory. The percentage of FLASH traffic remained at an acceptable level; the percentage of IMMEDIATE and PRIORITY messages increased by five percent and constituted 75 percent of all outgoing traffic. 172

I Corps Tactical Zone

(S) On 21 January 32 additional frequencies were assigned to III MAF. In replying to a III MAF message of 20 January, COMUSMACV explained that:

As you (CG, III MAF) know, the RVNAF controls and allocates the military frequency bands and the problem of providing frequencies to satisfy US and RVNAF requirements is acute. You... have all JCS allocated resources at my disposal. Of the 920 frequencies available, the JCS has allocated 800 for tactical voice use. Of the 800, you have 442, the RVNAF has 358. The (above) 32 frequencies were taken from MACV radio relay resources. Negotiations have also been underway for some time with the JCS for similar arrangements and a decision is expected shortly.

To satisfy the remainder of your requirements, I am proposing a co-sharing arrangement with the RVNAF....

The measures I have outlined should afford substantial relief. I also stress the need for continued effective management of the very finite frequency spectrum. Consideration should be given to maximum use of airborne UHF in lieu of VHF FM. Primary reliance of UHF wherever possible is necessary to reduce mutual interference in the VHF FM band. Multiple use of the same frequency by taking advantage of terrain shielding and distance separation is indicated, as is strict net discipline. 173

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(S) As a further reflection of the increased fighting and troop strengths in I CTZ at the beginning of the year, an additional 117 FM frequencies were assigned by CG, I CTZ to CG, III MAF and units under his OPCON on 26 January, for a period ending 30 April. This was the result of negotiations conducted on 25 January at which representatives of MACJ6, III MAF, and OPCON units presented their case to representatives of I CTZ, ARVN Signal Agency and JCS J6. Procedures were also worked out at this conference for III MAF C-E officers to request locally of the I CTZ Signal Officer the temporary use or the co-sharing of FM frequencies on a spot basis. COMUSMACV, in the light of this amicable conference, stated to CG, III MAF that:

I consider that the JCS has responded in a positive, rapid manner to the requests for additional FM frequencies. The additional frequencies represent a most substantial contribution on their part, since they have denied the use of these frequencies to their own forces who have needs similar to yours.

Careful management... of your present complement of 559 FM frequencies as augmented by the local agreement should reduce materially the radio interface problems being encountered. 174

#### MACV Forward

(S) On 25 January, a requirement was levied on ACoS, J6 to plan communications support for the establishment of a MACV Forward Command Post at Phu Bai. On 27 January, DCA-SAM was directed to activate a total of seven dedicated teletype circuits, 13 voice circuits, and to multipoint a weather teletype circuit to the MACV Forward Tactical Operations Center. Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions were issued on the same date. Two days later all circuits were established from the various subscribers to the Phu Bai Technical Control Point. Twenty-four sole-user voice, 40 common-user voice and 18 teletype circuits were established in January and February. 175

#### RED ROCKET

(S) On 11 April, the JCS directed that procedures be established to expedite transmission of key instructions from high-level authority to the SEASIA operating forces. The unclassified flag word "RED ROCKET" was designated to be used in such messages which would contain instructions originated by either the President, the SECDEF, DEFSECDEF, CJCS, or the Acting Chairman JCS. RED ROCKET messages were to be afforded top priority over all other FLASH precedence messages at manual relay centers. The goal for reaching division, task group, and wing/base level forces from the NMCC was set at twenty minutes total elapsed time, including reorigination and/or relaying.

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(C) As set up, MACV would receive RED ROCKET messages by both voice and teletype for further reorigination and relay, using dedicated and common-user communication networks. The 13th of April was designated as the time by which RED ROCKET procedures were to be established at the Phu Lam Joint Overseas Switchboard, at the Saigon Long Distance Switchboard, and at manual teletype relays at Phu Lam, Nha Trang and Da Nang. The primary means of communication from COMUSMACV to his major commanders (CG USARV, CG III MAF, CG I FFORCEV, CG II FFORCEV, SA IV CORPS, CDR 7AF, COMNAVFORV, CG 3th SF) was by dedicated command and control teletype and voice networks. Primary teletype circuitry from MACV used the dedicated Command Center circuits. Secondary means was the common-user network. Upon notification of a RED ROCKET alert the MACV Command Center notified the above commands and PROVCORPSV (XXIV CORPS). These commands in turn notified and received acknowledgement from all subordinate USN task forces, USAF wings and bases, USA and USMC divisions, and separate USA brigades/regiments. The goal for notification to MACV that the above had been accomplished was set at 18 minutes. All commands involved were directed to establish appropriate procedures for implementation of these instructions by 13 April.

(C) Recognizing that separate brigades/regiments might be employed beyond secure teletype facilities, MACV, on 12 May, allowed such units to use secure voice radio facilities as a substitute for teletype. In the several times a month NMCC tests were imposed on MACV, an average of 50 percent of all tests were completed within CINCPAC's 20 minute time goal. Those tests that took longer to complete were failures due to personnel unfamiliarity with procedures and requirements, and circuit outages. 176

(S) In some cases, delays were caused due to circuits/circuit operators not cleared for the security classification level of the RED ROCKET message. To preclude delays, COMUSMACV, in October, issued interim instructions to all applicable MACV units that, in such instances, RED ROCKET messages would be processed over present RED ROCKET circuitry. At the same time, action was directed to upgrade all RED ROCKET circuits to a Top Secret clearance and to obtain and maintain Top Secret cleared personnel for the communications centers involved. 177

#### J6 Relations with the JGS-Observations, Evaluations and Actions

(C) Observations made during the VC attacks beginning 31 January tended to confirm the suggestion previously made by COMUSMACV to the Chief JGS, GEN Cao Van Vien, on 6 October 1967, that the JGS organization for Communications-Electronics (C-E) be changed. In particular, the following were noted by J6 observers during the Tet period:

1. The Chief of the ARVN Signal Directorate assumed the role of Communications Operations Staff Officer and held it by virtue of his ability to take action using troops under his direct command. This displaced the JGS J6 from a role he could have played profitably.
2. The central logistic of the ARVN Signal Directorate virtually ceased to function. Supplies needed by field units such as batteries, which were available, were not moved. This was attributable to lack of direction and attention on the part of the Chief of the Signal Directorate who was serving as a communications operations staff officer during this time.

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3. Efforts by J6 advisors to obtain information on the ARVN communications situation from the JGS J6 were not too successful. This was attributable largely to the problems the JGS J6 Staff encountered when they tried to get the needed information from the Signal Directorate Operations Staff or from units. Thus the JGS J6 was put in a position where he was unable to perform his role as J6 Advisory to the Chief, JGS.

(C) It appeared that the failure to consolidate real staff supervision over communications operations in one JGS element, the J6, led not only to problems in logistics but also made practically no use of the knowledge and capabilities of the JGS J6 and his staff. Further, it demonstrated that the Chief of the Signal Directorate was not capable of performing in both the operations and logistics roles simultaneously.

(C) During the offensive it was noted that Vietnamese Forces' use of record communications systems showed only a small increase while voice communications showed a pronounced increase in traffic. There was every indication that secure record communications were not used to the extent they could have been. The tendency to use voice communications systems even where record communications systems would have been preferable was a problem and all advisory personnel in their day-to-day dealings with their counterparts were directed to emphasize this point.

(U) The Tet Offensive resulted in the RVNAF investigating the establishment of FM radio security nets throughout the major cities of the Republic. These nets would be for VIP emergency use, base and compound security, and major cantonment area security control. The MACJ6 Advisory Division assisted RVNAF in the research and planning of such a system, primarily during March. The concept jointly evolved called for the use of FM-1 and FM-3 radios with 1 and 5 watt outputs.

(C) After the Tet Offensive, the J6 Advisory Division briefed COMUSMACV and DEPCOMUSMACV on an assessment of the RVNAF C-E capabilities and limitations, and the effect the Tet Offensive had had upon RVNAF C-E. The overall evaluation given was that as a result of the Communist offensive no serious degradation in capability had been noted.

#### ARVN TO&Es

(U) On 15 March, the Personnel, Training and Organization Branch (PTO), Signal Advisory Division, USARV (MA), less the signal advisory to the RVNAF Signal School, was transferred to J6. The spaces transferred were:

Chief, PT&O Branch	LTC
TO&E Advisor	MAJ
Pictorial Advisor	CPT
Clerk-Typist	E-4
Typist	GS-4 (VN Civilian)

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(U) The branch was renamed the Training, Organization, and Personnel Advisory Branch (TOP). In its first month, TOP completed processing for MACV Force Development Division (J311) approval and RVNAF publication, two signal unit TOEs; the 601st CMR Support Company, and the 603d Sig Construction Bn. In April, TOEs for the ARVN Signal Support Bns, type A and type B, and the ARVN Signal Agency were revised. Additionally, ten non-signal ARVN TOEs were updated. These reviews included modern equipments to be used under the latest communications policies and doctrine.

(U) In May, 19 non-signal TOEs were updated. There were two areas of significant progress in regard to these updates. First, draft TOEs now contained wire net diagrams which quickly illustrated the proposed unit communications system. Secondly, the ARVN Signal Agency assumed a greater role in coordinating C-E aspects of non-signal unit TOEs.

(U) During June, four ARVN signal unit and 18 non-signal unit updated TOEs were approved by MACJ6. 178

(U) In July, J6 in cooperation with ACoS, MA, revised and modernized the signal portions of every ARVN TOE and TA, a total of 376. This effort provided the base for determining FY69 communications requirements, which were forwarded to JCS. The processing of ARVN signal TOEs and the signal portions of non-signal unit ARVN TOEs continued throughout the year. In August, the VN Naval Communications Instructions were printed and distributed, a project that had taken five years to complete. 179

#### Project MYSTERY STORY

(S) In October, the CJCS requested COMUSMACV to provide secure voice and TTY circuits direct from Saigon to Paris for the use of the VN delegation in Paris.

(S) The JCS considered that the request could not be justified as a military requirement and estimated the monthly cost at \$60,000.

(S) The request was subsequently approved by SECDEF and in the interim, the GVN was permitted to use existing secure US circuitry for voice communications to Paris on a common-user basis. Additionally, message traffic could be filed with the AMEMB Saigon for delivery in Paris.

(S) The terminal equipment installation in Saigon was completed and a test call completed from the Presidential Palace to SECOND AMEMB Paris on 5 November. The teletype equipment was checked in the clear from JCS to Clark AFB.

(S) In early November, the GVN requested US support in providing two additional secure voice terminals in Saigon and one additional terminal in Paris. Terminals were to be provided for the Chief, JCS/RVNAF, Saigon; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, RVN, Saigon; and the Chief, Military Delegation, RVN, Paris. This request was also approved by SECDEF.

(S) Due to the high-level GVN interest, top priority was given to the accomplishment of this support function. DCA determined that the most expeditious installation would be by using

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in-theatre KY-3 resources and deferring validated US AUTOSEVOCOM subscribers. Replacement equipment, however, would be provided from AUTOSEVOCOM depot storage.

(S) It was envisaged that the GVN subscribers in Saigon would be configured in the FTC-31/SEVAC to permit local and long haul conferencing via dedicated circuit 2444 to Paris. Class marking of GVN subscribers access lines in Saigon would be accomplished to prevent unauthorized access to US subscribers. Local conferencing of the GVN Paris subscribers via the SECORD board would not be possible. Although the long-haul narrowband secure circuit (Saigon-Paris) would be dedicated when required by GVN users, the circuit would be engineered via the NMCC console to provide the console operator with the capability of two narrowband circuits (Pentagon-Saigon and Pentagon-Paris when circuit 2444 was not required by GVN). US use would be strictly on a non-interference basis and in accordance with a schedule agreed to by GVN principals. 180

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4. Rpt (S), MACJ4, n. d., Subj: Logistical Review and Evaluation, 1st Qtr CY68 (U), Gp-4.
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7. Rpt (S), MACJ4, n. d., Subj: Monthly Logistical Historical Activities, Mar 68 (U), Gp-4.
8. Rpt (S), MACJ4, n. d., Subj: Monthly Logistical Historical Activities, Apr 68 (U), Gp-4.
9. Msg (C), CG USARV to COMUSMACV, 281245Z May 68, Subj: US Army Logistical Support, Northern I CTZ (U), Gp-4.
10. Rpt (S), MACJ43-LM, n. d., Subj: LOGSOM, Jun-Jul 68 (U), Gp-4.
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12. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 160755Z Oct 68, Subj: A Method of Supporting ARVN through the US Logistics System (U), Gp-4.
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UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

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CHAPTER X  
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

ORGANIZATION AND POLICY

Background

(U) Organized research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) are essential to the MACV mission. The nature of the Vietnam conflict required that the US/ARVN/FWMAF use their vast technological advantages to offset the topographical and population mix advantages enjoyed by the VC/NVA. This is particularly true in the areas of finding the enemy, bringing him to battle, and using the most effective weapons and ordnance possible.

(C) The basic organization, policies, and procedures which governed the RDT&E program within MACV for 1968 were outlined in MACV Dir 70-1, dated 27 September 1967, which was effective until 1 November 1968. In part, this directive called for RDT&E, in conjunction with Combat Development (CD) activities, to "enhance the combat effectiveness and the counterinsurgency and counter subversion capabilities of the US, Vietnamese, and Free World Military Assistance Forces" by:

1. Identifying operational, organizational, and materiel problem areas necessitating RDT&E or CD effort.
2. Initiating test, evaluation, or study action within the capabilities of Hq MACV or service components.
3. Insuring that appropriate CONUS agencies are advised of the requirement for action on problems beyond Hq MACV and Service component competence to solve.
4. Conducting or supporting tests, evaluations, or studies established by appropriate authority.
5. Providing RDT&E and CD support to the RVNAF principally through the RVNAF Combat Development Test Center, Vietnam (CDTC-V).
6. Providing access to data and test environment for the US scientific and military communities for development of new and improved weapons, equipment, concepts and techniques.
7. Assisting the US scientific and military R&D community in orienting its attention and resources towards combat requirements of forces in Vietnam.
8. Providing military evaluations of operational concepts, doctrine, and tactics applicable to two or more Services.

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(C) To implement these policies, MACV relied on the same organizational structure which prevailed throughout 1967. COMUSMACV utilized the MACJ3 as his principal staff advisor on RDT&E and CD matters. Specifically, the latter was to:

1. Recommend approval, disapproval, or notification of proposed RDT&E and CD joint projects based on an evaluation of operational impact, overall benefits which may accrue, and the feasibility of providing required resources.

2. Assign specific responsibilities and coordinate, monitor, and recommend follow-up action on projects of a joint nature or of special MACV interest. Principles delineated in Sections 8 and 10, Chapter IV of JCS Pub 2 apply.

3. Monitor service component commander projects to ascertain impact on mission accomplishment, avoid duplication of effort, insure that joint doctrinal aspects are properly handled, and insure that material or concepts under test and evaluation by one Service component commander are considered by other Service commanders where appropriate.

4. Maintain a record of significant projects being conducted in Vietnam.

5. Review projects being conducted in Vietnam periodically to consider and make appropriate recommendations with respect to continuation, expansion, consolidation, redirection, or termination.

6. Insure that joint projects are designed and conducted so as to make the maximum contribution to and cause minimum interference with operations while fulfilling project objectives.

7. Provide Military Assistance Command, Office of the Science Advisor (MACSA) a copy of pertinent documents submitted to Hq MACV in compliance with the reports paragraph 7 b and c of this directive.

8. Process final reports on joint projects as prescribed in paragraph 7e, Reports.

9. Prepare and furnish CINCPAC an up-dated list of "significant problems" during May and November of each year, in accordance with paragraph 9c, CINCPACINST 03960. 1A of 5 June 1967.

10. Insure that CINCPAC and, as appropriate, the Mission Council (thru the Mission Coordinator) are informed on pertinent RDT&E matters.

(C) Through MACJ3, COMUSMACV maintained necessary jurisdiction and coordination with RDT&E elements of the four Service components, USARV, COMNAVFORV, 7AF, and III MAF. These Service RDT&E units could initiate projects as directed by the Service commanders to whom they were operationally responsible but they were also charged with conducting projects of a joint nature when directed to do so by COMUSMACV.

(C) This decentralization carried with it the disadvantage of leaving COMUSMACV less able to supervise and direct RDT&E efforts than this position, at times, might require. To offset this potential disadvantage, COMUSMACV's staff included an Office of the Science Advisor (MACSA). This small group of specialists, headed by a top civilian scientist, acted as principal advisor to COMUSMACV and his staff on scientific matters. According to MACV Dir 70-1, the specific functions of MACSA were to:

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1. Monitor and conduct an independent review of development, test, and evaluation activities within the command and make recommendations to COMUSMACV or the responsible staff section as appropriate.
2. Review results of intelligence and field operations as requested by COMUSMACV and make recommendations with respect to scientific and technical features.
3. As requested by COMUSMACV, review plans for intelligence and field operations exploiting new equipment or scientific and technical innovations and make recommendations on them.
4. As appropriate, monitor the activities of scientific and technical personnel on duty in Vietnam.
5. Coordinate the activities of scientific and technical personnel on duty in Vietnam who are accredited to Hq MACV.
6. Maintain contact with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering on scientific and technical matters, particularly concerning possible new applications of advanced technology deserving increased R&D emphasis. In fulfillment of this function, the science advisor will neither transmit official requirements nor make commitments for COMUSMACV.
7. Review the requirements of this command for scientific advisors. Recommend functions, organizations, and staff relationship most appropriate to this position. Determine qualitative and quantitative requirements for long-term TDY science advisors to this command.

(C) In addition, MACSA was given the responsibility of exercising staff supervision over a research unit controlled by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Advanced Research Project Agency's Research and Development Field Unit, Vietnam (ARPA-RDFU-V).

(C) The same MACV Directive (No. 70-1, 27 September 1967) which outlined organization and objectives for R&D within MACV jurisdiction also provided for testing and evaluation of projects. Pointing out that the COMUSMACV would monitor RDT&E and CD activities, the directive specified that "projects will not be undertaken without giving full consideration to their conduct in CONUS or appropriate noncombat zones, and only those projects requiring the specific combat environment of RVN or data uniquely derivable from that area will be conducted therein." This was necessary, MACV felt, to ensure that maximum help could be gained from the RDT&E and CD programs at a minimum of interference with operations being conducted in RVN. By the same token, MACV directed that primary emphasis be placed on those RDT&E projects and programs "which offer direct and significant improvement of combat capability for forces involved in Vietnam."<sup>1</sup>

(S) This last consideration was an important one. MACV recognized that some projects were naturally more promising than others, that individual priorities would have to vary with the circumstances, and that certain general problem areas would require first consideration. Early in January, for example, MACV informed selected field units that "attempts of the R&D community to provide better capabilities to find the enemy" needed special emphasis, particularly in the areas of Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD), night vision equipment for armed helicopters, and Seismic Intrusion Detectors (SID). MACV went on to say:

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To the maximum extent practicable, requirements for operational qualities of new equipment should be established soonest in order to reduce production leadtime. It is recognized, however, the early establishment of quantitative requirements for equipment necessitates expedited development of operational and organizational concepts for employment. This action is considered necessary and warranted in order to bring about the earliest availability to assist in the critical problem of finding the enemy, his materiel, and base camps.

(S) MACV then suggested that:

. . . If one is willing to risk a small amount of production money prior to completion of testing, then the time between the end of the test and arrival of operational hardware can be significantly reduced. If the tests prove unsuccessful, the minor amount of money lost should be considered insignificant relative to the time gained if these tests are successful. <sup>2</sup>

#### The MACSA Proposal

(C) In December 1967, MACSA submitted a proposal for reorganization and expansion of the RDT&E effort. In essence, he recommended three organizational changes designed to "realize the full potential of scientific and technological applications to this war." First, MACSA recommended that a corps of scientific field advisors be attached to the commanders of field units "down to the level of division and independent brigade. . . ." In MACSA's view, these advisors would be on the lookout for new equipment, ideas, modifications, candidates for the in-country fix-it shop, special captured enemy gear, etc. <sup>3</sup>

(C) MACSA's second proposal called for "an integration of the presently fragmented RDT&E units in South Vietnam. Despite the great dedication and fine motivation of the individuals involved," the memo said, "the efforts of the Service RDT&E components continue to be largely isolated, fragmented and uncoordinated." MACSA therefore proposed an "overall" organization encompassing the various Service RDT&E units which would have as its "sole mission" the expeditious "development and application of new technical equipment for prosecution of the Vietnam War." The result would be a "more efficient and integrated entity." <sup>4</sup>

(C) With this expanded emphasis on R&D, MACSA saw the need for an enlarged MACV Science Advisor's office to handle the "greatly expanded number of programs and problems generated by field advisors and to provide the necessary integration amongst the assembled test units." This would require augmentations of the MACSA office from one civilian, four officers, and two enlisted men to one civilian, ten officers, one warrant officer, and eight enlisted men. <sup>5</sup>

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(C) Finally, MACSA felt that increased emphasis on RDT&E in Vietnam would require a corresponding "increased capability" in CONUS. The proposal did not specify what the "increased capability" should encompass but it stated that an essential qualification must be the ability of the CONUS organization to "attract the most capable scientists, and to inspire the spirit, verve, and dedication to get the job done. . . ."<sup>6</sup>

(C) MACSA's plan did not experience smooth sailing. In particular, field commanders did not see the necessity in having scientific advisors assigned below the levels of the main field forces. Thus, when MACV formally forwarded the proposal to CINCPAC in February, it recommended that scientific advisors be attached to senior field commanders and then only with their concurrence. At the same time, MACV agreed to MACSA's proposal to also serve as a science advisor to the Deputy Commanding General, US Army in Vietnam (DCG USARV) with a deputy stationed at Long Binh to handle day-to-day business.<sup>7</sup>

(C) Reaction at CINCPAC and JCS to the proposal was generally unfavorable. CINCPAC felt that the scientific advisors proposed by MACSA should be primarily responsible to the commanders they support rather than MACSA. In other words, MACSA's role should be one of coordination rather than direction. "It is important," CINCPAC noted, "that the use of scientific advisors and increased emphasis on MACSA's coordination of R&D activities do not erode established service channels for R&D."<sup>8</sup>

(S) JCS was even more critical. In particular, it rejected MACSA's proposed buildup until "complete documentation and justification" had been made.<sup>9</sup>

(C) In July and again in September, MACSA submitted revised proposals more in accord with what the higher commands wanted. In both documents--the latter was a minor revision of the earlier one--MACSA adopted the recommendations of higher headquarters.<sup>10</sup> The revised proposals also accepted the premise that the field science advisors should be assigned to the principal field forces and that their relationship with MACSA should be a "channel of information and support." These advisors would be assigned to the III MAF, I FFORCEV, II FFORCEV, IV CTZ Senior Advisor, 7AF, and NAVFORV; however, they would be available for TDY to other requesting agencies.<sup>11</sup>

FINDING THE ENEMY

Sensors

(C) Intrusion detection equipment in the form of trip wires, visible and infrared searchlights, surveillance radar, day and night vision devices, etc. had been introduced in Vietnam during the earliest days of the conflict. During 1968, however, increasing and at times particularly strong emphasis had been placed on families of attended and unattended personnel and vehicle sensors which would sound an alarm in some relatively distant observation post or surveillance center when activated. In general, these items fall into categories according to the principle behind the sensor, such as magnetic, seismic, acoustic, etc., and the method of placing the device, that is, hand placed or "seeded" by aircraft or helicopter.

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(C) The variety exists because each sensor has inherent weaknesses. For example, the infrared type which uses an interrupted beam to trigger the alarm is susceptible to false alarms by blowing dust, the trespassing of animals, and the like. At the same time, the seismic detectors, which seem to be the most promising of the group, can be triggered by artillery or mortar shells landing some distance away. And, of course, no single sensor can distinguish between friend and foe.

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(C) Other sensors in use and/or undergoing evaluation in SEASIA during the year included an Infrared Intrusion Detector (IRID) which uses a broken infrared beam to initiate the alarm system (there is also a miniaturized version of this system); the Balanced Pressure System (BPS), which uses buried hoses filled with water to detect earth vibrations; the Unattended Seismic Detector (USD) which utilizes a series of interconnected geophone sensors together with an appropriate relay system; the Magnetic Intrusion Detector (MACID) which uses individually placed sensors to detect the passage of ferromagnetic material, such as rifles, knives, etc.; and the Multipurpose Concealed Intrusion Detector (MCID) which utilizes magnetic current flowing through links of copper wire buried a few inches underground. The MCID, through its detection and relay system, sounds an alarm when ferromagnetic material passes through its force field. This particular sensor has the advantage of presenting a solid detection barrier up to 250 feet long for each detector used.

(TS) Overall, 1968 was a year of both success and frustration for the sensor program. Individual sensing devices worked well enough to warrant investments of huge sums of money in the refined and more reliable phase II series. Moreover, massive and generally effective systems, using a variety of types of sensors, have been set up along the DMZ and the Laotian border (see that portion of Chapter X entitled "Anti-infiltration Barriers"). Also, both personnel and vehicle detecting sensors were used extensively during the siege of Khe Sanh (January 1968), in the vicinity of Saigon during Tet (Jan - Feb 1968), and during the May - June offensives. The success of sensors in the more recent cases, however, was not nearly as spectacular as their contribution at Khe Sanh where, in the words of COMUSMACV, the operation "demonstrated the utility of sensors for monitoring movements of enemy troops and vehicles in tactical environment." 13

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(TS) The major frustrations with the sensor program centered around the lack of sensors, although there was some dissatisfaction with what might be called "technological restrictions." These limitations included the inadequacy of frequency space for the sensors to transmit without interfering with each other, the lack of workable, hand-emplaced sensors, and the lack of adequate local readout capability. <sup>14</sup>

(TS) On 1 April 1968, COMUSMACV expressed concern to Washington of "inadequate supplies" of sensors and stated his belief that great emphasis should be placed on "expanded production of sensors in numbers and diversity adequate to support in-country as well as out-of-country applications." He also recommended the following:

1. Development of new sensors that capitalize on the special accessibility and permissiveness of the in-country environment.
2. Development of portable/mobile sensor readout and interpretation capability suitable for the several categories of in-country sensor applications envisioned.
3. Development of a variety of equipments, concepts, and tactics for in-country sensor employment, ranging from small, static outpost protection to large dynamic offensive operations.
4. Establishment of a production pipeline to support the growing sensor requirement.
5. Establishment of a CONUS training base for the provision of specialist crews to man the sensor emplacement and readout operations.
6. Development of concepts and equipment (e. g. communications) for integrating sensor information into the field intelligence systems to provide quick reaction strike capability. <sup>15</sup>

(TS) Toward the end of the year, the Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG) was still concerned about "sensor shortage" and "continued slippage of production." At the same time, however, it spoke of "massive engineering reviews" to open up the bottlenecks. This emphasis, of course, was in keeping with COMUSMACV's earlier recommendation that "steps be taken as rapidly as possible to assure the discriminating development and well-planned employment of a spectrum of sensors that could accelerate realization of the great promise of this new technology." <sup>16</sup>

#### Camp Sentinel Radar

(C) The Camp Sentinel Radar (CSR) system represented a significant R&D effort to provide ground surveillance in defense of small to medium sized base camps located in areas partially or completely surrounded by foliage or wooded areas. The basic concept was that the system, a 360° electronic scanning Doppler radar, would penetrate the foliage and detect any radial movement between 1/2 and 11 mph to include men walking or running. This unique ability was possible because the system could cancel out returns from "fixed" objects, such as trees, or rhythmic motions, such as those coming from swaying branches. <sup>17</sup>

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(C) The system devised by Lincoln Laboratories under ARPA sponsorship, had three major components: the Antennae/Control Unit sat atop a 100 foot, self-erecting tower while the Power Supply Unit and the Display Unit could be set in a trailer or a bunker. Weighing some 5,200 pounds, the entire system, including the tower, could be broken down and moved by trailer.

(C) The CSR had a minimum range of 300 feet and a maximum range of 2.5 miles, depending on the foliage. Even more important, it had the capability of an irregular, variable survey. To this end, the 360° compass rose was divided into 32 segments, each representing 200 mils of arc. Within each segment, a 15-foot wide surveillance zone existed which could be moved 50 to 800 feet away from the neighboring segments and shifted in distance from the inner range of the set to the outer limit. The surveillance barrier, therefore, could be made into a regular circle at a particular distance but, more likely, would be set up as an irregular barrier, tailored to conform to the topography surrounding the base camp area.

(C) The single CSR set arrived in-country in August and immediately showed promising results. In one instance, counterfire was sent into the jungle on the basis of a radar return and a sweep the next day revealed evidence of intruders, including a broken camera. Nevertheless, a CSR had some drawbacks. For one thing, the 100 foot antennae tower was conspicuous enough to be an aiming point for mortar fire. This defect, however, could be overcome, at least in part, if the detection range were increased beyond the mortar range so that the friendly artillery could get its fires in first. Also, the equipment had not been waterproofed which made it unable to withstand the rigors of in-country service. For these reasons the set was inactive as the year came to a close, waiting for repairs and improvements. Once those had been accomplished, it would undergo further testing and evaluation.

#### Airborne Systems

#### QUIET AIRCRAFT

(S) In January 1968, operational evaluation began for the "Quiet Aircraft," a powered version of a Schweizer S-232 sailplane which was inaudible to ground forces when flying more than 1,500 feet above ground level. The concept envisioned the aircraft flying at night with the observer using a hand-held Starlight Scope to scan the area below.

(S) During the test period, the night surveillance resulted in visual sightings and observations of previously undetected enemy activities. A flotilla of VC sampans, for example, was observed for over two hours as they proceeded along the canals of the Nam Cam Forest while the aircraft remained undetected. Again the airplane was not detected as it orbited sapper teams interdicting Route 4 in the Delta.<sup>18</sup>

(S) In April, the two QT-2 models were returned to CONUS for modifications. In particular, the tests had revealed the need for a quieter propeller, expanded view ports, and greater strength in the wing structure. These modifications were accomplished and the aircraft returned to SEASIA in June for another month of operational evaluation.<sup>19</sup>

(S) Out of this evaluation which like the preceding one, was deemed successful, it was determined that the quiet aircraft, now designated PRIZE CREW, could make a "significant contribution" to operators in SEASIA. Under a "rapid development" contract, MACV asked for a

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total of 40 modified quiet aircraft (designated QT-3) to be distributed as follows: USARV 10, 7AF 18, NAVFORV 6, and III MAF 6. At the same time, the operational concept announced by MACV consisted of covert night surveillance with the greatest contributions coming from support of base defense, locating enemy rocket and artillery firing sites, surveillance of infiltration routes, and improvement of night artillery and air support effectiveness.<sup>20</sup>

(S) By year's end, the quiet aircraft concept had generated considerable enthusiasm in SEA-SIA. Phase III, of an announced three phase evaluation and procurement project, envisioned development of a new, optimized, tri-service quiet aircraft, designated YO-3A. It was not yet certain what the capabilities of this "optimized" aircraft would be but consideration was being given to at least a target marking capability, with possibly a laser guidance beam. There was also talk of a possible ordnance delivery capability.<sup>21</sup>

#### NITE PANTHER

(S) NITE PANTHER, a project utilizing the Drone Anti-submarine Helicopter (DASH) equipped with low light level television cameras (LLLTV), was conducted off shore and over the DMZ between 24 and 30 April 1968. The concept, tested by the Marines in I CTZ, envisioned reliable low level reconnaissance without the risk customary to such operations. During the testing period, more than a dozen flights were made with both encouraging and discouraging results. Two drones crashed, quality and coverage were sporadic but promising, and faulty power and monitoring equipment greatly limited effectiveness. At the end of the period, one salvaged drone and associated ground equipment were returned to CONUS for examination.<sup>22</sup>

(S) Despite the technological setbacks, the concept was thought to have exploitable potential. Thus, even as the NITE PANTHER system was undergoing study in CONUS, some thought was directed to a follow-on project, named NITE GAZELLE, which would use a Navy-improved DASH as the carrying vehicle for surveillance and weapons delivery.<sup>23</sup>

### SEARCH AND ATTACK SYSTEMS

#### Problems

(S) A significant time lapse between discovery of the enemy by US/ARVN/FW forces and a resulting fire attack has usually been of advantage to the enemy. Knowing that he has been observed, he can easily shift or disperse his forces. Part of this problem has been solved by the rapid response of TAC air and artillery. Night search and attack operations, however, have proven much more difficult and, not unnaturally, have brought on some important RDT&E effort. The following paragraphs describe several of the more prominent ones which received significant attention from MACV in CY68.

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Programs

TRIM

(S) The Trail/Road Interdiction Multi-Sensor (TRIM) project represented the most sophisticated, multi-sensor detection and destruction platform in-country during 1968. Navy sponsored and carrying a high priority, the program utilized three and later four modified P2 (Termed AP-2H) aircraft equipped with the following advanced sensing devices: Low Light Level Television (LLLTV), Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR), Downward Looking Infrared Radar (DLIR), Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), Multi-Mode Forward Radar, and Image Intensification Telescopes for visual surveillance under ambient night sky illumination. A computer coupled these sensors with a weapons delivery system capable of delivering various kinds of ordnance. In addition, the aircraft were equipped with fixed, forward firing, depressed angle, SUU-11, 7.62mm dual machine guns; a downward firing, multiple grenade launcher in the bomb bay; and a tail turret M-3 20mm dual machine gun.<sup>24</sup>

(S) Project TRIM began early in the year and was periodically extended through 1 September 1968. The squadron flew night surveillance/attack missions to support trail interdiction operations in Laos, to impede infiltration from Cambodia to SVN, and to provide close support of Riverine task forces. The tactic employed was the single pass concept which meant detecting the target and dropping the ordnance in one pass.<sup>25</sup>

(S) The project was not without its problems. Individual components of the system, some of which were hand-made and "one of a kind" periodically failed, with resultant repair difficulty. Several times during the year, MACV indicated concern at the delay and "lack of progress," stressing its "primary interest" in the project. At the same time, it was found that bomb damage was difficult to assess. "The most effective target destruction results," one report noted, "have been obtained by use of 20mm tail guns after the aircraft has passed over the target. Secondary explosions can be recorded but other damage is difficult to obtain at night."<sup>26</sup>

(S) Despite these setbacks, the concept was judged to be a sound one and the potential of the TRIM project was excellent. With this in mind, the temporary status of the 60-odd people involved in the project was made permanent with the change of the squadron to the status of Heavy Attack Squadron 21 (VAH-21) on 1 September 1968. Some questions as to operational capability remained, however, and in agreeing to the permanent status, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) had added a warning:

If significant improvement in combat operational capability is not realized. . . or the in-country space problem is not satisfactorily resolved, OSD will be approached for agreement to return the unit to CONUS and revert it to some as yet undetermined R&D status. Should this decision be made, decommissioning of VAH-21 would undoubtedly follow.<sup>27</sup>

(S) Still later in the year, BLACK CROW sensors were added to the TRIM package. These sensors detect the electro-magnetic radiations from spark plugs and give indications of being one of the most valuable detection devices aboard the aircraft.

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TROPIC MOON I, II, and III

(C) Projects TROPIC MOON I and II, two similar airborne night-time detection and attack systems, were conceived in 1967 but underwent testing and evaluation in SEASIA in 1968. TROPIC MOON I consisted of four A-1E aircraft carrying Low Light Level Television and a video screen in the cockpit which displayed target information gathered by the cameras under natural night illumination.

(C) TROPIC MOON II used LLLTV equipment and a laser range finder mounted on three B-57 aircraft. It also had an automatic, continuous updating, weapons release processor and associated electronic equipment.<sup>28</sup>

(C) Both programs began testing in January 1968: TROPIC MOON I at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, and TROPIC MOON II at Phan Rang, in RVN. The formal test period for the former ended on 8 May; the latter was cut short on 15 April. The tests showed that both systems left something to be desired and, in the case of TROPIC MOON II, the results were termed "marginal." The main reason, according to the final report, was that "the speed of the B-57 allowed insufficient time to identify targets." Also, the navigation equipment aboard the B-57 was too limited for the assigned mission. For these reasons, the project was not considered worth further RDT&E and, in May 1968, both 7AF and COMUSMACV agreed that TROPIC MOON II personnel and equipment should be returned to CONUS even though funds for the project had been allocated through the following December.<sup>29</sup>

(C) TROPIC MOON I, while considerably less sophisticated than its cousin, fared much better. According to the final test report, the results of TROPIC MOON I were also "marginal"; however, it was felt that the main problem was "environmental." "Weather in the operating area was poor," the report noted, "and the high antiaircraft threat forced aircraft to operate well above the 2,500 foot optimum altitude."<sup>30</sup>

(C) The TROPIC MOON I system itself worked well enough for 7AF to recommend and COMUSMACV to approve an extension of the formal test period. A more favorable location was considered essential, however, and in June 1968 the project was moved to Bien Hoa where operations were conducted in the more favorable environment of III and IV CTZs. In this location, operations went so well that in August, before the formal test period was over, the Senior Advisor in the IV CTZ asked that the program remain in his zone on a permanent basis.<sup>31</sup>

(S) Overall, the TROPIC MOON concept grew rather than declined in favor with MACV. It was believed that the limitations lay with the weapons systems rather than the concept itself. Indeed, at year's end, a program was well underway for TROPIC MOON III, a very advanced version of the two earlier programs. Again B-57s would be used but with drastically updated navigation equipment. In addition, the aircraft would be equipped with the LLLTV, FLIR, F and a sophisticated group of electronic countermeasures (ECM) gear.

(S) In the final months of 1968, contracts for the aircraft were being let in CONUS and training for the crews and technicians was underway. It was estimated that TROPIC MOON III would not take its place on the firing line until late 1969, at which time 16 of the special B-57s would be spread into three night attack squadrons and one night attack composite squadron.<sup>32</sup>

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### BLACK SPOT

(S) BLACK SPOT was a program to test and evaluate a particular integrated, airborne night search and attack system, a system similar in some respects to both the GUNSHIP and the TROPIC MOON programs. The test vehicles were two C-123 aircraft, armed with multiple target acquisition sensors and Hays dispensers for ejecting a variety of ordnance and ammunition. Specifically, the mission of BLACK SPOT was to interdict targets on the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger areas of Laos while gathering precise test information on the following:

1. Sensor performance and reliability.
2. The range at which different targets can be identified and their "characteristic signatures" on the sensing and recording equipment, and
3. The effectiveness of the types of Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU) munitions in destroying selected targets, including determination of the best mixture of fragmentation and incendiary bomblets.

(S) The BLACK SPOT program was to have been initiated in SEASIA in 1967 but priority requirements drew the modified C-123s to Korea where they were used primarily for the gathering of intelligence data. In November 1968, however, they were brought to Vietnam for in-country testing in IV CTZ. There, they were "very successful in locating and attacking numerous lucrative targets." On the first 15 combat missions, for example, they destroyed eight boats, damaged another six, and caused 14 secondary explosions and five fires. Although thorough bomb damage assessment was impossible because of darkness, all bombs were reported on target and overall success was such that on 27 November the authorized sortie rate was increased to two per day. A few days later, 7AF with strong CINCPAC support, requested that certain special munitions held for a contingency operation be released for use in the BLACK SPOT program. "BLACK SPOT success demonstrated using this munition justified higher priority for use against current active enemy than withholding for possible future use," was the way CINCPACAF put it. 33

(S) Project BLACK SPOT ended at Phan Rang on 13 November 1968, at which time it was positioned for operations in southern Laos. There, as in RVN, it showed itself to be a formidable weapons system. In late December, CINCPACAF reported that in 17 sorties in Laos, BLACK SPOT aircraft had attacked 45 targets destroying 26 trucks, probably destroying 38 and damaging 19. The same attacks caused 32 secondary explosions and 37 secondary fires. Because of such an impressive performance, CINCPACAF officially requested, on 26 December, a 120-day extension of the BLACK SPOT in-country TDY beyond the existing deadline of 11 February 1969.

### GUNSHIP II

(S) GUNSHIP II was easily the most advanced of the three GUNSHIP programs. Whereas the other two used essentially WWII aircraft, GUNSHIP II utilized the workhorse C-130, a turbo-prop heavy transport type plane.

(S) In the design and testing phase of GUNSHIP II, which took place in CY67, only one C-130 was used. It carried four 7.62mm miniguns and four 20mm Vulcan (Gatling) cannons, enough firepower for what one observer called an "awesome demonstration." This ship also carried

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some very sophisticated navigation equipment as well as sensors for locating and identifying targets, a Night Observation Device (NOD), Side Looking Radar (SLR), a Sideward Looking Infrared Radar (SLIR) system, a Battlefield Illumination Airborne System (BIAS), a flare dispensing system, and extra armor.

(S) The single GUNSHIP II was returned to CONUS early in 1968 for further modifications. It was then returned to SEA for use pending the arrival of the first of eight production model GUNSHIP IIs. When these began arriving in-country in November 1968, the prototype was again withdrawn from SEASIA and sent back to CONUS.

#### COMBAT GUARD (GUNSHIP III)

(S) The impressive showing of GUNSHIP I, and particularly GUNSHIP II, led to yet another fire support program known as COMBAT GUARD or, as it is sometimes called, GUNSHIP III. The latter utilizes the C-119 G and K models rather than the C-47 or the C-130.

(S) The C-119 is an outdated, World War II type aircraft, however, the shortage of the workhorse C-130s and the combination twin boom and tail loading of the C-119 led to its selection for gunship configuration. Plans called for the "G" model to have four of the 7.62mm miniguns and two 20mm Vulcan cannon. The "K" model, which would carry two outboard jet "assist" engines, would mount four of the 7.62s and four of the 20mm cannon. Both models would carry associated navigation and sensing equipment, including night observation and illumination devices and advanced fire control systems.

(S) At the end of GY68 the first of 18 programmed C-119 gunships had arrived in-country. The test and evaluation period was scheduled to begin in early January 1969 with the specific objectives being to determine:

1. If the C-119 can accomplish its assigned mission;
2. Acceptable methods of employment;
3. Ability of the system to meet close air support requirements; and
4. Adequacy of the authorized personnel and equipment list.

#### MOBILITY

(U) Since mobility was one of the "prime assets" of US/ARVN/FWMAF in Vietnam, it was understandable that some RDT&E effort would be continued in CY68 toward maintaining and improving this significant advantage. In this particular area of activity, there were two significant programs; the first concerned the air cushion vehicle, which was designed primarily for very rapid transit over rivers, swampy areas, and flat lands; the second, which carried a very high priority with MACV, was the creation of landing zones for helicopters by means of heavy bombs.

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(Patrol) Air Cushion Vehicle

(C) The (Patrol) Air Cushion Vehicle (PACV), called ACV by the Army and PACV by the Navy, is a military version of the Bell Aerosystems SK-5 Hovercraft. Thirty-eight feet nine inches long, 23 feet wide, 16 feet 6 inches high, and weighing approximately 9 tons, the ACV is equipped with light armor and mounts both twin .50 calibre machine guns and the lighter M-60 machine gun. Fully armed, the craft can race across suitable terrain at speeds in excess of 55 knots.<sup>34</sup>

(C) Power for the ACV is supplied by a gas turbine which drives a lift fan and a four bladed propulsion propeller. The lift fan, in turn, discharges a large volume of air through a flexible rubber trunk towards the ground, thereby allowing the vehicle to ride a "cushion" of air and clear fixed obstacles up to three and one half feet in height. The propulsion propeller, on the other hand, provides both forward motion and direction. Speed is controlled by varying the pitch of the propeller while the propeller blast is also used to turn the rudders.<sup>35</sup>

(C) The advantages of the ACV are obvious. Given the proper terrain, it can overtake and out maneuver anything the enemy has to offer. Moreover, its speed and maneuverability allow vast extension of patrol coverage, adding the time honored principle "economy of force" to those of mobility and firepower.

(C) As of the end of November the 9th Inf Div had employed three ACVs successfully on numerous occasions on patrol activities and search and destroy operations in the Delta. The CO of the ACV unit, an Armor officer, was highly enthusiastic about the performance and capabilities of his ACVs and was impatiently awaiting delivery of six additional vehicles.<sup>36</sup>

\*Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZ)

(S) Because of the extensive use of helicopters in SEASIA for air assault missions, medevac, and patrol insertion and extraction, the lack of suitable landing zones in certain areas was naturally one of the limitations governing their use, a fact not unnoticed by the VC/NVA. The enemy naturally avoided those areas vulnerable to helicopter assault. On the other hand, MACV and its subsidiary organizations actively sought to remove this operational handicap by developing a means for creating, when necessary, suitable HLZs. Indeed, the HLZ concept carried a very high priority among MACV and RDT&E activities after the inception of the program. In particular, MACV sought a means of creating HLZs in heavy jungle containing trees 150 feet tall and 36 inches in diameter. The desired requirements were that the created HLZ must contain neither large stumps nor craters and, hopefully, would be large enough to accommodate three to five helicopters.<sup>37</sup>

(S) Initially, the solution to this taxing R&D problem rested with the Air Force. At a test planning meeting at Hq USAF in March 1968, however, it was decided that the project, code named COMBAT TRAP, should be a joint USAF/USA affair. At the same time, it was decided to "take extraordinary actions to provide COMUSMACV with a capability to clear areas for helicopter landings," to include a 60-day test period in CONUS followed by a 60-day test period in SEASIA.<sup>38</sup>

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(S) In a series of communications between COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, JCS, and CSAF, the problem was discussed in terms of what kind of bombs would do the job, and equally important, what type of aircraft could deliver these bombs with sufficient accuracy. Some thought was given to the "temporary expedient" of using A-1Es, F-4s, and F-105s to deliver the 2,000 pound M-84 bomb and using the F-105 to deliver the 3,000 pound M-118. It was obvious from the beginning, however, that sufficient accuracy would not be achieved with these aircraft. In some instances, for example, the site to be cleared would have to be on the very crest of a ridge or top of a mountain to be of value. Also, it was equally obvious that neither the M-84 nor the M-118 bomb had sufficient penetrating and blast characteristics to do the job.<sup>39</sup>

(S) Several alternative solutions were considered. One was to marry the M-84 (for penetration) and the M-118 (for blast effect). This combination, however, would require major modifications and some delay since M-118s were no longer being manufactured. Another proposal was to take a hard look at a new liquid-filled Astrolite bomb with a claimed blast yield three to four times greater than comparable weight conventional bombs. It was further indicated that the first of these bombs could be delivered within seven months of contract approval. This proposal, however, lost favor when it became obvious that problems associated with the as-yet-unproven bomb would mean at least a 24 to 36 month delay in production.<sup>40</sup>

(S) In mid-May 1968, the Sandia Corporation offered still another proposal. It suggested building a huge 43,000 pound bomb composed from a liquid petroleum tank and triggering devices left over from the atomic stockpile. This Big Test Vehicle (BTV), as it was called, would be six feet in diameter, 244 inches long, and have a blast capability equal to 20 tons of TNT. Moreover, according to the Air Force Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, which was particularly enthusiastic about the BTV, the bomb could be made quickly, inexpensively, and could be carried by the B-52.<sup>41</sup>

(S) A test program for the BTV was set up in CONUS with the planned climax to be a series of live tests in a Montana forest. As of the end of 1968, however, these tests had not been concluded.

(S) In the meantime, RDT&E people found a reasonably good solution, though not an entirely satisfactory one. A supply of more than 200 M-121 10,000 pound high explosive bombs, created specifically for the now obsolete B-36 bomber, was carried in the Air Force inventory. Combining ingenuity and imagination, the experts found that the bomb could be effectively carried and dropped by the CH-54 helicopter (Sky Hook) and, in a palletized version, by the C-130 transport. In both instances, however, the bomb was parachute stabilized and carried a 36 inch extended fuze to insure detonation just above the ground.<sup>42</sup>

(S) In tests conducted in CONUS and SEASIA, some problems became evident. In the first place, the CH-54, while capable of impressive accuracy, had only a daylight VFR capability. Also, it was particularly vulnerable to ground fire. The C-130 had all-weather, day or night capability, but lacked the accuracy of the CH-54. Accuracy could be of prime importance as shown by one live drop wherein the bomb was only 25 meters off target; however, because the bomb fell on the side of a ridge, the landing zone created was not usable. At the same time, it was discovered that although the M-121 did clear an area without leaving either craters or stumps, this cleared area was only about 40 by 50 meters, which was only large enough to get one chopper in safely. This was far short of the three-to-five helicopters area desired. The blast, however, did render it possible for the one helicopter to land immediately and, with minor engineering effort, the HLZ could be expanded to accommodate three helicopters in about two hours.<sup>43</sup>

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(S) By mid-November 1968, all test MK-121s in SEASIA had been expended in Project COMBAT TRAP. Overall, results were favorable although the landing zone itself was still far smaller than MACV had requested. The desired results would have to wait for the BTV which was still undergoing development in CONUS. In the meantime, COMUSMACV felt that he would have to utilize the best available and that was the MK-121. On 29 November, he sent an urgent request for ten MK-121s to be in place in-country NLT 12 December 1968. "These weapons," COMUSMACV announced, "are required to support a forthcoming multi-battalion operation in I CTZ and are considered factors in the conduct of the operation."<sup>44</sup>

(S) The bombs were used in Operation TAYLOR COMMON in December. Because the HLZs had to be on a narrow ridge and on a small mountain top, the "miss distances" of between 40 and 200 meters meant that multiple (four or more) bombs had to be used before a suitable LZ for one helicopter was available.<sup>45</sup> This problem was anticipated and would receive due attention in the future. Meanwhile, there was no question but that the concept itself had proven valid.

#### Articulated Cargo Carrier

(C) The Articulated Cargo Carrier, a relatively small tracked vehicle pulling a tracked trailer, was developed to fulfill the need for a full tracked, amphibious, helicopter transportable cargo carrier capable of operating during both wet and dry seasons. The carrier provides exceptional mobility, particularly since it can carry a crew of two and eight passengers or 1500 pounds of cargo at a speed of 32 mph on land or 3.4 mph in the water. The unique feature of this vehicle is that engine power can be transmitted to the trailer tracks, thus providing traction to both units.

(C) The Articulated Cargo Carrier arrived in Vietnam for testing in November 1968. At year's end, it was undergoing evaluation under the aegis of the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV).<sup>46</sup>

#### ARTILLERY/MORTAR/ROCKET/COUNTERMEASURES

(S) Throughout the year enemy activity in SVN included regular and fairly heavy rocket, artillery, and mortar attacks on RVN cities and military installations. This was particularly true during the Tet Offensive (January and February) and in the major offensives in May and the less spectacular offensives of June and August. During the period 6 May to 15 June 1968, for example, 344 mixed rocket and mortar rounds impacted in the city of Saigon or its suburbs.<sup>47</sup>

(S) Such activity prompted a major countereffort on the part of MACV, particularly in developing a means of promptly identifying the enemy firing sites in order to permit swift and effective retaliation. Generally, this development took the form of R&D efforts to locate the firing sites through the use of radar and sound ranging (acoustical) detection systems.

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#### The AN/TNS-9

(C) In September 1967, MACSA and the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) arranged for 13 sets of AN/TNS-3 sound ranging equipment to be delivered in-country to locate VC/NVA firing locations. These WWII sets proved inadequate, which led to the introduction of a new sound ranging system, designated the AN/TNS-9, which had been developed by Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Generally this system utilized microphone arrays located at positions bordering a friendly installation. The microphones detect the sound of a weapon discharge and feed it to the processors which determine an azimuth from a given microphone array to the sound source. Two or more azimuths are then used to triangulate the exact location of the sound source. The AN/TNS-9 was designated to give a near "real-time" readout capability. In theory, therefore, it seemed to offer a reasonably good solution to the problem of locating a sound source.

(C) The one AN/TNS-9 in existence was brought to Vietnam on 24 February 1968, and began operation at Dong Ha with the 108th Artillery Group in early March. The test period came to an end on 2 April and the system was returned to CONUS for further operational evaluation and marrying up with a digital computer. The latter was especially designed to allow discrimination against extraneous noises while concentrating on that part of the sound frequency spectrum associated with artillery, rockets, or mortars. At the end of 1968 the CONUS evaluation was not yet complete and, therefore, the results of the CONUS test were still "inconclusive."<sup>48</sup>

#### Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Sound Ranging System

(S) The LASL (Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory) Sound Ranging System is a short base line, automatic azimuth computing artillery/mortar locator. The basic system consists of four unattended monitoring stations, each with four microphones mounted on a vertical frame, an automatic azimuth computer, an automatic telemetry transmitter, and a base station which receives all incoming data. When the microphone array senses a sound signal, the azimuth computer analyzes the sound to eliminate certain false alarms, measures the minute differences in time of arrival of the signal at each of the microphones (automatically compensating for differences in air density and temperature), and computes the azimuth to the sound source. This refined azimuth is then telemetered to the base station where it is duly plotted on a map. With two or more such azimuths, the base station operator is able to triangulate a fix.<sup>49</sup>

(S) While sound ranging systems are generally known for their lack of reliability, the LASL system gives promise of reversing the trend. Tests by the 108th FA Gp and elements of the III MAF, conducted between 20 June and 24 August, revealed azimuth accuracy of  $\pm 25$  mils on individual shots and  $\pm 15$  mils on multiple shots. (Mils are used by artillerymen to express azimuth relationships. Approximately 17.7 mils is equivalent to one degree of bearing). With such precision, the test units were able to obtain 549 target coordinates at distances up to 20,000 meters during the 60-day test period. Several "unconfirmed" weapons locations and a rocket launch site were also recorded.<sup>50</sup>

(S) ACTIV conducted tests of the LASL system in III CTZ during the latter part of 1968. Results of the tests had not been published by year's end.

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#### The AN/TPQ-28

(C) Perhaps the most promising counter artillery/mortar/rocket device considered in FY68 was the AN/TPQ-28 radar set. Preliminary tests indicated that the AN/TPQ-28 would have an "excellent first round" detection and a precise (within 50 meters) location capability against mortars. With an overall range limitation of 11 kilometers, however, the AN/TPQ-28 had only a "good" capability against rockets and a "rather limited" capability against artillery.<sup>51</sup>

(C) The desirability of the AN/TPQ-28 was further limited by the cost which was estimated to be \$1,927,000 per set. At the same time, essential redesign of the antenna system and increase in receiver-transmitter output meant that production quantities of the radar could not be expected before the end of 1969.<sup>52</sup>

(C) Because of excessive cost and delay, DA requested on 7 August that the total USARV requirement for the AN/TPQ-28 be reexamined and validated, both as to quantities required and their proposed locations. At the same time, however, DA offered suggestions as to several possible substitute units, all of which cost considerably less than the AN/TPQ-28 and, equally important, could be delivered in a matter of months. DA indicated that the AN/UPS-1, a USMC Air Defense Radar, had produced "excellent results" in controlled tests. The jets had detected mortar positions at 30 kilometers, artillery at 20 km and rockets at 15 km, all with a reasonable degree of accuracy as to location.<sup>53</sup>

(C) DA also recommended consideration of the AN/TPN-8 and the AN/MPQ-35, both of which were ground controlled, precision, approach-type radars already in use in Vietnam. DA thought that both sets could be used immediately to "assist" in artillery/counter mortar/rocket activity. With relatively inexpensive modifications, estimated to be between 5 and 15 thousand dollars per set, the effective pickup range could be increased to 8-9 kilometers for the AN/TPN-8 and 25-30 kilometers for the AN/MPQ-35.<sup>54</sup>

(C) At year's end, the issue over the AN/TPQ-28 and the suggested substitutes was still unresolved. A primary reason was the decline of enemy "attacks-by-fire," particularly after the half-hearted August offensive. This decline naturally resulted in a corresponding decline in the urgency of the problem.

#### MITHRAS FIREWATCH

(S) In October 1967, a CINCPAC Project ARMOROCOCO (Artillery/Mortar/Rocket Counter-Measures) conference asked for construction and combat test and evaluation of a counter artillery/mortar device, based on a design used by the Air Force in detecting ground fire against aircraft. As a result of this request, a new system called MITHRAS FIREWATCH, named for its developer, was brought into being. Its purpose was to place a forward observer in a fixed observation post with an improved capability to detect and pinpoint the source of hostile artillery and mortar fire.

(S) The MITHRAS FIREWATCH System is composed of three principal subsystems: the detection subsystem consisting of four acquisition infrared telescopes, for initial detection of flashes, a "main" pedestal, on which are mounted, in parallel, a precision infrared telescope, an M-43 battery commander's telescope, a night observation device (NOD), and a laser range finder; the acoustical subsystem made up of a microphone array which, in conjunction with the

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precision infrared telescope, provides azimuth data on sound origins; finally, the remote control subsystem consisting of a remote display panel which displays both azimuth and range. 55

(S) Two MITHRAS FIREWATCH Systems entered RVN in early June and operational testing by the 108th FA Gp near Con Thien and by elements of the III MAF began on the 24th of that month. The tests continued through 22 August. However, the 108th FA Gp submitted an interim report on 30 July which announced that the MITHRAS FIREWATCH System provided a "significant increase" in the ability to detect both the firing positions and the impact areas of artillery and mortar shells under "all conditions of visibility." The 108th CA Gp reported that the acoustical subsystem was "disappointing," and that the infrared devices had a susceptibility to solar reflections and, therefore, a high false alarm rate. Still the combination of the commanders's telescope, infrared telescopes, the NOD, and the laser range finder had proved of "great value." For this reason, the 108th FA Gp offered as an "initial recommendation" the suggestion that the systems remain in-country after the formal testing period and that more RDT&E effort be directed towards improving the acoustical and infrared components. At the same time, it recommended that MACV arrange for six of the systems to be placed in-country as soon as possible. 56

#### Visual Airborne Target Locator System

(U) The Visual Airborne Target Locator System's (VATLS) advertised purpose was to detect, acquire, identify, and precisely locate terrestrial targets for the purpose of bringing artillery and short-range missile fire to bear on them. The system was designated to provide near "real-time" reaction by friendly artillery to air observations of enemy targets.

(C) The airborne equipment associated with VATLS (Airborne Target Data Set, AN/ASD-2) is mounted on a pallet in the cargo area of a UH-1 series helicopter. It consists of the following subsystems: Stabilized Telescope, Laser Ranging, Attitude Reference, Transponder, Beacon, Control, Console, Relay Antenna, and Airborne Data Handling.

(C) The ground portion of VATLS (Data Analysis Central, AN/TSQ-45) is installed in an electrical equipment shelter and a modified M101 3/4-ton trailer. The shelter may be mounted on an M37 3/4-ton truck. The following subsystems comprise the Central: Computing, Operator's Console, Aircraft Tracker, Distance Measuring, and Theodolite and Orienting.

(U) The concept of VATLS operation is that when an airborne observer detects a target, he transmits positional reference information to the ground equipment which automatically processes it to determine target location. A precision microwave angular tracker and distance measuring equipment at the ground station establish the location of the aircraft at the moment of target marking. 57

(U) The first of two VATLS, accompanied by 12 military personnel and two technical representatives, arrived in-country in December 1967 and were attached to the 108th FA Gp at Dong Ha. On 15 January 1968, the system was declared operational. 58

(C) By March, because of low operational availability of the total VATLS, (e. g. 25 percent operational availability of the total system during the period 28 February - 14 March), USARV requested that the second VATLS, with or without the infrared sensing modification it was supposed to incorporate, and additional trained operators be shipped as soon as possible. USARV stated, "With two systems and additional operators available, operational time of at least one system would be greatly increased and a subsequent increase in data collection and target acquisition capability would result." 59

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(C) An attempt to use VATLS in an A Shau Valley operation in May was unsuccessful because of a problem with the data link which is believed to have been caused by radio frequency interference (RFI) on the VATLS-assigned frequencies. Upon its return to Dong Ha, the system functioned properly.<sup>60</sup>

(C) The second VATLS with Infrared Gun Flash Detector (IRGFD) began operating in Vietnam in October. However, by December, USARV concluded that although VATLS demonstrated great potential, it should be withdrawn to CONUS for modification and improvement. USARV credited VATLS with the capability to:

- Precisely locate previously acquired enemy targets when working in conjunction with AO's/FAC's.
- Provide accurately located bench marks for AO's/FAC's operating in the DMZ.
- Complete artillery surveys in remote locations.
- Survey newly emplaced friendly artillery positions and observation points.

(C) "The second system, which was equipped with an IR-GFD, demonstrated some capability for acquiring active artillery and small arms fire," USARV stated. "When perfected, this capability should greatly enhance the acquisition/location capability of the VATLS."<sup>61</sup>

(U) At the same time, USARV pointed out the following shortcomings:

- The reliability of the VATLS was totally unsatisfactory, particularly the DMS Distance Measuring System;
- The DMS was handicapped also by RFI problems due to its low power, non-directional antennas and cluttered frequencies;
- The equipment weight was excessive, putting undue strain on and/or limiting the fuel load of the UH-1H, resulting in potentially hazardous flying conditions;
- The equipment was not palletized to the point that it could be readily transferred from one aircraft to another in the event of air-frame damage.

(C) USARV ended with the recommendations that the shortcomings be corrected and consideration be given to deploying the improved VATLS in a fixed-wing aircraft to capitalize on the reduced operating costs and the greater reliability of that platform.<sup>62</sup>

#### MUNITIONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS

(U) Because of a wide variety of targets and terrain features, and a broad diversity of weapons delivery and placement methods, the Vietnam War, more than any other modern conflict since World War II, has required considerable RDT&E effort on the development and/or improvement of certain munitions. Understandably, most such effort has had a specific purpose

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in mind. A family of area denial weapons, for example, came into being to deny the enemy uninhibited access to important areas. Other programs were designed to increase the effectiveness of existing munitions against personnel, vehicles, and defensive positions, while still others aimed at "neutralizing" the enemy with chemical riot control agents.

#### Area Denial

(U) Over the past two or three years, a regular family of "denial" weapons came into being. The following examples represent those under development and/or testing and evaluation during 1968. Included also is one device which, for various reasons, was found unworthy of further consideration and, as a result, was refused further emphasis by RDT&E units.

#### RINGTROP

(S) RINGTROP was a small, non-explosive, anti-personnel and anti-vehicle device used for both area denial and as an aid in interdiction. A variant of the ancient caltrops, it consisted of a plastic ring with two scimitar-shaped blades riveted to the ring. The theory of employment was that the device, which had a self-destruct capability through corrosion in 30 to 90 days, would hinder troop movements into the seeded area and, employed along roadways, would temporarily block traffic, thus making the vehicles vulnerable to air interdiction.<sup>63</sup>

(S) By the end of 1967, there was already doubt as to the value of RINGTROP. This skepticism was further confirmed in 1968 when 7AF concluded that explosive devices were more effective than RINGTROP in temporarily halting traffic. Moreover, it was proving too expensive to modify high speed aircraft for accurate RINGTROP delivery and cargo type aircraft would have to operate at a dangerously low level.<sup>64</sup> At the same time, the III MAF, which had looked with favor on RINGTROP during much of 1967, concluded that it no longer had an adequate requirement for the device. In particular, the Marines found that its deployment "did not warrant helicopter use in high risk antiaircraft areas" and "its undetermined ground effectiveness does not justify development of another dispensing system."<sup>65</sup> Finally, it was discovered that the enemy had proven adept at harvesting the devices before self destruction and utilizing them against friendly forces.<sup>66</sup> Because its shortcomings now obviously outweighed its advantages, CINCPAC, on 25 February 1968, recommended "no further development and/or testing relative to this device."<sup>67</sup>

#### GRAVEL

(S) A series of anti-personnel harassment mines, known under the general name of GRAVEL, have been used in SEASIA since 1966. Basically, they are relatively small, irregular shaped land mines deployed from aircraft. The devices are kept inert until after clearing the aircraft and they also have a chemically activated self-neutralization system to render them safe after a specified period of time.

(S) The first generation GRAVEL mine, the XM-27, caused some anxiety, primarily because its self-neutralization system was unreliable and several unfortunate incidents occurred before the magnitude of the problem was fully realized. Indeed, in January 1968, COMUSMACV took the position that "as a result of experience with GRAVEL, this headquarters is reluctant to

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accept munitions which self sterilize or self destruct for use in areas where friendly forces may be employed in the foreseeable future.<sup>68</sup> Use of the XM-27 was discontinued in March 1968 but RDT&E effort on more advanced GRAVEL mines continued. The result has been not only variety but also increased reliability. At the end of the year, regular GRAVEL, "Small GRAVEL," and "Micro GRAVEL" mines were in use, with the latter so small that they were used primarily as "noisemakers" to trigger acoustical sensors. At the same time, each category could be given a variety of life spans so that operationally an area could be made hazardous for the enemy and then safe for friendly forces according to a pre-set schedule.

(S) Despite its promise, there were still some limitations to the use of GRAVEL at year's end. In the first place, use of the weapons depended in large part on A-1 aircraft availability since the A-1 was the only plane "certified" for GRAVEL delivery. Secondly, A-1 deliveries required a "permissive environment" free of AAA threat. Thirdly, GRAVEL had proven easy to sweep and indications were that the enemy had caught on to the trick. Finally, while most GRAVEL had an effective life of 15 days, it was not completely sterile until after 60 days.<sup>69</sup>

#### Wide Area Anti-Personnel Mine

(S) One of the newest area denial weapons of 1968 is the Wide Area Anti-Personnel Mine (WAAPM). So small that it can be carried in the palm of the hand, this ball-shaped fragmentation weapon is nonetheless highly effective. Designed to be delivered by high speed tactical aircraft, it is, like the GRAVEL mine, made "active" only after it has left the airplane. Upon impact with the ground, it shoots out a series of thread-like wires. An intruder passing within 25 feet of the mine itself sets off an explosion by touching or tripping one of the wires.

(S) WAAPM was initially scheduled for combat employment in SEA in May 1968. CONUS evaluation and production delays, however, set the schedule back until the end of the year. Indeed, it was September before the New Equipment Training Team (NETT) for WAAPM conducted introduction briefings and training sessions in-country.<sup>70</sup>

#### Riot Control Agent

(S) Non-lethal, incapacitating "riot control" agent CS was first used in Vietnam in 1967. While leftist organizations around the world complained of its use, the agent had proven both tactically feasible and effective. However, 1968 was the year that CS came of age, not so much because of broader acceptance but because of a wider variety of legitimate uses.

(S) CS was used in Saigon during the Tet Offensive when it became necessary to dislodge VC while avoiding excessive damage to buildings. Also, at the siege of Khe Sanh, CS was used to help form a barrier and to channel VC attacks. But perhaps the most impressive of all has been the use of CS-1 and the more water-resistant version, CS-2, in the interdiction of personnel, vehicles and supplies when used in connection with airstrikes. In one instance when CS was used on an infiltration trail in the A Shau Valley, the forward air controller reported no enemy movement for five days. On another occasion CS was used on Route 548, covering a section of the road just cut by an air strike. At first the VC/NVA troops attempted to wash away the CS with water but, when this failed, a bulldozer was employed. Entering the CS area, the driver lost control and rolled off the road. The abandoned bulldozer was subsequently destroyed by TACAIR. The interdicted road, which normally could have been reopened in 3-5 hours, remained closed for four days without additional effort.<sup>71</sup> "In-country tests," COMUSMACV concluded, "have established CS as an effective area denial weapon. . . ."<sup>72</sup>

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(TS) Such success naturally led to consideration of CS in conjunction with other weapons systems and towards other purposes. Aviators, for example, saw considerable promise in using CS in the rescue of downed fliers. A well-placed spread of CS could be more effective and certainly less dangerous than the suppressive fire now available to almost all downed airmen. Sterilization of an area might also neutralize the man to be rescued but at least he could be gotten out safely and, in time, would recover. Even more impressive, however, was the proposal to use CS in conjunction with road interdiction and subsequent airstrikes on congregated vehicles. Blocked vehicles would be unusually vulnerable to pinpoint detection by FACs and sensor carrying aircraft. Destruction by TACAIR or B-52 strikes would follow.<sup>73</sup>

(TS) There was also some consideration given to setting up major barriers by unloading vast quantities of CS from cargo-type aircraft. At year's end, this concept had been tried and found feasible. Both the C-123 and C-130 aircraft had dropped strings of 55 gallon drums with good pattern effect. Finally, major effort was underway in the development of a CS filled bomb capable of delivery by high speed aircraft. This bomb is designated BLU-52.

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Operation INFERNO

(S) Operation INFERNO (later BANISH BEACH), another area denial enterprise, grew out of a huge forest fire of unknown origin which raged for about ten days in early April 1968 throughout the VC sanctuary of the U Minh Forest in the southern tip of Vietnam. This area was ravaged by fire to a much greater extent than any military burn effort in Vietnam had been able to accomplish. Although smoke prevented accurate damage assessment, numerous secondary explosions and dense smoke indicated extensive destruction of VC POL and ammunition stores.

(TS) On 20 April, CINCPAC requested comments from COMUSMACV on the feasibility of attempting burn operations, similar to the U Minh Forest fire, in areas of the III and IV CTZs and in the Rung Sat Special Zone. 79

(S) COMUSMACV was able to reply that the Rung Sat Special Zone was not conducive to setting self-sustained fires since much of it was under water during high tide. He indicated further that the fire in the U Minh Forest was possible only because there had been no rain for more than three months, a strong wind in the right direction prevailed, and the extremely dry ground foliage had a peat-like consistency. 80

(S) Despite the likelihood of being unable to start self-sustaining fires, MACV, during April, conducted several burn/attack missions, code name, INFERNO to examine the feasibility and practicability of massive fire attacks against known enemy concentrations in heavy jungle growth. The primary objective of the attacks was to destroy enemy resources within a specific location in jungle territory; secondarily, to induce a self-sustaining forest fire to deny a large area of jungle terrain to enemy use.

(S) The concept was to saturate a selected jungle area with fuel oil (JP-4 and diesel) which would burn intensely upon ignition and by concentration of such intense heat, smoke and suffocation, assure the complete destruction of enemy material and personnel in the selected area. 81

(S) MACV flew four such missions on 7, 27, 28 and 29 April against selected jungle targets in established enemy base areas in Long Khanh and Bien Hoa Provinces. On each mission, fourteen C-130 aircraft dispensed sixty-four 55 gallon drums of fuel per aircraft in the selected target box. This highly inflammable area was then ignited to produce a massive fire blanket. Visual observation and photo coverage confirmed the intensity and magnitude of the localized fire as well as the density and persistence of enormous smoke clouds. It was most improbable that enemy resources of any nature could have survived the heat, flame, smoke and suffocation environment produced. The fire was not self-sustaining but possibly would have been so with a more favorable wind.

(S) The target boxes were marked by FACs. C-130s flew at trail at 2,000 feet separation, 3,000 feet altitude, and released their palletized loads by timing from a pre-established initial point. C-130 extraction procedures were standard. Pallets of four drums each separated after release and the drums fractured on impact. On the first mission, ignition was provided by fighter-delivered napalm; however, on subsequent missions, self-ignition was provided by use of a smoke grenade attached to one of the drums in each aircraft load. A backup method of ignition was provided by the FAC aircraft firing white phosphorus rockets into the fuel saturated area. 82

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(S) Throughout the summer, several more test runs were made on BANISH BEACH, as the operation was now called. These tests continued to show that no matter how good the theory, there were enough practical limiting factors to raise the question of discontinuing the program. 7AF, in a message dated 31 July, recommended termination of BANISH BEACH operations because of "limited airlift resources, aircraft vulnerability, low delivery accuracy, and a lack of conclusive BDA to reflect improvement over the capability of presently available in-country tactical air resources."<sup>83</sup>

(S) COMUSMACV, after receiving comments from his subordinate commands, decided to hold the program in abeyance due to limitations imposed by lack of resources, inconclusive bomb damage assessment and the necessity to effect needed improvements.

#### Project PAVE WAY

(C) PAVE WAY was a project to develop and test a terminally guided high explosive bomb similar to the WALLEYE system which was already in use in SEASIA. But whereas WALLEYE used TV as the sighting mechanism, PAVE WAY looked to three possible aiming methods, i. e., laser electro-optical (E-O) and infrared (IR). The latter two systems were tested in CONUS during the year and did not reach SEASIA. The laser PAVE WAY, however, arrived in August 1968 and was successfully tested in the following months by the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing.<sup>84</sup>

(C) The laser PAVE WAY utilized a series of detectors and amplifiers tied to a modified Shrike missile control system. The system thus had the capability of detecting the reflected laser energy bounced off the target by another airplane--this procedure left the weapon independent of inherent guidance target sub-system characteristics, such as contrast (TV) or temperature (IR)--compute the necessary information, and feed corrections to the bomb's control surfaces. In this manner, the bomb actually guided itself onto the target with sufficient accuracy to be reasonably certain of a lethal hit. The value of such a weapon, particularly in interdiction work against bridges, tunnels and other "choke points," is obvious.<sup>85</sup>

#### Anti-Swimmer Buoy

(C) Another form of area denial was the Anti-Swimmer Buoy developed by the US Navy Mine Defense Laboratory as a device for protecting bridges, barges, etc. In the past, these particular links or modes of transportation had been prize targets of the VC who usually placed their mines by hand at night. The anti-swimmer buoy, as its name implies, was designed to counteract this activity.

(C) The buoy was very simple. Deployed, it consisted of a small 6" x 15" ethafoam float, a nonfilament line with numerous three barbed fish hooks, and an anchor device. The buoy was prepared so that it came packed with the fish hooks buried in the foam and could be deployed simply by pulling a pin which allowed a center rod and an anchor to come free. As the anchor sank to the bottom, it released the line.

(C) The device could be used in water up to 40 feet deep and, when placed in lines to form two barriers, had a 90 percent chance of snagging a swimmer attempting to get through. Tested at Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Be during the year, the device proved easy to handle, accumulated very little debris, and created the overall impression that they would be very effective in discouraging swimmers from approaching defended targets.<sup>86</sup>

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Selected Munitions

(S) 1968 witnessed the introduction into RVN of a new family of Selected Munitions for testing and evaluation. Originally called Controlled Fragmentation Munitions (COFRAM), the series were all composed of clusters of small bomblets. These bomblets, each of which is small enough to be carried in the palm of the hand, are wedge-shaped when packaged. After being expelled in flight from the carrying canister, stabilizing vanes spring into positions, assisting in a good scatter pattern and insuring that the individual bomblet strikes the ground at the point of the wedge. Upon impact with the ground, a very sensitive triggering and expulsion mechanism ejects upward a small ball-shaped fragmentation grenade timed to explode some four to six feet above the ground.<sup>87</sup> To an observer on the ground, the explosions appear as "numerous small flashes of light."

(S) The potential of Selected Munitions as an anti-personnel weapon is obvious. By providing multiple sources of high-velocity shrapnel, a much broader and more lethal area of destruction is possible. Moreover, by providing above-ground bursts, the fragments can be deadly against troops in foxholes and other field fortifications. Also, the size of the bomblets permits their use in a variety of ordnance ranging from hand-thrown grenades to large aerial bombs. During 1968, in-country tests included evaluation of no less than two categories of grenades, four different mortar rounds, three artillery projectiles, and one aerial bomb.<sup>88</sup>

(S) CINCPAC authorized the use of Selected Munitions in SEASIA on 20 January 1968 and, at the same time, established a 120-day operational testing and evaluation period. The test began in February but was terminated in mid-May in order to have a final report ready by 15 June. This report was overall favorable to Selected Munitions. It pointed out the limitations, including the basic ineffectiveness of the weapon against troops under cover, such as in bunkers. Also, the bomblets were not as effective in dense growth as had been hoped and there was a relatively minor dud problem when the bomblets landed in soft mud or water. The enemy would be sure to exploit this discrepancy, using the duds to manufacture bombs and booby traps of his own. Other limiting factors, however, were generally connected with strengths of the system. Because of the lethal spread, for example, use had to be avoided near friendly troops or near civilians. This, in turn, meant that would-be users had to be absolutely certain of hostile targets and the relative location of friendly forces before employing Selected Munitions.

(S) On the other hand, Selected Munitions could be very deadly under optimum conditions, such as enemy troops in rice paddies. The very variety of delivery methods promised a bright future for the munitions. During the test period, for example, 409 targets were attacked using hand grenades, mortars, artillery shells and aerial bombs. Targets included various groups of enemy personnel, among them armed patrols, rocket, mortar and artillery teams, and, in at least one instance, personnel manning and supporting AAA batteries. On this latter occasion, Marine air units dropped Selected Munitions on a flak suppression mission and reported a "greater suppression of ground fire than was previously achieved in the same area using conventional bombs, rockets and napalm." In several instances, the attacks proved so disrupting to enemy personnel that they "reacted as if they were caught in a mine field."<sup>89</sup>

(S) Redesignated "Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM)," these items were undergoing continued testing and evaluation at the year's end. Most activity centered on selecting the optimum fusing, container, etc., for each of the delivery methods. Preparations were underway for the testing in early 1969 of the latest aerial version, the CBU-7, which contains some 1,200 miniature bomblets.

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COMMUNICATIONS

(U) RDT&E efforts to improve portions of the vast communications system in SEASIA continued throughout CY68. Some improvements were more or less routine but there were also significant advancements.

(S) During the year, a system known as "Little Joe" appeared. This simple idea which consisted of raising the antennae of ground radios above the jungle canopy by means of a balloon had been tried back in the early 1960's but, for some reason, had been discontinued. MACSA resurrected it in 1968 with impressive results. In effect, the simple technique increased the range of small patrol radios from a few kilometers to more than sixty kilometers.<sup>90</sup>

(C) Another relatively simple but impressive device was the infrared rotating beacon. Not much larger than a flashlight and invisible to the naked eye, the flashing beacon can be seen up to 6 km with a metascope. The advantages of such a system are obvious. The beacon could flash the position of a patrol or helicopter landing zone without normally revealing the same information to the enemy.<sup>91</sup>

(C) The so-called "Burst Transmitter" brought down to the tactical level a technique well known to the expensive and sophisticated transmission/relay systems. As the name implies, it involved the use of a "burst" or very rapid transmission of individual messages. The problem was to develop the field capability to tape the message at a slow speed, run it through the transmitter at a very rapid rate, and then reverse the process on the reception end. R&D soon provided this capability although for the time being messages had to be sent in Morse type code. Although this procedure was a limitation, it was more than offset by the obvious advantages of this system. Because the transmission was of short duration, the power could be raised accordingly. Simultaneously, it decreased the traffic, which is at times a prime consideration. Also, it made the whole transmission process much more difficult for the enemy to intercept and decode.<sup>92</sup>

(C) The Remote Area Terminal System (RATS) made its appearance early in the year and represented something quite new. The system uses both ground and airborne equipment to bring landing helicopters into relatively remote combat zones under poor weather conditions. It operates in much the same way as the costly, permanent Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) in use throughout much of the world; that is, equipment on the ground and in the airplane combine to give the pilot relative position and glide slope information to the field. Unlike GCA, RATS is relatively inexpensive and is highly mobile. Moved into the area, this terminal equipment gives the incoming pilot bearing, distance and glide slope information. Moreover, it allows the pilot to select his own approach path, a highly significant advantage when, as is frequently the case, some approaches are more dangerous than others.<sup>93</sup>

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CHAPTER XI  
CONTINGENCY PLANS AND SPECIAL STUDIES

CONTINGENCY PLANS



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#### T-Day Planning

(U) T-Day planning, the planning for the day that hostilities in SVN terminate, consumed the greatest amount of energy and time of any project in MACJ5 in 1968. By the very nature of the project, all sections of the staff were tasked to support this project. Voluminous and "short-fused" correspondence was generated to subordinate commands and received from senior commanders almost continuously.

(U) The objectives of T-Day planning were to lay the groundwork for an orderly withdrawal of US/FWMA forces from RVN and to facilitate the reconstitution of US PACOM strategic reserve forces.

(U) Logistical aspects of T-Day planning were particularly important. Determination of assets, disposition of excesses, capabilities of seaports and aerial ports, requirements for processing material, phasing of cargo and passengers through seaports and aerial ports, and continuing logistical support for residual forces were typical of the planning areas which demanded attention. To concentrate better on these planning areas, a T-Day planning group was established in MACJ4 Plans and Requirements Division with representation from MACDC and MACCORDS.

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(S) At the beginning of 1968, T-Day planning was limited to development of a preliminary understanding of goals and definition of terms between OSD and JCS. In early 1968, MACV developed four residual force levels. These ranged from a MAAG to a MAAG plus a three-division combat force. In August, following receipt of JCS planning guidance, MACV developed preliminary time-phased planning concepts for withdrawal of US/FWMA major forces under three alternatives:

<u>Alternative</u>	<u>T-Day*</u>	<u>R-Day**</u>	<u>Redeployment Complete</u>	<u>Roll Up</u>	<u>Residual Presence</u>
A	31 Dec 68	1 Jul 69	R+6	R+6 thru R+9	MAAG
B	31 Dec 68	1 Jul 69	R+12	Com- plete by R+12	MAAG
C	31 Dec 68	1 Jul 69	R+12	Com- plete by R+12	MAAG+2 Division Combat Force

\*T-Day was the day that hostilities in South Vietnam were terminated based on a determination made or joined in by the US that the essential conditions for a cessation of hostilities were being met.

\*\*R-Day was the day that major force withdrawals from Southeast Asia would begin. This would be determined after conditions establishing T-Day had stabilized enough to allow such withdrawals.

(S) In November, Alternative C was further identified in terms of major unit designation, strength, and residual stationing plan by MACV and forwarded to CINCPAC. A definition of the roll-up force for Alternative A was also completed.

(S) During October-November, an Alternative D was developed and submitted to CINCPAC. In general terms, Alternative D was:

<u>Alternative</u>	<u>T-Day</u>	<u>R-Day</u>	<u>Redeployment Complete</u>	<u>Residual Presence</u>
D	31 Dec 68	1 Jul 69	R+6 or 12 months	MAAG and Shortfall Units

The US shortfall package was tailored to make up specific shortfalls in RVNAF combat, combat support and combat service support capabilities. The initial size of the shortfall package would depend upon the actual time frame of US withdrawal from RVN. The shortfall package would decrease as RVNAF combat, combat support and combat service support units were

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activated in conformance with the Phase II goals of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization program.

(S) Alternative E was a planning alternative which provided for major force withdrawals completed by R+6 months under the provisions of the Manila Communique, roll-up of supplies and equipment by R+9 months and a residual MAAG support force of 38,000 personnel. This differed from Alternative A in that the period between T- and R-Day was an indefinite period. Alternative A concerned withdrawal of forces from Southeast Asia, whereas Alternative E concerned withdrawal of forces from South Vietnam only.

(S) During the latter half of 1968, MACV developed a list of unresolved T-Day issues requiring guidance/resolution by higher authority. CINCPAC was provided MACV recommendations on each issue. The issues included questions related to personnel, operations, logistics, communications, and construction.

(S) In mid-December, DEFSECDEF directed that T-Day planning procedures provide for advancing the assumed date for T-Day in increments of one quarter as the previously assumed date was overtaken by time. Additionally, it was directed that plans be made to update the critical information necessary for maintaining force redeployment schedules from Southeast Asia and worldwide force adjustment plans. In keeping with the guidance, at year-end T-Day was adjusted from 31 December 1968 to 31 March 1969 and R-Day from 30 June 1969 to 30 September 1969.

(S) On 28 December, MACJ5 distributed a revised draft plan for the withdrawal phase of post-hostilities planning in Vietnam (COMUSMACV draft Oplan 69-69) and requested submission of comments and/or completed annexes in early January 1969.<sup>2</sup>

Operation EL PASO

(TS) On 6 January, COMUSMACV directed MACJ5 to prepare an outline concept for a corporate operation in the Laos Panhandle. The detailed plan was to be developed by USARV. On 29 January, MACV published the approved planning directive.

(TS) Distribution of Oplan EL PASO was approved by COMUSMACV on 7 June 1968. On 19 July the requirement for component commanders to prepare supporting plans was suspended. Suspension of the planning requirement was necessitated by the invalidation of certain assumptions made in EL PASO, principally that Khe Sanh would remain a major combat base (Khe Sanh was evacuated on 5 July 1968).<sup>3</sup>

Operation PAC TIC GROVE

(TS) On 24 January, COMUSMACV in a message to CINCPAC, pointed out the growing threat of major proportions to Khe Sanh and the entire northern area and further pointed out the importance of encouraging the enemy to move some forces back to the north of the DMZ. COMUSMACV outlined, in general terms, the concept of an amphibious feint north of the DMZ, utilizing forces readily available in WESTPAC, with the principal objective being to force the enemy to recognize the threat of an actual invasion and take defensive counteraction, thereby

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reducing the current threat to friendly forces. COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC's approval to undertake detailed planning on a priority basis utilizing the DURANGO CITY Planning Group (a 1967 planning group which evolved a plan first called FRISCO CITY, then DURANGO CITY).

(TS) On 26 January 1968, CINCPAC concurred in the MACV proposal and recommended approval by JCS. Planning for this operation began immediately and it was designated PACIFIC GROVE. Because of the stringent limitations placed upon the execution of PACIFIC GROVE by JCS, COMUSMACV directed cancellation of the plan on 3 February. On 8 February, CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACV revive PACIFIC GROVE, within the limitations established by JCS, utilizing the command arrangements planned for Operation DURANGO CITY. On 9 February 1968, COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that Beach Jumper Units be used on a limited scale and that strategic deception be developed under CINCPAC auspices. As a result of this request, CINCPAC developed and submitted to the CJCS a strategic C&D concept called FRIDAY WEEK. Meanwhile, PACIFIC GROVE (CTF 76 Oplan 123-68) remained "on-the-shelf" for possible implementation.<sup>4</sup>

#### SPECIAL STUDIES

(U) During 1968, the office of the ACofS, J5 (MACJ5), prepared or contributed to a number of special studies, both of immediate and long-range nature. The substance of the most important of these studies is summarized below by division within MACJ5.

#### US/SEATO Division

##### Operation VESUVIUS

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(S) During the Ambassador (Chester) Bowles Mission to Phnom Penh of 8-12 January 1968, it was agreed that the US would periodically transfer specific intelligence of VC/NVA use of Cambodia to Prince Sihanouk. MACJ2 launched Operation VESUVIUS to satisfy this requirement. The first VESUVIUS package was delivered to the AMEMB Saigon on 24 January. VESUVIUS packages continued to be sent from MACV to the AMEMB throughout the year, although delivery to Sihanouk was dependent on the political situation obtaining at a given time (i.e., packages 6 and 7, covering arms shipments along the frontier and the Mekong-Bassac Sector were delayed due to the LCU-1577 incident) (See section on Cambodian border crossing in Naval Operations, Chapter V).<sup>5</sup>

##### Exercise RAMASOON

(S) SEATO Exercise RAMASOON, a controlled CPX employing austere player headquarters, was conducted in Thailand during the period 25 February to 15 March 1968. The objectives of the exercise were to test certain communications-electronics plans, arrangements, and procedures in an exercise situation based on Commander Central Region SEATO Field Force Draft Oplan 4/67, which was prepared by MACV. Designated officers and enlisted men from Hq MACV participated as players at Hq SEATO Field Force for the exercise.<sup>6</sup>

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#### SAUNA SCRUB

(TS) On 30 March 1968, COMUSMACV directed that an imaginative, in-depth study of Cambodia be undertaken. The study was to incorporate the latest information and estimates of VC/NVA use of Cambodia, together with facts showing the unfavorable impact on US operations in SVN resulting from the enemy's use of relatively secure base areas and LOCs. The study was to examine a wide range of military, political, and psychological actions in order that a scenario of US counteractions could be developed. The study was identified by the unclassified code name "SAUNA SCRUB."

(TS) On 30 April, COMUSMACV approved the SAUNA SCRUB staff study and the Inter-Agency Cambodia Committee was briefed on the proposal on 16 May. The study was favorably received and it was transmitted to CJCS in July. It continues to serve as a valuable reference on MACV's position on the VC/NVA use of Cambodia.<sup>7</sup>

Vietnam Division

#### NEW CASTLE

(TS) Project NEW CASTLE was a study to determine the optimum courses of actions to be taken by the US/RVN/FW forces during the period in which the US had ceased all aerial and naval bombardment of NVN. A continuing portion of the basic study was to determine a feasible means of investing the Laotian Panhandle with a US/RVN force sufficient to block the NVN infiltration routes into SVN and Cambodia.

#### VNAF Helicopter Expansion

(S) On 9 February, a long-range plan was initiated for the possible turnover of UH-1 assets and supporting equipment to the VNAF, assuming that UH-1 aircraft were not available from CONUS resources and that VNAF aircrews and maintenance personnel had completed training. This project was part of a program being developed by AFAG for expansion of a VNAF helicopter force to be used in support of RVNAF efforts.<sup>8</sup>

#### Contingency Plan for the Transfer of US Equipment to RVNAF

(S) In April, CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to prepare a contingency plan for turnover of mission essential equipment from US units to RVNAF in conjunction with the proposed force structure expansion of RVNAF to 801,000. The plan set forth the type US units that would turn over equipment to RVNAF units and the estimated time that the transfer would take place. Details concerning the equipment transfer and responsibilities of the component commanders were set forth. The MACV plan was formulated and submitted to CINCPAC for comments and approval the same month.<sup>9</sup>

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RVNAF Air Defense System

(S) As a result of correspondence between Chief JGS and COMUSMACV, a study to determine the requirement for an RVNAF Air Defense System was conducted. The summary of this Air Defense Study was:

1. US forces now provided required air defense for SVN.
2. There were no RVNAF personnel trained solely for aircraft or missile defense systems. VNAF did have one F5 squadron which could be utilized for air defense. VNAF also operated, jointly with the US, five radar sites (radars owned by VNAF).
3. There was no requirement for an RVNAF air defense system as a separate entity as long as US air defense capabilities remained in SVN.
4. There was a requirement for a limited RVNAF air defense capability to deter and counter a potential air threat to SVN (from NVN and possibly Cambodia) upon withdrawal of US air defense assets.
5. The JGS had developed its own air defense requirements and their proposed system consisted of four Hawk battalions, three F5 squadrons, ten AC&W sites, five AW battalions (M42) (vehicle-mounted twin 40mm) and 14 AW batteries (M55) (vehicle-mounted quad .50 cal. machine guns). The total personnel requirement, based on JGS calculations, for these additive units was 8,536, with 1,230 requiring CONUS school training. The initial cost for equipment and CONUS training would amount to approximately \$134 million. It was considered extremely doubtful that RVNAF could ever develop and maintain a system of this size and sophistication and still maintain other priority elements of its defense establishment.
6. The RVNAF air defense capability proposed by MACJ5 was less than the system proposed by the JGS. It would be developed on a phased basis. The initial increment would include two Hawk batteries, two F5 squadrons (existing squadron, plus conversion of one A1 squadron), eight AC&W radar sites (3 additional sites), and one air defense AW (M42) artillery battery. Additive personnel required would be approximately 853, with 307 personnel requiring CONUS school training. Initial cost of additive units would be approximately \$39 million. This force would provide a nucleus which would be expanded as required by the tactical situation and as technically trained manpower became available. Considerable advisory support would be required. This system would provide for only a token defense, but would give a degree of "prestige" to GVN. The earliest feasible date of initiating a self-sufficient air defense system was FY70.

(C) This study was approved by COMUSMACV in May as were the spaces designated in the RVNAF force structure for this air defense capability, subject to approval by JCS. The results of this study were included in the Optimum Force Structure package submitted in May 1968 but were not approved by OSD. CJCS was subsequently informed that the air defense system could not be considered in the current planning.<sup>10</sup>

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Special Plans Division

Implications of a GVN/NLF Coalition Rumor

(S) On 6 January, COMUSMACV tasked MACJ5 to provide a talking paper for use in presenting to the Mission Council, on 8 January, a discussion of the situation created by a rumor that the US would accept a coalition government for SVN which would include the NLF. This condition, if left unchallenged, was viewed as potentially dangerous since it would detract from badly needed popular support of GVN.

(S) The talking paper recommended a PSYOP program emphasizing the positive aspects of the friendly situation vis-a-vis the VC/NLF, the basic unity of US/RVN national goals, the allaying of fears of a forced coalition government, and capitalization on the positive pronouncements of GVN in this regard and US support thereof.

(S) On 8 January, an ad hoc committee, chaired by Mr. B. Zorthian (JUSPAO), was formed to examine all aspects of the problem and to develop appropriate counter plans.

(S) Subsequent J54 actions included:

1. An analysis of intelligence to determine the nature and scope of VC involvement.
2. Correspondence apprising component and field commanders of the situation and requesting inputs concerning the nature and scope of the problem in their respective areas.
- 3) Receipt, collation, and evaluation of these reports and forwarding of them to the committee chairman.

(S) The resulting study indicated that rumors and discussion were widespread concerning:

1. US unilateral peace initiatives and negotiations with Hanoi.
2. Impending VC victories which could force USG to accept, and force on GVN, a SVN partition.
3. A coalition GVN including the NLF.

(U) The final report on this matter was completed on 28 January.

Strategic Tactical Study

(S) On 27 January, COMUSMACV directed that MACJ5 in conjunction with the SJS Military History Branch, make a thorough military analysis of the Dien Bien Phu battle and a comparison thereof to the analogous Khe Sanh situation, in order to ensure that all possible counteractions were taken by US/FWMA forces. An ad hoc committee was established with representation from the Joint Staff and 7AF and met initially on 28 January 1968.

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(S) As the study progressed, the requirement emerged for two specific written products: Lessons of Dien Bien Phu (1954) Analogous to Khe Sanh (1968); and Final Report, Dien Bien Phu Analogous to Khe Sanh. On 11 February, COMUSMACV approved the work to date and directed that the final report be prepared on an urgent basis.

(S) On 13 February, additional guidance was provided which, in effect, established the requirement for Part II of the Final Report. The new charter was to forecast General Giap's actions after Khe Sanh as compared to an estimate of his reaction had he lost at Dien Bien Phu.

(C) On 27 February, the analysis was presented at Hq MACV (FWD) at Phu Bai, and on 7 March, to CG, III MAF at Da Nang.

(C) The final report was promulgated on 10 March 1968 and was given wide distribution throughout US commands in Vietnam. Additionally, requests for copies of the report by Washington agencies were received.<sup>11</sup>

#### Vulnerability Study

(S) In early January 1968, MACJ5 was tasked to conduct a study of enemy vulnerabilities and the means to exploit them. Initial action consisted of acquiring staff, subcommand and component inputs which stressed principally political, strategic and psychological vulnerabilities. After consolidation of the various inputs along with a Joint Staff assessment, the Vulnerability Study was presented to the CofS, MACV on 22 March. He directed that this study look toward enemy tactical vulnerabilities in SVN which could be exploited by friendly force capabilities and which were within COMUSMACV's authority and resources to implement. A new report on enemy vulnerabilities was written, coordinated, and submitted. The study was approved and distributed to the field on 24 May.<sup>12</sup>

#### MACV PSYOP Appraisal

(U) The semi-annual MACV PSYOP appraisal was completed in May. The appraisal began in early April with the action officers making field trips to all four CTZs, visiting appropriate organizations to help determine the problems and status in general of the operation. The draft report was submitted to the MACV working level staff, 4th PSYOP Group, and JUSPAO on 15 May. Staff comments were included in the final writing as appropriate. The appraisal was approved on 1 June and subsequently published.

(U) PSYOP Appraisal 68B was submitted to the CofS, MACV on 16 December. In approving the appraisal, the CofS, MACV terminated the requirement for future J5 semiannual appraisals.<sup>13</sup>

#### PW Study

(TS) In May, COMUSMACV directed a study to determine the merits and ramifications of returning sizeable numbers of PWs to NVN in an attempt to influence more NVA personnel to surrender on the promise of early return to NVN.

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(TS) The Study considered the following factors:

1. The number of PWs held and the number that would desire repatriation based on previous experience.
2. The PW's philosophy of being a prisoner.
3. The possible effects of such action on the GVN.
4. The possible effects on peace negotiations.
5. The problem of finding a third country to act as an intermediary.
6. Repatriation sites and modes of transporting PWs to the repatriation site.
7. The various PSYOP approaches that could be used and their effectiveness.

Following a discussion of these items, the advantages and disadvantages were summarized and the following conclusions were reached:

1. That the relatively small number of PWs who could probably be repatriated would not have a significant influence on enticing more NVA troops to surrender.
2. That the primary benefit to be gained through release of PWs could be in obtaining favorable world opinion which might or might not influence NVN during peace negotiations.
3. That in view of the current negotiations, this would not be the propitious time to recommend the release of NVA PWs.

(TS) Based on the above conclusions, it was recommended, and subsequently approved by COMUSMACV, that the unilateral return of PWs to NVN in an attempt to influence more NVA troops to surrender not be undertaken at this time. 14

#### Strategic Perspectives

(U) Strategic Perspectives was an objective appraisal of Herman Kahn's book, Can We Win in Vietnam (F. Praeger, New York, 1968) and John M. Mecklin's article "An Alternative Strategy in Vietnam" (Fortune, Apr 68). The two works were highly critical of not only US involvement in Vietnam, but also of the strategy, tactics and management of both military and civilian operations.

(U) An ad hoc study group was established to review both works, identify the problem areas, and prepare summaries of the authors' rationale and recommendations. The problems identified generally fell into four categories: Strategy and Operations, Politics and Economics, Intelligence, and Personnel and Administration. Each staff section involved prepared summaries of MACV programs and actions on items falling within their particular areas of expertise. The project was initiated on 21 April 1968 and concluded with a 142 page report on 16 July 1968. 15

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International Affairs Division

(C) In anticipation of eventual consultation with the North Vietnamese Government and the need for a fully cognizant and responsive MACV staff element organized to handle problems emanating from such talks, a new division was authorized for immediate formation within the Office of ACofS, J5. The division was to be staffed with officers who had the necessary professional experience and expertise to address requirements in the areas of assigned responsibility.

(C) Formation of the International Affairs Division (J55) was approved by COMUSMACV on 3 May 1968. The Division became the office of primary interest and had functional responsibility for resolution of substantive issues of military significance in the area of negotiations for Vietnam.

(S) In addition to general responsibilities, the division was tasked to monitor, analyze, interpret, and examine the implications of NVN actions of military significance once a dialogue commenced. It was envisioned that this Division would be tasked to develop positions which would influence and affect actions of military significance within the parameters established by the JCS.

(C) Further, it was required that the major MACV staff agencies and components designate principal points of contact for actions on negotiations and post-hostilities planning. The following MACV staff agencies and component commanders were tasked to designate principal points of contact within their respective organizations: ACofS, J1; ACofS, J2; ACofS, J3; ACofS, J4; ACofS, CORDS; Director, PSYOP; Cdr, 7AF; COMNAVFORV; DEPCG, USARV; and CG, III MAF.

(C) The division was singular in the extremely high qualifications required by its JTD descriptions. For officers, these included: War College, advanced degree in International Relations, SI Clearance, prior Joint or Combined Staff experience, and attendance at the National Interdepartmental Seminar.

(C) In June, COMUSMACV forwarded additional comments to CINCPAC regarding an earlier emergency JTD change request to JCS to approve personnel spaces for J55. In a subsequent message to JCS, CINCPAC concurred and reaffirmed his earlier position that J55 be formed within MACJ5. Pending favorable JCS action on the proposed JTD change, J55 continued to operate as a provisional organization. In late July, COMUSMACV was informed that favorable action on the MACV JTD change had been deferred and the International Affairs Division was incorporated within the Vietnam Division. However, in October a separate International Affairs Division (MACJ55) was authorized within J5 by the CoS with an authorized JTD of six officers and four enlisted personnel headed by an O-6.

(C) Actions within this activity, besides following negotiation developments in Paris, included analyses of the implications for cease-fire on MACV's mission and reciprocity for a bombing halt over North Vietnam.

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#### Cease-fire Contingency Planning

(C) In June, in response to specific questions on a cease-fire posed by CJCS, COMUSMACV forwarded his preliminary assessment of cease-fire planning requirements.

(S) On 2, 9, and 11 July, COMUSMACV and the principal staff members received briefings on the subject of cease-fire planning. Subsequent to and as a direct result of the discussions of COMUSMACV and his staff, a Preliminary Analysis of Cease-fire in Vietnam was developed with staff participation on a very close hold, limited need to know basis. In addition, an extensive fact sheet on the subject was prepared for COMUSMACV in anticipation of discussions with the SECDEF during his mid-July visit.<sup>17</sup>

#### Cease-fire Considerations

(S) During October, studies were developed as part of a continuing examination of cease-fire contingencies which proposed a US negotiating position/strategy to an enemy proposed cease-fire. The study developed four alternative responses (with advantages and disadvantages) identifying a "most desirable" cease-fire position and proposed a public statement to be issued in the event the enemy proposed cease-fire was contrary to a US/GVN acceptable cease-fire position. The cease-fire paper was coordinated with the AMEMB and was dispatched through AMEMB channels to the State Department as a joint MACV/AMEMB position message. Subsequently, a MACV message containing these same proposals was sent to CINCPAC and CJCS.

#### Cessation of Bombing

(S) In August, a study (Reciprocity Accompanying Halt in Bombing) was initiated to examine the problems connected with a complete cessation of the bombing of NVN and to determine what reciprocity might be acceptable in exchange for a bombing halt. The study concluded that no circumstances existed in the current time frame which would permit MACV to endorse a complete cessation of the bombing of NVN without major prior concessions from Hanoi. Psychologically, a complete bombing cessation without any reciprocity by NVN would seriously affect morale. The following reciprocal actions on the part of NVN in exchange for a cessation of bombing could be acceptable to MACV:

1. Prior agreement to respect the essential elements of the 1954 Geneva Agreement.
2. Prior agreement on a restoration of the DMZ coupled with agreement to respect the 1962 Accords on Laos and for a cease-fire as defined by the JCS SEA CABIN study.

Implicit in each of the above was adequate verification machinery to insure compliance. The RAHIB study served as a basis for a number of responses to CINCPAC, JCS, and the AMEMB concerning a complete cessation of the bombing of NVN.

#### Verification and Inspection Study

(S) A study on a verification system for cease-fire and withdrawal contingencies was completed on 7 October. The purpose of this study was to develop a MACV position on this critical

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subject. Subsequently, a Verification Annex was prepared and incorporated into the draft Pre-Withdrawal Plan (Oplan 63-69) and the Withdrawal Plan (Plan 67-69). Other aspects of a verification and inspection mechanism were currently being developed, including a verification system for a restored DMZ and a unilateral verification system.

#### Reestablishment of DMZ

(S) During October, studies were developed which proposed steps in US negotiation strategy which would lead to the reestablishment of the DMZ. The study recommended starting with agreement for arrangements between local commanders to ensure respect for the existing Provisional Military Demarcation Line (PMDL). The first proposed step would call for immediate establishment of a buffer even in advance of complete demilitarization and the associated international verification mechanism. The DMZ paper was coordinated with the AMEMB and was dispatched through AMEMB channels to the State Department as a joint MACV/AMEMB position message.<sup>18</sup>

#### Withdrawal Contingencies

(S) During October and November, studies were developed which proposed a negotiating strategy for mutual withdrawal. Withdrawal strategy was developed around five withdrawal contingencies ranging from comprehensive agreement to no formal agreement. These alternatives were depicted on a "spread sheet" and pouched via AMEMB channels to the State Department and Paris. Subsequently, copies were provided CJCS and CINCPAC.<sup>19</sup>

#### Post-Cease-fire Security

(S) On 29 August 1968, ACofS, J5 was tasked by DEPCOMUSMACV to review the status of previous staff actions relating to post-cess-fire security and to examine any alternative means of extending governmental influence and administration relating to the contingencies which may accompany a cease-fire. The study initiated as a result of this requirement ("Study of Post-Cease-Fire Security", short title POSEC) revealed that the subject of extending territorial security in a post-hostilities SVN had been examined frequently since mid-1966 by both MACV and the Inter-Agency Study Group under the Mission Council. On 21 September, COMUSMACV was briefed on the five possibilities examined in the study. These were:

1. A National Constabulary for RVN (NCR), wherein, either before or after a cease-fire, an elite professional constabulary would be created under the Ministry of Interior, drawing from all elements of RVNAF.
2. A National Constabulary Force (NCF) which would be created, either before or after a cease-fire, under the Ministry of Interior, by drawing selected personnel from RF/PF/CIDC/NPFF.
3. A Territorial Security Force (TSF) which would be created after a cease-fire is effected, by amalgamating, under the Ministry of Interior, RF/PF into a rural type of constabulary.

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4. A Rural Police and Security Force (RPSF) which would be created prior to a cease-fire, by amalgamating RF/PF into a renamed organization with reoriented mission and retained under command/control of RVNAF for duration of the emergency. (This force could eventually be transferred to the Ministry of Interior if circumstances should so evolve.)

5. Retention of existing RVN military and civil security organizations in their present forms, with coordination of roles and procedures, and progressive adjustment of relative emphasis as a changing internal security situation evolves.

(S) The study also pointed out that implementation of the basic premises listed above was based upon the assumption that the activities of the GVN armed forces would be severely circumscribed in the post-hostilities environment of SVN. Each of these premises would also require a major reorganization of existing organizations and command relationships. However, there are several important considerations that mitigate against any reorganization of GVN resources at this particular time:

1. Any reorganization which involves an intra-governmental transfer of functions would be both time consuming and politically difficult under present circumstances.

2. Broaching the subject of reorganization at this time would disrupt the thrust of current military and pacification operations, as well as impact unfavorably on the current accelerating program for improvement and modernization of the RVNAF.

3. In light of the continuing military threat in SVN, it was felt that there was a strong argument for military forces remaining under the Minister of Defense.

The study also revealed several other problems associated with any changes in existing GVN organizations and relationships:

1. Any transfer of major forces from one ministry to another would require the enactment of major amendatory legislation which would be extremely difficult and time consuming to obtain.

2. There was an understandable reluctance by the GVN and JGS toward any changes in existing force alignments, both military and civilian, at this time.

(S) As a result of the briefing of COMUSMACV, the following guidance was issued on this subject:

"Stay away from any changes in organizations or names. Work with the organizations as they now exist. Okay to approach JGS at action officer level to find out what JGS is doing in this area . . . what their plans are . . . what JGS position and thinking is . . . and then see what we may want to do. Most important, don't assume any 'reorientation' of what now exists . . . rather look at it from a standpoint of 'application' of what now exists . . . see where we can help . . ."

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(S) The views of the JGS on the subject of territorial security are still in the formative stages. Recent remarks of the CJCS reflect some of their current thinking on this subject:

"In the unlikely event of a cease-fire, that all military forces, other than regular army, but to include RF and PF, be civilianized as quickly as possible in order that they might continue to go into VC-controlled areas in order to preclude or remove VC political organizations at that level."

(S) On 24 December, a joint State/AID/DOD message on the subject on "SVN Constabulary" was received. This message again raised the question of a "constabulary type" force for SVN in the post-cessate-fire environment and suggested that such a "civilianized" force may have merit if certain restrictions were to be placed on military forces. The restrictions referred to were not identified in the message. A joint EMB/MACV/AID reply was sent on this message which stated "that there should be no reorganization of GVN forces at this time." This message also made the following points relating to post-cessate-fire security:

1. Any cease-fire agreement or other agreement to terminate hostilities which would restrict GVN use of all resources necessary to maintain security and law and order should be avoided, except as a temporary measure in connection with NVA regroupment and withdrawal as part of an overall settlement.

2. That there was no currently foreseeable requirement for a constabulary-type force, in contrast to the requirement for forces and capabilities which will be required in the RVNAF modernization and improvement program. This program, complemented by increased emphasis on an improved National Police establishment, will provide the most effective post-hostilities security in SVN.

3. As the security environment in SVN changes from a relatively hostile one requiring essentially military operations for securing the population to one which is less hostile, the security requirement would shift from predominantly military to gradually increasing police-type activities. The relative emphasis on functions of existing organizations should reflect the transitional nature of this environment.

(S) The overall MACV position on the subject of how best to extend GVN security, administration, and influence in the event of a cease-fire, as 1968 closed, can be summarized as follows:

1. There should be no major reorganization of existing forces (civilian or military) for this purpose.

2. No new organizations or forces should be established for territorial security at this time.

3. The best chance of providing the security environment required in the post-hostilities period is to give maximum support and attention to the existing RVNAF military and the civil security organizations in their present organizational form, with coordination of roles and procedures, and progressive adjustment of relative emphasis as a changing internal security situation evolves.<sup>20</sup>

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Support of Senior Military Advisor in Paris

(C) COMUSMACV provided support to the US negotiating team in Paris through the Senior Military Advisor. A MACV liaison officer had been present at the negotiations site since the talks commenced in May. The officer selected for this important assignment was rotated approximately every three weeks between senior MACV officers specifically designated for this task by the ACoS, J2. MACJ5 supported this effort by providing over 125 fact sheets on key issues of concern to the Senior Military Advisor, and by serving as the focal point on the MACV staff for all matters relating to the negotiations. All requests for specific information received from Paris were afforded priority handling within the MACV staff.

(C) Each MACV Liaison Officer to the Senior Military Advisor on the US Negotiating Team in Paris was oriented for his tour through J5 briefings.

Long Range Planning Task Group

(U) On 23 July, COMUSMACV approved a general concept for establishing a group of individuals with diverse combined military and academic backgrounds to analyze the total situation and prospects for the future in Vietnam. Specific plans for the project were approved on 27 August. Chief of Staff Action Memo No. 68-123 of 31 August explained the function of the group, designated the Long Range Planning Task Group (see below).

CHIEF OF STAFF ACTION MEMO NO. 68-123

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Long Range Planning

1. (S) To extend the breadth and depth of long range planning for execution of the overall mission of this command, J5 will develop a Long Range Plan that will provide a general frame within which other plans may be integrated. The plan will encompass an assessment of those variables and factors that impact on or relate to accomplishment of the MACV mission, in the context of the present situation in Southeast Asia and of US strategic objectives.
2. (C) In view of the fluidity of the current situation and the urgency of developing a truly comprehensive basic planning document, assigned personnel of J5 will be augmented on a task group basis during the initial planning development period. Selected officers of the several services with special qualifications will be drawn from organizations in-country to serve with the task group for approximately six months. The J5 task planning group personnel will work closely with other MACV agencies and subordinate headquarters in-country, to insure maximum use of presently available resources in developing an appropriate data base.

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3. (C) The necessarily comprehensive nature of this planning effort will provide an opportunity to carefully review the overall utilization of resources available for achievement of the MACV mission. Accordingly, J5 has been charged with incorporating into the planning effort an appraisal leading to recommendations for the optimum allocation of resources (men, money, and material). Particular attention will be devoted to the appropriate balance of resources for tactical vis-a-vis pacification operations. Recommendations that ensue will be fully coordinated prior to submission to the Chief of Staff.

4. (U) Addressees are requested to provide responsive assistance to the planning group efforts.

(C) The complete objective of the group was encompassed more specifically by the terms of reference approved by COMUSMACV:

Assess all significant variables relative to achieving US objectives in Vietnam.

Analyze the Allied efforts in the context of US strategic objectives and the Southeast Asia situation.

Determine whether the present allocation and utilization of men, money and materiel are obtaining optimum results--relative to US objectives.

Assess the validity of current policies, procedures, beliefs and assumptions--relative to COMUSMACV's mission.

Evaluate, in particular, the balance between resources used in pacification vis-a-vis tactical military operations.

Recommend specific means to resolve specific problems, and initiate appropriate staff action.

(C) Implicit in the terms of reference listed above was the beginning of an outline for the final product, to include:

1. A plan for the overall achievement of COMUSMACV's mission, which would serve as an "umbrella" within which annual combined plans and contingency plans could be fitted, and which would provide a target against which overall progress toward achieving objectives could be measured. The plan would be designed to provide a basis for a continuing inventory of the status of the political, military, economic, and sociological/psychological situation in South Vietnam.

2. An estimate of the situation provided through conceptual and "on the ground" evaluations, as seen through the perspective of the planning group, in the process of developing the data base for the plan. COMUSMACV was to be informed of the group findings on a continuing basis through the developmental period.

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3. A statement of improvement actions proposed when there was sufficient context to insure that actions would fit into the overall thrust of requirements.

(U) The group was composed of 13 officers, representing each of the services, one warrant officer and five enlisted personnel. In addition, through support of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, civilian consultant support was provided.

(U) The group was charged with completing its basic research by 15 March 1969. In the interim a preliminary "rough cut" of the final product was presented to the MACV Command Group on 1 November and briefed to COMUSMACV and the MACV staff later that month. On 31 December, an abridged plan was provided the staff to provide advance knowledge of the principal thrusts of the group's work.<sup>21</sup>

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## CONTINGENCY PLANS AND SPECIAL STUDIES - XI

1. Bklt (TS), MACJ031, 16 Sep 68, Subj: MACV Command History, 1967 (U), Gp-1; Memo (TS), MACJ5 to MHB, 16 Jan 69, Subj: Summary of COMUSMACV/COMUSSEASIA Oplans (U), Gp-None.
2. DFs (S/TS), MACJ5 to MHB, 19 Aug, 19 Sep, 20 Oct, 20 Nov, 19 Dec 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None; Mag (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 050250Z Nov 68, Subj: T-Day Planning - Alternative C (U), Gp-3; DF (S), MACJ55 to Dist, 7 Nov 68, Subj: Post-Hostilities Definitions (U), Gp-None; Mags (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 080327Z, 191235Z Nov 68, Subj: T-Day Planning - Alternative A Roll-up Force (U), Gp-3; Mag (S), JCS to All Commanders Unified and Specified Commands, 211759Z Dec 68, Subj: T-Day Planning (U), Gp-4.
3. DFs (TS), MACJ5 to MHB, 21 Feb, 19 Aug 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None.
4. DF (TS), MACJ5 to MHB, 19 Mar 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None.
5. DF (TS), MACJ5 to MHB, 21 Feb 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None; Mag (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB SAIGON, 030047Z Aug 68, Subj: VESUVIUS Packages 6 and 7 (U), Gp-None.
6. DF (TS), MACJ5 to MHB, 20 Apr 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None.
7. DFs (TS), MACJ5 to MHB, 20 Apr, 21 May, 20 Jun 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None.
8. Op. cit. #4.
9. DF (TS), MACJ5 to MHB, 21 May 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None.
10. Op. cit. #7.
11. Op. cit. #6.
12. Op. cit. #7.
13. DFs (S/TS), MACJ5 to MHB, 20 Jun 68, 20 Jan 69, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None.
14. Op. cit. #7.
15. DF (TS), MACJ5 to MHB, 19 Aug 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None.
16. DFs (TS), MACJ5 to MHB, 20 Jun, 20 Jul, 19 Aug, 19 Sep 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None.
17. DFs (TS), MACJ5 to MHB, 20 Jul, 19 Aug 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None.
18. DF (S), MACJ5 to MHB, 20 Nov 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None.

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19. DFs (S), MACJ5 to MHB, 20 Nov, 19 Dec 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None.
20. Briefing (S), MACJ5 to COMUSMACV, 21 Sep 68, Subj: Post-Cease-fire Security (U), Gp-None; Minutes (S), RD Council Meeting, 20 Jun 68, Gp-None.
21. Op. cit. #13 and 19.

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CHAPTER XII

SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND SELECTED TOPICS

MORALE AND WELFARE

General

(C) During 1968, the morale and welfare program remained an area of primary interest to COMUSMACV. Facilities and programs were expanded and improved to support the growing military population, and great effort was exerted to make conditions more livable for all personnel during their tour in RVN. An additional USO as well as additional Red Cross centers were added. Efforts were continued to provide services and entertainment to the troops in the field to the lowest possible level. Exchange facilities were expanded and, as with other services, carried to the lowest possible echelon. The liberal award policy was also continued and awards for the recognition of merit or heroism were encouraged. The morale of the command was extremely high, as evidenced by a message from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC on 16 November in which he stated:

Our personnel serving in Vietnam are characteristically a mature and responsible group of young men and women who understand and appreciate the purpose and importance of US presence in Vietnam. After having met the enemy and associated with Vietnamese people, they develop quickly an unshakable conviction that the Vietnamese need, want and are certainly deserving of our assistance and have a right to expect it.

All measurable criteria utilized to determine the status of morale indicates the morale of the US military forces in Vietnam is high and will remain high.

There has been no discernable effect on morale resulting either from the Paris peace talks or the bombing halt. The best evidence is the performance and the attitude of our personnel in combat and in all the activities that support combat. Motivation is strong and performance is superb. <sup>1</sup>

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#### Awards and Decorations

##### US Unit Awards to Free World Forces

(C) Pertinent service regulations indicate that US unit awards can be legally awarded to cobelligerent units. US Mission policy was to recommend FWMAF units for US Valorous unit awards only in those cases where such acts of extraordinary valor in action against the enemy fully met the criteria for the award as outlined in these service regulations. Recommendations for awards acknowledging acts of valor not in direct support of US forces had to be of personal knowledge to and, when possible, witnessed by US personnel. US meritorious unit commendations could be made to FWMAF units not larger than battalion size in those instances where such units had demonstrated outstanding meritorious service while serving in RVN and such service met the prescribed criteria. All recommendations for unit awards were routed through COMUSMACV for Mission concurrence and then forwarded to the respective US component Service headquarters for approval.

(C) Commanders having OPCON over FWMAF units, or to whom these units were responsive, were required to review meritorious service and valorous acts or deeds by these units to insure that deserving units would be recognized on their departure from Vietnam. Recommendations for those FWMAF units which did not normally rotate as a unit could be submitted as outlined above; however, approved meritorious unit awards were to be held in escrow pending return of the unit to their home country. All meritorious awards to FWMAF units had to be presented in the home country.<sup>2</sup>

##### Impact Awards

(U) On 16 August 1968, COMUSMACV delegated to two US division commanders and two general officers commanding separate US brigades the authority to make impact awards for valorous acts to ARVN combat soldiers and company grade officers to include RF/PF. The purpose of these awards was to give instant battlefield recognition to valorous or heroic ARVN and RF/PF soldiers. These impact awards were limited to the Bronze Star Medal with "V" (BSMV) and the Army Commendation Medal with "V" (ARCOMV). As a result, there were 234 BSMVs and 71 ARCOMVs processed for presentation to Vietnamese forces from September through the end of the year as opposed to 259 BSMVs and 100 ARCOMVs processed during the previous eight months of the year.<sup>3</sup>

##### Awards for Other than US Personnel

(U) MACV had received several inquiries regarding the possibility of awarding US meritorious decorations to Vietnamese officer personnel of various grades. In each instance, there had been no question as to the outstanding manner in which these officers had been performing their duties. They had usually been senior officers in positions of considerable responsibility. US Mission policy allowed the approval of valorous decorations for all but general officers by MACV but prohibited the approval of meritorious awards for foreign military personnel in Vietnam. In those cases involving foreign general officers, the AMAMB Saigon had to approve each recommendation for a valorous award before it could be forwarded to the appropriate US military service for approval. Early in 1968, in an attempt to streamline procedures, MACV requested

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to be approval authority for valorous awards to foreign general officers. However, DA disapproved the request. The policy at that time provided exception for US meritorious awards to senior ranking officers of Free World forces with the stipulation that, if approved, these decorations would not be presented in Vietnam. In this connection, there was no record of US meritorious decorations having been awarded foreign personnel serving in Vietnam.

(U) Members of the MACV staff and the AMEMB reviewed this policy in light of the current situation in RVN. The result of this review was the decision to adhere to the already established policy despite obvious disadvantages. In considering the matter, it was noted that US awards were highly regarded and generally sought after by foreign personnel. However, experience indicated the existence of serious potential disadvantages to US interests when meritorious awards were presented in relatively unstable areas. Despite the recognition inherent and intended in such meritorious awards, their presentation frequently contributed to the creation of jealousies among foreigners and was sometimes interpreted as indicating US influence over recipients. Additionally, their presentation in a relatively unstable environment could lead to embarrassment should political changes place an individual honored by the US in later disfavor. Finally, the desire to reciprocate in awards could lead to trade-offs and cause embarrassing relations with counterparts.

(C) However, on 1 September COMUSMACV requested a change in Mission policy which would allow US meritorious service awards to be given to members and units of the RVNAF. His rationale for requesting this change was that there had been a noted stability in the RVNAF since the time that the previous Mission policy had been formulated. Also, there had been guidance from DA to motivate the RVNAF and acknowledge them for a "job well done" whenever possible. Another consideration was that, in accordance with the existing policy, meritorious awards to Third Country Forces had to be presented in the home country rather than in Vietnam. If RVNAF were included in the meritorious awards program, then all awards could be presented in-country. On 16 September, AMEMB Saigon approved this change in policy. Gen Vien, CJGS, was the first Vietnamese officer to be awarded a US decoration for meritorious service under this new policy. He was awarded the Legion of Merit, Degree of Commander, on 1 November 1968.<sup>4</sup>

#### Civilian Awards

(U) The problem of awards for US civilians were left dangling and unsolved at the end of 1967. In July 1968, COMUSMACV presented the problem to CINCPAC and recommended that service component commanders and COMUSMACV be delegated authority to:

1. Approve and present certain US civilian awards.
2. Approve and present US military awards for valor to civilians.

The rationale for these proposals was that enemy offensive operations throughout RVN had brought to COMUSMACV's attention the frequent situation wherein the US civilian advisor and the military man found themselves shoulder to shoulder on the perimeter in defense of the village or hamlet in their charge and whereas, after the heat of the battle, the military man was often presented an award for his valor, the civilian advisor looked on without recognition. In July, the MACV staff probed the subject of civilian awards from every angle in an effort to determine a means of rapid and adequate recognition for the civilian employee, particularly

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those in the USAID program for whom MACV and the AMEMB were both responsible. The study concluded that, within the civilian incentive awards programs established by each US military service and US agency, there were appropriate awards which could be presented to civilian personnel in recognition of bravery, gallantry, and heroism. One such decoration was the Award for Heroism which required SECSTATE approval. This award seemed appropriate for presentation to civilian advisors of the USAID program who had performed heroically and were due proper recognition.

(U) However, the incentive awards system did not permit the rapid response required to recognize a civilian employee for bravery. A large number of the USAID provincial advisors were under the operational control of MACV and were in a position to be recommended for awards for bravery by other advisory personnel, both military and civilian. COMUSMACV recommended to the AMEMB that approval authority for the award of the Department of State Award for Heroism to civilian advisors be delegated to COMUSMACV. The AMEMB concurred and forwarded his approval of COMUSMACV's recommendation to SECSTATE.

(U) On the same date, 25 July, COMUSMACV sent a message to JCS setting forth the problem of presenting awards to civilians. In addition, he brought up the related problem of the inability to present military awards for valor to civilian personnel due to component service regulations which had provisions for the presentation of military awards for valor to civilians only during time of war. However, a state of war, though undeclared, did exist in Vietnam. He requested that consideration be given to authorizing the presentation of appropriate military awards for valor to all civilian personnel serving with the Armed Forces in Vietnam when the act of heroism so warranted. He also requested in this case that the approval authority for such awards be delegated to COMUSMACV and component service commanders, as appropriate. COMUSMACV was informed by CINCPAC that his proposals were being considered by the various component Service chiefs.<sup>5</sup>

(U) On 12 August, the Assistant SECDEF (M&RA) dispatched a letter to COMUSMACV regarding the results of the staff inquiry. It was found that, in accordance with DOD Directive 5120.16, each military service was required to have at least two awards which could be presented to civilian employees for superior performance, including heroism. One of these awards was intended for presentation by major commanders and the other to be presented by the Secretary of the Department concerned. The Air Force had an award specifically designed for Valor and the Army provided for the words "For Bravery" to be inscribed on the back to meritorious and exceptional service awards. However, the Navy award did not appear to provide an appropriate degree of recognition for valor and the Assistant SECDEF recommended to the Navy that consideration be given to the development of a medal for use by major commanders to recognize heroism.

(U) In addition, the Army's Public Service Award, with medal, could be awarded by a major commander to private citizens or US citizen employees of other Federal departments who made important contributions to the command concerned. In his capacity as CG, USARV, COMUSMACV could award this medal to any US citizen in Vietnam.

(U) Another award, the "Vietnam Service Medal" had been established and could be awarded by commanders on the basis of a year of satisfactory service in Vietnam. It was felt that this award could be of assistance in recognizing employee service that was not based upon a specific act of heroism or other unusual accomplishment.<sup>6</sup>

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## Vietnam Campaigns

(U) In view of the marked increase in the tempo of combat commencing with the Tet holiday truce on 30 January 1968, MACV recommended that the fifth campaign period of the Vietnamese conflict be terminated as of 29 January 1968 and that the name "Vietnamese Counteroffensive Phase III" be assigned to this period. Additionally, it was recommended that a sixth campaign commence on 30 January 1968 and its termination to be designated at a later date. The inclusive period for the fifth campaign, as proposed, would be 1 June 1967 through 29 January 1968.

(U) A later proposal by MACV requested that the sixth campaign be terminated on 1 April and titled "Tet Counter-offensive." It was further proposed that a seventh campaign be designated commencing 2 April 1968, to be terminated and named at a later date. DA reviewed the proposal and approved the termination of the fifth campaign on 29 January 1968 and the commencement of the sixth campaign on 30 January 1968, to be terminated and named at a later date. However, DA disapproved the "Tet Counter-offensive" sixth campaign proposal. The rationale was that although the linkup and relief of the Marine forces at the Khe Sanh Combat Base represented a significant culmination point in the general restoration of territories, DA did not occur in the opinion that the countrywide tempo of VC/NVA-initiated combat action was substantially and noticeably reduced by 1 April 1968. In view of the subsequent recurring actions and casualty lists, DA recommended that the sixth campaign not be terminated or named at that time; rather, that consideration be given to including the counteroffensive actions that had continued since 30 January into one campaign to be terminated and designated when the current actions and casualties significantly abated.<sup>7</sup>

(U) Nevertheless, subsequent to the Army Chief of Staff changeover in July 1968, the sixth campaign was designated as the "Tet Counteroffensive" extending from 30 January 1968 through 1 April 1968. The seventh campaign commenced on 2 April 1968, the name and termination date of which would be determined and announced at a later date.<sup>8</sup>

## Living Conditions

### Project MOOSE

(U) The purpose of Project MOOSE (Move out of Saigon Exeditiously), which had been conceived and implemented in 1967, was to reduce the American image in the downtown Saigon area. In reviewing the progress made as of 31 December 1967, 70 properties had been released, 42 of which were in Saigon/Cholon. In November 1967, the forecast had been that the 31 December working population in Saigon/Cholon would be 7,441. This goal was not met, partially because several units which had been scheduled to move did not, in fact, move. There were 12 of these units: one was erroneously scheduled to move, two did not move because facilities to receive them had not been programmed, and the remaining nine were associated with the 506th Field Depot, the future of which was under study. Additionally, in December, certain units and groups of individuals had been identified which had not appeared in earlier Project MOOSE reports for various reasons. These were identified through the cross-checking of billeting, supply, and other administrative records.

(U) The task of overhauling Project MOOSE was a first priority item for 1968. From its inception, the system had been subjected to several refinements as the need had developed for

# UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

new data or for data in different format. These data lent themselves readily to machine handling. Therefore, after coordination with the components and USAHAC, as well as with MACV, in defining the essential elements of information to be programmed, the system was automated in the first quarter of 1968. Each working and billeting location in the Saigon/Cholon and Tan Son Nhut areas had been coded for machine use. Using an existing report (e.g. the MACV manning authorization list) which was updated monthly, it was possible to identify each person's working and billeting site. As the components completed their own programs, they were integrated with the MACV plan so that when the input from USAHAC's billeting, real estate, and supply activities (then posted and researched by manual methods) was automated, a machine cross-check would become available. It was felt that this system held great promise for speedy, reliable reporting and ready access to required data.

(U) On 5 January 1968, Mr. John A. Calhoun, Counselor for Political Affairs, AMEMB, Saigon, was given an update on his request to remove the American image from the area of the National Assembly Building (see 1967 MACV Command History). As of that date, action had been taken to close the Brinks PX, relocate the Billeting Office from the Ambassador Hotel, relocate the bus terminal, and release the parking lot in that area. These actions were started immediately and were completed by March 1968. This was in addition to the move of the Civilian Personnel Office, which was already in progress at that time. CG, USAHAC was tasked with accomplishing these moves. These actions removed an estimated 5,000 daily customers, 300 billeting office customers, several parked buses, and the incident traffic and congestion. It produced a dramatic reduction in the visible US presence in this sensitive location. In the same time frame, before 30 June, there were firm acquisitions planned in the Tan Son Nhut environs, totaling 1,052 billeting spaces. These properties were grouped in the general area of the 3d Field Hospital. In the light of these releases and acquisitions, it was forecasted that, by 30 June 1968, the billeted assigned population in the Saigon/Cholon area would be reduced by not less than 1,000 to approximately 9,500.<sup>9</sup>

(U) On 5 March, the component commanders were tasked to prepare an aggressive plan for the attainment of the Project MOOSE objectives in FY69 to be submitted to MACV prior to 30 April 1968. The plan was to be designed toward making maximum progress in achieving the objective within programmed and anticipated resources. It was directed that the plan include:

1. PART I: Programmed Moves. Units, authorized strength, present location, future location, and planned relocation date.
2. PART II: Possible Relocations. Units and authorized strength of units with a mission or function which could be accomplished outside the Saigon/Cholon area; however, facilities were not or would not be available for relocation. Recommend actions for relocation and estimated construction costs and funding program of required facilities.
3. PART III: Unit designation, authorized strength, present location, mission/function, and justification of the need to remain in Saigon/Cholon for mission accomplishment during FY69.

(U) The component commanders submitted their Project MOOSE plans: 7AF on 22 March 1968, USARV on 28 April 1968, and COMNAVFORV on 10 May 1968. All plans were reviewed and approved on 12 August 1968. As a result of the review of the June 1968 Project MOOSE reports submitted by the component commands, additional guidance was furnished on 12 August. The component commands were requested to develop and implement detailed plans for the

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relocation of personnel and activities and for the release of the vacated facilities reported in the June report.

(U) Relocation of activities and reallocation or release of vacated facilities were to be carried out with regard to:

1. Coordination, as appropriate, with other service components concerned.
2. Coordination with USAHAC and the US Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam (USAECAV) for scheduling and routing of movements, provision of security, reallocation of facilities, and/or termination of leases.
3. Minimum disruption of the relocated activities' functional capability.
4. Functional adequacy of facilities.
5. Proximity of working, billeting, and messing facilities.
6. Security of personnel and equipment.
7. Habitability.
8. Reduction of expenditures.

In addition, each service component was required to provide a quarterly status report to Hq MACV with copies to the other service components, USAHAC, and USAECAV commencing 30 September 1968 covering the following:

1. Activity relocation schedules and/or deviations with estimates of new Beneficial Occupancy Dates (BOD).
2. Completion of activity relocations to facilities outside of the Project MOOSE area and relocations to other facilities within Saigon.
3. Release of facilities within Saigon.
4. Density populations in accordance with MACV Project MOOSE Monitoring System.

(C) By the end of the year, the working population in Saigon/Cholon had been reduced from 7,800 to 6,400; the billet population was reduced from 10,500 to 7,200; and leases on 21 hotels, 16 villas, nine office buildings, two warehouses, and six miscellaneous facilities in the Saigon/Cholon area were terminated. 10

#### Senior Officer's Trailer Park

(U) As a continuation of Projects MOOSE and MACONOMY (discussed elsewhere in this chapter) a plan for the construction for a Senior Officer Trailer Park near MACV Headquarters was approved by COMUSMACV. The purpose of the trailer park was to provide living quarters for general officers, civilian equivalents, and senior colonels near their place of duty. As a

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corollary to this, it was envisioned that certain leased villas which were being used by these personnel would then be released. The trailer park was to consist of 32 trailers and would be located in the MACV Annex area. The Director, Construction Directorate (MACDC) was charged with the responsibility for the construction of this trailer park and MACJ4, was assigned the mission of procuring the trailers. MACJ1 developed a billeting plan which included housing for general officers and civilian equivalents on a single occupancy basis, selected colonels on a double occupancy basis, and billets for VIPs. The Hq Crndt was tasked with the mission of establishing the necessary administrative and logistical support incident to operating the trailer park complex. Arrangements were made to procure those items not included in the contracts being drawn up by MACDC and to provide the necessary services. Desired facilities and services included, but were not limited to, operation of an officer's mess and bar, provision of laundry and maid service, furniture, communications, and newspapers.

(U) The trailer park was approved for occupancy in early August and certain leased villas were released. Rent free villas were retained and utilized by senior personnel whose place of duty was in the Saigon city area. <sup>11</sup>

### Basic Allowance for Subsistence

(U) On 7 July 1968, COMUSMACV informed his component commanders that for some time the authorization and payment of Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) to enlisted personnel in RVN had lacked uniformity. In some instances, enlisted personnel were furnished subsistence in kind while other personnel in the same areas were paid BAS. DOD policy stated that under normal conditions enlisted personnel would be subsisted in kind. For uniformity in making determinations, government messes available in the geographical area had to be used to the fullest extent compatible with economy and efficiency. In this connection, it had been determined that government mess facilities were available in the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area. The decision to authorize EM to draw BAS was to be fully justified in accordance with DOD policy and service regulations. In areas where members of one or more Services performed duty under similar conditions, commanders were to confer to ensure uniform determination on the authorization of BAS. BAS was not to be paid to enlisted personnel solely on the basis of merit, location of quarters, extra incentive, or compensation. Where government messes were available, the following policy was to be followed in authorizing BAS for enlisted personnel:

1. Rations Not Available (RNA) allowance (\$2.57 per day) would not be authorized except in those cases which met either of the following rules:
  - a. Members whose post of duty was located more than 30 minutes each way by government transportation from a government mess.
  - b. Members whose duty post was so located that cost of providing the member with transportation would exceed the difference between the \$2.57 RNA rate and the \$1.30 separate rations rate.
2. When any member's duty prevented him from utilizing an available government mess for occasional meals, he was authorized a prorated or supplemental subsistence allowance.

Based on these guidelines, all component commanders and CG, III MAF were requested to evaluate their current program to ensure compliance with the applicable directives and above guidelines. <sup>12</sup>

UNCLASSIFIED

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## Air Crew Quarters

(U) In response to a letter from 7AF, MACV concurred that quarters for air crews merited special consideration due to the mission of the individuals involved. However, it was felt that current standards and criteria, without modification of applicable Service regulations, afforded sufficient latitude for construction of satisfactory air crew quarters. The MACV standards of construction allowed for either painted wood or pre-engineered metal buildings in the temporary category. In addition, other materials could be employed at the option of the component commander when cost analysis indicated that construction costs were equal to, or less than, the type construction specified. OSD set the following maximum space criteria and cost consideration:

1. Enlisted men - 70 gross square feet per man, exclusive of latrine and showers.
2. Officers - 110 gross square feet per individual, exclusive of latrine and showers.
3. The maximum average cost for the housing item of a cantonment was \$500 per man.

(U) MACV Directive 420-2 permitted air conditioning of temporary facilities provided they were not tropicalized. Service regulations authorized the air conditioning of air crew sleeping facilities subject to the following conditions: 13

1. Base or installation was in a weather zone where air conditioning of personnel living spaces was authorized under AFR 91-8.
2. The officers' quarters or dormitory spaces to be air conditioned were used exclusively by air crews who were required to fly at night in support of SEASLA operations.
3. Day rest was mandatory for these crews and such rest could not be obtained without air conditioning.

## Nonappropriated Fund Mess Conversion

(U) The conversion of all Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Messes feeding over 50 persons to Field Ration (FR) Messes was scheduled to be completed on or before 31 March 1968. However, some problems concerning the conversion had arisen that were not foreseen in the October 1966 study and prior to COMUSMACV's decision to convert the messes in RVN. The main problems were:

1. How best to subsidize ROK officers in FR messes when service charges were required.
2. In some advisory team messes where the head count exceeded 50 persons, it was not feasible to convert the mess until assistance-in-kind (AIK) funds could be programmed into the FY69 budget.

(U) The problem of ROK officer subsistence was solved by issuing chit books to them. Officers who were billeted in or near a BOQ in which the mess was not scheduled for conversion would be issued a \$65.00 chit book as had been done in the past. Officers who were billeted in or near BOQs where a mess was scheduled for conversion would be issued a \$6.00 or \$6.20 chit

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book, depending on the number of days in the month, and these were to be used to pay service charges in the FR messes.

(U) As of 1 June, there were 17 NAF messes in RVN which had not been converted to FR messes and by 31 October, all but one in 7AF had been converted to an FR mess. 7AF reported that a new FR mess was to be constructed in the Spring of 1969 and that the NAF would be downgraded to a snack bar operation upon completion of this new FR mess. <sup>14</sup>

### Centralized Billeting Control

(U) On 23 March 1968, COMUSMACV stated that the events at that time had emphasized the continuing need to evaluate not only our operational but also our administrative procedures in order to insure optimum readiness of all elements of the command in any situation. It was essential that all resources be immediately available and responsive to the demands of any contingency. Since our most valuable resource was people, it was axiomatic that procedures for their prompt notification, muster, transportation, security, and utilization be refined to a degree that insured their immediate availability. This was not the case in many areas during the Tet incidents and was particularly noticeable in the densely populated Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area. There were many factors which contributed to this unsatisfactory condition and all were being examined to insure correction. One of the principal weaknesses in the over-all control of personnel was the absence of a central repository of information which would permit cognisance over the billeting arrangements of personnel scattered throughout the metropolitan complex of Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut. To eliminate this obvious deficiency, CG, USAHAC was designated as the COMUSMACV Executive Agent for the coordination and control of all matters pertaining to the billeting of US military personnel in the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area, except for those billeted on Tan Son Nhut Air Base. All component commanders and agencies with military personnel billeted in the effected area were required to immediately make plans to coordinate all billeting policies and procedures through CG, USAHAC who would administer the program on a continuing basis. <sup>15</sup>

### Tour Length

#### Vietnam Tour Length

(U) Unless something drastic happened, the 12-month tour in Vietnam was here to stay. The Senate Armed Services Committee was assured by the nation's military leaders that no change was contemplated in the standard tour. As CJCS put it in early 1968, "only as sort of a last resort should we extend the tours in Vietnam, particularly for any appreciable length of time." He testified shortly after the Communist Tet Offensive raised some fears in Washington (and Vietnam) that tours might have to be extended to cope with the military problems created by the offensive. At the same time SECSTATE said:

"I think we all recognize that the 12- or 13-month tour had contributed immensely to the morale of the men. We do pay a price in having a high rate of rotation because it results in a relatively low experience level. But there is no question in the Chiefs' minds and none in mine that the fixed-term

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tour does contribute to the high morale we have there." 16

### Second R&R Program

(U) With MACV approval in October 1967 USARV had instituted a program authorizing a second R&R for those personnel extending their tour in Vietnam for three to six months. A MACV letter of 20 April 1968 added the incentive of priority on R&R booking to the program. An analysis of the overall extension program indicated that, while 11 percent of the extensions were for three to six months, 30 percent of the extensions were for some period of time less than three months. Those extending for less than three months were preponderantly enlisted men. This could be attributed to the early discharge policy for an EM returning to CONUS with less than ninety days of active duty remaining. Of the EM who extended for three to six months, there was no evidence to indicate that the added R&R was a decisive factor. As of May 1968, USARV's experience with the short-term extension program had been disappointing. Nevertheless, they were continuing to provide maximum command emphasis to the program. 17

### Special 30 Day Leave Program

(U) DA informed MACV that Public Law (PL) 89-735, which authorized an extra 30-day leave for men who volunteered for an additional six months in Vietnam, was extended by PL 90-330 and was signed by the President on 5 June 1968. The program, as extended by PL 90-330, was to continue in force until 30 June 1970. The House had voted to make the authority permanent, but the Senate modified the bill to extend it for two years instead and the House accepted the Senate version. The Senate Armed Services Committee said it opposed permanent extension of the law because "the justification for use of this authority in Vietnam might not necessarily exist in other areas where a permanent authority could apply." The 30-day leave, plus travel time, was in addition to the individual's regular leave time. Transportation to the US or any other approved place was furnished by the government. Since November 1966, when the law had gone into effect, almost 60,000 military men had extended their tours; 97.4 percent were enlisted men. The Senate Committee said the average cost for transportation was \$570 per man extending. But, it added, the net cost to the government was really zero because it costs about the same to transport two men who extend for six months each as it costs to send a replacement for a full year while relocating the family of the replacement. 18

### 18 Month Tours for Advisors

(U) Tours for senior Army officers being assigned to fill key senior and deputy advisory positions at the province level in Vietnam were increased from 12 to 18 months (See 1967 MACV Command History). Tours for officers assigned to advisory duties at lower levels of command remained at 12 months although men could volunteer to stay longer in-country. The Army gave "top priority" to finding officer volunteers to fill these province level posts. The Army Chief of Staff wrote personal letters to a number of "carefully selected" officers asking them to volunteer for the program. Volunteers were to be given up to 49 weeks of language and specialized training to prepare them for advisory positions.

(U) The Secretary of the Army noted that the tour for province advisors was not being increased because of any personnel shortages but rather, that 12 months was simply too short a

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time for an officer to be effective in that job. In actuality, he was advising a man who was equal to the rank of governor of one of our states.<sup>19</sup>

### Rest and Recuperation

#### General

(C) The Rest and Recuperation (R&R) sites located in the Far East were the first to support the R&R Program. This was desirable because it provided concrete evidence of our avowed interest in Asian affairs and it gave our Service members an opportunity to see the desirable areas of Asia. In addition, it helped to give servicemen a better appreciation of greater Asia whose people we were defending in Vietnam and had defended or aided in the past. Early in January, however, there was noted a steady decrease in R&R to the Far East centers. This was due principally to the expansion of the Hawaii R&R Program, the half fare provision, and the opening of Sydney, late in 1967. While desirable and meeting a definite need, these three factors diverted 20 percent of the total traffic, or 7,000 seats per month, from the Far East sites. Further drastic reduction in this area could have been construed as inconsistent with the national purpose in Asia, invited possible political repercussions, and would effect the morale of the many individual servicemen preferring Asian R&R. In particular, our relations with the Asian governments were considered as they were always sensitive to actions appearing favorable to non-Asians at the expense of Asians. In this context, the Communist press could certainly be expected to offer their interpretation of moves directing R&R toward non-Far East countries.

(U) Early in February, an assessment of the various sites showed that based on four months of spring/summer operations in Sydney, that site's popularity was well-founded. Fourth quarter 1968 utilization rate was 99.1 percent. In January, the number of flights per month was increased from 15 to 30 and utilization dropped slightly to 98.7 percent.

(U) Singapore, Penang, and Kuala Lumpur demonstrated a limited attraction, but those persons using these sites were thoroughly satisfied. Any reduction at any of these sites was not deemed economical and the MACV position was that, if conditions warranted, elimination of one or more of these sites should be considered rather than a reduction.

(U) Hong Kong had a very distinct appeal to servicemen, but terrorist activities in the summer of 1967 marred this appeal and resulted in a temporary decreased utilization. However, utilization was on the increase again at the start of 1968.

(U) Bangkok was the most popular site in the MACV R&R Program with a long record of sustained utilization in excess of 99 percent. US participation at this site had, in effect, been reduced because aircraft seats had been made available for Thai forces and for transiting US combat air crews. This site provided amusement, entertainment, and points of cultural interest with a minimum of time away from one's duty station.

(U) Tokyo was also a popular and particularly desirable site because it offered meals and lodging at a military installation for a very minimum cost to servicemen with limited means. The gold flow was minimized in this manner. Although this site was capable of receiving almost twice the traffic, the usage declined approximately 50 percent from what it had been in early 1967. This decline was primarily due to the increased traffic to Honolulu and Sydney.

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Tokyo was considered as an alternative or relief valve capable of receiving traffic that might be diverted from Sydney during Australian winters.

(U) Honolulu R&R was operated at 45 flights per month at the beginning of the year and increased to 60 flights per month on 1 October. Accommodations in Honolulu were critical at that level and resulted in undue hardship and extra expense. A further increase was considered undesirable unless accommodations became conveniently available in greater numbers.<sup>20</sup>

(U) During 1968, a total of 435,827 R&R seats were purchased and 419,914 were used for an overall 96.5% utilization rate.

(C) Maximum on-ground authorization at the different sites at the end of the year are as follows:<sup>21</sup>

Tokyo:	1,000	Taipei:	830	Kuala Lumpur:	166
Penang:	249	Manila:	300	Singapore:	300
Bangkok:	1,050	Hawaii	2,000	Hong Kong:	996
Sydney:	1,500				

#### The Marihuana and Weapons Problems

(C) In January 1968 the AMAMB Canberra informed COMUSMACV that three R&R personnel had been arrested in Sydney for the importation of marihuana and he expressed serious concern about the impact of this overall problem on the public relations aspects of the R&R Program. The "score" then stood at 10 arrests, 10 trials, eight convictions, and two dismissals. A magistrate in the Special Federal Court in Sydney expressed concern over the number of cases coming before his court and said, "American servicemen coming from Vietnam must be made to realize that possession of marihuana is regarded very seriously in Australia." All of the arrests and trials had received national press, radio, and TV coverage with each succeeding incident receiving increased news prominence. Already the program had unquestionably suffered from this adverse publicity, and a side effect had been to stimulate a heavy newsplay of allegations of massive use of marihuana and other drugs by US forces in Vietnam. The AMAMB was concerned that the total impact of the newsplay might offset public support in Australia not only for the R&R Program but even for the Allied effort in Vietnam.

(U) The situation in Australia and other R&R sites caused CINCPAC to write COMUSMACV, stating in part:

The severe steps now being taken by the government of Australia to curtail marihuana smuggling by our R&R personnel are serious. Coupled to other reports received from both embassy and military sources elsewhere, I think we must take an immediate and close look at the management of the over-all R&R program.

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The major problems which I continue to hear, despite supposed appeals at R&R conferences and by message and official letter, include the following:

1. Importation of guns, ammunition, flares, bayonets, knives, grenades, and other dangerous items, any of which constitutes a flagrant violation of local laws. There is growing indignation and protest to our on-site R&R representatives.
2. Departure of R&R troops from Vietnam with active, infectious venereal disease. On several occasions it has been reported that medical officers have given the afflicted persons enough penicillin pills "to continue his treatment" while on R&R leave.
3. Failure to obtain necessary inoculations, or in many instances, to carry the required shot cards, thereby, delaying processing at the point of arrival.
4. Finally, and most serious in my view, the failure for follow-through corrective action once the deficiency is reported.

.....  
In conclusion I recognize the problems under which this program must be conducted, with the morale ramifications of over-administration at either end of the R&R circuit. Nonetheless, our servicemen themselves will suffer greatest unless we are able to organize ourselves around their temptations to violate the rules.

The information contained in this letter is a small sampling of opinion and may not stand up under vigorous investigation. On the other hand, the time-consuming and thorough customs inspections being imposed on our people in Australia at this time lead me to conclude that there is even a limit to the patience of our friends.<sup>22</sup>

(U) CINGPAC's concern over the incidents in connection with the R&R program was well placed. COMUSMACV shared his concern with a full awareness that small details could sometimes impact with unwarranted heaviness on large and generally successful operations. In this instance, it had become apparent that the deliberate, wrongful acts of a statistically unmeasurable percentage of all R&R travelers were making the program unnecessarily restrictive at the moment and might quite possibly curtail it in some areas for future participants. As CINGPAC had pointed out, the excellent behavior of the nearly 100 percent majority could not be known because it was the actions of a willfully disobedient handful which were given consideration repeated publicity. As a result, MACV had been compelled, in the past, to develop more restrictive R&R processing procedures and recognize the requirement for even more stringent measures.

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(U) The processing system had developed to the point where individuals were not becoming involved in undesirable activities through ignorance or either prohibitions or possible punishments. They became involved simply because their personal habits and desires were at odds with the requirements of military discipline and of society. Accordingly, the problem existing on the Vietnam end of the R&R channel was one mainly of checking, inspecting, and restricting. In this respect, no stone was left unturned as all strived to eliminate even the smallest deficiency. The processing sites had demonstrated and continued to demonstrate that their search techniques were effective because many contraband items were confiscated in Vietnam. During the last six months of 1967, two cases had slipped through but were detected later in Hong Kong. One hundred percent assurance that no weapons or explosives would get through certainly could not be expected because time and physical facilities did not permit individual baggage and body search and quarantine from those not processed.

(U) In spite of the increased security measures, the incidents of marihuana smuggling into R&R centers did not cease. COMUSMACV felt that the discovery of marihuana and other unauthorized items subsequent to the arrival of the aircraft in the host countries indicated a lack of efficiency and effectiveness of the R&R out-processing procedures. Efforts at the unit level and other procedures conducted prior to the arrival at the R&R centers had been effective in reducing the number of incidents; however, a number of individuals who did not respond to verbal warnings continued to attempt to circumvent controls. Experience indicated that the thoroughness and professionalism of the searches of R&R personnel conducted in the host countries was the primary factor that continued to result in the discovery of personnel in possession of contraband. Substantial amounts of marihuana found aboard aircraft after debarkation of the passengers, or in amnesty boxes which were provided as the last means to dispose of contraband, indicated a healthy respect for the efficiency of the host country search procedures.

(U) Accordingly, COMUSMACV directed all component commanders to immediately implement, as a minimum, the following procedures at R&R out-processing centers in RVN:<sup>23</sup>

1. Conduct detailed searches of a representative number of enlisted personnel selected at random from each out-processing group.
2. Develop and implement search procedures to insure professionalism, efficiency, thoroughness, minimum inconvenience, or embarrassment to the individual and also insure that searches were conducted by mature, experienced, military or security police personnel.
3. Develop and furnish to the officer designated as troop commander aboard the aircraft a short meaningful briefing which he would be detailed to give over the aircraft public address system while in flight. The briefing would again describe the penalties, the immediate termination of the R&R, and other punishments imposed for smuggling of marihuana. The briefing would enjoin passengers to dispose of any marihuana via the aircraft rest-room facilities while in flight and to contact the individual giving the briefing if they were in possession of other contraband or prohibited items.
4. Insure that posters, furnished by MACV, warning of the prohibition against transporting marihuana, narcotics, weapons, and other items of contraband aboard aircraft, were prominently posted in a conspicuous location in each R&R processing center and that the posters were specifically mentioned during briefing procedures.

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(U) Nevertheless, marihuana incidents continued, especially in Australia. On 30 October, COMUSMACV issued instructions that, effective 10 November 1968, only one pack of opened cigarettes or one pouch of pipe tobacco or 4 cigars would be retained in the possession of R&R passengers bound for Sydney. No cigarettes or tobacco products would be allowed in stowed baggage. The only cigarettes, cigars, or tobacco which should be taken on board would be for in-flight use. Prior to debarkation, all remaining tobacco items would be deposited in a container on board the aircraft. No cigarettes or tobacco products would be permitted to enter Australia. The effective date was subsequently changed to 15 November.<sup>24</sup>

(U) On 27 December, COMUSMACV again emphasized his interest in the marihuana problem and issued further command guidance on the subject when he said:

Since 1 November, twelve servicemen have been apprehended by authorities in countries where R&R sites are located, for possession and importation of marihuana. Additionally, a number of incidents have occurred where marihuana was found on the aircraft after the passengers debarked. It is necessary that present control measures at in-country processing centers be improved.

The goal to be achieved at in-country R&R processing centers is the total absence of marihuana on any R&R flight departing from Vietnam. Briefings at R&R processing centers must emphasize the high probability of the offender being detected, the severe penalties faced in civilian and military courts, the adverse publicity resulting from these offenses, and the potential effect on the entire R&R Program. Amnesty containers will be provided only at in-country processing centers where individuals can inconspicuously dispose of marihuana or other contraband with no questions asked.

Effective immediately, R&R processing centers will conduct a thorough personal search of all personnel in the grade of E-4 and below who are destined for Australia and Hong Kong. Twenty-five percent of personnel in the grade of E-4 or below destined for other R&R sites will be given a personal search. Spot checks of other enlisted personnel may be conducted as appropriate. The search will also include an inspection of all hand baggage and articles carried by the individual. In order for these searches to achieve their purpose, they must be performed by mature and experienced military police or security police personnel.

## UNCLASSIFIED

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Search procedures in effect at R&R processing centers will be reviewed with particular attention given to the thoroughness of the search and the sequence of the search in the general processing cycle. Generally the physical facilities of the centers do not provide adequate areas where personnel can be segregated immediately subsequent to the search. This enables individuals to conceal prohibited items prior to the search and retrieve them before departing the processing center. Inasmuch as possible, personnel should be restricted in their movement to prevent access to areas previously vacated. Lacking adequate facilities to segregate personnel until their departure, personal searches will be conducted immediately prior to boarding transportation to the aircraft.<sup>25</sup>

### Reduced Fares, West Coast Points to Hawaii for Parents Joining Members on R&R in Hawaii

(U) Effective 20 March 1968, United, Pan American, and Northwest Airlines filed revisions to R&R tariffs to provide reduced fare travel, approximately a 25 percent discount, from West Coast points to points in Hawaii for parent(s) of unmarried US military personnel on duty in Vietnam or Thailand who were authorized official R&R in Hawaii. Tickets at the reduced fare were on a round-trip basis and travel had to be completed within 15 days. Pan American and Northwest Airlines extended this reduced fare to both parents whereas United Airlines initially extended this privilege to only one parent; however, effective 3 May 1968, United Airlines filed an amendment to the tariff which extended the reduced fare travel to both parents.<sup>26</sup>

### Reduced Fares for Spouses of Personnel Based in Thailand Who Chose Hawaii as Their R&R Site

(U) Effective 5 January 1968, United, Pan American, and Northwest Airlines filed a revision to the R&R tariffs to provide reduced fare travel, with a discount of approximately 25 percent, from West Coast points to Honolulu for spouses of Thailand based aircr@ members afforded out-of-country R&R leave and who selected Hawaii as their place of leave. Tickets at the reduced fares were on a round-trip basis and travel had to be completed within a 15-day period. The requirements and procedures were the same as for spouses of military personnel based in Vietnam (See 1967 MACV Command History).<sup>27</sup>

### Extended In-Flight Service

(U) During the October R&R scheduling conference, MACV made a request that involved extended in-flight service on all R&R carrier flights to include the showing of movies on the longer flights and stereophonic listening equipment on all flights. Justification was based on the following factors:

1. Reduction of on-ground in-processing time by using an orientation film concerning the destination site.

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2. Installation of the video and stereo equipment was possible with aircraft configuration modification.

3. The longer flights were tiring experiences which could be made more enjoyable and ease the tension of the passengers.

4. Video and stereo services were furnished on many scheduled commercial air carriers as well as on some MAC commercial charter missions. Our personnel deserved comparable services to those furnished passengers on any commercial flights.

(U) On 24 December, Commander, Military Airlift Command (COMAC) stated that it would cost an estimated \$107,500 to \$130,000 to equip one plane for the showing of movies and that the cost of maintaining, replacing, and cleaning the equipment would be \$5,240 for 100 flights a month. Pending the outcome of the proposals and DOD's reaction to the additional costs and a willingness to pay the increased rates to compensate the carriers for this type service, he recommended that the subject be tabled.<sup>28</sup>

### Wearing of Civilian Clothing on R&R Flights

(U) On 10 November, COMUSMACV requested that CINCPAC consider the authorization of optional wear of civilian clothing while travelling on an R&R aircraft. The advantage of this proposal were as follows:

1. It would serve to lessen the impact of the American presence in foreign countries. Uniforms are particularly noticeable during arrival and departure at public airport terminals when a flight is managed as a group; personnel had no opportunity to change clothing until after they were briefed and had checked into their hotels. The impact would be significant at sites such as Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Singapore where reduction of American presence was an objective.

2. It would promote the objective of providing the participant with the feeling that R&R commences at the in-country processing site. Additionally, it would help ease tension, facilitate comfort, and permit personnel to feel relaxed both during the processing and on the flight.

3. It would reduce the baggage load, since some civilian clothing could be worn instead of packed.

4. It would improve the general appearance of the group because many individuals who reported to the in-country processing center directly from combat units did not have properly cleaned or pressed uniforms. The lack of cleaning facilities and uniform material which wrinkles easily were inherent causes. Civilian clothing would present a more casual appearance and be less noticeable. Accordingly, the wearing of civilian clothing would eliminate the unacceptable appearance of sizable groups of American military personnel in sloppy military dress.

5. It would partially, if not totally, resolve the problem of providing class A uniform items, particularly to personnel from line units who arrived at the R&R processing center with incomplete uniforms.

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(U) Possible disadvantages of wearing civilian clothing aboard R&R aircraft were as follows:

1. A decreased awareness would exist at locations where it is desirable to make the American military presence known.
2. A minimal adverse effect would be felt by civilian rental clothiers at sites where this service is provided.

(U) Upon approval of this proposal, the Vietnam Regional Exchange would provide, at the in-country processing centers, sufficient stocks of shirts, slacks, belts, socks, ties, and shoes to accommodate all personnel who needed them. In conjunction with this service, facilities could be established to permit R&R participants to deposit uniform and boots at the departure site for cleaning and shine.<sup>29</sup>

(U) On 27 January 1969, CINCPAC approved this proposal and indicated that it could be implemented at all sites except Hong Kong and Taipei. (The proposal for these two sites was still under consideration.)<sup>30</sup>

#### New Zealand

(C) On 4 March 1968, the New Zealand Embassy presented a note on R&R to the AMEMB, Wellington, in which the Government of New Zealand (GNZ) offered to make facilities available to US and other servicemen in RVN (including NZ servicemen). The note stated that the GNZ could provide facilities for two jet flights of approximately 160 passengers each to Auckland and one similar flight to Christchurch every five days. Most of the servicemen could be accommodated in and around these two cities but tours would be arranged to other places of recreational interest. The US was invited to send a team to New Zealand to explore the program possibilities. The GNZ was assured that the proposal would be studied carefully but that the distance of New Zealand from RVN, the availability of aircraft, and the need for additional R&R locations would have to be assessed.

(C) In response to a query from CINCPAC, COMUSMACV stated that increasing the number of R&R sites from ten to twelve would increase the number of varied environments available to the R&R travelers. This would tend to favor more individuals through providing greater variety in site selection. However, considering the variety already available, the effect would appear to be minimal. Establishing the sites proposed would produce a monthly total saturation of 2,952 personnel. Operations, involving ten sites, were at that time programmed below the maximum combined on-ground authorization by a monthly figure of 5,650. Comparison of these figures showed an existing expansion capability nearly double the number of spaces that could be generated at the proposed New Zealand sites. Since the readily available expansion capability exceeded the anticipated requirements through 1968, no requirement for New Zealand sites existed.

(C) Accepting the requirement for additional aircraft at a greater expense, the proposal was within MAC/carrier capability and the new sites could be incorporated into the system without difficulty by 1 January 1969. Considering the great land and sea distance between Auckland and Christchurch, two site detachments would be required. The monetary and manpower expenditure in relation to the number of troops handled would be unfavorable, particularly at Christchurch with only one flight per week. The monetary and manpower expense of establishing

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the new sites had to be viewed in light of the relatively expense-free expansion capability at the ten existing sites. Acceptance of the proposal would raise the number of seasonal sites to four-- Tokyo and Sydney being the current two. Although seasonal effect could not be predicted, any adverse effect at all on the long haul New Zealand flights would produce a significant percentage of unused seats per aircraft.

(C) On 16 May, the GNZ was notified that the US had sympathetically studied their proposal for an R&R Program in New Zealand but was unable to give a positive response at that time for the reasons stated above (except the last one dealing with Korea); however, a further reading would be taken in six months to determine if an additional R&R site was needed then. The GNZ expressed disappointment but understanding of the US position.<sup>31</sup>

(C) Consequently, on 14 September 1968, CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to review his position reference the New Zealand R&R site. On 17 September, COMUSMACV replied that his position had not changed. However, two days later, on 19 September, COMUSMACV rescinded his 17 September message and stated that, although the ten sites already established at that time were adequate to accommodate all personnel programmed for R&R in the foreseeable future, an R&R Program to New Zealand was considered desirable because of troop preference and in view of New Zealand's contribution to the effort in RVN. The opening of a new site without closing an existing one, however, was not recommended because of the operating expenses involved. An analysis of the sites in use indicated that troop preference of R&R sites in Malaysia and in Singapore were the lowest in the program. On this basis, the opening of a site in New Zealand should be coupled with the closing of a site in Malaysia. MACV recommended that the opening of a site in New Zealand be favorably considered contingent upon the closing of Penang. It was also recommended that a firm commitment to open the New Zealand site be based upon a feasibility survey and that the scheduled opening date be no earlier than 1 July 1969. As of the end of 1968, there were no further developments in the proposed opening of a New Zealand R&R site.<sup>32</sup>

#### Australia

(C) In early January, CINCPAC queried MACV as to the advisability of increasing the R&R participation at Sydney. MACV stated that the following actions, in connection with the R&R program, had been taken or were contemplated:

1. In the 2d quarter of FY68, an R&R center had opened in Sydney. During that period, approximately 7,300 R&R tourists chose that site.

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2. In the 3d quarter of FY68, traffic to Sydney would be increased 100 percent over that of 2d quarter, thereby programming in excess of 14,000 R&R tourists in that period alone.

3. In the 2d quarter of FY68, the R&R Program had reduced traffic to Tokyo and Hong Kong by approximately 5,000 and 1,500 respectively, in order to provide for the opening of Sydney and the expansion of flights to Honolulu. Other reductions were effected for Taipei and Manila. The 3d quarter of FY68 programmed increase to Sydney and the seven flights per month (1,124 passengers) increase to Honolulu was offset by a corresponding reduction equally divided between Tokyo and Taipei.

(C) MACV recommended that there be no commitment to further increase the R&R traffic to Australia at that time and that the winter season in Australia should be approached with caution. R&R winter attractiveness could require periodic reduction in order to afford a more favorable climate. In this respect, MACV recommended that fluctuations due to winter weather be alternately adjusted between Tokyo and Australia in order to minimize the political impact on Japan and to offer warmer climates to servicemen. The Australian weather, along with the unfavorable publicity over marihuana, suggested that the popularity of Australia with servicemen might not continue.

(C) JCS requested that CINCPAC submit a plan to provide phased increase in Australian R&R to a programmed monthly goal of 6,480 by October 1968. On 13 February, CINCPAC stated that four months' experience had indicated that the troops had accepted Sydney as an R&R site and would support a monthly programmed goal of 6,480 during the spring/summer seasons. No problems were anticipated concerning the capability of Sydney to accommodate this goal. Increases in R&R to Australia were recommended to be programmed beginning on 1 October 1968, which was during their spring season. It was obvious that increasing R&R to Australia would cause a decrease at one or more other sites and it was agreed that reductions should be avoided at Hong Kong, Taipei, and Singapore. CINCPAC's final recommendation was that R&R to Australia be increased to the desired figure of 6,480 per month and that Penang be closed as an R&R site on 1 October to provide compensation.

(U) The Government of Australia (GOA) agreed, by note on 31 May, to increase the daily maximum on-ground R&R strength to 1,500, but suggested that the US consider using the Brisbane/Gold Coast area for the increase in order not to strain the hotel facilities in Sydney. However, it was pointed out that if the US did plan to have all 1,500 R&R personnel in the Sydney area, the GOA would ask the hotels to reserve that many singles every day throughout the year. At the same time, the GOA asked for confirmation of an earlier understanding that the R&R program would not exclude any Australian servicemen in RVN who wished to spend their R&R leave in Australia. The Australian National Tourist Association and the Australian Accommodation Council favored spreading the R&R activity to the Gold Coast and wished to discuss this with the AMEMB.

(C) The request for a 1,500 on-ground strength was for the purpose of accommodating minor fluctuations. In actuality, it was planned that the on-ground strength at any one time would be 1,360. The request for the use of Sydney only was to reduce the administrative requirements for an additional R&R processing detachment and contract carrier facility. The seasonal weather variations at a beach resort, such as the Gold Coast, made it unlikely that troops would elect that location during the winter. Other factors that militated against the extension of the R&R Program to the Gold Coast were the fact that the only airfield capable of receiving 707 jets was located at Brisbane, one hour's drive from the Gold Coast; hotel capacity

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on the Gold Coast appeared to be sufficient to handle the increase during the "off season", but some doubt existed as to the desirability/capability to handle the influx during the heavy tourist season; the lack of suitable entertainment and tourist-oriented facilities in Brisbane; the comparably vast facilities at the Gold Coast would require a plurality of R&R processing detachments; and such an operation would be exceedingly uneconomical and personnel and financial support appeared prohibitive.

(C) At the same time that these matters were under discussion, GOA again brought up the fact that they wanted to be assured that a minimum of 3,000 spaces per year were programmed for Australian servicemen. It was agreed that this number would be programmed and further increases would be permitted upon the request of the GOA.<sup>33</sup>

#### Bangkok

(C) In early March 1968, the AMEMB Bangkok expressed concern with the impact of the American presence there. The AMEMB, MACTHAI, MACV, and Thai Ministry of Defense personnel considered the problem to determine a solution acceptable to all parties. Prior to April 1968, the American non-duty presence, other than R&R, probably exceeded the total numbers produced by R&R. For example, Vietnam alone was sending approximately 3,000 non-duty, non-R&R personnel per month to Bangkok. Other Pacific area commands were also contributing greatly to the total presence through ordinary leave, permissive TDY, and unnecessary air crew stop-overs. As a major morale program serving troops assigned to combat areas, MACV and MACTHAI R&R Programs were not recommended or considered for reduction when American presence might be reduced by other means. This American presence was noticed as much by adverse impact as by total numbers. Compared to R&R, personnel on ordinary leave, permissive TDY, etc., added most of the adverse impact as borne out by local observation and incident statistics. This was attributed to the control, orientation, and protection received from the R&R center and various Thai Government agencies for the R&R personnel. Bangkok was one of the most desirable sites in the MACV R&R Program. It provided most of the attractions found at all other sites and, being close to Vietnam, presented a minimum time away from duty for R&R participants. These two qualities were most advantageous for the many individuals whose duty situations would otherwise have made the scheduling of R&R difficult.

(C) The foregoing, posed as a joint Embassy/MACTHAI/MACV recommendation to CINC-PAC, led to his recommendation that aircraft be precluded from remaining overnight in Bangkok unless on official business. In addition, he requested that COMUSMACV limit the total leave, pass, and permissive TDY/TAD personnel in Bangkok at any one time to a maximum of 1,000. The overall effect was that R&R could have been increased over the current levels without appreciable impact. Accordingly, on 10 April, COMUSMACV informed the component commanders that ordinary leave, pass, and permissive TDY/TAD to Bangkok would not be authorized for personnel either assigned or under the administrative control of MACV or the component commands.

(C) In May, JCS noted a variation between the recommended R&R quota of 4,000 for Bangkok and the FY69 quota recommended by MACV of 5,940. In view of the potential problem of saturation of Bangkok, JCS requested a review to ascertain whether or not any modification should be made. An analysis of the total number of R&R participants shown indicated that the MACV monthly requirements did, in fact, exceed the JCS-recommended monthly quotas by some 2,000. This increase had been caused by an increase in troop strength, the addition of combat personnel from Thailand, and an increased R&R participation rate. The majority of this increase had been

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programmed into Bangkok because of the popularity of the site. Continuous coordination had been effected by CINCPAC with the AMEMB Bangkok to ensure that the in-country and out-of-country programs and the authorized environmental and morale leave programs were acceptable. Prior to implementing the in-country program, leave, pass, and non-official travel to Bangkok had been eliminated. The current program had been concurred in by the AMEMB Bangkok and met the levels required for the current troop strength and personal desires. Neither CINCPAC nor MACV were considering any modification to the program.<sup>34</sup>

#### Guam

(U) Effective 1 July 1968, there was a change in MACV policy which permitted Guamanians or personnel having dependents residing on Guam to debark from Honolulu R&R flights at Anderson Air Force Base. Guam was not designated as an R&R site because there was insufficient command-wide interest to warrant such action. Under the revised procedure, personnel were permitted to apply for R&R to Honolulu and debark at Guam by competing with other Honolulu applicants on a space available basis. Previously, individuals had been permitted to board Honolulu bound R&R aircraft and debark at Guam if they had leave orders and only if space was available.<sup>35</sup>

#### Okinawa

(U) CG, III MAF supplemented the command R&R programs with a weekly C-130 flight from Da Nang to Okinawa. R&R quotas were available on this flight using the same criteria given in the MACV R&R Directive, with the added provision that the individual's family must be residing in Okinawa. Period of R&R in Okinawa was five nights and was considered as a normal R&R.<sup>36</sup>

### Post Exchange

#### General

(U) Practically everything a serviceman in Vietnam needed, the Vietnam Regional Exchange (RVNR) could provide. In pursuing its mission of "Service to the Fighting Man," the RVNR had, as of June 1968:

1. Developed into the biggest retail operation in Vietnam with 20 food facilities, 314 retail outlets, and 1,400 concession shops spread throughout the country from Dong Ha, near the demilitarized zone, to Bac Lieu in the south. From a shoestring operation in 1965, RVNR had grown to a million-dollar-a-day business.
2. Built up a merchandising stock of more than 5,000 line items ranging from chewing gum to highly sophisticated stereophonic equipment.
3. chalked up sales that equaled the combined exchange sales of all the other regions in the Pacific Exchange System (PACEX): Guam, Hawaii, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Philippines, and Thailand.

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4. Given valuable training in retail operation to hundreds of employees, most of whom were local nationals.

5. Provided employment to 8,430 Vietnamese whose pay amounted to \$741,000 (\$VN 87,438,000) per month. In technical positions were 209 US civilians, 884 Third Country Nationals, and 869 military personnel.

(U) The RVNR retail operations depended upon four giant spots for support. These warehousing facilities had a total of 1.5 million square feet of storage space. Each month the Cha Rang Logistical Complex in the Qui Nhon area handled about 14,000 measurement tons of PX merchandise worth \$9 million; Da Nang, 20,000 tons worth \$7 million; Cam Ranh Bay, 11,000 tons worth \$12 million; and Saigon, 38,000 tons worth \$26 million. RVNR received transportation support from MACV in shipping supplies to the retail outlets by land, water, and air. Cargo and vessel movements in Vietnam went by priorities. In some instances RVNR experienced difficulties, but somehow it usually managed to overcome the problems. The retail outlets had to have adequate supplies to serve the troops in their respective areas. About 600,000 Free World forces looked to the RVNR for their essential needs. 37

(U) The Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) had assumed responsibility for exchange operations from the US Navy on 26 December 1965. A report of audit on validation and transfer of assets from Navy Exchange, Saigon, to the RVNR had been conducted between 13 November 1965 and 22 February 1966. It alluded to certain problem areas such as personnel manning, lack of coordination within RVNR, transfer of Field Exchange assets, inventory deficiencies, etc. The first fiscal year of operation had ended on 10 January 1967 and it was computed at that time that approximately \$21 million worth of goods, which should have arrived in RVN, were unaccounted for. A physical inventory on 10 January 1967 revealed an overage from the computed "book" inventory of \$10 million. This meant that merchandise in the depots and sales activities had been placed in stock without any receiving reports being rendered, but there was still an approximate shortage of \$11 million worth of merchandise that had been paid for but never received.

(U) In January 1966, barely one month after the exchange had started operating, many major problems in the fiscal and accounting procedures area had been identified. In a letter to MACJ1, dated 25 January 1966, PACEX specifically noted errors in bank deposits, no receiving reports, no disbursement reports, and an overall lack of documentation of all transactions. In reply, MACJ1 stated that the US was engaged in a combat situation and we must be prepared to accept the errors and losses which were inevitable under these circumstances. He made specific note of the lack of adequate facilities and especially the absence of trained personnel to operate the exchanges.

(U) During the same time frame AAFES requested MACV's assistance in obtaining command support from appropriate fund resources for general purpose vehicles and material handling equipment. In his reply to this request, MACJ1 brought AAFES to task for their lack of support of the exchange operations in RVN, identified the lack of an internal audit capability as a major problem, and indicated that a continuous inspection and audit of branch exchange accounts was essential. This exchange of messages was the first indication the board of directors could find of the condition of the RVNR. As a result, literally hundreds of inspections, investigations, reports, and fact-finding committees, delving into the exchange operations in RVN and related problems, were started.

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(U) Probably the most significant document was the "Investigation of the US Economic and Military Assistance Programs in Vietnam" conducted by the Moss Committee in the spring of 1966. Their report covered many areas directly related to the exchange operations. They touched on the questionable coverage and adequacy of the internal audit capability and the port situation in RVN and presented background data on PX difficulties. Many of the problems discussed in these documents were determined by the board to be causes of the losses under investigation. The initial Moss Committee report triggered a review of audit and inspection programs, which were conducted in RVN during 1966 by the Comptroller General of the United States. These reports are mentioned to show the high level of interest in the exchange operation.

(U) The board found that the RVNR had experienced a loss of \$7,615,200.19 between the period of 26 December 1965 to 10 January 1967. This loss was categorized as follows: Overall in-transit loss, \$5,715,185.86; Marine Cargo and transit loss, \$1,722,798.38; Loss due to enemy action \$9,622.48; Cash in-transit loss, \$165,118.74; and Working Funds Loss, \$2,474.73. A reserve of \$11,478,423 was established to cover these losses. The board could find no information that would either validate or negate the reported Accounts Receivable Loss of \$15,073.34.

(U) The underlying cause of the losses was poor planning, primarily in the areas of personnel, equipment, and facilities. During the period in which the losses occurred, there was a general lack of documentation due to an insufficient number of qualified personnel. Consequently, the exact causes of the losses could not be determined. Further complicating the problem was the fact that the control of cash and the flow of merchandise within RVN was inadequate and the exchange was unable to identify losses when they occurred. Considerable losses occurred during transportation of merchandise from the ports to the depots and from the depots to the stores. The transportation was provided by Vietnamese trucking firms with military security escorts. The Moss Committee had recommended that military riders be placed on each truck. However, such riders were not used but convoy security had been retained throughout 1966. Inadequate security was evident in all areas where exchange merchandise was handled.

(U) The substance of various audit reports and inspections made during 1966 had indicated that the problems which led to the losses were known. However, the magnitude of these problems had apparently not been realized until after six months of operation. When full realization had been obtained, supplemental planning began to initiate remedies. In August 1966 the first substantial results of the corrective efforts had been noticed. Compounding the problem had been evidence of a lack of coordination within RVNR and between PACEX and RVNR. The investigation had disclosed no evidence of gross negligence, fraud, dishonesty, or willful misconduct, and a lack of evidence with which to hold one person, or a group of persons, pecuniarily liable for the losses.

(U) Despite many problems, numerous errors in judgment, and ever-increasing requirements, the exchange had been able to accomplish its primary purpose in a commendable manner. While conducting its investigation, the board had noted considerable improvements in methods and procedures that had been established since 10 January 1967.

(U) RVNR concurred with the recommendation of the board that the amount of \$7,605,577.71 be recognized as an operating loss, and applied against the reserve established for this purpose. There had been several more recommendations made by the board regarding the setting up of simplified accounting procedures, substantially reducing high-value items in RVN, developing

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new minimum stock levels, using the "Sea-Land Containership Service", and providing greater control over all aspects of the handling and receipt of supplies. In some areas the RVNR had already initiated action. The completed report of the investigation was submitted to COMUSMACV who approved it on 15 March 1968 and forwarded it to RVNR for action.<sup>38</sup>

(C) In late 1967 CINCPAC had informed COMUSMACV that:

I know you share my concern over the unacceptable amount of losses experienced in US Exchange merchandise in Vietnam. Aside from the obvious effect on the cost of Exchange merchandise for US servicemen, these losses must have significant adverse effects on the legitimate Vietnamese economy.<sup>39</sup>

He further stated that information obtained from the Chairman, Pacific Joint Board of Directors for the Army/Air Force Exchange and Motion Picture Services indicated that the following steps had been taken to help reduce the merchandise losses in Vietnam:

1. Increased the number of experienced US exchange civilian management personnel from 24 in January 1967, to 160 as of 10 November.
2. Instituted an aggressive training program for local national employees.
3. Implemented control procedures and established Exchange Port Operations Detachments in mid-1967 which was expected to improve documentation of losses, of claims actions and control of merchandise movement from ports to depots.
4. Began shipping exchange merchandise from CONUS to Da Nang via Sea-Land containers in August and to all other Vietnam ports in November 1967.
5. Established a computer capability in Vietnam to improve merchandise inventory management.
6. Made a continuous effort through appropriate military commands to acquire adequate warehouse facilities for exchange merchandise, e. g., in November 64,000 square feet of warehouse space was made available at Qui Nhon compared to only 8,000 prior to that.

(C) On 1 February 1968 COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that the actions summarized above were previously taken by the Exchange Service and would result in greater efficiency and lower loss rates as they became full effective. In addition, the following actions had been taken in Vietnam and should likewise have a favorable impact on the loss rates:

1. Initiated a concept of categorizing exchange outlets, which prescribed stock assortments tailored to the volume and space available at each store, thereby reducing the loss exposure at the smaller stores.
2. Initiated a store inventory system which would provide central cognizance over the majority of the store stocks on a monthly basis.

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3. Assigned specific responsibility for security on in-transit exchange merchandise to 1st Log Cmd.
4. Changed procedures for utilizing saturation MP patrols for security against truck diversions.
5. Added an additional 63,000 square feet of covered storage space.
6. Authorized Sea-Land vans and containerhips for redistribution of exchange stocks between Vietnam depots effective 12 January 1968.

(C) Additionally, a joint survey effort by the component commanders' representatives and the RVNR was to be initiated when data from the 10 January 1968 inventory was made available. This joint team was to survey the management, storage facilities, and security at exchange complexes where the major exchange accountability losses had occurred during the past four months. The evaluation and recommendations of this team were to be furnished the RVNR Council for evaluation, approval, and transmittal through channels for appropriate corrective action. Continuous command attention was to be directed towards further improvements. The objective of the RVNR was to reduce losses in the command by at least one-half on a percentage basis for FY69. 40

#### Videotape Recording

(U) In mid-1968, a new concept in person-to-person communications was inaugurated when US servicemen in Vietnam began "sending themselves home" on television. Vidihome International opened a television videotape recording studio at the Tan Son Nhut Base Exchange, allowing soldiers to tape personal messages to send home to their families and friends. This was the first time television videotape had been used for international person-to-person communications on such a massive level. The average cost of a televised message was less than a telephone call from Saigon to the US. A serviceman taped a message on a Vidihome International videotape machine and sent the tape home. The person receiving it went to a nearby Vidihome exhibitor noted on the card enclosed with the tape. The tape was then shown a minimum of four times on a videotape deck. Vidihome International had nearly 150 exhibitors in major metropolitan areas and other cities across the US. Servicemen could purchase two-, five-, or ten-minute tapes. The messages were shown free of charge by Vidihome exhibitors, and the tapes remained the property of the recipients. Vidihome hoped to expand the program and allow families at home to send videotape messages back to Vietnam. The company already had a few monitors in Vietnam for playback of such tapes and intended to establish recording studios in the US for use by families of servicemen. 41

#### PX Privileges for PHIL and ROK Personnel in Vietnam

(U) ROKFV had four large main exchanges and 57 smaller branch exchanges in RVN. The main exchanges were located in the headquarters area of the Tiger and White Horse Divisions, the 100th Cmd, and the Marine Brigade. The PHILCAGV operated an exchange at its base camp at Tay Ninh. The number of Filipinos in Saigon and at the medical team operating locations was too small to warrant the operation of separate exchanges. US exchanges in the Qui Nhon area were off-limits to personnel of the Capital ROK Division (Tiger) for purchase of controlled

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items. This restriction was voluntarily imposed by the ROK Division Commander to insure tighter control of rationed items and reduce friction between US and ROK forces.

(U) Until 1 July 1968, when the new series MACV ration cards became effective, ration cards for ROK personnel in the Saigon area were over stamped. With the issuance of new ration cards ROKFV's Commander instituted the following policy for the Saigon area: (these restrictions were voluntarily imposed to control purchase of rationed items and reduce ROK presence in US exchanges.)

1. Ration cards for use at US exchanges were limited to E7s and above and none were over stamped.
2. E6s and below could purchase only from the exchange located at the ROKFV Hq.
3. Authorized ROKFV personnel could patronize US exchange facilities only during off duty-hours. Authorized transient personnel, however, could use US exchanges at any time.
4. ROK Military Police and Criminal Investigation Division (CID) persons were stationed at the main exchanges in the Saigon area to control unauthorized entrance. The smaller branches were spot checked.
5. ROKFV personnel could no longer purchase refrigerators. The Commander, ROKFV ordered this item deleted from ration cards prior to issuance.

(U) Efforts were made to encourage FWMAF to establish their own exchanges where strengths justified and to limit the use of US exchanges. In many cases, including Saigon where all FWMAF were represented, establishment of comparable separate exchanges was not practical from the standpoint of numbers and distribution of personnel. Further, the institution of controls more meaningful than those which could be obtained voluntarily with moderate encouragement would require modification of existing military working arrangements and involve considerations of inferior treatment, segregation, and discrimination, matters of great political sensitivity among our oriental allies. It was recognized that controls achieved voluntarily, though considerable, were less than complete and would not eliminate allegations of excessive buying by members of the Allied forces. However, under inter-governmental working arrangements, it was considered that our actions in this respect must be limited to those restrictions which could be obtained voluntarily as actions in the mutual interest of US and FWMAF. 42

### Black Market and Currency Control

(U) US military authorities continued to initiate new and more effective measures to suppress the black market operation in RVN. Many of the measures were employed in cooperation and close coordination with Vietnamese authorities and other US agencies. While these measures were primarily directed at preventing the diversion and theft of US materials and reducing the illegal sale of desirable PX items to black market operators, there were some combined US and Vietnamese police raids in black market areas to seize contraband items. As a result of a request from MACV in January 1968, President Thieu ordered the NP to close the so-called black market stalls that were operating in Saigon. These stalls were closed on 21 March 1968.

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(U) The following are some of the measures that were taken to prevent the theft and diversion of US supplies and materials into black market:

1. High value and theft-prone cargo was transported on US military trucks driven by US military personnel whenever possible. Military Police also escorted such cargo when it was transported on contractor trucks.
2. Sealed containers were used more extensively to secure cargo from the time that it left the CONUS manufacturer until it arrived at the using agency in RVN.
3. Military Police were posted at ships and in ports to help reduce pilferage of supplies.
4. Saturation patrolling was conducted by combined MP and NP on major supply routes.
5. A coded template was used to check all transportation movement documents for authenticity.

(U) On 1 May 1968, a new automated currency and black market control system was implemented by MACV on a test basis. This system, which closely monitored all currency transactions and purchases of selected high-value PX items, was designed to replace a less effective system which required manual sorting and screening of all transaction and purchase forms. The new computerized system would rapidly identify possible currency and black market violators for investigation by component Service law enforcement agencies. When fully implemented, this control system would significantly reduce the illegal sale or disposal of desirable high-value PX merchandise to the black market. However, by the end of the year, this system had not been fully implemented. <sup>43</sup>

(U) Liquor items sold through Exchange outlets, which included brandy, cognac, champagne, whisky, and bourbon, were popular black market items and could be found in numerous civilian bars and clubs. One method suggested by MACV of reducing the desirability or attractiveness of these items to the black market purchaser would be the practice of "breaking the seal" on liquors of alcoholic content at the time of purchase. In addition, the protective foil and seals on champagne or wine bottles could be removed or mutilated at the time of purchase either by the customer or by sales personnel. This practice would not harm the contents of the bottles but might serve as a deterrent to the black market purchaser since he could not determine whether or not the contents had been tampered with or altered. There was no legal objection to the proposal to open bottles of liquor or to tear seals at the time of purchase. RVN law was silent as to the carrying of opened bottles in public places. MACV requested that the RVNR institute this procedure on a trial basis in the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area during the entire month of February 1968.

(U) Final results of the test were overtaken by events in that the action of the GVN in curtailing black market operations and the closing of bars in the Saigon area prevented a proper evaluation of the program's effectiveness of reducing black marketing of Class VI items. In view of this situation, RVNR recommended that the "test" be discontinued. If necessary, the program could be reactivated under conditions where it would be possible to better evaluate the value and necessity for breaking liquor bottle seals at the time of sale. On 25 April 1968 MACV approved the discontinuance of the "test", with the provision that the RVNR should be prepared to reinstitute the program should Saigon bars reopen or should there be a substantial increase in black market activities. However, by the end of the year, the program was not reinstated. <sup>44</sup>

## UNCLASSIFIED

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## Airline Ticket Sales

(U) On 26 December 1967, COMUSMACV was queried by JCS regarding the establishment of airline ticket offices in RVN. MACV recommended a system of US corporation exchange concessionaires whereby PACEX would be tasked, effective 1 July 1968, with the single management of the ticketing and travel service. With this recommendation to contract with only US firms, there would be no loss of funds through "gold flow". However, this recommendation was not accepted. MACV was then directed by JCS and CINCPAC to commence discussions with representatives of the certified US carrier, Pan American Airways (PANAM), with the view toward charging them, at the earliest convenient date, with providing servicemen a ticketing and travel service in RVN at seven specified locations. It was further directed that on-base services being provided by the three travel agencies in RVN be terminated at the earliest convenient date following the establishment of the PANAM system.

(U) On 3 April 1968, MACV advised CINCPAC and JCS that the proposed PANAM system was being implemented as directed, but the establishment of Joint Airlines Military Traffic Offices (JAMTOs) under these conditions would result in significant reduction of the level of service and create other disadvantages to the serviceman. Foremost among these was the possible loss of \$290,000 in exchange revenue. Also, MACV requested that PANAM be directed to establish additional offices to provide an acceptable level of service.

(U) PANAM proceeded to install the directed system and displaced the Civil Air Transport at the Tri-Service Air Traffic Coordinating Office (ATCO) location at Tan Son Nhut on 1 May 1968. PANAM purchased and installed teletype equipment and brought supervisory personnel into RVN to open offices on 1 June at Da Nang, Bien Hoa, Long Binh, and Cam Ranh Bay. The original MACV recommendation was considered the preferable solution. However, in view of the circumstances that had since occurred, there were no objections to the PANAM system if an acceptable level of service was provided and if there was a fare reduction to compensate for the loss of exchange revenue. In addition, since PANAM had installed certain equipment and provided some personnel for the new offices, they would have a legitimate complaint if the arrangement were to be terminated. Contracts with the original exchange concessionaires expired on 1 July.

(U) The advantage of buying tickets prior to departure for CONUS was financial. The one-third and one-half fare discount tickets could be obtained if the purchaser was qualified; i.e., they had to be on leave status, in uniform, and possessing a completed DD Form 1580. In addition, a saving of 5 percent federal tax was realized if the ticket was purchased in Vietnam.

(U) At the request of JCS, COMUSMACV commented on the PANAM operation of JAMTOs on 26 August 1968:

1. Where located, the quality of service provided by PANAM was, in general, superior to the former PACEX concessions.
2. Comparative sales data indicated that PANAM sales in July 1968 were slightly less than the former concession system. The early August trend indicated that this difference in sales volume might decrease.

# UNCLASSIFIED

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3. Component command comments indicated the service provided by PANAM in July 1968 was less convenient and accessible than the former concession service. MACV therefore recommended that PANAM be required and authorized to open sales locations at Chu Lai, Tuy Hoa, Pleiku, and Nha Trang, in order to provide an acceptable level of service consistent with the need for maintaining a minimum number of sales locations. However, at the end of the year, PANAM operated ticket offices at Da Nang, Long Binh, Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, and Tan Son Nhut. 45

### Postal Operations

(U) During 1968, a total of 83,602 tons of mail entered and left RVN. This represented a net decrease of 19 percent of 20,682 tons below that of 1967. Total stamp sales were \$7,326,779.10, a decrease of 12.7 percent under that of 1967. However, postal money order sales increased by some 23 percent, or \$67.4 million, to a record \$357,994,930.20. Eleven new APOs were opened, one was closed, and four new FPOs were opened during the year. 46

(U) In order to encourage early surface mailing by the public and thereby providing some measure of relief for airlift requirements during the extremely heavy Christmas holiday period and a savings in transportation costs to the government and the public, Adjutant General of the Army, in cooperation with the Post Office Department, formulated a plan to reserve cargo space aboard an MSTs-controlled ship to transport Christmas parcels to Vietnam. The ship, the SS Hunter Victory, was designated "The Santa Claus Special" and sailed from San Francisco on 22 November with an estimated 1.5 million pounds of packages. The ship off-loaded at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon, delivering over 500,000 packages, all of which were handled by Military Post Offices for delivery to addressees prior to Christmas. 47

(U) On 29 December 1967, COMUSMACV wrote CINCPAC proposing an amendment to PL 90-206. This law provided a convenient and inexpensive means of handling mail for servicemen and their families by the use of SAM and PAL. The law as written did not preclude the use of SAM and PAL mail by commercial firms. Because of this apparent oversight, approximately 65 percent of the SAM and PAL mail coming to Vietnam was destined for clubs, messes, exchanges, and contractors. The result was a slowdown of SAM and PAL mail for servicemen. In fact, the justifiable individual parcel had to compete for space with the ever-growing quantities of commercial mail.

(U) The Deputy Postmaster General, during a trip to Vietnam, discussed this problem with COMUSMACV who subsequently directed action be taken to resolve the problem. As an interim measure, the following actions were taken:

1. Establishment of a program of postal improvement objectives, one of which was the limitation on commercial use of SAM and PAL mail.
2. A message was dispatched to all component commands requesting assistance in limiting the use of SAM and PAL mail by clubs, messes, exchanges and contractors through supervision and requiring the aforementioned organizations to program and requisition supplies and equipment sufficiently in advance to permit surface movement. Periodical publications mailed to exchanges were not affected by the above restrictions. 48

## UNCLASSIFIED

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(U) In early June, Deputy CoS, 7AF Operations, requested that MACAG investigate the feasibility of transporting ordinary parcel post mail to CONUS via returning MAC C-141 aircraft. According to 7AF, there had been a problem of obtaining suitable retrograde cargo for return flights to CONUS and it appeared that personal mail, regardless of class, should carry a high enough priority to preclude any movement by surface transportation as long as there was available airlift capacity which was being wasted. MACV endorsed the idea of transporting mail which would provide a significant reduction in total transit time to addressees and took action to obtain the necessary approval, which had to be given by the CSAF and the AF Postal and Courier Service (AFPCS). The proposal was staffed by AF and coordinated with DOD. Coordination was necessary because of special rates and possible competition with scheduled commercial carrier service. In late November, special permission was given by the Assistant SECDEF for Logistics to use C-141 aircraft to carry all classes of mail from Vietnam and Thailand to all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Panama. <sup>49</sup>

### American Red Cross

(U) During 1968, the American Red Cross (ARC) personnel in RVN increased from 363 to approximately 400. Seven new field stations were opened and ARC personnel were placed in 20 hospital facilities, an increase of three over 1967 (See Figure XII-1).

(U) Service to Military Installations (SMI) Branch provided consultation and guidance on personal and family problems, financial assistance and emergency communications on behalf of servicemen and their families. During the year, the SMI staff increased to 194 personnel, 8 percent over that of 1967. This staff aided over 287,000 servicemen in 1968, an increase of 29 percent over that of 1967. A total of over 372,000 cables were sent during the year representing a 4 percent increase over the 1967 traffic flow. Over 4,000 servicemen received emergency interest-free loans or grants during 1968. The SMI Branch also confirmed over 46,000 emergency leaves and leave extensions.


(U) Service to Military Hospitals (SMH) Branch offered a program designed to help patients derive maximum benefit from hospital care by aiding in the solution of personal and family problems and by providing medically approved recreational facilities. At the end of the year, there were 52 ARC personnel serving at 20 hospital facilities in SVN. Nearly 19,000 hospitalized servicemen received direct ARC assistance. Of particular interest was the fact that over 5,000 hours of volunteer time were logged in these hospitals. The volunteers consisted mainly of civilian secretaries of government agencies and wives of certain civilian personnel living in-country.

(U) Supplemental Recreational Activities Office (SRAO) consisted of fixed recreation centers at base camps and clubmobile recreation visits to forward positions. At the end of the year, there were 17 such units in existence, a decrease of two from the 1967 total. This decrease was caused by a consolidation of facilities in two areas. The staff of young college women graduates increased from 107 in 1967 to 125 in 1968. Clubmobile visits and center functions totalled over 37,000 for the year and total attendance at these activities was estimated at 3.5 million. In addition to these activities, the SRAO staff served beverages on flight lines, job sites, and embarkation points and visited medical clearing and holding companies and hospitals.

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AMERICAN RED  
CROSS LOCATIONS  
IN SOUTH VIETNAM



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FIGURE XII-1

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(U) A number of on-going special programs were highly successful during the year. Among the most notable were:

1. Operation HELPMATE--The 20 military hospitals and the 17 SRAO units were individually adopted by an ARC Chapter and community in the US. The sponsoring chapters and communities provided books, records, party prizes, shower shoes, and special holiday decorations not normally available through requisition and local purchase.
2. Operation SHOP EARLY--Over 690,000 "dirty bags" filled with Christmas gifts from ARC Chapters and communities in CONUS were distributed to the military men and women in Vietnam.
3. Friendship Kits--Over 125,000 kits consisting of school supplies, hygienic items, and small gifts were compiled by ARC youths in the US and sent to RVN for distribution to children. This was part of the Junior ARC's "Hands Across the Waters" Program.
4. Program 45--Through this program, individuals, civic clubs, organizations, corporations, and Red Cross Chapters donated larger pieces of equipment for the recreation centers, hospitals, and clubmobiles. Such equipment included tape recorders, stereos, phonographs, cameras, and record stands.

(U) Another program undertaken in 1968 was the Red Cross Lifesaving and Water Safety Course. Courses were conducted at Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon. Units in the field sent groups of personnel to these courses and, upon satisfactory completion of the course, returned to their units to teach the course there. This proved most beneficial, especially to those units who were engaged in river and delta operations. <sup>50</sup>

### Chaplain

(U) The history of the Chaplaincy of the US Armed Forces reached some unprecedented landmarks and thresholds in 1968. From a concept which was conceived with the formulation of MACV, the first truly unified tri-service chaplains' office matured to offer professional and technical guidance and direction to some 350 Army, Navy, and Air Force chaplains serving in Vietnam. The spiritual objective of this joint effort was the same as the objectives of each service: to bring the message, comforts, and rites of the Church to the battlefield. This joint endeavor permitted the mission to be accomplished more effectively.

(U) For the first time in military history, a true concept of "area religious coverage" was a reality in its three dimensions of denomination, branch of service, and geography. Of essence in this concept was that a Jewish chaplain of any branch of service provided all the rites of his faith to Jewish personnel of all branches of the Armed Forces in a given geographical area. A Catholic and Protestant Chaplain did the same for all members of their faiths. Among the dividends which were derived from implementation of this concept were:

1. Assurance that each individual serving in Vietnam was provided with an opportunity for worship, sacraments, and spiritual counselling if he desired these services;
2. Amelioration of the impact of transportation problems incident to geographical

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dispersion of units, denial of roads to secure surface movement, and high priority tactical requirements for available helicopter lift;

3. A precedent for cooperation between the chaplains of the three services which would serve as a pattern for further joint efforts.

(U) While statistics were not valid indicators of the spiritual health of a command, they did serve to measure the degree of effort expended for this purpose. In 1968 the average chaplain conducted 6.5 worship services each week. Approximately 20 to 25 percent of the military personnel availed themselves of the opportunity to attend a worship service each week.

(U) Three additional chaplains sacrificed their lives in the service of their nation in Vietnam in 1968, bringing to ten the number who have died in Vietnam since December 1964.

(U) A hallmark in the history of the Armed Forces Chaplaincy occurred in 1968 when the Medal of Honor was awarded to Chaplain (Captain) Angelo J. Liteky, Jr; US Army. It was the first Medal of Honor awarded to a chaplain in Vietnam, and the second in modern military history to be awarded to a chaplain, the other being a Navy Chaplain in World War II.

(U) The spiritual life of the command was stimulated by the presence in Vietnam at the Christmas season of two great leaders of the US religious community. Doctor Billy Graham made his second visit to Vietnam, the first being for Christmas in 1966. The Most Reverend Terence J. Cook, Archbishop of New York and Military Vicar to Catholic Armed Forces personnel made his first visit, continuing a precedent for annual Christmas visits begun by his predecessor, the late Archbishop Cardinal Spellman. The itinerary of each was arranged so that they could minister to the maximum number of military personnel.

(U) In addition to the role of spiritual leadership, the chaplains of MACV and the FVMAF participated in the nation-building work in RVN. Through the efforts of the chaplains and generosity of the members of the military parishes, more than a quarter million dollars were contributed in direct aid for such community projects as repair or rebuilding of temples, churches, schools, hospitals, nurseries, and orphanages, and much more was donated in locally sponsored projects. The thrust of this effort was to foster the Judeo-Christian concept of "love of neighbor" to ameliorate the enmities and suspicions which divided the religious factions in Vietnam. No statistics were kept on the great amount of donation in kind which was given by individuals through chaplains for this purpose. These donations in kind included books, clothing, medicines, toys, food, and medical equipment.

(U) In this connection, US chaplains in all parts of Vietnam gave direct support in the area of professional and technical assistance of the RVNAF chaplains. This assistance ranged from guidance provided by the MACV Command Chaplain and the MACJ3 PSYOP Chaplain to the three Vietnamese Chaplaincy Directorates to the communication and exchange of ideas between the RVNAF chaplains at the lowest echelon and the Advisory chaplains in the CTZs. This resulted in at least a degree of pulpit and altar exchange between US and RVNAF chaplains.

(U) The chaplain strength at the end of 1968 was as follows: 51

## UNCLASSIFIED

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	<u>PROTESTANT</u>	<u>CATHOLIC</u>	<u>JEWISH</u>
USAF	30	16	0
USN	67	31	0
USA	<u>307</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	404	142	4

## The USO

(U) In June 1968, COMUSMACV summed up the mission and accomplishments of the USO in RVN as follows:

The United Service Organizations, Inc. has established clubs in Vietnam to supplement and assist in programs for the furtherance of the religious, spiritual, social, welfare, and educational needs of military personnel. Officially, it is the United Service Organizations, Inc., but to millions of Americans who have worn the military uniform it is known simply as the USO. They can personally vouch for the vital job the USO is doing in Vietnam through maintaining the morale and well-being of our servicemen serving in this distant country.

In the Republic of Vietnam today there are 15 USO facilities operating in far flung sites an average of twelve hours a day. Total participation at the 15 facilities was 548,000 for the month of April 1968, or an average of more than one visit per serviceman in-country. That is a remarkable record. The USO is indeed providing a little bit of home away from home for the troops.

In addition to the facilities provided by the USO, through the National USO Headquarters in the US and the USO Hollywood Overseas Committee, arrangements are made for frequent tours by the nation's foremost entertainers. This effort is appreciated by the troops.

I consider the USO one of the greatest morale boosters we have in Vietnam.

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(U) The USO began the year with fourteen clubs (See 1967 MACV Command History for a listing) and added one more during the year at Can Tho. The USO staff rose from 47 at the beginning of the year to 52 at the year's end. Over 7.3 million servicemen availed themselves of the USO facilities in-country during 1966.<sup>53</sup>

### Entertainment

(U) Professional entertainers and other celebrities were provided to the troops in RVN on a regular basis by the USO, in conjunction with the Hollywood Overseas Committee. They were sponsored by DOD and traveled under DOD invitational travel orders as GS-15 equivalents. In-country, they were accorded a priority II for air travel.

(U) After-action reports rendered by escort officers for these tours and exit interviews conducted with entertainers reflected a pattern of difficulties which indicated a lack of coordination, attention, and common courtesy. This was evidenced in failures to meet and assist these entertainers, delay and difficulty in obtaining air and ground transportation, the absence of prior arrangements for billets and staging when required, and in perfunctory treatment.

(U) In this connection, COMUSMACV directed commanders at all levels to insure that:<sup>54</sup>

1. Professional entertainers were met and assisted in each location visited.
2. Adequate air and ground transportation was provided with the least possible delay consistent with operational necessity.
3. Close liaison and coordination was maintained on performance and transportation schedules in order to provide for maximum utilization of the performers' time.
4. Show times for scheduled flights were minimized and entertainers were offered the use of the most comfortable facilities available during periods when waiting was required.
5. The best available billeting, messing, and staging facilities, where required, were provided.
6. Professional entertainers were handled with courtesy at all times and were accorded the treatment due persons of GS-15 equivalent ratings.
7. The professional entertainment program was given the necessary command supervision to insure its effective functioning.

(U) Of further concern to COMUSMACV was the large number of entertainers and similar groups in-country without any official status with the USG. As of mid-August, available information reflected an in-country commercial entertainment population of 50 registered commercial booking agents and 900 entertainers, comprising 80 entertainment groups and representing individuals from 17 different countries, all without any official status with the USG. Generally, the stature of these units and the quality of entertainment provided were not comparable to that of units provided by DOD and the support, status, handling, and prestige accorded these commercial groups could not be allowed to approximate that accorded USO entertainers and personalities.

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(U) In this regard, MACV directed that continuing attention be given to maintaining the distinction between DOD/USO sponsored professional entertainers and entertainers in-country on commercial ventures, since the stature and prestige of the USO program was well established and enviable. 55

(U) During 1968, there were 54 DOD/USO sponsored shows and 16 military touring shows in-country. Among the more notable professional shows to entertain in-country were the perennial Bob Hope Christmas Show, the Martha Raye Show, and the Johnny Grant Show. 56

### DISCIPLINE, LAW, AND ORDER

#### General

(C) Discipline, law, and order remained high on COMUSMACV's list of priority items during 1968. Of particular interest to him was the conduct of US forces in SVN, especially with regard to relations with the Vietnamese. In this connection, COMUSMACV reiterated policy guidance in this area on 31 August when he stated:

Recent untoward reaction by US Forces personnel to situations involving contact with Vietnamese citizens and their property show that some of our personnel either do not understand or are not concerned about the relationship between personal attitudes of US Forces personnel and the goals which we are seeking to help this country attain. The constant rotation of personnel makes it necessary for all levels of command to indoctrinate our personnel on these matters. We must be certain that each man is capable of an appropriate individual reaction when confronted by potentially explosive circumstances involving Vietnamese Nationals.

Fundamental to our progress in accomplishing our long-term mission in Vietnam is a realization by every person that his actions are directly and vitally related to the success of our effort. We must display patience, understanding, and perseverance in our tasks. Only if each of us complies with the laws, regulations, and customs of both countries can we effectively assist Vietnam in achieving her rightful place among nations. The people of Vietnam have a long history of opposing foreign domination. We work toward the day when they will again be self-sustaining in their efforts. The difficulties imposed by language and cultural differences must not impede the success of our mission. 57

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#### Summary Courts-Martial in Saigon

(C) A Staff study was conducted during the early part of the year to determine if it would be feasible to establish Summary Courts-Martial in Saigon to handle minor offenses as they occurred. One reason for the study stemmed from complaints voiced by the NP that the US was not taking action against US personnel for offenses committed in Saigon and that the establishment of a Saigon Summary Court-Martial was considered to be one method of "advertising" to the GVN that the US was, in fact, taking appropriate action. After thorough study, it was concluded that a Summary Court-Martial in Saigon would not be feasible from practical and equitable standpoints because:<sup>58</sup>

1. 24-hour representation would be required from all services for a Summary Court-Martial and convening authority.
2. Individual consideration could not be given to each accused's case.
3. The accused's commander could not be consulted in each case.
4. The administrative requirements and inconvenience to witnesses would create more immediate delays and losses of productive work-time than experienced in current procedures.
5. The potential decreased morale of personnel would offset any benefits gained.
6. A satisfactory system for informing Vietnamese authorities of actions taken already existed through the Community Relations Council.

#### Courts-Martial of US Civilians

(C) Early in 1968, the AMEMB Saigon requested a blanket approval to request waivers of the GVN primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over US civilians. Up to this time, requests for waivers were submitted on an individual basis. On 21 March, SECSTATE refused to grant this blanket authorization and said that the sole purpose of limiting requests for waivers to cases in which referral to court-martial was made was to reduce the number of waiver requests to a minimum and thereby reduce the visibility and apparent magnitude of the USG exercise of jurisdiction over US civilians.<sup>59</sup>

(C) USARV Hq, in August, received reports involving an alleged theft of large quantities of USG property by C. A. Bramum, an employee of Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E). The property included a 2 1/2 ton truck, roadroller, a semi-trailer, a 20 ton mobile crane, a 10 to 12 1/2 ton crane, a front end loader, numerous truck tires and tubes, truck motors, and other automotive parts. Value of the items was determined to be between \$100,000 and \$150,000. Bramum was picked up at the Tokyo airport on 20 August and returned to Vietnam on 23 August. Upon arrival, he was charged with conspiracy to commit larceny, larceny of government property, wrongful disposition of government property, and disobedience of a lawful general regulation. He was placed in pre-trial confinement at the USARV Stockade in Long Binh.<sup>60</sup>

(C) On 21 September the AMEMB Saigon requested permission to seek waiver of jurisdiction from the GVN. Basis for this request was that the GVN was not likely to want to

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prosecute since no Vietnamese Nationals were involved. Branum was a Category I civilian and therefore subject to the UCMJ. The SJA, Hq Engr Trp RVN (Prov), indicated that there was adequate and competent evidence to sustain a conviction in the case. <sup>61</sup>

(C) Although STATE agreed that the magnitude of the case rendered it significant and one in which prosecution ought to ensue, it was felt that it was not one for which STATE wished to grant authorization to AMEMB Saigon to request waiver of jurisdiction. STATE felt that this was one case which GVN should be urged to act on and requested AMEMB to strongly encourage this. However, if this failed, STATE said consideration would be given to initiating prosecution in a Federal district court in the US when and if Branum should decide to return or be brought to the US. <sup>62</sup>

(C) As requested, AMEMB contacted the GVN Minister of Justice in mid-October. The Minister stated that the GVN would not take jurisdiction over Branum since there were no Vietnamese involved and the property allegedly stolen belong to the USG. Based on this information, STATE requested AMEMB to look into extradition possibilities. AMEMB stated that extradition would be possible if the USG issued a warrant for Branum's arrest on a charge which would also be an offense against the laws of Vietnam. Also, a Federal marshal could take custody of Branum in Vietnam. <sup>63</sup>

(C) On 17 December, COMUSMACV requested SECDEF assistance in obtaining SECSTATE approval to proceed with the case or be provided disposition instructions. On 21 December, CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's request and stated that trial by court-martial was legally and reasonably the proper course of action and again recommended that permission to request waiver be authorized. At the end of the year, the Branum case was still open and the requested permission still had not been granted. <sup>64</sup>

(C) There were two significant cases involving civilians dealing in illegal currency manipulation during 1968. These were the Morris Case and the Johnson Case. The Johnson Case was perhaps the more significant of the two since it also involved a US military person, a USMC Gunnery Sergeant, who was allegedly in collusion with Johnson. Johnson, a senior employee of PANAM, was a Category I civilian and AMEMB Saigon requested permission to seek a waiver of GVN jurisdiction on the basis that the AF Judge Advocate was of the opinion that a conviction could be sustained in a court-martial. His opinion was based on OSI and NISO investigations. However, SECSTATE refused to grant permission to request a waiver on the grounds that, although the charge was in violation of a MACV directive, the crux of the charges was that Johnson allegedly possessed US currency in Vietnam and the case should be of primary interest to the GVN. The GVN customs officials were subsequently notified of the availability of Johnson for prosecution. But the local customs officials declined to exercise jurisdiction and Johnson escaped any punishment by either US or GVN authorities. In separate action, the USMC Gunnery Sergeant was tried by court-martial and found guilty, reduced in grade, and lost a certain amount of his pay and allowances. The Morris case paralleled Johnson's and he also escaped any penalties. <sup>65</sup>

(U) Throughout the year, coordination continued with the Embassy and other Mission agencies on the general questions of rights, benefits, and responsibilities accorded US citizens and TCNs sponsored by US agencies and instrumentalities in Vietnam. A representative of the MACV SJA Division established the necessary procedures with COMUSMACV THAI relative to the reciprocity or withdrawal of privileges of civilians who are found to have engaged to various

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forms of criminal activity. Procedures were further instituted whereby the withdrawal of privileges would also result in a discharge from or a bar to further employment in the area. These administrative procedures for the control of civilian conduct became necessary because of the inability of the military to effectively exercise criminal jurisdiction under the provisions of the UCMJ. State Department policies denied the military other than administrative remedies for such offenses. Other instances of criminal conduct by civilian offenders resulted in requests to the State Department to obtain waivers of Vietnamese jurisdiction. 66

(U) On the positive side, there were some authorizations granted to request a GVN waiver during the year. The most notable of these were the Latney Case (See 1967 Command History), which involved murder, and the Averrette Case which involved larceny. In both cases jurisdiction was waived by the GVN. 67

### Marihuana and Narcotics

(U) Allegations of widespread use of marihuana by US troops in Vietnam began to appear in the US press and other news media in the fall of 1967. Unsubstantiated claims that as many as 75 or 80 percent of the US troops in Vietnam were using marihuana understandably caused concern at the highest government levels. As a result of a study, it was determined that marihuana grew in all areas of Vietnam. It was cheap and readily available from peddlers, street urchins, taxi and cycle drivers, and prostitutes. Marihuana showed up wherever there was a concentration of US troops. However, there was no credible evidence or indication that the enemy was trying to subvert or demoralize US forces by pushing the use of marihuana or that the use of marihuana had an, measurable impact on the health, welfare, morale, efficiency, or combat effectiveness of the troops in Vietnam. The enemy's main interest was concentrated on selling marihuana so as to derive revenue for their cause.

(U) The main deterrent to the use of marihuana was command emphasis from COMUSMACV down through the chain of command to the lowest echelon. All commanders and troops were educated as to the dangers to health and criminal penalties involved in the use of marihuana and utilized all means at their disposal to discourage the use of, or experimentation with, marihuana. Efforts to curb its use was a continuing program of high priority. e

(U) In mid-1968, a special CID team was successful in locating and identifying what was considered to be a primary source of marihuana in Vietnam. They were able to learn that, in some areas of the Delta region, marihuana was under cultivation as a regular crop by the local natives. An investigation indicated that this product was destined for ultimate sale to and use by US forces personnel. The assistance and cooperation of the GVN was sought at the ambassadorial level to permanently rid the countryside of marihuana. 68

(U) Instructions were also issued to all province chiefs to eliminate the cultivation of marihuana in their province. In October, the GVN publically condemned trafficking in, and use of, marihuana and opium. As of the end of the year, plans were made to expand the Vietnamese Narcotics Bureau and to initiate a corporate US/GVN effort aimed at suppressing the availability of marihuana and narcotics in RVN. Also, the US Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was sending an agent to RVN to provide professional assistance in suppression efforts. 69

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(U) Another area where marihuana became a major problem in 1968 was in the R&R program. While processing through customs at R&R centers, notably Sydney and Hong Kong, quantities of marihuana were discovered. (For a more detailed discussion of this problem, refer to the Morale and Welfare section elsewhere in this chapter.)

(U) During the year, the marihuana rate of involvement rose from 1.3 per thousand to 4.5 per thousand. In numbers, there were 194 cases in January and 523 cases in December. However, the rising rate was attributed more to increased command emphasis and increased enforcement effort than to an increase in actual use.

(U) Involvement with opium and hard narcotics was, and continued to be, very low throughout the country. Involvement rate for opium in January was .003 per thousand (one case) and in December .068 per thousand (15 cases). Hard narcotics involvement rates were .00 (no cases) in January and .36 per thousand (138 cases) in December 1968. <sup>70</sup>

Black Market/Currency Control

(U) During the year, there was an increasing number of commodity and currency violators in-country who had been identified by US forces investigative efforts. End of the year statistics were as follows:

	<u>Commodity violators</u>	<u>Currency violators</u>
Army	139	42
Navy	17	49
Air Force	23	20
Marines	41	23
US Civilians	12	105
TOTAL	<u>232</u>	<u>239</u>

It was speculated that, although the numbers represented an increase over previous years, this increase was attributed to better and more effective investigation efforts than to an actual increase in violators. In other words, the number of violators did not increase appreciably. It was simply that more of them were being caught. <sup>71</sup>

Military Payment Certificate (MPC) Conversion

(C) On 21 October 1968, in a move which was planned with the utmost of secrecy and security, a new series of MPC (Series 661) was exchanged for the old (and invalid) 641 Series. Series 641 MPC was introduced into Vietnam in August 1965 and had been in use since that time. This was the first conversion of MPC in the Vietnam theater. In addition, this conversion was the first involving other FWMAF. This conversion was necessary in order to insure that only authorized personnel possessed the MPCs. Available data indicated \$276,931,802.50 was accounted for or converted by authorized personnel. This left a balance of \$6,227,597.50 not converted. The major portion of the unconverted 641 Series MPC was presumed to be in the hands

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of unauthorized possessors: Vietnamese Customs officials, black market money changers, and other Vietnamese Nationals. 72

## PRISONERS OF WAR

### US/FWMAF Prisoners

#### General

(C) The USG was a party to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. There were four separate Conventions. Number I was for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick of armed forces in the field. Number II was for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea. Number III provided for treatment of prisoners of war. Number IV provided for the protection of civilians. The United States considered the armed conflict in Vietnam to be international in character. Accordingly, all articles of all four Geneva Conventions were applicable. However, the enemy, North and South, refused to acknowledge that the Geneva Prisoner of War Conventions applied. Most captured US personnel held in NVN and all held in SVN were kept carefully isolated from outside contacts in gross violation of Geneva Prisoner of War Convention (GPW). No reports were made to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) concerning captured US personnel; neutral agency inspections were not allowed; regular mail channels had never been established; US PWs had been held up to public ridicule and otherwise used for political purposes, all in violation of terms and spirit of international law. The ICRC traditionally avoided, as much as possible, direct public confrontation with any government and therefore had avoided outright public pressure on the enemy. Hanoi's claim that they were not involved in the conflict in the South, combined with ICRC knowledge (but not public recognition) that they were indeed deeply involved in the South, served to cause more than the usual ICRC care in avoiding criticism of the enemy. ICRC efforts were aimed toward aiding captured US personnel in all possible unobtrusive ways while, at the same time, maintaining a basis for dialogue with Hanoi when necessary.

(C) Some captured US personnel in NVN had been allowed to write directly by international mail to their families using a special Hanoi address. Other mail was sent via the American Red Cross (ARC) either to ICRC in Geneva or NLF representatives in Algiers. Almost all packages destined for PWs in NVN were returned, via Moscow, with the notation "refused by NVN postal service." No concrete information was available on the fate of the packages sent via Cambodia to PWs in SVN.

(C) The year's activities, coordinated by means of the DOD PW Policy Committee, were aimed toward encouraging the enemy to accord GPW required treatment to captured US personnel; specifically, causing the enemy to establish regular reports on PW status, allowing neutral agency inspection, and unilaterally repatriating seriously sick and wounded PWs. 73

#### PWs Released by VC/NVA

(C) The first PW release of the year by North Vietnam was announced on 27 January 1968 when they said they would release three American pilots captured in the North. The initial

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announcement did not identify the pilots or say where they would be released. On 29 January a further announcement from Hanoi identified the prisoners as Captain John David Black, Major Norris Miller Overly, and Ensign David Paul Matheny. North Vietnam said that they were releasing the pilots because they "had shown a repentant attitude during the period of detention." The Hanoi broadcast said that this was in keeping with its "humanitarian and lenient policy." Two representatives from an American peace committee left on 31 January 1968 on the first leg of the flight to Hanoi to pick up the three pilots. Howard Zinn, a professor of government at Boston University, and the Reverend Daniel Berrigan, a Jesuit priest serving as an instructor of religion at Cornell University, had been selected for the journey by the above mentioned committee to send representatives "to receive them". There had been an earlier report that Hanoi was seeking representatives of an American peace group to release the prisoners to. In a similar action on 11 November 1967, North Vietnam had turned over three prisoners to US peace representatives at Phnom Penh, Cambodia.<sup>74</sup>

(C) Upon the arrival of the ICG plane at Vientiane on 16 February, the released pilots stated a preference for travel by US military aircraft rather than by commercial means. Some delay in their departure was experienced due to "dialectic diddling" by Zinn and Berrigan. The crux of the discussion was the fact that the North Vietnamese authorities at Gia Lam had told the pilots that they preferred that they accompany Zinn and Berrigan on commercial aircraft and "indicated" their action would have bearing upon their decisions with respect to the release of other prisoners. It was clear that Zinn and Berrigan had played very heavily upon this feature in their conversations with the released pilots during the flight from Hanoi to Vientiane. They had indeed already obtained agreement from the trio that they would go by commercial air. The choice of the mode of travel was left entirely up to the decision of the pilots. However, AMEMB Vientiane made it clear that their Services had expressed a positive preference for their travel by military air. Berrigan characterized this statement as "intolerable pressure" and began a filibuster which lasted for thirty minutes after the pilots had all expressed a choice in favor of military air.

(C) The pilots pleaded with Zinn and Berrigan to go with them on the Attache aircraft, but the latter refuse, partly as a form of pressure on the pilots to reverse their decision and partly as a matter of principle. When the pilots nevertheless chose the Attache plane, both Zinn and Berrigan advised that they felt compelled to tell the press that pressure had been used and that the agreement they had with the State Department had been broken and had "destroyed the basis of the past two week's work". Zinn and Berrigan held a press conference in which they aired their charges against the AMEMB Vientiane. It was unfortunate that the squabble took place in the way that it did. Zinn had been prepared to accept the pilots' decision as equitable when it was made, but Berrigan emotionally balked, and because of his vociferous protest, the matter ended as it did.<sup>75</sup>

(C) In after-action consideration, it was interesting to speculate on the reasons behind Hanoi's action in selecting the three particular pilots chosen for release. Hanoi had reacted to earlier US needling about prisoners by the release of staged photographs such as those which appeared in Life Magazine in the summer of 1967. The free world rejection of these photos (e.g., Amb Harrimans's statement that they were "travesty") struck home and caused them to decide to release some prisoners who would bear out their statements about good treatment, etc. Three pilots shot down after the "travesty" reaction were then selected, given good treatment, and otherwise prepared for release at Tet. The intention of Hanoi was to thus document its earlier photo claims by human evidence.

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(C) This speculation led to two hypothetical conclusions. These were that Hanoi was sensitive to meddling and that their claims should be further tested by asking for the release of pilots shot down before their staged photos. <sup>76</sup>

(C) In the second release of the year, Hanoi International Service on 30 March 1968 stated that the People's Revolutionary Committee of Thua-Thien-Hue had decided to release "before 1 April 1968", Sandra Johnson, described as a member of the International Voluntary Services (IVS), and Marjorie Nelson, described as "doctress." The final paragraph of the communique stressed that "USG and the Saigon stooge administration must bear full responsibility for insuring the safety of Sandra Johnson and Marjorie Nelson on their way back to their families." All appropriate US and GVN military and civilian officials in I CTZ were notified to ensure that all echelons were alerted to the expected appearance of the two women, presumably in the Thua-Thien-Hue area. The communique gave no information about their health. <sup>77</sup>

(U) The women had been captured during the battle for Hue and had remained in VC hands for about 52 days until their release during the evening of 31 March 1968. The NVA, accompanied by VC, escorted the women to a private home north of Hue off Highway 1. After instructing the family to care for the women for the night feed them in the morning, and escort them to Hue, the NVA then departed.

(U) On the morning of 1 April, the family fed the women, took them to the main highway, and put them on a commercial bus headed for Hue. Not being sure who had control of Hue at that time, the women left the bus at a small shopping market just on the outskirts of Hue. Upon leaving the bus they noticed a US military sentry whom they approached and requested assistance in getting to US control. They were immediately escorted to the MACV compound in Hue. From there they were flown to Phu Bai, and then to the 12th USAF Hospital at Cam Ranh Bay where they were immediately given a medical check and found to be in excellent health. The intelligence briefing commenced on 2 April 1968. The women were very cooperative and were willing to discuss all the events leading up to their capture, conduct during their confinement, and of other US personnel they had contacted there. <sup>78</sup>

(U) The next prisoner release by the North Vietnamese did not take place until 3 July and was heralded by an announcement stating that "the General Political Department of the Vietnamese People's Army has decided to release three US pilots captured in NVN." On 8 July a further announcement from Paris stated that:

The three American Pilots the North Vietnamese Government decided to release last 3 July may be handed over to American pacifists who are going to Hanoi for this purpose immediately, according to a good source in Paris. These American pacifists, three in number, will leave for the North Vietnamese capital via Bangkok and Vientiane, where they will take the International Control Commission plane that is a link to Hanoi. The American pacifists may be Ann Scheer, Vernon Grizzard, and Steward Meacham who are now in Paris. <sup>79</sup>

The escorts left Paris on 12 July and were in fact Mrs. Anne Scheer of Berkeley, California, the wife of Robert Scheer, Editor of Ramparts magazine, Vernon Grizzard, an antidraft organizer

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from Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Steward Meacham of Philadelphia, secretary of the American Friends Service Committee. The names of the men to be released were Major James Frederick Low, age 43, captured 16 December 1967; Major Fred Neale Thompson, age 32, captured 20 March 1968; and Captain Joe Victor Carpenter, age 37, captured 15 February 1968.

(S) Ambassador Harriman informed the SECSTATE that he had been approached by [ ] of the NVN delegation in Paris and who, in reply to a question from the AMEMB, stated that the men were in good health. The AMEMB expressed gratitude for the release and disappointment that some of the men who had been injured or held for a long time had not also been released. [ ] said that since the three Americans who would escort them had arrived in Hanoi, thought that they would be released within a few days. [ ] noted that the three civilians had told him the same thing when he saw them in Paris, and that he had explained that the pilots, when they reached Vientiane, would be free to decide for themselves the manner of return, whether by military-medical aircraft or commercial airline. In order to ascertain whether [ ] was expressing his government's preference or those of the peace group, Harriman specifically asked him if his government had expressed any preference on the manner in which the pilots returned to the US. He replied "not yet" and added that one could be sure that the North Vietnamese policy towards injured was humane. [ ] also stated that it was the desire of the three civilians to escort the pilots back to the US; otherwise they would go back empty-handed. He was informed that the civilians could return with the pilots on a military plane if they wished to do so and that they had been so informed.

(U) On 18 July there was a press story datelined Hanoi that reported the release of the three pilots at a ceremony inside the city prison camp. According to the story, the prison director read the decision of the Army's General Political Bureau ordering their release, which he said was "inspired by the policy of humanity and clemency." The three pilots expressed their thanks and those of their families for the gesture and for their treatment in the prison camp. It was reported that Captain Carpenter promised, "When I return to the USA, I will explain the attitude of the independence and unification of Vietnam against US aggressors." The other two were reported to have made similar statements. Asked his opinion on the war, Major Thompson said, "It has caused a lot of disruption and cost a lot of lives on both sides. That is why it must be ended as soon as possible. My first task will be to inform my family of this." Major Low said "I believe that the Vietnamese people want peace and I am certain that the US people want it too. We think we should work for such peace around the world." Captain Carpenter added, "I know that the great majority of US people do not want war. My first move will be to return to my family. Then I plan to inform the US people of the way I was treated by the Vietnamese people and their attitude toward the war."

(C) The ICC flight landed at Vientiane as expected on 19 July but the pilots were not aboard. AMB Sullivan reported that he had "eyeballed" the aircraft cabin to be sure there was no effort at a "smuggle in." The mystery as to the delay was not solved, but on 21 July an American Friends Service Committee worker reported that the departure from Hanoi had been delayed for one week. Speculation suggested that, since there was only one ICC flight between Hanoi and Vientiane weekly, the pilots would arrive on the 2 August flight, which in fact they did. Upon their arrival they elected to travel to the US by commercial airline, in spite of the fact that they would not be able to leave until the next day. 80

(C) During Tet, 1968, the VC captured an Australian civilian, Keith Hyland, in the Cholon area, along with one other civilian. On 25 November, he was released in Phnom Penh for the year's fourth release. At his debriefing, he said that there were three other civilians who were

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held in captivity with him near the Cambodian border but, he said, they had been released in July. However, there is no record of any of the other three being released.<sup>81</sup>

(C) The last prisoner release of the year commenced when two Liberation Radio broadcasts occurred on 19 December 1968 announcing that US prisoners would be released and requesting US representatives to meet with People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) representatives to discuss the release. The second broadcast, in the name of the Eastern Nam Bo Military Zone of PLAF, proposed five unarmed representatives from each side meet at 1500 Saigon time on 25 December 1968 at a location 9 km south of Tay Ninh City. Guidance from SECSTATE indicated that the US would respond positively to the PLAF broadcasts. AMEMB Saigon proposed that the discussions for prisoner releases take place at the Paris Talks in order to avoid ceremonies which would enhance the status of the local military commanders in the field to settle the issue and SECSTATE directed this latter approach be taken.

(C) The political sensitivity of meeting with the PLAF dictated careful preparation for the discussion. After coordinating with AMEMB Saigon, COMUSMACV directed CG, II FFORCEV to prepare appropriate plans and to form a five man team to meet the PLAF representatives. The teams was to consist of a team Chief (LTC), assistant team chief (MAJ), interpreter (US), communications officer/NCO and medical officer/aidman. The other major subordinate commanders were also directed to form similar teams for possible future prisoner release operations. An Armed Forces Vietnam Network broadcast on 21 December announced that representatives of II FFORCEV would meet with representatives of the opposing forces at the date, time, and location specified in the enemy broadcast.

(C) The meeting began as scheduled on 25 December and terminated at about 1730H. There were approximately 30 enemy observed in the area, including the five man team, 12 of whom were apparently guards and three or four were photographers who took pictures throughout the meeting. Others were unidentified.

(C) The meeting dissolved over the issue of whether the representatives would sit down and engage in amenities and undefined discussion. Protocol conditions were the main themes which the PLAF representatives addressed as pre-conditions to discussion for the release of the prisoners. The II FFORCEV Team Chief, following guidance given him by MACV and AMEMB Saigon, refused to engage in amenities and attempted to discuss details pertinent only to the release of the prisoners. As a result, the prisoners were not released and the enemy representatives refused to set a time and place for the release or even to discuss it.

(C) At the debriefing session, it was concluded that the meeting was inconclusive and the enemy gave no firm indications that they would in fact release the prisoners; there were inferences that further meetings would be requested by radio broadcast. It was also suggested that in the future:

1. A firm stand by the team chief was desirable but that he should have more latitude in responding to procedural matters, such as whether or not to sit during discussions.
2. The five-man prisoner release teams for each subordinate command might be required and each should have a highly qualified interpreter.
3. A press pool and helicopter should be available so that the US press could be brought quickly to the meeting site if it were found that the enemy press was present or if the

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enemy team posed no objection to the presence of the US press even though no enemy press was in the area.

(C) On 28 December 1968, the Liberation Radio again announced the desire of the PLAF to meet again with representatives of US forces to discuss the release of three US prisoners. The meeting was requested for 0900 Saigon time on 1 January 1969 at the same location as before and a US/RVN/FWMAF 72 hour truce was demanded to coincide with the announced PLAF New Year truce.

(C) The approach used for the Christmas Day meeting was again adopted; that is, a low key meeting of local military commanders in the field to effect the release of the prisoners. Plans for the meeting were carefully prepared and thoroughly coordinated with AMEMB Saigon. Guidance for the II FFORCEV team was revised and provided the team chief with more latitude in responding to procedural matters.

(C) COMUSMACV dispatched a message to CG, II FFORCEV directing that appropriate plans be made and a five man team composed as before meet with the PLAF representatives as requested. A safe corridor from the Cambodian border to the meeting site was also established. A qualified photographer was included in the team and a plan was made to bring in four members of the US press to the meeting site. The press was to be called in at the discretion of the II FFORCEV team chief if the enemy press was present or, in the absence of the enemy press, if the PLAF team chief did not strongly object to the presence of US press.

(C) An AFVN radio broadcast of 30 December 1968 announced the CG, II FFORCEV intention to meet with the PLAF representatives as requested. CG, II FFORCEV did not accept the demand for the 72 hour New Years truce; instead, safe conduct was assured the PLAF team in specified zones from 0600 Saigon time on New Years' Day until three hours after termination of the meeting.

(C) The meeting began as scheduled on 1 January 1969 and the PLAF representatives agreed to release the prisoners at the site. After a one hour recess the prisoners were turned over to the II FFORCEV team at 1055H. The released persons were PFC Donald G. Smith USA, SP4 Thomas N. Jones USA, and SP4 James W. Brigham USA.

(C) Upon arrival of the II FFORCEV team, 15 enemy press personnel began taking pictures. The plan to bring in the US press was implemented and the members of the press, both US and enemy, remained in the area throughout the discussions and release of the prisoners. No significant press problems developed at the meeting.

(C) There was apparently a definite change of attitude on the part of the enemy representatives. When the II FFORCEV team chief stated he was not prepared to sit down for the discussions, the enemy accepted this and remained willing to release the prisoners. The enemy stated four conditions for the release:

1. The prisoners must be removed from Vietnam expeditiously.
2. The announced humanitarian purpose of the PLAF for releasing the prisoners must not be distorted.
3. The prisoners must be treated humanely.

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4. The safety of the PLAF representatives must be assured as stated in the AFVN broadcast of 30 December 1968.

(C) The II FFORCEV team chief readily agreed verbally to the first and fourth conditions but stated that the second condition was not clear and that the third condition was completely superfluous since the US Army always treats all persons humanely.

(C) At the debriefing session, it was concluded that:

1. The approach followed in meeting the PLAF representatives informally in the field is sound.
2. The careful planning and preparation for the meetings indicated the desirability of establishing and orienting prisoner release teams in each of the major subordinate commands for possible future prisoner release meetings under similar conditions.
3. The political sensitivity of the meetings with the PLAF requires specific guidance for the prisoner release teams. New guidance, based on the experience gained, would be developed for use by prisoner release teams in any part of South Vietnam. This guidance, when coordinated with AMEMB Saigon, would be proposed for distribution to major subordinate commanders.
4. There was a need for a highly qualified US interpreter on each prisoner release team. The level of competence of the interpreter should permit him to understand asides and inferences made by the enemy representatives. There was a need to establish a readily identifiable group of such qualified personnel for possible use in prisoner release meetings. 82

### Cambodian Detainees

(U) During 1968, the Royal Khmer Government (RKG) of Cambodia detained and released 14 Americans (one American was released in early 1969) and a Filipino tugboat crew in two separate incidents.

(C) The first occasion involved the US Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) chartered tugboat BREAM which was piloted and manned by Philippine Nationals and had two US MPs on board as a security detail. On 20 May 1968, the boat was proceeding upstream on the Mekong River from My Thoun, RVN to Tan Chau, RVN, at which time they were to turn and enter the Hau Giang River, following it downstream to Long Xuyen where they planned to spend the night. The BREAM had expected to pick up a River Patrol Boat (PBR) as an escort but, because the PBR did not appear, she sailed independently. At approximately 1500 hours, the MPs observed a gun boat, similar to a Vietnamese PBR, proceeding to midstream from the southern bank of the river, toward the BREAM. At a distance of approximately 200 yards, the MPs noticed that the gun boat had two 50 cal. MGs pointed at the BREAM and the crew was motioning the tug to southern bank of the river. Fifteen irregularly uniformed troops on the river bank motioned the MPs and crew off the boat as it approached the bank. The troops were armed with AK-47s and US carbines and were led by a junior officer, believed to be a lieutenant. The MPs and the BREAM crew were searched by the troops on the bank. They were held there approximately 15 minutes, awaiting the arrival of a senior officer, assumed to be the commander. The troops confiscated the equipment, radio, and the MPs' weapons.

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(C) The Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh delivered a note to the Royal Khmer Government (RKG) on 25 May on the behalf of the USG, explaining the inadvertant intrusion, requesting the release of the MPs to Australian custody, and expressing regret for the "unauthorized entry of two American Military Policemen." The Cambodian reply dated 28 May stated that the USG request was "unacceptable" and then asserted that the RKG "categorically rejects the American thesis of error in navigation." The RKG further stated that the two MPs were to be "submitted to the treatment laid down by Cambodian laws."

(C) The RKG reply to a Philippine request for the release of their personnel and the boat was couched in much less aggressive terms. It asked that the GOP be informed of the "serious consequences that can result from violation of territorial waters of Cambodia by one of its tug-boats on board which there are American soldiers carrying arms and ammunition." After asking the GOP to use its influence to prevent a recurrence of such incidents, it stated that the Filipino crew would also be "submitted to the treatment laid down by Cambodian national law."

(C) The Australians informed members of the AMEMB that Sihanouk, in remarks following a speech on 26 May, said that the Filipino crew were civilian citizens of a friendly country that had recognized Cambodian frontiers, and if President Marcos personally wrote requesting their release he would not be disappointed. In the case of the two Americans that it was different, Sihanouk reportedly continued, as they were soldiers, and Cambodia "may have to ask for bulldozers or tractors in return for their release." The tug was reportedly to be incorporated into the Cambodian Navy in accordance with "customary international usage."

(C) Apparently, the initial Cambodian intention was to give different treatment to the Filipino crew and the Americans. Needless to say, this was disturbing to the SECSTATE, especially in view of Sihanouk's ruminations about extorting ransom from the USG. The SECDEF asked the AMEMB Manila to express the hope that the GOP would be willing to continue to request the release not only of its own citizens but also that of the two Americans. It was suggested that the GOP could point out that the American MPs were not in charge of the tugboat and that their unauthorized entry into Cambodian waters was presumably the consequence of a navigational error on the part of the Filipino captain. Of particular concern was the apparent intention of Sihanouk to try the Americans while releasing the Filipinos.

(C) On 29 May the Philippine Ambassador, De La Rose, called on the Cambodian Foreign Minister on instructions from his government and told him that full responsibility for the intrusion into Cambodia, as a result of a navigational error, lay with and was explicitly accepted by the Philippine captain of the tugboat. The presence of the American military escort on board was not imposed by the United States military authorities but was a requirement of the Philippine owners of the tugboat, who refused to operate in SVN without US military protection against the VC. The escort was entirely under the captain's orders at all times. He further said that it would be embarrassing and invidious for the GOP if the Philippine captain and crew, who were responsible for the Americans' predicament, were to be released and the two American soldiers subjected to the process of Cambodian law.

(C) In reply to a message from US Ambassador Bowles, Sihanouk, on 2 June, replied by trying to justify the discrimination between nationals of countries that had "recognized Cambodia's borders" and the US which had not done so. He said that the US personnel would be tried by the Cambodian courts.

(C) On 8 June, the acting Prime Minister, Son Sann, informed the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh that, "on a personal basis" Prince Sihanouk had decided to release the two

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American prisoners in honor of the memory of the late Senator Kennedy. The Australians were also informed that the Filipino crew of the tugboat was to be released the same day. The Filipino crew and the Americans were released on 8 June and the BREAM was ceremoniously returned to the Philippine Ambassador on 9 July. 83

(C) The second incident occurred on 16 July when an Army Utility Landing Craft (LCU-1577) while on a routine resupply mission to US installations in the Mekong Delta, inadvertently strayed across the border into Cambodia and was captured. Eleven US Army personnel and one Vietnamese soldier were aboard. The RKG issued a note charging that the intrusion was an "act of deliberate provocation". The USG immediately expressed regret for the inadvertent entry and requested the return of the LCU and the personnel on board, but the RKG, on 22 July, rejected this request and asserted that the vessel and crew "will be submitted to the treatment provided by the Cambodian laws." On 30 July, the USG asked the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh to pass a note to the RKG reaffirming the inadvertent and accidental nature of the intrusion and again asked for the return of the LCU and personnel on board. There was also an informal suggestion from the RKG that violations of air and water space by the US should be paid for by the US with bulldozers, tractors and such equipment. 84

(C) On 2 October, Prince Sihanouk said that on the forthcoming Independence Day, November 9, he would let the detainees out momentarily to join the festivities. There was speculation that the men would be released during the celebration, but such speculation was unfounded.

(S) In a 7 November news conference, Prince Sihanouk said that he would release the 11 Americans if he received a promise from President Johnson that there would be no more incidents along the border with South Vietnam. But two border incidents on 6 November changed his whole tone as regards the freeing of the LCU crewmen.

(C) In an announcement on 20 December, Prince Sihanouk said that he was releasing the 11 men and a helicopter crewman who was captured in November in a gesture of good will toward President Johnson. All the men with the exception of the helicopter crewman, who was too injured to move, were released on 20 December. The last detainee was released on 6 January. 85

#### Prisoner Escapes

(C) There were two successful prisoner escapes by US personnel during 1968. The first one occurred when, on 22 September, Sergeant Buddy Wright of the 4th Inf Div's Long Range Patrol was captured by NVA forces when he became separated from his platoon on a long range patrol. He was taken into Cambodia where he remained a prisoner until 26 September when he escaped by untying the ropes that bound him. It took him ten days to get back to a friendly position. 86

(C) The second and most dramatic occurred on 31 December when elements of the 7th Bqdn, 1st Cav of the 164th Avn Gp, while engaged in an operation in An Xuyen Province, IV CTZ, rescued Major James N. Rowe, a Green Beret officer who had been held by the Viet Cong since 29 October 1963, a period of more than five years. According to initial debriefing, Major Rowe said that on 22 December a B-52 strike hit approximately 500 meters east of a camp where he was being held. There were approximately 20 VC located at the camp, but no other PWs. Since that date, he had been moved from area to area, but did not know the locations because he was blindfolded most of the time while he was being moved.

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(C) On the morning of 31 December many helicopters were in the area where he was last detained and it appeared that ARVN troops were closing on the camp. There were seven VC with Rowe at this time. Rowe could tell it was ARVN troops because the VC were monitoring the ARVN radio net. He and his guards started to move away from the ARVN sweep. The VC moved in a group, but Rowe convinced one of his guards to break from the group because the gunships could easily engage them. He and his lone guard separated from the group and took another trail. As he and the guard were moving, the guard accidentally "lost" the magazine to his weapon. Rowe could hear helicopters coming toward his location, and he jumped the guard and knocked him out. Then he ran to a clearing and signaled the helicopter. One of the gunships picked him up and took him directly to the 29th Evac Hospital at Can Tho.

(C) Prior to December 1968, Rowe had been making plans to escape and had tried unsuccessfully on at least three other occasions. He had not seen any US or ARVN PWs since late 1967. His mental and physical condition was described as excellent and his morale appeared to be exceptionally high and he appeared anxious to continue debriefing. He was airlifted to Fort Sam Houston, Texas for further debriefing and convalescent leave on 2 January 1969. 87

#### VC/NVA Prisoners

#### Background

(S) 1967 had been a year of expansion and improvement in the RVNAF PW program. The PW camp capacity had increased from 3,000 to 13,000 while the PW strength had increased from 1,652 to 9,743. Numerous programs were developed in order to improve the care and treatment of PWs. These programs included the approval of PW work pay, a pilot education program to teach illiterate PWs basic reading and writing, mail privileges and visitation rights of PW families, gratuitous issue of health and comfort items, and a dispensary with a medical doctor and staff within each camp. Automation of PW records had been instituted and at year's end, four of the six PW camps had been included in the automated system. In 1968 the records of the other two camps were automated. 88

#### PW Camp Construction

(U) Since the beginning of the ARVN PW program, construction of five mainland camps and the Central PW complex on Phu Quoc Island provided quality detention facilities for PWs. As of the end of 1968, RVNAF had the capability to house a maximum of 32,000 PWs under emergency conditions and 21,000 under normal conditions using oriental standards of ten square feet per man. As of December 1968 there was a total of 21,571 PWs in all camps. Phu Quoc was able to house 10,000 PWs under normal conditions. However, by using tents in the recreation yards of the four completed inclosures, an additional 2,500 PWs could be interned. Accelerated construction, as directed by COMUSMACV and CJCS, was underway and a planned capacity of 14,000 PWs on Phu Quoc was programmed for completion by 15 February 1969. A capacity of 20,000 PWs was proposed by the end of 1969. Living standards in PW facilities in many cases exceeded those provided for ARVN units. Continued visits from MACV/US EMB/RVNAF staff, operational, and advisory personnel, as well as the ICRC, attested to the adequacy and quality of the treatment afforded PWs. In mid-1967, the move to change capacities of the camps to meet oriental standards provided a substantial capacity cushion which existed until the end of June 1968. Accelerated construction at Phu Quoc was proceeding on a schedule, and no future problems were foreseen in either the quantity or quality of PW facilities. 89

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Handling of VC/NVA PWs

(C) The forces that captured or detained suspected personnel were responsible for prompt screening and classification of detainees as PWs, innocent civilians, or civil defendants. Subsequent to classification, PWs were detained in military channels for exploitation until their transfer to the ARVN PW camps; non-PWs who were suspected as civil defendants were released to the appropriate GVN civil authorities; persons who qualified as returnees were transferred to the appropriate Chieu Hoi center; and detainees who were determined to be innocent civilians were released and returned to the place of capture.

(C) Intelligence utilization of PWs was accomplished through a combined MACV/RVNAF exploitation system, based on a concept of combined interrogation from sector to national level, as required. Civilian prisoners and interrogation reports of interest to MACV/RVNAF were made available for exploitation by the National Police and vice versa.

(C) The procedure for reporting the acquisition of sources was instituted by MACV and JGS on 24 March 1968. This system provided that the capturing unit submit a preliminary interrogation report by electrical transmission on each PW/rallier within 12 hours after detention or, if this was impossible, as soon as possible following capture. The preliminary report was to include the following:

1. Name/Alias.
2. Rank/Position (NVA or VC).
3. Unit/Organization (NVA or VC). Complete rundown of unit strength and condition; infiltration group; letter box number.
4. Location of source's unit; mission, if known; location and mission of and unit of which source had recent knowledge.
5. Capturing unit.
6. Location of source
7. Any other information of special importance.

As a result, preliminary reports of interrogation were received from the field within a matter of hours.

(C) The preliminary interrogation report provided a means of assuring further systematic exploitation of the source's knowledge. MACV, JGS, or other headquarters could direct that further interrogation on subjects of interest be conducted by the field unit, provincial interrogation centers, or when advisable, by the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC) in Saigon. On occasion, a CMIC team would go to the field in order to conduct follow-up interrogation. Additionally, interrogations were conducted at the National Interrogation Center (NIC) under the joint auspices of the US, CIA, and the RVN Central Intelligence Organization (CIO).

(C) Following classification and interrogation, the PW was transferred from the capturing

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force to one of the ARVN PW camps. Substantial progress had been and continued to be made in the segregation and categorization of PWs. A camp for female PWs was established at Qui Nhon in March 1968 and, by the end of June, it was fully operational and contained almost all the female PWs in SVN. Another progressive step was taken in April 1968, when all VC under 18 years of age were concentrated at Bien Hoa for special rehabilitation, education, and vocational training. Isolation of PWs according to degree of the ideological commitment had been the most difficult, but it was underway at the facility on Phu Quoc Island. Originally only hardcore VC and NVA PWs were to be transferred to Phu Quoc, but the accelerated transfer of the bulk of the PW population to Phu Quoc from the mainland since February had required additional internal segregation measures. Segregation by rank had been accomplished, and, as this facility expanded, increased emphasis was given to ideological segregation as well as to segregation by force served (VC/NVA).

(C) As to the many alleged cases of maltreatment at the time of capture, it can be seen that a scholar would have a somewhat different attitude toward a PW than a military man engaged in combat. "Fair" treatment, not joyous reception, was regularly emphasized. Repeated visits to PW camps, collecting points, and hospitals where PWs were treated by ICRC representatives reaffirmed that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions as pertains to Prisoners of War were being closely adhered to by US, FVMAF, and RVN forces and that humane treatment was afforded them. Allegations of mistreatment and abuse at the point of capture continued to be made by PWs, but reports of such occurrences within the PW camps were extremely rare. Also, each PW camp had an increasingly effective work program. Since 1 April 1968, prisoners received eight piasters per day for work performed. These measures were just part of the overall rehabilitation program and were in addition to the continuing PSYWAR and PSYOPs programs of both the JCS and MACV. 90

(U) Conventional Military Police doctrine provided that PWs be accurately identified, processed, and accounted for by name and other identification data only after arrival at a PW camp. Prior to arrival at a PW camp, they were to be handled strictly by headcount. This concept was inadequate for PW accounting in RVN. It was necessary to classify, accurately identify, and initiate an accountability record on each PW at the division/separate brigade collecting points. In USARV the special requirement existed because PWs were evacuated from the division/separate brigade collecting points to ARVN PW camps where they were under the complete control and custody of the GVN. The maintenance of accurate PW accounting records proved extremely difficult because:

1. Most Vietnamese names were identical or similar to the point where a minor clerical error would make identification impossible.
2. Many PWs had no grades or service numbers.
3. Many PWs either did not know their date of birth or knew only the year, since all birthdays were considered to be at the beginning of the lunar year (Tet).
4. After internment in a PW camp, many PWs were transferred to another camp, reclassified, or released.

Prior to 1 December 1967, the USARV PM had compiled PW rosters by obtaining the captured data from the capturing troops and then depending on the ARVN PW rosters to keep the data current. This system had proven inadequate because the only positive means of identifying the PWs

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on the GVN records was by means of the internment serial numbers which were not known by USARV. On 1 December 1967, a system was initiated by which the Detainee Report Form was routed through the PW camp to the USARV PM. This arrangement enabled the USMACV advisors at the PW camps to record the internment serial numbers on the Detainee Report Forms during the PW in-processing. As a result of this procedure, the accuracy of the PW rosters was greatly improved. 91

#### Release of VC/NVA Prisoners

(C) In response to the February 1968 release by NVN of three pilots shot down over North Vietnam in 1966, SECDEF proposed that arrangements be made for a public release of NVN prisoners to reciprocate the action taken by Hanoi. He felt this action would carry forward the standing US policy of reciprocal releases and would be welcomed by families of the American PWs and the American press. He indicated that appropriate reciprocal action would be the release and return to NVN via ICC plane of three, or perhaps more, NVN naval prisoners captured and held by US forces at Da Nang since July 1966. The release would be announced publicly either by US or jointly by the US/GVN. Prior to their release, the prisoners would be visited by ICRC personnel to verify their condition and whether they in fact desired repatriation.

(C) SECDEF envisioned that the ICC would inform Hanoi authorities that the USG was releasing the prisoners and state the ICC intention to transport them at the USG request on a forthcoming flight. The USG would proceed on the assumption that the NVN would accept these personnel, whose return had been demanded in the past. Two of the original group who were sick or wounded were successfully repatriated to NVN in March 1967. In this case it was done through Cambodia without publicity.

(C) In anticipation of the final approval for the release of three of the prisoners, COMUSMACV directed CG III MAF to screen the prisoners and prepare three (one officer and two enlisted men) for immediate release. After selection the following actions were directed:

1. Perform a complete physical and dental check of the selectees by US medical personnel and prepare a detailed medical certificate on each PW.
2. Provide appropriate clothing for travel.
3. Consolidate all personal property up to 25 kilograms per PW to include any currency which was in their possession at the time of capture and any funds due them since internment.
4. Prepare bilingual release for each selectee and require the PWs to sign them.
5. Forward to MACV a biographical profile on each selectee to include full face photo with negative.

In addition, the CG, III MAF was directed to be prepared to move the personnel on short notice.

(C) In light of a press leak which was widely carried in the US, SECDEF suggested that the Saigon Mission spokesman announce that the USG was releasing the three NVN naval personnel captured in July 1966, and would return them to Hanoi. It was further suggested that he state that the prisoners had been visited by the ICRC to ascertain that they were willing to accept

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return to NVN. As background, he suggested that the spokesman should note that this release was in response to the release of the three US pilots and that arrangements for the release were identical to those used by Hanoi in the release of the US personnel. He further instructed that the prisoners be placed on the first available ICC flight with no prior notification to NVN beyond the normal manifest procedure, pointing out to ICC personnel that this was exactly comparable to the Hanoi arrangements in release of the US pilots, in which the only prior notification to the USG was by public announcement.

(C) It had been hoped that the prisoners could be placed on the 15 March ICC flight departing Vientiane for Hanoi but unavoidable delays prevented this. AMEMB Saigon was instructed to inform the ICC personnel that although there might have been disagreement on the circumstances of the prisoners' capture, there was no dispute that these were NVN regular naval personnel whom the DRV acknowledged and had repeatedly asked to be returned.

(S) The final arrangements for the release were made by the USG. Acceptance of the prisoners by NVN was handled by the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in a meeting with an embassy official of the NVN. The DCM took the opportunity to inform the NVN representatives that the USG:

1. Noted with satisfaction that, despite the absence of diplomatic relations, it was possible for representatives of the two nations to engage in a "dialogue."
2. Expressed the appreciation of the three pilots, their families, and the USG for their release.
3. Informed the NVN representative that, as a reciprocal gesture, the USG wished to return unconditionally three NVN sailors via an ICC plane or via any other arrangement that Hanoi preferred. The sailors had been interviewed by the ICRC and expressed a desire to return to the DRV.
4. The DCM asked that the "dialogue" be continued by the NVN representative ascertaining his government's attitude toward further releases and exchanges of captured personnel. The CG, III MAF was directed on 28 March 1968 to move the selected prisoners to Da Nang airfield on 29 March so that they could be transported from there to Vientiane for final release to representatives of the NVN government. They were flown to Vientiane on 29 March and the final release was transacted.<sup>92</sup>

(C) In May, the AMEMB Saigon suggested that the USG should support the inclusion of the 14 remaining members of the NVN PT boat crew in any repatriation offer, since it was doubtful they could be considered to be trading bait to effect an exchange of any US flyers in the NVN. Under the circumstances, the AMEMB could see little reason to keep them any longer. Including them in an offer would, moreover, demonstrate USG readiness to return those NVN military personnel held in custody by the US.<sup>93</sup>

(S) On 31 July SECDEF stated in a joint message to PARIS and CINCPAC that if the three American pilots, scheduled for release by NVN on 2 August, were released without incident, plans for release of the 14 NVN seamen would start at the 7 August Paris meeting. However, he emphasized that the offer should be described as a goodwill gesture, not as an act of reciprocity. The three pilots were released on schedule from Hanoi to Vietnam via the weekly ICC flight on 2 August without incident. (See - US/FWMAF Prisoners)

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(S) Repatriation of the 14 NVN seamen was tentatively set for 16 August, with transportation being furnished from Da Nang Air Base to Vientiane by Air America on the morning 16 August, following appropriate news coverage at Da Nang.

(S) After the proposal was made in Paris, AMEMB Paris sent word to the NVN delegation that if USG were to release the seamen on 16 August, NVN would have to get word to USG before the Paris meeting on 14 August. Since the DRV now clearly understood that the responsibility for any delay rested with them, AMEMB Paris saw no reason why the USG should be in a hurry.

(S) And there was, indeed, a delay. The NVN did not accept the proposed method of release and on 10 August, SECSTATE requested AMEMB Saigon and COMUSMACV to provide plans for a ship-to-ship transfer of NVN prisoners. In addition, he requested specific information on other possible options for transferring the 14 prisoners to NVN control.

(S) Proposed arrangements for a ship-to-ship transfer were as follows:

1. Best location: a position east of the DMZ on the 17th parallel about 5 miles to seaward in the South China Sea.

2. Time of day: considering transit time and probable weather factors, time of transfer should be between 1000 and 1400.

3. Type of US boat: with the primary considerations being navigational capability and adequate platform space for positioning of security guard personnel and civilian observers, a Coast Guard Patrol Boat (WPB) was recommended, with a destroyer being stationed within 5 miles of the rendezvous point to protect the transfer craft.

4. Type of NVN boat: since it was known that NVN had twelve 65-foot P-4 boats north of the 19th parallel, one of these was recommended.

5. Third party: transfer of prisoners and ICC/ICRC personnel could be accomplished in port in SVN or at sea by boat, possible via helicopter, to a third country ship acceptable to the United States, for delivery of the prisoners and accompanying ICC and/or ICRC representatives to Haiphong or other designated port in NVN.

6. Advantages: the ship-to-ship transfer of the prisoners had the advantage of interfering least with combat operations and providing the enemy minimal opportunity in which to exploit during a period of standdown in the vicinity of the transfer point. A cease-fire in the DMZ would not have been required for this option. This option also permitted the ICC and ICRC to verify the transfer of the prisoners to NVN control. However, it had the disadvantage of requiring the active cooperation of the NVN to effect the transfer and it exposed the friendly craft to hostile action. Any standdown would have had to be of short duration so as to preclude sufficient time for any other type enemy movement.

(S) Specific information on other options were:

1. Landing prisoners on NVN coast. Shifting sands and silt characterized most of the NVN coast. NVN personnel could have been put ashore with US landing craft or sampans. However, unilateral action by the US was not recommended. US landing craft would be vulnerable during the operation and safe passage for NVN personnel could not have been guaranteed.

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2. Sending prisoners north by sampan or fishing boat. A sampan was more adaptable to rivers, ports, and harbors but could be considered seaworthy only during relatively calm weather. Delivery into NVN custody could not have been guaranteed. A fishing boat would be seaworthy and could have been escorted or transported north to a point off the coast (Vinh) where the craft could have been supplied and prepared for the short trip to port. The use of a seaworthy fishing boat was feasible. However, delivery to NVN custody by this means could not be guaranteed either.

3. Landing prisoners by helicopter in eastern DMZ. This procedure would have involved actual penetration of the enemy land areas. Because of the Ben Hai River barrier in the eastern DMZ, a landing zone would have had to be selected in the northern section of the DMZ in an area under NVN control. The selection of a precise landing zone, landing coordination instructions, and a temporary cease-fire would have been required. The option would be particularly difficult if NVN chose not to have representatives meet the helicopter(s) at the landing zone. Both US and PW personnel would have been vulnerable. The PWs could be abandoned in the landing zone; however, the area was heavily mined. Because of the foregoing and the chances of mechanical failure, the risks of helicopter delivery into or north of the DMZ were not acceptable. Even if a white flag of truce were used, an internationally recognized signal, it could have been misused as enemy propaganda by calling such display "surrender."

(S) After due deliberation, it was decided to release the prisoners via fishing boat because that was the plan that the DRV was most likely to accept and the one that required the least elaborate preparations for execution. On 21 October, USS DUBUQUE (LPD), in execution of Operation MIGHTY YANKEE, transported the 14 NVN prisoners to a point 12 miles off Vinh, on the NVN coast, where they were released in a seaworthy boat provided by the USG. The men were experienced sailors and it was confirmed that they landed safely in NVN. Arrangements for the release were worked out by the US and NVN Embassies in Vientiane. Both sides gave assurance that the operation would be safe from military action. A 36-hour standdown of military activity in the area of the release was observed by both sides. All the men had confirmed their willingness to accept repatriation.<sup>94</sup>

(C) On 26 November, the GVN made a public announcement that 140 VC prisoners of war would be released on 30 November as a humanitarian gesture. The prisoners were of all ages and were selected because they were drafted into the service by the VC and were unwilling members of the VC. They were given a choice to remain in South Vietnam or to try to enter into the North and all chose to stay in the South. On 30 November, in simultaneous ceremonies in Saigon, Da Nang, and Pleiku these prisoners were released amid much ceremony.<sup>95</sup>

#### Release of NVN Civilian Seamen

(S) In early December, plans began to formulate for the release of the seven NVN civilian seamen who had been picked up in October 1966 in the Gulf of Tonkin. The release, designated Operation TIGHT JAW, was to be carried out in similar fashion to Operation MIGHTY YANKEE of October. COMSEVENTHFLT recommended the following order of preference for alternatives of delivery of the seamen to NVN:<sup>96</sup>

1. Delivery ashore by US manned helicopter.
2. Pickup from US ship by NVN manned boat.

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3. Put seamen into a US furnished and equipped boat to proceed ashore.
4. Delivery ashore by US manned boat.

His rationale for the first choice was that it would avoid:

1. The necessity to determine the small boat proficiency of the seamen.
2. Procurement and outfitting a seaworthy craft.
3. Effects of unfavorable weather, wind, and surf conditions on boating.

(S) ICRC representatives interviewed the seven seamen on 9 December and found that all wanted to be repatriated as soon as possible. The crewmen were also interviewed by a III MAF Naval officer and it was ascertained that the men had no experience with any boats other than a small rowboat. Based on this information, the AMEMB Saigon urged elimination of the possibility of allowing the men to maneuver a small boat to shore and further recommended that the helicopter alternative be accepted. <sup>97</sup>

(S) However, NVN specifically rejected all alternatives except that of putting the men in a small boat despite the USG's concern about this group's ability to navigate. By stating this condition, NVN had, in effect, taken on the responsibility for the men's safety.

(S) Based on this information COMNAVSUPFACT purchased and provisioned a fishing junk, and on the morning of 16 December the seamen, the junk, and appropriate press and ICRC representatives boarded the USS DULUTH (LPD) at Da Nang. The DULUTH proceeded to the release point which was thirteen miles seaward of Cua Sot and the release was effected without incident. <sup>98</sup>

#### Release of Prisoners (By the VC)

(C) The five mainland PW camps were not attacked during Tet. This could be attributed in part to their being guarded and operated by ARVN, their population was never permitted to exceed 2,000, and there were only five possible targets. By contrast, there were 37 provincial correctional centers which were normally overloaded with detainees and prisoners. They were operated by an inadequate staff and were guarded by RF/PF forces. In spite of this, most attacks against correctional centers had been successfully repulsed. During the Tet Offensive period, however, five provincial facilities were breached out of the sixteen attacked. It was estimated that 2,238 prisoners/detainees were released, and of these, 300 to 500 were identified as "hard core." Moving prisoners to more secure areas and greater attention to the threat of confined VC being liberated by attack helped solve the problem. As of 1 April, 1,500 prisoners had been moved to Con Son Island; 5,000 more were scheduled for movement on the completion of the emergency camp.

(U) It was ARVN tactical practice to place their detainees, including possible PWs, in the first available lock-up site. When ARVN screening teams identified PWs they were listed for transfer to PW camps. Despite continuing US pressure to have ARVN-captured PWs transferred expeditiously from civil prisons to PW camps, a sizable residual number remained at all times in civil (Directorate of Corrections) prisons. <sup>99</sup>

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Who is a PW?

(C) The intermingling of civil defendants with PWs was prohibited by Article 22 of the GPW. Accordingly, PWs had to be segregated from the other categories of prisoners and be provided special treatment as required by the Geneva Convention. Thus the transfer of "hard core VC" to PW camps as proposed by CINCPAC earlier could not be implemented unless they could be classified as PWs.

(C) There were two aspects to the handling of this problem, each of which was influenced and governed by the fact that all VC were members of an organized resistance movement which constituted the enemy in a very real war. Given existing circumstances in SVN, there was no VC identifiable as such who should not be regarded as an enemy. On the other hand, those VC captured under conditions which satisfied the criteria of Article 4A(2), GPW, were entitled as a matter of legal right to the treatment and privileges of a PW. They were placed in PW camps under RVN security. These camps were designed and guarded so as to preclude escape from within and release of the PWs by the enemy from without. The camps had thus far withstood those threats even during the Tet Offensive. On the other hand, captured hard core VC who did not qualify for special treatment as PWs were not as securely confined, were occasionally released due to overcrowded jails, were susceptible to release, and had been released by the enemy. The acts of terror, murder, and sabotage being committed by these VC constituted without doubt the principal stimulant to the enemy's continuing high state of morale and spirit since his battlefield setback. Thus, some elements of the enemy were being held in secure captivity while others who constituted an even more serious threat were not.

(C) There were at least two ways to meet the problem. Additional camps, comparable from a security standpoint to PW camps, could be built to hold all captured VC who did not technically qualify for PW treatment. In conjunction therewith, or in the alternative, a different and more liberal interpretation of the GPW convention could be adopted in line with the following rationale. The GPW guaranteed that an individual captured during war would be accorded humanitarian treatment. The thrust of the GPW was an affirmative one in that it required the capturing and detaining power to accord rights and privileges to the PW. It did not restrict those powers if they should choose to accord the same rights and privileges to other individuals who, though not required to be treated as PWs, were nevertheless to be retained in captivity for the duration of the conflict. Article 4A(2) enabled those powers to withhold PW rights and privileges from such individuals, but it did not prohibit according them such rights. The ultimate success in SVN was contingent in a large measure upon neutralizing the VC infrastructure.

(U) All members of the VC were considered as enemy. However, under the terms of the Geneva Convention, the fact that a person was a VC did not in and of itself warrant his classification as a PW. Under the terms of Article 4 of the Geneva Convention, as applied to Vietnam, the following categories of combatants were classified as PWs after capture:

1. Viet Cong Main Force.
2. Viet Cong Local Force.
3. North Vietnamese Army.

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(U) Difficulty was encountered in classifying guerrillas as PWs after capture. Article 4 defined guerrilla types as those which fulfilled the following conditions:

1. Were commanded by a person responsible for them.
2. Had a fixed insignia recognizable at a distance.
3. Carried arms openly.
4. Conducted their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

The VC guerrilla did not fulfill these conditions. In order to meet this difficulty, the definition of guerrilla types was expanded by MACV which defined "irregulars" as organized forces composed of guerrilla, self-defense, and secret self-defense elements subordinate to village and hamlet level VC organizations; and provided that any member of such a unit would be classified as a PW after capture if he was captured while actually engaging in combat or in a belligerent act under arms, other than an act of terrorism, sabotage, or spying, or who admitted, or for whom there was proof, of his having participated or engaged in combat or a belligerent act under arms, other than an act of terrorism, sabotage, or spying. Representatives of the ICRC had spoken in highly complimentary terms of these definitions. 100

Repatriation of Sick and Wounded PWs

(C) Since November 1967, the GVN, with USC support, had tried to repatriate to NVN approximately forty seriously sick and wounded NVA PWs and two groups of NVN civilian seamen. The PWs qualified for direct repatriation under Articles 109 and 110 of the Geneva Convention, had been examined by an ICRC doctor, and had expressed to the ICRC representatives a willingness to be repatriated to NVN. An offer of repatriation was made through the ICRC to the NVN government. In view of the damage to the Ben Hai Bridge and the continuing combat in the DMZ, the ICRC suggested travel to Hanoi via ICC aircraft if the DRV agreed.

(C) The permission to repatriate NVN personnel by ICC aircraft had to be given by Hanoi. Otherwise without prior assurance that the personnel would be accepted upon arrival in Hanoi, the ICC plane would not transport them. SECDEF felt that, if the ICC route were attempted and proved unsuccessful because Hanoi would not provide the necessary valid entry documents, then the onus for rejecting the personnel should be made to lie with Hanoi.

(C) With the approach of Tet, SECDEF was interested in knowing the status of GVN and ICRC plans to repatriate 40 seriously sick and wounded NVA PWs to North Vietnam. On 16 January, the ICRC dispatched a telegram to the DRV Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hanoi, requesting authorization to repatriate the 40 NVN sick and wounded PWs. The committee proposed that repatriation be effected in late January or early February.

(C) On 16 May the ICRC received a note dated 27 April from the GVN Minister of Foreign Affairs requesting the committee to renew its efforts to arrange the repatriation of the 40 sick and wounded PW's. But at the end of the year these 40 PWs were still in GVN custody with no word received from DRV regarding repatriation. 101

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## SECURITY

### General

(S) The RVNAF/MACV 1968 Combined Campaign Plan had as a primary objective the extension of CVN control in the Republic of Vietnam. Tasks related to security were as follows:

1. Securing the major political, economic, food producing, and population centers.
2. Establishing, maintaining, and securing military installations.
3. Conducting military clearing and securing operations to establish and maintain security for areas undergoing pacification.
4. Providing security for forces engaged and participating in the identification and elimination of the VC infrastructure.
5. Maintaining security of areas in which pacification had been conducted and from which pacification teams had moved; sustaining security of cleared areas.
6. Opening and securing LOCs supporting military, economic, and political efforts.

(S) In the concept of operations, RVNAF was to have the primary responsibility for participating in and supporting pacification with priority of effort to providing territorial security for the selected priority areas. RVNAF also was given the responsibility for providing territorial security for LOCs that supported priority economic and political efforts, national resources, government centers, and areas that had undergone prior pacification.

(S) US/FWMAF assisted and reinforced RVNAF, as necessary, in opening and securing LOCs, providing security for selected priority areas, and protecting national resources. 102

### Security of Saigon

(S) During 1967, the enemy situation in the Capital Military District (CMD) subsided as a result of operations by RVN and US forces. This improved situation permitted the 5th ARVN Rgr Gp to assume the sole responsibility on 15 December 1967 for conducting operations in the CMD. The mission of the 5th ARVN Rgr Gp was to locate and destroy VC forces, guerrillas, installations, and supplies and to support the RD effort in the area.

(S) In a message to COMUSMACV on 31 December 1967, the CG. II FORCEV stated:

It is expected that the 5th Ranger Group will successfully perform this mission; nevertheless, additional strength should provide insurance

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against a regression in this key area. If the Viet Cong gain a military success against ARVN in the Capital Military District or damage a key installation to the extent that US forces must be redeployed into the C. S. Government of Vietnam prestige would suffer a setback.

(S) After the departure of the 199th Inf Bde from the district, the 5th ARVN Rgr Gp assumed a greater responsibility for the security with fewer effective forces to accomplish the job. CG. II FFORCEV recommended the assignment of one additional maneuver battalion to the 5th ARVN Rgr Gp. 103

(U) As a result of the Tet Offensive and the requirement to bring US troops to the defense of Saigon, a task force headquarters was moved into the CMD on 2 February 1968. This headquarters was composed of key representatives from II FFORCEV and assumed control of all US forces in the Saigon/Gia Dinh area. Twice in the month of May this headquarters moved into Saigon, once to direct the defense against the early May VC/NVA offensive and later in the month in response to intelligence that another enemy attack was predicted. Eventually in June, this headquarters became a separate command designated the Capital Military Assistance Command under II FFORCEV charged with the defense of Saigon/Gia Dinh. (For additional information on the formation of CMAC see Chapter IV, Friendly Forces.) 104

(U) The Philadelphia Inquirer reported on 3 July that a massive Saigon Defense Ring was ready for new Red attacks. The newspaper stated:

Allied defenses ringing the city in depth are so formidable that it's unlikely the Communists can penetrate them with any significant strength. More than 30,000 South Vietnamese and US troops are involved.

A Communist threat to shell Saigon with 100 rounds for 100 days so far has proved an empty boast. Saigon has not had a rocket attack since June 21.

This could be because the Communists aren't really trying. But a more likely reason is vastly improved measures against rocket attack.

During the last week US and South Vietnamese sweeps have uncovered hundreds of rounds of hastily hidden rockets.

"The only way to be absolutely sure they don't hit Saigon is to stop them before they can get their rockets within range," said MG John Hay, senior advisor to the Saigon defense command.

.....  
But rocket surveillance and counter-action have been developed to a fine art. Helicopter and spotter planes hover over the city night and day. A system of visual and radar observation towers had

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been set up. Reaction time to enemy fire has been reduced to two minutes. 105

(C) CG, CMAC informed COMUSMACV on 24 July that CMAC had completed an initial listing of 48 sensitive installations within the CMD. These included important bridges, buildings, storage and equipment yards, and other installations vital to US and RVN. Plans were under development to employ elements of the units' OPCON to CMAC for security reinforcement of these installations as necessary. 106

(C) In early July, there were indications of an improved public attitude about the security status in Saigon. The city had not been hit by rockets or mortars since 20 June. As a result, the tension which gripped the city in mid-June had largely dissipated. The fear of renewed attacks was lessened as indicated by fewer Vietnamese families taking refuge in Vung Tau.

(C) There was also a general recognition that the security situation of Saigon had improved because of the increased activity by ARVN and US forces around the city. Some newspapers reflected optimism of no further attacks; others felt that the city was ready to cope with any future VC effort. 107

#### Protection of Other Populated Areas

(U) An indication of the effort expended in strengthening vital areas was the infiltration barrier being constructed around Da Nang, RVN's second largest city. The barrier was the brain child of CG, I Corps (ARVN). Its purpose was to stop infiltration of enemy units into Da Nang and protect the city by keeping the enemy outside 122mm rocket range of the city. The barrier was to consist of a 300-meter cleared area with split double apron, triple strand concertina fence on either side. Between the fences, 20-foot guard towers and bunkers were to be interspersed at regular intervals. 108

#### Defense Against Rocket and Mortar Attacks

(S) Early in the month of January, COMUSMACV showed his concern about the defense against rocket attacks. On 3 January, the Da Nang airfield complex had received approximately 30 rounds of rocket fire, later identified as 122mm. A survey of the area disclosed three rocket sites containing a total of 20 firing positions. COMUSMACV stated that:

It is becoming apparent that we may be faced with an increasing number of rocket attacks throughout the CTZs. Therefore, effort will be concentrated on every aspect of the subject problem as a matter of urgency. 109

(S) To cope with the rocket and mortar threat to the city of Saigon, II FFORCEV artillery was tasked to establish and integrate flash observation positions around the perimeter of the city. Nine flash observation posts were constructed and configured to form a complete triangle around the metropolitan area. Three of these observation posts were located on 60-foot steel

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towers, two were located on 100-foot water towers, two were positioned on buildings, and the remaining two on 80-foot radio towers. During the period 17 June to 1 July, the 8th Bn, 25th Army Target Acquisition Battery (TAB) established order survey control to all nine flash control towers which identified the exact location of each friendly firing position. A flash control center was organized and placed under the OPCON of CMAC. This control center determined the coordinates of the rocket or mortar launch point by a process of intersection based on the azimuths received from the tower sightings. Artillery personnel in CMAC reported that this was their most reliable means of locating hostile rocket and mortar locations. 110

#### Installations and Air Base Security

(S) Security of installations and protection of air bases in SVN continued to be a matter of serious concern to COMUSMACV. From the beginning of the Tet Offensive to 1 March 1968, enemy rocket/artillery and mortar attacks against US bases destroyed 36 fixed wing aircraft and 23 helicopters. Varying degrees of damage were inflicted on an additional 220 aircraft and 188 helicopters. COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that the Tab VEE Study had analyzed the problem of air base security in detail and had discussed possible solutions. COMUSMACV's goal was to implement those measures which were applicable to RVN and the enemy threat which they faced.

(S) To assure absolute minimal damage to fixed base assets would require complete military control of the areas surrounding each installation out to at least 12,000 meters, and/or provision of complete hardened enclosed revetments for mission essential aircraft. The first requirement would require massive commitment of troops and acquisition of valuable urban real estate, particularly in areas such as Tan Son Nhut. The second requirement would also present problems in material, real estate, and construction.

(S) In response to specific requests by CINCPAC, COMUSMACV replied that the value of aircraft revetments had been repeatedly demonstrated in the attacks on US bases. Aircraft densities and ramp space limitations had restricted dispersal of aircraft and flexibility to revet. Nevertheless, in spite of restrictions, some dispersal had been effected. Base defense plans were re-evaluated and aircraft protective measures promulgated. In addition, intelligence efforts were intensified. COMUSMACV ended by stating that there was no quick solution to this problem and continual counter actions in all areas must be pursued.

(S) CINCPAC recognized and supported COMUSMACV's efforts to minimize aircraft losses from artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks and further recommended to JCS that the R&D effort develop and make available a tactical aircraft shelter on a priority basis. R&D effort was also to be directed toward developing an increased capability to locate and destroy enemy weapons. 111

(U) On 23 July, 135 mortar and rocket rounds hit the US military complex at Da Nang, the most intensive shelling of the war against this northern base. Six Americans were killed and 30 wounded. Two airplanes were destroyed and 2 were damaged. Renewed rocket activity on airfields and other vital installations throughout SVN continued to be prevalent in August and continued sporadically throughout the remainder of the year. 112

(S) Action was taken to initiate the necessary protection for US aircraft throughout RVN. Construction on aircraft shelters was started in late 1968 and by the end of the year 115 were in place. (For further information on this subject see the section on Construction in Chapter IX, Logistics.)

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#### MACV Defense Force

(U) The MACV Defense Force (MDF) was organized to protect the MACV Hq from ground attack, a contingency revealed by the January-February Tet Offensive during which enemy units approached to within several hundred yards of the headquarters compound and annex.

(C) By 7 February, a provisional defense force composed of 530 officers and men had been organized, armed, and equipped. Those personnel were selected from those assigned to the MACV Hq and the 69th Signal Battalion and from those billeted at the MACV Annex. Military Policemen of Company C, 716th MP Bn manned the gates and towers and maintained the internal security of the MACV complex. This unit also provided the vital security link and was an integral part of the MDF. The entire group of officers, senior NCOs, and enlisted men were commanded by the Headquarters Commandant.

(C) Concurrent with the establishment of the MDF, all bunkers in the MACV headquarters compound were converted to fighting bunkers. An Emergency Operations Center, under the direction of a field grade officer, was established in the headquarters building with direct communications to the TSN Joint Defense Operations Center, USAHAC TF PETER, and USARV TF WARE.

(U) During non-duty hours, the primary mission of this force was the security and defense of the MACV complex; however, during duty hours (0700-1900), these personnel performed their usual tasks within the MACV Headquarters. Additionally, they were on call at any time during the day should an emergency arise. 113

#### Security of Communication Facilities

(S) The enemy attack on Nui Ba Dien, about 50 miles north-northwest of Saigon, on 14 May 1968, clearly emphasized the importance of providing adequate security for communications facilities. All radio relay equipment providing circuits for the Defense Communications System subscribers at Tay Ninh and Nui Ba Dien plus tactical VHF and UHF equipment supporting the 1st and 25th Inf Divs was lost. As a result, COMUSMACV requested that security being provided to vital communications facilities be reviewed for adequacy. 114

(U) However, no other incidents of this nature occurred during the remainder of the year.

#### Security of RVN Correctional Centers

(C) The security of the 37 provincial and four national correction centers in RVN caused considerable concern to MACV. The potential escape of VC prisoners raised a serious threat to the military effort relating to the pacification campaign. This could be especially dangerous since a large percentage of the prison population consisted of VC political cadre. In 1967, the VC struck three correction centers in I Corps freeing 2,700 detainees. During the Tet Offensive of 1968, 16 prisons were attacked, five breached, and 2,228 prisoners released. Between February 1968 and the end of the year, 10 attacks were made against correctional facilities with negative results.

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(C) A joint survey of 31 of these correction centers by JGS, Ministry of Interior, and MACV, during the period 17 October to 19 November 1968, disclosed many deficiencies. COMUSMACV therefore requested that commanders inform their counterparts of the existing conditions and threats in these correctional centers. Immediate action was necessary within US and ARVN channels to preclude further deterioration in the existing situation. 115

#### Bridge Security

(C) It was apparent in 1968 that the enemy was placing increased emphasis on the destruction of key bridges along the LOCs. As a result, MACV directed that added effort be made to improve bridge security throughout all CTZs.

(C) COMUSMACV notified his subordinate commanders on 17 June that MACV planned to analyze all future sabotage incidents involving bridges over ten meters in length. The purpose was to compile enough data on a command-wide basis to permit thorough analysis of VC trends and weaknesses in security measures. He directed that, beginning 15 July, all incidents of this nature be investigated by US and RVNAF personnel and a report rendered to MACV. 116

(C) After the destruction of the Ben Luc Bridge on 30 June, MACV conducted an investigation and determined the bridge was destroyed by a main charge and several smaller charges wired to the base of one pier. Security deficiencies were also uncovered: poor security procedures by bridge guards, no bridge or water lighting, mine barriers not installed, a general lack of knowledge of bridge security techniques, and little command supervision on the part of the units responsible for bridge security. The MACV CofS emphasized to CofS of JGS that differences which showed up between the RVNAF and MACV investigations of the incident could lead to false conclusions and a serious loss of security by placing emphasis on doubtful preventive measures. He also stated that while there was sufficient emphasis on bridges, par se, there appeared to be a general neglect of surface and subsurface water surveillance in the vicinity of all bridges. He recommended that JGS reopen the Ben Luc investigation and that bridge security be given added emphasis by JGS and all Corps Commanders. 117

(U) Those members of the MACV staff regularly concerned with the protection of bridges concluded that an alert guard force was the single most effective method of bridge protection. This observation was disseminated to the CofS JGS on 18 August.

(C) Despite increased precautions, the Ben Luc Bridge was again sabotaged on 7 August when six pontoons of the bridge were destroyed by three to four 50 pound charges which were apparently tied to the bridge by swimmers. Ten hours were required to repair the bridge. 119

(C) The IV CTZ was plagued by bridge incidents in three locations in August. Bridges at Phong Hiep, the An Hiep Bridge in the village of Lho Due on National Highway 4, and the An Tri Bridge on QL 4, north of the My Thuan ferry site, were damaged by saboteurs. In general, a week to ten days was required to complete repairs and restore the bridges to operational condition. 120

(C) On 9 September, COMUSMACV tasked USARV to provide material and to install security lighting for 25 bridges determined to be vital to the defense of the Saigon/Gia Dinh area. These bridges were on routes that would be used to shift forces to meet enemy threats. 121

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(C) The increased concern for bridge security was apparent when on 26 October 1968 the Chief of Staff directed that an Ad Hoc Study Group be established for the purpose of (1) analyzing the problem of bridge protection in Vietnam and (2) recommending methods and systems to provide adequate security for bridges commensurate with their importance. The study group consisted of representatives from J3 (Chairman), Construction Directorate, Military Assistance, Science Advisor, J4, CORDS, and the Operations Research/Systems Analysis Office.

(C) The study group analyzed the bridge protection problem and categorized highway and railway bridges throughout Vietnam in order to identify those vital and important bridges requiring effective security. Specific procedures were developed to enhance the physical and personnel security measures, and various new developments in the field of antiswimmer protection were analyzed and catalogued. The results of the study were published in a manual entitled "Bridge Protection in the Republic of Vietnam" and promulgated to all field commanders under a cover letter signed by the Chief of Staff on 28 November 1968. This publication stimulated an increased effort to improve bridge security and provided a standard on which field commanders could base inspections and evaluations of bridge security in their areas of operation. 122

### THE TAX PROBLEM

(U) Although there was no tax agreement per se between GVN and the USG, there was a pertinent paragraph in the Pentilateral Agreement of 1950, the document which authorized US forces in Vietnam. The paragraph reads as follows:

To grant, except where otherwise agreed, duty-free treatment and exemption from taxation upon importation, exportation, or movement within Indochina, of products, material or equipment furnished by the UNITED STATES in connection with this agreement.

(U) Since there was no agreement contrary to the foregoing provision, MACV consistently interpreted the quoted language as providing full tax-free treatment for all supplies and equipment brought into RVN under the Military Assistance Program. Moreover, this interpretation was applied to all US military forces, their agencies or instrumentalities, including items brought in by a contractor in furtherance of a US contract, or by a concessionaire, such as PACEX. Despite clear rights in the matter of taxes, the USG encountered problems in that some of the government agencies such as the exchange, exchange concessionaires, banking facilities, commissary, clubs and messes, and contractors were not recognized or viewed by GVN officials in the same manner as the US Government. The USG refused to accept any attempted treatment of these agencies and instrumentalities as other than a recognized integral part of the US effort in Vietnam and as fully entitled to treatment on an equal basis with the US.

(U) In the forward of a "Compendium of Vietnamese Tax Laws" written in 1968, the MACV SJA summed up the policy with reference to GVN taxes as follows:

Resistance to tax attempts by GVN is and must continue to be the responsibility of every purchasing

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official, administrator or organization. We must necessarily deal with tax matters on a case by case basis, as we do not have a status of forces or other agreement upon which to base a specific denial of applicability of given taxes. Instead...we must rely upon the general provisions of the Pentalateral Agreement and resist each attempted imposition. We can do this only by diligent and persistent submission of tax problems through the Embassy to the Foreign Ministry of the RVN, and our efforts are circumscribed by the diligence with which our personnel detect and then work to alleviate problems of taxation....

(U) By the end of 1968, there were some fifty different known taxes imposed by the GVN. Almost all were applicable to the Vietnamese and some were levied, or attempts made to levy them, on US contractors, concessionaires, and other USG-sponsored activities. Listed below are some major subdivision of GVN taxes which fell into this latter category:

1. Consumption Taxes: This was a tax on consumable products, mostly ice and meat. Ice was taxed at \$VN 100 per metric ton and there was a per head tax on animals slaughtered for food. The GVN attempted to impose this tax by requiring the Vietnamese vendor to pay the tax, who could then include the tax in the prices quoted. The MACV position on this tax was that it imposed a direct tax burden on the US forces and its imposition violated the terms of the tax exemption. Another consumption tax imposed was the excise tax collected on such things as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, cold drinks, sugar, matches, and flints. However, items of this nature, if imported, provided to US forces, or obtained from US forces' outlets for sale in privileged facilities, were not subject to this tax.
2. Port Taxes: The GVN attempted to impose a variety of port taxes on ships in Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay harbors. The port taxes levied in Da Nang included circulation, loading-unloading, surtax, commercial office, port labor, mooring, anchorage, pier, and merchandise taxes and a warehouse fee. The port tax in Cam Ranh Bay was a customs tax and varied from \$VN 10,000 to \$VN 20,000 per vessel. All of these taxes violated the US tax exemption under the Pentalateral Agreement of 1950. On 8 October 1968, the Prime Minister issued a letter to the RVN Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which he recognized the exemption of all taxes and port dues for vessels owned by the US and private merchant ships chartered by the US and laden with cargoes destined for use by the GVN or for the aid of the GVN.
3. Patente Tax: This was a tax or annual license for exercising a trade, industry, or business in Vietnam. The amount varied with the importance of the firm. The tax assessment amount was generally determined by the nature and size of the industry, profession, or business. In addition, the tax could be increased by addition to it in the nature of a supplemental levy for the prefecture, province, or village budget. There had been some effort, mostly in the Dalat area, to impose this tax in the nature of a sales or use tax and call it a Patente Tax. The USG position was that if the tax was in the nature of a license to do business and was imposed on a trade or business not involved as a DOD-invited contractor or as an agency or instrumentality of the US, then it was not a direct tax on the US, and no exemption could be claimed. On the other hand, if the tax was imposed as a sales tax in such a manner that it had a direct impact on the US, its agents and instrumentalities, then the tax would violate the tax exempt status of the US and could not be tolerated.

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4. Perequation Tax: This tax was levied upon imported items with a view toward equalization of the market price. The tax was a direct burden on the US from the standpoint of sales of discarded or surplus military property. While the GVN could levy the tax on a Vietnamese purchaser of surplus or discarded equipment -- such a purchase would constitute an import from the US closed economy into the Vietnamese economy -- it was the US position that a tax placed on the disposition of these goods to other than Vietnamese persons was a burden to the US. A tax on surplus property was first encountered when USAID tried to finalize a surplus property agreement and, at the last minute, the GVN proposed a tax of 6 to 10 percent. This tax was rejected by the US. The GVN claimed that the tax did not violate the US tax exempt status in that it was a tax on the purchaser and not on the US. However, the US saw it as directly diminishing the amount of money that they would receive without imposition of the tax. The tax on discarded military property was levied after attempts at the registration tax had failed because of US opposition. The loophole through which both of these taxes could be avoided was by the simple expedient of retaining title to any such property sold or discarded in the name of the US and having the ultimate purchaser of the property, acting as an agent of the US government, ship the property from Vietnam to wherever the purchaser desired and then arrange for the title to pass from the US to the purchaser at some point outside of RVN. Under the provisions of the Pentilateral Agreement, the US was entitled to export anything it had brought in without payment of any tax.

5. Customs Tax: There were a number of customs taxes levied on the US by the GVN. These included import, export, austerity, perequation, and port taxes, the latter two of which are discussed elsewhere in this section. The import and export taxes were established by a GVN Decree. The US position was that US property brought into Vietnam never entered the Vietnamese economy and, hence, could not "leave" the economy when we removed the goods from the country. Thus, the US property was not "exported." On import taxes, US forces personnel could import personal materials into RVN without payment of tax. However, this was a touchy area and all personnel were urged to use APO/FPO channels for all personal imports or handcarrying them rather than importing them through other than military mail channels. The austerity tax was an additional tax to the regular customs fees and was imposed on imported items. The rate varied and was higher for luxury items. In cases of import by Vietnamese firms, using US procurement and paid for by the US out of contract funds, this tax was still levied upon supplies, materials, and machinery imported to fulfill US contracts. Vietnamese firms were subject to this tax; however, exemption from the tax was sought on US contracts. The USC position on all three of these customs taxes was that any attempt to levy the taxes upon US forces, their agencies and instrumentalities, including US contractors, violated the terms of the tax exemptions granted the US in the Pentilateral Agreement.

(U) Other taxes which the US encountered in Vietnam included the dredging tax which was encountered in the Da Nang area, the drivers license tax which was encountered in the Cu Chi area by US TCN drivers of PA&E, and the Economic Consolidation Surtax which was a surtax upon clearing of accounts wherein items were brought into Vietnam. This tax was encountered in the MACV aid agreement to the RVNAF commissary system (See Chapter IV for a detailed discussion of the commissary system). The GVN taxed the imports which came in for the commissary system at a rate of \$VN 38 per US dollar.

(U) The variety of other taxes which existed in Vietnam were either non-applicable to the US (such as the various property taxes, since the USC owned no property in RVN) or the US was exempt by decree or a mutual understanding of the Pentilateral Agreement. 123

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## PROJECT MACONOMY

Project MACONOMY is the vehicle for identifying and highlighting those management improvement and cost effectiveness actions that have been accomplished or are in being, and to stimulate further imaginative management improvements. The program encompasses all elements of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and all significant management actions which they must take to enhance mission accomplishment at the most economical cost. The anticipated and accomplished savings reported for each management improvement action are estimated from the best source documents available to the reporting agencies. The concept of MACONOMY will continue to be stressed as we strive to fulfill our mission. 124

### General

(U) The object of Project MACONOMY was to develop a well-balanced, hard-hitting, highly effective, maximum-combat power military force which could be sustained at minimum cost for an indefinite period. Project MACONOMY had been initiated in October 1967 to identify and highlight management improvement and cost effectiveness actions, accomplished and in being, throughout MACV. A one-time reporting requirement was levied upon MACV staff elements and component/uni-service commanders. These reports were submitted on 15 December and reflected action taken in 1967. Total reported savings were estimated at \$108,468,217 and 2,727 manpower spaces. The actions reported in December served as building blocks for future management improvements to be reported by the originating activities on a monthly basis. These monthly reports were to be consolidated quarterly, published, and given extensive distribution. 125

### Accomplishments

(U) The first quarterly report for 1968 revealed a continued increase in total reported savings but a drop in total manpower savings. The accomplished savings of all elements of MACV amounted to \$132,764,301 with an estimated manpower savings of 708. A summary of management actions for the period 1 January-31 March 1968 appears below:

	<u>Estimated Monetary Savings</u>		
<u>Reported by</u>	<u>Actions</u>	<u>Anticipated</u>	<u>Accomplished</u>
MACV Staff	12	\$66,084,279	\$50,338,205
USARV	19	\$36,685,927	\$23,960,800
7AF	11	\$57,886,845	\$57,840,421

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## Estimated Monetary Savings

<u>Reported By</u>	<u>Actions</u>	<u>Anticipated</u>	<u>Accomplished</u>
NAVFORV	8	\$ 1,684,750	\$ 624,875
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>\$162,321,801</b>	<b>\$132,764,301</b>

## Estimated Manpower Savings

<u>Reported By</u>	<u>Actions</u>	<u>Anticipated</u>	<u>Accomplished</u>
MACV Staff	1	212	403
USARV	2	205	205
NAVFORV	1	100	100
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>917</b>	<b>708</b>

((U) Individual monetary savings actions ranged from a low of \$3,000 to a high of \$40,869,926 and were concerned with such items as Reduction of Casualty Evacuation Costs (HQ MACV Staff), Express Equipment (USARV), Reduction of Funded Requirements (7AF), and Stock Inventory Evaluation Validation and Excess (SIVE) Program (NAVFORV) as well as many others. Significant progress had been made toward achieving the objectives of MACONOMY as evidenced by the total number of actions and the savings achieved. <sup>126</sup>

(U) Cumulative totals for FY68 were impressive, reflecting saving of some \$512 million and estimated manpower space savings of 7,445. <sup>127</sup>

## Estimated Monetary Savings

<u>Reported By</u>	<u>Actions</u>	<u>Estimated Savings</u>
MACV Staff	29	\$ 92,778,772
USARV	48	241,511,664
7AF	45	176,926,353
NAVFORV	8	810,750
<b>Cumulative TOTALS</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>\$512,027,539</b>

## Estimated Manpower Space Savings

<u>Reported By</u>	<u>Actions</u>	<u>Estimated Savings</u>
MACV Staff	5	397
USARV	9	5,999
7AF	6	730
NAVFORV	3	159
<b>Cumulative TOTALS</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>7,445</b>

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## Recognition

(U) On 6 August, SECDEF noted that a review of FY68 accomplishments under Project MACONOMY showed significant management actions taken by elements of MACV to enhance mission accomplishments at the most economical costs, and that the achievement of these accomplishments under such adverse conditions was truly remarkable and considered worthy of special recognition. SECDEF informed COMUSMACV that a special unit citation would be awarded the MACV unit selected as representative of various organizations making significant contributions to the objectives and goals of Project MACONOMY. This award would be presented in the "Cost Reduction Week Recognition and Awards activities at the Pentagon or White House between 15 September and 15 October 1968." 128

(U) A board of senior officers at MACV decided that the participation in the program had been so extensive at all levels that it was desirable for each component and III MAF to receive an award. This approach would recognize the joint effort of all concerned and demonstrate the teamwork of US forces in Vietnam. This position was approved by COMUSMACV and OASD (I&L) Defense Cost Reduction Directorate. Each of the components and III MAF were requested by MACV to nominate one individual to represent their command at the award ceremony in Washington. 129

(U) As a consequence, four MACV representatives were presented citations by President Johnson at a ceremony in Washington, D. C. in October. This ceremony was the highlight of a Cost Reduction Week established to honor the thousands of defense employees who had contributed to cost reduction action since the inception of the program in 1962. 130

(U) Savings for the first half FY69 were impressive, as noted below, and indicated all services were giving full cooperation to ensure Project MACONOMY's success. 131

<u>Reported By</u>	<u>Estimated Monetary Savings</u>
MACV Staff	\$ 97,964,940
USARV	1,959,219
NAVFORV	1,070,949
TAF	140,725,603
III MAF	17,917
TOTAL	<u>\$241,738,628</u>

USARV also reported an estimated manpower savings of 1,087 spaces for the same period.

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## SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND SELECTED TOPICS - XII

1. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 161140Z Nov 68, Subj: Troop Morale in Vietnam (U), Gp-4.
2. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG, USARV, 160830Z Jul 68, Subj: US Unit Awards to Free World Forces (U), Gp-4.
3. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CG, USARV, 160845Z Aug 68, Subj: Impact Awards; DF (U) MACAG-PD to SJS, 10 Sep 68, Subj: Workload Data-Decorations and Awards for the months of January-August 1968; DF (U) MACAG-PD to SJS, 9 Jan 69, Subj: Workload Data-Decorations and Awards for the months of January-December 1968.
4. Ltr (FOUO), COMUSMACV (MACJ13) to CG, 9th Inf Div, 1 May 68, Subj: None Stated; Ltr (U) COMUSMACV to AMAMB Saigon, 1 Sep 68, Subj: Mission Policy, US Military Awards to Free World Forces; Memo (C) AMAMB Saigon to COMUSMACV, 16 Sep 68, Subj: Mission Policy, US Military Awards to Free World Forces (U) Gp-None; Interview (U) CPT Melanson USAF, MHB and LTC Mendenhall USA, MACJ13, Subj: Not Stated.
5. Memo (U), COMUSMACV (MACJ13) to AMAMB, 25 Jul 68, Subj: Civilian Awards; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 231205Z Jul 68, Subj: Ibid; Msg (U), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 220028Z Aug 68, Subj: Ibid.
6. Ltr (U), ASD (M&RA) to COMUSMACV, 12 Aug 68, Subj: Not Stated.
7. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CG, USARV, 020106Z Apr 68, Subj: Fifth Vietnam Campaign; Msg (U), DA to CINCUSARPAC, 281732Z May 68, Subj: Designation of Vietnam Campaigns.
8. Msg (U), DA to AIG7401, 272123Z Sep 68, Subj: Campaign Designations in Vietnam.
9. Briefing (U), MACJ42 to Cofs, 17 Jan 68, Subj: Project MOOSE Briefing; Ltr (U), MACJ4 to Mr. John A. Calhoun, 5 Jan 68, Subj: Not Stated; Ltr (U), MACJ02 to Mr. John A. Calhoun, 17 Jan 68, Subj: Not Stated; Ltr (U) MACJ43-LM to Mr. John A. Calhoun, 1 Jul 68, Subj: Not Stated.
10. Ltr (U), MACJ4 to DCG USARV, et al., 5 Mar 68, Subj: MOOSE, FY69; Ltr (U), MACJ43-LM to 7AF, 12 Aug 68, Subj: 7AF MOOSE Plan, FY69; Ltr (U), MACJ43-LM to CG, USA-RV, 12 Aug 68, Subj: United States Army Vietnam MOOSE Plan, FY69; Ltr (U), MACJ43-LM to CDR NAVFORV, 12 Aug 68, Subj: US Naval Forces, Vietnam MOOSE Plan FY69.
11. DF (U), MACJ12 to DCofS, 22 Mar 68, Subj: MACV Senior Officer Trailer Park; Ltr (U), MACJ12, to COMNAVFORV, 7 May 68, Subj: Utilization of Prestige Quarters.
12. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CG, USARV, 070855Z Jul 68, Subj: Evaluation for Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS).
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# UNCLASSIFIED

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16. Navy Times, 8 May 68.
17. Memo (U), AVHGA-PE to GEN Westmoreland, 25 May 68, Subj: Status of Short-term Voluntary Extension Program in USARV.
18. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to JCS, 210321Z Apr 68, Subj: Special 30-Day Leave Report: DB No. 146 (U), MACV Hq, 20 Jun 68, Item #9: Army Times, 5 Jun 68.
19. Army Times, 12 Jun 68.
20. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 140835Z Jan 68, Subj: R&R Program (U), Gp-4; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 080215Z Feb 68, Subj: Australian R&R Program Increases.
21. Rpts (S), MACJ1, n. d., Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, Jan-Dec 68 (U) Gp-None; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 071206Z Jan 69, Subj: R&R Participation for Dec 68 (U), Gp-4.
22. Ltr (U) ADM Sharp to GEN Westmoreland, 22 Jan 68, Subj: Not Stated.
23. Ltr (U), ADM Sharp to GEN Westmoreland, 22 Jan 68, Subj: Not Stated; Ltr (U), GEN Westmoreland to ADM Sharp, MACJ13, 28 Jan 68, Subj: Not Stated; Msg (C), AMEMB CANBERRA to COMUSMACV, 170717Z Jan 68, Subj: Conviction of R&R Personnel for Marijuana Smuggling (U), Gp-4; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG, III MAF, 030229Z Mar 68, Subj: Marijuana Traffic (U), Gp-4; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CG, USARV, 230140Z Apr 68, Subj: Marijuana Smuggling Aboard R&R Aircraft.
24. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to USARV, et al., 301501Z Oct 68, Subj: Restriction on the Number of Cigarettes an Individual May Take on R&R Flights to Sydney; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to USARV, et al., 091313Z Nov 68, Subj: Restriction on the Number of Cigarettes an Individual May Take On R&R Flights to Sydney.
25. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to USARV, et al., 270935Z Dec 68, Subj: Marijuana Smuggling Aboard R&R Aircraft.
26. Msg (U), CSAF to CINCPACAF, 271851Z Feb 68, Subj: Reduced Fares, West Coast Points to Hawaii for Parents Joining Members on R&R in Hawaii; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to USA-RV, Subj: Reduced Fares for Parents of R&R Servicemen; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to USARV, Subj: Reduced Fares for Parents of R&R Servicemen.
27. Msg (U), CSAF to CINCPACAF, 041741Z Jan 68, Subj: Reduced Fares, West Coast Points for Wives Joining Husbands on R&R Leave in Hawaii.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

28. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to COMAC, 201605Z Dec 68, Subj: Extended In-flight Service for R&R Aircraft; Msg (U), MAC to COMUSMACV, 241632Z Dec 68, Subj: Extended In-flight Service for R&R Aircraft.
29. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 100532Z Nov 68, Subj: Wear of Civilian Clothing While Travelling on R&R Aircraft.
30. Msg (U), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 272211Z Jan 69, Subj: Optional Wear of Civilian Clothing While Travelling on R&R Aircraft.
31. Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB WELLINGTON, 062054Z Mar 68, Subj: Classified, Gp-None; Msg (C), CINCPAC to JCS, 180208Z Apr 68, Subj: Classified, Gp-4; Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB WELLINGTON, 172259Z May 68, Subj: Classified, Gp-None; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 071155Z Apr 68, Subj: Classified, Gp-4.
32. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 191321Z Sep 68, Subj: Classified, Gp-4.
33. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 140825Z Jan 68, Subj: R&R Program (U), Gp-4; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 080219Z Feb 68, Subj: Australian R&R Program Increased; Msg (C), CINCPAC to JCS, 130335Z Feb 68, Subj: R&R Program (U), Gp-4; Msg (U), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 311949Z May 68, Subj: R&R Increase in Australia Approved; Msg (C) CINCPAC to JCS, 040114Z Jun 68, Subj: R&R Increase to Australia (U), Gp-4; Msg (U), CINCPACREP/AUSTRALIA to CINCPAC, 010730Z Jul 68, Subj: Adjusted Second Qtr FY69 R&R Rqmts, Australia; Msg (U), CINCPAC to COMAC, 030127Z Jul 68, Subj: Adjusted Second Qtr FY69 R&R Rqmt, Australia.
34. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to USARV, 100145Z Apr 68, Subj: Restriction on Travel to Bangkok, Thailand (U), Gp-4; Msg (C), CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 032309Z Apr 68, Subj: Thailand In-country R&R Program (U), Gp-4; Msg (C), CINCPAC to JCS, 042151Z May 68, Subj: Bangkok R&R Quota (U), Gp-4; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to COMUSMACHAL, 060644Z May 68, Subj: Bangkok R&R Quota (U), Gp-4.
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36. Command Bulletin No 242 (U), MACV Hq, 10 Oct 68.
37. Exchange Talk, July 1968.
38. Rpt (U), PACEX, n. d., Subj: Investigation of Losses Incurred by the Vietnam Regional Exchange, Period of 25 Dec 65 - 10 Jan 67; Ltr (U), RVNR-FAI-7.2, 20 Dec 67, Subj: Replies to Report of Investigation-RVNR, 26 Dec 65 - 10 Jan 67.
39. Msg (C), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 290212Z Dec 67, Subj: Losses of Exchange Merchandise (U), Gp-4.
40. Msg (C), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 290212Z Dec 67, Subj: Losses of Exchange Merchandise (U), Gp-4; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 011449Z Feb 68, Subj: Losses of Exchange Merchandise (U), Gp-4.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

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42. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 151233Z Jul 68, Subj: Military Exchange Privileges for Filipino and Korean Military Personnel in Vietnam.
43. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 281143Z Jul 68, Subj: Diversion of Supplies and SVN Black Market; Interview (U), CPT Melanson USAF, MHB and LTC Adair USA, MACJ15, Subj: Not Stated.
44. Ltr (U), MACJ13 to Chairman, Vietnam Regional Exchange Board, 23 Jan 68, Subj: Liquor Control; Ltr (U), 7AF to COMUSMACV, 17 Apr 68, Subj: Diversion of Supplies in SVN Black Market.
45. Msg (U), JCS to CINCPAC, 251542Z May 68, Subj: Airline Ticket Sales in RVN; Msg (U), USARPAC to CINCPAC, 250525Z May 68, Subj: Airline Ticket Sales in RVN; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 310044Z May 68, Subj: Airline Ticket Sales in RVN; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 260744Z Aug 68, Subj: Pan Am Operation of Airline Ticket Sales in RVN.
46. Bklt (TS), MACJ031, 16 Sep 68, Subj: MACV Command History, 1967 (U), Gp-1; Rpts (U), MACAG, n. d., Subj: Quarterly Historical Summaries, 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Qtr, CY68.
47. Msg (U), DA to COMUSMACV, 112039Z Sep 68, Subj: The 1968 Santa Claus Special; Stars & Stripes, 2 Dec 68; Rpt (U), MACAG, n. d., Subj: Quarterly Historical Summary, 4th Qtr, CY68.
48. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 291530Z Dec 68, Subj: Proposed Amendment to PL 90-206 to Forbid Commercial Use of SAM and PAL Mail.
49. Ltr (U), 7AF to COMUSMACV, 8 Jun 68, Subj: Airlift of Parcel Post Mail; Ltr (U), MACAG-SP to 7AF, 17 Jun 68, Subj: Airlift of Parcel Post Mail; Msg (U), CINCPAC to CSAF, 140131Z Aug 68, Subj: Use of Retrograde Airlift to Transport 3d and 4th Class Mail from RVN to CONUS; Stars and Stripes, 2 Dec 68.
50. Interview (U), CPT Melanson USAF, MHB, and Mr. Higgins, HQ SEA-ARC, 6 Feb 69, Subj: Not Stated; Bklt (TS), MACJ031, 16 Sep 68, Subj: MACV Command History, 1967 (U), Gp-1
51. DF (U), MACCH to MACJ03, 17 Feb 68, Subj: Historical Summary; Periodical, Army Digest, Jan 69, Vol 24, #1.
52. Ltr (U), COMUSMACV to Mr. Milton Feitelson, 9 Jun 68, Subj: Not Stated.
53. Rpt (C), MACJ1, n. d., Subj: Historical Summary for Mar 68 (U), Gp-None; USO Door Count Sheet (U), n. d., Subj: Not Stated; Interview (U), Between CPT Melanson, USAF, MHB & LCDR Wood, USN, MACJ13, 4 Feb 68, Subj: Not Stated.
54. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 060730Z Jul 68, Subj: DOD/USO Sponsored Professional Entertainers.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

55. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to TAG, WASH DC, 130016Z Aug 68, Subj: Professional and Commercial Entertainment Programs.
56. Rpts (S), MACJ1, n. d., Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, Jan - Dec 68 (U), Gp-None.
57. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG, USARV, et al., 311025Z Aug 68, Subj: Conduct of US Forces Personnel (U), Gp-4.
58. Rpt (C), MACJA, 2 May 68, Subj: Historical Report, 1st Qtr CY68 (U), Gp-4.
59. Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB SAIGON, 212011Z Mar 68, Subj: Court-Martial of Civilians (U), Gp-None; Rpt (C), MACJA, 2 May 68, Subj: Historical Report, 1st Qtr CY68 (U), Gp-4.
60. Msg (U), CG, USARV to DA, 210129Z Aug 68, Subj: Not Stated; Msg (C), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 211059Z Sep 68, Subj: Request for Waiver of Jurisdiction, CA Branum (U), Gp-None.
61. Msg (C), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 211059Z Sep 68, Subj: Request for Waiver of Jurisdiction, CA Branum (U), Gp-None.
62. Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB SAIGON, 081632Z Oct 68, Subj: Branum Court Martial Case (U), Gp-3; Rpt (U), MACJA, 3 Feb 69, Subj: Historical Report-July thru December 1968.
63. Msg (C), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 090850Z Nov 68, Subj: Branum Case (U), Gp-None; Msg (C), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 211300Z Oct 68, Subj: Branum Case (U), Gp-None.
64. Msg (C), CINCPAC to SECDEF, 210352Z Dec 68, Subj: Branum Case (U), Gp-4; Rpt (U), MACJA, 3 Feb 69, Subj: Historical Report for Jul - Dec 68.
65. Msg (U), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 8 Jul 68, Subj: Not Stated; Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB SAIGON, 020011Z Aug 68, Subj: US Civilians-Court-Martial (U), Gp-None; Embtel (U), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 21 Aug 68, Subj: Request for Waivers of Jurisdiction: John N. Morris, Arlen R. Johnson.
66. Ltr (U), MACJA to MACJ031, 3 Feb 69, Subj: Historical Report-Jul thru Dec 68.
67. Embtel (U), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 17 Sep 68, Subj: Request for Waiver of Jurisdiction: Raymond G. Averrette; Rpt (U), MACJA, n. d., Subj: Historical Report Jul - Dec 68.
68. Briefing (U), MACJ15 to LTG Lampert, 28 Jun 68, Subj: Illegal Activities in Vietnam.
69. Fact Sheet (U), MACJ15 to MACJ1, 18 Jan 69, Subj: Narcotics.
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71. DF (U), MACJ15 to SJS, 14 Feb 69, Subj: Currency and Commodity Violators, CY68.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

72. Rpt (C) MACCOM, 22 Jan 69, Subj: Historical Summary (U) Gp-None; Embtel (U), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 040800Z Nov 68, Subj: MPC Conversion.
73. Rpts (S), DA, 24 Jan and 17 Jul 68, Subj: Army Buildup Progress Report (U), Gp-4; MACV Dir 20-5 (U), MACJA, 15 Mar 68, Subj: Prisoners of War -- Determination of Eligibility.
74. Honolulu Advertiser, February 1, 1968.
75. Msg (C), AMEMB VIENTIANE to SECSTATE, 161736Z Feb 68, Subj: Release of Prisoners (U), Gp-3.
76. Msg (C), AMEMB VIENTIANE to SECDEF, 171127Z Feb 68, Subj: Release of Prisoners (U), Gp-3.
77. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG, III MAF, 310927Z Mar 68, Subj: VC Release of Two American Women (U), Gp-4.
78. Msg (U), ACSI DA to CG, USARV, 011220Z Apr 68, Subj: Not Stated.
79. Embtel (U), AMEMB Saigon to SECSTATE, 9 Jul 68, Subj: Not Stated.
80. Embtel (U), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 3 Jul 68, Subj: Release of Three US Pilots (U); AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 9 Jul 68, Subj: Not Stated; Embtel (S), AMEMB PARIS to SECSTATE, 18 Jul 68, Subj: Not Stated, Gp-None; Embtel (U), AMEMB BANGKOK to SECSTATE, 19 Jul 68, Subj: Not Stated; Embtel (C), AMEMB VIENTIANE to SECSTATE, 20 Jul 68, Subj: Release of 3 Pilots (U), Gp-3.
81. Msg (C), AMEMB BANGKOK to AMEMB SAIGON, 261100Z Nov 68, Subj: Released VC Prisoner Australian Keith Hyland (U), Gp-3.
82. MFR (C), MACJ3-06, 4 Jan 69, Subj: After Action Report PW Release 18 Dec 68 to 2 Jan 69 (U), Gp-4.
83. Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB MANILA, 282108Z May 68, Subj: Tug Prisoners (U), Gp-3; Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB NEW DELHI, 291001Z May 68, Subj: Tug Prisoners (U), Gp-3; Msg (C) AMEMB MANILA to SECSTATE, 310729Z May 68, Subj: Tug Prisoners (U), Gp-None; Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB MANILA, 052343Z Jun 68, Subj: Tug Prisoners in Phnom Penh (U), Gp-3; Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB BANGKOK, 061625Z Jun 68, Subj: Tugboat Prisoners (U), Gp-None; Msg (C), CG USARV to DA, 131332Z Jun 68, Subj: Returnees from Cambodian Control (U), Gp-3; Embtel (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB SEOUL, 1 Aug 68, Subj: Cambodian Detention of American LCU and Crew (U), Gp-3.
84. Embtel (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB SAIGON, 31 Jul 68, Subj: LCU Detained in Cambodia (U), Gp-None; Embtel (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB SEOUL, 1 Aug 68, Subj: Cambodian Detention of American LCU and Crew (U), Gp-3; Stars and Stripes, 21 Jul 68.
85. Stars and Stripes, Nov 68, Msg, (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB SAIGON, 130107Z Nov 68, Subj: LCU Detainees and Cambodian Incidents (U), Gp-None; Msg (C), AMEMB BANGKOK to SECSTATE, 201256Z Dec 68, Subj: LCU Detainees (U), Gp-4; Msg (C), AMEMB

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

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86. Embtel (C), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 18 Oct 68, Subj: US POW Escapes from Cambodia (U), Gp-4.
  87. Msg (C), SA 21st ARVN Inf Div to SA IV CTZ, 310935Z Dec 68, Subj: Returned US Personnel (U), Gp-4; Msg (C), DCG USARV to ACSI DA, 010255Z Jan 69, Subj: Recap-Pac (U), Gp-3; Msg (C), SA IV CTZ to COMUSMACV JPRC, 311530Z Dec 68, Subj: Returned US Personnel (U), Gp-4; Stars and Stripes, 4 Jan and 5 Jan 69.
  88. Rpt (S), MACJ341, 3 Feb 68, Subj: MACV Year-end Wrap-up Report, CY67 (U), Gp-4.
  89. Rpt (TS), MACJ5, 9 Jul 68, Subj: Strategic Perspectives (U), Gp-1.
  90. Rpt (TS), MACJ5, 1 Jul 68, Subj: Strategic Perspectives (U), Gp-1.
  91. Rpt (C), USARV, 15 Feb 68, Subj: Operational Report of Lessons Learned, 1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68 (U), Gp-4.
  92. Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB SAIGON, 220120Z Feb 68, Subj: Reciprocal Release of NVN PWs in Response to Release of Three Pilots (U), Gp-None; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG, III MAF, 050950Z Mar 68, Subj: Classified, Gp-4; Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB SAIGON, 060048Z Mar 68, Subj: Reciprocal Release of NVN PWs in Response to Release of Three Pilots (U), Gp-None; Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB SAIGON, 070048Z Mar 68, Subj: Reciprocal Release of NVN PWs in Response to Release of Three Pilots (U), Gp-None; Msg (S), AMEMB VIENTIANE to SECSTATE, 121200Z Mar 68, Subj: Release of NVN Sailors (U), Gp-1; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG, III MAF, 280925Z Mar 68, Subj: Classified, Gp-4.
  93. Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB PARIS, 061613Z Jun 68, Subj: Repatriation of Prisoners to NVN (U), Gp-3; Msg (C), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 13 Jun 68, Subj: Repatriation of Prisoners to NVN (U), Gp-None.
  94. Msg (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB VIENTIANE, 312224Z Jul 68, Subj: Release of NVN Prisoners (U), Gp-3; Msg (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB VIENTIANE, 082319Z Aug 68, Subj: Release of NVN Prisoners, Gp-3; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG, III MAF, et al., 071203Z Aug 68, Subj: Repatriation of NVN Naval Personnel (U), Gp-4; Msg (S), AMEMB PARIS to SECSTATE, 111343Z Aug 68, Subj: Not Stated, Gp-1; Memo (S), COMUSMACV to AMEMB SAIGON, 4 Oct 68, Subj: Classified, Gp-4; Msg (S), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 051100Z Oct 68, Subj: Classified, Gp-4; Msg (S), CTF 76 to USS DUBUQUE, 191957Z Oct 68, Subj: Operation MIGHTY YANKEE (U), Gp-4; Embtel (C), SECSTATE to US Mission, Geneva, Subj: Classified, Gp-4.
  95. Embtel (C), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 080510Z Nov 68, Subj: GVN Release of 140 PWs (U), Gp-None; Embtel (C), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 26 Nov 68, Subj: GVN Release of 140 PWs (U), Gp-None; Stars and Stripes, 26 Nov 68.
  96. Msg (S), COMSEVENTHFLT to COMNAVFORV, 070400Z Dec 68, Subj: Classified, Gp-4.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

97. Msg (S), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 091200Z Dec 68, Subj: Classified, Gp-None.
98. Msg (S), COMSEVENTHFLT to CTF 76, 141606Z Dec 68, Subj: Operation TIGHT JAW (U), Gp-4; Msg (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB SAIGON, 140031Z Dec 68, Subj: Return to NVN Personnel (U), Gp-None; Msg (S), COMSEVENTHFLT to CTF-76, 042328Z Dec 68, Subj: Operation TIGHT JAW (U), Gp-4.
99. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to SA I CTZ, 230252Z Feb 68, Subj: PW Camp Security (U), Gp-4; Ltr (C) COMUSMACV to CG, III MAF et al., 11 Dec 68, Subj: Security of Correction Centers (U) Gp-4.
100. Msg (C), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 092352Z Mar 68, Subj: Release of Prisoners (U), Gp-4; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 011526Z Apr 68, Subj: Release of Prisoners (U), Gp-4.
101. Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB SAIGON, 110313Z Jan 68, Subj: Repatriations to NVN (U), Gp-None; Embtel (U), AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE, 24 May 68, Subj: Repatriations to NVN (U), Gp-None; Embtel (C), US Mission Geneva to SECSTATE, 18 May 68, Subj: Repatriations to NVN (U), Gp-None.
102. Rpt (S), RVNAF/MACV, 11 Nov 67, Subj: Combined Campaign Plan, 1968 (U), Gp-4.
103. Msg (S), CG, II FFORCEV to COMUSMACV, 312255Z Dec 67, Subj: Security of Capital Military District (U), Gp-4.
104. Manual (U), MACV, n. d., Subj: Organizations & Functions.
105. Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 July 1968.
106. Msg (C), CG, CMAC to COMUSMACV, 240445Z Jul 68, Subj: Defense Reaction/Reinforcement of Critical Installations (U), Gp-4.
107. Rpt (C), AMEMB SAIGON - Mission Weekly, 7-13 July 1968, Subj: Saigon Security and Public Attitudes (U), Gp-None.
108. Rpt (U), 45th MI Hist Det, 8 Aug 68, Subj: The Da Nang Infiltration Barrier.
109. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 050722Z Jan 68, Subj: Defense Against Rocket Attacks (U), Gp-4.
110. Rpt (S), HQ II FFORCEV Arty, 15 Aug 68, Subj: Operational Report of Hq II FFORCEV Artillery for Period Ending 31 Jul 68 (U), Gp-4.
111. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 280236Z Feb 68, Subj: Aircraft Destroyed/Damaged (U), Gp-4; Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 090420Z Mar 68, Subj: Aircraft Destroyed/Damaged (U), Gp-4.
112. Rpt (U), 23 July 68, Early Bird Edition - Current News.
113. DF (TS), MACJ5 to SJS (MHB), 19 Mar 68, Subj: Monthly History (U), Gp-None; MACV Observer, 7 Feb 69, Vol 7, No. 40.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

114. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CDR 7AF, et al., 191027Z Jun 68, Subj: Security of Communications Facilities (U), Gp-4.
115. Ltr (C), COMUSMACV to CG, III MAF, et al., 11 Dec 68, Subj: Security of Correction Centers (U), Gp-4.
116. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to Subordinate Commanders, 170413Z Jun 68, Subj: Survey of Bridge Security (U), Gp-4.
117. Ltr (C), CofS MACV to CofS JCS/RVNAF, 25 Jul 68, Subj: Not Stated, Gp-4.
118. Memo (C), CofS MACV to CofS JCS/RVNAF, 18 Aug 68, Subj: Protection of the Ben Luc Bridge (U), Gp-None.
119. Msg (C), CG, II FFORCEV to COMUSMACV, 220215Z Aug 68, Subj: Incident Report (U), Gp-4.
120. Msg (C), SA IV CTZ to COMUSMACV, 292152Z Aug 68, Subj: Damaged Bridge Incident Report (U), Gp-4; Msg (C), SA IV CTZ to COMUSMACV, 300220Z Aug 68, Subj: Damaged Bridge Incident Report (U), Gp-4; Msg (C), CG, II FFORCEV to COMUSMACV, 301000Z Aug 68, Subj: Incident Report (U), Gp-4.
121. Ltr (C), COMUSMACV to CG, USARV, 9 Sep 68, Subj: Security Lighting for Bridges in Saigon-Gia Dinh (U), Gp-4.
122. DF (C) MACJ3 to MACJ031, 1 Apr 69, Subj: Draft 1968 MACV Command History (U), Gp-None.
123. Compendium (U), MACJA, n.d., Subj: Compendium of Vietnamese Tax Laws.
124. Rpt (U), GEN Westmoreland, 31 Mar 68, Subj: Forward to Quarterly Report of Project MACONOMY.
125. Rpt (S), MACJ 341, 3 Feb 68, Subj: USMACV Year-End Wrap-Up Report CY67 (U), Gp-4.
126. Rpt (U), MACV, 31 Mar 68, Subj: Quarterly Report on Project MACONOMY.
127. Rpt (U), 30 Jun 68, Subj: Project MACONOMY FY68 Year-End Report.
128. Msg (U), SECDEF to COMUSMACV, 062043Z Aug 68, Subj: Not Stated.
129. Rpt (U), MACCO, n.d., Subj: Historical Summary, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 68.
130. MACV Observer, 1 Nov 68.
131. Rpt (U), MACCO, n.d., Subj: Historical Summary, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 68.

UNCLASSIFIED



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ANNEX A -- 1ET OFFENSIVE IN RETROSPECT

(U) On 30 January 1968, the enemy violated his announced ceasefire in recognition of the Buddhist Lunar New Year holiday (Tet) and launched a country-wide attack on the major cities of SVN (See Figure A-1). He was well aware that, during the holiday period, the populace would be visiting with families and that RVNAF would be at a reduced status due to the granting of leave to its members. Also, a unilateral 36-hour stand-down, from the evening of 29 January through the early morning of 31 January, had been declared by the GVN and its allies, thus creating an ideal opportunity for the attack.

(C) It was inconceivable to the SVN citizens that the VC/NVA would stage such a large scale attack on the most sacred night of Tet -- 29 January. Celebrations, church services, and parties in every city were attended by patrons of the normal security elements, regardless of the RVNAF organization to which they belonged. As a result, RVNAF strength on 29 January was reduced to about 50 percent and, due to the inadequacy of the Vietnamese communication system, the effective notification of the bulk of these forces when the truce was broken was impossible. Consequently, when the major attacks came on 31 January, the RVNAF effective strength was still approximately 50 percent. The RF/PF units, whose members normally live near their outposts, were at approximately 70 percent strength.

(C) Past experience had indicated the probable violation of the truce set by the enemy and all of RVNAF and the Free World Allies expected his use of the truce to build up his logistics base for future operations. GVN and RVNAF authorities had also expected that the enemy would launch an attack either before or during the Tet holiday season; consequently, rehearsals and coordination of defense plans were accomplished during January. However, despite the many intelligence indications of a major offensive, including the possibility of a significant assault on urban areas, the magnitude of the attack came as a surprise. One reason, of course, was that any major attack on the cities represented a completely new departure from past enemy strategy.


VC Strategy and Plan

(U) According to various sources and VC documents captured in the weeks just prior to the Tet Offensive, the main VC/NVA strategy was based on the fact that "the war will reach a culminating point in 1967-68 with the objectives of forcing US and FWM forces to withdraw from Vietnam and the GVN to accept a coalition government," which the NLF/SVN could dominate.

(U) The objectives of forcing US and other FWM forces to withdraw and gaining a coalition government were to be achieved by a general counter-offensive featuring large-scale, powerful, continuous attacks utilizing reserve forces supported by newer and larger weapons. This counter-offensive was to coincide with a general uprising of the people in SVN who would assist the VC in destroying the GVN. The attacks were to be directed at political and military targets, such as provincial and district capitals, GVN in Saigon, RD Cadres, and National Police; widespread attacks by fire designed to demonstrate the failure of GVN to protect the people; and finally, the destruction and/or demoralization of the RVNAF.

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FIGURE A-1

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(U) The enemy went to extensive effort to infiltrate the nation's cities prior to his first attacks by fire. His men slipped in, particularly Hue and Saigon, among the crowds of holiday travelers, on produce trucks, and in everyday traffic. Local force units were the first to infiltrate the cities, leaving larger main force units in reserve to await the expected popular uprising -- which did not materialize -- before being committed. He used funeral processions to smuggle in weapons and arms. Other quantities of arms and ammunition were smuggled into the towns in market baskets, in vegetable trucks, under lumber, or in false bottomed sampans.

(U) In order to divert a major portion of our resources to a remote area while he attacked the major cities of RVN, the enemy had moved in strength on our border outpost at Khe Sanh in northwest Quang Tri Province prior to the commencement of Tet. Khe Sanh was a critical position in that it guarded the approaches to Quang Tri City and Dong Ha. (COMUSMACV was resolved to hold Khe Sanh, for we could not permit the VC/NVA to establish another threatening base area within easy access to NVN and Laos, as they had done in the A Shau Valley in 1966).

#### I Corps Tactical Zone

(U) During the fall of 1967, an increasing number of documents and PW reports obtained by Allied intelligence in the I CTZ indicated a possible large-scale enemy offensive was to be directed against cities and major military installations. Further information obtained in the Da Nang area left little doubt that the attacks would be not only Corps-wide but probably country-wide. A crash security program by the enemy in the southern two provinces of I CTZ tended to confirm the offensive. The Americal Division reported large-scale movements of enemy troops and equipment and noted that district and regional forces were moving out of their local areas to consolidate with other units. During December it was discovered that the entire 320th NVA Div had infiltrated into the two northern provinces of I CTZ.

(C) By December, only one major unit, the 1st ARVN Div at Hue, took exception to the view that a major night offensive against population centers would come. This division could neither credit the enemy with "the intent" nor "the capability to launch a division size attack against Hue."

(C) With this single exception, all major I Corps commands were fully alerted by mid-December to the likelihood of a large-scale enemy offensive. So certain was III MAF HQ of the enemy's intentions, that a plan (Operation CLAXTON) was developed which included the detonation of controlled demolitions and fire bombs at Da Nang Air Base, Marble Mountain Air Facility, and the Force Logistics Command to represent a rocket attack on these installations in order to deceive the enemy into prematurely launching his attack. It was assumed that a major rocket attack by the enemy would be used to signal a ground attack in the Da Nang area.

(C) On 20 December, the plan was tested and although no enemy ground attack occurred, enemy rocket units were deceived into disclosing their positions. As a result, the positions were taken under fire by artillery and ground units and a possible enemy rocket attack was thwarted.

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(C) Despite the fact that Operation CLAXTON had failed to trigger a large-scale enemy attack on Da Nang, there was still little doubt that an enemy offensive was forthcoming. With the hard intelligence available, III MAF commanders were strongly opposed to any truce in the I CTZ and approximately six hours prior to the time the truce was to go into effect, the decision to cancel the Tet truce in I CTZ was announced. COMUSMACV and CG, III MAF agreed that, in view of the increasing enemy threat to Khe Sanh and the likelihood of a large-scale attack on population centers, the proposed truce would have an adverse effect on the tactical situation in I CTZ. All units in I Corps were at 100 percent alert on 30 January when the enemy began his effort.

(U) Beginning in the early hours of 30 January with widespread attacks on Allied installations throughout the I Corps area, the enemy Tet Offensive was met everywhere by resourceful and aggressive Allied countermeasures which denied the enemy his major objectives and forced him back on the defensive. Only at Hue City, aided by bad weather and tactical surprise, was the enemy able to hold his objective for more than a few hours.

(C) The enemy main effort in Quang Nam, as expected, centered on Da Nang and Hoi An. At 0330 on 30 January, the enemy initiated rocket and mortar attacks against the Da Nang Air Base, Marble Mountain Air Facility, and the I Corps Hq Compound, followed by a ground attack on the I Corps Hq. A few of the enemy succeeded in penetrating the compound but caused only minor damage before being driven out by a reaction force from the 4th ARVN Armd Cav Regt. The reaction force pursued the enemy; being joined later in the day by elements of the 1st ARVN Rngr Gp and the 1st MP Bn. The retreating enemy force suffered heavy casualties and lost their battalion commander before they were finally able to break contact and withdraw.

(S) One major enemy objective during Tet was to inflict major damage on Allied aircraft and facilities throughout the Republic. The attacks on the Marble Mountain and Da Nang airfields were significant examples of damage inflicted on air assets in the Republic. In the attack on the Marble Mountain Airfield at 300300 January, 17 helicopters and one observation plane were damaged. At Da Nang Air Base in the attack at 300330 January, 2 F4B, 1 F4C, and 1 A-6A were destroyed while 27 tactical aircraft were damaged.

(C) While the Da Nang area had been under attack, the enemy had also made a determined effort to capture Hoi An. Here the attacking forces, supported by heavy mortar fire, attempted to penetrate the city through the 102d Engineer Compound. The Engineers, supported by APCs and flare ships, repelled the attack but not before substantial enemy forces had infiltrated the city. The remainder of the attacking force retreated to a dependent housing area east of the compound where they were badly mauled by direct fire from ARVN artillery. Meanwhile, three companies of the 2d ROK Bde had been dispatched as a reaction force and began gradually forcing the enemy out of Hoi An towards the northeast. A fourth ROK company, supported by USMC tanks, moved into the city from the northwest to protect the Provincial Capital and the MACV Compound areas.

(C) Although GEN Lam, I Corps Commander, had granted the 2d ROK Mar Bde permission to employ all supporting arms necessary to clear the city, GEN Kim, Brigade Commander, undertook to position his forces in a manner which would permit the enemy to withdraw to the northeast as pressure was applied. This decision, although somewhat prolonging the battle, undoubtedly prevented the destruction of much of Hoi An and saved many civilian lives. By 0700 on 31 January, the ROK Mar Brigade and ARVN units occupied most of the city and had forced the enemy through the gap to the northeast where he was engaged by the 10th Company of the ROK Mar brigade and ARVN rangers and suffered heavy losses before completing his withdrawal. A

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second attack on Hoi An on 6 February failed to penetrate the city and was repulsed in less than five hours.

(C) The enemy's only success in Quang Nam Province was his occupation of the Duy Xuyen Subsector Headquarters. Fearing that his headquarters was about to be overrun, the Province Chief of Duy Xuyen had withdrawn his forces west to Tra Kien and within a few hours the enemy entered unopposed. However, Duy Xuyen was reoccupied by elements of the 2d ROK Mar Brigade on 3 February.

(C) The second phase of the enemy's offensive in Quang Nam Province was marked by the attempt of the 2d NVA Div to attack the city of Da Nang from the south. The division was late in starting and was unable to close on Da Nang in time to take advantage of the local force attacks of 30 and 31 January. However, by 6 February it was apparent that the enemy would move in force against Da Nang and that the two battalions of the 1st Mar Div, which had blunted all his major thrusts, would probably be insufficient to stop the enemy's main attack. Accordingly, CG, III MAF decided to reinforce the defense with two additional battalions from the Americal Division. These battalions, the 2d Bn, 1st Inf, and the 1st Bn, 6th Inf, were moved north and almost immediately were in contact with elements of the 2d NVA Div.

(C) COMUSMACV, who was then on an inspection tour of I Corps, suggested that the Americal units be deployed as a reinforcement element to Da Nang. In conference with GEN Robertson, CG, 1st Mar Div, GEN Korter, CG, Americal Division, and GEN Murray, DEP CG, III MAF, a plan was evolved to interpose the two Americal battalions, reinforced by two 1st Mar Div Bns, between Da Nang and the enemy. Meanwhile, the lead enemy battalions, advancing north on the night of 7 February, began a heavy attack on Combined Action Platoon E-4. This was the enemy's fatal error.

(C) By turning aside to eliminate this small unit, the enemy revealed his exact position and was promptly engaged by elements of 1st Bn, 3d Mar Regt and 1st Bn, 6th Inf. The enemy suffered over 250 KIA and his attack on Da Nang was decisively broken up. By 10 February, he was in full retreat from the Da Nang TAOR.

(C) In Quang Tri Province, the enemy also met with little success. A heavy ground attack, supported by mortars, against Quang Tri City on 31 January was repulsed with the enemy suffering heavy losses. Later in the day, five companies of the 1st Bde, 1st Air Cav Div, supported by elements of the 1st ARVN Regt, smashed into the enemy's assembly area east of the city, inflicting heavy casualties and driving the enemy from his positions. By 0700 on 1 February, the enemy was in full retreat from the city area.

(C) Elsewhere in the province, efforts to mount an attack on the Hai Lang District Headquarters and Trien Phuong District Headquarters were frustrated by Allied artillery and aggressive spoiling attacks by elements of the 1st Air Cav Div and the 1st ARVN Regt.

(C) The Cam Lo District Headquarters, which came under attack on 2 February, was defended only by an eight-man advisory team and a single platoon of US Marines since all Vietnamese personnel had abandoned their posts and sought cover. This small force, with artillery support, nevertheless succeeded in repelling an attack by an estimated five battalions of the 320th NVA Div inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.

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(C) In Quang Ngai Province, the enemy made his main effort in the early morning of 31 January with a five-pronged attack against Quang Ngai City supported by mortars, rockets, and recoilless rifles. The enemy failed to secure most of his objectives but did succeed in occupying the provincial jail and the hospital. A counterattack by RF/PF forces, supported by a platoon of APCs and Americal gunships, cleared the hospital, but the enemy retained control of the jail and fighting continued throughout the day. The last enemy positions were finally reduced by 0800 on 1 February. Allied forces, pursuing the retreating enemy units, inflicted heavy casualties and captured numerous heavy weapons.

(C) At the same time that Quang Ngai City came under attack, the enemy launched heavy ground attacks against Allied installations in the Tam Ky area of Quang Tin Province. These attacks were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. Quang Tin Provincial Headquarters was briefly occupied by the enemy, but within a few hours, a counterattack by the 4th Bn, 5th ARVN Regt had restored the area to friendly control.

(C) The enemy's only real success in the I Corps area was his 26-day occupation of Hue City. Launching his attack on the city at 0340 on 31 January, the enemy achieved complete tactical surprise. He was aided by the absence of many ARVN personnel who had left the city on Tet leave and by the rivalry between the NP and ARVN, which had prevented ARVN from stationing substantial numbers of troops in the city.

(C) In the Hue area, the enemy had ready access to the city from his base in the A Shau Valley. A covering outpost like the one at Khe Sanh covering Quang Tri City was not available. Consequently, enemy regular units (eight VC/NVA battalions under the command of the 6th NVA Regt) were able to move rapidly and directly into the city. Before the battle was over, some 16 NVA battalions had been identified in the city.

(C) Fortunately our forces had been well positioned in the Hue area prior to the attack. The 1st Cav had been moved from II CTZ to the Quang Tri area in January in preparation for planned offensive operations into several enemy base areas along the Laotian border. At the same time, the 1st Mar Div operational area had been extended northward to Hue.

(C) Within a few hours the enemy was in control of the Citadel and the sector south of the Perfume River which contained the MACV Compound, the University, and a heavily populated residential area. The recapture of Hue was a hard, bitter fight. It involved house to house fighting and a slow but deadly process of routing the entrenched enemy from the heavily walled ancient fortress of the Imperial City. Two USMC companies, one each from the 1st Bn, 1st Mar Regt and 2d Bn, 5th Mar Regt, were employed with ARVN units on 1 February in an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge the enemy. The results of this attempt indicated that the number of enemy troops had been underestimated. Two more companies from the 2d Bn, 5th Mar Regt were committed to the battle. Despite the handicap of poor weather, which severely restricted the use of supporting arms, especially air, the four Marine companies succeeded in clearing the area south of the river by 9 February and accounted for over 1,000 enemy KIA. However, as long as the enemy could retain control of the southwest wall of the Citadel, he could still reinforce and resupply his troops north of the river. Elements of the 1st Air Cav Div, after encountering stubborn enemy resistance west of the city, succeeded in clearing the southwest wall on 24 February and effectively isolating the enemy.

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(C) Meanwhile, beginning on 12 February, elements of the 5th Mar Regt and Vietnamese Marines began an attack on the Citadel area from the north and northeast. Still hampered by bad weather, the attacking forces encountered fierce enemy resistance which obligated GEN Lam to authorize air strikes and heavy naval gunfire against the citadel. On the afternoon of 24 February, the Vietnamese Black Panther Company assaulted and seized the Imperial Palace, and on 25 February the Citadel was declared secure and the city of Hue returned to GVN control.

(C) A local failure in intelligence and population control had allowed the enemy to penetrate and occupy large sections of Hue and several miscalculations in the first few days of fighting had allowed him to secure his position within the Citadel and prolong the fighting in Hue. These errors were:

1. Piecemeal commitment of friendly reaction forces over a period of five days.
2. Failure to seal off the western wall of the Citadel for the first 25 days of the fighting. This had allowed the enemy to reinforce and resupply his forces. Once his means of resupply and reinforcements were cut off, the enemy's position deteriorated rapidly.
3. Initially, a policy had been established that the city was not to be bombed or shelled in order to prevent damage to the historical buildings and areas. This policy later had to be abandoned.
4. An initial failure to supply heavy direct fire weapons to ARVN units. Lack of these heavy direct fire weapons contributed to the long time frame required by ARVN to drive the enemy out of the Citadel.

(C) During the battle for Hue, Navy river patrol boats and support craft came under repeated enemy fire while engaged in continuing supply and evacuation operations to and from the embattled city.

(C) A high point of the Hue battle occurred on 24-25 February 1968 when the 2d Battalion, 3d ARVN Regt and the Black Panther Company, 1st ARVN Div initiated the offensive action which cleared the Citadel. While elements of the 3d ARVN Regt and the Black Panther Company cleared the western wall and palace area, the 2d Bn, 2d ARVN Regt conducted a night attack which secured the southern wall and the Vietnamese Marines swept all the way to the southeast wall by nightfall. By the evening of 25 February 1968, only one enemy platoon was still resisting. Losses inflicted on the enemy by the 3d ARVN Regt and the Black Panther Company during the period 31 January to 29 February were 1,084 KIA, 22 PW's captured, and 268 individual and 88 crew-served weapons seized. Friendly losses included 113 KIA and 67 weapons.

(C) Unavoidable wide destruction of the city and Citadel occurred and 116,000 civilians were made homeless as a result of the battle. It was a costly battle, one in which the enemy lost 5,000 killed in the city and an additional 3,000 to the immediate north, compared to 500 US and ARVN troops KIA. Tragically, while the enemy was in possession of the city, he singled out and executed over 1,000 government officials, school teachers, and citizens of known government loyalty, a horrible demonstration of what could occur were the Communists to succeed in their cause to gain control of SVN.

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(C) From a purely military standpoint, the enemy's many-pronged Tet Offensive in I CTZ met with failure. Except at Hue, the enemy had been unable to hold a sizable population center for more than a few hours. Everywhere, VC/NVA forces had suffered severe losses and some units had been virtually destroyed. Moreover, in most areas the enemy had been unable to interfere with Allied offensive operations which continued unabated throughout the Tet Offensive. Generally speaking, the ARVN units, which bore the brunt of the initial enemy offensive in many areas, performed in a highly satisfactory manner. Time after time, they had met their VC/NVA counterparts and forced them to withdraw with heavy losses.

(C) Politically and psychologically the enemy's efforts proved, in the long run, to be self-defeating. The Communist attacks failed to spark the popular uprisings which the VC had hoped for and expected. In addition, the enemy's cynical disregard for civilian lives and his widespread destruction of religious shrines and historic monuments served to further alienate the Vietnamese population. Finally, the enemy suffered tremendous losses with no concrete gains to show for his efforts.

(C) Perhaps the most serious effect of the Tet Offensive was the setback suffered by RD. Many American advisors commented on the adverse effects produced by the actions of RD personnel who had abandoned their villages at the first sign of the enemy attack and now showed a great reluctance to return. An erroneous but widespread belief that the VC would soon launch a "second offensive" kept many RD teams in the cities.

(C) Among the most important lessons learned from the Tet Offensive was the value of timely intelligence correctly interpreted. All major I Corps commands, except for the 1st ARVN Div at Hue, were fully alerted to the probability of a major enemy offensive and had fairly accurate knowledge of the location and strength of the enemy's larger units. This state of readiness on the part of all commands contributed markedly to the Allied successes during the initial Tet attacks.

(C) At the tactical level, many American advisors stressed the need for more aggressive patrolling and ambushing by ARVN and local force units to deny the enemy the opportunity to mass troops undetected.

(C) The operation at Hue marked the first time in the Vietnam conflict that Marines had engaged in house to house fighting. Nevertheless, as the Commander of the 3d Bn, 5th Mar Regt observed in a taped interview, individual Marines were quick to adapt to the techniques of fighting in built-up areas, although few had previous training or experience in this type of combat.

(C) Overall, the Allied successes in the Tet period were due to skilled intelligence evaluation, effective use of supporting arms, and the fine performance of ARVN, ROK, and American units.

(C) The performance of elements of the 2d ARVN Div and the associated RF/PF units in the defense of Quang Ngai and Tam Ky on 31 January 1968 was worthy of the highest praise for results gained, area secured, and enemy losses inflicted.

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(C) By and large, this action of the 2d Div was an ARVN show. In less than 24 hours (0400-2400), enemy losses inflicted by ARVN forces were: 1,223 KIA (body count), 111 PWs captured, and 384 individual and 56 crew-served weapons captured. Friendly losses were: 75 KIA, 203 WIA, and 17 weapons. These results were achieved with minimal US combat support consisting of normal advisory effort, two helicopter gunships at each city, and artillery support and air strikes directed by attached USAF Forward Controllers and elements of the 1st Bn, 1st Cav.

(C) Although the enemy achieved some limited penetration of the two cities, he was unable to capture and hold any significant objectives. Where the enemy did manage to penetrate, ARVN units counterattacked promptly and vigorously, driving them out and destroying them in place. ARVN units were alert, aggressive, and performed with distinction. 2

### Results of Tet Offensive in I CTZ

(C) Everywhere, VC/NVA forces had suffered severe losses and some units had been virtually destroyed. Enemy casualties for the period 30 January to 25 February were 17,342 KIA, 742 PWs captured, 70 returnees, and 3,584 individual and 769 crew-served weapons captured. Friendly casualties during this period were: USMC: 944 KIA and 6,582 WIA; USA: 361 KIA and 1,576 WIA; USN: 3 KIA, 25 WIA; ROKMC: 66 KIA and 226 WIA; and ARVN: 1,133 KIA and 3,277 WIA.

### II Corps Tactical Zone

(U) Within the II CTZ, the enemy made a concerted effort in the last quarter of 1967 to halt or, at least, limit Allied initiative and offensive successes which were making increased and dramatic inroads against the VC/NVA. Allied forces successfully met the test, however, and each phase of the enemy Winter-Spring Offensive campaign failed, despite a significant commitment of men and material.

(U) Due primarily to the need for additional forces in other corps areas, significant changes had been made between November 1967 and just prior to Tet. In November there was a total of 78 Allied maneuver battalions in the II CTZ. At Tet there was a total of 67.

(U) The enemy was losing control of the population; lines of communications were being opened; and he was becoming increasingly dependent on infiltration in order to maintain his forces. In a bold effort to reverse his misfortunes in the II Corps area, the enemy launched the opening phase of his Winter-Spring campaign in Kontum Province at Dak To in early November 1967. The enemy forces suffered severe losses in nearly three weeks of heavy fighting in Kontum, but for the first time he abandoned the practice of backing off when the fighting became costly.

(U) During the lull which followed Dak To, it became more and more apparent that the enemy was regrouping and repositioning his forces in order to renew the offensive at a time and place of his own choosing.

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(U) During December 1967 and January 1968, enemy activity was generally confined to shifting maneuver elements, terrorism, sabotage, interdiction of LOCs, and attacks by fire. In general, the enemy attempted to avoid large ground contacts with Allied forces. One exception was in Binh Dinh Province where ARVN, ROK, and US operations against the 3d NVA Div exacted a heavy toll, killing over 3,000 of the enemy's best troops; consequently, major elements of the 3d NVA Div were unable to participate to any great degree in the Tet Offensive.

(U) In January, intelligence indicated that the enemy was preparing to launch another phase of his campaign. The future battle plan for the Pleiku Provincial Unit was captured in Pleiku Province in early January and an increasing number of reports of enemy plans and preparations were received. Accordingly, in late January, military units in II CTZ were alerted to the probability of enemy activity just prior to or after Tet.

(U) Within II Corps, as the country-wide offensive began on 30 January, elements of the 3d NVA Div attacked a major LZ in Binh Dinh Province while local force elements and a sapper company attacked Qui Nhon, the province capital. The fighting in and around Qui Nhon lasted from 30 January to 5 February. During this period, elements of the 90th Local Force (LF) Bn and three sapper companies attacked Allied installations and GVN offices in and around the city. Key targets were the Military Security Service (MSS) Headquarters, 2d Railway Security Compound, radio station, and Bach Dang village. The enemy occupied all target areas despite their defense by RF/PF elements. The first reaction forces to contact the enemy were four RF platoons that were stationed in the Bach Dang area. The 405th Scout Company and 1st Bn, 41st ARVN Regt were also committed into the Bach Dang area. RF/PF, NP force, and Province Headquarters Task Force surrounded the enemy occupying the radio station and were later reinforced by three companies of the Capital ROK Division's 1st Regt. Two CIDG companies were committed against enemy forces controlling the railroad station. By 31 January, all areas were secured. Enemy casualties were 276 KIA, 58 PWs captured, and 162 individual and 11 crew-served weapons captured. Additionally, 12 members of the infrastructure were killed and 31 captured.

(U) In Phu Yen Province, from 30 to 31 January and 5 to 6 February, elements of the 5th Bn, 95th NVA Regt were engaged in and near Tuy Hoa; key targets appeared to have been C Battery of the 6th Bn, 32d Artillery, Binh Tin Hamlet, the Tuy Hoa North Airfield, and the Province Prison. By 0600 on 30 January, Company D, 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf and two companies of the 2d Bn, 28th ROK Regt attacked the enemy force that had been attacking C Battery, 6th Bn, 32d Artillery, Tuy Hoa North Airfield, and the prison. By 0730 on 31 January, the enemy force had been surrounded and destroyed in Binh Tin hamlet. Two battalions of the 47th ARVN Regt and two RF companies attacked an enemy strongpoint in the center of Tuy Hoa on 5 February and reduced the strongpoint by the following day.

(U) During the fighting in and around Tuy Hoa, the enemy forces lost 316 KIA, 104 PWs captured, and 104 individual and 10 crew-served weapons. Infrastructure losses were unknown.

(U) In Khanh Hoa Province, elements of the 18B NVA Regt emerged in an aggressive role for the first time since their limited objective attacks around Ninh Hoa and Nha Trang in October and November. Elements of the 11th Company, 7th Bn, 18B NVA Regt and the H-71 LF Company attacked facilities in Ninh Hoa on 30 January. The main objective was the RF/PF Training Center. Enemy forces attacking the center were caught between the cross fires of the MACV Compound and the Ninh Hoa Police Station. At 1200 hours on 30 January, seven companies of the 2d and 3d Bn, 29th ROK Regt moved to blocking positions around the city and, on 31 January,

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closed their encirclement and reestablished control. Though there were reports of sporadic contacts through 4 February, the heavier fighting terminated on 31 January. The enemy force lost 45 KIA, four PWs captured, and 12 individual and one crew-served weapon. Though no infrastructure members were killed, five were captured.

(U) As the enemy proceeded with his systematic, coordinated city offensive, he attacked Nha Trang on 30 January with elements of the 7th Bn, 18B NVA Regt, the T-88 Recon Company, the T-89 Engineer Company, and the K-90 and K-91 Sapper Companies. These forces launched their attacks against the sector and province headquarters, the military and civil jails, the radio station, railroad station, and the Roberts Compound area. The enemy suffered heavy losses in his abortive attempt to take these key objectives in the city. From 30 to 31 January, 15 Mobile Strike Force (MSF), CIDG and Ranger Companies of the 5th Special Forces Group(SFG); the 272DMP Company; the 11th Company, 30th ROK Regt; and US, ARVN, and ROK Headquarters personnel attacked enemy strongpoints and by 1 February eliminated all but scattered pockets of resistance. In five days of fighting, enemy killed numbered 274 while 76 PWs and 169 individual and 21 crew-served weapons were captured. Eight infrastructure members were killed and 109 suspects detained.

(U) For the first time in several months, the 482d VC LF Bn and the 840th VC Main Force (MF) Bn launched a major attack in Ninh Thuan Province. At 0315 on 31 January, elements of the 482d and 840th launched an attack against Phan Thiet. Key targets included the MACV Compound and water point, Binh Thuan Sector Headquarters, an ARVN artillery platoon, LZ Betty, the Province Prison, and points along the perimeters of the city. Though the heavier contacts terminated on 4 February, sporadic fighting continued into 10 February. In many instances, the enemy units reportedly concentrated in schools in the northern portion of the city as well as in a large pagoda in the western part of Phan Thiet. He felt certain that these structures would not be fired upon. As the fighting in the city died out, it appeared the enemy was withdrawing back to his base areas.

(U) At 0630 on 31 January, the first reaction forces to contact the enemy were four PF platoons, an RF platoon, and a province reconnaissance platoon northwest of the town at Xuan Phong. From that time, the 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf and the 4th Bn, 44th ARVN Inf reinforced by the 3d Bn, 44th ARVN Inf; two Mobile Strike Force (MSF) companies; three RF companies and 15 PF platoons drove the enemy out of most of the city and secured the area by 9 February. On 18 February the enemy again attacked Phan Thiet and overran the prison, releasing 500 prisoners. By 23 February the enemy attack had been defeated and the city was under friendly control. Enemy losses were 1,256 KIA, 48 PWs captured, and 253 individual and 88 crew-served weapons. The infrastructure suffered 60 killed or captured.

(U) The enemy launched attacks in the western highlands against Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province, Pleiku City in Pleiku Province, and Kontum City and Tan Canh in Kontum Province.

(U) The attack at Ban Me Thuot, which began on 30 January and terminated 6 February, involved three battalions of the 33d NVA Regt, the E-301 VC LF Bn, and up to five provincial local force companies. The apparent key targets included the 23d ARVN Division Headquarters, the MACV Compound, both airfields, the province chief's house, the ARVN military compound, the RF/PF training center, and the province bank. Additionally, two churches, missionary buildings, and a leprosarium were destroyed. The initial attacks were met by the RF and PF companies and platoons performing their normal security operations. By noon of 30 January,

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the 23d Recon Company, the 8th ARVN Cav, and three battalions of the 4th ARVN Regt were in contact. In the early hours of 1 February, the 23d ARVN Rngr Bn was deployed to the city, and on 2 February the 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf had reinforced from Pleiku. Final search and clear operations were completed by these forces on 6 February. The enemy lost 919 KIA, 186 PWs captured, and 161 individual and 10 crew-served weapons. Infrastructure losses were 25 captured.

(U) The attack on Pleiku City, which commenced early on 30 January and terminated on 4 February, involved the N-15 VC LF Bn, the 40th Sapper Battalion, and four district companies. Key targets were the Pleiku Sector Headquarters, the MACV compound, the 71st Evac Hospital, the PW camp, New Pleiku and Camp Holloway airfields, the province chief's quarters, and the Montagnard Training Center.

(U) As the enemy attacked, elements of the 22d ARVN Rngr Bn and the 3d ARVN Cav moved to alert positions throughout the city. Company A, 1st Bn, 69th Armd deployed to the contact areas and reinforced ARVN forces as did two MSF companies and one RF and one PF company. Elements of the 4th Div Engineer Bn were airlifted southwest of the city and, moving in with two MSF companies, conducted a coordinated attack on enemy strongpoints. By 3 February, the joint US/ARVN task force had secured the city and clean-up actions were begun. Enemy losses included 632 KIA, 182 PWs captured, and 179 individual and 10 crew-served weapons. Twenty-five infrastructure members were killed and 160 suspects detained.

(U) Kontum City was struck early on 30 January by three battalions of the 24th NVA Regt, the 304th VC LF Bn, and the 406th VC Sapper Bn. Some of the heaviest fighting during the Tst Offensive occurred when the enemy forces attempted to take the MACV compound, post office, finance office, province chief's headquarters, the airfield, and the 24th Special Tactical Zone Headquarters. As a result, the prisoner interrogation center and a church were destroyed.

(U) The initial enemy assault was met by two Montagnard scout companies (-), the 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf (-), two CIDG companies, and RF/PF forces. By noon, it was apparent reinforcements were required and the 1st Bn, 22d Inf; D Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav and C Company, 1st Bn, 69th Armor were moved into the city. ARVN reinforced with the 3d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf and two scout companies. By 3 February friendly forces, conducting search and clear operations, were meeting light resistance and all action ceased on 4 February.

(U) The enemy suffered extremely heavy casualties in Kontum, losing 1,189 KIA, 56 PWs, and 166 individual and 29 crew-served weapons.

(U) The last major city to be struck was the autonomous city of Dalat in Tuyen Duc Province. Elements of the 186th VC MF Bn, reinforced by a part of the 145th VC MF Bn, infiltrated the city and attacked at 0100 on 1 February.

(U) The initial attack was met by an RF platoon, armored car platoon, and sector headquarters personnel. Two RF companies and the armored car platoon, supported by gunships, were the first reaction force to drive the enemy out of the center of the city on that day. On 4 February, three CIDG companies reinforced the hard-pressed regional forces and on 5 February, the 23d ARVN Rngr Bn moved into the city. On 8 February the CO, 23d ARVN Div assumed control of all forces in Dalat and, reinforced by the 11th ARVN Rngr Bn, on 10 February attacked the enemy force and secured Dalat the next day.

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(U) The enemy forces in and around Dalat lost 208 KIA, eight PWs, 40 individual and three crew-served weapons in 12 days of fighting. Infrastructure losses were 17 killed and 15 captured.

#### Results of Tet Offensive in II CTZ

(U) As of 1 February, the enemy had committed forces against major population centers in nine of the 12 provinces in the zone. As a result, the enemy lost 5,405 KIA, 704 PWs, and 1,327 individual and 127 crew-served weapons. Allied losses were 427 KIA, and 1,524 wounded - a ratio of 11.8 to 1.

(U) The results of the Tet Offensive were generally viewed by the people in the II CTZ as a victory for the GVN. In the few weeks immediately following the offensive, it seemed that the majority of the population would most likely remain neutral. This noncommitted attitude was due primarily to the fact that the people were still subjected to the influence of both the VC and the GVN. The people's confidence in the GVN to protect them had been greatly reduced as the VC propaganda, prior to the Tet Offensive, indicated that the cities would be attacked and entered and the VC did exactly what they had promised.

(U) Although many of the people had a noncommitted attitude, most advisory personnel in the II CTZ agreed in general with a statement made by the Province Senior Advisor in Kontum when he stated, "The VC/NVA Tet Offensive has caused the military and the civilian population to solidify in their efforts against the VC. There is a distinct unity of effort, the realization of a national purpose." Additionally, there was a marked indication that the people of Kontum were now "acting in behalf of their province and city, instead of reacting."<sup>3</sup>

#### III Corps Tactical Zone

#### Events Leading Up To Tet

(C) By November 1967, the operations of II FFORCEV and III Corps within III CTZ had succeeded in driving the bulk of the VC/NVA main forces away from the more heavily populated areas into the sparsely settled border regions. Intelligence indicated that the enemy had suffered three times the losses in 1967 as in 1966. The threat in Gia Dinh Province was reduced to the point that the 199th Lt Inf Bde was able to phase out Operation FAIRFAX and move into War Zone D, leaving tactical responsibility for the security of the Capital Military District (CMD) to the 5th ARVN Rngr Gp. The 1st Inf Div had been successful in opening Highway 13 to Quan Loi, splitting War Zone C from D, and facilitating civil and military movement north of Saigon. The 9th Inf Div had commenced clearing Highway 1 from Saigon to the II/III Corps boundary. The Revolutionary Development Program was accelerating, and public administration training was underway in all provinces. Economic activity was improving and LOCs were being opened.

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(C) It appeared that the enemy had decided to employ the majority of his main force units along the Cambodian border and, in particular, to strengthen and consolidate his hold over Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Quang Duc Provinces. Intelligence data indicated that, after a Tet truce period during which he would massively resupply and reinforce across SVN borders, he would launch a major dry season offensive.

(C) In order to destroy the enemy's main force units when they could be found and to frustrate any larger-scale infiltration from Cambodia during the Tet truce, II FFORCEV adopted a border strategy in December whereby a major number of US battalions would be committed along the southern border of III CTZ. However, II FFORCEV did not execute the December border unit placement once evidence began to amass that the VC had changed their own strategy and were going to aim their main force offensive at the populated areas of III CTZ, which was largely covered by ARVN.

(C) Several attacks against district and province capitals, such as Bao Tri and Trang Bang in Hau Nghia Province and Tan Myen in Bien Hoa Province, broke the pattern of earlier enemy operations. The attacks signalled a change in the objectives of the VC forces and the size forces he planned to use in the attacks. Also, plans for attacks on other capitals were discovered. Besides these indications of a definite shift of enemy forces toward the base area in III CTZ, there was evidence the enemy was reequipping his troops with AK-47s, RPG-2s and RPG-7s. NVA fillers were being infused into local force battalions, and there were persistent reports of a major offensive being planned.

(C) Despite the many reports and indications of a major offensive in populated areas, it was not concluded by early January that the attacks would occur during, and in violation of, the Tet truce or that the main objective would be Saigon itself.

(C) On 10 January, COMUSMACV approved the abandonment of the original Tet posture in the III CTZ and CG, II FFORCEV, throughout January, gradually shifted the center of gravity of his forces to meet the newly developing threat.

(C) The VC buildup of weapons and ammunition caches in and around Saigon began as early as November. These were for the purpose of resupplying attacking local force units, arming recently recruited personnel, arming civilians who would rally to the VC cause during the expected "uprising," and arming the VC prisoners to be released from Chi Hoa Prison.

(C) Based upon a study of commercial traffic, ammunition and demolitions were smuggled into the city by vehicles representative of the normal prevailing traffic.

(C) The major VC units that participated in the attack on Saigon proper (exclusive of the Tan Son Nhut Air Base) were the 1st through 6th VC Bns, all of which normally had operated in or on the periphery of the CMD. They were familiar with Saigon, did not require an extensive commo-liaison network to assist their movement into the city, and were able to move about as ordinary citizens.

(C) When it is considered that the VC infiltrated Saigon, a city of 2,500,000 and suburbs of an additional 800,000, with 4,000 troops, the infiltration is placed in its proper perspective. Four thousand people moving into a city that size during the busy Tet season while 20,000 ARVN soldiers were on leave would be extremely difficult to detect.

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(C) The other battalions and regiments that took part in the offensive made normal tactical marches over established routes, through established base camps, and known base areas. These units were held in assembly areas at 9 to 12 hours marching distance from their targets for the coordinated assault. However, the enemy encountered many difficulties which prevented these reserve units from reaching their destination. Guides and units became separated or lost, columns became intermixed, some units attacked from a march column without deploying, and other units waited for following elements that never arrived. A significant example of faulty execution was the failure of two VC companies to rendezvous, as planned, in a rubber plantation adjacent to the Bien Hoa PW camp. When they arrived in the area and found no rubber trees (the area having been cleared of all vegetation one month earlier by Rome plows), they became confused and departed.

(C) In the 48 hours preceding the main VC attacks in III CTZ, intelligence indicators of an imminent attack multiplied and both ARVN and US forces made precautionary adjustments.

(C) On 29 January at 1615, CG, II FFORCEV sent out a Flash message to all OPCON units warning of probable VC violation of the Tet truce and directing a maximum alert posture during the Tet period.

(C) On the night of 29 January, heavy attacks occurred in I CTZ, causing GVN to cancel the Tet truce on 30 January at 0945. III Corps and II FFORCEV immediately resumed offensive operations. However, there was only one significant contact in III CTZ on 30 January which occurred when TACAIR and a light fire team attacked a convoy of 25 oxcarts and 200 VC south of Tay Ninh, killing 40 VC and destroying 8 oxcarts.

#### The Battle of Long Binh

(C) The first indications of a ground attack came at 0035 on 31 January when elements of the 199th Lt Inf Bde detected and engaged a VC force north of the Dong Nai River moving south toward Bien Hoa Airbase, and killed 47. A long-range patrol of the 199th Bde also detected approximately 90 VC who double-timed past their position just north of Long Binh.

(C) At 0330 the 2/47 Inf Bn, 9th Inf Div moved to the Long Binh area from its position on Rt 15, in the vicinity of Bearcat. At 0430, two battalions of the 275th VC Regt launched a ground attack through Ho Nai village, south across Highway 1, against the northern perimeter of Long Binh. At the same time, the U-1 LF Bn harassed the eastern perimeter, covering efforts by sapper units to penetrate the main ammunition dump. One company of the 275th VC Regt attempted to seize the ARVN PW compound which contained approximately 2,000 PWs.

(C) Elements of the 199th Bde engaged the enemy throughout the area and, by a series of platoon and company moves, converged on the 275th VC Regt which was under heavy fire from gunships of the Air Cav Troop, 3/17 Air Cav Sqdn. Several sapper teams did penetrate the ammo dump and set time charges, many of which were removed by EOD teams before 4 of the 100 pads of ammo detonated at 0800.

(C) It became apparent at 0600 that the 199th Bde, reinforced by units of 9th Div and supported by one troop of the 3/17 Air Cav Sqdn, had encircled the bogged-down assault elements of the 275th VC Regt and were killing them at a sustained rate.

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(C) At 0800, Company B, 4/39 Inf Bn combat assaulted in the grass helicopter pad opposite II FFORCEV Hq, then quickly moved out of the hot LZ, departing the area through the Widows Village.

(C) A company sized force from the 199th Bde, together with ARVN MPs, repulsed the attack on the PW compound.

(C) From this point on, the battle of Long Binh consisted of the systematic destruction of the defeated VC Regt by air, artillery, ground sweeps, ambush, and long-range patrol activities.

#### The Battle of Bien Hoa

(C) Simultaneously with the 0300 attack on the eastern portion of Long Binh, Bien Hoa Air Base received about 25 rockets followed closely by a mortar-supported ground attack. The air base received a total of 100 mixed rocket and mortar rounds during the attack which destroyed an F-100 and one A-37 and damaged 23 other aircraft. Two battalions of the 274th VC Regt attacked from the east while the 238th VC LF Company, reinforced, attacked III Corps Headquarters.

(C) The VC attacking the air base were initially engaged by the east bunker line manned by an RF platoon and the MP Base Reaction Force. The VC breached the perimeter wire but did not get onto the airstrip. The 57th RF Bn, dispatched by the Dong Nai Sensitive Area Command, reinforced the defenders of the air base at 0420 and the VC penetration was erased.

(C) At 0820, the 2/506 Abn Inf was deployed by helicopter from its operational area in the MANCHESTER AO to the 101st Abn Div Hq at Bien Hoa Air Base and commenced an attack south through the east gate.

(C) A Troop, 3/5 Cav Sqdn from the 9th Div, which had been ordered to reinforce III Corps Headquarters, departed from Blackhorse Base Camp, fought right through the middle of the 275th VC Regt astride Highway 1 and plowed into the flank of the 274th VC Regt attacking Bien Hoa Air Base, inflicting and suffering heavy losses. It linked up with the 2/506 Abn Inf and assisted in securing III Corps Headquarters. Air strikes, gunships, and artillery saturated the VC approach routes east of the air base. Despite the heavy ground attack, air operations were not halted at Bien Hoa except between 0300 and 1300 on 31 January.

(C) By late afternoon on 31 January, the immediate ground threat to Bien Hoa and the III Corps Headquarters had been eliminated. Several hundred VC were killed in this action. It was to take three more days and the concerted efforts of the 199th Bde, elements of the 101st Abn Div, II Armd Cav Regt, and the 9th Inf Div to drive out or destroy the remnants of the five VC battalions in the Bien Hoa/Long Binh area. The major ground attack from the 5th VC Div, however, was eliminated on the first day of the offensive.

#### The Battle of Tan Son Nhut

(C) The attack on Tan Son Nhut commenced at 0321 on 31 January when heavy fire was received on the base from around the entire perimeter. The main attack by a three-battalion

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force was launched from the west at Gate 51 while secondary attacks were aimed at eastern Gate 10 and northern Gate 58.

(C) The VC force apparently attacked in a column of battalions, prepared to pour through a breach in the perimeter bunker line. The heavy weapons companies of the enemy battalions were set up in the Vinatenco Textile Mill, a structure west of Gate 10. Anti-aircraft weapons were placed on the roof and apparently a cache of weapons had been assembled there to supply those recruits in the force that were not armed.

(C) The initial assault defeated several bunkers guarding Gate 51, and the leading battalion penetrated the defenses and got approximately 200 meters inside the wire in the direction of the main runway.

(C) Forces from the 377th Security Police Squadron with a two-platoon USARV Task Force (TF35) and mixed ARVN elements executed their counterattack plan in time to block the penetrating force.

(C) At approximately 0430, two companies from the 8th ARVN Abn Bn counterattacked the penetration, sustaining heavy casualties.

(C) The Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area Commander and his advisor requested assistance from US combat forces. The 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav, 25th Inf Div was committed. The squadron was deployed on Route 1 from the Hoc Mon Bridge, 8 miles from Tan Son Nhut, to Go Day Ha. C Troop, at the Hoc Mon Bridge, responded first. It was guided cross-country, past potential blocking positions, by the squadron commander who dropped flares from his command helicopter. This technique permitted the troops to arrive before light, at 0600, avoiding VC planned ambushes.

(C) C Troop attacked the VC forces from the northwest, drawing heavy fire from the textile mill and succeeded in cutting off the trailing VC battalion from their source of weapons in the mill. It then became heavily engaged with the VC forces in the vicinity of Gate 51, losing over a third of its strength, while destroying the capability of the VC force to continue the attack. This was the decisive force and action which defeated the main VC assault on Tan Son Nhut.

(C) VNAF and USAF airstrikes were directed on the textile mill in the morning hours and partially neutralized its fire.

(C) At 1219 a mixed US and ARVN force of 25 men from Tan Son Nhut launched a counter-attack against the depleted VC force inside the base and overran them, closed the gate, and ended the threat. During this action, the Vietnamese Commander, Deputy Commander, and US Deputy Senior Advisor were wounded.

(C) At 1300, the remainder of the 3/4 Cav Sqdn, having completed the neutralization of the textile mill, arrived at Gate 51 and engaged the disorganized VC forces. The threat was eliminated from the west when the 3/4 Cav Sqdn arrived. Over 500 VC dead were counted within the base and west of Gate 51.

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(C) On the north perimeter of Tan Son Nhut, elements of an ARVN battalion blocked the strong VC/NVA attack which had already swept through Go Vap. Two VN Marine battalions from the Delta were assaulted into the JCS Hq area during the morning, and one, the 4th VNMC Bn, counterattacked toward Go Vap from inside Tan Son Nhut.

(C) In Go Vap, the VC overran the Co Loa artillery camp and captured 12 105mm howitzers. The defenders had removed the breach blocks, however, so the weapons could not be used. These artillery pieces were later recaptured intact. By 1000, the Armored Command Headquarters was also penetrated. The VC assault force was accompanied by NVA tank crews who expected to capture and use tanks from the headquarters. Fortunately, these tanks had been removed two months previously. The counterattack by the 4th VNMC Bn restock the Co Loa area by nightfall, having killed over 100 VC and sustained losses of seven KIA and 52 WIA.

(C) During the initial attack by fire on the air base at 310342JAN, fourteen aircraft were damaged. Later, on 18 February, three tactical and two transport aircraft were destroyed and 35 aircraft damaged when 100 rockets and mortars were fired onto the air base.

#### The Race Track

(C) The Phu Tho Race Track was the focus of another series of battles. The VC seized and tried to hold the race track for several reasons, including the following:

1. It was a good rallying point for VC unfamiliar with Saigon.
2. It was the center of a good road net.
3. It had a large covered area suitable for a hospital.
4. It's control denied the US forces a large LZ inside the city.
5. It was within 82mm mortar range of Tan Son Nhut.

A strong VC force converged and assembled at the track after overrunning the police station there. A US MP platoon engaged them but was pinned down. One company of the 3d Bn, 17th Inf reinforced by a platoon of D Troop, 17th Cav, moved in from Binh Chanh by truck and counterattacked, linking up with the MP force. This force cleared the race track so that the 3d Bn, 7th Inf was able to assault onto the track.

(C) The 33d ARVN Rngr Bn from Nha Be District joined the 3d Bn 7th Inf and the combined force commenced to clear the area. By nightfall, an area three to four blocks in radius was cleared. The 6th VC LF Bn, which had the objective of seizing the nearby Chi Hoa Prison, was the principal enemy unit engaged. In the course of the heavy fighting in the vicinity, the VC battalion was virtually destroyed and it never reached its objective.

(C) The fighting which occurred around the race track ebbed and flowed for several days because VC troops continued to rally there. Eventually, personnel from every VC unit in the attacks on Saigon were identified at the race track.

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### US Embassy

(C) The US Embassy was a particular target singled out by the VC. Elements from the C-10 Sapper Battalion--a unit whose members lived in Saigon itself--breached the wall with satchel charges and attacked the main building with RPG and automatic weapons fire. The Marine guards defended from inside the building and were reinforced by both MPs and a small Marine reaction force. Navy helicopter fire teams supported US forces during the battle. One platoon from C Company, 1/502 Abn Bn was dispatched from Bien Hoa by helicopter and successfully landed on the roof pad at 0810 after having been driven off by fire at 0500. The Embassy grounds were secured by 0900 and 19 VC were KIA.

### Other Attacks in Saigon

(C) JGS Hq was attacked from the north at 0930. The VC succeeded in entering peripheral buildings but were unable to reach any vital installations. They were opposed by the 8th Abn Bn until ARVN reinforcements arrived and undertook the slow task of rooting them out.

(C) The Presidential Palace received RPG and automatic weapons fire from an unfinished hotel located across the street from the palace grounds. ARVN troops, US MPs, and NP, supported by two ARVN tanks, cordoned off the area. They kept the building under a state of siege for two days until all the VC were either killed or captured.

(C) Attacks were made against police stations, particularly in the 6th and 7th Precincts. Hotels and other embassies were attacked by fire.

(C) The studio portion of the National Broadcasting Station was seized and held until the 1st ARVN Abn Bn drove the VC out.

(C) BOQs and BEQs throughout Saigon received attacks by fire and police and combat unit forces were dispatched to the relief of US personnel in their quarters.

(C) Throughout the day on 31 January, ARVN and US forces reinforced the CMD. The VC failed to prevent reinforcement either by overland routes or by air. By midnight, US and ARVN forces had brought more maneuver battalions into the CMD than the VC had in their initial assault.

(C) In order to control combat units in the CMD, CG, II FFORCEV dispatched his Deputy Commander to Saigon with a small staff to take operational control of US units. This operational headquarters, Task Force WARE, was co-located at CMD Headquarters and was operational by 1100, 31 January. It remained operational until 18 February.

(C) Outside the CMD, besides widespread attacks by fire, there were four major ground attacks. These attacks were initiated against Ben Cat, Duc Hoa, My Tho, and Ben Tre.

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Ben Cat

(C) The Phu Loi VC Local Force Battalion, C-10 VC LF Company, and an element of the C-10 VC Sapper Bn attacked the 8th ARVN Regt Hq and the Ben Cat District Headquarters at 0355 from the east. By 0429, the VC were inside the ARVN perimeter and had captured the 155mm howitzer position. The town of Ben Cat was also occupied. The 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav and C Company, 1st Bn, 18th Inf counterattacked with the 2d Bn, 8th ARVN Regt, supported by 1st Div Arty, 5 light fire teams, and an Air Force C-47 Gunship (Spooky). The armored cavalry relieved the district headquarters just before it was about to fall. The attack was halted and contact broken by the VC at 0600.

Duc Hoa

(C) Elements of the 506th VC LF Bn attacked the 25th ARVN Div Hq and the MACV compound in Duc Hoa at 0625. At 0640, they entered the market place.

(C) First, a FAC from Tan An and a light fire team from Cu Chi arrived at 0640. At 0720, the 4/49 Inf Bn, 2/10th Cav Sqdn and the Div Recon Company -- all ARVN -- arrived and counterattacked. The VC withdrew to the southwest at 0900.

(C) Ground attacks were launched on 1 February in Phu Cuong, Cu Chi, and Ba Ria. The Engineer School at Phu Cuong and portions of the city were seized. Although sections of the city were occupied, the province headquarters was held. An ARVN reaction force cleared the city by 1830. At Cu Chi, the VC penetrated and burned 50 percent of the MACV compound and opened the jail. US and ARVN units reached the center of Cu Chi at 1030 but contact continued by ARVN until 1830. Ba Ria in Phuc Tuy Province was attacked on 1 February. At 0700 the VC captured the airstrip and at 0830 elements of the Royal Australian Regiment counterattacked down Highway 2 and broke the VC grip on all the key centers while two ARVN units completed clearing the town of VC. The VC effort shifted to Hong Dien and it was not until 4 February that the VC were eliminated from the area. Xuan Loc was also attacked on 1 February. The VC attack was directed against the province headquarters and other Allied positions. Their first attack was repulsed on 1 February; however, the enemy reinitiated the attack at 2245 on 2 February. They were again repulsed and the city was cleared for the last time. This action cleaned the last pocket of VC from the area between Bien Hoa and Long Binh. A combined US/VN attack broke the back of the VC northwest of Go Vap on 1 February.

(C) A VC headquarters was discovered in the An Quang Pagoda in Cholon on 1 February. The NP and VNMCC encircled the pagoda in the early afternoon and, after air strikes, the building was seized by 1705.

(C) In spite of the heavy fighting throughout Saigon on 1 February, it was apparent that the VC neither controlled nor had they put any critical installation out of action. GVN was still intact and there were no signs of a popular uprising. The 48-hour period before relief was scheduled for the local force units was running out and no relief was in sight. The VC were on the defensive everywhere in Saigon.

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(C) A pattern of attempted LOC interdiction southwest of Saigon began and was to continue well into March. The period 2-5 February was characterized by a transition from a predominance of VC initiated attacks to the regaining of the initiative by US, FW, and ARVN forces.

(C) An attack by elements of the 273d VC Regt on 2 February against the Thu Duc District Headquarters, the NP, the large power plant, and the water treatment works was anticipated and repulsed.

(C) There were many sightings of VC units and groups moving during daylight around Saigon trying to consolidate. Harassment by gunships, artillery, and sweeps by US or ARVN units prevented the massing of any kind of major enemy force.

(C) By 5 February, RVNAF units began taking over sole responsibility for clearing Saigon of VC, and US units began to operate against VC attempting to base in the outer districts.

(C) After 5 February, the battle around Saigon changed in character. Separate attacks against outlying province and district capitals continued but they occurred in diminishing frequency and intensity.

(C) One US unit, the 3d Bn, 7th Inf was redeployed on 9 February to the Phu Tho Race Track where, acting on RVN intelligence, they found the VC command post in a pagoda 2 km west of the race track. The VC defending force was destroyed, the headquarters captured, and GEN Tran Do, COSVN Political Chief in command of all VC forces attacking Saigon, was killed.

(C) In spite of the failures of their attacks and the losses suffered by their assaulting forces, the VC high command insisted on continuing their offensive action. The enemy attempted to establish a dispersed stronghold north and northwest of Saigon from which they could launch rockets against Tan Son Nhut.

(C) Elsewhere in III CTZ, a VC local force attempted to launch a major attack against Tay Ninh City. Forewarned, the Province Chief deployed his recon platoon in an ambush of the enemy force and, with the help of gunships, routed the enemy with heavy losses.

(C) Captured documents show that COSVN ordered a second wave of attacks on 17-18 February which were to be stronger than the first attacks on 31 January. However, they were feeble by comparison with earlier Tet assaults. There were 20 ground attacks and 57 attacks by fire. As action subsided on 18 February, it was clear that the enemy lacked the strength to mount serious new attacks against the key areas in III CTZ. The essentially defensive battle of Tet was over.

#### Results of Tet Offensive in III CTZ

(C) From 29 January through 19 February, US forces lost 453 KIA and 3,625 WIA; ARVN lost 471 KIA and 1,290 WIA; and FWM forces lost 20 KIA and 83 WIA.

(C) No US, FWM, or ARVN maneuver units of company size or larger were destroyed or rendered combat ineffective during the offensive. Only one RF company was rendered combat ineffective by hostile action.

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(C) There were a few cases of RF/PF outposts being defeated by treacherous action from within. In one significant case, 37 RF/PF and 2 US were murdered in the La Cua outpost in Hau Nghia Province by VC who had penetrated the organization.

(C) The Tet Offensive caused a setback in the pacification program in III CTZ as many RD cadre were withdrawn from their assigned hamlets to regain or maintain security in district or province capitals. By 1 March, cadre were back in 83 of the 92 hamlets occupied prior to Tet.

(C) The offensive created well over 100,000 refugees in the III CTZ and 67,000 in Gia Dinh. At least \$20 million damage was done to industrial and commercial enterprises. VC/NVA forces lost 12,614 KIA, and 864 personnel and 3,087 weapons were captured in III CTZ during the offensive. Losses of many of the enemy's political cadre left the VC infrastructure particularly vulnerable at the district and city level. <sup>5</sup>

#### IV Corps Tactical Zone

(U) On 25 January the SA, IV CTZ issued a warning to all subordinate elements that, during the impending Tet holiday cease-fire period, the Viet Cong were expected to resupply and move into position for a post-Tet Offensive.

(U) Then, on 29 January, he further advised all subordinate elements that intelligence information indicated the enemy could be expected to deliberately violate the truce by approaching friendly installations during the night of 29 January or early morning of 30 January. All provincial senior advisors were directed to take action to insure maximum alert posture through the Tet period.

(U) At approximately 1000 on 30 January, the SA, IV Corps was informed by MACV Hq that the Tet truce had been cancelled. This information was immediately disseminated to all IV Corps elements. US controlled assets were directed to attack VC targets located during 30 January. Several large concentrations of sampans were destroyed in Sa Dec and Vinh Long Provinces during the offensive of 30 January.

(U) At 0230 on 31 January, a Corps-wide series of attacks by VC forces began. Within the first 24 hours, 10 of the 11 VC designated province capitals had been attacked and some occupied. In the same period, 13 of the 16 GVN province capitals had been struck.

(U) Initially, in the 44th Special Zone, intense fighting broke out in Chau Doc, Moc Hoa, and Tri Ton. In both Chau Doc and Tri Ton, the heavy fighting lasted approximately 36 hours. Both cities were infiltrated by VC units but in neither case were the VC able to capture vital military or political installations. Navy river craft and SEAL teams contributed significantly to the defense of Chau Doc. The VC units were rapidly driven out of Moc Hoa and by 0700 on 2 February, the situation was quiet except that supply operations in the province were disrupted for the next few days.

(U) On 3 February at 0130, Cao Lanh was mortared but no ground attack occurred. At 1000 the same day, ARVN units trapped an estimated 300-man VC force outside the city. Air-strikes and gunships were called in and an estimated 200 VC were killed. On 4, 6, and 9

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February, Cao Lanh and the province capital headquarters were attacked again; however, the attacks were not pressed and died out by nightfall in all three cases. Three other district towns were also hit during the initial period, but none were seriously threatened.

(U) In the Upper Delta area, the two hardest hit cities were My Tho and Ben Tre, although practically all of the province and district towns received either a mortar or ground attack. My Tho and Ben Tre were both infiltrated during the evening of 30 January, and fighting started at 0300 on 31 January. Two VC units, the 261st Bn and the 207th Company, entered My Tho from the northwest, penetrating at the PBR and RAG bases. PBR fired against the Viet Cong infiltration from waterways adjacent to My Tho and Ben Tre rivers, and Navy helicopter fire teams were engaged in continuous operations during the battles. The 261B VC Bn attacked My Tho from the north, engaging the 32d ARVN Rngr Bn, and the 514th VC Bn attacked from the west. Heavy fighting raged throughout the city until dawn of 2 February when the main VC units disengaged. The next day, clearing operations started and on 4 February heavy fighting took place again in the city. By 5 February, the VC units had been pushed out of the city, but operations to clear the area surrounding the city lasted well into the middle of the month with moderate to heavy fighting north of the city.

(U) Highway 4 was interdicted in 62 locations and six bridges were damaged between 6 and 8 February. Efforts to open the road were begun on 11 February, and by 16 February the route was open from the III Corps boundary to the Mekong River. The route remained open continuously for at least a portion of each day.

(U) The VC also infiltrated two battalions into Ben Tre on 31 January, occupying key locations near US and ARVN installations. Mortar and ground attacks against the city started at 0300, and heavy fighting lasted for the next two and a half days. By nightfall on 2 February, fighting had subsided, and the next morning search and clear operations started. From 3 to 14 February, sporadic contact was made with VC units, but the danger to the city gradually diminished after the initial onslaught.

(U) Go Cong, the capital of Go Cong Province, was mortared at the outset of the offensive but not until 5 February did it receive a ground attack. During the attack, which lasted only one day, the VC liberated 100 prisoners from the city jail. Another half-hearted attack was launched against the city on 8 February but was quickly beaten off.

(U) During the fighting in the 7th ARVN Div area, two US brigades assisted the ARVN units in My Tho and Ben Tre. Two battalions of the 1st Bde, 9th Div were in Ben Tre on 1 and 2 February and two battalions of the 2d Bde, 9th Div, supported by a fire support base, were in My Tho on the same dates.

(U) In the 41st DTA (Division Tactical Area), the two primary objectives of the VC were Vinh Long City and airfield and Tra Vinh City. Heavy fighting lasted in Vinh Long from 0315 31 January, until late on 4 February when the city was cleared of VC soldiers. Navy helicopters of TU 116.2.4 flew extensive missions in support of US forces at Vinh Long Air Field and surrounding areas. Units sent to reinforce the city on 3 February were the 4th Bn, 16th ARVN Inf, 3d Bn, 15th ARVN Inf, 3/2 ARVN Cav, 43d ARVN Rngr Bn and the Hq and Recon Company of the 15th ARVN Regt. Additionally, on 4 February, two battalions of the 9th Div were inserted south of the city to engage VC units in the area which were threatening the airfield. By 8 February, the situation in Vinh Long had been restored to near normal, and no major threat occurred after that date.

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(U) Tra Vinh City was also attacked on 31 January, although not as strongly as Vinh Long and by the next day, 1 February, it was clear of major VC units, although minor activity continued until 6 February.

(U) In the 42d DTA, determined efforts were made by the VC to take Can Tho and airfield, and Soc Trang and airfield. Lesser attacks took place against Ca Mau and Rach Gia on 31 January. Soc Trang, Ca Mau, Bac Lieu, and Rach Gia had been cleared by 1 February but heavy fighting raged in Can Tho until 5 February when the VC forces were finally routed out of the university. Periodic heavy fighting took place in the area west of Can Tho. The VC units in the area seemed determined to remain and harass the airfields at Can Tho and Binh Thuy, which they did two or three times a week. On 13 February, the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) of the 9th Div joined the ARVN units in their efforts to clear the VC out of the Ba Sa road and thus expand the Can Tho defensive perimeter to safer limits. The MRF remained under the OPCON of the SA until 4 March.

### Lines of Communication

(U) The VC Tet Offensive was particularly punishing to military and public engineering activities in the IV CTZ. VC deliberate destruction was directed primarily against the land LOCs: National Highway 4; and Interprovincial Routes 31, 7, and 6A. Damage to airfields, fortifications, and cantonments was a by-product of the ground fighting and by comparison to LOCs, relatively insignificant. There was no damage to the canal system in the Delta. During the period 31 January through 14 February, Highway 4 was interdicted constantly; seven bridges were destroyed and seven damaged.

(U) On the nights of 31 January and 1 February, Highway 4, Provincial Roads 6A, 7, 8 and 31 were interdicted in a sufficient number of places to close the roads to any but the most localized traffic. The initial lack of security elements to accompany military engineer effort to restore the trafficability on the routes resulted in a period of about 10 days before any significant sections of Highway 4 were open to traffic. While the many craters and cuts in the road required extensive engineer effort to fill and repair, the limiting factor to opening sections of Highway 4 was the repair/replacement of destroyed or damaged bridges. Although the engineer effort to open the roads was continuous, nightly VC interdiction in the form of mining, cratering, berms, obstacles, and hand labor digging caused much of the initial repair work to be repeated. Thus, sections of Highway 4 were finally opened to at least one-way traffic, as follows:

1. 10 February - Vinh Long to Sa Dec.
2. 12 February - My Tho to Gia Duc.
3. 14 February - Vinh Long to Can Tho.

(U) At the end of the reporting period, Highway 4 was open to both commercial and military traffic each day although a combination of security requirements and engineer effort reduced the usable time period to generally the afternoon hours.

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## Casualties in IV CTZ

(U) Casualties through 14 February were VC: 5, 252 KIA, 564 detained, and 408 returnees; ARVN: 437 KIA and 1, 524 WIA; US: 85 KIA and 443 WIA; and ROK: 2 KIA. There were 1, 940 VC weapons captured.

## Revolutionary Development

(U) The Tet Offensive in IV Corps had a devastating effect on the Revolutionary Development Program. During the final half of February, RD officials, both US and GVN, were assessing the degree of remodeling that would be necessary in the 1968 plans. It was noteworthy that few RD areas and hamlets were attacked by the VC in spite of reduced security. Extensive damage was done to provincial towns by friendly forces in their efforts to dislodge VC elements from populated areas. Performance of military units in support of RD during the period was generally good; however, some reports were received of extensive looting in Vinh Long by elements of the 9th ARVN Div and the Rangers.

(U) Many of the RD cadre were brought into the province cities or district towns at the beginning of the offensive. Some were quickly returned to their 1967 Phase II hamlets -- 55 teams at the end of February. Some were in 1968 Phase I hamlets -- 18 at the end of February. Seventy-two teams were still in province or district towns at the end of February. Forty-five teams were in rural areas other than 1967 or 1968 pacification hamlets (38 village teams in An Giang; two each in Bac Lieu, Ba Xuyen, and Co Cong; and one in Phong Dinh) -- a total of 190 RD teams. The fact that the team was listed as being in a hamlet merely meant that the flag was there, not necessarily that the full team was there. For example, in An Xuyen, two-thirds of the five teams listed in 1967 Phase II hamlets were in fact in Cau Mau City. In Kien Hoa, on 23 February, there were 11 teams listed in the 1967 Phase II hamlets in the Ba Tri RD area, but the total cadre present for duty was 45 -- the balance located either in Ben Tre or missing.

(U) During February, approximately 90 percent of the cadre that were accounted for were involved in security and/or relief/refugee work. All provinces were moving the teams out into the rural areas as soon as the local situation stabilised. This had to be a provincial decision due to the varying conditions although orders were issued directing that all teams would be returned to RD areas as soon as possible but not later than 1 April.

### Lessons Learned

(U) Several valuable lessons were learned as a result of the Tet Offensive, the more important ones being:

1. Personnel absences be more stringently controlled. Positive actions be taken to regulate the number of personnel authorized leave "permission" so that the combat unit strength would not be depleted during national holidays or truce periods.

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2. Major population centers should have counterattack plans identifying, as a minimum, the control measures on an overlay. These plans should be disseminated to units in consonance with security.

3. Infantry and armored cavalry units should be trained to operate as combined arms and to fight in built-up areas. This training should include instructions on techniques and principles of mutual support, assault and reduction of positions; clearing of buildings; employment of supporting fires; and security of an area once it had been cleared.

4. Coordination must be conducted between provincial forces, government agencies, and ARVN to better control the civilian population. Civilians in cities contributed to the confusion experienced by the reaction forces during the first day of the offensive. Additionally, they were used as intelligence-gathering sources by the VC. This was particularly evident on 31 January and 1 and 2 February during the mass exodus from My Tho.

5. A check point or traffic control system should be established to keep the civilians from interfering with military operations.

6. Defensive positions in compound areas or base locations must be continually maintained and improved. Improvements which should be included are: rebuilding and strengthening bunkers; installations of communications trenches; installation of barrier materials to include flame mines, trip flares, and booby traps; construction of overhead cover, and increased alertness of the personnel occupying the positions. The casualty rate during the days following the offensive was extremely low because the above mentioned actions had been taken.

7. When practical, engineer personnel, equipment, and material should be prepositioned along LOCs so that they can be immediately responsive to repair the interdiction LOC.

8. Emergency landing facilities, capable of receiving landing crafts or tactical military crafts should be constructed adjacent to critical ferry sites.

### Results of the Tet Offensive

(U) Throughout the country, the Tet Offensive was exceedingly costly to the VC/NVA. The enemy suffered losses in three areas: men, material, and morale. Between 29 January and 11 February, he suffered 31,754 KIA, 5,821 detained, and lost 7,505 individual and 1,276 crew-served weapons. Allied losses were 1,001 US and 2,082 ARVN and FW personnel KIA. By the end of February, the number of enemy killed rose to over 37,000 out of an estimated force of 60,000 committed to the Tet Offensive. Weapons lost by him numbered over 13,000. In the first two months of 1968, the VC/NVA lost over 35,000 KIA -- two-thirds as many as in all of 1967.

(U) The enemy's actions during Tet served his purpose to a degree. Many of his dead, however, were irreplaceable hard-core VC and infrastructure. More important than the number of enemy killed was the fact that the enemy initiated his offensive during a sacred Vietnamese holiday which disenfranchised the VC/NVA from the people, provided a newfound respect for RF/PF forces who responded magnificently, and welded the RVNAF into a more determined, effective, confident, and aggressive fighting force. The enemy had been soundly beaten militarily; however, the cost in civilian lives and property lost was a tragic event.

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(U) In spite of his catastrophic defeat on the battlefield in Vietnam, his Tet Offensive did obtain an unheralded psychological success abroad, particularly in the US.

(U) Equally as astounding as the enemy's losses were the number of refugees created by the VC/NVA Tet attacks. By 1 March, new refugees in SVN numbered over 600,000, with some 30 percent of this number concentrated in the Saigon/Gia Dinh area. This problem, coupled with ARVN's need to draw back from the countryside to the cities during Tet, caused a major setback in the pacification program. After the dust had settled, the situation was evaluated and although there was no permanent damage to the program, Allied forces did need to retrench and rework the pacification programs. It took until October to reach the pre-Tet pacification standing.

(U) Within the population centers, severe property damage was done, particularly in Hue and Saigon/Cholon. The national government was in a state of shock and failed to react immediately to relieve the plight of the refugees. At US urging, the government formed the Inter-ministerial Central Recovery Committee under the direction of Vice President Ky and organized Project Recovery, which undertook country-wide emergency assistance to the refugees and distribution of goods, supplies, and building materials. Project Recovery gave the refugees a modicum of faith in the central government even though its initial energy and sense of emergency soon slowed. However, if it had not been for Project Recovery, it is entirely possible that the Communists might have made some progress in fomenting a small uprising against the government.

(U) Following the first wave of attacks, the enemy broke contact and withdrew to the countryside to reequip and await replacements. He was woefully short of manpower, weapons, and ammunition.

(U) It was expected that the enemy would continue to exert pressure on urban areas through attacks on lines of communication, imposing economic blockage, eroding GVN control by propaganda assassination, and repeated raids on towns, cities, and district capitals.

(U) The second wave of the enemy's Winter-Spring Offensive was a failure. On 18 February, he attacked by fire over three dozen cities throughout the II, III, and IV CTZs but did not follow-up with a ground assault. He had suffered too severely in the previous three weeks to mount another major ground assault so soon. The resolute defense and aggressive tactics of US, FW, and ARVN forces once again had defeated him. In all, the second wave was no more than a weak and ineffective effort. Even his spectacularly desperate attempt to land, simultaneously, four trawlers loaded with supplies, arms, and ammunition on 1 March was an utter failure. US and VN naval forces sank three of the trawlers and the fourth turned back before entering the Republic's contiguous zone.

(U) In reaction to the VC attacks on Saigon, the RVNAF JCS launched Operations TRAN HUNG DAO I and II to clear out the area surrounding Saigon during the period 5 February to 8 March. Six VNMCC, four Ranger and five airborne battalions accounted for over 1,600 enemy killed and ended the Tet threat in Saigon.

(U) In March, RVNAF joined with elements of our 1st, 9th, and 25th Divisions in Operation QUYET THANG (Resolve to Win). Scouring the Capital Military District and its five surrounding provinces, the combined force accounted for 1,420 enemy killed and numerous arms caches uncovered. On 7 April, QUYET THANG I was followed by another combined US/ARVN operation TOAN THANG, a III CTZ wide operation using 79 maneuver battalions. It was the

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biggest operation of the war and by the time it terminated on 31 May, it had accounted for over 7,000 enemy killed. Even more important, TOAN THANG I did much to preempt VC/NVA plans for a second wave attack on Saigon. TOAN THANG II was initiated simultaneously with the termination of TOAN THANG I and continued into 1969. <sup>6</sup>

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## TET OFFENSIVE IN RETROSPECT - A

1. Unless otherwise noted, this section on the Introduction and VC Strategy and Plans is based on the following sources: II FFORCEV, Tet, After Action Report (C), 31 Jan - 18 Feb 68, n. d., Gp-4; III MAF Tet Offensive Report (S), 3 Aug 68, Gp-4.
2. Unless otherwise noted, this section on I Corps Tactical Zone, is based on the following sources: III MAF Tet Offensive Report (S), 3 Aug 68, Gp-4; CG 1st Marine Division After Action Report (C), 25 May 68, Gp-4.
3. Unless otherwise noted, this section on II Corps Tactical Zone, is based on the following sources: HQ, I FFORCEV Tet Offensive After Action Report (C), 9 Apr 68.
4. Unless otherwise noted, this section on III Corps Tactical Zone, is based on the following sources: HQ, II FFORCEV Tet Offensive After Action Report (C), n. d.
5. Unless otherwise noted, this section on IV Corps Tactical Zone, is based on the following sources: US Army Advisory Group, IV CTZ, Historical Summary of VC Tet Offensive IV CTZ (U), 8 Apr 68.
6. Unless otherwise noted, this section on Lessons Learned and Results of the Tet Offensive are based on the following sources: III MAF Tet Offensive Report (C), 3 Aug 68, Gp-4; II FFORCEV Tet After Action Report (C), 31 Jan - 18 Feb 68, n. d., Gp-4; HQ I FFORCEV Tet Offensive After Action Report (U), 9 Apr 68; US Army Advisory Group, IV CTZ, Historical Summary of VC Tet Offensive, IV CTZ (U), 8 Apr 68.

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## ANNEX B -- ANTI-INFILTRATION BARRIER

### General

(S) On 15 September 1966, the SECDEF directed the development and deployment, on an expedited basis, of an anti-infiltration system to impede the flow of vehicles and personnel overland from NVN into SVN. This system was to include three principal subsystems: a Strong Point Obstacle Subsystem (SPOS) in northeastern RVN, an air-supported anti-personnel subsystem in northwestern RVN and eastern Laos, and an air-supported anti-vehicular subsystem in Central Laos. Overall responsibility for developing, readying, and deploying approved systems was vested in Joint Task Force 728. Optimal employment in SEASIA of the special resources provided fell within the operational responsibility of CINCPAC/COMUSMACV, as exercised through their 7AF and III MAF components. The code word DYE MARKER/DUEL BLADE referred to the special resources provided for the SPOS, and MUSCLE SHOALS/IGLOO WHITE to those for the air-supported subsystems. Within the MUSCLE SHOALS/IGLOO WHITE operational area, the (predominantly) anti-vehicular subsystem was referred to as MUD RIVER and the (predominantly) anti-personnel subsystem as DUMP TRUCK. The Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC) was the ground center where sensor activations were analyzed and interpreted. It was located in the DUTCH MILL facility at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. The DUCK BLIND project initiated in April 1968 utilized MUSCLE SHOALS/IGLOO WHITE and DYE MARKER/DUEL BLADE assets and technology in a wide range of applications in operations against the enemy in RVN.

### Code Name Changes

(TS) The code names given to the system changed several times because of partial compromise of their classified meanings. The first change occurred on 14 June 1967 when the first official name of the program, PRACTICE NINE, was changed to ILLINOIS CITY. A month later ILLINOIS CITY was changed to DYE MARKER. On 8 September 1967, after SECDEF released information to the public which implied the construction of a SPOS south of the DMZ, Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG) decided to give separate code names to each of the two major subsystems: DYE MARKER remained the name for only the SPOS, and MUSCLE SHOALS became the name of the air-supported subsystems. On 1 June 1968, MUSCLE SHOALS was further changed to IGLOO WHITE. In April 1968, the code name DUCK BLIND was assigned to connote MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER resources, other than to impede overland infiltration from NVN to SVN, in operations against enemy forces in SEASIA. The unclassified meaning of DUCK BLIND was a program associated with the DCPG. The code name DYE MARKER was changed to DUEL BLADE in June 1968. On 15 October, the nickname DUCK BLIND was dropped because of compromises and the nickname DUFFEL BAG was substituted.<sup>1</sup>

### Summary of Operational Results

(S) Operationally significant MUSCLE SHOALS capabilities were realized by mid-December 1967 in the anti-vehicular subsystem and, by late January 1968, in the Khe Sanh Combat Base defense role. However, tactical developments in the eastern DMZ area forced postponement of the completion of the SPOS.

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## DYE MARKER/DUEL BLADE

### General

(C) The purpose of the DYE MARKER anti-infiltration system was to reduce the infiltration of NVA forces and material into SVN. The type of obstacle used to deny infiltration was dictated by the terrain and political considerations.

(C) Near the DMZ in SVN, the terrain from the South China Sea to 23 km inland is flat and lends itself to a straight line type obstacle. Further inland, rolling hills gradually become mountainous as they approach the Laotian border. In this area, a series of strong points and defile barriers in the choke points and routes of infiltration were required.

(C) The SPCS was to consist of an obstacle trace from the South China Sea to the Dong Ha Mountain, backed up by a series of strong points. The obstacle trace was to be fronted by a fence at the northernmost edge of the trace. This would be backed up with twin single apron and barbed steel tape, an anti-personnel mine field, a passive sensor detector system, and twin single apron with barbed steel tape to mask the rear edge of the obstacle trace. Associated with the obstacle trace would be a series of observation posts (OP) and towers. Six heavily fortified strong points would be installed to support the obstacle system with battalion base areas as back up. The manning force was scheduled to be a USMC regiment and an ARVN regiment (See Figure B-1).

### Fighting Bunkers

(C) The Third Naval Construction Brigade (NCB) was given the job to design and construct two prefabricated concrete fighting bunkers for demonstration and display in Da Nang. One bunker was constructed of concrete joags and the other consisted of a concrete parapet slanted inward at 60 degrees. These bunkers were also tested to determine the protection offered against .30 and .50 cal machine gun fire and 155mm shells. It was determined that chain link fence provided good protection against RPG fire and the decision was made to incorporate this protection into the fighting bunker design. On 14 January, a demonstration conducted for COMUSMACV resulted in a decision to construct three additional slightly modified concrete fighting bunkers for evaluation. At another demonstration, in late January, COMUSMACV, Chief JCS, and CG, III MAF decided the slant sided parapet would be utilized in places permitting machine lift to position and the concrete log parapet would be used in places requiring hand lift. The mobilisation of material and personnel to prefabricate the bunkers was initiated by the Third NCB at Dong Ha. By 19 March, the construction of 32 Lincoln Log bunkers had been completed with production of the slant sided bunkers scheduled to begin on 1 April 1968. By the end of June, 80 Lincoln Log bunkers had been fabricated along with 400 slant sided type. These bunkers were scheduled for installation during the month of July.

### Living Bunkers


(S) As a result of evaluations conducted at Fort Benning, Ga., two of the five living bunkers tested were selected as most desirable for use in RVN. These two bunkers were the prefabricated concrete arch and the multiplate culvert. Arrangements were made to have forms for the

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**ORIGINAL DYE-MARKER CONCEPT**



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FIGURE B-1

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concrete arch and two multiplate bunkers with end sections shipped to Da Nang for erection and further evaluation. A demonstration was set up on Red Beach by Third NCB in March for approval by COMUSMACV. The multiplate culvert was unanimously picked for use at DYE MARKER sites.<sup>3</sup>

(S) At MACV request, DCPG had directed procurement of an Armco Multiplate Metal Arch and underpass for the first 300 living bunkers. Third NCB was directed to procure other items for the first 300 living bunkers. In order to provide timely advance procurement, DCPG was requested to procure and store components for an additional 546 bunkers at Port Hueneme. The estimated total living bunker requirement was 846.

(S) Based on a MACV request for assistance, DA investigated the feasibility of using eight-gauge corrugated metal interior partitions as exterior endwalls. The Office of the Chief of Engineers, USA indicated this course of action was not recommended due to probable failure resulting from static earth pressure and very high stresses produced by differential settlement of the entryway and shelter itself. However, in light of continuing requirements for improved endwall design, the Army and Navy were tasked separately to propose and test other methods.<sup>4</sup>

#### ARVN DYE MARKER Regiment

(S) On 28 January 1968, COMUSMACV discussed the importance of having ARVN man strong points and the resultant need to give ARVN the necessary resources, such as fighting bunker construction and crew-served weapons, for the strong points. He further expressed his opinion of the importance of the need for a fast mobile reserve in the vicinity of C-1 (a forward operating base), the desirability of ultimate ARVN occupancy of C-4, and the need for ARVN DYE MARKER buildup.

(TS) COMUSMACV provided the following guidance:

1. Build toward an ARVN DYE MARKER Regiment of five four-company battalions and one armored cavalry squadron. One battalion will be located at each base and disposed to man OPs along obstacle trace (using not more than 12 platoons in entire ARVN portion of trace); to provide two-company perimeter defense at A-1 (and one company reserve that will ultimately occupy C-4), and to provide three-company perimeter defense of A-2, A-3, A-4 and C-1. The armored cavalry squadron and one infantry company or more will be in mobile reserve at C-1.

2. Organize DYE MARKER regiment by: attaching four new 1st ARVN Div companies now training to the four DYE MARKER battalions, one per battalion; organizing next four new companies into fifth DYE MARKER battalion; and forming and training new DYE MARKER cavalry squadrons as soon as necessary equipment and personnel can be drawn together. Augment ARVN forces with additional crew-served weapons.<sup>5</sup>

(S) COMUSMACV informed CG, III MAF on 30 January that he had made the decision to augment the ARVN DYE MARKER Regiment with additional forces and weapons so that it would be properly organized for its mission. At this time, MACJ33 was designated project manager at MACV level and it was recommended that a similar project manager be established at I CTZ level.<sup>6</sup>

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(S) The concept called for a certain percentage of the SPOS to be manned by ARVN forces. COMUSMACV requested approval from CINCPAC on 29 January to augment the ARVN units manning the strong points with the following additional weapons:<sup>7</sup>

Machine gun, 7.62mm light M60	-	98
Mortar, 81mm M29/M23A1 Mount	-	22
Mortar, 60mm M19 W/E	-	22
Recoilless Rifle, 106mm on Mount M79	-	15

(S) In compliance with COMUSMACV's guidance, CG, III MAF established the following goals for accomplishment by 30 June 1968:

1. Constitute the present 2d ARVN Regt, 1st Inf Div as the DYE MARKER Regiment to be composed of five infantry battalions (four rifle companies each and one headquarters company each) and one armored cavalry squadron.

2. Employ the regiment to man strong points A-1 through A-4, to include a minimum of twelve platoon-sized observation posts along the linear obstacle between A-4 and the South China Sea coast; forward operating base (FOB) C-4 with one rifle company; FOB C-1 with the armored cavalry squadron and up to one infantry battalion.

3. Direct support artillery and other supporting arms as required and to be determined.<sup>8</sup>

#### Revised DUEL BLADE Program

(S) Per request of COMUSMACV, CG, III MAF submitted a revised DUEL BLADE Plan on 15 June. In essence the plan proposed that:

1. The ARVN DUEL BLADE Regiment would continue to occupy DUEL BLADE positions A-1, A-2 and C-1. Additionally, ARVN would relieve US forces and occupy position A-3 by October 1968 and position A-4 by December 1968.

2. US forces would continue to occupy positions A-3, A-4, C-2, C-3, and C-4. Following relief by ARVN forces in December, C-2, C-3, and C-4 and the Defile System would continue to be occupied by US troops.

3. The US Mobile Reserve initially stationed at C-1 would be replaced by the ARVN armored cavalry regt on or about 1 September 1968.

4. The requirement for site A-5 would be eliminated.

5. The installation of the linear obstacle would be deferred indefinitely.

6. Relocation of C-3 would be eliminated.

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7. The requirement for COB at Lang Ro Du and Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) would be eliminated.

8. Concrete fighting bunkers would be installed as programmed.

9. All "A" positions would be constructed on the basis of an ARVN battalion with fighting bunkers for three companies.

10. Maximum effort would be expected to accelerate the construction activities prior to the onset of the northeast monsoon.<sup>9</sup>

(S) COMUSMACV approved the following aspects of the concept on 5 July:

1. Deferral indefinitely of installation of the linear obstacle.
2. Construction of "A" positions on a basis of one ARVN battalion each.
3. Acceleration of construction to accomplish as much as possible before the onset of the northeast monsoon.
4. Installation of IGLOO WHITE sensors between "A" sites with replacement dependent upon effectiveness.

(S) Regarding the stationing of ARVN troops, COMUSMACV requested CG, III MAF to discuss the matter with CG, I CTZ with the objective of setting a target date for ARVN occupation of A-3 as the next step toward ultimate ARVN occupation of all four strong points.

(S) CG, III MAF was also tasked to prepare plans for the construction of the linear obstacle and strong point A-5. The planned construction was to be in three phases with the decision for the actual construction to be made at a later date.<sup>10</sup>

(S) Discussion between CG, III MAF and CG, I CTZ revealed that the CG, I CTZ did not desire to commit ARVN forces to sites A-3 and A-4 for the foreseeable future. Instead, he wanted to occupy A-1, A-2, and C-1 and to employ his two remaining infantry battalions in a mobile role with Marine forces in the DMZ area. CG, III MAF recommended concurrence with the ARVN commander and he informed COMUSMACV that III MAF was proceeding under the general premise that we should "walk away from the earlier DYE MARKER concept." A mobile posture was planned under the current precept in lieu of a physical obstacle.<sup>11</sup>

(S) The proposal that ARVN forces focus on developing a capability for mobile operations in the DMZ, instead of occupying A-3 and A-4, met the approval of COMUSMACV. He stated, however, that at a later date ARVN should be eased into occupying both sites after receiving sufficient training.

(S) COMUSMACV made the following comment in reference to mobile operations:

Change to primarily mobile operations in DMZ area and indefinite deferral of DUEL BLADE obstacle appear to be about as far as we should walk away from earlier DYE MARKER concept. We must

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be prepared to construct the obstacle when an opportune occasion occurs. In this event A-5 should be installed as the logical western anchor for the obstacle system stretching across the coastal plain. Accordingly, A-5 should be included in obstacle construction plans. <sup>12</sup>

(S) CG, I Corps and CG, III MAF met on 9 July to discuss DUEL BLADE planning with respect to bunker construction, availability of construction materials, and control procedures at I Corps/III MAF level and in subordinate commands. Agreement was reached between the two commanders on the division of responsibilities between US and ARVN, concepts for employment of forces, and future DUEL BLADE plans. <sup>13</sup>

(S) On 22 October, COMUSMACV ordered all construction and planning efforts associated with the present DUEL BLADE Program to be halted pending further guidance. <sup>14</sup>

(S) On 29 October, MACV Planning Dir 10-67, which established the responsibilities and schedule for planning and implementing DUEL BLADE/DYE MARKER Program, was rescinded. A revised anti-infiltration program, still referred to as DUEL BLADE, was initiated because of the change in the operational posture of friendly and enemy force. The old DUEL BLADE concept, anchored to the SPOS, was no longer considered suitable for current or anticipated tactical operations in support of the anti-infiltration mission of FWMAF in northern Quang Tri Province.

#### Concept for Revised DUEL BLADE

(S) Under the new concept, FWM maneuver forces, maintaining a mobile, operational posture supported by air strikes, artillery, and naval gunfire, would actively resist infiltration from the north across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line (PMDL). In locating hostile forces, whether infiltrating or static, all means of surveillance and intelligence would be used. These included, but were not limited to, motion detection radar, night observation devices, xenon searchlights, attended and unattended detection devices (sensors), FACs, patrols, and PW and agent reports. Of these means, sensors were expected to provide a constant 24 hour-a-day capability.

1. For maximum utilization, sensor emplacement was to begin immediately south of the PMDL (the PMDL being the northern limit of the revised DUEL BLADE area). Route 9 from Laos in the west, east to Ca Lu, thence on a line direct to Dong Ha, and on to the South China Sea via the Cua Viet River was to be the southern limit of DUEL BLADE.

2. Present "A" and "C" sites were to be used as fire support bases as required. Other DUEL BLADE assets not yet expended were to be used in support of this revised program at the discretion and direction of CG, III MAF.

3. Sensors were to be ground read-out by maneuver elements when location permitted; air read-out by III MAF air resources was to be provided for areas temporarily without ground read-out capability. Sensor frequency and tone-code limitations permitting, read-out would be accomplished via 7AF resources.

4. A centrally located facility was to be provided the tactical area commander for gathering information from all intelligence sources. This intelligence information, together

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with friendly order of battle, was to be automatically collated and visually displayed in as near real-time as possible. A storage capability was to be provided for a historical base to be used for analysis and reporting.

5. Some of the sensors planned for use in this concept had been subject to NOFORN restrictions. These restrictions were being modified to permit required RVNAF to utilize the equipment in tactical operations. Strict control and accountability by US forces was to be maintained over read-out devices. Sensor equipment supply, storage, and maintenance was to remain US only.

(5) Responsibilities delegated were as follows:

1. CG, III MAF:

a. Was responsible for operational and administrative planning for and implementation of the revised DUEL BLADE Program. Plans would be submitted to MACV for review NLT 14 November 1968. Planning would include, but not be limited to, the following:

- (1) An OPLAN and ADMIN Plan based upon the provided concept.
- (2) Intended use of existing facilities within TAO, e. g., Camp Carroll, strong points A-1 through A-4 and support bases C-1 through C-4.
- (3) Utilization of on-hand DUEL BLADE materials.
- (4) Bills of Material, as required. (Requirements for this program would be determined before consideration was given to the release of DUEL BLADE materials for other projects).
- (5) Provisions for interface with out-of-country programs of 7AF.
- (6) Air support requirements, to include air read-out of sensors.
- (7) Sensor employment plan, to include emplacement priorities.
- (8) Personnel requirements, if additional to prior program, with appropriate justifications.
- (9) Provision for anti-infiltration surveillance coordination center.
- (10) Provision for coordination with CG, I CTZ for combined operations, sensor training, supply, maintenance, and control.
- (11) Provision for naval gunfire support in accordance with current procedures.

b. Would provide to MACV the functional requirements for a Mobile Infiltration Surveillance Center (MISC). It was intended to request DCPG for the development, procurement, and delivery of this mobile facility on an expedited basis.

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2. CDR, 7AF would coordinate with CG, III MAF on interface between IGLOO WHITE and DUEL BLADE at the Laotian border to assure coordination of intelligence efforts and minimum interference between forces. CDR, 7AF supports with air in accordance with current procedures.

3. COMNAVFORV would continue logistical support.

4. CG, USARV would continue logistical support. <sup>15</sup>

(S) Sensor inventory remained low through October although production forecasts indicated relief by mid-December. COMUSMACV informed his major commanders on 31 October that recent decisions influencing infiltration interdiction programs, changes in the pattern of operations and the significant sensors required a shift in priorities. Consequently, the maintenance of an active field of 160-200 sensors was allocated to the revised DUEL BLADE Program. Sensors in excess of revised DUEL BLADE requirements were to be used in base defense with priority given to bases most frequently subjected to enemy probing. <sup>16</sup>

(S) CG, III MAF requested authority on 30 October to close out DUEL BLADE positions A-3 and C-3 as seen as possible. Occupancy of these positions was not envisioned in III MAF detailed plans and the sudden departure of the 1st Cav Div necessitated redeposition of forces in the XXIV Corps area. Concurrence by COMUSMACV was forthcoming on 3 November. <sup>17</sup>

(S) During the month of December, three sensor fields were hand implanted in the eastern portion of the DUEL BLADE area. Coordination between III MAF and 7AF was initiated to begin air implantation of sensors in the western area. By the end of the year, defoliation of a trace 2,000 meters wide adjacent to the border of Laos and immediately south of the DMZ in the western area of DUEL BLADE was 65 percent completed.

(S) III MAF OPLAN 405-68 (DUEL BLADE II) was approved by COMUSMACV on 30 December. Implementation was directed to be accomplished within programmed funds and available resources. <sup>18</sup>

#### MUSCLE SHOALS/IGLOO WHITE


##### General

(S) MUSCLE SHOALS, a \$670 million per year air-supported surveillance system was designed to help reduce the infiltration of men and material into SVN. It has two major subsystems: MUD RIVER, the anti-vehicular subsystem covering the major roads in Laos, and DUMP TRUCK, the anti-personnel subsystem in the western part of the DMZ and eastern Laos. Special MUSCLE SHOALS munitions (gravel, dragon tooth, button bomblets, and wide area anti-personnel mines) alone cost approximately \$300 million a year. (See Figure B-2). <sup>19</sup>

(S) The code name IGLOO WHITE was substituted for MUSCLE SHOALS on 1 June 1968 but the program remained unchanged.

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ANTI-INFILTRATION SUBSYSTEMS

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FIGURE B-2



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December Through March -- Introduction, Completion, Validation and Operational Integration

(3) The first weeks of operation in MUD RIVER were extraordinarily hectic. MUSCLE SHOALS was a very complex and new assemblage of equipment, facilities, concepts, people, and procedures. It had been rushed into the field while still definitely in R&D from a system point of view. Also, the interdiction campaign into which it was injected had only recently entered an unprecedentedly dynamic new phase--five to ten times the pace of the previous year. Under these circumstances, the early weeks were inevitably a nightmare of fault detections, analysis, and correction; design oversight discovery; procedure revision; interface clarification; and human error due to inexperience. Concurrent with this R&D consummation under fire, a substantial effort was required to complete construction and installation of the facilities at Nakhon Phanom. A substantial fraction of the staffing was also completed during this period--with the attendant indoctrination, training, and organizational accommodations. Over and above all of these diversions, the extraordinary national interest in the project resulted in a flood of distinguished visitors and innumerable urgent messages questioning, recommending, and requesting data and explanations.

(3) In spite of these complications, the sensor field was successfully deployed over the MUD RIVER area. The sensors did respond to passing trucks (among other things), the EC-121s did pick up the sensor signals and relay them to the ISC, and the computer-assisted ISC analysts did derive usable movement reports. By 7 December 1967, the ISC was fully operational and providing numerous Spotlight Reports to Task Force ALPHA operations for utilization in the Tactical Air Control System. The fundamental premise underlying the system was proven--that it was feasible, in a combat environment, to air-emplace and monitor a large sensor field and relay the sensor outputs in real-time to a remote center for analysis and exploitation.

(3) Once this critical milestone had been passed, validation of the ISC's truck movement reports became the principal focus for TF ALPHA activities in MUD RIVER. In the existing tactical environment, no more direct calibration means were available than diversion of Forward Air Controllers (FACs) to investigate as many individual Spotlight Reports as practicable. The fluctuations of the resulting "confirmation rate" were tracked and analyzed in infinite detail from Washington to Nakhon Phanom. Over a period of weeks, it emerged that this seemingly simple and straightforward index of MUSCLE SHOALS performance was in itself virtually meaningless. It was largely determined by such extraneous factors as FAC time availability, road visibility, weather, enemy ability to evade FACs, defense intensity, level of strike activity, command emphasis on confirmation for sake of confirmation, and truck density in the area. Complex analyses of masses of data have been required to draw any quantitative conclusions at all concerning the reliability of Spotlight Reports as indicators of actual truck movements. The most that has been established with any degree of assurance was that between 50 percent and 80 percent of vehicular Spotlight Reports were generated by actual truck movements (the remainder being spurious). The present high value ascribed to MUSCLE SHOALS as a truck movement intelligence source derived less from this "direct confirmation" measure than from the general plausibility and realism in detail of the pattern of enemy activity derived from correlation of ISC reports over time and space. By the end of February, a high degree of knowledgeability and recognition of the utility of MUSCLE SHOALS' reports had been developed in 7AF elements prosecuting the war on the Laotian LOCs.

(3) The planned DUMP TRUCK operational test of an air-supported anti-personnel infiltration barrier on the trail network in eastern Laos-western DMZ area was overrun by the event of the massive enemy buildup at Khe Sanh. Here, as earlier in the DYE MARKER area to the

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east, the tactical problem changed from infiltration to invasion. On 19 January, COMUSMACV directed diversion of DUMP TRUCK resources to the direct support of Khe Sanh. Within a remarkably short time, the meticulously planned initial deployment was completely replanned, relocated, and reoriented to battlefield surveillance of the Khe Sanh area. The first sensors were emplaced on 21 January and more than 150 sensors were operating by 25 January. Arrangements were made to send Spotlight Reports from TF ALPHA to the Marine Fire Support Control Center (FSCC) at Dong Ha and directly to the Intelligence and Targeting Officers at Khe Sanh. Throughout the siege, these reports contributed timely and pertinent tactical intelligence not available from any other source. On a 24-hour, all-weather basis, they provided, from monitored points throughout a wide area, useful information on personnel and vehicular movements, on concentrations and general levels of activity, and on firing sites. The speed and success of this system adaptation to a completely different tactical application from that originally envisioned was a dramatic demonstration of the flexibility and versatility inherent in the MUSCLE SHOALS concept.

(5) During February and March, a significant evolution occurred in the way the sensor reports were utilized at Khe Sanh. In the beginning, well-defined targets for artillery and air strikes were scarce and the Marine Targeting Officers were unfamiliar with the operating characteristics of the sensor field. Individual movement reports were responded to by artillery or air strikes against the sensor location given in the Spotlight Report--in essence, the originally contemplated "Infiltration Barrier" reaction. Although a definite improvement on blind harassing and interdiction targeting, this tactic was inherently limited in effectiveness by the time delay in the reporting system (30 minutes and up from sensor report through DUTCH MILL to Khe Sanh) and by unresolvable uncertainties in sensor location and target separation from sensors. As the siege progressed, potential targets became plentiful and the Marine Intelligence and Targeting staff became familiar with the sensor field, its capabilities, and its limitations. At this stage, firing (or bombing) at every indication of movement would have been a relatively unproductive utilization of the available strike resources. Greater payoff lay in the development of particularly lucrative targets for massed and coordinated artillery and air strikes. The sensor reports came to play a key role in this decisive phase of the action. They were correlated with visual reconnaissance and other intelligence sources to analyze and anticipate the enemy's overall plan of attack, to pinpoint and functionally categorize his concentration areas, and to deduce timing patterns in his supply and assault activities. Against this background, the available artillery, tactical air, and B-52 firepower could be concentrated on selected areas to achieve maximum results. In many cases, the proper timing of attack on a selected target area was essential. As an example, a known assembly area for the reserve regiment in an anticipated enemy assault plan became an extremely profitable target for pre-planned massed fire--but only in the brief interval between positioning and jump-off. In instance after instance, in night and fog, sensor-derived activity patterns provided the "now is the time" cue for strikes. This mature exploitation of MUSCLE SHOALS as a complement to other intelligence and targeting techniques, rather than as a stand-alone trigger for reflex response, became a major guideline for future applications.

(5) Another evolutionary advance during the Khe Sanh siege was the initial use, on a small scale, of ground read-out devices (MICROTALE) for local monitoring of sensor strings within line of sight of an observation post. This technique for intensive monitoring on a real-time basis of a few air-emplaced (or hand-emplaced) sensors was a valuable complement to the wholesale data handling techniques of the basic MUSCLE SHOALS approach. It lent itself well to many anticipated tactical applications.

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(S) In short, the first four months of MUSCLE SHOALS were months of impressive accomplishment in system introduction, completion, validation, and integration into both air and ground operations.

(S) In addition to this accomplishment, the new system at Khe Sanh made a significant contribution to the operation into which it was introduced, as is elaborated in the foregoing discussion.

(S) In MUD RIVER, however, the tactical situation did not lend itself to such a quick, clear contribution. In November and early December just before MUSCLE SHOALS, truck sightings and truck kills in the area were up by a factor of 5 to 10 over the previous year. This typified the ensuing campaign. Here, as in DYE MARKER and DUMP TRUCK, the tactical environment into which the new system was injected was very different from that which had been envisioned in 1966.

(S) During the December-March shakedown and validation phase, MUSCLE SHOALS influenced the intensive ongoing anti-vehicular campaign almost solely through its Spotlight Report output. All ISC-assessed truck movements were reported via TF ALPHA operations to the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) for use in battle management. In this mode of interdiction system operation, the value of Spotlight Reports lies in their efficiency in helping FACs acquire trucks to attack. As it happened, under the circumstances of this particular campaign, the FACs didn't really need such help. The enemy persistently pushed large numbers of trucks over well-defined and reasonably visible roadways, frequently with headlights on. At the same time, improved aircraft, tactics, and (especially) night vision devices had realized an entirely new order of FAC target acquisition effectiveness. In these situations, the four on-station night FACs spent a relatively small fraction of their time in finding 190 to 230 trucks a night--2 or 3 times as many as could be attacked with the available effective truck-killing aircraft. The addition of Spotlight Report advice as to where still other trucks might have been found made no noticeable contribution. The system was firepower-limited--not target-limited.

(S) A further contribution of the MUSCLE SHOALS project in this time frame was the successful laying of more than a million gravel mines on the Laotian roads and another million in 20 fields on the approaches to Khe Sanh. In both areas it must be assumed that this harassed the enemy to some extent. Some casualties are known to have been inflicted. However, evidence to date is not indicative of a significant operational impact in either area.<sup>20</sup>

#### Transition Toward Full Exploitation

(S) By April, a sufficient level of confidence had been established in the validity of the ISC's moving truck reports that continued emphasis on Spotlight Report confirmation for the sake of confirmation was no longer required. At the same time, extensive operations analysis of the interdiction campaign had established that timely availability of adequate truck-killing resources rather than target discovery was the pacing factor under the existing circumstances. Consequently, emphasis at TF ALPHA changed from simply feeding a maximum number of new target candidates into the already congested ABCCC to a broader intelligence development role aimed at more efficient scheduling and allocation of the limited strike assets.

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(S) New tracks were evaluated in the ISC against the background of the total pattern of current activity in the area and only the most lucrative (i. e. larger than average convoys) were passed to the ABCCC. At minimum burden on the ABCCC, assistance was thus provided in optimizing allocation of strike resources available in a given time interval.

(S) Day to day activity patterns were also provided to 7AF TACC as guides for attack sortie scheduling to match firepower presence to target availability.

(S) As part of the overall interdiction effort, 7AF mounted a sustained effort during April to maintain first one and then two route cuts in chosen areas on the principal traffic flow route through the MUD RIVER area. MUSCLE SHOALS was intimately integrated into this tactical operation in order to monitor the effects produced on traffic flow near the cut. The overall success of the operation was not dramatic but MUSCLE SHOALS did its part well. It showed, for example, that for the most part there was surprisingly little change in the traffic patterns of the route segments on either side of the cut--with truck motion continuing both towards and away from the cut, on both sides, (presumably implying a transfer operation near the cut or an undiscovered by-pass). Over a period of weeks, there was a noticeable trend towards larger convoy sizes and a relative shift in traffic from the interdiction path to a more southerly route. However, the significance of these possible results of the cut was blurred by the concurrent overall buildup of traffic levels in the area and by an expected seasonal shift to the relatively weather-resistant southern route.

(S) The major TF ALPHA staff effort, however, was applied during April and May to the development of lucrative targets among the relatively fixed terminal facilities of the trucking system--truck parks, storage and transshipment areas, and maintenance and refueling areas. The first step of this development was the definition of about 30 suspect areas of concentrations (typically 2 x 5 km) of such terminal activities. This was accomplished by correlating ISC-derived movement data from December to April with terrain analyses, FAC and visual reconnaissance reports, roadwatch and SLAR reports, photography, and Laotian agent reports. The next step was the confirmation of each suspect area, categorization of the type of activity there, and the further pinpointing of active locations within the area. In this step, use was made of sensor strings specifically deployed near suspected approaches to the area and of probing or reconnaissance sensors (acoustic) deployed within the area of interest. (One successful drop of the latter kind yielded several days of bustle and banging from what was obviously a busy truck repair station.)

(S) From the intelligence developed on extensive areas of consistent activity over a period of days, TF ALPHA was able to identify more volatile target opportunities by continuous monitoring of the traffic patterns in the vicinity of (and sometimes within) concentration areas whose target value fluctuated from day to day. On the basis of such monitoring during the evening and early morning hours, "Super" Spotlight Reports were forwarded to 7AF TACC each morning, designating those truck park/transshipment areas estimated to be the most attractive for strikes that day.

(S) There was little doubt that these TF ALPHA inputs had enhanced the effectiveness of both the B-52 and TACAIR strikes against the trucking system's stationary targets. It was not possible, however, to quantify this contribution at the time.

(S) During the same period, the longer term intelligence potential of the ISC's truck movement records was increasingly exploited. With several months of data in hand, statistical analyses at MACV and 7AF began to yield interesting insights into the enemy's detailed pattern of operations on the Laotian LOC.

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(S) Sensor surveillance of the Khe Sanh area was continued at reduced intensity through April and May. With the great reduction in the level of tactical activity subsequent to the relief of the Marine garrison, the role of the sensor net evolved even further in the direction of a general intelligence gathering medium--in contradistinction to an immediate target acquisition means.

(S) With the abatement of the Khe Sanh emergency, deployment of sensor strings was resumed in the original DUMP TRUCK area. However, these deployments were directed principally to monitoring vehicular movement on the principal northern approaches to the A Shau Valley rather than to the originally conceived small-group personnel interception.

(S) The most significant aspect of the April - May period of transition was the broad surge of command interest in the tactical potentials of sensor-derived intelligence. This received its major single impetus from the Khe Sanh experience. However, completion of in-theater staff studies, under way for some time, contributed substantially by defining a diversity of new and promising tactical applications to MUSCLE SHOALS resources.

(S) Some of the applications involved the full MUSCLE SHOALS (sensor plus central processing) System deployed to cover new areas. The prime system capability to be exploited in these instances was 24-hour, all-weather electronic surveillance of large areas of real estate without actual physical commitment of forces on the ground to search for and locate enemy movement. It acquired information and transmitted it to the ground commander in near real-time and allowed him to employ his forces at the time and the place of his choosing.

(S) Other envisioned applications involved intimate integration of a relatively small number of sensors into a localized tactical situation with on-the-scene read-out from observation posts on the ground or in light aircraft or helicopters. Both air and hand-emplaced sensors would be employed, depending on the specific circumstances. The tight time coupling among sensor activation, situation evaluation, and strike reaction achievable in these compact situations would make practical immediate engagement of sensor-detected targets--when that is the commander's choice. (A very successful experiment of this kind was run during the early May withdrawal from the A Shau Valley. Hand-emplaced sensors at strategic points such as roadcuts were monitored by MICROTALE from Signal Hill at distances of up to 20 km and covered by immediate artillery fire.) Most future plans for this class of applications are now identified by the code-word DUFFEL BAG.

(S) The specific proposals for immediate exploitation have considerably exceeded the limits of availability of sensors, frequency channels, EC-121 orbits, and trained personnel. Consequently, difficult command choices regarding sensor allocations have had to be made in order to derive maximum operational benefits over the remainder of the year.

(S) Sensor operations continued in all areas in July. However, the planned emplacement of sensor field approaches to Base Areas 101 and 114 was delayed because of US tactical operations in the areas to be seeded.

(S) In August, the continued sensor shortages caused by production slippage of Phase II sensors and an urgent operational requirement for a new sensor field northwest of Cam Lo required modification of the Southwest Monsoon Plan. The requirement for sensors on the approaches to Base Areas 101 and 114 was cancelled as was the sensor field scheduled for emplacement in the DUEL BLADE Trace between A-1 and A-2. The requirement to maintain sensor strings in the DUMP TRUCK area around Khe Sanh was also cancelled. In spite of the cancelled requirements,

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the sensor shortages caused a significant drop in the number of active strings reported at the end of the month.

(S) During September, the anti-vehicular sensor fields continued to monitor enemy logistic activities in the MUD RIVER area of Laos, extending south of the approaches to the A Shau Valley and in the Route Package 1 (RPI) Tally Ho area of southern NVN. The continued shortage of sensors, however, reduced the number of active sensors in each field.

(S) An assessment of system effectiveness showed a continued qualitative contribution to information on the levels of truck traffic, movement patterns, and truck parks and staging areas. The marked decrease in truck activity in both the MUD RIVER and the RPI area during the period by sensor indications, visual sightings, and other intelligence sources were attributed to the effectiveness of the intensified interdiction campaign implemented in July. IGLOO WHITE was credited with a significant contribution to this impairment of the enemy resupply effort.

(S) A new interdiction system called COMMANDO HUNT was implemented in October with the onset of the northeast monsoon. The bulk of the IGLOO WHITE sensor resources were concentrated in Laos. The active sensor field in RPI was reduced to zero by 21 October but later in the month was increased to 72 long-life air delivered seismic intrusion detectors (ADSIDS), in anticipation of a bombing halt. These sensors were monitored by aircraft orbiting over the Gulf of Tonkin. The operational control of interdiction type aircraft allocated to COMMANDO HUNT was exercised by TF ALPHA. By 1 November, the COMMANDO HUNT plan was considered fully implemented and limited only by the availability of sensor resources. 21

#### DUCK BLIND/DUFFEL BAG

##### General

(S) COMUSMACV was directed by CINCPAC in April to coordinate with DCPG and submit a plan for application of MUSCLE SHOALS and DYE MARKER type technology and assets to a wide range of applications in operations against the enemy in accordance with guidance contained in a DEPSECDEF memo of 5 April 1968. This plan was to cover those tasks which could be achieved through added procurements and short term modifications and those which could be achieved on a longer term basis through equipment and procedures especially modified or developed for that purpose. This plan would be nicknamed DUCK BLIND.

(S) The MACV DUCK BLIND plan was prepared on 22 and 23 April in coordination with representatives of DCPG and was forwarded to CINCPAC on 1 May 68.

##### DUCK BLIND Plan

(S) The DUCK BLIND plan embodied two phases. Phase I consisted of operational evaluations of sensor employment in eight different tactical applications. Favorable results of these introductory operations were to be exploited as rapidly as possible during follow-on operations conducted during Phase II. The tactical applications were:

1. Combat sweep.
2. Targeting enemy troop locations.

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3. Surveillance of enemy base areas.
4. Route surveillance (including waterways).
5. Ambush.
6. Convoy protection.
7. Base defense.
8. Monitoring of LZs.

(3) The MACV plan outlined the in-country use of DYE MARKER/MUSCLE SHOALS-type equipment in tactical operations and stated the requirements and support necessary to support the operational concepts. The plan discussed the following areas:

1. MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER operations.
2. Introductory DUCK BLIND operations.
3. Follow-on DUCK BLIND operations.
4. Training support.
5. Logistics support.
6. Personnel requirements.

#### MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER Operations

(3) MUD RIVER operations would continue with the weight of effort shifting as dictated by the southwest monsoon and the prevailing tactical situation. Integral to these operations was the use of sensors in the A Shau Valley approaches and the enemy Base Areas 101 and 114. In addition, the plan provided for sensor coverage in the defile area which extended westward from the "Rock Pile" toward the Laotian border and southward toward Route 9.

1. Support of the foregoing operations, as visualized, would require maximum utilization of available EC-121 monitor aircraft and necessitate ISC functioning to full capacity.
2. Available sensor resources and scheduled deliveries would be adequate to support the above concepts at the planned usage rates.
3. MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER operations and sensor coverage of the A Shau Valley and enemy base areas were accorded first priority. Planned sensor usage would not leave a significant amount of resources for use in DUCK BLIND. Therefore, requirements to support the latter would be additional to that programmed for MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER.

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Introductory DUCK BLIND Operations

(S) The plan contemplated using MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER-type sensors, plus other detection devices, in a series of tactical applications inserted into on-going tactical operations during May, June, and July. The objective of these introductory operations was to develop techniques for optimum sensor employment and to determine the operational validity of the tactical concepts employed.

Follow-on DUCK BLIND Operations

(S) Follow-on operations, assuming the concepts tested in the introductory phase proved valid, were generally to involve decentralized ground operations in areas usually accessible to friendly forces. Operational results and user acceptance were so favorable that further testing as envisaged in the plan was dispensed with and sensors were operationally employed.

Training Support Requirements.

(S) The training requirements and associated support essential to the employment of the plan were:

1. Range of Training:

- a. Orientation of commanders and key staff officers regarding concepts, capabilities, limitations, and techniques.
- b. Instruction of commanders of operating units and selected enlisted men in employment and read-out of sensors.
- c. Instruction of air crews in delivery of sensors.
- d. Instruction of supply and maintenance personnel in the storage, assembly, checkout, and repair of sensors and read-out equipments (organizational and direct support only).

2. Initial Support Required:

- a. General orientation team.
- b. Instruction team focusing on tactical aspects.
- c. New equipment training teams focusing on technical aspects.
- d. Lesson plans and associated demonstration equipment and training aids.
- e. Draft manuals for use by staff officers, operating units, and technicians.

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### Logistic Support

(S) These requirements were that:

1. USARV would develop a capability as soon as possible to perform in-country receipt, storage, assembly, checkout, and maintenance (organizational and direct support) of DUCK BLIND devices. 7AF would furnish this support from Thailand pending USARV development of this capability.
2. 7AF would initially furnish logistic support from Thailand for DUCK BLIND/MUSCLE SHOALS munitions by helicopter.
3. III MAF would maintain current capability to support in-country use of DYE MARKER line sensors pending further determination of whether requirements would warrant USARV assumption of this responsibility.

### Personnel Requirements

(S) Although the number of personnel required was not stated, the plan would require personnel augmentation as determined by component commanders particularly in the areas of sensor management, supply, and maintenance and would be accomplished by reallocation within currently authorized theater manpower ceilings.

(S) CINCPAC concurred in the plan on 8 May and recommended to JCS that it be approved for planning purposes on a limited trial basis, that implementation of the plan be on an incremental basis, by phase, as recommended by COMUSMACV and approved by CINCPAC; and that a continuing review be made of DUCK BLIND operations in order that non-productive applications could be identified and discontinued.<sup>22</sup>

(S) COMUSMACV commented on DUCK BLIND to his major commanders on 9 May:

I am enthusiastic about the potential of sensors and am convinced we are on the verge of a break through in acquisition of ground tactical intelligence. Therefore, I desire that vigorous command emphasis be given to the program for introduction of sensors into tactical operations. All personnel involved in this effort should be made aware of the sense of urgency which I attach to this project.<sup>23</sup>

### Problem Areas

(S) The major problem anticipated in DUCK BLIND applications of MUSCLE SHOALS sensors was radio frequency interference from external sources in SVN. Since the majority of DUCK BLIND operations would be conducted at tactical unit level and since most sensors would be monitored from ground locations or low altitude aircraft (up to 5,000 ft), RFI problems would

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be local in nature. Interference between sensors in adjacent areas would be a problem only in northern I CTZ where close coordination would be necessary to avoid interference with IGLOO WHITE sensor fields. MACJ6 was tasked in May to provide centralized management and frequency coordination in support of DUCK BLIND.<sup>24</sup>

(S) In June, CDR, 7AF noted that because of the increased use of IGLOO WHITE detection devices, it was desirable to have a single manager for the control and assignment of sensor frequencies and tone codes in SEASIA. This was considered necessary to preclude interference between on-going operations and any proposed future operations. CDR, 7AF requested that responsibility for the centralized management and control of frequency tone codes in SEASIA be assigned to him.<sup>25</sup>

(S) COMUSMACV replied on 16 June that MACJ6 would continue to provide centralized frequency coordination and management. However, close coordination would be maintained with 7AF and TF ALPHA to insure that interference to IGLOO WHITE from DUCK BLIND sensors in I CTZ would not occur.<sup>26</sup>

#### Sensors

(S) Although numerous sensors and allied equipment were used in the DUCK BLIND program, ACUBUOYs, ADSIDs, and HANDSIDs were employed in greatest numbers. A discussion of these sensors can be found in Chapter X (Research and Development).

#### Phase I - Operations

(S) COMUSMACV requested CG, USARV and CG, III MAF on 16 June to commence DUCK BLIND operations NLT 23 June in order that a feasible schedule could be established for completion of Phase I operations.<sup>27</sup>

(S) On 8 July COMUSMACV authorized the employment of acoustic and seismic sensors in the defense of Saigon.<sup>28</sup>

(S) An interim report on the progress of Phase I operations was submitted to CINCPAC on 9 July with an expected completion date of eight Phase I applications by 30 August. Delays in receipt of material, few contacts with the enemy, and lost shipments resulted in tasks not being completed.<sup>29</sup>

#### Phase I - Evaluations

(S) Phase I DUCK BLIND operations terminated 25 August. Unattended intrusion detection devices were utilized in eight tactical applications with a view to obtaining operational evaluations in a combat environment. Sensor detection capabilities and employment techniques provided the basis for sensor emplacement planning. The scope of the evaluations was limited by availability of sensors, time, and a lack of enemy activity in test areas; sensor coverage was less than optimum in most cases and test duration varied from one week to two months. During the period, some sensors were diverted from planned tests to support similar applications in tactical operations being conducted in response to a significant enemy threat.

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(S) Results of the eight operational evaluations were as follows:

1. **Combat Sweep - Undetermined.** Testing unit lacked opportunity to conduct an appropriate operation.
2. **Ambush - Successful.** Enemy approach was sensor-detected and mortar fire was delivered resulting in one enemy KIA and captured equipment.
3. **Enemy Base Area Surveillance - Undetermined.** Artillery fired daily against sensor derived targets. After two weeks, there was a significant decrease in sensor reported activity. Unable to verify results due to inaccessibility.
4. **Targeting - Successful.** Of the 364 targets reported acquired by sensors, 250 (68.7%) were fired on by artillery, resulting in significant decreases in enemy activity in those areas. A few enemy KIA were confirmed and some equipment captured. However, in most instances gun damage assessment was not obtained due to night firing into inaccessible areas.
5. **Base Area Defense - Undetermined.** Testing unit was not engaged by enemy.
6. **Convey Protection - Successful.** Tanks and mortars fired on sensor detected activity along a road segment that had been subject to considerable mining by enemy. This operation commenced in June and no further mining incidents in that area were reported during 1968.
7. **Route Surveillance - Successful.** Artillery fired on sensor indications of approaching squad size unit. Results were four enemy KIA and some captured equipment.
8. **Monitoring of Helo LZ - Successful.** Although sensor activity occurred in the LZ area prior to test day, there were no indications when the test was conducted and a check of the area by a recon patrol confirmed the absence of hostile troops. The sensors did detect the friendly troop activity.

(S) An early recognition by field commanders of the potential of sensor-provided information resulted in request for this equipment to be used in on-going operations. Due to the limited supply of sensors, allocations were made only to high threat areas where sensor-derived intelligence would be a significant input to decisions for timely counteractions. In these operational areas, sensors were located where known enemy activity had been occurring, and activations were responded to by ambushes, artillery fire, or infantry assault. Some results of these sensor supported operations are as follows:

1. Sensors detected enemy approaching ambush location. Nineteen enemy KIA.
2. Sensors were emplaced next to a suspected enemy LOC. Artillery fired on activations. Aerial scouts observed and reported remnants of enemy activity. An infantry sweep an hour later located five NVA KIA by artillery, and picked up the following equipment: one AK-47, six AK magazines, seven NVA packs, 10 HCs, 100 lbs. rice, six rds RPG and one pound of documents.
3. A combat operating base had been subjected to frequent enemy mortar fire. Sensor emplacement indicated enemy activity and patrols were able to verify enemy mortar firing positions. Patrol routes were adjusted and mortaring ceased.

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4. Sensors were emplaced to help deter VC interdiction by mining of an important LOC. The site selected had a particularly high incident rate of enemy mining. Since installation of sensors and the rapid artillery response to activations, no mines have been emplaced within 300 meters of the sensor modules.

5. Sensors had produced numerous indications of enemy troop movements and locations in 3d Mar Div AO which were confirmed by aerial observer, agent, and PW reports. In one area where a high activity rate was reported, a recon patrol called in artillery which produced 159 secondary explosions and 25 fireballs. In another instance, four secondary fires resulted from two missions fired in response to sensor activations. Sensor information in conjunction with other indicators prompted initiation of a regimental-size operation which resulted in numerous sightings and several contacts.

(S) In addition to the foregoing examples of sensor-use operations, these devices were also in use in the defense of Saigon, Chu Lai, and Da Nang and were being tested in riverine operations (no results to date). In the city defense role, sensors have been helpful in detecting enemy troop movement.

(S) It was concluded that Phase I DUCK BLIND operational results were such as to justify not only continuation of the program but expansion as well. Recognition was given to the fact that much needed to be accomplished in supporting areas such as personnel requirements, training, doctrine development, logistics, and follow-on equipment requirements. Actions or recommendations, as appropriate, were to be provided as established.<sup>30</sup>

(S) The enemy's interdiction of mobile supply routes by mining and ambush was a matter of continuing concern to COMUSMACV. He noted that the use of sensors as a means of targeting these areas of enemy activity had proven successful and application was encouraged by tactical commanders responsible for MSR security.<sup>31</sup>

(C) The DUCK BLIND program became known as DUFFEL BAG in October.

(S) The limited availability of these sensors and ancillary equipment restricted in-country sensor operations through the remainder of 1968.

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## ANTI-INFILTRATION BARRIER - B

1. Msg (S), DCPG to CINCPAC, 201700Z Apr 68, Subj: DYE MARKER (U), Cp-3; CHECO Rpt (TS), 31 Jul 68, Subj: IGLOO WHITE (U), Cp-1; Msg (C), DCPG to COMUSMACV, 132224Z Oct 68, Subj: Not Janted, Cp-4.
2. Rpt (S), MACDC, n.d., Subj: Quarterly Historical Summary, Jan-Mar 68 (U), Cp-None.
3. Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 291416Z Mar 68, Subj: DYE MARKER Second Generation Standard Living Bunkers (U), Cp-4; Rpt (S), MACDC, n.d., Subj: Quarterly Historical Summary, Jan-Mar 68 (U), Cp-None.
4. Msg (S), DCPG to CINCPAC, 181940Z May 68, Subj: DYE MARKER (U), Cp-3.
5. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 300838Z Jan 68, Subj: ARVN DYE MARKER Dispositions (U), Cp-3.
6. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to SA I CTZ, et al., 020851Z Feb 68, Subj: Program Management (U), Cp-4.
7. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 290438Z Jan 68, Subj: Additional Weapons for ARVN (U), Cp-4.
8. Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 200104Z Feb 68, Subj: Weekly Progress Report DYE MARKER Regiment (U), Cp-4.
9. Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 151010Z Jun 68, Subj: Revised DUEL BLADE Plan (U), Cp-4.
10. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 050850Z Jul 68, Subj: Revised DUEL BLADE Plan (U), Cp-3.
11. Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 071010Z Jul 68, Subj: Revised DUEL BLADE Plan (U), Cp-4.
12. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 080147Z Jul 68, Subj: DUEL BLADE Revision (U), Cp-4.
13. Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 091300Z Jul 68, Subj: DUEL BLADE (U), Cp-4.
14. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 220854Z Oct 68, Subj: DUEL BLADE Construction/Planning (U), Cp-4.
15. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, et al., 290900Z Oct 68, Subj: Revision of DUEL BLADE Program (U), Cp-4.
16. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, et al., 311510Z Oct 68, Subj: Classified, Cp-4.

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17. Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 301442Z Oct 68, Subj: DUEL BLADE (U), Cp-4;  
Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 030310Z Nov 68, Subj: DUEL BLADE (U), Cp-4.
18. Rpt (S), MACJ3, Dec 68, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary (U), Cp-4.
19. Rpt (S), ODASD (SA), Apr 68, Subj: SEA Analysis, Apr (U), Cp-4.
20. Rpt (S), MACJ332, 31 May 68, Subj: Classified, Cp-4.
21. Rpts (S), MACJ3, Jul - Nov 68, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, Jul - Nov 68 (U), Cp-4;  
Rpt (S), MACV, 4 Dec 68, Subj: Year-End Review, Vietnam (U), Cp-4.
22. Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 142144Z Apr 68, Subj: DYL MARKER/MUSCLE  
SHOALS Plan (U), Cp-4; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 011052Z May 68, Subj:  
DUCK BLIND Plan (U), Cp-4; Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 080215Z May 68, Subj: DUCK  
BLIND Planning (U), Cp-3.
23. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to 7AF, et al., 090505Z May 68, Subj: DUCK BLIND Operations  
(U), Cp-3.
24. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to 7AF, 081022Z Jun 68, Subj: DUCK BLIND (U), Cp-3.
25. Msg (S), 7AF to COMUSMACV, 120220Z Jun 68, Subj: Classified, Cp-3.
26. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to 7AF, 161135Z Jun 68, Subj: Classified, Cp-1.
27. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to USARV, et al., 161652Z Jun 68, Subj: DUCK BLIND Operations  
(U), Cp-3.
28. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 081202Z Jul 68, Subj: Classified, Cp-4.
29. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 090358Z Jul 68, Subj: DUCK BLIND Progress Report  
(U), Cp-3.
30. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 150115Z Sep 68, Subj: Classified, Cp-4.
31. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 031005Z Oct 68, Subj: DUCK BLIND Equipment to  
Thwart Ambushes (U), Cp-4.
32. Rpt (S), MACV, 4 Dec 68, Subj: Year-End Review, Vietnam (U), Cp-4.

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## ANNEX C -- OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRESS RELATIONS AND PROBLEMS

### Organization, Mission, Relationships

(U) The Military Assistance Command Office of Information (MACOI) was tasked to advise and assist COMUSMACV on all matters relating to public and command information. The Chief of Information (CINFO), an Army brigadier general, was the principal advisor to the MACV Joint Staff and to the Vietnamese JGS on public information and the Command Information Program. As such, he was responsible to supervise command-wide information activities, coordinate with the AMEMB's Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), and maintain liaison with and advise RVNAF in matters pertaining to public and command information.

#### Command Information Division (MACOID)


(U) Basically, the Command Information Division (CID) provided information materials designed to increase the knowledge and understanding of the forces in Vietnam and our role in the struggle in SEASIA. The Division had two main branches: Materials and The Observer. The Materials Branch was concerned with the production of pamphlets, brochures, leaflets, posters, and other publications to keep the servicemen informed. The Observer Branch was concerned with the publication of the MACV weekly newspaper. CID maintained liaison with command and internal information officers of the component USMC commands and provided policy guidance relating to the missions and responsibilities of COMUSMACV. The Division also monitored all command newspapers published in Vietnam to insure information was in consonance with MACV objectives and conformed with MACV release of information directives. Monthly, an information newsletter was sent to all IOs in Vietnam. The "adoption" program, whereby interested US military units in Vietnam were aligned with volunteer citizen groups in the United States who had asked to do something for our servicemen in Vietnam, was supervised by the Division. Other activities included:

1. Monitoring of the distribution of free Stars & Stripes and the delivery thereof.
2. Preparation and distribution of a weekly Unit Press Bulletin, which was mailed to each IO in Vietnam.
3. Coordination and supervision of command information material for presentation on AFVN radio/television.
4. Writing and publishing orientation editions of the Stars & Stripes and arranging distribution of these to all incoming military personnel. (Beginning in 1968, arrangements were made by the Chief of Information with the Military Airlift Command to issue these editions to replacements at the aerial ports of embarkation in COMUS rather than in Vietnam as had previously been the case). The Observer continued to be the official publication of MACV. It was not a unit newspaper per se. Its coverage extended to all US and Free World forces in Vietnam and to selected civilian programs sponsored by the US and GVN. In its coverage of selected news areas not included in other unit publications, The Observer stressed:

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OFFICE OF INFORMATION**



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FIGURE C-1

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1. The advisory effort.
2. MACV policies and programs.
3. Pacification, to include Civic Action and Revolutionary Development (RD).
4. Allied forces.
5. RVNAF activities.

## Public Information Division (MACOI-P)

(U) The Public Information Division (PID) was geared to serve the press corps in providing at least twice daily news releases and daily news briefings and copy in respect to military operations and RD projects in RVN. There were three main division branches to insure that this was accomplished: the News Branch, the Audio Visual Branch, and the Statistical Analysis Branch. The News Branch prepared and released a formal news release to the national and international press corps twice daily. These were based on the MACV Combat Operations Center log sheets, spot reports, and other news items, so that recipients were kept abreast of the daily progress of the war. To further keep the press informed, daily news briefings were given each afternoon in Saigon. Once each week, newly arrived media representatives were given a general orientation briefing. The News Branch maintained a reference library of facts and figures on battles, both air and ground, and other events that had occurred during the military campaigns in Vietnam. This facility was for the use of the staff as well as the press. The main task of the Audio Visual Branch was directing the operations of the DOD Combat Camera Teams assigned to MACV by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, (OASD(PA)) for DOD directed commercial production of color composite news film. There were five of these teams assigned in 1968 to cover military and RD activities in RVN and SEASIA. They produced at least three news film features each week for release via the DOD news film pool for use on national TV.

## Special Projects Division (MACOI-S)

(U) The Special Projects Division (SPD) was organized as the service and liaison agency for news media representatives visiting and working in RVN who were covering military and pacification activities. In this capacity, SPD acted as the sole issuing agency for MACV press accreditation; coordinated in-country military transportation for news media representatives (more than 500 during most of 1968 with a high of 649 during Tet); prepared itineraries and gave general briefings for newly arrived correspondents; and maintained liaison with IOs in the field, JUSPAO, the GVN Ministry of Information (MOI), and the press officers of other GVN agencies. Accreditation cards were issued for 30, 90, or 180 days to an average of 65 newsmen each week, depending on the length of a correspondent's intended stay in RVN. All newsmen in RVN had to have been accredited with the GVN MOI prior to receiving a MACV press card. Accreditation required a letter certifying employment or, in the case of a third country national, an embassy letter to that effect. An average of four or five applicants were refused accreditation each week, primarily because of improper employment letters, failure to show proof of financial responsibility, or as nonjournalistic persons and free-lancers who failed to produce letters of commitment from two different agencies. SPD offered each newly-accredited

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correspondent a briefing on the general situation in Vietnam and, in addition, once the specific interests of the newsmen were learned, he was given all available information as to how best to gather his story. When desired by a newsmen, SPD prepared itineraries which normally allowed him to obtain the maximum coverage in the least amount of time. Staff ground rules required that, if possible, all correspondents wishing to interview MACV staff officers would first be interviewed by an SPD officer. Interview requests for a general officer were not accepted by name. Instead, the SPD action officer got the story line and proposed questions and then contacted the proper staff agency for the interview. Interviews with top level MACV officers were arranged through the Chief of Information only. To accomplish the mission of transporting correspondents in-country by air, SPD made use of four military airlift systems. The largest single airlift capability was provided by the daily C-130 flights which operated from Tan Son Nhut to locations in the I, II and III CTZs. There were originally 15 seats on each of these which were booked for correspondents but based on usage factors, space requirements were reduced to 10 seats on Saigon to Da Nang flights and 5 seats on all other flights. To transport newsmen to locations within a 75 mile radius of Saigon, a UH-1D helicopter from the 120th Aviation Company was assigned to SPD. However, assignment of this helicopter to SPD was terminated in May and thereafter helicopter flights were scheduled by SPD through MACV Flight Operations. For areas in the III and IV CTZs beyond this 75 mile radius, SPD arranged bookings with the III and IV CTZ ATCOs at Tan Son Nhut and MACV Flight Operations, using daily flights (i. e., C-7A, C-123, Beavers, etc.). For large press parties traveling to a specific event, SPD arranged for special aircraft to transport these groups. In addition, SPD maintained liaison with Air America, RMK-BRJ, and other organizations with inherent airlift capabilities to provide newsmen with transportation to areas not covered by regular or special press flights. To facilitate communications between correspondents and field information officers in RVN and the staff itself, SPD had immediate access to teletype machines linking it with the Press Centers at Da Nang and Nha Trang; the IOs in Can Tho, Pleiku, and An Khe; Hq II FFORCEV; Hq 7AF; and Hq USARV. Monthly, SPD published a roster of accredited correspondents and military information officers for the staff, military information officers, and accredited correspondents. SPD also administered the granting of certain privileges to correspondents. These privileges included PX/commissary cards which not only allowed the authorized correspondents (US citizens only) access to these facilities but also gave them a monthly liquor and cigarette ration and the option to purchase any item of \$25 value or less. All accredited correspondents were allowed: to use military money exchanging facilities; to have access to all FWMAF compounds within the limits of local security requirements; and to use space available transportation by land, sea, and air of Free World Forces carriers. Correspondents covering sustained combat actions with RVN forces were provided C-rations upon request. Medical treatment was limited to routine immunizations and emergency medical and dental care. In the event of death or injury of a correspondent, SPD took action to notify the sponsoring agency.

### Information Advisory Division (MACOI-1)

(U) The Information Advisory Division (IAD), assisted the RVNAF in improving its capability to transmit, through internal and public news media, timely, complete and factual information concerning its (RVNAF) mission, role, and accomplishments to the Vietnamese and worldwide public audiences as well as to internal and FWMAF. It acted as the principal US agency to improve the image of the RVNAF and advised and assisted the GVN Ministry of Defense (MOD) in its public information effort. IAD, in its close and continuous association with RVNAF counterparts, assisted RVNAF IOs in their contacts with non-Vietnamese news media representatives and, conversely, encouraged news media contacts with RVNAF. The advisory effort

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in the public information field included liaison between RVNAF and agencies of the US Mission Council in solution of such information problems as on-and-off-shore training, procurement of non-military equipment and supplies, and, where appropriate, the identification and recruitment of trained civilian information personnel.

### Plans and Policy Division (MACOI-P&P)

(U) The Plans and Policy Division (P&P) was primarily concerned with the security review of all informational materials prepared by military sources under the control of COMUSMACV and intended for public release. P&P also formulated, reviewed, and updated MACV news media ground rules governing types of information that were releasable and defined the types of information which were not releasable for the guidance of news media personnel. Public information guidance issued by CINCPAC and SECDEF and basic public information guidance, as contained in MACV Directive 360-1, were promulgated by P&P to subordinate elements. Within P&P was the Review and Analysis Branch (R&A). R&A was responsible for the review and administrative clearance of all news materials (articles, stories, audio tapes, photographs, etc.) concerning US military operations in Vietnam and adjacent water. Security and policy conformity was the major concern, along with factual accuracy of material submitted for release. R&A, on the average, cleared 1,000 photographs, 200 audio tapes, and 3,500 stories and articles each quarter. All materials originated in II, III, and IV CTZs concerning operations were required to be submitted through R&A for clearance prior to publication. The Information Services Officer of III MAF representing MACOI at Da Nang cleared all news material for units within I CTZ, averaging 150 pieces daily. In addition, the division maintained a "significant precedence" file to isolate and make available for rapid reference any information released--officially or unofficially--on any subject previously or currently not cleared for general release. This file provided a rapid check and reference in explaining to an originating agency why an item was being killed or amended.

### Developments in the Information Advisory Program

(U) In an undated letter written in the last part of 1967, COMUSMACV pointed out to Gen. Vao Van Vien, CJCS, the danger of losing US public support for the struggle in Vietnam unless RVNAF's important role in the struggle received proper recognition and publicity in the US. The letter suggested that US IOs be assigned as advisors to the ARVN divisions and other major commands. COMUSMACV also advocated combined US/RVNAF military briefings as another step toward solving this problem.

(U) In his reply of 28 December 1967 discussing the subject of derogatory reports in the American press, General Vien concurred in the suggestion to assign the IOs but did not comment on the proposal for combined briefings. The General also indicated that he had ordered his staff to study the problem of improving the RVNAF military information program in terms of three points:

1. Augmentation of the number of personnel for the Public Relations and Information Bloc of the Directorate of Political Warfare and setting up of a section of information and press at each of the corps, divisions, special zones, units, and branches of arms.

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2. Paying particular heed to the publication of ARVN victories by organizing visits to the battlefields for foreign military attaches in Vietnam and local and foreign correspondents and reporters.

3. Providing transportation, as soon as possible, for press officers to visit the battlefields and pick up more details in order to furnish newsmen with more precise information; making daily briefings more vivid and interesting; and setting up six more teams of frontline press officers to gather news and collect documents and pictures to be furnished to the press.

(U) In a memorandum for the CoFS, dated 27 November 1967, CINFO indicated that COMUSMACV "has directed the staff to begin preparation of implementing actions so that Information Advisors can begin functioning as soon as possible." The same letter indicated that these advisors should function initially on the personal staff of the RVNAF commanders and, in addition, should advise the RVNAF IOs who would also be on the personal staff of the commanders. Their principal duties were to be:

1. To advise and assist the RVNAF in developing a public information capability at the division level.

2. To encourage and facilitate visits by the press to observe activities of the division and its components.

3. To prepare public information materials about a division's accomplishments and transmit them through MACV information channels for release by the RVNAF Press Office.

(U) Accordingly, in a MACV letter of 20 December 1967, USARV was levied for thirteen qualified IOs to fill the bulk of the requirement and another letter of the same date requested III MAF to fill the remaining requirement. 2

(U) Thirteen army officers were assigned as Information Advisors with RVNAF division level units in January 1968 and given a four-day orientation program by MACOI-I. Subjects of discussion were organization of the RVNAF POLWAR Department with special emphasis on the RVNAF Information Bloc; organization of ARVN divisions, policies, and procedures in carrying out the advisory program; and the duties and responsibilities of Information Advisors.

(U) Division Information Advisors had either arrived or were still enroute to their new duty stations when the Tet Offensive began. The Tet Offensive provided an excellent opportunity for the advisors to draw attention to the valor and effectiveness of RVNAF units. From this initial point, the Information Advisors were productive in generating copy and media coverage of their commands. The initial and continued success of their advisory efforts resulted in a notable increase of participation of newsmen in RVNAF operations and an awareness of RVNAF accomplishments.

(U) An Information Advisors Conference was conducted by MACOI on 10 January 1968 for Corps and Navy Information Advisors. Topics of discussion were organization of the military information of RVNAF, relations with the press, policy matters affecting newsmen covering combat assignments, personnel and equipment requirements of corps headquarters, and communication links between military headquarters.

(U) A basic information course for Vietnamese officers and NCOs from division size units

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was started on 25 March 1968 and finished on 24 April 1968. This course was conducted by the RVNAF Office of Information and its purpose was to train information and press cadre for assignment to division level units in order to strengthen the RVNAF information system. The bulk of the 26 officer and 26 NCO graduates were assigned to corps, division and other press offices.<sup>3</sup>

(U) During the second quarter of CY 1968, the Office of Information Advisory Program continued apace. Although no action by itself was spectacular, each when added to the others, amounted to a growing awareness and effectiveness in the information field on the part of the RVNAF.

(U) A conference for Information Advisors with the RVNAF was held on 17 May. Twenty-five officers, representing each of the US Armed Services and the RVNAF, discussed various policies and procedures pertaining to the Information Program. The officers also received additional information guidance from the Minister-Counselor for Information of the American Embassy, Saigon and MACOI. The Chief of the RVNAF Information and Public Relations Office departed on 21 June for the US to attend the US Army's Advanced Public Relations Course at the University of Wisconsin. His attendance at the course marked the first time a foreign officer had been selected to participate in the 8-week course.

(U) Arrangements were finalized in May with AFVN to feature an RVNAF unit on its Panorama program each Sunday afternoon. The utilization of this program was to inform the listeners about RVNAF and its accomplishments.

(U) The RVNAF Office of Information extended its service to the news media on 4 June by publishing a daily morning press release in addition to the afternoon release. By utilizing the MACV Communications Center, the sending and receipt of releases to and from corps, division and special commands (e.g., Airborne, Ranger, Marines, VNAF, VNN), US Information Advisors, and Vietnamese counterparts were expedited.

(U) During the second quarter, GVN and RVNAF made greater use of press conferences. The success of this program was illustrated by the conferences of LTC Nguyen Van Vy, MOD, of the mobilization program and by MG Nguyen Van Minh, CG, CMD and Governor of Saigon, on the military arrangements for the defense of Saigon. Another example of a successful press conference was the introduction to the press of two high-ranking VC defectors, COL Tran Van Duc and LTC Phan Mau.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The first combined military briefing by the MACV and RVNAF IOs was held on 29 August 1968. Subsequently, the closely coordinated joint daily briefings strengthened the military briefing system in Vietnam and resulted in a marked increase of awareness by newsmen of RVNAF operations and accomplishments. Within the same period, a program was initiated with the AFVN to use RVNAF news capsules on scheduled news broadcasts during the day.

(U) The Information Office of the Capital Military Assistance Command, formed in June, received the additional function of advising the ARVN Information Office at the CMD Hq.

(U) In the last quarter of 1968, a substantial reduction in the size of field advisory teams was authorized. It was noted that implementation of the Combat Assistance Team policy would, in some instances, eliminate the US IO assigned to divisional level advisory teams. To correct this situation, the Senior CTZ Advisors were directed to ensure that US IOs were included in the Combat Assistance Team conversions and that they were employed only in their

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primary function. At the same time it was pointed out that ARVN division information personnel were not ready to carry out an effective information program without US assistance. <sup>5</sup>

Public Information Division Activities - News Branch -  
Ground Rules Problems and Violations

(U) The first six months of 1968 brought unprecedented challenges to PID due to the greatly accelerated pace of combat activity in the Republic during the period. Highlights were the Tet Offensive, the siege of the Khe Sanh Combat Base in Quang Tri Province, the continued increase in Vietnamese participation in the war, the start of official conversations in Paris, the enemy offensive of May and June, and the up coming US elections with the resultant pro- and anti-Vietnam controversy generated thereby, particularly in respect to the Vietnamese leaders themselves.

(C) These events, others of a lesser nature, and their underlying causes resulted in or caused a record high of 649 news media representatives from 29 different countries to be present in Vietnam in March. In servicing these newsmen, the most difficult task of PID was information concerning the interpretation of guidelines for the press. Primarily, this was due to the intense competition to manufacture headline-getting stories. Media representatives began to report exact casualties and damage and referenced the landing areas of mortar and artillery rounds, all valuable pieces of information to the enemy. This type of reporting was especially crucial at Khe Sanh where some press reports, in effect, provided the enemy with free hard intelligence.

(U) To counter this state of affairs, PID reissued DOD approved guidelines and established a PID duty officer who operated a service bureau to answer all press queries on a 24-hour-a-day basis. In addition, further guidance was issued to the news media representatives through special briefings and memoranda to the press. Similar guidance was issued to field commands so that the policies of DOD and MACV were fully known, understood and complied with at all echelons. During the heavy attacks on Con Thien in September of 1967, it had become apparent that the public release of specific results of attacks in terms of casualties and damage inflicted on this static position were of instant value to the enemy since this information was not available from any other source. Prior to these attacks, constant shellings of static installations had not occurred to any serious degree during the war, and results of normal battles in the field were normally released by MACV. As a result, oral instructions had been issued to the press by the Chief of Information that specific results of shellings of static positions would not be used unless released by MACOI, and that MACOI would normally not make such release. During the extended series of attacks by fire on the Khe Sanh Combat Base in January, February and March, the press again attempted to chronicle specific results of shellings of the base. As a result, on 26 February, a memorandum to the press was issued pointing out that the ground rule which precluded release of exact number and type of casualties or damage suffered by friendly units applied especially to situations when the enemy had no means of determining damage unless it mentioned in the press and that such use of specifics by the press when not released by MACV would result in the withdrawal of accreditation for the individuals concerned. There was a temporary furor both in Saigon and Washington over this announcement, but the logic of the matter soon resulted in a number of editorials actually praising MACV for taking this stand.

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(C) On 4 March, COMUSMACV informed SECDEF that the number of accredited correspondents in-country was at a record high, and many of them were covering the intense activity in northern I CTZ (Hue, Khe Sanh, and the DMZ). Facilities in the northern provinces were overburdened and the sharpened competition was producing information that could assist the enemy. Accordingly, COMUSMACV planned to increase control of the press in the area north of the Hai Van Pass. The plan was based on a DEFCOMUSMACVFW message of 28 February. Short of censorship, COMUSMACV intended to control the movement of correspondents and demand strict compliance with the memoranda. Newsmen would be reminded that MACV was "the sole releasing authority in Vietnam for US military news. Even though an officer or enlisted man disclosed information which was not releasable under the ground rules, it may be used only if released by MACV." Releasing authority was delegated by COMUSMACV only to the MACV Office of Information and to the MACV Press Center in Da Nang.

(C) COMUSMACV went on to state:

It is impossible to eliminate completely the "gray areas" from these rules. Violations will therefore be handled objectively and carefully. The Chief of Information, USMACV, will be promptly informed of all violations, and decisions as to possible suspension or withdrawal of accreditation will be made by COMUSMACV after full investigation. The basic criterion will be: "Did the breach of the ground rules actually result in exposure of plans or in actual or potential damage to friendly forces and/or operations?" This criterion will not be revealed to the press.

Based on the limited transportation, messing, billeting and other facilities available in the area, the number of newsmen must be limited to 15 at Khe Sanh, 10 at Rock Pile, 12 at Con Thien, 7 at Gio Liph, 25 at Camp Evans and 25 at Camp Carroll.

Allocations for other areas will be similar to the present Khe Sanh quota: 2 each for US TV networks, 2 each AP and UPI, 1 for Reuters, 4 as pool for others. In some cases networks and wire services may also be required to pool.

Numbers of press to move between Phu Bai, Da Nang and controlled areas will be determined daily through liaison between Information Officer MACVFW and Information Services Officer, III MAF, subject to desires of senior US Command in CTZ.

If the above procedure does not prove effective, censorship in some form should be invoked. . . .

(U) DOD approved this suggestion on the limitation of newsmen north of the Hai Van Pass. On 25 March, CG, III MAF and CG, PROVCORPSV were authorized to take action to implement this plan. Actually, press visits to the area were never of such magnitude to require implementation except at Khe Sanh.

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(C) On 17 March, the CJCS had queried COMUSMACV as to what extent press revelation had resulted in actual damage to MACV plans. In answer, COMUSMACV stated "that no instances can be cited demonstrating actual damage to MACV plans as a result of press revelations." However, he stated that there were several instances of articles which contained material which could have potentially damaged MACV plans through divulging specific key points in installations or the location of forces. Examples provided were:

1. Family Magazine, 18 Jan 67, carried aerial and other photos of Special Forces camp at Cai Cai, SVN. Photos show in great detail trenches, gun positions, storage and other areas within camp.
2. Fortune Magazine, 1967, shows map of SVN reflecting disposition of major units and locations of Air Bases and Naval Forces.
3. Newsweek had a similar map in late 1967. . . .
4. Time Magazine issue of 16 February 1968 located MACV FWD at Phu Bai.

There were also several instances of articles which were potentially damaging because they told the enemy of certain limited friendly capabilities:

1. Washington Post, 14 Sep 67, article stated US has probably only a limited supply of Walleyes for combat use in Vietnam.
2. New York Times, 22 Sep 68, stated that only about half of the 1st Cav Div's helicopters were in flying condition. (However, the story was not printed until three weeks after it was written and the situation was largely rectified at that time).

There were several instances of unauthorized release of information on new weapons systems:

1. Los Angeles Times, 6 Sep 67, contained an article describing ordnance developed under "Project Gunfighter."
2. There have been several articles about the "barrier" which involved rather accurate information about at least some of the equipment and locations involved. . . .
3. Baltimore Sun, 15 Sep 67, had an article describing the Walleyes.
4. Washington Post, 10 Sep 67, contained a story describing the characteristics of a new bomb nicknamed "Destructor."

In the troop movement/future plans area, there were also some potentially damaging stories. In each case, however, there were mitigating circumstances:

1. CBS broke 5 Jan 68 MACV embargo on announcement of Operation FARGO. However, they broke it as the result of an interview with

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the Commanding Officer of the major unit involved who posed no objection to its release.

2. On 7 Oct 67, JPI filed stories concerning the establishment of a new CIDG camp near the Cambodian border at Bu Prang, despite the fact that the announcement had been embargoed by MACV for security reasons. However, investigation developed that the unit IO had erroneously agreed to the release.

3. UPI also broke the embargo concerning the arrival of the 198th Infantry Bde in Vietnam on 22 October. However, UPI contended they had misunderstood the timing. Since the unit had arrived, disembarked, and moved out into the country by the time UPI story was filed, no action was taken.

(U) In light of these problems, MACV, on 27 March, issued to all accredited members of the press at that time, and thereafter to future arrivals as they became accredited, a memorandum entitled "Interpretation of Ground Rules" and excerpts from "Rules Governing Public Release of Military Information".<sup>6</sup> These are reproduced below:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS

27 MARCH 1968

Subj: Interpretation of Ground Rules

1. A MACOI memorandum to the press of 29 January 1968 reminded all members of the ground rules involving ground combat to which they agreed when they were accredited by MACV. A follow-up memorandum of 26 February further explained one of the rules.
2. Members of the press have been most cooperative in attempting to stop the flow of important intelligence information to the enemy. However, based both on logic and the many queries received from newsmen, it is obvious that no set of ground rules can cover every tactical situation encountered by newsmen in the field. Although relatively few in number, "gray areas" cannot be eliminated.
3. To assist newsmen in correctly interpreting any ground rule "gray areas" MACV will provide 24-hour service to anyone who obtains information which he feels is subject to interpretation under the ground rules. Any newsmen in the I CTZ who is concerned about the intelligence value of material he wishes to use in a story should contact the ISO at the MACV Press Center, Da Nang; phone Da Nang 6259. Elsewhere in Vietnam, queries should be addressed to MACV extensions 3163 or 3989 where someone able to make a decision will always be on duty.
4. We hope that this service will help ensure a maximum flow of information while insuring the necessary protection to our troops.

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5. For your information, a copy of the key ground rules is attached.

Excerpts from "Rules Governing Public Release of Military Information" (31 Oct 66 & 29 March 1968)

The following information is only releasable by MACV.

1. Future plans, operations, or strikes.
2. Information on or confirmation of Rules of Engagement.
3. Amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units (ordnance includes weapons or weapons systems).
4. During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments, name of operations and size of friendly forces involved.
5. Intelligence unit activities, methods of operation, or specific locations.
6. Exact number and type of casualties or damage suffered by friendly units.
7. Number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside of RVN.
8. Information on aircraft taking off for strikes, enroute to, or returning from target area. Information on strikes while they are in progress.
9. Identity of units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.
10. Number of aircraft damaged or any other indicator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground antiaircraft defenses.
11. Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, course, speeds, or angle of attack. (General descriptions such as "low and fast" may be used.)
12. Information on or confirmation of planned strikes which do not take place for any reason, including bad weather.
13. Specific identification of enemy weapons system utilized to down friendly aircraft.
14. Details concerning downed aircraft while SAR operations are in progress.
15. Aerial photos of fixed installations.

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(U) On 29 August, the USG and the GVN initiated a new program of conducting combined US/VN briefings for the press. Civilian representatives of the respective governments handled matters pertaining to government, political, and civilian matters while military spokesmen covered subjects connected with the Armed Forces and war actions. Before each afternoon's briefing, representatives of both staffs met to coordinate matters of mutual interest and to assure no duplication or conflicts of subjects to be covered.

(U) Prior to 29 August, each government had conducted its own briefings at separate times. The new system was a definite improvement in that now the press could receive all the news of the day at one sitting. Additionally, the joint sessions provided greater exposure of the GVN and RVNAF to the international press. All VN statements were given in Vietnamese and then in English for the benefit of the mixed audience. A Vietnamese-speaking US briefing officer was provided by MACOI as required. 7

### Audio Visual Branch of FID

(U) The Audio Visual Branch's DOD Motion Picture Teams filmed 52 sound-on-film color news features between mid-March and the end of June. Of these, 31 were released to worldwide media. Only 21 percent of the production effort was not used by DOD against a 40 percent non-usage figure for the previous quarter and a cumulative 53 percent rejection rate previously experienced. 8

(U) The third quarter of the year in the Audio Visual Branch was marked by the production of DOD V-series motion picture projects at an unprecedented level. Fifty-seven sound-on-film news featurettes were filmed and twenty of these were released to worldwide media complete and one was released without sound; only 16 were rejected for flaws of a technical or substantive nature and 13 were pending release at the close of the quarter. Thus, only 33 percent of the Branch's production effort was not utilized by DOD as compared to the cumulative 49 percent rejection rate measured from 21 August 1967 to 1 July 1968.

(U) A breakdown by quarters during the calendar year was:

	Projects Exposed	Projects Used	Percentage of Usage
1st Quarter	81	37	46
2nd Quarter	46	34	74
3rd Quarter	45	26	58
4th Quarter	52	25	48

While there were fluctuations within quarters, the actual overall percentage of use for the year was 56 1/2 percent, an excellent utilization rate. The variations by quarter were attributable to a number of factors such as the preoccupation of the media with the presidential and congressional elections which preempted most other material. The receipt of new equipment by the teams, which had to be tested and proven out for performance, resulted in loss of some otherwise good feature stories. Overall, however, the release rate of the V-release films was higher than that of 1967's 47 percent, an increase of almost 10 percent. This increase was indicative of better equipment and facilities and an improved experience level of the teams.

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The teams covered a spectrum of activities in the categories of nation building, civic actions, combat, new equipment usage, and special interest items. Included also was coverage of the Pueblo crew release at Pimunjom, Korea. An average of almost three films per week were released by DOD in the US to the national TV networks and to the international newsreel media. The TV audience in the US alone was approximately 120 million people weekly. Additionally, arrangements were made locally with JUSPAO (USIA) to release selected V-release films to 50 Free World nations. Since the selected films were primarily in the nation building and civic actions categories, an audience of uncounted millions more all over the world saw the actions of the United States Forces in the best possible light. To exploit the potential of the films locally, arrangements were made for use of the films on both American Forces Vietnam Network and the Vietnamese government controlled television station, thus bringing the films to the American civilian and military personnel, Free World Forces, and the bulk of the Vietnamese people in the Saigon area. Examples of subjects released during 1968 were:

- USN Hovercraft SK-5
- Port of Saigon
- New Army Helo Hunts VC
- Yankees Give Captured Rice to Orphans
- SVN Wages War on Rats
- USAG Thai Zoo
- Training of Thai Security Troops
- Former North Vietnamese Learn Peaceful Trades
- Saigon Business Activity
- My Tho, SVN, Rebuilds
- Medical Teams in SVN
- USN Flying TV Stations
- Self-Help and "Miracle Rice"
- Kit Carson Scout Program
- SVN Women Join in War Effort
- West German Mercy Ship
- Aussie's Civil Efforts in SVN
- US and Vietnamese Share Tough Jump School Training
- USAF AC-47 "Spooky" Patrols the Skies

### Special Projects Division

(U) Throughout the year, SPD provided extensive airlift service for press corps personnel. Fixed-wing flights were provided for accredited reporters to cover the general situation in I and II CTZs and helicopter transportation was provided for reporters going to III and IV CTZs. Statistics for 1968 are tabulated below:

<u>Month</u>	<u>I, II CTZ</u>	<u>III, IV CTZ</u>
January	385	294
February	427	127
March	506	102

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April	416	28
May	281	127
June	271	93
July	329	295
August	184	132
September	154	176
October	205	195
November	198	207
December	<u>207</u>	<u>239</u>
Total	3,563	2,015

(U) MACV-accredited correspondents in RVN reached an all-time high of 649 on 7 March. Of these, 250 were US, 123 were VN, and 276 were Third Country Nationals. The previous high of 575 had occurred during the September 1967 elections. Quarterly statistics are shown below: 10

<u>Accreditation</u>	<u>Quarter</u>			
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>
US Citizens	292	250	177	225
Vietnamese	97	77	64	90
Third Country	<u>325</u>	<u>268</u>	<u>172</u>	<u>236</u>
	714	595	413	551

### Command Information Division

(U) During the first half of the year, the CID published four command information booklets for US service personnel in RVN. The first, entitled "All About Money," discussed MPCs, piaster spending, currency controls and conversion and like matters that had a direct affect on the morale of all personnel. The other three were: "By Your Side - The Red Cross," "Ready Reference Facts on Vietnam," and "The Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam." Circulation of The Observer was increased from 80,000 to 100,000 copies in order to maintain a distribution of one copy per five servicemen.

(U) In the last six months of 1968, the CID wrote or revised and had printed the following pamphlets. The number of copies printed is shown in parenthesis.

Chieu Hai: The Winning Ticket (50,000)  
 Your R&R Program: Hongkong (50,000)  
                           Bangkok (50,000)  
                           Penang (50,000)  
                           Manila (50,000)  
                           Sydney (50,000)  
                           Hawaii (50,000)  
                           Vung Tau (20,000)  
 American and Vietnamese National Holidays and Commemorative Dates (5,000)  
 Vietnam Regional Exchange (20,000)

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Tet, 1969 (20,000)  
Your R&R Program (General Information) (50,000)

"Chieu Hoi: The Winning Ticket" received wide acceptance. A second printing of 50,000 was ordered and later 100,000 copies in the third printing. A measure of its effectiveness was that the pamphlet was being translated into Korean, Thai, and Vietnamese.

(U) The Summer-Fall and the Winter-Spring editions of the Stars and Stripes orientation edition (150,000 copies each) were printed and shipped to CONUS ports of embarkation for distribution to personnel enroute to Vietnam.

(U) The Observer continued to be published by CID with an increased amount of materials originating in the Division. The following are examples of additions and changes to the newspaper: 11

1. "Viewing Vietnam," a cultural feature, was begun.
2. Cartoons oriented on command information themes were added as a feature.
3. Morale building quotes using the theme "Why we are here" were introduced.
4. Combat tips oriented toward the serviceman in contact with the enemy were included in the paper.
5. An increased use of command information materials throughout the paper with small boxes and slogans being inserted at various points.
6. An increased emphasis on ARVN units and improvements was put into each edition.
7. Reader interest was increased by upgrading the quality of pinups used, and by dropping the use of the Saigon T<sup>h</sup> schedule.
8. A color page was used without increase in cost.

## American Forces Radio and Television Service, Vietnam

(U) During the first quarter of the year, American Forces Vietnam Network (AFVN) continued to expand its radio and television facilities. AFVN programming from Qui Nhon started immediately upon completion of the 10 kw transmitters on 11 February 1968. Coverage from this station into such areas as An Khe exceeded calculated expectations. Three weeks earlier, on 20 January, AFVN programming commenced from a 10 kw transmitter at Pleiku with an interim power output, awaiting the eventual 50 kw transmitter scheme that, when installed, would provide a dominant signal throughout most of the Central Highlands.

(U) AFRTS operated seven television stations located throughout RVN at the beginning of 1968. AFVN-TV in 1968 was no longer in the construction phase of development but rather had changed over to a program of maintenance and improvement.

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(U) On 12 April, the 10 kw transmitter at Dong Ba Thin (CRB) became operational, increasing radio coverage from north of Nha Trang to south of Phan Rang. The America Division (southern I CTZ) area was afforded improved radio coverage beginning on 18 May with the installation of a 250 watt transmitter at Chu Lai. Inland in II CTZ, on 24 June, the Pleiku radio station became fully operational.

(U) The most significant AFVN radio operations of the year took place during the Tet Offensive when AFVN radio broadcasted hundreds of security announcements, special reports, and public service announcements. Starting 30 January, the Saigon key station provided a constant flow of information to its listeners on the status of hostilities, curfew regulations, uniform regulations, road conditions, etc. In the days and weeks immediately following the first enemy countrywide attacks, AFVN Saigon broadcasted as many as 400 extra announcements per day at the request of various offices and agencies. The subjects ranged from those enumerated above to reports of machinegun jeeps having fallen into enemy hands and to announcements of school closures. Special spots were aired at the request of the AMEMB to locate civilian personnel.

(U) The Hue transmitter site was an almost immediate casualty of the Tet Offensive as the enemy invested the city on the very first day of the offensive. To replace this loss, Air Development Squadron Eight's EC-121 "Blue Eagle" flight was displaced from Tan Son Nhut and its duties over the Delta to fill the gap in broadcasting in northern I CTZ. Elsewhere in the Republic broadcasting continued although schedules were adjusted to compensate for personnel unable to reach their studios or drawn off for security duties. In Saigon during the part of February, FM programming had to be cancelled. AFVN was, for the first few days, the sole link for thousands of servicemen and American civilians caught in their billets or other isolated locations and unable to join their units or reach their places of employment.

(U) During the second offensive, in May, programming was only slightly affected. The special programs and information and caution announcements initiated during the February actions were reinstated. On 3 May, the Saigon key station and the nearby Vietnamese radio station were subjected to a terrorist attack. A vehicle with 110 pounds of TNT was parked next to the Vietnamese studio and the resulting explosion killed two civilians and injured 30 others. Only surface damage was done to AFVN. There were no personnel casualties and programming time lost amounted to only one minute.

(U) In 1968, AFVN continued to bring a wide variety and constant stream of command information programs to its listeners and viewers. The list below gives some idea of their variety and all encompassing scope:

Vietnamese Law	Black Market	M-16 Maintenance
International Law	Federal Income Tax	<u>Chieu Hoi</u> Program
Contraband Items	Custom Laws	Preventive Maintenance
Personal Property Claims	General Postal Rules	Counterfeit MPC
Mail Processing	Postal Savings	Combat Art
Wrapping Packages	Personal Weapons	Navy Support
Marihuana	War Trophies	Spooky
Traffic Regulations	AFRTS Story	Saigon's 716 MP Bn
New Regulations on Currency	The Pacific Stars &	The SPAD
Control	Stripes	Army Emergency Relief
ARVN Units	Incentive Awards	The Red Cross

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MUST Hospital  
Veterans Benefits  
Free World Forces  
Winter Olympics  
Mr. Melvin Belli  
Kennedy Memorium

Personal Hygiene  
USO  
Tet  
1st Log Cmd  
Martin Luther King  
Memorial

MARS  
Postal Locator Service  
Marble Mountain  
Seabee in RVN  
Passover

(U) AFVN continued its normal schedule of 24 radio newscasts a day and two TV newscasts nightly, as in 1967. On 21 February, in accordance with a new DOD directive, AFVN news began to attribute each news item in every newscast to its source, i.e., AP, UPI, ABC, etc. A short time later, in accordance with a subsequent directive, only a general attribution became necessary and only in cases of direct DOD quotes of officials or speculative stories were direct attribution necessary. AFVN-TV, in cooperation with the CBS, recorded two "Face the Nation" productions: one with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and the other with President Nguyen Van Thieu. The programs were aired on the CBS Nationwide Network on 25 February and on AFVN on 19 and 26 February. Within the scope of its limited news gathering capability, AFVN News covered several parts of RVN including a number of farewell ceremonies for GEN W. C. Westmoreland. Following his departure, AFVN News presented a special program summarizing the General's last round of official visits and his farewell press conference on 10 June. 12

(U) In September, AFVN News joined AFVN-TV in revamping its schedule by adding a 15-minute news and sports (10 and 5 minutes) newscast at "sign on" every afternoon in the Saigon area. This meant that 50 minutes of TV news per day would be presented. The national political conventions were covered in August by selected newsmen charged with presenting five-minute convention newscasts on radio. Each day there was produced a 25-minute special taped presentation of the stateside political activities which was aired each evening on AM, FM, and TV.

(U) AFVN-TV extended its program day, effective 2 September, with new sign-on times of 1430 on weekdays and 1330 on weekends. On 18 September, the program "Lets Speak Vietnamese," designed to teach American servicemen Vietnamese under the guidance of a native instructor, was introduced.

(U) Starting in October, AFVN produced several special programs, beginning with the World Series. Games were broadcast "live" over AFVN radio and a 25-minute radio wrap-up of each game was presented for those unable to listen to the early morning "live" broadcasts. After the Series was completed, a special 55-minute program was aired, giving a complete rundown on each game. In mid-October and continuing until the completion of the Olympic Games, a daily summary of Olympic activities was presented on both radio and TV. CBS and ABC news films were used to supplement the TV broadcasts. AFVN News presented special national election coverage for both radio and television on 6 November. Radio coverage was live from the US and utilized the major commercial radio network reports. TV coverage was locally produced and featured reports on the presidential, congressional, senatorial and gubernatorial races. Utilizing a specially constructed "election central" which reflected the returns as they became available from AP and UPI, coverage was continuous throughout the day until the presidential race was decided. The launch and recovery of both Apollo 7 and 8 were also carried live through the facilities of AFVN Radio News. In late December, messages were broadcast over AFVN to the VC concerning proposed dates, times, and places for the

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release of three US servicemen held prisoner by the VC. It is believed that this was the first time an Armed Forces Radio Network had ever been used to talk directly to an enemy. Live coverage was provided for all the major Bowl football games. Live, remote broadcasts were originated from Tan Son Naut for Christmas midnight mass celebrated by New York Archbishop Terrance Cooke and a morning service conducted by Evangelist Billy Graham. These broadcasts were aired throughout Vietnam and were fed simultaneously to AFRTS Washington.

(U) The major part of northern I CTZ was provided TV coverage when the station at Quang Tri became operational on 4 December. This station, which broadcasts on Channel 11, had an effective radiated power of 40 kw. This quarter also saw the completion of the US obligation to construct a complete high power (250 kw effective radiated power) television station for the RVN. This project had been marked by many setbacks beginning with the Tet Offensive. At that time the station had been virtually completed but, as a result of Tet, it had to be completely rebuilt. This station, located at Can Tho, became operational and was formally turned over to RVN on 19 November. 13

### Relations and Problems with the Press--Background

(U) Two collateral controversies have simmered side by side during the war in Vietnam: what to do about the war itself and what to do about the news coverage of the war. With every newspaper and magazine, every network television news program, and almost every radio newscast giving the American people the closest thing to real time news of the war, there had never in the history of warfare been so much current information about a conflict. However, many members of the press felt that officially released information in Saigon and Washington did not tell the whole story, while many US officials believed, for their part, that the press was reporting the war in a negative, biased fashion--making news rather than reporting it. The former Director of Public Affairs for COMSEVENTHFLT's Detachment Charlie (Saigon) summed up this problem in an article for the Navy League.

#### The 'Credibility Gap'

... most of this information starts its trip to the American people from Saigon. The controversy has developed because the officials responsible for running the war often disagree with the way the war is reported by the Saigon press corps, while the press disputes much of the facts given them.

According to Christian Science Monitor correspondent Cynthia Parsons, "the credibility gap over the Vietnam war starts right in Saigon at the official US press briefing." The problem, adds the Washington Star, is "most troublesome and persistent."

The controversy over the job the press does from Vietnam reaches to the highest levels. According to Jim Lucas, veteran Vietnam reporter for Scripps-Howard, President Johnson "is known to be disenchanted with some of the press corps in Vietnam."

## UNCLASSIFIED

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According to some published reports, Secretary of State Dean Rusk is said to have remarked to a hard-questioning reporter, "Whose side are you on?" The press explains it is not a "mouthpiece" for the administration. R. W. Apple, who recently finished a long tour as bureau chief for the New York Times in Saigon, points out that his stories were based on information from the "same majors, captains, sergeants, middle-level civilian officials" who also report to the administration.

But, he adds, "very often the information that starts out with the captains and majors doesn't make it to Washington."

Bill Touhy, the Los Angeles Times' Saigon bureau chief, wonders if the elaborate charts and statistics presented in Washington "really reflect what's going on in the Viet Nam countryside."

### Witness to Bias

Information officials in Saigon point out that the situation can be seen many ways. And, they add "usually badly by some of the correspondents here."

Robert Shaplen of the New Yorker reminds that it is the officials' "business to be optimistic and our business to be . . . skeptical." And Touhy adds, "We're not operators and administrators, we tend to be examiners."

Columnist Holmes Alexander boils the controversy down to "who's telling the truth?" And answers his question this way:

"The answer is that nearly everybody does. This is nearly everybody bears true witness to his bias and his senses."

Mostly the press' dissatisfaction centers on the land war and the pacification program, on the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese army, and on Vietnamese politics.

So while the track record for the majority of the Saigon press corps is as good or better than that of most of its critics, perhaps it would be informative and interesting to look at the Saigon press corps a little closer. 14

(U) COMUSMACV, as in past years, continued to be troubled, if not plagued, by press reports that reflected negatively on the US effort in Vietnam. Some were cursory in nature, but others were deeply disturbing. This was particularly true during the Tet Offensive when

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the press overplayed the negative aspects. Below is given a broad overview of a few cases.

(U) In the 9 February Christian Science Monitor, the following article appeared, which illustrated the unfortunate antagonism that at that time developed between the press corps and the military IOs of MACV:

The credibility gap over the Vietnam war starts right in Saigon at the official United States press briefings.

While I was sitting inside the Press Center auditorium listening to a major in the United States Army say that there were virtually no Viet Cong snipers left in Saigon, one was shooting down into the square just one-half block away. . . .

At the same press briefing a reporter asked about Saigon's critical water situation. . . . The briefing officer said he knew of no water trouble and added, "I had a bath just two hours ago." . . . Bath or no bath, the water situation was critical, with only impure water coming through the taps. . . .

And I witnessed a display of Mack Sennett inefficiency on the part of the national police to set up an effective road block. It was not clear what area they wished to block, because they only laid barbed wire across one street in an intersection. . . .

The question of whether or not the massive countrywide attack by the North Vietnamese was a surprise or not also has elicited some fast double talk from the United States armed forces. 15

(U) Or there was this mid-Tet evaluation:

. . . the official attempt to convince the world and the Vietnamese people that the enemy paid an intolerably heavy price for his victory. This may prove true but official estimates of enemy casualties last week should be viewed with the utmost skepticism. Body counts of enemy dead are at best always open to doubt; almost every reporter in Vietnam has his own personal example of inflated reports of enemy dead in battles that he himself has observed. To think that in the midst of last week's chaos and breakdown of communications a careful tabulation of such an enormous number of bodies was actually made defies logic and contributes further to the credibility gap. 16

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(U) An objective article by Gene Roberts of the New York Times placed the press' role vis-a-vis the military in better perspective and is worth quoting almost in its entirety because it summed up both sides of the argument:

This morning, as they do every morning, representatives of the United States command placed a hefty stack of mimeographed press statements on a table in a Government building in downtown Saigon.

3 July 68

One item told of a battle 46 miles north of Saigon in which two United States infantrymen were killed and four wounded. Although the battle took place at 9 a. m. yesterday, no U.S. correspondents--including any who might have witnessed it--were forbidden to say how many had been killed and wounded until the statement appeared on the table.

The battle was only a routine . . . but it illustrated how the military's "ground rules" for press coverage apply. The ground rules set forth 15 categories of information--including United States casualties--that cannot be reported until a formal announcement is made in Saigon.

Last week the ground rules were dramatized when John Carroll, the Baltimore Sun's correspondent, wrote that the United States was in the process of abandoning its garrison at Khe Sanh after successfully defending it for three months earlier this year against the longest enemy siege of the war.

## Press Card Was Lifted

Brig. Gen. Winant Sidle, chief of information for the military command, ruled that Mr. Carroll had violated a rule that forbids discussion of troop movements until they have been "cleared" by the military. He suspended Mr. Carroll's military accreditation card for an indefinite period, effectively preventing him from talking with military and embassy officials and barring him from military transportation.

How sweeping are the ground rules? Do they prevent the press from relaying facts a reader in the United States would need to reach a solid opinion on the conduct of the war? Do they prevent the enemy from getting information that would jeopardize the lives of allied troops?

In broad terms, the rules are designed to deny the enemy information about tactics, troops

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movements, air supply levels, future plans, and casualties and damage caused by enemy attack.

The commanders here reason for example, that if the enemy forces knew that rocket attacks on a base had seriously hurt the allies, they might order a ground attack in an effort to overrun the base while it was at its weakest. On the other hand, if they found out that the attack had done little damage, he might cancel a planned assault that would have pitted him against a superior force.

Before a newsman can become accredited by the United States command, he has to sign a statement that he will abide by the rules. Few if any correspondents object to signing. For the most part they look upon the rules as a reasonable alternative to censorship, which has not been interposed in this war.

### Right to Protect Itself

"An army has a right to protect itself," says a French reporter who is not in sympathy with the American position here. "I think the ground rules are fair. They may delay you a bit in telling the story to your readers, but you can tell it eventually. If there were censorship, the censors could edit out anything embarrassing to the United States."

Most of the more than 500 accredited correspondents here appear to share that assessment.

"The ground rules work pretty well," General Sidle says. "The press, as a whole, tries to abide by them."

"Ground rules are common sense," he adds.

"All a reporter has to do is ask himself, 'will this help the enemy?'" . . .

Last week Mr. Carroll . . . went to Khe Sanh and saw Marines disassembling the metal runway and dynamiting bunkers. He said he became convinced that enemy troops could see all this from nearby positions, so that there was no valid military reason for withholding the report.

Information officers counter that they are in a better position than newsmen to decide when information will benefit the enemy. One high-ranking information officer conceded that there was at least a 90 percent chance that Mr. Carroll was right, but added that when there was even the slightest chance that the enemy did not know, it was best not to tell him . . .

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Military men contend that for the most part they have tended to give reporters the benefit of the doubt in enforcing the ground rules. General Sidle says that accreditation cards have been suspended only four times since 1966, when the rules were written, and that it is customary to reaccredit after 30 days.

"An awful lot of odds and ends get out that are helpful to the enemy, according to General Sidle, "but you can't have ground rules for everything."

Although he believes the enemy is assisted unwittingly by newspapers, he has not advocated censorship. . . .

For its part, the press corps is less concerned over not reporting all it knows at the earliest possible moment than it is over the possibility that it may not be getting all pertinent battle information. Reporters often guess wrong in trying to anticipate looming battles, so they depend on the daily military communique. 17

(U) On 19 February, the Washington Post ran a front page five column spread with two photos and carried a story under the head "A Drink of Water--Then Death." The first photo showed a Vietnamese male half sitting amid wreckage and being given a drink of water from a canteen by, what the story said, was a Vietnamese Marine. The other photo showed a uniformed Vietnamese standing above a Vietnamese male crumpled on his back and the uniformed person pointing an M-16 at the figure. The accompanying story went on to relate:

. . . The Vietnamese Marines who captured him gave him water. The next Marines to pass by questioned him. The third group did not hesitate. When Trank asked them for a cigarette, a Vietnamese private answered: "I'll give you death," he stabbed the wounded man and then fired three bursts from his M-16 into his chest. . . Allied troops have been ordered not to kill or torture prisoners. . . but the snuffing out of life has become common on both sides in recent weeks (the February offensive against Saigon).

An American Ranger adviser told a newsmen last week: "We usually kill the seriously wounded VC for two reasons. One is that the hospitals are so full of our own soldiers and civilians there is no room for the enemy.

"The second is that when you've seen a (sic) 5-year old girls with their eyes blindfolded, their arms tied behind their backs and bullets in their brains, you look for revenge. I saw two little girls that died yesterday. One hour ago I shot a wounded VC." 18

(U) In respect to the siege at the Khe Sanh Combat Base, the following excerpt was typical of the pessimistic reporting of the period, which culminated in a running journalistic battle between Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., on the pessimistic side, and Joseph Alsop. The below article was by John Wheeler of AP. Its overplay is apparent from the fact that the total casualties suffered during the more than two months of shelling and attacks were 93 KIA and

## UNCLASSIFIED

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and 2,400 WIA requiring evacuation, for a daily average of 1.3 KIA and 5.8 WIA--very light casualties for a normal operation.

The combat complex of Khe Sanh is coming under increasing pressure of raids and bombardments. The cruelest punishment of all is being taken by U. S. Marines protecting outposts on the hills surrounding the main base.

The routine heavy mortar barrages by 120mm shells have reduced much of the outposts to a thin dust, where the prospects of being killed or wounded are near the maximum. Sheer human misery and terror push men to the breaking point--some of them over it.

During the bad weather, which is almost every day, wounded must wait for many hours, sometimes days, before helicopters can get in to take them to doctors, because of this some men have bled to death or died of wounds that need not have been fatal.

The officers say it is impossible to evacuate the hill positions even if they wanted to or to reinforce them. Significantly, any attempt to evacuate by helicopter would result in heavy casualties and a large number of choppers destroyed, they say. Any attempt to walk out through ten NVN battalions would be suicide.

Because of the small positions, there simply isn't room to put in reinforcements or the necessary bunkers to protect them. It has proved extremely difficult to keep the positions up to strength and supplied with adequate food and water, the latter is short enough that the hill men have long beards.

Even the wounded maintain a quiet stoicism after they are finally pulled out of what must rank as among the most dangerous places in the world.

A Marine with his left leg blown off and the foot of a second hanging only by a bit of skin chatted with doctors in the main Khe Sanh aid station. . . .

Hill 881 South is the most battered of the outlying mountain outposts. Bunkers are too dangerous to live in so the men sleep in the zigzag trenches which are harder for the communist gunners to zero in on. Sleeping, often with the help of tranquilizers, is done during the day.

Only the night, with its protective cloak of darkness gives the Marines enough cover to repair trenches. . . . 19

(U) The establishment of MACV IWD at Hue/Phu Bai (later renamed PROVCORPSV and subsequently XXIV Corps) in February brought press relations headaches too, due to speculative and inferential news stories that if not meant to, at least tended to cause embarrassment

## UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

and unfounded conclusions. The following excerpts are illustrative of the press' penchant for trying to fathom various meanings out of military tactical/management actions. From the Los Angeles Times, February:

Marines along DMZ Disturbed at Report of Takeover by Army--The reported impending Army high command takeover from the U. S. Marines of the fighting along the DMZ--unconfirmed officially--has deeply disturbed high-ranking Marines.

Whatever official explanation may eventually be voiced for this move it rankles the Marines that the arrival of four-star Army Gen. Creighton Abrams from Saigon will be interpreted generally as a belief by the Pentagon staff that the Marines are not doing the job.

It has been reported that Abrams, who is Gen. William C. Westmoreland's Deputy, has already taken up his job as overall northern commander with headquarters at Phu-Bai, south of Hue, which has been the main base for the 3rd Marine Division.

Any adverse judgement would not reflect upon the Marine combat units, but upon Marine generalship. . . .

And there was this article in the 19 February edition of the Chicago Daily News:

Marines Yield Vital Viet Area to Army--U. S. Marine Corps control of SVN's five northernmost provinces, formally known as the 1st Corps Area and scene of the bitterest fighting of the war, has come to an end.

Army Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, right-hand man of Gen. W. C. Westmoreland, top U. S. commander in SVN, has set up advance headquarters at Phu-Bai 45 miles north of here (Da Nang), with a staff of 200.

Military sources said the move was dictated by the fact that the 1st Corps has become the major battleground of the war. . . . 20

William Tuohy, of the Los Angeles Times, also had an article on this same subject on 2 March:

Changes in the U. S. military command structure seem to preage a significant downgrading of the Marine leadership in Vietnam.

In the view of many observers, the permanent assignment of an Army three-star general to the

## UNCLASSIFIED



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I Corps area reflects the Army's growing dominance in a region once known as "Marineland."

Though no U. S. official will admit it publicly, it is an open secret that many top staffers in Gen. William C. Westmoreland's Saigon high command are less than enthusiastic with the conduct by Marine generals of the war in the five northernmost provinces which comprise the critical I Corps battlefield.

The new change of command announced yesterday places a three star Army general, Lt. Gen. William B. Rosson, in I Corps as commander of "MACV Forward," MACV being the designation for the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, the official title for Westmoreland's headquarters.

Heretofore, a U. S. Marine three star general held full sway over all U. S. troops in the I Corps area, and technically that responsibility is still held by Lt. Gen. Robert F. Cushman, Jr., the senior Marine in Vietnam.

But recently, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, a four star Army commander and Westmoreland's chief deputy, established the "MACV Forward" command at Phu Bai, the big Marine base between Da Nang and Hue. Now Abrams has turned over personal command to Gen. Rosson.

The 80,000 man Marine Force in I Corps has recently been beefed up with some 30,000 Army troops. But it is the assignment of an Army three star general in a supervisory capacity to I Corps that focuses attention on the quality of Marine leadership.

The chief criticism levied against the top Marine commanders is that they have not sufficiently prepared their troops for the kind of war which has evolved along the Demilitarized Zone, that is positional warfare and static defense bases.

In view of almost every observer who has visited I Corps, the Marines were ill-prepared for the artillery attacks to which they were subjected at the northernmost outposts of Con Thien, Gio Linh and Dong Ha.

Further, critics say, despite months of opportunity, the strategic Marine base at Khe Sanh was not prepared to withstand an enemy artillery siege until it actually began two months ago.

The criticism of the Marines is invariably directed at the senior leaders: The battalion

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and company grade officers are first rate and the valiant performance of the infantryman, or "grunt" in Marine slang, is second to none in Vietnam.

For a military branch that has made its reputation on dash, enterprise, style and imagination, the top Marine leadership in Vietnam has been singularly unimpressive, say the critics--who are growing in number.

The other criticism of the Marine leadership and tactics are many vast, time consuming amphibious operations that do not result in contact; forays into the DMZ by understrength units; failure to accept intelligence on enemy units supplied by MACV from its many sources; rash and costly assaults on entrenched enemy positions of limited value; offensive operations launched without sufficient forces and support, and failure to employ helicopters properly. . . . 21

(C) The storm of controversy and acrimony this story caused generated the following correspondence from COMUSMACV to CG, FMFPAC:

Your message 040336Z Mar 68 relating the Los Angeles Times article by Bill Tuohy has been received. I'm distressed to see such distorted reporting and deplore such irresponsible journalism. I reject any allegation that "many top staffers" in my headquarters have made known to the press any of the irresponsible ideas reflected in the article. I charge this whole matter off to speculative reporting based on circumstantial evidence and the abiding preoccupation of the press to develop controversy and attempt to bring about friction. I am planning a background session with the press tomorrow at which time future command arrangements in I CTZ will be disclosed. Tuohy will be invited. Best regards. 22

(U) The following public statement was released by COMUSMACV after the above background briefing was held:

It has distressed me greatly to learn some news articles have interpreted the changing command arrangements in the I Corps Tactical Zone as a reflection against the U. S. Marine Corps and the Third Marine Amphibious Force.

Contrary to these speculative news stories, I wish to make it absolutely clear that these arrangements are based on tactical and management considerations and have nothing to do with the performance of the Marines, which is, and always has been excellent. One of the principles of military management is that the span of control of

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commanders must be kept within normal bounds. There is a limit to the number of subordinate units that any one commander can control efficiently.

I wish to state emphatically that I have great admiration for the U.S. Marine contingent in Vietnam, from its commander down to the lowest private. 23

(C) The I CTZ command relationship press-generated controversy continued throughout March. On the 17th, an article by Donald Kirk, printed in the Washington Star, stated in essence that the more military officials explained the reason for command arrangements in I CTZ the more "observers here" (Vietnam) fail to believe them. COMUSMACV felt the article definitely impugned the integrity of all the military leaders concerned. After the article was brought to the attention of COMUSMACV by CJCS, the former expressed his feelings to CG, III MAF thusly:

The Washington Star article is indeed a nasty one. In trying to prolong and exacerbate interservice sensitivity to command arrangements here, the writer is doing a grave disservice to our military effort and to our national interests.

Over and above this, and also his misrepresentation of the facts, I am deeply concerned at his backhandedly impugning my integrity and good faith and that of General Cushman.

My information staff is not aware of any other newsmen who share the attitudes Mr. Kirk attributes to "some observers," particularly after the briefings we gave them last week. In actuality, many observers here have already expressed their contempt of Mr. Kirk's military knowledge and judgement.

. . . . I feel that I have done all I can do to clarify the command and interservice relationships in the III MAF area and do not intend to do more. Base upon the reports I have received, I believe that the great majority of the press here understand the situation. . . . 24

#### Operation DELAWARE

(U) Press problems continued to plague MACV with respect to operations in northern I CTZ. Operation DELAWARE (19 April - 17 May), caused controversy when a news embargo on the operation, the first of its kind in the war, was imposed. DELAWARE was the one major exception to the MACV policy of "full disclosure" because of the high risk of the operation, a spoiling attack in which airmobile penetration deep into the long standing and well defended enemy base area in the A Shau Valley, near Laos, took place. Surprise was essential to both the success of the operation and to the safety of US forces. This required unusual security measures which resulted in the careful control of information that might have been of benefit to the enemy. Generally, the press understood this and cooperated with the MACV embargo.

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(C) However, newsman Joseph Alsop inadvertently broke the news embargo and forced MACV to make an earlier than planned initial announcement on 21 April. Nevertheless, MACV made it plain that all military activities subsequent to that date remained embargoed. Due to the high risk nature of the operation, the inclement weather, the danger of NVA reinforcement from Laos, and similar considerations, the press embargo was maintained until the success of the operation was assured. Three separate meetings were held with the press during the remainder of the operation with the embargo being lifted in each case to include the date of the briefing. MACOI had some difficulty in convincing some members of the press that MACV was not trying to hide a defeat of some kind or trying to conceal something unusual, such as an across-the-border attack, or that MACV was not being arbitrary. However, COMUSMACV felt that responsible newsmen understood the problem and seemed to be in agreement with the plan. In addressing the problem to CG, III MAF he indicated that:

In view of the unusually long embargo and to minimize any press suspicion of our intentions, I desire that limited numbers of the press be permitted to enter the A Shau Valley from time to time as practical considerations, such as operational requirements, transportation, billeting, messing and so forth, permit. Periodically there should be days when no press is permitted in the valley. This situation will obtain until further notice.

Care should be exercised to ensure that priority of such visits is given to the US wire services, the US TV networks, and the three major US news magazines. Second priority should be accorded the major independent US newspapers, particularly those which operate news services, and the foreign wire services. Last priority goes to all others. Freelancers should not be allowed to enter the valley without previous concurrence of MACOI. In general, the same priority principles should be as governed the presence of newsmen at Khe Sanh.

(U) On 1 May, CG, III MAF implemented a plan to effect these guidelines. Again, Donald Kirk led what outcries there were at the implementation of a news embargo. In part he wrote:

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the American commander in Vietnam, is convinced the press has impeded prosecution of the war.

Although Westmoreland holds that the level of reporting has "improved" in the past few months, he still blames the press for distorting the image of the war and for reporting a wealth of facts valuable to enemy intelligence analysis. . . . .

It was Westmoreland's general disgust with much of the press, in the opinion of informed sources here, that led him more than a month ago to initiate what turned out to be the most unusual attempt at controlling Vietnam coverage since he arrived in Vietnam more than four years ago.

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The occasion was Operation Delaware, the 1st Air Cavalry Division's sortie into the A Shau Valley in the Communist-dominated northwestern wilds of the country.

The operation, launched April 19, was "embargoed," the term that means correspondents cannot report on it without losing the accreditation that enables them to cover American military activities. 25

(U) On 22 August, COMUSMACV, in a message to his component commanders and to DCG, USARV, reemphasized the rules and rationale of embargoing news about ongoing operations and particularly of the need for field commanders to release promptly the embargo when circumstances permitted such. The message read: 26

As prescribed in MACV Directive 360-1 the initial release of information pertaining to any tactical operation will be made by MACV when, in the opinion of the commander concerned, the release of such information will not adversely affect the security of his command. Therefore, the decision to permit public release of information concerning an operation is dependent upon receipt by MACV, through operational channels, of a message from the field command recommending that such public release be made.

The "ground rules" under which newsmen operate in Vietnam require them to embargo release of stories concerning a tactical operation until the operation is officially released by MACV.

There have been several recent instances of what appeared to be undue delay in the lifting of the press embargo on certain operations. In one case, no request for public release was received from the commander even after the operation terminated.

In view of the importance of accurate reporting to the American public of events taking place in Vietnam, it is essential that commanders handle the matter of press embargoes with great care. Under no circumstances should press demands be permitted to derogate valid security considerations. However, it is equally important not to use security as a crutch to delay the public release of operations when it can be presumed that the enemy is aware of the general strength and location of friendly forces involved.

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## Accreditation Problems

(U) In RVN, COMUSMACV was the sole US military commander authorized to accredit or withdraw accreditation for newsmen. Accreditation was considered by MACV as a means of identification and a verification of bona fide employment not authorization for clearance to classified information, areas, or equipment.

(U) In RVN, the major problem was with adherence to the "ground rules." Illustrative was the February story of Joseph B. Treaster, in the New York Times, which discussed shortages in aircraft in the 1st Cavalry Division. An investigation revealed that the primary source of Treaster's information was the division's staff which gave him the information but did include the " proviso" that he would abide by the ground rules. Treaster, when queried, pointed out that the ground rules covering shortages said that "amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units" were not releasable unless released by MACV but he had felt that aircraft were not covered by this and he did not believe his story would be helpful to the enemy in any case since it was, when published, many days old and the situation had been remedied. Illustrative of the flexibility of the MACV position on relations with the press and interpretation of the ground rules was the action taken in this case. MACV's evaluation of the incident was that the "New York Times Bureau here has apparently been seriously shaken by MACV investigation and as a result some of their staffers have actually asked MACV to clear parts of several stories. In view of (this). . . and since Treaster is a sincere, honest reporter and one of the better ones on the Times staff, it would probably do more harm than good to suspend his accreditation." MACV took no further action on this matter. 27

(U) Such was not the case of free lance correspondent Helen Musgrove of the Jacksonville, Florida Journal. The below message to SECDEF sums up the case:

Mrs. Helen A. Musgrove, free lance correspondent for the Jacksonville, Florida Journal was debarred on 23 April 1968 by MACV Debarment Notice 8-68. As an accredited newspaperwoman, the GVN would have allowed Mrs. Musgrove to import duty free in VN equipment used in conjunction with her position as a news medium representative. This privilege did not include any goods brought into Vietnam for a commercial venture other than her newspaper work. According to Mrs. Musgrove's estimates, she invested approximately \$8,000 in popcorn equipment which, it is alleged, she attempted to import duty free into Vietnam during January of this year for the purpose of establishing concession in a Saigon USO Club. . . . In view of debarment, Mrs. Musgrove's accreditation has been withdrawn, pending results of investigation.

(U) In June the accreditation of reporter John Carroll of the Baltimore Sun was suspended for an indefinite period for a gross violation of the MACV ground rules. Carroll broke a story of the Marines pulling out from their base at Khe Sanh before sanction for such was

# UNCLASSIFIED

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given by MACV. In explaining his action to SECDEF, COMUSMACV said that:

Mr. Carroll's accreditation was suspended indefinitely for violation of at least one of MACV's ground rules which he and all other correspondents agree to honor when they are accredited. The signed agreement says in part, "I understand that violation of the ground rules or failures to show my MACV accreditation card to the military police authorities when requested may lead to suspension or cancellation of my accreditation."

The ground rule involved is the one which forbids the use of information concerning "future plans, operations, or strikes" until officially released by MACV.

Also applicable is the ground rule which says that "During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments, name of operation and size of friendly forces involved" will not be used until officially released by MACV.

(U) Quite expectedly, the Baltimore Sun, in its articles on the subject, was quite critical of MACV and MACV policy. On 28 July the following article appeared:

Saigon, July 27 (Special)--The six-month suspension of the military accreditation of John S. Carroll, correspondent of the Baltimore Sun, is the most severe penalty imposed on a writer for a major publication during the Vietnam War.

The credentials of other correspondents have been lifted but never for more than 30 days.

Mr. Carroll had been suspended "indefinitely" last month after writing that the Marines were abandoning their outpost Khe Sanh. Although the story was later confirmed by the military, Mr. Carroll was suspended for violating a ground rule that forbids public discussion of pending troop operations.

Brig. Gen. Winant Sidle, the chief of information, said today that the "indefinite" suspension had been "reduced" to six months . . . .

Mr. Carroll can remain in Vietnam.

Mr. Carroll said today that the move by the military command was "extraordinarily vindictive."

"Some sort of ground rules are necessary but this arbitrary system of penalties could very well be abused to stem the flow of honest and accurate reporting," he added.

(U) Another Baltimore Sun page 1 story read:

Saigon July 28--At least four newsmen have

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had their American military accreditation in Vietnam suspended temporarily for publishing reports on American military activities before their release by the United States commands, a spokesman reported today.

All these suspensions except the latest--that of John S. Carroll, Baltimore Sun correspondent--ran for 30 days. Mr. Carroll's suspension has been set at 6 months because of an account of the American evacuation of the Khe Sanh Marine base he made before official announcement of it.

The United States command has discredited 23 persons covering the Vietnam war in the last several years for misconduct, thus denying them access to American military facilities for news coverage.

"Nineteen of the twenty-three were discredited for misconduct such as bad checks, nonpayment of bills or other financial irresponsibility and for currency and postal violations," the spokesman said. "Four were debarred after complete criminal investigations."

"Fourteen of these we consider permanently discredited," the spokesman added. "The other nine you might call temporary, meaning they may be accredited after careful reconsideration and after certain conditions are corrected. We have only reaccredited one person subsequently."

"I would estimate," the spokesman said, "that we consider for discreditation possibly two to three persons a month. The large majority of these persons are admonished and counseled and allowed to continue. Their actions are usually due to a misunderstanding." 28

#### The "All-Out Offensive"

(3) On 27 May, COMUSMACV published informal guidance to his commanders in a message of that date. He reviewed the Tet defeat of the enemy and steps that had been taken to exploit the situation: steps which had been agreed upon at the ARVN, FW, and US commanders conference on 31 March. COMUSMACV and other Allied commanders, on 6 May, had called for "a full offensive against the enemy" and "with the prospect of negotiations confronting us, we must redouble our vigilance and our initiative, to insure that the enemy achieves no success on the battlefields of SVN." A major breakthrough toward military victory in South Vietnam was called for. Fighting was to be "characterized by an aggressive, unremitting, twenty-four hour application of pressure on all enemy elements throughout RVN." The enemy would "be driven from the populated areas, pursued relentlessly, isolated and destroyed" was the guidance. US commanders were to forge "a totally coordinated military offensive, in which a

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ful role" was to "be assigned to the RVNAF." The ultimate goal of COMUSMACV's guidance was that:

These operations must result in driving the enemy from the population and political centers of the country, opening the lines of communications, and giving breathing room to the process of pacification. . . . The purpose of fighting in the summer of 1968 (was to) be to hound the enemy, destroy the forces and rid this land of his influence.

No mention of the Paris official conversations was made in this directive to all MACV commanders.

(J) Unfortunately, there was an opportunistic press leak which exploited this general guidance and tied it directly to the Paris talks, a fabrication. A story by Keyes Beech appearing in the Chicago Daily News claimed that a top secret directive had been sent to all US field commanders in South Vietnam telling them to win the war in the next three months. The article stated that the objective was to break the then current military stalemate and gain "a decisive voice at the Paris peace conference." It went on to claim that, since the Communists were seeking the same thing, the talks would produce some of the bloodiest fighting of the war in the weeks and months ahead. Beech went on to say that although the (alleged) directive went out under Gen Westmoreland's name, it had originated with Gen Abrams who was soon to become COMUSMACV. The leak, coupled with the political inferences drawn from it, caused embarrassment to COMUSMACV and a query from the National Military Command Center (NMCC), as well as one from SECSTATE to both AMEMB Paris and AMEMB Saigon.

(U) In answer to insistent queries, COMUSMACV, on 26 May, issued the following statement to the press:

There is no MACV directive, classified or unclassified, which (a) ties the prosecution of the war in Vietnam with the Paris Peace Talks, (b) states that the war must be won within the next three months or within any specific period of time.

In a press briefing on that day, a US spokesman explained that the directive of 6 May "was a kind of pep talk - the kind that gets sent out about every six months or so" and that "it said we had to make an all-out effort to keep the counteroffensive going, that is, the counteroffensive that began after the enemy's Tet offensive." Having foreseen such troubles, COMUSMACV, weeks before, on 3 April, had told all commands and commanders in Vietnam that:

No member of this command is authorized to make any comment whatsoever concerning the cessation of bombing which has occurred over most of North Vietnam or concerning any problem connected therewith, directly or indirectly.

Press queries on this subject will be answered

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with, "No Comment." Persistent queries may be referred to MACOI. This instruction will remain in effect until rescinded. 29

"Third Wave" Offensive

(C) After the May-June enemy attacks were defeated, there was a lessening of combat action throughout the Republic. However, captured enemy documents and information gathered by interrogation and intelligence sources, plus persistent rumors, indicated that the enemy was preparing to launch a "Third Wave" of countrywide attacks in the late summer. Rumors led to speculation which led to queries from many quarters, particularly the press corps. The problem revolved around the questions of when, where, and how will we know the attack is a general one (if indeed there is one) and is it the much touted "Third Wave?" Because of persistent speculation, COMUSMACV felt it necessary to provide definitive guidance to his component and senior commanders in the matter, which he did on 18 August. In a message to CG, III MAF; CG, I FFORCEV; CG, II FFORCEV; CG, CMAC; CO, USAHAC; SA, IV CORPS; Cdr, 7AF; and COMNAVFORV he stated:

The handling of public affairs activity during the expected enemy offensive is most important to US interests and must receive detailed attention of commanders, staff, and particularly their information officers.

The press no doubt will speculate that the offensive has started; however, the official announcement must come from COMUSMACV.

The quicker that factual information can be provided to the press the better - as facts dispel rumors.

Insure that your information officers are kept fully informed at all times. A continuous flow of accurate information is required to keep the press advised. It is equally important for information officers and their staffs to know news that should not be put out as it is to know news that can be released.

Let our actions speak for themselves. Avoid speculations that may mislead the press and particularly avoid speculation about the future course of the battle or comment about our future operations. Our capabilities and preparations, together with what has happened and where, and what we have done, provide the soundest basis for comment. Be careful not to over exaggerate a special situation. Use facts.

(S) Nine days later, SECDEF, in a message to AMEMB Saigon and to COMUSMACV commented that:

Excellent MACV press activities have resulted in informed news coverage of current NVA/VC activities.

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We agree with the public affairs approach outlined last week by General Abrams to DASD/PA Fryklund--particularly that MACV should not predict, claim or characterize but should point out clearly and promptly the current actions of the enemy and let the actions speak for themselves. . .

We also support your intention of pointing out to newsmen that the enemy's broadcasts characterize his current actions as a major offensive. When in your opinion intelligence verifies these enemy statements we would fully support your releasing them.

We continue to believe that basic reporting of the facts should continue to be done in Saigon, not here, and that MACV should not characterize the current assaults until the enemy has done it himself and until his actions make it clear to newsmen that the Third Wave is indeed in progress.

Again our praise to all hands for excellent public affairs handling of a difficult situation. 30

#### Casualty Reporting

(U) Casualty reporting had been a part of the "numbers game" played in connection with the war in SEASIA. The reporting system had been explained many times--orally and in writing--to reporters, editors, and publishers; however, the passage of time had always seen confusion and misconceptions creep back into the news reports about casualties. With this in mind, a review of the casualty reporting practice in the recent wars the US had fought was necessary to give proper perspective to the present controversy and problem of casualty reporting.

(U) During World War II, there was no attempt to compile statistics or lists of names of casualties for public announcement. Such compilations occurred only after the war was over. The criterion for a reportable wounded casualty was admission to a hospital or corresponding field activity. Although not spelled out in the criterion in practice a "corresponding field activity" was a battalion aid station or greater facility. There was no reference to the Purple Heart in determining casualties.

(U) In the Korean War, public announcements were made weekly, based on notifications of next of kin. Thus, the weekly lists represented those casualties whose next of kin had been notified during the reporting period rather than those actually wounded during the period. The criterion for a reportable wounded casualty in Korea was the same as for World War II.

(U) Early in the Vietnam conflict, the same criterion as in Korea was used for determining reportable casualties. In 1962, an Executive Order authorized the award of the Purple Heart to those wounded in Vietnam. At that time, the criterion for a reportable casualty became the award of the Purple Heart which criteria is a wound received as a direct result of hostile action or through misadventure while in action or going to or returning from action, requiring treatment by a medical officer. The term "medical officer" was not defined. If it were strictly defined as a doctor, then a reportable casualty in Vietnam would be the same as a

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reportable casualty in World War II or Korea. In practice in the field it was not strictly defined and a corpsman was generally considered a medical officer for purposes of awarding the Purple Heart and determining a reportable casualty.

(U) Because of this, MACV was plagued by two misconceptions about casualties reported:

1. That the total US casualties in SEASIA could be compared with casualties announced in previous wars.
2. That the summary of casualties reported each week was an announcement of the casualties occurring during the report week.

(U) In respect to the first misconception: each week on Thursday, DOD had released a statistical summary of "Vietnam Weekly Casualties," cumulative from 1 January 1961 through the Saturday before the Thursday on which the summary was released. The "wounded or injured" category was broken down to cover "died of wounds" and "non-fatal wounds." The latter sub-category was divided further into individuals who required hospital care and those who did not require hospital care. In comparing Vietnam to Korea or World War II, an accurate comparison could only be made if one ignored the figure for wounded who did not require hospital care as this figure, as explained above, was not collected and released during earlier wars. The vast majority of the news media did not bother with this finite but most important point. Therefore, stories that US combat casualties in Vietnam were greater in number than those suffered during the Korean War were in basic error and grossly misleading.

(U) The second area of confusion was amply illustrated by stories that total US casualties in Vietnam were higher than in Korea and that the weekly figures for the week ending 6 April were the highest of the war. The inflation caused by including the wounded not requiring hospitalization provided the first false assumption and secondly no one week could be accurately compared with another since, as explained above, the casualty reporting system did not make such comparisons possible.

(U) Despite the news media practice of doing so, it was incorrect to compare total casualties in the Vietnam War with those in other wars unless (1) the current category of "Non-fatal wounds--hospital care not required" was deducted from the Vietnam War casualty figure, and (2) one realized there could be no correlation between wounded casualties announced for a certain week and the number actually occurring in that week.

(C) COMUSMACV recognized this overall problem and recommended to CINCPAC that a change in the reporting system be made when he dispatched the following message, on 12 April, with information copies to OSD(PA) and CJCS:

1. (U) At present, all casualties incurred by US troops in Vietnam, no matter how slight the injury, are reported through channels and to the press.
2. (U) This procedure differs from those used in WWII and Korea. During those conflicts the wounded in action statistics included only those persons wounded seriously enough to require hospitalization.

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3. (U) Although for several months the WIA figures released to the press have carefully differentiated between those requiring hospitalization and those who do not, the press has tended to lump the figures together, thereby giving a totally false impression when compared with WWII and Korean casualty figures.

4. (C) Should the present system of reporting casualties to the press be changed to conform with the Korean and WWII procedures, a much more valid casualty comparison could be made between Vietnam and those two conflicts. For example, counting only those wounded requiring hospitalization, the statistics would read:

a. WIA in Korea June 1950 - July 1953 (3 years, 1 month): 103,284.

b. WIA in Vietnam 1 Jan 61 - 30 Jan 68 (7 years 1 month): 56,992.

5. (C) It is obvious that such a change in Vietnam casualty reporting to the press would provide a more accurate data base for the comparison of reported casualties with other conflicts. In addition, an accurate, more significant portrayal of the effectiveness of combat operations in RVN would be possible.

6. (C) It is equally obvious that such a change, if made at this somewhat late date, would create considerable press speculation questioning the motives for the change and possibly providing some grist for the mill of credibility gap. However, it is believed that the press furor, if any, would be short lived and that the end result would be a much more realistic picture in the minds of both the press and public as to the casualty situation in Vietnam.

7. (C) To effect the change as painlessly as possible, DOD and MACV should make the announcement simultaneously, explaining the reasons for the change and providing revised casualty statistics beginning 1 January 1961. Subsequently, all DOD casualty reports would include only those WIA requiring hospitalization (MEDEVAC). Saigon press questions would be answered by MACV at the appropriate evening briefing. In Washington, the same task could be accomplished through either a press

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conference or a backgrounder. The actual release and followup questions and answers should be prepared by ASD(PA).

8. (C) It is recommended that:

a. DOD press casualty reports be changed to limit WIA to those requiring hospitalization.

b. WIA public statistics since 1 Jan 61 be modified accordingly.

c. The announcement of this change be made simultaneously in Washington and Saigon.

d. The announcement be prepared by ASD (PA).

e. No change be made in official in-house casualty reporting.

(U) CINC PAC replied concurring with the MACV position. However, no action on the matter was taken at OASD (PA) and it was allowed to lie dormant. <sup>31</sup>

(C) On 17 August, CINC PAC inquired of SECDEF if the casualties incurred during the 26 July terrorist attack on the Royal Thai Air Force Base, Udorn, should be treated separately or if they should be associated directly with the Vietnam War released figures. SECDEF, on 20 August, stated that these casualties "would not be treated separately [and] would be associated directly with the Vietnam War released figures." In addition, guidance was sent to the effect that "only the figures for the total casualties incurred by US military personnel in connection with the conflict in Vietnam will be unclassified and releasable. Any breakdown for separate countries or lesser areas will remain classified as Confidential."

(C) SECDEF queried CINC PAC, COMUSMACTHAI, and COMUSMACV as to whether or not to include Cambodia in the same context as Thailand in that:

... The eleven well-publicized internees from the [Army] LCU held by the Cambodians were included in the weekly casualty release charged to Vietnam. Under the existing ground rules the eleven men should not have been counted but to have failed to do so would have brought some criticism. Adding Cambodia to the Thailand proposal at this time might prevent possible future problems. Request reaction all addresses.

(C) COMUSMACV replied thusly:

Concur that all casualties resulting from direct actions or mission support of Vietnam conflict should be reported as one total, regardless of individual's base of origin.

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However, we have reservations whether individuals based in Thailand or other countries incurring casualties within the boundaries of the country of assignment should be included in Vietnam conflict total casualty figures if a breakdown of figures would remain classified. A total of casualties under such a procedure may not reflect a true picture of losses due to Vietnam action.

The US Embassy in Saigon. . . concurs with MACV position. <sup>32</sup>

As a result of this, casualty reporting procedures were not changed. DOD and COMUSMACV continued to release figures reflecting all casualties directly connected with the war in Vietnam.

#### RVNAF

(U) Without doubt, other than pursuing and defeating the enemy outright, the major task of MACV in 1968 was the improvement of RVNAF. This task in 1968 was foremost among staff activities and priorities. In consequence, this effort also played a significant part in the activities of the Office of Information staff's activities and priorities. There was an internal shift of emphasis that brought about such things as an expanded information advisory effort, greater recognition of RVNAF in the Observer as well as unit newspapers, and the sponsoring of joint US/GVN press corps briefings each afternoon in Saigon (these items, and others, are discussed under their respective MACOI Division sections).

(S) In early July, the JCS spelled out their policy to improve the recognition of the performance and progress of the RVNAF. Addressed to CINCPAC, with information to COMUSMACV, their guidance, in part, stated:

. . . . The American public has been informed that the RVNAF would gradually assume a greater share of the burden in winning the war. . . It seems appropriate to give increased recognition to the performance and progress of the RVNAF.  
. . . . Conduct a three-pronged program. . . to obtain maximum publicity and coverage in US/worldwide news media of successful RVNAF operations. . . and to permit feedback of the "recognition" to Vietnamese outlets as further stimulant . . . Command information programs within RVNAF, guided and assisted by US advisors, to recognize and extol the dedication of RVNAF fighting men in order to improve esprit de corps. . . long-range motivational/incentive programs to further stimulate members of RVNAF toward service and combat aggressiveness.

(C) In reply to the JCS message and the program suggestions contained in that message, COMUSMACV stated to CINCPAC, info JCS, that: <sup>33</sup>

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Commanders and information officers in Vietnam are well aware of the need for full recognition of RVNAF performance and progress and there does not appear to be any requirement for an additional program in Vietnam to support this objective. . . . the three-pronged program proposed [by JCS] is already underway on a top priority basis. . . .

This headquarters: . . . enthusiastically concurred(s) in additional efforts which might be taken elsewhere to improve RVNAF recognition, keeping in mind, however, that no attempt should be made to create an RVNAF image which is better than the real thing. Past attempts of this nature have backfired and appear to be largely responsible for the current press doubts concerning the RVNAF, at least among the Saigon Press Corps.

#### Favorable Press

(U) After the enemy's attacks of May and June, adverse stories written and filed by the Saigon Press Corps continued to be printed but in a progressively smaller number than before. Sometime in mid-summer a perceptible change in war reporting became apparent. In fact, in retrospect, the first half of 1968--Tet, Khe Sanh, the second cities offensive--was the high point of American press criticism of the US military's conduct of the war. In the last half of 1968, MACV was no longer being continually castigated for "more destroying than searching," or for using "baseball bats (B-32s) to swat flies (VC)," and other such simplifications of a complex task. Instead, an appreciation of the difficult task at hand and the finite gains being made began to be emphasized by the press. Also, with respect to the enemy, a changed treatment by the press corps became apparent. Before the Tet Offensive, and particularly thereafter, the enemy had gratuitously been given the accolade of being "ten feet tall," infallible, or almost unbeatable. This was in contrast to the portrayal of an often bumbling American military.

(U) In essence, the suicidal nature of the May and June attacks, the failure of the enemy to continue rocketing Saigon, his failure to mount no more than a few ineffective and (to him) disastrous attacks in his much vaunted and heralded "Third Wave" attacks in August, the rise of RVNAF fighting ability and esprit, the continued stability of the Thieu government and, above all, a much belated recognition of the reasoning behind MACV tactical/strategic policies, and the worth of the American fighting man in Vietnam all effected this change.

(U) Since favorable articles in the press during this subtle change in attitude did not engender message or letter traffic of an official nature, the best way to illustrate this change is by quoting random examples of such reporting; some by correspondents who at the time of Tet and Khe Sanh were literally Cassandras, prophets of doom. Following is a series of excerpts from news stories that are indicative of this change. A perusal of news headlines and feature stories from January through May compared to August through November would show the reader a dramatic shift in emphasis and attitude on the part of reporters in Vietnam. The below summary attempts to do the same.

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(U) Peter Braestrup, Washington Post Foreign Service, in a 12 August article on the MACV use of B-52s, signaled this changed attitude:

    Saigon, Aug 11. The windows of downtown Saigon rattled last night as the distinctive long rumble of a B-52 bomber strike came over the flat, flooded rice paddies from the west.

    This morning, as is its habit, the US command disclosed the whereabouts of the night's B-52 targets. The closest bombs, apparently those which rattled the windows, fell in Long An Province, 14 miles away--about the same distance Rockville is from downtown Washington.

    Tonight, the windows rattled again, twice. When the Strategic Air Command's big bombers began dropping scores of 500 and 750-pound bombs on Vietcong jungle sanctuaries on June 18, 1965, there was considerable outcry over "using a sledgehammer to hit a fly." Such skepticism has faded.

    Indeed, especially during the current eight-week-old relative lull in big-unit warfare, the B-52s' 30-ton bomb-loads have emerged as one of Gen. Creighton W. Abrams' prime weapons in disrupting any enemy timetable for a third offensive against Vietnam's cities.

    "Abrams has been using B-52s like maneuver battalions, like a strategic reserve, jabbing all the time," observed one high-ranking planner. "Our intelligence is better and our flexibility is better. And the enemy now has a more complicated logistics system, which gives us better area targets."

    As many as 13 strikes a day bring the B-52s from Guam or Utapao, Thailand. . .

    In June the B-52s were credited with helping the US 4th Division deter a two-division enemy threat around Kontum and Dakto in the Central Highlands. The bombers also paved the way for the second US foray into the Ashau Valley on Aug 4.

    (The B-52s' most dramatic hour came during the 77-day siege of the Marine base at Khe Sanh, when they dropped 60,000 tons of bombs to relandscape the hills. Some 750 pounders were placed within 500 meters of the defense perimeter and the B-52s were credited with a decisive role in discouraging an all-out enemy assault). . .

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Nobody claims that every B-52 strike is on target. But there is plenty of testimony, from prisoners and captured documents, that the enemy feels some pressure from them.

Not long ago, US troops picked up a diary belonging to Nguyen Duc Tau, 20 year old veteran of the 101st NVA Regiment. It recorded his trip south in 1964 and fights in the Highlands and north of Saigon. His odyssey included two strikes against his outfit by the B-52s. On Nov 17, 1966, Tau recorded, "One of the bombs hit an underground shelter and hurled seven comrades a distance of 15 meters. Four of them were killed on the spot."

On Oct 26, 1967 the B-52 again caught up with Tau and his friends, all of them in deep shelters. "I was safe, although half buried," he noted.<sup>34</sup>

(U) Another article reflecting this shift in attitude was one carried in US News & World Report entitled "Did US Bungle Victory?" Its two main negative points were that gradual escalation was a denial of basic military doctrine and that the US had not sufficiently prepared for a small unit, anti-guerrilla war because in the early 1960s US military thinking was still "applicable to war in a highly developed area of the world, such as Europe." But the article did state:

It is possible at this time to start putting the Vietnam War in perspective. Two main points emerge:

1. There will be no decisive military victory over the Communists because too many fundamental mistakes have been made by the US. Some blunders were set in motion long before the war started and were corrected only under the pressure of combat. Many changes have taken too long.

2. Despite all the problems, there is a measure of success to be salvaged. In fact, one overriding US objective--to deny victory to the Communists--has at this date all but been accomplished.

First, here is an appraisal of the immediate situation, made after three months of touring the battle areas from one end of South Vietnam to the other.

Mid-1968 will probably come to be regarded as the turning point in the war, with peace by mid-1969 a possibility. The reasons are many and varied.

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Never before have the Allied forces been better prepared or more on the alert. North Vietnamese military operations are rapidly becoming an exercise in futility.

A clandestine war, such as that being attempted by the Communists, has inherent limitations which cannot succeed in the face of the massive Allied buildup.

The Viet Cong's capacity for internal subversion has been reduced sharply. The ranks of the Viet Cong are now 72 percent North Vietnamese.

The Government of South Vietnam, shaken by US political oratory and fears of a "sellout" in Paris, is struggling with some successes for stability and acceptance.

For the first time in a decade there is no visible threat of a military coup to overthrow the Government.

To observers on the scene, this much seems clear: any military operations undertaken henceforth by the Communists will be for propaganda purposes. The aim: to establish a facade of strength they do not possess, in an attempt to influence US public opinion and the Paris talks.

The North Vietnamese cannot conquer, hold and organize any substantial portion of South Vietnam, nor can they overthrow the Saigon Government by force.

None of this means, of course, that the Allies have won the war in the traditional sense. The North Vietnamese have not been forced to withdraw or surrender. The Reds' capacity for prolonged harassment remains impressive.

It does mean, however, that within the framework of military restraints, self-imposed by the US for domestic political reasons, the Allies have accomplished a vital purpose; the preservation of South Vietnam as a potentially viable non-Communist nation.

The restraints the US placed on itself have limited Allied ground operations to within South Vietnam and restricted the bombing of North Vietnam. Despite the military handicaps, there is growing evidence that the war has been far more costly to the enemy than hitherto realized.

While intelligence sources are reluctant to project overall casualty figures officially, the most conservative estimate obtainable here places

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enemy losses to battle, bombing and disease since 1962 at around 700,000 men. Some sources believe the Communists have lost at least one million men.

A large number of news stories over the years, by inference at least, have surrounded the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong with an aura of victorious cunning. . . .

Under General Westmoreland's successor, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, there has been stepped-up emphasis on the tactics called "detect and cordon."

These tactics involve flooding the countryside nightly with literally thousands of small patrols whose primary mission is to locate the enemy. As soon as the enemy is detected, additional troops are moved in to surround the area, which is then pounded by air and artillery.

Under these circumstances, if the enemy is to survive, he must attempt a breakout--which means he must abandon his position, move into the open and attack the Allied forces dug in around him. For the enemy, it is a costly effort.

Military men here argue that American impatience with the war has been fanned by reportorial emphasis on what are described as US military blunders, that little attention has been paid to the enemy's.

The Communists have exhibited a remarkable lack of imagination. North Vietnamese military operations are generally predictable, their planning inflexible and their options limited to fighting in the vicinity of their supplies. The enemy often fights for no apparent military purpose.

Much has been written about the difficulties of the US in dealing with a clandestine war. Little has been said about the inherent limitations of such warfare.

Modern armies with their fleets of trucks, helicopters and aircraft have the ability to move men and supplies at will. The clandestine warrior does not.

To prepare for battle, the North Vietnamese must porter their medical supplies, arms and ammunition into the areas where they intend to fight. Their ability for sustained combat is limited by the size of their supply caches. Quick replenishment is out of the question.

The location of these supply caches governs the North Vietnamese selection of targets. Since the North Vietnamese cannot operate at a distance from his supplies, his maneuver room

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is limited.

Over the years, the Allies have plotted the North Vietnamese supply routes from Laos and Cambodia with considerable accuracy. The Allies now know the areas preferred by the North Vietnamese as supply bases.

What this means is that the North Vietnamese are having an increasingly difficult time mustering large numbers of men at the caches without detection. When they do muster they have, in effect, signaled their target and route. They are being intercepted with mounting success.

Many Americans here are extremely critical of the South Vietnamese government, citing corruption, draft-dodging, and inefficient bureaucracy, the black market and military factionalism as grounds.

These charges are all generally valid. But there is another, and largely overlooked, side to the coin.

The current Government was organized after a general election in which 80 percent of those eligible to vote did so. A new Constitution was drafted and approved. All this was done in the midst of a war.

Close observers stress that, for a change, the Government appears to be making an effort to weed out the inefficient and corrupt. At least 12 of the nation's 44 provincial chiefs have been removed from office.

A confident South Vietnamese Government has freed more than 2,700 persons who had been held on suspicion of being Communist sympathizers. It has embarked on a program of legal reform aimed at ending the old French system under which the accused is presumed to be guilty unless he can establish his innocence.

Some measures of the Government's growing strength can be gleaned from the fact that in 1964 tax revenues amounted to only 11.5 billion piasters, or 97 million dollars, at the rate of \$1 to 118 piasters. Now they total more than 26 billion piasters, or 220 million dollars.

In summary two main points: The Government of South Vietnam is becoming stronger almost daily. The possibility that the Communists can overthrow it by force or internal subversion is becoming more remote.

The military situation is such that, while the Allies grow stronger, the North Vietnamese

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are spending thousands of lives for no compensatory gain.

These are the principal reasons why observers here feel some kind of honorable peace can be achieved in 1969 if the US is determined to stay with it. 35

(U) On 5 and 13 September, Beverly Deepe of the Christian Science Monitor, who had been a most severe critic of USMACV, turned her guns on the enemy, heretofore sacrosanct:

The Communists, now apparently winding up for a third military offensive, have driven home some scorching criticism of their previous countrywide thrust in May.

Their criticisms of subordinate units have a wide range of targets. These include:

A gunner who wasted 10 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire by missing his assigned targets.

A unit which went "on a walking exercise in the jungle" rather than rushing in to reinforce its comrades in battle.

Units which fled in battle leaving munitions, heavy weapons, and wounded soldiers behind.

Refusal of commanders to execute orders "with ut hesitation."

Fabrication by senior unit commanders of battlefield reports to superior headquarters, minimizing Communist casualties and exaggerating allied losses.

A major Communist difficulty was the defection of a senior Communist Party Officer, Lt Col Tra(va)n (sic) Van Duc, who outlined portions of the Communist battle plan to the allied command shortly before the assault. Since then, the Communist command has intensified the indoctrination of its troops.

However, allied intelligence sources report that following the May offensive, a number of Communist cadre and officers have continued to voluntarily defect to the allied side. Others have been captured on the battlefield.

More significantly, these sources report that since the May offensive, as many as 10 to 20 percent of the troop strength from some badly battered units have deserted the Communist ranks, returning to their homes. . .

The commander of one unit of the First Regiment was told to go back and fight. He said he could not because he did not have a sampan. When a subordinate found him a sampan, he said he was sick.

## UNCLASSIFIED

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The subordinate then asked if he would designate someone to replace himself as commander. Lying on a bed the commander just rolled his heavy body to the wall and refused to answer. 36

(U) Another Beverly Deepe article entitled "Chasing Credibility in Saigon" pointed out that Hanoi was both deceiving and being deceived--in short, the enemy was not infallible, he had deep problems and his own "credibility gap."

... Compared with Washington's, however, the Communist credibility gap is more of a canyon. It exists within its own hierarchy, within international diplomatic circles, and between the Communists and the South Vietnamese people.

If President Johnson's problem is evaluating his Top-Secret reports from Saigon, the essential Communist problem revolves around their low-ranking commissars and troops no longer believing in the Communist Party leadership--which is the fountainhead of wisdom and infallibility on their side.

If the Communist Party leadership is not maintaining the trust of its cadre and troops, then it will have--and is having--difficulty in gaining the trust of the South Vietnamese people, whom they are attempting to woo as supporters.

Diplomatically, the verbal games the Communist negotiators played in Paris on the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South did nothing to enhance their credibility here--especially when some Saigon housewives had even heard the northern accents of the Hanoi troops in Saigon when they assaulted the city in the past.

One Vietnam-based American official explained the current American problem this way:

"The main thing is that before time was a weapon the Communists always used. Time now is on our side. I see no need for any American concessions right now because the South Vietnamese are becoming increasingly stronger vis-a-vis the enemy. The longer they wait, the better off we are. Of course, I ignore the great public demand for peace--and this is a factor to be weighed too". . . 37

However, the article did go on to explore and condemn US military "conservatism" and institutionalized "optimism," "two persistent problems"--but, in essence, it struck a greater balance than previous Deepe articles.

(U) A most outspoken editorial by the Tampa Tribune of 30 September was instructive:

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The cry continues and grows that the US quit the war in Vietnam.

One of the major reasons for doing so, chorus over and over the apostles of gloom, is that we and our allies are not and cannot win the war.

Up until only a year ago they'd say that all we had to do to see this is to look at the impressive statistics on equipment lost to the Communists by South Vietnamese troops.

The figures, they'd maintain, demonstrated the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were winning the war. No military force, went the argument, could continue battle when the enemy took away its weapons faster than the US could continue to supply them.

The concern over lost materiel was accompanied by charges that the losses proved South Vietnamese wouldn't fight, were 40-hour-a-week soldiers, wouldn't operate at night and "nowhere in the country can be said to have made real gains against the enemy."

Well, the gloom-sayers should look again. A year later, the situation is radically different-- but those who read the losses of materiel as sure signs of defeat are strangely silent.

Now it is the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese who are losing huge military stocks.

Since the first of this year, allied forces have seized 40,969 enemy rifles, enough to equip four enemy divisions at their usual strength of 10,000 men. In the same time, the allies took 1,797 artillery rockets and 8,446 mortars, machine guns and other crew-served weapons.

More than 4 million rounds of rifle ammunition, more than 57,000 mortar shells, more than 12,000 mines, more than 49,000 grenades and more than 2,400 tons of rice have been wrested from the enemy.

This loss of materiel damages the enemy more than a similar loss would injure US forces. North Vietnam isn't resupplying with American equipment in great volume these days and must depend upon Russia for it. Its a long haul from the Czechoslovakian munitions plants to Haiphong, or overland from Red China. . . .

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Especially now that the news reports from the war zone contain more and more accounts of South Vietnamese in action, the talk suggesting that the Viet Cong need only to shout "boo" and all South Vietnamese will drop their weapons no longer sounds convincing. South Vietnamese may be far from the best soldiers by US standards but they are working at it.

There also seems to be quite a change in the battlefield operations. Marines moved out of their fixed positions several months ago and began stabbing at the enemy's strongholds. Army forces and South Vietnamese roam far afield in efforts to find and destroy the enemy and his supplies.

Even allowing for exaggeration in the excitement of battle, the losses inflicted upon the Communists are staggering. . . .

Those Americans who advocate withdrawal, ignominious though it may be, might take heart in reviewing the situation today. It is possible they would discover signs that the US purpose of stemming the Communist aggressive tide in Southeast Asia may be closer to achievement than the enemy propagandists would like us to believe.

(U) The war against corruption within RVN got notice too:

Baby step by step, corruption is beginning to go out of style in South Vietnam. While the new anticorruption campaign is not performing any miracles, both American and the most honest Vietnamese officials throughout the country say that dramatically new attitudes are beginning to show everywhere.

For one thing, officials are now afraid to be too blatant about their thievery.

For another, in places like the National Assembly, eager young men wanting to make a fast name for themselves find it propitious to denounce thievery wherever they find it.

Mostly any success that the campaign has had to date is ascribed to the puritanical hand of Prime Minister Tran Van Huong, described by an American official here as "notoriously honest." . . .

While plenty of corruption still exists, it appears very strongly that there is, indeed,

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a substantive new attitude.

Perhaps most important, the American Embassy stands squarely behind Prime Minister Huong. If this Government falls, the embassy has told the Vietnamese politicians in no uncertain terms the United States might very well find it no longer necessary to continue in Vietnam. . . .

While Huong attacks corruption from a basically moral position, others in the Government realize that they simply have to clean up or the game, literally, is up.

In the three months since Huong took office, some notable changes have taken place. Twenty-five of 44 province chiefs have been removed from office.

This sort of thing has been done before, but this time not one of the 25 has yet showed up in a higher position. Most are awaiting prosecution. 38

(U) Even the writers of *NewswEEK*, a long-time critic of US actions in Vietnam, began in October to recognize that a military victory was being won in Vietnam:

The consensus wisdom these days is that the war in Vietnam is being lost, that nothing remains for the US but to withdraw in good order if possible, in disorder if necessary. If this is true, and it may be, then it is because the war is being lost on the playing fields of America. It is not being lost on the battlefields of Asia.

. . . that we have neglected to notice what is going on in Vietnam itself. What is going on there makes celebrations of Ho's triumph on the streets of Chicago and on university campuses at least seem premature and the US press' defeatism unrealistic.

Wars have been lost before by lack of patience on the home front and this one can be, perhaps is being. The French lost Vietnam more in Paris than at Dienbienphu. . . .

Conditions of peace will be dictated principally by the situation on the battlefield at the time of negotiation. For the US, the South Vietnamese and their allies the situation is now the best it has ever been and improving. For the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong it is by the same token the worst it has been and deteriorating.

Military experts believe the North Vietnamese have been trying for weeks to mount a repeat of the

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Tet offensive against Saigon and other urban centers but that General Abrams has frustrated these efforts by brilliant use of improved intelligence sources, ground patrols to fix the enemy and air power to harass him and keep him off balance. The North Vietnamese now make up about 80 percent of the Communist fighting force. They and what remains of the VC have suffered heavy casualties (18,500 killed in action in the last five weeks). They also have lost enormous caches of arms and food supplies. Guerrilla forces have been cut in half by cannibalisation to fill the depleted ranks of regular infantry units.

Meanwhile, under President Thieu and Prime Minister Huong, the Saigon government is doing some of the things that should have been done years ago. More than 150 officials have been fired for inefficiency and corruption. No fewer than two dozen province chiefs have been replaced. The Saigon police force is now commanded by a professional civil service. The new mobilization law has added 220,000 men to the South Vietnamese forces, 160,000 of them volunteers; bringing their total strength to 755,000. By next year this country of 17 million will have almost 1 million men under arms. . . . 39

(U) And this article of 28 October:

Limited as the perspective still is, a backward look now reveals that the so called Tet offensive in South Vietnam at the start of this year was a Churchillian "hinge of fate" for the United States and its Asian allies. For the attackers it was a temporary success and a long-range disaster. For the defenders it was a jolting setback that ultimately produced conditions leading to the present renewal of hopes for peace. . .

City people whose concern had not previously been enlisted were frightened into resolution. The Thieu government pulled up its socks. A conscription law was enforced and the South Vietnamese Army with the help of the Americans, was reequipped and greatly improved in effectiveness. The countryside bounced back to pre-Tet status or better. The enemy broke off the siege of Khe Sanh. The fortunes of war clearly reversed direction. . . .

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In this country the effects of the Tet raids were even more spectacular. American reaction to the war news last January and February was panicky. Sen. William Fulbright and his peace bloc accepted Tet as proof positive that the war was as futile as it was immoral. John Kenneth Galbraith predicted collapse of the Saigon government and "effective dissolution of the South Vietnamese Army" in a matter of weeks. . . .

Now at last, time seems to be running out faster for Hanoi than for Saigon-Washington. This may produce results. 40

(U) The previously much maligned Marines in northern I CTZ also came in for their share of belated praise:

In the Buffer Zone, Vietnam, Oct. 13-Several months ago, the Marine Corps announced that its forces in the northwestern corner of South Vietnam were assuming a new, more mobile posture.

Today, from the Ben Hai River in the buffer zone to the abandoned base at Khe Sanh, the impact of the new tactics is evident everywhere.

The Marines are moving freely into areas where American troops have never ventured. In doing so, they have discovered underwater bridges across the Ben Hai, seized the heaviest enemy artillery shells ever found in South Vietnam and uncovered ton after ton of North Vietnamese supplies. . . .

The tactics being used have been developed during the Vietnam war, especially for this rugged terrain.

First, a hilltop is selected in an area where the enemy is believed to be operating. The peak is cleared by jets, often dropping bombs as heavy as a ton each. After further reconnaissance, crews with chains saws, a small bulldozer and a backhoe are lifted by helicopter onto the peak to prepare a base.

Often, the hilltop is to become a fire-support base, and 105-mm. howitzers are lowered from helicopters onto the summit. When the base is operational--usually a matter of hours after the first crew lands--infantry troops begin moving down the fingerlike ridges and into the steamy jungles, searching for the enemy or his supply lines.

The maneuver elements always stay within the "fan" of the artillery support and,

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in many instances, the ground commanders are able to call in fire from two or three separate bases. . . .

The fire-support bases and landing zones, being relatively small, are far more difficult targets for enemy artillery than Khe Sanh was. Their location on high ground allows them to be defended with a minimum number of men tied down. And when the cost of keeping a base outweigh its value, it can be readily abandoned.

The bases themselves will continue to be of value, even after an operation ends and they are abandoned. Each cleared hilltop is a potential fire-support base or landing zone, ready to be used on short notice by mobile forces. 41

(U) The improvement of RVNAF in the latter half of 1968 was also recognized:

Whatever the background explanation, the most prominent feature of the war in Vietnam today is that General Abrams has repeated what General Matthew B. Ridgway did in the Korean War. . . .

Within a month after General Ridgway took over the command, the retreat had been halted, the morale of the troops at the front restored, and the groundwork laid for the military stability which has survived today.

In Vietnam the Tet offensive caused almost as much havoc among the allied forces as had the retreat from the Yalu in Korea. But General Abrams already was busy rebuilding the South Vietnam Army. Since he took over the top command, the strategy and tactics of the war have been completely overhauled and changed. And the results are impressive. The enemy is being kept off balance. None of his attacks have gone anywhere. There has been no general offensive.

This change has been achieved without the extra 200,000 men requested in the time of dismay which followed the Tet offensive. And the American casualty figures have continued to be at a lower level deemed to be politically tolerable. 42

(U) The effect of the war on North Vietnam and the North Vietnamese became a matter of interest, in comparison to previously almost complete attention to the problems of South Vietnam and the South Vietnamese.

Saigon - In North Vietnam's Ninhbinh Province south of Hanoi, a Roman Catholic youth is drafted.

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To the northwest, in the harbor city of Haiphong, a massive tree limb lies across a street, blocking traffic. It has been there since a typhoon whipped through a month ago.

In the market place at Dinhlap, a small town near the Chinese border, a peasant woman pays five dong--about 75 cents for a kilo of rice.

Meaningless vignettes?

Perhaps.

But to some experts on North Vietnam there is great significance in each of them. They seem to provide insight on what life is like today in North Vietnam, how bad the country is hurting from the war, how willing it might be to seek peace.

Until recently, Catholics were considered a security risk by North Vietnamese recruiting officials because of the potency of Roman Catholicism in South Vietnam. The fact that they are now being drafted may mean that the North Vietnamese armed forces are caught in a manpower squeeze.

If this analysis is correct, it is also possible that the tree limb continues to block traffic in Haiphong because there is nobody to remove it. As for the price of rice in Dinhlap, that, too, may be related to the typhoon and, more specifically, to the supply of manpower.

The storm heavily damaged crops that already were hurting from insufficient cultivation. In a country that is chronically short of staples like rice, such damage and neglect is quickly reflected in market prices. . . .

Besides drafting Roman Catholics, the Hanoi Government also has ceased issuing discharges. The traditional two-year tour in uniform no longer exists. Now, the tour is "for the duration." . . .

By latest estimate, about 45 percent of the enemy troops in the South are now North Vietnamese. Obviously, North Vietnam, cannot send men South forever at the rate allied officials claim they are being killed. In fact, the strain already is having an effect on the fighting in the South.

Intelligence reports indicate that the quality of men coming South has deteriorated. Many are inadequately trained. Some have never fired a rifle.

The desertion rate in enemy units also appears to be rising. A North Vietnamese prisoner recently told an Allied interrogator that word was spreading rapidly that "South Vietnam is not good duty." 43

(U) The following was indicative of editorial comment on the reasons for Hanoi's easing of terms for negotiations which had led to the complete bombing halt:

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Out of all the confusion in the air over truce talks, this emerges: It is Hanoi, not the U. S. that needs a breather.

This on-the-spot analysis is by Sol W. Sanders of the staff of "US News & World Report," who recently returned to Vietnam after a year in the US. He views the current situation against a background of more than 20 years in that part of the world.

There are signs that the US at last may be within reach of its original goal: to halt the attempt of the Hanoi regime to take over South Vietnam.

The end is not yet here. But there is growing evidence that the struggle is entering its last and conclusive stage.

At this point it is Hanoi--not Washington--that seeks a truce.

How it Seems. To this reporter, returning to the war zone after a year in the US, these are the most important ingredients of the current situation:

1. The US has won a clear-cut military victory against the North Vietnamese forces sent into South Vietnam in increasing numbers since early 1964.
2. Victory is largely the result of the slow and highly inefficient, but mammoth, putting into place of an American military establishment which in resources and sheer mass, if not in skills, staggers the imagination.
3. The South Vietnamese Government, for the first time since the US Government and internal enemies pulled the rug from Ngo Dinh Diem in November, 1963, has begun to represent a broad consensus of Vietnamese and may now exploit the overwhelming non-Communist sympathies of the people.
4. Hanoi is in the throes of an excruciatingly difficult decision--how to escape from a quandary which denies it victory after enormous sacrifices and an all-out commitment of the North Vietnamese regime to take over the South.
5. Washington could still lose the struggle here by abandoning the fight while the outcome is not yet conclusive.

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. . . . Typical of the new confidence is the attitude of an old acquaintance, a South Vietnamese officer commanding a regiment at the Demilitarized Zone. A Northerner, a refugee who fled to the South in 1954, the colonel has been fighting steadily for more than a decade. I have seen him in various posts, often despairing of a successful conclusion to the war. I have never seen him with more confidence than now in his own and his troops abilities.

The colonel, his American advisers, and US troops working in conjunction with his regiment are anxious to take on the regular North Vietnamese unit that infiltrates the Demilitarized Zone into their zone of operations. They wage a constant and aggressive campaign to tangle with the enemy-- and in the past six months they have badly mauled the North Vietnamese in a succession of battles. . . .

Today these regular North Vietnamese forces are decimated, or worse. . . .

The Communists' big offensive last August was nipped in the bud. Hanoi simply could not mass its troops and begin its third major attack. . . .

But perhaps the most significant factor is that Hanoi has lost large numbers of South Vietnamese Viet Cong military and political cadres.

Other things being equal, a South Vietnamese Communist unit is far more effective in the war here than the North Vietnamese infiltrators. . . .

Finally, after a decade, at least some Americans--civilian and military--are being given proper indoctrination before they are sent over to work with the South Vietnamese.

The US military has moved into a much more intimate pattern of relationships with the South Vietnamese Army. More and more Americans are coming back for second and third tours, familiar with the past mistakes and determined to avoid them in the future.

Added up, all these factors mean that the weight of the powerful US establishment here is increasingly serving in on the vast problems which led to so many earlier failures. . . .<sup>44</sup>

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
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**ANNEX D  
LIST OF GROUND OPERATIONS  
BY  
CORPS TACTICAL ZONE**

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FIGURE D-1

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**GROUND OPERATIONS IN ICTZ**

CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				%	P/A	PERSONNEL	WPKS
Allen Brook	27MarRgt	Quang Nam	4May/24Aug	172	1134	1017	154
Brilliant Dragon	2RCKMC Bde	Quang Nam	2/22Apr	16	58	234	10
Brilliant Dragon II	2RCKMC Bde	Quang Nam	1Apr-18May	16	84	133	23
Berlington Trail	Americal Div	Quang Tin	8Apr/11Nov	129	985	1931	545
Caracian II	161AbaDiv	Quang Tri	1Apr/17May	156	806	2100	581
Champaign Grove	11InfBde	Quang Ngai	4/28Sep	43	172	378	73
Concordia Square	1CavDiv	Quang Tri	8/17May	28	117	349	151
Dawson River	9MarRgt	Quang Tri	28Nov-			continues	
Delaware	1CavDiv	Thua Thien	18Apr/17May	142	846	739	2562
Dragon Palace	2RCKMC Bde	Quang Nam	1/28Jun	14	54	128	23
Dragon Palace II	2RCKMC Bde	Quang Nam	3/18Jul	5	19	103	42

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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				FIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNs
Golden Valley	194LA/4Bde	Quang Tin	16/12May	9	85	342	--
Henderson Hill	5MarRgt	Quang Nam	23Oct/4Dec	35	272	700	46
Stouton	1MarDiv	Quang Nam/ Thanh Thien	26Feb/12Sep	121	848	702	258
Hong Quang 1/43	51ARVN Rgt	Quang Nam	26May/12Jun	4	26	311	28
Hong Quang 1/51	51ARVN Rgt	Quang Nam	9/12Jul	16	74	161	18
Hong Quang 1/60	51ARVN Rgt	Quang Nam	21/23Aug	21	111	109	38
Hong Quang 1/62	51ARVN Rgt	Quang Nam	23/26Aug	10	45	262	52
Hong Quang 1/65	1ARVN RgtGp	Quang Nam	28Aug/18Sep	26	131	218	43
Hong Quang 1/70	51ARVN Rgt	Quang Nam	12/17Sep	73	180	361	80
Hong Quang 1/74	51ARVN Rgt	Quang Nam	6/19Oct	15	91	151	20

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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	V/A	PERSONNEL	W/PMS
Hung Quang 1/81B	1ARVN Rgt	Quang Nam	8/10Dec	-	6	130	41
Hung Quang 12/4	1ARVN Rgt	Quang Nam	16/20Nov	6	46	171	31
Job Stuart	1CavDiv	Thua Thien	21Jan/31Mar	274	556	3268	732
Job Stuart III	1CavDiv	Quang Tri	17May/3Nov	232	1568	2114	1361
Kestucky	9MarBgt	Quang Tri	1Nov67-			continues-	
Lamson 181	2ARVNBgt	Quang Tri	26/22Jan	25	75	199	26
Lamson 193I	2ARVNBgt	Quang Tri	10/13Mar	42	148	305	73
Lamson 193 II	1ARVNBgt	Quang Tri	16/13Mar	3	37	102	25
Lamson 203	2ARVNBgt	Quang Tri	28Mar/2Apr	19	83	108	71
Lamson 206	2ARVNBgt	Quang Tri	4/7Apr	9	67	103	1
Lamson 207	3, 6, 8Aba Bn	Quang Tri	6/17Apr	48	206	215	93
Lamson 210	1ARVN RgrCp	Thua Thien	6/8Apr	6	27	136	21
Lamson 212	3ARVNBgt	Thua Thien	18Apr/12May	132	26	130	66

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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	VIA	PERSONNEL	WFPS
Lamson 216	3ARVNR gt	Thun Thien	18Apr/12May	26	132	130	66
Lamson 218	2ARVNR gt	Quang Tri	29Apr/2May	27	99	288	49
Lamson 218 II	2ARVNR gt	Quang Tri	3/8May	20	123	281	38
Lamson 220	1ARVNR gt	Quang Tri	4/6May	12	52	166	54
Lamson 222	1ARVNR gt	Quang Tri	12/14May	8	63	223	50
Lamson 224 TT	1ARVNDiv	Thun Thien	23May/17Jun	16	110	223	103
Lamson 224 QT	1ARVNR gt	Quang Tri	14May/17Jun	34	103	243	105
Lamson 225	3, 6, 8, Aha Bn	Thun Thien	15Jun/12Sep	76	263	260	214
Lamson 227	2ARVNR gt	Quang Tri	23/29May	12	23	236	68
Lamson 228	2ARVNR gt	Quang Tri	7/12Jun	25	65	219	49
Lamson 235	1ARVNR gt	Quang Tri	25/27Jun	26	72	148	46
Lamson 245	5ARVN Rgt	Thun Thien	1Aug-			continues	

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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRENCH V CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	VIA	PERSONNEL	AFMS
Lamson 250	1ARVNDiv	Quang Tri	7/27Aug	35	170	429	98
Lamson 260	54ARVN Rgt	Thuan Thien	10/2009ep	1	11	76	87
Lamson 261	1ARVNDiv	Quang Tri	118ep-			continues-	
Lamson 266	1ARVNDiv	Quang Tri	21/2309ep	3	38	103	23
Lamson 271	2ARVNRgt	Quang Tri	15/17Oct	7	48	101	33
Lancaster II	3MarDiv	Quang Tri	21Jan/23Nov	359	2101	1001	652
Manshake Thrust	1MarDiv	Quang Nam	18May/23Oct	270	1746	2728	452
Maul Peak	1MarDiv	Quang Nam	6/19Oct	28	148	202	27
Meads River	1MarDiv	Quang Nam	2009ep/9Dec	107	523	1019	179
Muscantine	11LInfBde	Quang Ngai	19Dec67/10/Jan	86	500	1119	393
Marshall Mountain	5MarDiv (Mech)	Quang Tri	9Dec-			continues-	
Napoleon/ Saline	3MarDiv	Quang Tri	11Nov67/9Dec	395	2134	3495	831


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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPNs
Sevada Eagle	101AbnDiv	Thun Thien	18May-				
Pygmy	1CavDiv	Quang Tri	1/15Apr	92	667	1044	643
Dayet Thang 324	2ABVNDiv	Quang Ngai	30Jul/26Aug	65	200	239	43
Scotland	3MarDiv	Quang Tri	11Nov67/31Mar	204	1622	1561	180
Scotland II	11MarDiv 3MarDiv	Quang Tri	15Apr-			continues-	
Taylor Common	11MarDiv	Quang Nam	7Dec-			continues-	
Vernon Lake II	Americal Div	Quang Ngai	2Nov-			continues-	
Wheeler/Wallowa	Americal Div	Quang Nam	11Nov67/11Nov	683	3599	10020	1724
Worth	7MarBgt	Quang Nam	1..7AMar	27	89	167	20

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FIGURE D-2

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**GROUND OPERATIONS**

CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	VIA	PERSONNEL	WPNs
An Duong 5	22ABVNRgt	Binh Dinh	13/18Jan	9	7	104	21
Bach Ma 6	9ROKRgt	Khanh Hoa	5May/7Jan	6	7	205	135
Bach Ma 9	9ROKRgt	Khanh Hoa	11Oct/4Nov	15	28	382	124
Bach Jee 17	9ROKRgt	Khanh Hoa	6/10Jul	2	2	129	35
Binh Tay 7	42ABVNRgt	Kontum	18/21Aug	18	76	101	11
Binh Tay 3/5	42ABVNRgt	Phu Yen	18Sep/25Oct	10	32	337	116
Binh Tay 24/GD III	42ABVNRgt	Kontum	10/27Jul	2	80	133	13
Binh Tay 42/9	40ABVNRgt	Pleiku	24/25 <sup>+</sup>	10	33	171	5
Bolling	1CavDiv/ 173AbaBde	Phu Yen	19Sep67/16Jul (suspended)	60	248	667	234
Byrd	101AbaDiv	Binh Thuan	25Aug66/28Jan	34	335	849	308
Cochise Green/Dun Siach	173AbaBde	Binh Dinh	30Mar/29Sep (suspended)	39	75	164	20

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CORE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	VIA	PERSONNEL	WPNS
Dan Binh 41/65	41ARVNRegt	Binh Dinh	21/29 Sep	38	75	142	20
Dok Kae See 7	9BOKRegt	Phu Yen	16Apr/6May	4	6	110	48
Klamath Falls	101AbnDiv	Binh Thuan	1Dec67/8Jan	28	138	156	77
MacArthur/ Bien Tay	4InfDiv/173 Abn Bde	Phuho/ Konbuon	12Oct67-	-	-	-	-
Maeng Ho 9	CapROKDiv	Binh Dinh	17Dec67/30Jan	64	96	749	349
Maeng Ho 10	CapROKDiv	Binh Dinh	16Feb/1Apr	23	42	664	248
Maeng Ho 11	CapROKDiv	Binh Dinh	20/27 Apr	1	4	201	110
Maeng Ho 12	CapROKDiv	Binh Dinh	11Jan/19Jul	29	54	355	179
McClain/ Dan Thang	1 CavDiv	Binh Thuan	20Jan-	-	-	-	-
Patrick	4InfDiv	Binh Dinh/ Quang Ngai	9Feb/30Mar	18	92	235	54
Pershing	1CavDiv	Binh Dinh	11Feb67/19Jan	600	2921	5401	1468
Pershing II	1CavDiv	Binh Dinh	20Jan/29Feb	21	164	614	158
Tien Bo	23ARVN Div	Quang Duc	24Aug/9Sep	106	251	1091	251

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
CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CAPITALS		ENEMY LOSSES	
				SEA	VIA	PERSONNEL	WPKS
Tien Bo 24	23ARVNDAV	Quang Duc	5/64-				
Walker	173AbnBde	Binh Dinh	16Jan-				
Who Rang 6	26ROKRGt	Phi Yen	6/1964*	15	28	382	124

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TIME FRAME OF GROUND OPERATIONS IN III CTZ



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FIGURE D-3

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**SCHEDULE OF PHASES IN III CTZ**

CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				SEA	VIA	PERSONNEL	WT/TS
Box Springs	101AbnDiv	Binh Duong/ Phuoc Long	16/28Mar	24	90	106	12
Manchester	199LAbnCo	Bien Hoa	18Dec67/17Feb	37	210	456	85
Coyot Thang	1stDiv/25 1stDiv/8 ARVN ARVN ARVN AbnDiv	Gia Dinh/Long An/Hoa Nghia/ Binh Duong/ Bien Hoa	11Mar/7Apr	305	920	1429	573
Saratoga	25thDiv	Hoa Nghia	8Dec67/10Mar	302	1075	3062	601
Toan Thang Phase I	III Corps/ II FFV	All III CTZ	8Apr/31May	507	3719	7645	2104
Toan Thang Phase II	US/ARVN/ FWMAF	All III CTZ	31May-	-	-	continues-	-
Toan Thang C/14	PF Cos	Binh Duong	15/16May	1	-	120	2
Enterprise	9thDiv	Long An	13Feb67/10Mar	253	1548	2107	480
Toan Thang 500/B/23	8 PF Cos	Tay Ninh	24Sep/31Oct	11	41	150	36
Tran Hung Dao	VNMC & Rgr Bns	Gia Dinh	4/17Feb	149	389	953	627
Toan Thang 199/723	25ARVNDiv	Tay Ninh	4/10Sep	28	49	114	25


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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/ TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				MIA	WIA	PERSONNEL	WPM
Uniontown	1991A/B/C/D	Bien Hoa	18Dec67/30Mar	13	191	922	197
Wilderness	251A/DIV	Tay Ninh	11Mar/7Apr	21	154	256	5
Yellowstone	251A/DIV	Tay Ninh	8Dec67/24Feb	135	1694	1254	214

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FIGURE D-4

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**GROUND OPERATIONS IN IV GTZ**

CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				MA	MIA	PERMANENT	WINS
BE 44/7	43RgrBn	Chau Doc	11/18Jul	10	50	128	4
Coronado IX	91stDiv/TF 117/VNMC	Dinh Tuong	2Nov67/18Jan	35	293	434	86
Coronado XI	91stDiv/TF 117/VNMC	Phong Dinh	13Feb/4Mar	39	196	264	45
Can Long 73/ND/67	7ARVN Div	Dinh Tuong	27Dec67/3Jan	38	123	164	121
Hop Tac I	91stDiv	Dinh Tuong	8Feb/30Apr	51	401	343	54
Kodan	91stDiv	Dinh Tuong/ Phong Dinh	15May/20Nov	14	311	116	22
La Doan 2/9	5VNMC Bn	Chuong Thien	29Feb/18Aug	--	4	252	94
Mo Duong/ PD	9ARVN Div	Phong Dinh	7/8May	6	61	100	1
Peoples Road	91stDiv	Dinh Tuong	17Mar/30Jul	28	205	239	89
Quyet Chien (IIB)	91stDiv	IV GTZ	3Aug/1Dec	94	721	1571	390
Quyet Chien (ARVN)	All ARVN Units	IV GTZ	3Aug-				continues

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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED; TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		ENEMY LOSSES	
				KIA	MIA	FREEDOM	WCH
Quyet Chien 44/37	41RgrBa	Kien Phung	4/Nov	9	30	107	6
Quyet Chien 44/42	43.44Rgr Ba	Chau Doc	16/29Nov	14	24	123	5
Quyet Chien EX 44/17	41ARVNRgt	Kien Phung	1/8Sep	8	25	143	30
Quyet Chien 9/38	9ARVNDiv	Vinh Binh	13/19Dec	6	118	162	10
Speedy Express	9InfDiv	Dinh Tuong	1Dec			continues	
Truong Cong Dinh/BD/21	21ARVNDiv	Ba Xuyen	25/28Mar	21	120	155	37
Truong Cong Dinh/7/11	7ARVNDiv	Go Cong	21/23Apr	10	48	132	41
Truong Cong Dinh/7/14	11ARVNRgt	Dinh Tuong/ Go Cong	1/4May	20	42	194	71
Truong Cong Dinh/7/16	7ARVNDiv	Dinh Tuong	8/10May	6	18	101	20

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CODE NAME	MAJOR UNIT	PROVINCE	COMMENCED/TERMINATED	FRIENDLY CAPSULES		EMERIT LONES	
				SEA	WIA	PEN/REMOVED	W/MS
Truong Cong Dinh/21/23	21ARVNDV	Phong Dinh	25/27May	7	61	151	24
Truong Cong Dinh/21/24	21ARVNDV	Phong Dinh	27/29May	8	19	107	30
Truong Cong Dinh/CD/31	41RgrBa	Chan Doc	4/8May	26	27	157	36
Truong Cong Dinh/GT/21/PD/41	21ARVNDV	Phong Dinh	9/10Jun	41	104	107	11
Trey Kich XI	21ARVNDV	An Xuyen	4/6Mar	11	47	265	52

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## ANNEX E -- COMMANDERS AND PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICERS\*

### Hq, MACV

<b>COMUSMACV</b>			
William C. Westmoreland	GEN	USA	
Creighton W. Abrams	GEN	USA	Jul 68
<b>DEPCOMUSMACV</b>			
Creighton W. Abrams	GEN	USA	
Andrew J. Goodpaster	GEN	USA	Jul 68
<b>DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Ops/CDR, 7th Air Force</b>			
William M. Memyer	GEN	USAF	
Robert E. Worley (Acting)**	MG	USAF	Jul 68
Royal N. Baker (Acting)	MG	USAF	Jul 68
George S. Brown	GEN	USAF	Aug 68
<b>DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS</b>			
Robert W. Komer	AMB	Civ	
William E. Colby	AMB	C	Nov 68
<b>Chief of Staff</b>			
Walter T. Kerwin, Jr.	MG	USA	
Charles A. Corcoran	MG	USA	Jul 68
<b>Deputy Chief of Staff</b>			
William E. Bryan, Jr.	BG	USAF	
<b>Asst Deputy to DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS</b>			
George I. Forsythe	MG	USA	
Roderick Wetherill	MG	USA	Aug 68
<b>ACoGS Personnel, J-1</b>			
Franklin M. Davis, Jr.	BG	USA	
Robert C. Forbes	BG(MG)	USA	May 68
Frank B. Clay	BG	USA	Aug 68

\*First named incumbent occupied the position on 1 January 1968 or upon arrival of his unit in-country, or upon creation of the position. Date of successor is indicated. Promotions during tenure are shown in parentheses.

\*\*KIA on 23 July while piloting an RF-4C Phantom 65 miles NW of Da Nang.

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<b>ACoSS Intelligence, J-2</b>			
Phillip B. Davidson, Jr.	BC(MG)	USA	
<b>ACoSS Operations, J-3</b>			
Willard Pearson	MG	USA	
Albert E. Brownfield, Jr.	BC	USA	Feb 68
Willard Pearson	MG	USA	Apr 68
Charles A. Corcoran	MG	USA	May 68
William S. Coleman (Acting)	BC	USA	Jul 68
Elias C. Townsend	MG	USA	Aug 68
<b>ACoSS Logistics, J-4</b>			
Henry A. Rasmussen	BC(MG)	USA	
<b>ACoSS Plan, J-5</b>			
Don C. Darrow	MG	USAF	
Royal N. Baker	MG	USAF	Mar 68
Richard F. Shaefer	MG	USAF	Jul 68
<b>ACoSS Communications-Electronics, J-6</b>			
Sam L. Huey	BC	USAF	
John E. Frisen	BC	USAF	Jan 68
<b>ACoSS for Civil Operations &amp; RD Support (MACCORDS)</b>			
Wade Lathram	FSC-1	Civ	
William E. Colby	FBR-1	Civ	Mar 68
Glen C. Long (Acting)	BC	USA	Dec 68
<b>ACoSS for Military Assistance (MACMA)</b>			
Donnelly P. Bolton	BC	USA	
James V. Galloway	BC	USA	Dec 68
<b>Deputy ACoSS CORDS</b>			
W. A. Knowlton	BC	USA	
E. F. Cole	BC	USA	Jan 68
Glen C. Long	BC	USA	Dec 68
<b>Secretary Joint Staff</b>			
James V. Galloway	COL	USA	
Jack T. Pink	COL	USA	Feb 68
Patrick W. Powers	COL	USA	Dec 68
<b>Chief of Information</b>			
Winant Sidle	BC	USA	
<b>Inspector General</b>			
R. M. Cook	COL	USA	

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<b>Adjutant General</b>			
Neil N. Snyder, Jr.	COL	USA	
Sidney Critz	COL	USA	Apr 68
<b>Staff Judge Advocate</b>			
R. H. Ivey	COL	USA	
<b>Chaplain</b>			
Joseph S. Chmielewski	CHAP(COL)	USA	
Gerhardt W. Hyatt	CHAP(COL)	USA	Oct 68
<b>Science Advisor</b>			
Dr. William McMillan		Civ	
<b>Command Surgeon</b>			
R. M. Hall	COL	USA	
Mal B. Jennings, Jr.	COL(BG)	USA	Jul 68
<b>Comptroller</b>			
J. L. Clancey	COL	USA	
A. H. Watkins	COL	USAF	May 68
M. E. Richmond	COL	USA	Jun 68
<b>Chief, Studies &amp; Observations Group</b>			
John K. Singlaub	COL	USA	
S. E. Cavanaugh	COL	USA	Jul 68
<b>Director, Construction Directorate</b>			
Andrew P. Rollins	BG(MG)	USA	
William T. Bradley	MG	USA	Oct 68
<b>Director, Training Directorate</b>			
Edward M. Flanagan, Jr.	BG	USA	
Frank E. Burdell, Jr. (Acting)	COL	USA	Feb 68
Robert E. Connor	BG	USA	Apr 68
H. S. Cunningham	COL	USA	Dec 68
<b>Chief, Free World Military Assistance Office</b>			
J. E. Dunn	COL	USA	
W. E. Revis	COL	USA	May 68

## MACV Advisory Units

<b>Chief, USAF Advisory Group</b>			
Donavon F. Smith	BG	USAF	
Charles W. Carson	BG	USAF	Apr 68

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<b>Chief, Naval Advisory Group/COMNAVFORV</b>			
Kenneth L. Voth	RADM	USN	
Elmo R. Zumwalt	RADM(VADM)	USN	Sep 68
<b>Senior Advisor I Corps/CG III MAF</b>			
Robert Cushman	LTG	USMC	
<b>Senior Advisor II Corps/CG I FFORCEV</b>			
William B. Rosson	LTG	USA	
William R. Peers	MG(LTG)	USA	Mar 68
<b>Senior Advisor III Corps/CG II FFORCEV</b>			
Frederick C. Weyand	LTG	USA	
Walter T. Kerwin, Jr.	MG(LTG)	USA	Aug 68
<b>Senior Advisor IV Corps</b>			
William R. Desobry	BC	USA	
George S. Eckhardt	MG	USA	Jan 68
<b>Senior Advisor CMD/CG, CMAC (Provisional)*</b>			
John H. Hay, Jr.	MG	USA	
Fillmore K. Mearns	MG	USA	Aug 68

## Component Service Commanders

### Air Force

<b>Vice Commander</b>			
Robert F. Worley	MG	USAF	
Royal N. Baker	MG	USAF	Jul 68
<b>Commander, 834th Air Division</b>			
Burl W. McLaughlin	BC(MG)	USAF	

### Army

<b>DEPCG, USARV</b>			
Bruce Palmer, Jr.	LTG	USA	
Frank T. Mildren	LTG	USA	Jun 68
<b>CG, Provisional Corps, Vietnam**</b>			
William B. Rosson	LTG	USA	
Richard G. Stilwell	MG(LTG)	USA	Aug 68

\*Established 4 June 1968.

\*\*Established 10 March 1968; redesignated XXIV Corps on 15 August 1968.

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CG, 1st Logistical Command			
Thomas H. Scott, Jr.	MG	USA	
Joseph M. Heiser, Jr.	MG	USA	Aug 68
CG, USA Engr Command (Provisional)			
Charles M. Duke	MG	USA	
William T. Bradley	BG	USA	May 68
David S. Parker	MG	USA	Jul 68
CG, USA Hq Area Command (HAC)			
Albin F. Irsayk	BG	USA	
George I. Taylor	COL	USA	Aug 68
CG, 1st Cav Div (AM)			
John J. Tolson, III	MG	USA	
George I. Forsythe	MG	USA	Aug 68
CG, 1st Inf Div			
John H. Hay, Jr.	MG	USA	
Keith L. Ware*	MG	USA	Mar 68
Orwin C. Talbott	MG	USA	Sep 68
CG, 4th Inf Div			
William R. Peers	MG	USA	
Charles P. Stone	MG	USA	Jan 68
Donn R. Pepke	MG	USA	Dec 68
CG, 9th Inf Div			
George G. O'Connor	MG	USA	
Julian J. Ewell	MG	USA	Feb 68
CG, 23d Inf Div (Americal)			
Samuel W. Koster	MG	USA	
Charles M. Gettys	MG	USA	Jun 68
CG, 25th Inf Div			
Filmore K. Mearns	MG	USA	
Ellis W. Williamson	MG	USA	Aug 68
CG, 101st Abn Div (AM)			
Olinto M. Barsanti	MG	USA	
Melvin Zais	MG	USA	Jul 68
CG, 1st Avn Bde			
Robert R. Williams	MG	USA	

\*KIA on 13 September in a helicopter crash near Loc Ninh, Binh Long Province.

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CG, 1st Signal Bde W. M. Van Harlingen, Jr.	BC	USA	
CG, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) Richard J. Glikos James M. Gibson	COL COL	USA USA	Oct 68
CG, 173d Abn Bde Leo H. Schweiter Richard J. Allen John W. Barnes	BC BC BC	USA USA USA	Apr 68 Dec 68
CG, 199th Inf Bde (Lt) (Sep) Robert C. Forbes Franklin M. Davis, Jr. Frederick E. Davison	BC BC COL(BC)	USA USA USA	May 68 Aug 68
CG, 1d Bde, 82d Abn Div Alexander E. Bolding, Jr. George W. Dickerson	COL(BC) BC	USA USA	Dec 68
CG, 11th Armd Cav Regt Jack MacFarlane Charles R. Gorder George S. Patton	COL COL COL	USA USA USA	Mar 68 Jul 68
CG, 5th Special Forces Group Jonathan F. Ladd H. R. Aaron	COL COL	USA USA	Jun 68
<b><u>NAVY</u></b>			
DEFCOMNAVFORV William H. House	RADM	USN	
DEP DIR, PACNAVFACSEA/OICC Spencer C. Smith Henry J. Johnson	RADM RADM	USN USN	Jul 68
COMNAVSUPPACT/NAVFORVREP, Da Nang Paul L. Lacy, Jr. James B. Osborn Emmet P. Bonner	RADM RADM RADM	USN USN USN	Feb 68 Dec 68
CDR, 3d NCB James R. Bartlett	RADM	USN	

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## Marines

Deputy CG, III MAF			
Raymond L. Murray	MG	USMC	
William J. Van Ryzin	MG	USMC	Feb 68
Rathvon M. Tompkins	MG	USMC	May 68
Carl A. Youngdale	MG	USMC	Jun 68
CG, 1st Mar Div			
Donn J. Robertson	MG	USMC	
Carl A. Youngdale	MG	USMC	Jun 68
Ormand R. Simpson	MG	USMC	Dec 68
CG, 3d Mar Div			
Rathvon M. Tompkins	MG	USMC	
Raymond G. Davis	MG	USMC	May 68
CG, 1st MAW			
Norman J. Anderson	MG	USMC	
Charles J. Cullter	MG	USMC	Jun 68
CG, Force Log Cmd			
Harry C. Olson	BG	USMC	
James A. Feeley, Jr.	BG	USMC	Oct 68

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## COMUSMACV 1968 COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

### JANUARY

- 1 -- US mil strength in RVN is 480,536 (314,470 USA, 31,669 USN, 78,013 USMC, 55,908 USAF, 476 USCG).
  - FVMAF strength in RVN is 48,739 ROK, 6,812 Australian, 516 New Zealand, 2,020 Republic of the Philippines, 2,205 Thailand.
  - Est VC regt atks 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div base camp in Tay Ninh Prov (En: 382 KIA, 8 Det, 87 I/W, 29 C/S; Frd: 23 KIA, 153 WIA).
  - GEN Harold K. Johnson, CoS, USA, ends 12-day visit to RVN.
- 2 -- 36-hour New Year's stand-down ends at 0600. 63 major (casualties incurred) and 107 minor en violations recorded.
  - Est en bn (believed to be 406th Sapper Bn) atks Nghia Hanh Subsector Hq, 8 km SSW of Quang Ngai City (En: 65 KIA, 2 Det, 18 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 18 ARVN KIA, 40 WIA, 12 civs wounded, 6 I/W).
- 3 -- En atks Da Nang AB in Quang Nam Prov with 30 rds 122mm rkt fire. 3 acft dest, 17 dam.
  - Est 2 bas, sptd by rkte and mtrs, atk Hau Rue District Hq, 28 km SW of Tan My in Quang Tin Prov (En: 56 KIA, 17 Det, 11 I/W, 5 C/S; Frd: 26 ARVN KIA, 46 WIA, 16 MIA, 1 civ killed, 3 civs wounded).
- 4 -- En atks Ban Me Thuot Afd in Darlac Prov with 82mm mtr and B-40 rkt fire. 2 helos dest, 11 helos and 10 acft dam.
- 5 -- En atks Mang Thit RD Hq, Vinh Long Prov with 82mm mtr fire (1 RD KIA, 15 RD WIA, 18 civs wounded).
- 7 -- GEN Leonard F. Chapman, CMC, arrives in RVN for 6-day visit.
  - Est en co atks Phu Loc Dist Hq, Thua Thien Prov (En: 91 KIA, 13 I/W and 3 C/S; Frd: 16 US, 10 ARVN and 7 PF KIA, 1 civ killed; 68 US, 9 ARVN and 2 PF WIA, and 1 civ wounded).
- 8 -- 269th and 506th VC LF Bns, Duc Hoa Sapper Unit C-234, and Special Action Unit A-357 atk Hq 49th ARVN Regt and Chieu Hoi Center in Khiem Cuong, Hau Nghia Prov (En: 26 KIA, 6 Det, 14 I/W, and 4 C/S; Frd: 19 ARVN, 6 RF, 7 NP and 1 CIDG KIA, 3 Hoi Chanh and 4 civs killed; 5 US, 36 ARVN, 14 RF, 12 NP and 6 CIDG WIA, and 13 Hoi Chanh and 25 civs wounded).

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- Est en co atks RD Team 128 and RF Platoon 47 in Quang Ngai Prov (4 RD and 1 civ killed, 2 I/W and 1 C/S).
- 10 -- AMB Chester Bowles arrives in Phnom Penh for talks with Prince Sihanouk on border problems and VC/NVA sanctuaries in Cambodia.
- Est en ba, sptd by mtr and RPG fire, atks 1/27th Inf base camp in Hau Nghia Prov (En: 75 KIA, 1 Det, 10 I/W, 11 C/S; Frd: 5 KIA and 29 WIA).
- En atks RF co and RD team in Kien Son, Kien Giang Prov (En: 4 KIA, 5 I/W; Frd: 20 RF and 2 RD KIA, 11 RF WIA, 4 I/W).
- En atks Kontum Afd, manned by 57th Avn Co (En: 16 KIA; Frd: 7 US and 6 ARVN KIA, 20 US and 1 ARVN WIA, 4 helos dest and 11 dam).
- 13 -- GEN Dwight E. Beach, CINCUSARPAC, arrives in RVN for 3-day visit.
- 14 -- MG George S. Eckhardt, USA, is appointed SA, IV CTZ, relieving BG William R. Desobry, USA.
- 786th US warplane lost over NVN as MIG-21 downs USAF F-105 (38th US air-to-air loss of the war).
- 2/40 and 3/40 ARVN Inf engage en ba 15 km NNE of Bong Son, Binh Dinh Prov (En: 59 KIA, 12 I/W; Frd: 9 ARVN KIA, 15 ARVN and 2 US WIA).
- 15 -- US Dist Judge George L. Hart (Washington, D. C.) rules that wartime provisions of UCMJ apply to US civs in NVN (J. H. Latney vs. US).
- President Thieu delivers major address stating that the GVN must play a central role in any peace negotiations. (Statement caused by speculation regarding US unilateral peace initiatives and talk of a coalition government including NLF).
- 18 -- US forces participating in Opn KENTUCKY engage est reinf en co 3 km NE of Con Thien, Quang Tri Prov (En: 162 KIA; Frd: 8 KIA, 39 WIA).
- 19 -- RKG claims US and SVN forces entered Cambodian territory on 18 January, attacking a Cambodian frontier post at Peam Montea. USMACV admits combined patrol did inadvertently enter Cambodia.
- 20 -- President Johnson announces Clark Clifford will replace Robert S. McNamara as SECDEF.
- PF platoon engages 150-200 en 12 km ESE of Gio Linh, Quang Tri Prov. 2/7 APC and USMC AMTRAC force and one bn plus the 2d ARVN Regt reinf (En: 50 KIA, 80 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 3 ARVN and 2 US KIA, 11 ARVN and 17 US WIA).
- 21 -- Polish model of Soviet AK-47 assault rifle equipped with grenade launcher adaptor is captured. First reported use of Polish model of this weapon and first reported use of this weapon for firing rifle grenades.

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- 22 -- Go C/1/9 Cav engages unk size en force 10 km SE of Quang Tin City, killing 52 en while suffering only one US WIA.
- 23 -- VC release two US PWs (USMC Cpl and a USA Pvt) near Tam Ky, Quang Tin Prov.
- 5th Bn, 2d Bde, ROKMC relocates from Quang Ngai Prov to Hoi An, Quang Nam Prov.
- 24 -- Est 2 VC cos atk Go Bai hamlet, 7 km W of Phan Thiet, Binh Thuan Prov (20 RF, 2 RD, and 1 civ killed; 18 RF and 14 RD WIA; 2 RF MIA; and 7 I/W).
- Elms of 1/50 Inf (M), participating in Opn PEPHUNG, contact 3 en cos 5 km E of Phu My, Binh Dinh Prov (En: 128 KIA, 1 Det, 17 I/W, 11 C/S; Frd: 4 KIA and 19 WIA).
- 6 cos of Capitol ROK Inf Div, participating in Opn MAENG HO 9, contact est 2 NVA cos 10 km SSE of Phu Cat, Binh Dinh Prov (Contact continues through 26 Jan. En: 278 KIA, 11 Det, 143 I/W; Frd: 11 KIA, 25 WIA).
- 24 -- USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN65) and escorting TG, enroute from Sasebo, Japan to VN, alter course for Sea of Japan in response to North Korean seizure of USS PUEBLO (AGER2).
- A NAVSUPFACT De Force resupply LCMS is sunk in Cau Viet by command detonated mine.
- ARVN Trans-Vietnam convoy completes Route 1 transit from Saigon to Quang Tri City.
- 25 -- President Johnson orders callup of 14,000 AF and 600 Navy air reservists in response to PUEBLO crisis.
- First sighting of an artillery in Khe Sanh area, Quang Tri Prov (9 km NNW of Khe Sanh).
- 26 -- Elms of 407th Sapper Bn, sptd by 111-120 rds of 60mm mtr fire, atk Camp Holloway, Pleiku City (En: 1 KIA, 1 Det, 11/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 18 WIA, 26 helos and 3 acft dam).
- 27 -- 1st Air Cav Div assumes resp for Camp Evans with 2/12 Cav, 23 km NW of Hue, Thua Thien Prov.
- En atks Quang Tri Afd with 140mm rfts (3 KIA and 20 WIA; 17 H-34s, 14 UH-1E, and 5 CH46 minor dam).
- VC declare 7-day Tet truce from 270100 to 030100 Feb.
- 29 -- Allied forces declare 36-hr Tet stand-down from 291800 to 310600 except in I CTZ, the DMZ, and along supply routes in NVN south of Vinh.
- 30 -- VC/NVA commence general Tet Offensive throughout RVN. GVN cancels Tet stand-down and USMACV follows suit, resuming operations due to VC/NVA commencement of general offensive. Significant actions are listed below by CTZ.

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## I CTZ

- Da Nang AB, Quang Nam Prov, attd with mtr and rkt fire (1 acft dest and 29 acft dam, bldgs and eqpt dam).
- Marble Mtn Air Fac, Da Nang, attd by fire (17 helos dest or dam, east runway dam).
- En atks Da Nang City and attendant mil facs.
- Elms of Americal Div receive 121 rds mtr fire, beginning at 0200 hrs. At 0930, 1/1 Armd Cav and C/1/17 Cav attd by est 200-300 en (En: 36 KIA, 1 Det).
- Chu Lai Afd, Quang Tin Prov, attd by fire (Frd: 2 KIA, 5 WIA, 3 acft dest, 5 acft dam, bldgs and eqpt dam).
- Quang Ngai City attd by fire and by grd trps at 0405. City secured in late afternoon.
- Phu Bai Afd and LZ EL PASO in Thua Thien Prov, 12 km SE of Hue, attd by fire (Frd: 4 KIA, 14 WIA).
- Hue City in Thua Thien Prov attd by est 2 en cos at 1300. Portion of city north of river completely surrounded by en. En drops spans of both Perfume River bridges and seizes Citadel.

## II CTZ

- Kontum City attd by est 500-1000 en trps. 4th Inf Div reaction forces brought into city. Arty and air strikes employed against est 2 en bns. 19 separate grd atks by en between 1845 and 2330, with est 400 rds mtr fire. Afd, 24th STZ (ARVN), and Sector Hq under intense fire.
- LZ ENGLISH in Binh Dinh Prov recs rkt and mtr atk. Perimeter penetrated by saboteurs with satchel charges. (Frd: 1 KIA, 3 WIA, 2 helos dest, 3 helos dam).
- Flanders Army Afd in Khanh Hoa Prov, 14 km NW of CRB, attd by unk size en force with satchel charges (Frd: 9 helos dest, 3 helos dam).
- Village of Tan Canh, 5 km E of Dak To, receives 60 rds of mtr fire followed by grd atk by est VC co. Two-thirds of village dest.
- Qhi Nhem train station under atk by est VC platoon. En also controls radio station.
- C/6/32 Arty in Phu Yen Prov recs mtr and grd atk. Est en platoon penetrates perimeter and engages base defense force (Frd: 3 KIA, 7 WIA).

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## III CTZ

- Long Binh complex and II FFORCEV Hq under mtr and rkt atk.
- 25th Inf Div base camp vic Ca Chi in Mau Nghia Prov recs mtr fire.
- ~~Bien~~ Cat in Binh Duong Prov under mtr and grd atk.
- En conducting heavy grd atk from east end of runway at Bien Hoa AB thru III CTZ Hq compound towards Hwy 1. PW camp also under atk.

## CMD

- VC atk AMEMB at 0300, breaching wall and entering courtyard before being repulsed at 0930 (En: 19 KIA; Frd: 6 KIA, 5 WIA).
- Presidential Palace in Saigon and several US billets receive SA and mtr fire.
- TSN AB and JCS area atk. Approx 100 VC enter TSN perimeter.
- Heavy fighting erupts in Cholon, particularly near Phu To Racetrack. Power plant partially knocked out.
- 2 Claymore mines and SA fire directed at home of AMAMB.
- VNN Hq and HAC motor pool atk.
- Saigon BOQ # 3 atk by VC; reaction force incurs 16 US KIA.

## IV CTZ

- My Tho, Dinh Tuong Prov, atk by mtr. En concentrated in western edge of city. Advisory compound isolated from 7th ARVN Div Hq.
- Chau Phu, Chau Doc Prov, atk by mtr and grd trps. En overruns city. Deputy Prov Chief MIA.
- Truc Giang, Kien Hoa Prov, atk by mtr.
- Vinh Long Afd atk by mtr and grd by est 3 en cos (Frd: 7 KIA, 20 WIA, 5 acft dam).

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- 31 -- President Thieu declares martial law throughout RVN, to include 24-hr curfew and press censorship.

## I CTZ

- Quang Tri City atkd by est 2 en bns.
- Khe Sanh recs 122mm rkt atk.

## II CTZ

- Ban Me Thuot Afd recs mtr atk followed by grd atk. MACV compound atkd by unk-size en force. Est 2-3 en bns in city.
- MACV/CORDS compound in Nha Trang and BOQ and Hq I FFORCEV rec intensive mtr atk followed by grd atk. VC sappers penetrate compound.
- Phan Thiet atkd by mtr and atk by est 2 en bns. Heavy action vic MACV compound.
- Kontum Afd recs 200 rds mtr fire. Field closed. MACV and USASF compounds atkd by mtr. En controls 90% of the city.
- Ammo dump at Qui Nhon, Binh Dinh Prov, atkd by unk-size en force.

## IV CTZ

- Vung Liem, Vinh Binh Prov, overrun by est 2 en co.
- Sa Dec City atkd by mtr and grd trps.
- Can Tho, Phong Dinh Prov, atkd by mtr and grd trps (En: 95 KIA, 33 Det; Frd: 10 KIA, 31 WIA).
- En blows up power plant in Tra Vinh (2 US WIA).
- Afd at Soc Trang, Ba Xuyen Prov, atkd by mtr and grd trps (En: 30 KIA, 15 WIA; Frd: 6 KIA, 22 WIA).
- Rach Gia, Kien Giang Prov, atkd by mtr and grd trps (En: 200 KIA, 6 Det, 73 I/W; Frd: 16 KIA, 26 WIA).

At the end of the month, heavy fighting continued generally throughout RVN. Casualties to that point had reached: En: 4,959 KIA, 1,862 Det; Frd: KIA - US 232, ARVN 300, FWMAF 3; WIA - US 929, ARVN 727, FWMAF 22.

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## FEBRUARY

- 1 -- US mil strength in RVN is 487,323.
  - Heavy fighting continues in all major cities of SVN with units of 1st Air Cav and 1st Mar Div engaged in Quang Tri City; Kontum Afd is under continuous SA fire and closed; Dalat is partially invested; VC occupy An Quang Pagoda area in Cholon Sector of Saigon; Cu Chi in Nau Nghia Prov is under mtr atk; TSN AB continues under atk.
  - 1 co of 9th Inf Div, elms of 164th Avn Gp and ARVN units battle to retake Vinh Long City from VC. US mil and civ personnel are evacuated to Vinh Long Afd. PBR base is temporarily overrun by en, but all US personnel escape by PBR.
- 2 -- Kontum Afd is reopened, but city continues to be under atk (En: 625 KIA, 12 Det, 74 I/W; Frd: 7 US, 12 ARVN, 3 CIDG KIA; 37 US, 31 ARVN, 4 CIDG WIA).
  - Heavy fighting continues around An Cuong Pagoda and Phu To Racetrack area, Saigon.
  - Est 100 en atk Vinh Loi, Bac Lieu Prov.
  - Est bn atks Cao Lanh, Kien Phong Prov.
  - As of 2400 casualties since 291800 Jan, start of Tet Offensive, are: En: 12,704 KIA, 3,376 Det, 1,814 I/W, 545 C/S; Frd: 318 US, 661 ARVN, 4 FWMAF KIA (total: 983); 1,639 US, 1,792 ARVN, 52 FWMAF WIA (total: 3,483).
- 3 -- Joint US-VN National Recovery Committee established under direction of VP Ky in order to aid civ victims of the VC Tet Offensive.
- 4 -- Unk number of en, sptd by mtr fire, atk Tan Uyen City, Bien Hoa Prov.
  - JCS launches Opn TRANG HUNG DAO, a 33-day search-and-dest opn to eliminate an opposition in Saigon, involving 5 ARVN Abn Bns, 5 VNMC Bns and 5 Rngr Bns (En: 1,666 KIA, 1,861 Det, 701 I/W, 129 C/S; Frd: 216 KIA, 605 WIA, 1 MIA, 20 I/W, 5 C/S).
- 6 -- En co commences a 3-day engagement, employing flamethrowers and supported by 9 Soviet PT-76 amphibious tanks, against Lang Vei SF Camp, 7 km WSW of Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Prov (Camp is overrun on 8 Feb). En employs tanks in SVN for first time (7 tanks dest).
  - As VC are driven out of the city, Saigon curfew relaxed by police precincts.
  - US Mission announces US will release 3 NVN seamen cptr by USN off coast of NVN in July 1966 as a reciprocal gesture for 3 US fliers released by Hanoi in January.
  - Unk number of en atk Camp Radcliffe, An Khe, Binh Dinh Prov with 82mm mtr fire (8 OH-6A, 3 UH-1H, 1 UH-1D, 4 OH-13 and 3 AH-1 dam).

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- 7 -- 18 rds of 105mm howitzer COFRAM munitions are fired in support of Lang Vei SF Camp, marking the first employment of COFRAM munitions.
- VC blow up both bridges spanning the Perfume River, Hue, Thua Thien Prov closing Rte 1 at this point, while battle of Hue Citadel continues.
- VC make first attempt to disrupt communications in Saigon by attacking Phu Lam Telephone Relay Station with mtr fire. Minor dam incurred.
- MACV est 750-1,000 VC left in Saigon area.
- 2/16 ARVN Inf launches 2-day opn in ARVN 44 SP Zone, Kien Phong Prov (En: 170 KIA, 20 I/W, 24 C/S; Frd: 2 US and 7 ARVN KIA, 7 US and 39 ARVN WIA).
- 3/39 Inf (reinf), 3/10 and 4/10 ARVN Inf and 1 RF Bn launch 2-day regti reaction opn in Kien Hoa Prov (En: 276 KIA, 23 Det, 86 I/W, 15 C/S; Frd: 42 KIA, 122 WIA, 6 MIA, 4 I/W).
- 8 -- DaLat City, Tuyen Duc Prov, is declared clear as of 1600.
- Unk number of an atk 1st Inf Div Base Camp at Lai Khe, Binh Duong Prov, with 10 rds 122mm rkt (8 UH-1C and UH-1D dam).
- Unk number of an atk the A/1/9 USMC position at Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Prov (En: 124 KIA, 1 Det, 3 I/W, 12 C/S; Frd: 21 KIA, 27 WIA).
- 9 -- President Thieu announces plans for partial mobilisation.
- USMACV Fwd is est at Hue-Phu Bai, Thua Tien Prov under GEN Creighton W. Abrams, Jr, USA.
- 10 -- BG Albert R. Brownfield, Jr., USA, is appointed MACJ3, relieving MG Willard Pearson, USA, who is appointed Deputy Commander/CoS, MACV Fwd.
- GVN recalls to active duty reservists in age group 18-33 who have had less than 5 years active service.
- First sighting of Soviet-built IL-28 (Beagle) twin jet bombers is made at Phuc Yen Afd, near Hanoi.
- Est on bn, sptd by 250 rds of 60/82mm mtr fire, atks Tan An City and Hq, 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div, Long An Prov (En: 123 KIA, 17 Det, 27 I/W, 8 C/S; Frd: 4 US, 4 RF, 8 NP KIA, 25 civ killed; 11 US and 11 RF WIA, 200 civ wounded).
- 11 -- Unk number of an atk Bien Hoa Afd with 20 rds 122mm rkts (Frd: 1 KIA, 36 WIA, 1 F-4, 1 O-1E, 1 O-2A, 1 O-1, 2 UH-1D dest, 4 F-100, 5 O-1E, 1 O-2A and 6 UH-1C dam).
- Intense Tet Offensive countryside actions taper off. Cumulative results from 291800 Jan through 112400 Feb are: En: 31,754 KIA, 5,821 Det, 17 Ret, 7,505 I/W, 1,276 C/S; Frd: 1,001 US, 2,082 ARVN, 60 FWMAF KIA (total 3,143); 5 087 US, 7,806 ARVN, 244 FWMAF WIA (total: 13,137).

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- 12 -- Unk number of an atk Camp Evans, 22 km NW of Hue, Thua Tien Prov, with 100 rds 82mm mtr fire (Frd: 3 KIA, 28 WIA, 2 AH-1G, 2 OH-13 and 17 UH-1H dam).
- 13 -- Pentagon announces Opn IVY TREE, the movement of an additional 10,000 men to RVN to counter expected "second round" Communist city offensive and assault on Khe Sanh Combat Base (1 Abn Bde TF of 82d Abn Div and 1 USMC Regt (RLT 27 (Reinf) are units designated).
- 1 of 2 unarmed Navy A-1 Skyraiders enroute from NAS Cubi Point, R. P. to YANKEE Station strays over Hainan Island and is shot down, marking ninth incident involving CHICOM and US a/c since Sep 68, and first since 21 Aug 67.
- En employs 120mm mtr in the IV CTZ for the first time in attacking Binh Thuy Afd, Phong Dinh Prov with 40-43 rds (Frd: 4 USAF and 1 VNAF KIA; 12 VNAF WIA; and 1 UH-1D, 1 A-1E, 7 H-34, 3 C-2A, and 2 Cessna dam).
- 14 -- 2 USAF F-4 Phantom jets down 2 MIG-17s over Hanoi (109th and 110th air-to-air kills of the war).
- 15 -- USAF F-4 Phantom lost over NVN, marking 800th US loss in the 3-year air war over NVN.
- 16 -- 3 US pilots are released by NVN and are flown to Vientiane, Laos, by ICC aircraft.
- Unk number of an atk Binh Thuy Afd, Phong Dinh Prov, with 20-28 rds of 57mm RR and 120mm mtr fire (Frd: 2 VNAF WIA, 2 AC-47 and 1 O-1A dam).
- Unk number of an atk Can Tho Afd, Phong Dinh Prov with 50 rds B-40 rchts (Frd: 11 US WIA, 2 AH-1G and 1 OV-1 dam).
- 17 -- All time weekly high of US casualties is set during 7 days ending 17 Feb: 543 KIA and 2,547 WIA.
- Elms of 199th Lt Inf Bde terminate Opn MANCHESTER, a 62-day search-and-destroy opn, launched 18 Dec 67 in Bien Hoa Prov (En: 456 KIA, 85 Det, 1 Ret, 57 I/W, 20 C/S; Frd: 37 KIA, 210 WIA).
- En conducts over 35 separate mtr and rkt atks against cities and installations throughout II, III and IV CTZs in an apparently coordinated effort, but does not follow-up with a general offensive (II CTZ: Kontum City, Phu Cat, Gia Nghia, Duc Lap, Nhon Co, Dai-lat, Di Linh, Bao Loc and Phan Thiet; III CTZ: Song Be, An Loc, Quang Loi, Tay Ninh City, Lai Khe, Phu Loi, Ben Bat, Dau Tieng, Cu Chi, Trung Lap, Trang Bang, Duc Hoa, Tra Cu, TEN complex, Saigon, Tan Tru, Ben Luc, Thu Thua, Go Den, My Yen, Bien Hoa AB, Long Thanh, and Long Binh; IV CTZ: My Tho, Dong Tam, Cai Lay, Ben Tre, Binh Dai, Cao Lanh, Vinh Long City, Chau Doc City, Can Tho, Binh Thuy Afd, Soc Trang Afd, and Rach Gia).
- 18 -- 8 rds of 122mm rchts fall in Hq MACV compound, marking first time the Hq has come under atk (Frd: 4 WIA and minor materiel dam). Concurrently, unk number an atk TEN AB, Gia Dinh Prov, with 100 rds of 122mm rkt and 82mm mtr fire (Frd: 39 WIA,

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- 1 C-130, 1 RF-4C, 1 RF-101, and 1 (VNAF) C-119 dest; 2 C-117, 1 B-57, 6 C-130, 2 (VNAF) C-47, 1 UH-34 and 1 S-2B dam).
- Elms of 8th Abn Bn engage unk size en force 4 km NW of TSN (En: 75 KIA, 28 I/W; Frd: 7 KIA, 32 WIA).
- Air strikes dest 75 of 95 sampans discovered near Cambodian border region of Hau Nghia Prov. 533 rds of RPG-2, 352 rds of 82mm mortar, 96 rds of 60mm mortar, 46 rds of RPG-7, 29 rds of 75mm RR, 37 cans of MG ammo, and 208,000 rds of 7.62 mm recovered.
- 19 -- C/2/14 Inf, 25th Inf Div, cptrs 37 rds of CHIGOM 107mm spin-stabilized rockets, the first such cptrd, confirming earlier report of use of this wpn by the en in III CTZ.
- 21 -- Hanoi Radio Station, 3.5 mi SW of the city center, is bombed for first time. USMC A-6s conduct the raid.
- Hq, 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div closes Chu Lai, Quang Tin Prov, for future ops in I CTZ.
- 22 -- White House announces selection of Samuel D. Berger to replace Eugene Locke, who resigned in Jan as Deputy US Amb to RVN.
- COMUSMACV, GEN William C. Westmoreland, USA, launches Project TARP (Tat Aggression Relief Project), a 43-day US personnel voluntary fund drive to aid the civilian populace of RVN (Donations total \$130,970.16).
- Unk number of en atk 2 tugs towing 8 ammo barges on Dong Nai River, 15 km E of Saigon, Gia Dinh Prov (Frd: 3 civ killed, 2 US WIA, 6 barges sunk, 2 tugs dam).
- 23 -- CJCS, GEN Earl Wheeler, USA, arrives at Hq MACV for 4-day conference.
- Khe Sanh Combat Base, Quang Tri Prov, receives 1,307 rds of en arty, rkt and mtr fire.
- 24 -- USMC and ARVN forces retake most of Hue Citadel from VC/NVA forces, virtually ending 25-day siege and battle of Hue (En: approx 4,200 KIA; Frd: approx 490 KIA).
- Hanoi's port, 1.8 km SE of center of city, is hit by Navy A-6 Intruder aft from USS ENTERPRISE, the first strike on this 11-acre complex.
- Unk number of en atk USMC Marble Mtn Air Fac, Quang Nam Prov, with 20 rds of rkt fire (Frd: 1 KIA, 7 WIA, 1 OV-1A dest, 6 UH-1E and 1 CH-46 dam).
- Unk number of en atk TSN AB in Gia Dinh Prov with 26 rds of 122mm rkt fire (Frd: 4 KIA, 11 civ killed, 32 WIA, 9 civ wounded, 3 C-130 dam).
- Elms of 25th Inf Div terminate Opn YELLOWSTONE, a 79-day search-and-destroy opn which commenced on 8 Dec 67, in Tay Ninh Prov (En: 1,254 KIA, 1,438 Det, 1 Ret, 146 I/W, 68 C/S; Frd: 135 US, 5 ARVN KIA, 994 US, 67 ARVN WIA).

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- 25 -- ARVN forces overcome last en resistance in Hue Citadel.
- 3/5 Armd Cav, reinf by C/2/34, closes Da Nang, Quang Nam Prov for future opns in I CTZ.
- Air observers sight extensive en trench lines within 100 meters of Khe Sanh defense perimeter and within 50 meters of east end of airstrip.
- En continues to attempt to interdict Saigon LOCs by blowing up Cau Kinh and Giong-Ong-To bridges E of city, the latter being the only road between Saigon and the major ammo/POL off-loading point at Cat Lai. Concurrently, two US merchant ships off-loading ammo at Cat Lai are attacked by mtr fire. Minor dam incurred.
- 26 -- COMUSMACV (MACOI) announces that when the tactical situation dictates, US casualty announcements, dam and en rds recd will be withheld to deny the en information of intelligence value on which he can base subsequent atks. (New policy will not effect DOD daily and weekly casualty list reporting).
- Elms of 49th ARVN Regt initiate Opn AN DAN 66, a 3-day search-and-destroy opn in Nam Nghia Prov (En: 125 KIA, 6 Det, 15 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 5 KIA, 25 WIA).
- Elms of A-321 USASF from Ben Soi SF Camp engage an est en co, reinf with 3 tanks, 22 km W of Tay Ninh City. First sighting of en tanks in III CTZ. (En: 30 KIA, 1 unk type tank dest; Frd: 1 US, 1 CIDG WIA).
- 27 -- Elms participating in Opn WHEELER/WALLOWA engage unk size en force 4 km W of Tam Ky, Quang Tia Prov (En: 208 KIA, 28 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: 1 WIA).
- First ASPB is sunk and lost during an attack on MRF FSB, 3 km W of Can Tho, Phong Dinh Prov (Opn CORONADO XI).
- JCS announces MG Nguyen Duc Thang has replaced MG Nguyen Van Manh as CG, IV CTZ, and MG Lu Lan has replaced LTG Vinh Loc as CG, II CTZ, marking highest level shifts within ARVN in over 2 years.
- 28 -- En trawler is sighted by MARKET TIME P3V acft off Ca Mau Peninsula, IV CTZ. Taken under covert surveillance and fir-ly engaged 40 mi ENE of Ca Mau Point. Sunk by gunfire from USCGC WINONA abou 010200 Mar.
- En trawler is sighted by MARKET TIME P3V acft 160 km E of Nha Trang, II CTZ, and taken under covert surveillance. Fire from a VNN PCF, "Spooky" acft and USN PCF dest trawler 010231 Mar after it flees to a cove 10 mi N of Nha Trang.
- En trawler is sighted by MARKET TIME P3V acft and taken under covert surveillance by USCGC ANDROSCROGGIN. After attempting to evade, trawler dest itself near Duc Pho, II CTZ, 010235 Mar.

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- Fourth en trawler is sighted by MARKET TIME P3V acft and taken under covert surveillance by USCGC MINNETONKA. Turns eastward before entering 12-mi contiguous zone of RVN.
- 29 -- Hq USMC RLT 1/27 (-) (reinf) closes Da Nang, Quang Nam Prov, for future ops in I CTZ.
- Unk number of en atks Duc Hoa ADd, Hau Nghia Prov with 100-200 rds 82mm mtr fire (1 US, 2 ARVN KIA, 2 US, 14 ARVN WIA, 1 UH-1B and 5 L-19 dam).
- Refugees, as a result of Tet Offensive, now total 599,858 (I CTZ - 121,518; II CTZ - 101,454; III CTZ - 94,766; IV CTZ - 109,441; Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh - 172,679). 68,099 homes are reported dest, and 19,457 civ wounded.
- Casualties from Tet Offensive (291800H Jan through 292400H Feb) are: En: 45,005 KIA, 7,417 Det, 40 Ret, 11,027 I/W, 1,726 C/S; Frd: 1,825 US, 3,557 ARVN, 92 FWMAF KIA, (Total: 5,474); 9,854 US, 12,806 ARVN, 349 FWMAF WIA (Total: 23,009).
- Opa NAPOLEON, which began on 5 Nov 67 in Quang Tri Prov, combines with Opa SALINE, which began on 30 Jan 68 in Quang Tri Prov, to form Opa NAPOLEON/SALINE.

### MARCH

- 1 -- US mil strength in RVN is 501,097.
- LTG William B. Rosson, USA, is appointed DEPCOMUSMACVFWD.
- MG William R. Peers, USA, relieves LTG William B. Rosson, USA, as CG, I FFORCEV.
- En shells TSN AB in Gia Dinh Prov with 16 rds of 122mm rkt fire (1 US and 4 RVNAF WIA, 1 civ wounded, 1 C-123 dam).
- Elms of 1st and 26th ROKA Cav Regts engage unk size en force 17 km NNW of Qui Nhon, Binh Dinh Prov (En: 165 KIA, 6 Det, 60 I/W, 8 C/S; Frd: 7 KIA, 11 WIA).
- GVN starts to draft 19 year olds.
- 2 -- En ambushes co of 25th Inf Div 4 mi N of TSN AB, in Gia Dinh Prov (En: 20 KIA, 4 I/W; Frd: 48 KIA, 29 WIA, 2 MIA).
- 3 -- En shells 31st ARVN Regt Hq at Vi Thanh, Chuong Thien Prov with 150 rds of 75mm RR fire. 25 PF trainees defect during atk. (23 ARVN and 24 RF trainees KIA, 3 civ killed, 6 ARVN and 6 RF trainees WIA, 78 I/W, 11 C/S).

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- 4 -- En shells Marble Mtn Air Fac, Quang Nam Prov, with 35 rds of rkt fire (9 WIA, 1 CH-53 dest, 12 UH-1E, 10 CH-53 and 16 CH-46 dam).
- En shells Nha Be Tank Farm, Gia Dinh Prov with 30 rds of 75mm RR fire dest a 12,500 bbl tank (4 US WIA).
- Est en co atks Phu My Dist Hq and jail in Binh Dinh Prov (En: 73 KIA, 2 C/S; Frd: 1 PF KIA, 2 RD WIA).
- Est 2 en cos atk Tuy Phuoc Dist Hq, 7 km NNW of Qui Nhon, Binh Dinh Prov (En: 125 KIA, 3 Det, 24 I/W, 14 C/S; Frd: 6 RF WIA).
- En atks Tuy Hoa, Darlac Prov, D/16 Arm, 173d US Abn Bde and ARVN units counter-attack (En: 218 KIA, 12 Det, 111 I/W, 27 C/S; Frd: 8 US KIA, 18 ARVN KIA, 15 civ killed, 18 US WIA, 53 ARVN WIA, 65 civ wounded, 2 US MIA).
- 5 -- VC atk and largely dest hosp at Ca Mau, An Xuyen Prov. 32d ARVN Regt conducts 3-day counterattack (En: 283 KIA, 5 Det, 29 I/W, 21 C/S; Frd: 11 KIA, 47 WIA (2 US), 1 I/W).
- Unk number of en atk Phu Loi and Phu Loi Afltd, Binh Duong Prov. 3/7 ARVN counter-attacks (En: 23 KIA, 1 Det, 1 C/S; Frd: 1 US and 11 ARVN WIA, 2 OH-1B, 2 UH-1B, 1 UH-1C, 10 UH-1D, 4 Ol-C, 6 CH-47 dam).
- Est reinf en bn upd by 82mm mtr and 57-75mm RR, atk Quan Long City, An Xuyen Prov (En: 287 KIA, 3 Det, 43 I/W, 13 C/S; Frd: 10 ARVN KIA, 20 civ killed, 2 US and 41 ARVN WIA, 50 civ wounded, over 1,000 civ homes dest, 1 AH-16 and 1 UH-1D dam).
- 6 -- ADM U.S. Grant Sharp, USN, GINGPAC arrives in Saigon for 2-day visit.
- M/3/3 USMC participating in Opn KENTUCKY engages unk number of en 5 km NE of Con Thien, Quang Tri Prov (En: 81 KIA; Frd: 14 KIA, 29 WIA).
- USAF C-123 hit by grd fire crashes 5 km SE of Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Prov (49 KIA).
- 3d Mar Div air observer, 6 km NW of Con Thien, Quang Tri Prov, evaluates 2 tracked vehicles engaged by arty fire on 5 Mar as wooden decoys. First instance of en use of decoy devices in RVN, although previously used at NVN afdls.
- 7 -- Hq 101st Abn Div closes Phu Bai, Thua Thien Prov, for future ops in I CTZ.
- En shells Phu Hiep Afltd, 15 km SE of Tuy Hoa, Phu Yen Prov with 30-35 rds of mtr fire (1 WIA, 5 UH-1B dam).
- Units participating in Opn NAPOLEON/SALINE begin 2-day engagement with (probable) elms of 2d Bn, 803d Regt and 52d Rgt, 320th Div, 3 km NE of Dong Ha, Quang Tri Prov (En: 164 KIA, 24 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 21 KIA, 174 WIA, 10 MIA).

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- 8 -- COMUSMACV announces formation of PROVCORPSV to assist in command and control of US units in the northern part of I CTZ, under the command of LTC William B. Rosson, USA, but subordinate to CG, III MAF.
- US casualties in VN (136,993 - of which 19,313 are KIA), pass level reached in Korean War.
- 9 -- Elms participating in Opn WHEELER/WALLOWA engage unk number of en 15 km NW of Tam Ky, Quang Tin Pro (En: 129 KIA, Frd: 18 WIA).
- En shells MRF FSB with mtr fire, 12 km SSE of My Tho, Dinh Tuong Prov, sinking two arty barges (10 WIA, 4 105mm howitzers).
- 10 -- PROVCORPSV activated, replacing MACVFWD.
- 2/2 and 3/2 ARVN Inf engage unk number of en 8 km N of Dong Ha, Quang Tri Prov (En: 102 KIA, 7 Det, 20 I/W, 5 C/S; Frd: 3 KIA, 37 WIA).
- 11 -- GVN dismisses 7 province chiefs, including LTC Phan Van Khoa, Chief of Thua Thien Prov and Mayor of Hue.
- 13 -- En atks Quang Hu Workshop, Vinh Binh Prov, defended by 71 PF (71 PF MIA, 70 I/W).
- 14 -- En co enters La Hai Nam Refugee Center, Dong Xuan, 16 km SW of Song Cau, Phu Yen Prov, abducting 299 families (1,011 individuals).
- 15 -- USN acft from YANKEE Station carriers make first strike of the war on Do Son radio comm station, 12 mi SE of Haiphong.
- En shells Quang Tri Afd, Quang Tri Prov, with 20 rds of 122mm rkt fire (3 US WIA, 6 UH-1E and 4 UH-34 dam).
- ARVN elms participating in Opn QUYET THANG engage unk size en force in 1-day battle near Saigon, Gia Dinh Prov (En: 197 KIA, 32 Det, 35 I/W, 15 C/S; Frd: 5 KIA, 37 WIA).
- 16 -- US KIA in RVN since 1 Jan 61 as a result of hostile action reach 20,096.
- First reported use of 107mm rkts in I CTZ, when en atk Dong Ha Comat Base, Quang Tri Prov.
- TF Barker, participating in Opn MUSCATINE, conducts a 1-day search-and-destroy opn 9 km NE of Quang Ngai City (En: 128 KIA, 6 I/W; Frd: 2 KIA, 10 WIA).
- 17 -- Project COMBAT LANCER initiated; 6 F-111A acft deploy to Takhli, RTAFB for 6-mo combat evaluation.
- En shells Binh Thuy Afd, Phong Dinh Prov with 40 rds of 75mm RR fire (1 U-17, 3 L-19, 1 H-34 dam).

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- 18 -- Est on bn atks 37th ARVN Rgr Bn sector of Khe Sanh Combat Base, Quang Tri Prov, and is repulsed.
- Elms of 49th ARVN Regt and 3/11 Cav engage unk size en force in 3-day battle 6 km NE of Duc Hoa, Hau Nghia Prov (En: 273 KIA, 31 I/W, 13 C/S; Frd: 21 ARVN KIA, 12 US and 44 ARVN WIA).
- Elms of 9th ARVN Abn Bn discover large ammo cache 11 km N of TSN AB, Gia Dinh Prov (31 rds of 122mm rkt, 1,200 rds of 60mm and 80mm mtr, 30 rds of 75mm RR, 138 rds of B-40 and 13 cases of TNT).
- 20 -- Elms of 3/11 Cav and 57th ARVN Regt participating in Opa QUYET THANG engage est en bn 7 km SW of Cu Chi, Hau Nghia Prov (En: 142 KIA, 6 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 8 KIA, 21 WIA).
- 21 -- En shells TSN AB, Gia Dinh Prov with 7 rds of 75mm RR fire (5 C-130, 2 MH-43 dam).
- En shells Soc Trang AB, Ba Xuyen Prov, with 25 rds of 75mm RR fire (3 US WIA, 3 UH-1 dam).
- Elms participating in Opa WHEELER/WALLOWA engage unk size en force 7 km S of Hoi An, Quang Nam Prov (En: 112 KIA, 12 I/W, 14 C/S; Frd: 18 WIA).
- President Thieu, in TV address, announces RVNAF will be increased by 135,000 men.
- 22 -- President Johnson announces GEN W. C. Westmoreland, USA, will be relieved of his present post to become CofS, USA, on 1 July.
- Between 221800 and 232300, Khe Sanh Combat Base, Quang Tri Prov, recs over 1,100 en mtr and rkt rds. Heaviest shelling since 23 Feb when over 1,300 rds were recd in 24-hr period.
- En shells Bien Hoa AB with 6 rds of 122mm rkt fire (12 WIA, 5 helos dam).
- 24 -- Samuel D. Berger, Deputy US Amb designate to RVN arrives in Saigon to take up his duties.
- 25 -- GEN Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., USA, arrives in Washington for 3-day conference.
- MG Royal N. Baker, USAF, is appointed MACJ5 relieving MG Don O. Darrow, USAF.
- Co D, 1st Bn, 7th Cav on a search-and-destroy mission in A Chau Valley, Thua Tien Prov encounters enemy tanks suspected to be T-54s.
- F-111A fighter-bombers employed for the first time in combat in missions over NVN Panhandle. Bombers come from Det 1 428 TFW based at Takhli, RTAFB.
- En atks installations in and around Trang Bang, Hau Nghia Prov (En: 284 KIA, 24 I/W, 15 C/S; Frd: 10 US, 14 ARVN Rgrs, and 8 RF KIA, 71 US, 17 ARVN Rgr, 13 RF, 2 PF WIA, 1 PF and 1 NP MIA).

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- First Mekong River convoy since Tet Offensive leaves Vung Tau for Phnom Penh.
- Est 2 or 3 on bus, aptd by B-40 rkt and 60mm mtr fire and flamethrowers, atk 3/8th Inf FSB, 21 km W of Kontum City (En: 135 KIA, 4 Det, 20 I/W, 15 C/S; Frd: 19 KIA, 51 WIA, 3 MIA).
- Elms of the 44th ARVN Rgr Bn participating in Opn TRUONG CONG DINH 21/5 engage the Soc Trang VC LF Bn in Ba Xuyen Prov (En: 100 KIA, 1 Det, 9 I/W, 5 C/S; Frd: 5 KIA, 35 WIA).
- 27 -- ARVN 1st Rgr Gp, participating in Opn LAMSON 201, engages unk number of en 15 km NW of Phu Loc, Thua Thien Prov (En: 154 KIA, 40 Det, 23 I/W; Frd: 5 WIA).
- 28 -- First F-111A fighter-bomber is lost during a mission over NVN, cause and location unk.
- Elms of 11th and 12th ARVN Rgrs, 7th Inf Div, near Phuoc Tay, Dinh Tuong Prov discover large ammo cache during sweep mission (90,000 rds AK-47 ammo, 111 cases MG ammo, 348 mtr rds, 10,000 meters detonating cord, 80 mines and other assorted munitions).
- 29 -- USC flies 3 NVN naval personnel to Vientiane for release to NVN authorities in a reciprocal gesture for NVN's release of three US pilots in Feb.
- En shells Camp Holloway Afd, Pleiku, with 33 rds of 82mm mtr fire (4 WIA, 1 UH-1H and 5 UH-1C down).
- 30 -- Second F-111A is lost over northern Thailand while enroute from a mission in NVN. Both pilots are rescued. Cause laid to foreign object rendering control system inoperative in certain positions.
- US forces suffer new weekly WIA high in the 7 days ending 30 Mar - 3,886 WIA of which 1,829 are hospitalized (previous high was 1,965 WIA for week ending 23 Mar 68).
- First Automatic Switching Center (AUTODIN) in VN is dedicated at Phu Lam Signr Station, Saigon.
- Elms of the 26th USMC Regt, participating in Opn SCOTLAND, engage est en bn 1 km S of Khe Sanh Combat Base, Quang Tri Prov (En: 115 KIA; Frd: 9 KIA, 71 WIA).
- 31 -- Est 150 on atk Truoi River Bridge, 13 km SW of Phu Bai and another bridge 11 km SW of Phu Bai, Thua Thien Prov, dropping span of the former and destroying the latter (En: 9 KIA, 4 I/W; Frd: 14 US KIA, 7 ARVN KIA, 30 US and 2 ARVN WIA).

## APRIL

- 1 -- US mil strength in RVN is 508,953.

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- President Johnson announces callup of some 50,000 reservists.
- President Johnson in radio and TV address to the nation announces an immediate bombing pause over portions of NVN north of 20°N latitude, plus a 13,500 man troop increase for RVN over presently approved 525,000 man ceiling.
- MG Willard Pearson, USA, is appointed MACJ3 relieving BG Albert R. Brownfield, Jr., USA, who assumes duty as ACoS for Operations for ARVN/RF/PF Affairs.
- ICC "temporarily suspends" all fixed and mobile teams outside of Saigon and Hanoi to reduce expenses. Results in 30% cut in present staff size.
- MACV reports USAF Ground Proximity Extraction System is used for the first time for aerial delivery of cargo in combat at the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the period 31 Mar to 1 Apr.
- MACV announces Allied forces have captured over 15,000 I/W and 3,300 C/S weapons since 1 Jan 68.
- USN MARKET TIME P-3V Orion surveillance acft (based in Thailand) shot down by a Cambodian naval vessel over the Gulf of Siam. Plane crashes 5 miles north of Phu Quoc Island. All 12 crewmen killed.
- DELTA FALCON forces dest 30 en sampans and 4 structures along an infiltration route from Cambodia in Kien Phong Prov. 375 sampans dest since 5 Mar.
- 2 -- VC initiated incidents in IV CTZ for a 24-hr period drop to 9, lowest since start of Tet Offensive.
- 3 -- NVN, on Hanoi Radio, in response to partial US bombing pause, announces it is willing to discuss with US "the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other acts of war against North Vietnam."
- Mr. William E. Colby assumes duty as ACoS for CORDS as Mr. L. Wade Latham departs RVN.
- 4 -- President Johnson announces he will fly to Honolulu on 6 Apr with SECDEF Clark Clifford, and CJCS GEN Earl Wheeler, USA, to discuss Hanoi's move for talks with US leaders in VN. (Trip cancelled by the Pres due to assassination of the Rev. Martin Luther King).
- 1/9 Marines make first sortie out of Khe Sanh and seize Hill 471 S of the combat base.
- Foreign Ministers of the 7 nations participating in the defense of RVN meet in Wellington, N.Z.
- 5 -- 2 replacement USAF F-111A acft arrive at Takhli RTAFB from Nellis AFB, Nev.
- Est en bn, sptd by mtr and RPG fire, atk 1/9 USMC on Hill 471, 1 km S of Khe Sanh Combat Base, Quang Tri Prov (En: 122 KIA, 32 I/W; Frd: 2 WIA).

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- In a 2-day action, elems of the 3/47 ARVN Inf and ROKA engage an est en bn which occupied My Hoa Village, Phu Yen Prov (En: 280 KIA, 24 Det, 2 Ret, 93 I/W, 24 C/S; Frd: 16 KIA (10 ARVN, 6 ROKA), 51 WIA (39 ARVN, 12 ROKA)).
- 6 -- COMUSMACV departs RVN for 2 days of conferences with President Johnson in Washington, D. C.
  - Elms of 1st Cav Div in Opn PEGASUS reach vic of Khe Sanh Combat Base, the first Allied to make overland contact since 21 Jan 68.
  - 7-day period ending 6 Apr marks lowest number of weekly US KIA (279 KIA) since start of Tet Offensive (1,344 WIA this period).
  - USAF completes recovery of F-111A lost over NE Thailand.
- 7 -- The 5/12 US Inf closes Long Binh, Bien Hoa Prov, from the US, and is put under OPCON of 199th Lt Inf Bde.
  - Forces in Opn PEGASUS/LAM SON 207 discover en cache 1 km SW of Khe Sanh Combat Base containing 4,500 hand grenades, 450 rds B-30 rcts, 1,800 rds 60mm mtrs, 400 new picks and shovels, and a large quantity of SA ammo.
  - Elms of DELTA FALCON force discover 2 large wpns caches 45 km NW of Rach Gia, Kien Giang Prov (384 I/W, 57 C/S, 185,000 SA ammo, 433 rct and mtr rds).
- 8 -- Khe Sanh emergency resupply effort terminates. A total of 1,152 resupply sorties flown during the period 21 Jan to 8 Apr, delivering 12,773 STON of cargo. USAF, USN and USMC flew 24,449 sorties in support of the base. B-52s flew 2,548 sorties, dropping over 60,000 tons of bombs. Tactical air delivered over 35,000 tons of bombs.
- 9 -- President Johnson announces a note has been sent to Hanoi suggesting sites for talks.
  - Prince Sihanouk offers Phnom Penh as a site for pending US/NVN talks.
  - Co D, 1/12 Cav finds en wpns cache 1 km SW of Khe Sanh Village, Quang Tri Prov (57 I/W, 12 C/S, 1,560 mtr rds, 2,000 CHICOM grenades).
  - Amb Ellsworth Bunker departs RVN / Washington for 5 days to discuss proposed talks with NVN.
- 10 -- President Johnson announces ADM John S. McCain, Jr., USN, presently CINCUSNAV-EUR, will relieve ADM U. S. Grant Sharp as CINCPAC; that GEN Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., USA, presently DEPCOMUSMACV will assume duties of COMUSMACV from GEN W. C. Westmoreland, and that LTG Andrew Goodpaster, USA, presently Comdt, NWC, will be promoted to GEN and become next DEPCOMUSMACV.
  - Elms of 1st Air Cav reoccupy Lang Vei SF Camp, Quang Tri Prov. Camp was over-run by en on 8 Feb.

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- Elms of 1st Bde, 1st Air Cav Div discover en wpns cache 4 km SSW of Khe Sanh Combat Base (57 I/W, 12 C/S, 15 rds of 60mm mtr, 153 rkt grenades, and other miscellaneous munitions).
- 11 -- White House rejects Hanoi's proposal of Warsaw as the place for talks in that it is not "an appropriate site in neutral territory."
  - Route 9 into Khe Sanh officially reopened.
  - MACV announces seize of Khe Sanh cost 93 US KIA and 400 WIA. Est 15-20,000 en killed during seize.
- 12 -- MACV discontinues use of term "search and destroy operations" as over-used and misunderstood. More specific substitutes will be used in the future such as cordon and search, clearing, reconnaissance in force, pursuit, raid, spoiling attack, ambush, containment.
  - USAF F-111As resume opns over NVN Panhandle after being grounded since 30 Mar.
  - Unk number of en spdt by 82mm mtr fire atk 3/22 US Inf 11 km SW of Suoi Da, Tay Ninh Prov (En: 129 KIA, 1 Det, 53 I/W, 18 C/S; Frd: 16 KIA, 42 WIA).
- 13 -- Hanoi rejects US proposal of Geneva, Rangoon, New Delhi, Vientiane, or Jakarta as talk sites (NVN had proposed Phnom Penh or Warsaw, which US reject as not "neutral.")
  - Elms of 1/12 Cav participating in Opn PEGASUS/LAM SON 207 discover en wpns cache 1 km W of Lang Vei, Quang Tri Prov, containing 30 I/W, 32 C/S, 5,300 mtr rds, 1,050 RR rds, 400-M-79 grenades, and 113,000 rds of SA ammo -- all of US manufacture.
- 14 -- 3/26 USMC participating in Opn PEGASUS seize Hill 881N, Khe Sanh (En: 106 KIA, 2 Det, 56 I/W, 7 C/S; Frd: 6 KIA, 14 WIA).
- 15 -- SECDEF Harold Brown, USA GEN Harold K. Johnson and CINCUSARPAC GEN Dwight Beach arrive in RVN for a 5-day visit.
  - Deputy Amb Samuel D. Berger sworn into office at AMEMB, Saigon.
  - BG Robert E. Connor, USA, assumes duties as Director, MACV Training Directorate.
- 18 -- US proposes 10 locations to Hanoi, in addition to those previously offered, for a talk site: Ceylon, Japan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Malaysia, Italy, Belgium, Finland, and Austria.
- 19 -- BG William S. Coleman, USA, is appointed Dep Asst CofS for Operations for ARVN/RF/PF Affairs, replacing BG Albert R. Brownfield, Jr., USA.
- 21 -- Elms of the 1st Air Cav Div, participating in Opn DELAWARE, invade the A Shau Valley, Thua Thien Prov, the largest NVA/VC supply base in I CTZ, marking the first time US troops have entered the valley since an overran the A Shau SF Camp in Mar 66.

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- 23 -- MACV authorizes a second week of out-of-country R&R for US servicemen voluntarily extending their Vietnam tour for 90 to 179 days.
- En shells Vung Tau Afd, Phuoc Tuy Prov, with 15 rds 122mm rht and 10-15 rds of 82mm mtr (1 KIA, 17 WIA, 1 C-7A dest, 2 CH-47 and 2 O-1A dam).
- 25 -- Trp B, 1/8 Cav, participating in Opn DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 discover en wpns cache 2 km NW of A Luoi, Thua Thien Prov (315 I/W, 600 rds of 122mm arty, 18-11/2 ton trucks, Soviet 37mm anti-aircraft guns, 30 flamethrowers, and miscellaneous munitions).
- 29 -- US rejects Hanoi suggestion that US talk with "Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces" as an "artificial organization, a creature of the NLF and Hanoi."
- 2d ARVN Regt on an offensive sweep 4 km N of Dong Ha, Quang Tri Prov engage est 2-3 en bns (En: 151 KIA, 131 I/W, 4 C/S; Frd: 21 KIA (4 US, 17 ARVN), 69 WIA (22 US, 47 ARVN), 18 ARVN MIA).

### MAY

- 1 -- US mil strength in RVN is 513,408.
- White House proposes to NVN that the Indonesian Cruiser Irian be used as site for talks.
- USAF 120th TFW, formerly a part of the Colorado ANG and the first ANG unit to deploy to a war zone since WWII, arrives at Phan Rang AB to become part of the 35th TFW.
- 95 en surrender to elms of 101st Abn Div participating in Opn CARENTAN II, 4 mi NW of Hua, Thua Thien Prov.
- 2 -- MACV announces 1st Air Cav trps, while sweeping the A Shau Valley in Opn DELAWARE, capture Soviet transistorized mine detectors and an undam PT-76 tank.
- Elms of 101st Abn Div and 82d Abn Div participating in Opn CARENTAN II in 3 significant contacts with the en NW and S of Hua, Thua Thien Prov, kill 302 and capture 100 wpns.
- 3 -- White House announces agreement with Hanoi on Paris as site for official talks. W. Averill Harriman, Cyrus Vance, and Llewellyn Thompson will represent US.
- Terrorists explode a taxi loaded with explosives outside Saigon AFRTS studio (3 civ killed, 30 wounded (5 US)). Broadcast service momentarily disrupted.
- Elms of ARVN SD/7/14 participating in Opn TRUONG CONG DINH engage est en bn 12 km NE of My Tho, Dinh Tuong Prov (En: 194 KIA, 3 Det, 38 I/W, 17 C/S; Frd: 13 KIA, 41 WIA, 2 MIA, 10 I/W, 1 C/S).

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- Elms of 1st Cav Div participating in Opn DELAWARE discover 2 en caches in vic of A Luoi, Thua Thien Prov (857 I/W, 1 C/S, 18-1 1/2 ton trucks, 3 tons of automotive spare parts, and misc munitions and supplies).
- 51st ARVN Rgr Bn participating in Opn TOAN THANG engage est en bn 2 km NE of Duc Hoa, Hau Nghia Prov. 4/23 and 3/22 US Inf reinf (En: 167 KIA, 3 Det, 14 I/W, 16 C/S; Frd: 22 ARVN KIA, 15 ARVN WIA).
- En force atks ARVN D/1/18 Inf, which is reinf by US A/1/4 Cav in Opn TOANG THANG, 4 km NNW of Di An, Bien Hoa Prov (En: 236 KIA, 5 Det; Frd: 7 US KIA, 27 US WIA).
- 5 -- En launches 197 rkt, mtr, and fire atks throughout RVN during evening of 5 May and on into morning of 6 May (25 aflds, 19 province towns, 41 district towns, 92 mil install). Few instances of grd follow-up atks, and these are small-scale. GVN imposes 1900-0700 curfew in Saigon/Gia Dinh, and MACV follows suit. Atks initiate third phase of en Winter/Spring Offensive.
- VC infiltrators kill 3 Australian and 1 British newspapermen in Cholon, Saigon; First Secretary of the West German Embassy is also killed by VC in Saigon.
- TSN AB Commander Col Luu Kim Cuong is killed leading a counterattack against VC units attempting to enter base.
- 3 en rkts hit LST loading trps at Da Nang (5 KIA, 12 WIA, 16 MIA).
- Est en bn sped by mtr and RPG fire atks ARVN elms 15 km S of Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Prov (En: 107 KIA, 5 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 3 US and 13 RD KIA; 10 US and 11 RF WIA, 8 RF MIA).
- En shells Quang Tri Afld with 20 rds of 122mm rkt fire (7 WIA, 1 CH-46 dest, 8 CH-46 dam).
- En ambushes a 4th US Inf Div convoy on Hwy 14, 13 km S of Kontum. Elms of ARVN 3d Armd Cav, gunships and TACAIR spt frdly units (En: 121 KIA, 2 Det, 26 I/W, 17 C/S; Frd: 15 US and 1 ARVN KIA, 28 US and 8 ARVN WIA, 9 US MIA).
- 6 -- En shells TSN AB with 23 rds of rkt and mtr fire (1 KIA, 38 WIA, moderate material dam).
- ARVN abn forces engage en 1 km S of TSN AB near French Military Cemetery (En: 37 KIA, 6 Det, 19 Wpns; Frd: 7 KIA, 1 WIA).
- 7 -- Elms of 9th US Inf Div establish day-long contact with en force 11 km S of TSN AB, Gia Dinh Prov (En: 213 KIA, 11 Det, 28 Wpns; Frd: 7 KIA, 1 WIA).
- Frdly forces contact en in a series of engagements 5, 8, and 9 km SW of TSN AB (En: 189 KIA, 30 Det, 78 Wpns; Frd: 15 KIA, 84 WIA).
- GVN imposes 24-hr curfew in Cholon section (6th, 7th, and 8th Precincts) of Saigon, due to heavy fighting.

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- GVN reports in 2 days of fighting in Saigon area 2,000 en are killed and 200 det.
- 9 -- MACV announces 2,540 en KIA in and around Saigon since 5 May (53 US and 20 ARVN KIA, 487 US and 719 ARVN WIA).
  - En force atks 3/21 US Inf participating in Opn NAPOLEON-SALINE, 10 km N of Dong Ha, Quang Tri Prov (En: 159 KIA, 58 I/W, 18 C/S; Frd: 1 KIA, 16 WIA).

En fires 4 rds of 82mm mtr containing English language propaganda leaflets into compound of Hq, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in Kontum City. Incident marks first known en use of 82mm mtr to deliver propaganda leaflets.
- 10 -- Start of Paris talks between US and NVN postponed until 13 May, but talks between second echelon representatives begin, and they agree on procedural rules for the conversations.
  - BG Robert C. Forbes, USA, assumes duties of MACJ1 and CG, US Army Element USMACV, replacing BG Franklin M. Davis, Jr., USA.
- 11 -- US and NVN representatives in Paris agree to exclude reps from other govts from initial conversations.
  - En overruns 3 of 5 outposts of USSF Kham Duc CIDG Camp 75 km W of Tam Ky, Quang Tin Prov. Camp is evacuated 12 May, ending 3-day battle (En: 300 KIA; Frd: 25 US KIA, 86 US and 29 ARVN WIA; status of 678 civs unk; 7 105mm how dest, 2 C-130, 1 O-2, 2 CH-47, 1 A-1H, 2 UH-1C, 2 CH-46 dest, approx 150 ARVN/civs killed in C-130 crash).
- 12 -- En launches simultaneous atks on Binh Loi and Newport Bridges, Gia Dinh Prov; dam 50-60 ft of Newport Bridge.
  - Elms of 3/50th ARVN Inf participating in Opn TOAN THANG discover 150 AK-47s 14 km NNW of Tan An, Long An Prov.
  - MACV announces that of the 26 VC/NVA bns trying to enter Saigon since 5 May, elms of only 8 actually reached the city's fringes.
  - En losses put at 2,500 KIA in city (Saigon) and over 5,200 KIA in III CTZ, plus 1,951 I/W and 572 C/S.
  - DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS, Robert Komer, announces VC/NVA May Offensive. Resulted in only 16 of 4,000 govt posts being abandoned, of which 10 have been recaptured; only 6 of over 700 RD teams were withdrawn. 122,500 new refugees created in Saigon/Gia Dinh area.
  - USS HENRY B. WILSON (DDG7) engages and sinks en 75-ft steel-hulled trawler 26 mi SW of Phu Vinh, Vinh Binh Prov.
  - GVN announces 9 May defection of VC regimental commander, LTC Truong Trung Doan of VC 165th Rgt, 7th Div. Second highest ranking defector to date.

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- 3/1 and 4/1 ARVN Inf engage 2 en cos 4 km NE of Quang Tri (En: 119 KIA, 2 Det, 32 I/W, 9 C/S; Frd: 8 KIA, 60 WIA).
- 15 -- MACV announces release of 2 VC prisoners from Quang Ngai prison camp as a reciprocal gesture for release of two US soldiers freed by VC in Quang Tin Prov (USMC Cpl J. A. Santos and USA PFC L. O. Rivera) on 20 Jan.
- A/3/4 US Cav on reconnaissance-in-force opn, 12 km NE of Trang Bang, Hau Nghia Prov, engage en force (En: 82 KIA, 3 Det, 10 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 5 KIA, 20 WIA).
- 1st Bn, NVA 95B Regt atks 105th and 438th RF Cos, 11 km ENE of Kontum (En: 147 KIA, 18 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: 3 WIA).
- 16 -- 3/7 USMC participating in Opn ALLEN BROOK engage est en bn 15 km NE of An Hoa, Quang Nam Prov (En: 131 KIA, 6 I/W, 6 C/S; Frd: 26 KIA, 37 WIA).
- 17 -- ADM U. S. Grant Sharp, USN, CINCPAC arrives in RVN for 2-day visit.
- 18 -- Period 5-11 May sets new 7-day high for US KIA - 562. Previous high was 11-17 Feb - 543 KIA.
- President Thieu accepts resignation of PM Nguyen Van Loc and his cabinet, and appoints Tran Van Huong new PM.
- 19 -- En commences campaign of nightly rkt atks against Saigon. 22 rkts land in Saigon, about 150 houses dest near Central Market (3 NP and 3 civ and 1 US wounded).
- En atks Newport Bridge, Saigon, and is repulsed by US/ARVN guards.
- En shells Camp Evans, Thua Thien Prov with 122mm rkt fire (13 acft dam, 4 UH-1 dest).
- Elms of 101st Abn Div find Soviet double-barreled wheel-mounted 23mm AA guns in A Shau Valley, Thua Thien Prov.
- En atks British tanker ANCO QUEEN, 13 km SE of Nha Be, Gia Dinh Prov. Light helo fire team and PBRs spt within 2 minutes. (En: 11 KIA, 2 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 5 US and 1 RF WIA).
- 20 -- En shells Marble Mtn Air Fac, 5 km SSE of Da Nang, Quang Nam Prov, with 25 rds of mtr fire (9 WIA, 5 UH-1E, 3 CH-53, 3 CH-46 dam).
- Philippine tug BREEM with 2 US MP security guards on board while enroute from Vung Tau Tho via the Mekong and Bassac Rivers, loses way and strays over Cambodian border. Tug and all abd are taken into custody and escorted to Phnom Penh. MPs are released on 10 Jun to Australian authorities in Phnom Penh and flown to Bangkok.
- 21 -- President announces the nomination of LTG George S. Brown, USAF, to assume duties of CDR, 7AF and DEPCOMUSMACV for Air. Incumbent GEN William W. Momyer, USAF, will become CDR, TAC.

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- 23 -- MG Charles A. Corcoran, USA, assumes duties of MACJ3 from MG Willard Pearson, USA.
- 25 -- The 1/2 and 4/2 ARVN Inf engage en 2 km N of Dong Ha, Quang Tri Prov (En: 122 KIA, 4 Det, 24 I/W, 6 C/S; Frd: 7 KIA, 22 WIA).
- En shells Cua Viet Naval Fac 13 km NE of Dong Ha, Quang Tri Prov, with 111 rds of mixed 100mm, 130mm, and 152mm arty fire (4 WIA, 160,000 gallons fuel and miscellaneous POL materiel dest).
- 26 -- USAF jets dam or dest 16 100mm AA gun emplacements between Dong Hoi and DMZ. 100mm guns are largest en AA wps in use to date.
- Est en bn atks night defensive position of 4/23 US Inf 3 km W of Phu To Race Track, Gia Dinh Prov (En: 218 KIA, 3 Det, 17 I/W, 4 C/S; Frd: 6 KIA, 32 WIA).
- En shells Phu Bai Afd, Thua Thien Prov, with 30 rds of mtr fire (Frd: 3 KIA, 14 WIA, 6 CH-46, and 3 UH-34 dam).
- 28 -- GEN W. C. Westmoreland, USA, COMUSMACV departs RVN for 9-day trip to CINC-PAC and Washington.
- ROKA forces find 120mm mtr and 14 rds of ammo 30 km NW of Qui Nhon, Binh Dinh Prov. First indication of use of this wpn in coastal provinces of II CTZ.
- 29 -- A/2/327 US Abn Inf participating in Opn NEVADA EAGLE find en wps cache 20 km SW of Hue, Thua Thien Prov (785 rifles, 102 rds 75mm RR, 3 60mm mtrs (complete) and misc munitions).
- 2d VN Marines engage en force 3 km SW of Phu To Race Track, Saigon (En: 309 KIA, 34 Det, 21 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: 7 KIA, 29 WIA, 7 MIA).
- 30 -- A/2/17 US Cav participating in Opn NEVADA EAGLE engages est en platoon 12 km E of Hue, Thua Thien Prov (En: 142 KIA, 44 Det, 45 I/W, 7 C/S; Frd: 1 KIA, 10 WIA).
- GVN lifts all press censorship.
- President Johnson announces promotion of LTG Bruce Palmer, DCG, USARV to GEN and assignment as ACofS, USA, MG Richard G. Stilwell, Dep CG, III MAF to LTC and reassignment to CG IFFORCEV relieving LTG William B. Rosson; MG Walter T. Kerwin, CofS USMACV, to LTC and reassignment as CG IFFORCEV relieving LTG Frederick C. Weyand.
- 31 -- 1/6 VNBC engages est 2 en cos 4 km E of TSN, Gia Dinh Prov (En: 101 KIA, 6 Det, 27 I/W, 9 C/S; Frd: 13 KIA, 57 WIA, 1 MIA).

## JUNE

- 1 -- US mil strength in RVN is 630,638.

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- 4th Bn RAR closes RVN for ops with 1st ATF at Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy Prov; 2d Bn, RAR departs RVN.
- 6th VNMCC, sped by AC-47 gunships, engages unk number of en attempting to infiltrate 4 km E of TSN, Gia Dinh Prov (En: 182 KIA, 11 Det, 48 I/W, 21 C/S; Frd: 17 KIA, 71 WIA).
- 2 -- 6 high-ranking VN mil and police officers are killed in Cholon when US helo fires rkt which malfunctions.
- 1/1 ARVN Inf engages est en bn 6 km NE of Quang Tri City (En: 107 KIA, 3 Det, 32 I/W; 13 C/S; Frd: 19 KIA, 62 WIA).
- 3 -- A/2/327 Abn, participating in Opn NEVADA EAGLE discovers wpm cache 21 km SW of Hue, Thua Thien Prov, containing 392 I/W, 3 C/S.
- 4 -- En fires 40 rkt and mtr rks into Saigon and suburbs. A cargo ship and Cho Quan power station in south-central Saigon are hit.
- GVN establishes the post and command of Governor of Saigon/Gia Dinh, appointing MG Nguyen Van Minh, CG, 1st ARVN Div as CG, to be under operational control of CG, III CTZ. New command will coordinate defense of Saigon/Gia Dinh.
- US Emb announces fighting in Saigon/Cholon in past 3 weeks has caused an additional 115,562 homeless.
- MACV appoints MG John H. Hay, Jr., USA, DCG, II FFORCEV as SA to the Governor of Saigon/Gia Dinh, and assigns OPCON of all US forces involved in security of the CMD to him, under overall OPCON of CG, II FFORCEV. CMD thus has 2 parallel and sping command structures.
- 60 en (21 NVN) (74 wpm) surrender to elms of ARVN 4th (Black Panther) Div in Thua Thien.
- Elms of the 18th ARVN Rgrs engage en 1.5 km S of Phu To Race Track, Saigon (En: 135 KIA, 20 Det, 34 I/W; Frd: 13 KIA, 41 WIA).
- 6 -- VC terrorists detonate est 200 lbs of C-4 and dest Chinese "A Shau" newspaper plant in Cholon, Gia Dinh Prov (5 civs killed).
- 7 -- Undetermined number of en rkts hit Saigon, killing 20 civs and wounding 40 others.
- 9 -- 31 members of 308th VC MF and 6th LF Bns, including Cdr and 2 NCCs, surrender to ARVN Rgrs in SW Saigon.
- Organized VC resistance from 25 May atks end in Saigon/Cholon.
- GEN W. C. Westmoreland departs RVN for Washington, D. C., to assume duties of CoS USA. GEN Creighton W. Abrams assumes temporary command of USMACV.

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- 11 -- VC fire 26 rkts into central Saigon, causing 135 civ casualties.
- 12 -- En rkts TSN AB, Gia Dinh Prov, with 14 rds of 122mm (1 VN KIA, 26 WIA: 4 C-130, 2 C-123, 1 C-1A, 1 U-21, and 1 UH-1 dest, 1 helo dam).
  - 2d ARVN terminates search and cordon opn SE of Gio Linh, Quang Tri Prov (En: 219 KIA, 2 Det, 46 I/W, 3 C/S; Frd: 25 KIA, 83 WIA).
  - VP Nguyen Cao Ky resigns as head of Civil Defense Forces.
- 13 -- BG John N. McLaughlin, USMC, assumes duties as Director, COC, Hq MACV relieving BG John R. Chaisson, USMC.
- 14 -- En rkts TSN AB, Gia Dinh Prov, with 10 rds of 107mm (1 KIA, 1 acft dest, 1 acft dam).
- 15 -- Elms of 4th Regt, 3d Mar Div, engage unk size en force 7 km SSE of Khe Sanh Village, Quang Tri Prov (En: 186 KIA; Frd: 16 KIA).
  - GVN National Assembly passes General Mobilization Decree. All able-bodied men 18-38 are eligible for active service.
- 16 -- LTG Frank T. Mildren assumes DCG, USARV, relieving LTG Bruce Palmer.
  - In a night of confused activity, US grd and Naval units in vicinity of Dong Ha, Quang Tri Prov and eastern end of DMZ report and fire upon suspected en helos and jet acft. HMAS HOBART hit by jets, suffering 2 KIA, 7 WIA. USS EDSON, BLANDY, and BOSTON, USCG WPB PT DUME and PCF 12 are overflowed or atkd, all without casualties. PCF 19 is sunk by rkt fire with 5 MIA. Later investigation reveals jets were US, but question of "sighted" helos remains unsolved.
  - CPT Phan Van Xuong, XO of VC Quyêt Thang (273d) Regt defects to ARVN forces in Co Vap, Gia Dinh Prov.
- 18 -- B-52s mark end of third year of participation in the war.
  - USMC elms in defensive positions 15 km SSE of the Khe Sanh Combat Base atkd by unk size en force (En: 128 KIA; Frd: 11 KIA, 30 WIA).
  - GVN announces largest en grp surr to date. 141 VC from 273d Regt, most of whom are NVN, surrender to ARVN SF and VNMC units in Gia Dinh Prov, just NE of Saigon (50 I/W, 6 C/S).
- 19 -- President Nguyen Van Thieu signs General Mobilization Decree while at Hue, Thua Thien Prov, celebrating VN Armed Forces Day.
- 20 -- II FFORCEV becomes CMAC.
- 21 -- VC hit northern outskirts of Saigon with at least 10 rkts (6 VN killed, 20 wounded).
  - 8 rds 122mm rkt impact on SE side of Saigon. 6 rds fall into Saigon River or adjacent swamp, 2 hit British merchantman, causing negligible dam (1 VN killed).

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- 25 -- PRU trps aptd by PBRs locate an en prison camp in southern Vinh Binh Prov and free 29 prisoners: 4 are killed by en and 8 wounded when their release appears imminent.
- 27 -- USMACV announces Khe Sanh Combat Base, Quang Tri Prov, will be abandoned in a shift to more mobile opns.
- Allied forces surround unk size en force, believed to be 814th Bn, Quang Tri Liberation Front, 12 km NE of Quang Tri City (En: 225 KIA, 38 Det; Frd: 3 KIA, 36 WIA).
- COL Tran Van Hai, NP Chief, announces investigation into rkt deaths of 6 high-ranking officers in Cholon in early June concludes (report later released (1 August) exonerates USA pilot, and blames faulty rkt).
- CMCAC puts CMD on full alert, cancelling leaves, in preparation for expected en offensive.
- Elms of ARVN 25th Inf Div find 76 122mm and 50 -107mm rkts 13 mi NW of Saigon, while participating in Opn QUYET THANG.
- 28 -- VC sapper squad atks Son Tra refugee hamlet 6 mi S of Chu Lai, Quang Tin Prov, killing 88, of whom 73 are civs, and wounding 103 others. 85% of hamlet is burned, leaving 4,000 homeless.
- 29 -- Elms of US 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div, find large en arms cache near Moc Hoa, Kien Tuong Prov (29 tons of TNT, 297,000 AK-47 rds, 1,142 mtr rds, 8,783 grenades, 491 wpns).
- USMACV reports 187 US KIA in week ending this date. Lowest weekly figure since first week of 1968.
- USMACV reports that in first 6 months of 1968, 10,503 Americans died ((from all causes) in RVN, a figure almost equal to the 1967 total of 11,058.
- In the first 6 months of 1968, en loses 39,800 wpns, enough to arm 6 of his divs. En loses over 170,000 men in the same period.

### JULY

- 1 -- US military strength in RVN is 528,840.
- 1st Cav Div (AM) redesignated 1st Air Cav, and 101st Abn Div redesignated 101st Air Cav Div.
- 3 -- GEN Creighton W. ABRAMS assumes command of USMACV.
- Hanoi announces it will release three US pilots, but does not reveal names, date or place.
- 5 -- Last USMC units leave Khe Sanh Combat Base, Quang Tri Prov.

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- 11 -- GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster assumes duties of DEPCOMUSMACV.
- 13 -- MACV announces US KIA in week ending this date is 118, lowest weekly total since 7 October 1967, when it was 102.
- 14 -- SECDEF Clark Clifford arrives in RVN for 5-day visit. CJCS GEN Earl G. Wheeler and Asst SECDEF William P. Bundy accompany him.
  - B-52s make deepest 1968 penetration of NVN, bombing truck parks, supply complexes, ammo dumps, wpns sites, and trp concentrations 15 mi N of the DMZ.
- 16 -- GEN William W. Momyer, Cdr 7AF, departs RVN to assume duties as Cdr TAC.
  - Opn BOLLING, initiated by 17M Abn Bde and 1st Cav Div in Phu Yen Prov on 19 Sep 67 is suspended (En: 667 KIA, 2,473 Det, 212 I/W, 22 C/S; Frd 60 KIA, 248 WIA).
- 17 -- USA LCU-1577 of 5th Trans Heavy Boat Co inadvertently crosses into Cambodia while enroute from Vang Tau to Can Tho. 11 US and 1 ARVN taken into custody by RKG.
  - Elms of VC T-10 RSSZ Gp fire 2 122mm rkts at a merchant ship in Long Tau Channel. Rkts miss target. First reported use of 122mm rkts against shipping.
- 18 -- B-52s strike NVN SAM sites for the first time at a point 31 mi SE of Dong Hoi and 4 mi N of the DMZ.
- 19 -- Presidents Johnson and Thieu meet at CINCPAC Hq, Honolulu, for 2 days of discussions.
  - NAVADGRP turns over 4 "Swift" boats (PCFs) to VNN. VNN concurrently assumes resp for 2 more MARKET TIME patrol stations for a total of 8.
- 20 -- Saigon marks one month without rkt atk (last atk was 21 June).
- 21 -- VC terrorists kill 5 civs and injure 55 by a blast set off in the Quoc-Thanh Theatre, near NP Hq, Saigon. 4 others killed and 41 wounded as VC terrorists set off charge in a restaurant on Vo Tanh Street, Saigon.
- 22 -- 1500 Thai infantrymen of the Black Panther Div arrive in Saigon aboard USS OKANOGAN (APA220), first of 12,000 to deploy to RVN. Unit will be stationed at Bear Cat, Bien Hoa Prov.
- 23 -- MG Robert F. Worley, Vice Commander, 7AF, is shot down and killed in an RF-4C Phantom, in Thua Thien Prov, 65 mi NW of Da Nang. Copilot bails out safely, MG Royal N. Baker, MACJ3, assumes duties as Vice Commander, 7AF, immediately, instead of 9 Aug as previously planned.
  - En fires some 250 mtr and rkt rds into 7 installations in Da Nang area, Quang Nam Prov. At Marble Mtn Air Fac 5 US and 9 CIDG wounded, 8 acft dam; 6 US KIA, 68 US WIA at NMCB Compound, Red Beach. 2 acft dam at Da Nang AB.

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- 24 -- SECARMY Stanley R. Resor, arrives in RVN for 10-day visit.
- MG Roderick Wetherill, USA, assumes duties of Asst Deputy to DEPCOMUSMACV for C/RE..
- 25 -- MG Charles A. Corcoran, USA, assumes duties as Cofs, USMACV, relieving MG Walter T. Kerwin, USA, who departs to assume duties of CG, II FFORCEV.
- B/5/7 1st Air Cav Div discovers large en hosp complex 38 km W of Hue, Thua Thien Prov, including 37 40'x40' huts with underground rooms, and a large quantity of medicine and eqpt.
- 26 -- En rkts Da Nang AB with 15 rds of 122mm (1 US KIA, 7 US WIA, 1 A-6A dest, 7 A-6A dam).
- 27 -- En mines 4 USN LCMs in Cua Viet River, Quang Tri Prov, but fails to sink any. River traffic halted for most of the day.
- MACV announces that the accreditation of Baltimore Sun correspondent John S. Carroll, revoked for an indefinite period in June, will now be revoked for 6 months.
- 28 -- Pres Johnson names RADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., to relieve RADM Kenneth Veth as COMNAVFORV and CHNAVADGRP, and upgrades the position to VADM rank.
- MG Richard F. Schaefer, USAF, assumes duties as MACJ5.
- SEVENTHFLT announces USN jets destroy 232 WBLC in NVN in area from 19th parallel to a point 75 mi S to Cape Muir Ron; largest kill yet in one day.
- Co A, 1/26 US Inf, 26 km WNW of Song Be, Phuoc Long Prov, discovers 70 tons of polished rice, 500 gals cooking oil, 600 gals powdered food, and 101 pedal bicycles, and other miscellaneous stores, munitions, documents, along with 7 RPG-2 rkt launchers, 18 I/W, 3 C/S.
- ARVN security personnel stop US manufactured vehicle in Da Nang and discover 260 lbs of explosives, 19 wpns, 80 mines, 48 cases of 7.62mm ammo and 18 cases of warheads. Two VC cptrd, one escapes.
- 29 -- 1,800-man contingent of Thai Black Panther Div arrives in Saigon, boosting Thai forces in RVN to 3,300 of a programmed 12,000.
- RADM Kenneth L. Veth, COMNAVFORV, presents first M16 rifles to VNN at VNN Hq, Saigon. VNN CNO Commodore Tran Van Chon attends ceremony.
- VC sapper team partially overruns Tuy Hoa AB, Phu Yen Prov, dest 2 C-130s and dam 1 F-100, 3 C-130s, 1 AC-47 (En: 9 KIA, 3 I/W, 1 C/S; Frd: 1 WIA).
- PRU, acting on an agent report, contacts 11-man en recon unit in Da Nang, Quang Nam Prov, 2 are killed, 4 commit suicide with hand grenades, and 5 are cptrd.

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- 30 -- Thai unit stumbles on US night ambush position near their base at Bear Cat, Bien Hoa Prov, causing US forces to open fire, inflicting several casualties on the Thais.
- 2d Bde, 9th Inf Div and MRG ALFA with US 4/47 and 3/60 Inf and 5th Bn VNMC launch 10-day opn into en base area 480, in Chuong Thien Prov, 100 mi SW of Saigon, and 37 mi SW of Can Tho. This is first allied penetration of this remote area (En: 252 KIA, 39 Det, 85 I/W, 9 C/S; Frd: 4 US and 3 VNMC WIA).
- 31 -- ADM John S. McCain, Jr., USN, assumes duties as CINCPAC, relieving ADM U. S. Grant Sharp, Jr., USN.
- US and NVN delegates meet in Paris for 15th session of official conversations.
- On Opn DANSINH/COCHISE GREEN in Binh Dinh Prov, 15 km W of Phu My, the E/1/50 Mech, while searching a cave complex in the vic of Hon Che Mtn, discovers 1 ton of rice, assorted documents, 935,000 \$VN and \$150,00 US in \$50 bills.

## AUGUST

- 1 -- US mil strength in RVN is 529,435.
- GEN George S. Brown USAF, assumes duties as Cdr, 7AF and DEPCOMUSMACV for Air relieving GEN William W. Momyer, USAF.
- BG Earl F. Cole assumes duties as Cdr USA Elem, USMACV.
- BG Frank B. Clay, USA, assumes duties of MACJ1, replacing BG Robert C. Forbes.
- Arrival of 1st Bde, 5th Mech Inf Div is announced by MACV. Bde is deployed to Quang Tri and Thua Thien Prov.
- USS NUECES (A<sup>T</sup> 340) and USS MERCER (APB39) arrive at Vung Tau, doubling the number of barracks ships (self-propelled) in the MRF.
- 2 -- NVN releases USAF pilots who are then flown to Vientiane, Laos in an ICC aircraft, in company with 3 US pacifists.
- III CTZ mobile field court sentences, in absentia, student Nguyen Dang Trung, Chairman of Saigon Students Executive Committee, to 10 years at hard labor for "weakening the fighting spirit of the Vietnamese people and Armed Forces."
- 3 -- GEN Leonard F. Chapman, CMC, arrives in RVN for 7-day visit.
- 4 -- ADM John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, arrives in RVN for 2-day visit.
- 5 -- Command of II CTZ is transferred from LTG Le Nguyen Khanh to LTG Do Cao Tri at a ceremony in Bien Hoa. LTG Khanh remains in command of VNMC Bde.

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- 6 -- DELTA BLACK HAWK trps in Kien Giang Prov, 46 km NW of Rach Gia discover and dest arms factory, including 34 structures, forges, castings, 500 grenade casings, lathes, mines, cauldron, 22 I/W, and miscellaneous supplies.
- USMC's newest FAC aircraft, the O-1V Bronco, begins combat evaluation period in RVN by Mar Air Recon Sq 2, Marble Mtn, Quang Nam Prov.
- 7 -- At 16th session of Paris talks USG announces, as a reciprocal goodwill gesture to the release of 3 USAF pilots, it will release 14 NVN sailors cptrd on 1 Jul 66 during a naval engagement in the Gulf of Tonkin. Prisoners are held in Da Nang.
- 8 -- Prince Sihanouk says he will release USA LCU and 11-man crew when USG takes responsibility for alleged atk on a frontier village in which 14 Cambodians were killed and also gives him 14 bulldozers.
- VC terrorist tosses grenade into MF jeep in 3d Precinct in downtown Saigon, killing 1 and wounding 1. Terrorist escapes.
- ARVN 2/3 and 5/2, and 1/11 APC 4 km E of Gio Linh, Quang Tri Prov engage unk size en force (En: 107 KIA, 14 I/W, 4 C/S; Frd: 7 KIA, 49 WIA).
- USMACV announces 1,844 Chieu Hoi during the month of July, the highest monthly total since Aug 67. Also announced is that during this year the number of officers and NCO returnees is more than double that of 1967, although overall figures are down.
- 10 -- After 1 year service in RVN the last elm of the RTAVR "Queen's Cobras" departs from Saigon for Bangkok.
- 11 -- ADM Thomas H. Moorer, CNO, arrives in RVN for 5-day visit to various installations and YANKEE Station.
- National Self-Defense Month begins, initiating a program in which 133,000 arms will be distributed to the citizens of RVN (10,000 in Saigon, 2,000 in each province and municipality--53,000 immediately, 40,000 in August, 40,000 in September and October).
- 13 -- Tropical Storm "Rose" limits air strikes over NVN to 31, the lowest number since 27 May 66, when 10 strikes were mounted. Also the first day, since 10 Dec 67, that USN pilots did not log a single flight over NVN, as TF 77 takes storm evasion maneuvers.
- 14 -- DELTA BLACK HAWK unit (7th Sqdn, 1st US Air Cav and VN CSF units) 18 km E of Cao Lanh, Kien Phong Prov, dest 3 en munitions factories, melting, chemical, sheet metal, booby trap, and blacksmith shops, 4,800 hand grenades, 1,600 sq ft of sheet metal, chemical stores, etc.
- 15 -- PROVCORPSV at Phu Bai, Thua Thien Prov, is redesignated as XXIV Corps.
- ARVN units operating as part of Opn LAMSON 250 5 km NE of Gio Linh, Quang Tri Prov, engage unk size en force in a heavy firefight (En: 159 KIA, 13 I/W, 17 C/S; Frd: 1 KIA, 31 WIA).

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- ARVN inf tng ctr in southern Long An Prov is atkd by unk size en force employing 300 rds of mixed 60mm and 82mm mtr, MG and S/A fire (En: 28 KIA; Frd: 29 KIA, 150 WIA, tng ctr 50 percent dest).
- 16 -- 8 prisoners and 1 Mar gd injured as 300 prisoners riot at USMC Brig Da Nang, Quang Nam Prov.
- 17 -- En documents cptrd by Allied forces indicate 17 Aug as day called for by COSVN for start of Third Offensive which is to last until Nov 68 to influence US political conventions, quadrennial elections, raise NVA/VC morale, force GVN to accept a coalition govt, and make SVN demand a halt to the bombing of the north.
  - Lull in fighting ends as en attacks in strength in I, II and III CTZs. Main fighting erupts in Tay Nhat Prov and city with atk on afid and SF camp.
  - Asst SECARMY (FA) Eugene M. Beckers arrives in RVN for 16-day visit.
  - Dep Asst SECDEF (PA) Richard Fryklund arrives in RVN for 3-day visit.
- 19 -- MG Roderick Wetherill assumes duties as Asst Dep to COMUSMACV for CORDS relieving MG George I. Forsythe.
- 20 -- GEN I. Nasarro, CINCPACAF, arrives in RVN for 7-day visit.
  - Unk size en force, est at a bn, overruns USMC CAP 2-3-4 3 km ENE of Hoi An, Quang Nam Prov, killing all members of CAP except 3 on patrol at the time. (10 US, 24 PF KIA).
- 21 -- After a 2-month lull (since 21 Jun) en 122mm rkts hit Saigon. 10 hit in downtown area, 6 in Cholon, 3 along the docks (17 civs killed, 69 wounded). National Assembly bldg roof is hit, moderate dam.
- 23 -- En atks Cam Le Bridge, south of Da Nang, Quang Nam Prov, overrunning part of bridge, but is forced back by A/M USMC MP Bn (En: 182 KIA, 3 Det, 45 I/W, 1 C/S, 440 lbs TNT, 44 lbs C-4; Frd: 11 KIA, 68 WIA).
  - Est en bn atks Marble Mtn Afid, Quang Nam Prov (En: 32 KIA, Frd: 16 KIA, 125 WIA).
  - En force of bn to regt size atk Duc Lap SF Camp, 32 mi N of Gia Nghia, Quang Duc Prov, and 5 mi from Cambodian border. Battle rages through 26 Aug. (En: 803 KIA; Frd: 52 KIA (2 US), 129 WIA (4 US). Largest Vietnamese en kill in a single battle of the war).
- 24 -- GEN Ralph E. Haines, Jr., CINCUSARPAC, arrives in RVN for 4-day visit.
  - ARVN units 10 and 12 km S of Da Nang, Quang Nam Prov, engage unk size en force in fierce engagements (En: 225 KIA, 3 Det; Frd: 7 KIA, 39 WIA).
- 25 -- ADM John J. Hyland, CINCPACFLT, arrives in RVN for 2-day visit.

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- Elms of US B/2/1 Inf and A/1/1 Cav engage unk size en force near Tam Ky, Quang Tin Prov (En: 213 KIA, 10 I/W, 10 C/S; Frd: 7 KIA, 30 WIA).
- 26 -- ADM John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, arrives in RVN for 1-day visit.
- The 101st Air Cav Div and the 1st Air Cav Div are redesignated as the 101st Airborne Div (AM) and the 1st Cav Div (AM).
- 28 -- US 1/508 Inf in Opn NEVADA EAGLE 26 km South of Hue, Thua Thien Prov, find a series of en arms caches containing 200,000 rds S/A ammo, 1,000 rds 82mm mtr ammo, 500 60mm mtr ammo, 150 rds 57mm RR, 50 B-40 rcts, 41 RPG-2 launchers, and other miscellaneous arms.
- 29 -- ARVN PRU raid in IV CTZ frees 49 VN prisoners, mostly RF/PF from en prison camp SW of Vi Thanh in Chuong Thien Prov.
- 30 -- COMUSMACV and GVN approve use of CS munitions by arty, mtr, helo and light fixed-wing acft without prior surface clearance in order to suppress quickly en rct or RR fire on selected sensitive areas in the CMD.
- Prisoners at USA Long Binh prison stockade riot. 1 prisoner is killed, 59 prisoners and 4 gds injured in an hour-long melee. Heavy dam is done to stockade. 10 large bldgs are burned (prisoner population is 719 military, 1 civ).
- 31 -- MG Elias C. Townsend assumes duties of MACJ3 relieving MG Charles A. Corcoran.

### SEPTEMBER

- 1 -- US mil strength in RVN is 537, 588.
- Da Nang, Quang Nam Prov, receives 12-15 rds 122mm rcts, killing 1 ARVN and 13 civs and 1 USMC wounded, but inflicting no dam to mil fac.
- QUYET CHIEN 44/17, a 4-day opn in Dinh Hiep and Kien Phong Prov commences(En: 143 KIA, 1 Det, 22 S/A, 8 C/S; Frd: 8 KIA, 30 WIA).
- 2 -- En fires 31 122mm rcts into 5 mil installations in Da Nang area (1 ARVN and 26 civs killed, 1 USMC and 45 ARVN wounded).
- 3 -- VC terrorists explode a grenade in front of USAID Hq on Le Van Duyet St in Saigon, wounding 7 civs. Another grenade wounds 8 civs in Saigon dock area.
- 4 -- US and NVN reps meet in Paris for the 20th time, but no progress is made.
- BG Frank B. Clay assumes command of USA Elm, USMACV.
- 5 -- SECNAV Paul R. Ignatius arrives in RVN for 5-day visit.

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- ARVN BG Truong Quang An, Cdr, 23d Div and 4 US are killed when their helo is downed near Duc Lap, Quang Duc Prov.
- 9 -- VC terrorists set off a 75-lb charge at GVN Information Office in Saigon's VI Precinct at 2030, dest the bldg, killing 9 civs and wounding 55.
- Dam est from Typhoon "Bess" indicate 60 percent of rice crop and 55 percent of en stored rice in Quang Tri Prov dest, seriously affecting the en postare.
- US Asst SEC Labor Robert Weaver arrives in Saigon to visit GVN civ agencies.
- 10 -- USMC RLT 27, called temporarily to RVN in Feb, departs RVN for CONUS.
- 11 -- BG Harold C. Pattison, ChMIIHist, DA arrives in RVN for 13-day visit.
- Bad weather caused by Tropical Storm "Bess" limits US air missions over the NVN Panhandle to 70, the lowest number since 13 August, when Tropical Storm "Rose" also interfered with the US air activity.
- En hits Binh Thuy AB, Phong Dinh Prov, with (suspected) 35 rds of 75mm RR fire (3 US 0-1, 1 AC-47, 2 U-10, 2 VNAF CH-34 dest, 2 UH-1 and 1 AC-47 dam).
- Elms of the 101st Abn Div and ARVN units launch a coordinated sweep of Vinh Loc Island ("Street Without Joy" area), 20 km E of Hue, Thua Thien Prov (En: 114 KIA, 242 PW, 12 Hoi Chanh; Frd: 1 KIA, 2 WIA).
- 13 -- Elms of 1st Bde, 5th Div (Mech), 3d Mar Div and 1st ARVN Div engage unk size en force in the DMZ 4 km NE of Gio Linh, Quang Tri Prov (En: 176 KIA, 1 Det; Frd: 4 KIA, 46 WIA).
- Elms of 1st US Inf Div ENE of Loc Ninh, Binh Long Prov, end 2-day heavy engagement (En: 167 KIA; Frd: 18 KIA, 60 WIA).
- MG Keith L. Ware, CG, 1st Inf Div, is killed along with 7 other US in helo crash near Loc Ninh, Binh Long Prov. MG Ware is 4th US general killed in the war.
- 14 -- ARVN uncover large ammo cache 13 km NE of Quang Loi, Phuoc Long Prov (2,742 RPG rds, 336 grenades, 547,560 AK-47 rds, 1,701 mnr rds, 1,969 lbs of CHICOM TNT).
- 15 -- ADM John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, arrives in RVN for 6-day visit.
- An ARVN sweep 22 km E of Rach Gia, Kien Giang Prov, uncovers 49 I/W, 5 C/S, 100 kg TNT, 10 tons assorted ammo, and other ord.
- ARVN 46th Regt, in ops S of Saigon in Can Giouc District, Long An Prov, finds CHI-COM 3 bank X 4 tube (total 12) 107mm (barrage) rkt launcher.

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- 16 -- In Opn TOAN THANG, 15 km NE of Go Dau Ha, Tay Ninh Prov, FSB POPE receives unk number 82mm mtr rds. US 3/187 Inf counterattacks (En: 131 KIA, 4 Det, 7 I/W, 5 C/S; Frd: 4 KIA, 48 WIA).
- In 2-day action (16-17) 17 km WNW of Hot An, Quang Nam Prov, 21st and 39th ARVN Regt and 2/51 ARVN Inf engage unk size en force (En: 134 KIA, 9 I/W, 7 C/S, and 500 grenades; Frd: 25 KIA, 55 WIA, 21 MIA, 15 I/W, 3 C/S).
- 18 -- Est 2 en cos atk Hoa Da Village, Binh Thuan Prov, overrunning village, dist Hq, and MACV compound, but are driven out 4 hrs later (En: 8 KIA; Frd: 39 PF KIA, 40 WIA (34 PF, 2 US, 4 VN civ)).
- 19 -- USMC find 7 wpns caches in vic of Rockpile (3,343 82mm mtr rds, 957 60mm mtr rds, 7,786 CHICOM grenades, 2,900 lbs TNT, and 323,520 rds of 7.62 ammo).
- 21 -- In Opn TOAN THANG, 9 km SW of Ben Soi, Tay Ninh Prov, 1st VNMCM/163d RF Co OP is atkd by est 200 rds 82mm mtr fire and by grd trps (En: 128 KIA, 2 Det, 22 I/W, 10 C/S; Frd: 4 KIA, 48 WIA).
- Elms of 9th Mar find 164 en KIA in graves NW of Rockpile, Quang Tri Prov, apparently KBA.
- 22 -- En fires 15 122mm rckts and 15 82mm mtr rds into I CTZ Hq and Naval Hospital, Da Nang, and MAG-16 at Marble Mtn, Quang Nam Prov. 45 acft dam.
- Binh Son Village and PW camp, 17 km N of Quang Ngai City is atkd by grd trps and 100 rds of mixed 60mm and 82mm and RR fire. En frees 3 PWs and shoots some who refuse to leave (En: 10 PWs KIA, 62 PWs WIA; Frd: 21 KIA (3 PF, 18 civ), 18 civ WIA).
- John S. Foster, Asst SECDEF (Research & Engineering) arrives in RVN for 14-day visit.
- 23 -- MACV announces Allied forces in the past 2 weeks in the DMZ have captured 920 I/W, some 15,000 mtr rds, 5,500 lbs TNT, over 1,500 miscellaneous rkt rds and over 1,000,000 S/A rds.
- 25 -- ROKFV marks 3 years of combat in RVN.
- ADM John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, arrives in RVN for 2-day visit.
- 26 -- Est en bn atks Phuoc Tan RF outpost, 7 km SW of Ben Soi, Tay Ninh Prov, breaching perimeter, but not penetrating OP (En: 146 KIA, 48 I/W, 14 C/S; Frd: 14 KIA, 96 WIA (2 US)).
- 28 -- Fire of unknown origin ignities contaminated fuel being off-loaded at Naval Facility, Cua Viet, Quang Tri Prov, spreading to adjacent areas (2 KIA, 6 WIA, 2 MIA, major dam to 3 LCM6, 2 LCM3, 1 LCM8; 3 PBRs, 1 fuel barge, 1 LCM3, 2 15' skimmer boats, spare parts, and causeway structures dest).

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- 30 -- USS NEW JERSEY commences combat ops in vicinity of DMZ, firing 20 rds of 16"/50. First battleship action since Jul 53.
- MACV announces that all FW Cdrs and the RVN JCS have signed AB-144, the Combined Campaign Plan for 1969. Action takes place at RVNAF Hq, marking first time US, Vietnamese, and all Allies have signed the combined plan, formerly a joint US/RVN document.
- CORDS announces secure population reaches 66.8%, only .4% below pre-Tet all-time high of 67.2%, reached on 31 Jan 68.
- VADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., relieves RADM Kenneth L. Veth as COMNAVFORV/CHNAVADGRF at ceremonies on board USS GARRETT COUNTY (LST786) in Saigon. CINCPAC, COMUSMACV and AMB Bunker attend ceremony.

## OCTOBER

- 1 -- US mil strength in RVN is 537,819.
- GVN begins natl registration (ID cards) of all citizens under the National Identity Registration Project.
- 2 -- An Army CH-47 collides with a USAF C-7A "Caribou" just after takeoff from Camp Evans, 60 mi NW of Da Nang, Thua Thien Prov; both crews and all 24 passengers are killed.
- 5 -- SECNAV Paul R. Ignatius arrives in RVN for 8-day visit.
- GEN Duong Van "Big" Minh returns to Saigon after nearly 4 years of exile in Bangkok.
- 6 -- USN SEALs and a VN force overrun enemy PW camp on Con Coc Island, 77 mi SW of Saigon, freeing 23 PWs, killing 1 VC.
- 7 -- GEN Jack G. Merrill, Cdr AF Logistics Command, arrives in RVN for 2-day visit.
- 8 -- 2/12 Inf (US) contacts en force 8 km NE of Tray Bang, Hau Nghia Prov (En: 147 KIA, 7 Det, 35 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 8 KIA, 13 WIA).
- 10 -- GVN denies coup was attempted against President Nguyen Van Thieu on 8 Oct despite full national armed forces alert that date.
- 11 -- Dep Asst SECDEF (Civil Rights & Ind Relations) Jack Moskowitz arrives in RVN for 5-day visit.
- 16 -- American Independent Party VP candidate GEN Curtis LeMay, USAF (Ret), arrives in RVN for 4-day private "fact finding" visit.
- 18 -- Level of fighting and losses in RVN at an all-time low as MACV reports 5 US KIA in past 3 days.

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- As part of dry season campaign, USN component of MACV launches Opn SEA LORDS, employing assets of TFs 115, 116 and 117 to interdict VC infiltration routes from Cambodia into the Mekong Delta. First entry of PCFs into the Delta and the first regular USN intrusion into the minor waterways of the Delta.
- 20 -- ADM John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, arrives in RVN for 2-day visit.
- LTG Henry W. Buse, CG, FMFPAC, arrives in RVN for 4-day visit.
- 21 -- In a surprise move MACV announces "C" Day -- the conversion of all current series 641 MPC. First mass currency conversion since the introduction of MPC into Vietnam in August 1965. \$20 MPC note is introduced.
- In Opn MIGHTY YANKEE, USS DUBUQUE (LPD8) transports 14 NVN sailors from Da Nang to a point 12 mi off Vinh, NVN, where PW group is released in a motor whale-boat. Opn is carried off with concurrence of NVN authorities. HMAS PERTH and USS BAUSELL escort USS DUBUQUE. NVN guaranteed a combat stand-down in the area, as did USC, when arrangements were made in Vientiane, Laos. 14 sailors are last of a group of 19 who were captured during a NVN PT attack on USN destroyers on 1 Jul 66.
- 23 -- 1st Mar Div Recon Teams sight 170 NVA 4 km NW of An Hoa, Quang Nam Prov, moving SW, and another grp of 121 NVA moving ENE. TAS and arty called in (En: 124 KIA).
- In Opn LAMSON 271, 6 km NE of Gio Linh in DMZ, ARVN 1/2 Inf, 1/11 and 3/11 Cav plus two platoons of USMC M Tank Bn, while on an offensive sweep locate and atk en co (reinf) (En: 112 KIA; Frd: 3 ARVN KIA, 30 WIA).
- 24 -- MACV announces that weekly US casualty figure for 7 days ending 19 Oct is 100 KIA, the lowest KIA figure in 14 months (12 Aug 67, when 82 US were KIA in that 7-day period).
- 25 -- In Opn KENTUCKY, US 1/61 Inf (Mech) and ARVN B/1/77, 8 km NE of Con Thien, Quang Tri Prov, make heavy contact with enemy (En: 232 KIA, 242 I/W, 17 C/S; Frd: 6 KIA, 29 WIA).
- In Opn BAEK MA-9, ROKFV 9th "White Horse" Div for the first time invades en stronghold at "Grand Sommet," held by 7th Bn, 18B NVA Div, just outside Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa Prov (En: 204 KIA, 34 I/W, 21 C/S; Frd: 3 WIA).
- Opn BINH TAY 3/5 terminates in II CTZ (En: 337 KIA, 7 Det, 76 I/W, 40 C/S; Frd: 10 KIA, 32 WIA).
- 26 -- In Opn TOAN THANG, 7 km NW of Tong Le Chun, Tay Ninh Prov, 2/28 US NDP receives en probe and mtr atk (En: 80 KIA, 3 Det, 26 I/W, 6 C/S; Frd: 14 KIA, 29 WIA).

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- COMUSMACV directs 1st Cav Div (AM) to relocate from northern I CTZ to northern Tay Ninh Prov, III C/LZ, in Opn LIBERTY CANYON. Movement is by air and 7th Flt amphibious shipping. Movement starts 28 Oct and div closes Tay Ninh Prov by first week of Nov.
- 28 -- President Johnson announces appointment of MACCORDS Robert W. Komer as American Ambassador to Turkey. William E. Colby, Deputy Asst for CORDS, will replace AMB Komer.
- LTG Lewis W. Walt, Asst CMC, arrives in RVN for 8-day visit.
- 29 -- COMUSMACV GEN C. W. Abrams, Jr., flies to Washington to confer with President Johnson.
- In Opn SEA LORDS, USS WASHOE COUNTY and 7 PCFs enter Bo De and Cua Lon Rivers, An Xuyen Prov, destroying 242 sampans and numerous on structures.
- 30 -- ADM John J. Hyland, CINCPACFLT, arrives in RVN for a 2-day visit.
- 31 -- Opn VICTORY DRAGON III (ROK) in Quang Nam Prov, terminates (En: 235 KIA, 30 Det, 73 I/W, 7 C/S; Frd: 10 KIA, 35 WIA).

### NOVEMBER

- 1 -- US Military strength in RVN is 534,907.
- Accelerated Pacification Campaign commences.
- At 0322, 3 en mines detonate between the pontoon and hull on the starboard side of USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY (LST1167), an MDMRF support ship, killing 25 (24 US, 1 VNN). Ship was severely damaged but flooding was controlled.
- President Johnson orders a complete cessation of air, grd, and naval bombardment of NVN to begin this date. (Announcement was made on 31 Oct in Washington).
- 3 en rks hit TSN AB causing light dam. First rkt atk on TSN since June. 6 rkts hit southern portion of Saigon, 1 hitting a church on Khanh Hoi Island, killing 21 VN civs and wounding 44.
- 2 -- President Thieu announces RVN will not send delegates to the 6 November talks in Paris because of NLF participation.
- Opn VERNON LAKE II commences in Quang Ngai Prov.

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- 3 -- Opn JEB STUART III terminates with following results (En: 2,114 KIA, 261 Det, 60 Ret, 1,228 I/W, 133 C/S; Frd: 232 KIA, 1,568 WIA).
- 4 -- 5 UH-1Ds from D/3/4 Cav hit by grd fire (3 dest, 2 with major dam) in Opn TOAN THANG in Hau Nghia Prov while attempting to extract trps.
  - Analysis shows that some of the rds received at FSB 29 (II CTZ) on 2 Nov were CHI-COM 105mm arty fired from positions inside Cambodia. This was the first use of an 105mm arty in II CTZ.
- 5 -- Opn BAEK MA-9, which began 11 Oct SW of Nha Trang, terminates. Forces involved were ROKA units against the 18B NVA Regt (En: 382 KIA, 9 Det, 92 I/W, 32 C/S; Frd: 15 KIA, 28 WIA).
  - Elms of 6/31 Inf (US) contact en 15 km NE of Cao Lanh, Kien Phong Prov (En: 90 KIA, 8 Hoi Chanhs, 89 AK47, 12 LMG, 2 12.7mm HMG, 2 M60 MG, 34 RPG-2, 28 RPG-7, 2 LAW, 1 M16, 2 82mm mtrs, 110 82mm mtr: rds, 80,000 rds AK47 ammo.
  - 41st Rgr and 8 RF Cos in Opn QUYET CHIEN 44/37 in Kien Phong Prov make heavy contact with east en bn (En: 107 KIA, 4 I/W, 2 C/S; Frd: 9 KIA, 30 WIA).
- 6 -- William E. Colby assumes duties as DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS.
- 7 -- Opn COMANCHE FALLS III terminates in Quang Tri Prov (En: 107 KIA, 45 Det, 7 Ret, 159 I/W, 9 C/S; Frd: 22 KIA, 57 WIA).
- 10 -- GEN Joseph J. Nasar, CINCPACAF, arrives in RVN for 5-day visit.
- 11 -- Opn BURLINGTON TRAIL terminates in Quang Tin Prov (En: 1,931 KIA; 1,289 Det, 441 I/W, 104 C/S; Frd: 192 KIA, 985 WIA).
  - VADM W. D. O'Brien, RN, CINCPACFLT arrives in RVN for 6-day visit.
- 12 -- Thomas D. Morris, Asst SECDEF (I&L), arrives in RVN for 3-day visit and David E. McGiffert, Undersecretary of the Army, arrives for 8-day visit.
  - Opn WHEELER/WALLOWA in Quang Tin Prov terminates (En: 10,020 KIA, 5,195 Det, 1,724 I/W, 329 C/S; Frd: 683 KIA, 3,599 WIA).
  - ARVN units launch HUNG QUANG 12/4, a 4-day combat opn in Quang Nam Prov (En: 171 KIA, 7 Det, 31 I/W, 7 C/S; Frd: 4 KIA, 46 WIA).
  - Opn MEADE RIVER, an opn to establish cordon around Thanh Phong Village and search and clear village and adjacent areas to dest en forces, caches, and fortifications and to capture VCI in support of APC, is launched in Quang Nam Prov. Opn is expected to last 8-10 days, is conducted by ARVN, ROKMC, NPFF and PRU units, and is controlled by 3d Mar Div.
- 21 -- US forces (USMC) shell northern half of DMZ for the first time since start of bombing halt.

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- 23 -- RF-4 Phantom recon acft downed over NVN.
  - Opn LANCASTER II, a search-and-clear opn conducted by elms of 3d Mar Div which began in Jan 68, terminates (En: 1801 KIA, 207 Det, 824 I/W, 89 C/S; Frd: 359 KIA, 2, 101 WIA).
- 25 -- 2 USAF acft, an F-4 Phantom and an unarmed recon acft, downed over NVN.
- 27 -- RVN agrees to send delegates to Paris peace negotiations. USG announces Saigon govt will take lead and be main spokesman on all matters of principal concern to SVN.
- 28 -- RVN announces that delegation to Paris peace negotiations will be headed by VP Nguyen Cao Ky.
- 30 -- William E. Colby, Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, given rank of Ambassador.
- 31 -- GVN releases 140 VC prisoners in simultaneous ceremonies in Saigon, Pleiku and Da Nang. All prisoners choose to remain in SVN.

## DECEMBER

- 1 -- US mil strength in RVN is 537,584.
  - Opn SPEEDY EXPRESS commences in IV CTZ. All US assets in Delta involved under OPCON of SA, IV CTZ.
- 2 -- GVN announces it will observe 24-hour Christmas truce commencing 1800, 24 Dec.
  - Opn HARDIN FALLS, Bn (reinf)-size opn in support of APC, commences in Quang Tin Prov. Conducted by 1/1 Cav (US), A/1/46 Inf (US), 1 RF Co, 1 PF Platoon, and 1 PRU Det; expected duration - 90 days.
- 3 -- MG G. M. Seignious II, Office of the Chairman, US VN Delegation, Paris, arrives in RVN for 6-day visit.
- 6 -- Opn HENDERSON HILL terminates in Quang Nam Prov (En: 107 KIA, 45 Det, 7 Ret, 159 I/W, 9 C/S; Frd: 22 KIA, 57 WIA).
- 7 -- C/1/5 (USMC) finds cache in Quang Nam Prov of 50-70 tons of rice and 2,000,000 NVN Plasters.
  - US casualties in VN since 1961 reach 30,000 KIA.
  - USAF RF4C recon acft hit by grd fire 60 km N of DMZ. Plane down at sea and crew rescued. Fourth plane downed by NVN since 1 Nov bomb halt.
  - Opn MEADE RIVER terminates in Quang Nam Prov (En: 841 KIA, 2,710 Det, 164 I/W, 15 C/S; Frd: 107 KIA, 523 WIA).

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- Opn NAPOLEON SALINE, 13-month multi-bn search-and-clear opn in Quang Tri Prov, terminates (En: 3,495 KIA, 349 Det, 631 I/W, 200 C/S; Frd: 395 KIA, 2,134 WIA).
- 10 -- Opn MAPSHAL MTN, a pacification opn in Quang Tri Prov, initiated under OPCON 1st Bde, 9th In: Div (Mech).
- 11 -- 11 LCU detainees held by Cambodia are released.
- 12 -- ADM J. J. Hyland, CINCPACFLT, arrives in SVN for 2-day visit.
- 15 -- BG James S. Timothy, USA, is appointed Deputy SA, II CTZ.
- 16 -- 7 NVN seamen rescued in Gulf of Tonkin in Oct 67 repatriated in Opn TIGHT JAW.
- 23 -- In Opn LE LOI, in Quang Nam Prov, 21st and 29th ARVN Rgr Bns have contact with en forces throughout the day (En: 198 KIA (59 KBA), 17 I/W, 10 C/S; Frd: 13 KIA, 65 WIA WIA).
- During a search-and-clear opn N of Ca Mau in An Xuyen Prov, elems of the ARVN 32d Regt discover a PW camp and release 83 ARVN PWs.
- In Opn TOAN THANG in Tay Ninh Prov, US and ARVN units make heavy contact (En: 103 KIA, 1 Det, 36 I/W, 13 C/S, 202 RPG rds, 250 CHICOM grenades, 500 lbs TNT, 13,200 AK47 rds, and 3 radios; Frd: 17 US KIA, 12 US WIA).
- 24 -- NLF announced 72-hour ceasefire commences at 0100.
- RVN announced 24-hour ceasefire commences at 1800; FW forces will also observe ceasefire.
- 25 -- GVN/US/FW ceasefire terminates at 1800. 133 violations of ceasefire by en noted during 24-hr period.
- Reps of CG, II FFORCEV meet with VC reps in Tay Ninh Prov for US prisoner release. No prisoners released.
- 27 -- NLF announced 72-hour ceasefire terminates at 0100.
- 30 -- NLF announced 72-hour ceasefire commences at 0100.
- A record of 123 Hoi Chanhs return to GVN cause in IV CTZ.
- 31 -- The following major US/FWMAF opns continue into 1969:

I CTZ: MARSHAL MTN, SCOTLAND II, DAWSON RIVER, NEVADA EAGLE,  
TAYLOR COMMON, VERNON LAKE II, KENTUCKY, FAYETTE CANYON,  
HARDIN FALLS.

II CTZ: McLAIN/DAN THANG, COCHISE GREEN/DAN SINH, MACARTHUR/  
BINH TAY.

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III CTZ: TOAN THANG II.

IV CTZ: SPEEDY EXPRESS, QUYET CHIEN (ARVN).

- MAJ James N. Rowe, USA, escapes from VC. Cptrd on 22 Oct 63.
- Chieu Hoi returns for 1968 total 18,171 compared to 27,178 for 1967; a decrease of 33 percent.
- End of year friendly military strength in RVN is: US, 536,040; RVN: 826,500; Korea: 50,003; Australia: 7,661; New Zealand: 516; Thailand: 6,005; Philippines: 1,576.
- US casualties since 1 Jan 61 are KIA: 30,543.

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## GLOSSARY

AA	Anti-Aircraft
AAA	Anti-Airc: Artillery
AAC	Autonomous Administrative Committee
AAFES	Army and Air Force Exchange System
AATTV	Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam
AB	Airbase
ABC	American Broadcasting Company
ABCOC	Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
ABD	Accumulated Bomb Damage
ABN	Airborne
AB&T	Alaska Barge & Transport, Inc.
ACoS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ACS	Air Commando Squadrons
ACTIV	Army Concept Team in Vietnam
ACW	Air Command Wing
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
ADSID	Air Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detector
A&DSL	Administrative & Direct Support Logistic
ADSRs	Automatic Document Storage and Retrieval System
AF	Air Force
AFAG	Air Force Advisory Group
AFAT	Air Force Advisory Team
AFGP	Air Force Advisory Group
AFB	Air Force Base
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFLD	Airfield
AFLS	Armed Forces Language School
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFPCS	Air Force Postal and Courier Service
AFRTS	American Forces Radio & Television Service
AFVN	American Forces Vietnam Network
AG	Adjutant General
AID	See USAID
AIK	Assistance in Kind
ALC	Area Logistical Command
ALCC	Airlift Control Center
AM	Airmobile
AMAMB	American Ambassador
AMB	Ambassador
AMC	Army Material Command
AMEMB	American Embassy
AMMO	Ammunition
AMPHIB	Amphibious
AMS	Army Map Service

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ANDPF	Alliance for National Democratic and Peace Forces
ANGLICO	Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
AO	Area of Operation
AP	Armed Propaganda
APA	Assistant Province Advisor
APB	Self-propelled Barracks Ship
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APC	Accelerated Pacification Campaign
APD	Airborne Personnel Detector
APO	Army Post Office
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
APPROX	Approximately
APT	Armed Propaganda Teams
ARC	American Red Cross
ARC LAPES	Single Parachute Low Altitude Extraction System
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
ARL	Landing Craft Repair Ship
ARMD	Armored
ARMORCCO	Artillery/Mortar/Rocket Countermeasures
ARPA-RDFU-V	Advanced Research Project Agency, Research and Development Field Unit, Vietnam
ARTY	Artillery
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASD(I & L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installation and Logistics)
ASID	Air-Deliverable Seismic Intrusion Detector
ASL	Authorized Stockage Lists
ASLT	Assault
ASPB	Assault Support Group
ASR	Available Supply Rate
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier
ATCO	Air Traffic Coordinating Office
ATF	Australian Task Force
ATK	Attack
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AW	Automatic Weapons
AWOL	Absent without Leave
BAR	Browning Automatic Rifle
BAS	Basic Allowance for Subsistence
BBL	Barrel
BDE	Brigade
BEQ	Bachelor Enlisted Men's Quarters
BIAS	Battlefield Illumination Airborne System
BLT	Battalion Landing Team
BN	Battalion
BOD	Beneficial Occupancy Dates
BOQ	Bachelor Officers' Quarters
BPS	Balanced Pressure System
BTV	Big Test Vehicle

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C	Confidential
CAP	Country Assistance Program
CAS	Controlled American Source
CAV	Cavalry
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
CCB	Command Communications Boat
CCP	Combined Campaign Plan
CD	Combat Development
CDEC	Captured Documents Exploitation Center
CDR	Commander
CDS	Container Delivery System
CDTC-V	Combat Development Test Center, Vietnam
CG	Commanding General
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICV	Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
CID	Command Information Division
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCPACINST	Commander in Chief, Pacific, Instruction
CINCPACREP	Commander in Chief, Pacific, Representative
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific
CINFO	Chief of Information
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
CIOCC	City Intelligence and Operation Coordination Center
CIV	Civilian
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJGS	Chief Joint General Staff
CLVTC	Cat Lai Vocational Training Center
CMAC	Capital Military Assistance Command
CMD	Capital Military District
CMEC	Combined Material Exploitation Center
CMIC	Combined Military Interrogation Center
CMIT	Combined Mobile Improvement Team
CMLS	Capt Mui Lay Sector
CMTT	Combined Mobile Training Team
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Company
COB	Combat Operating Base
COCIOF	Coordination of Clandestine Intelligence Operational Proposals
COFRAM	Controlled Fragmentation Munitions
CoS	Chief of Staff
COL	Colonel
COMDT	Commandant
COM	Communications
COMNAVFORV	Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam

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COMRTFV	Commander Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam
COMSEVENTHFLT	Commander Seventh Fleet
COMSTSFE	Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Far East
COMUSMACV	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CONUS	Continental United States
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
COBFL0T	Coastal Flotilla
COSVN	Central Office for South Vietnam
CPSA	Central Procurement and Supply Authority
CPT	Captain
CPTR	Capture
CRB	Cam Ranh Bay
CRC	Central Recovery Committee
CS	A riot control agent type of Tear Gas
C/S	Crew-Served Weapon
C&SC	Command & Staff College
CSAF	Chief of Staff, Air Force
CSAS	Common Service Airlift System
CSF	Casualty Staging Flight
CSC	Coastal Surveillance Center
CSR	Camp Sentinel Radar
CSS	Combat Sky Spot
CTC	Central Training Command
CTF	Commander Task Force
CTG	Commander Task Group
CTU	Commander Task Unit
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
CWCH	Civilian War Casualty Hospitals
CY	Calendar Year
DA	Department of the Army
DADAC	Department of the Army Distribution Allocation Committee
DAM	Damaged
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DASH	Drone Antisubmarine Helicopter
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCG	Deputy Commanding General
DCM	Deputy Charge of Mission
DCO	Dial Central Office
DCofS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DCPG	Defense Communications Planning Group
DD	Destroyer
DE	Destroyer Escort
DEGN	Diethyleneglycol Denitrate
DEPCG	Deputy Commanding General
DEPCOMUSMACV	Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense

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DEROS	Date Eligible Return from Overseas
DGFA	Director General of Finance and Audit
DGOH	Director General of Highways
DGON	Director General of Navy
DGWVA	Director General of War & Veterans Affairs
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIOCC	District Intelligence & Operation Center
DET	District
DIY	Division
DLIR	Downward Looking Infrared Radar
DM	Adamsite
DMS	Distance Measuring System
DMZ	Demilitarised Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DODMAN	Department of Defense Military Assistance Manual
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DTA	Division Tactical Area
DTC	Division Training Center
DTE	Dial Telephone Exchange
DZ	Drop Zone
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
EEL	Essential Elements of Information
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
ELMS	Elements
EM	Enlisted Men
EN	Enlisted
ENGR	Engineer
EQPT	Equipment
ER	Emergency Resupply
EST	Establish/Estimate
EVAC	Evacuation
EXPL	Explosion
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FASID	Fixed-Wing Aircraft-Deployed Seismic Intrusion Detector
FFORCEV	Field Force Vietnam
FLIR	Forward Looking Infrared Radar
FLR	Forward Looking Radar
FLT	Flight
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FPO	Fleet Post Office
FR	Field Ration
FRD	Friendly
FSE	Fire Support Base
FSCC	Fire Support Coordination Center
FTR	Fighter
FW	Free World
FWD	Forward
FWF	Free World Forces

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FWM	Free World Military
FWMA	Free World Military Assistance
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
FY	Fiscal Year
GCA	Ground Control Approach
GEN	General
GMT	Greenwich Mean Time
GNZ	Government of New Zealand
GOA	Government of Australia
GOP	Government of the Philippines
GP	Group
GPES	Ground Proximity Extraction System
GPW	Geneva Prisoner of War Convention
GPWD	General Political Warfare Department
GRC	Government of the Republic of China
GRD	Ground
GVN	Government of Vietnam
H&I	Harassing & Interdiction
HANDSID	Hand Emplaced Seismic Intrusion Detector
HELO	Helicopter
HELOSID	Helicopter Deliverable Seismic Intrusion Detector
HLZ	Helicopter Landing Zone
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Hour
IAD	Information Advisory Division
ICC	International Control Commission
ICEX	Infrastructure Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation
ICR	Intelligence Collection Requirement
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICM	Improved Conventional Munitions
IDC	Industrial Development Center
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
IG	Inspector General
IID	Infrared Intrusion Detector
ILC	International Logistics Center
IND	Indicators
INF	Infantry
IO	Information Office
IR-GFD	Infrared Gun Flash Detector
IRHA	Injuries Resulting from Hostile Action
ISA	International Security Affairs
ISC	Infiltration Surveillance Center
ISSA	Interservice Support Agreement
IVS	International Voluntary Services
I/W	Individual Weapon
IWCS	Integrated Wideband Communications System
JAMTO	Joint Airlines Military Traffic Office
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff

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JGS	Joint General Staff
JPRC	Joint Personnel Recovery Center
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JUSPAO	Joint United States Public Affairs Office
KIA	Killed in Action
KLSC	Korean Logistical Service Corps
KM	Kilometer
KSCB	Khe Sanh Combat Base
KW	Kilowatt
LAAT	Logistics Advisory Assistance Team
LAPES	Low-altitude-parachute-extraction system
LASL	Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
LAW	Light Anti-Tank Weapon
LBN	Letter Box Number
LCM	Landing Craft, Mechanized
LDNN	Underwater Demolition Team (Vietnamese Abbreviation)
LF	Local Force
LHFT	Light Helicopter Fire Team
LIMDIS	Limited Distribution
LLLTV	Low Light Level TV
LN	Local National
LOC	Lines of Communication
LOI	Letter of Instruction
LOTS	Logistics-Over-the-Shore
LOU	Limited Official Use
LPD	Amphibious Transport Dock,
LPH	Amphibious Assault Ship
LRP	Long-Range Patrol
LRRP	Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol
LSD	Dock Landing Ship
LSIL	Infantry Landing Ship, Large
LSMR	Medium Landing Ship, Rocket
LST	Tank Landing Ship
LT	Lieutenant
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LTG	Lieutenant General
LT INF	Light Infantry
LVT	Light Vehicle Track
LZ	Landing Zone
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACAG	Military Assistance Command Adjutant General
MACDC	Military Assistance Command Construction Directorate
MACEVAL	Operations Research/System Analysis, Hqs MACV
MACFWMAO	Military Assistance Command Free World Military Assistance Office
MACMA	Military Assistance Command, Military Assistance
MACOI	Military Assistance Command, Office of Information
MACPD	Military Assistance Command, Psychological Operations Directorate

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MACSA	Military Assistance Command, Science Advisor
MACT	Military Assistance Command, Training Directorate
MACTHAI	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MACVDAG	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Distribution and Allocation Committee
MACVFWD	Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Forward
MAJV	Mobilization and War Veterans Advisory Branch
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MALT	Mobile Advisory Logistics Team
MAP	Military Assistance Program
Mar	Marine
MARDIV	Marine Division
MARS	Military Affiliated Radio System
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funding
MAT	Mobile Advisory Team
MATTLO	Military Attache Liaison Office
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MCI	Army Combat Meal Individual
MCID	Multi-purpose Concealed Intrusion Detector
MDAP	Material Defense Assistance Program
MDEM	Ministry for Development of Ethnic Minorities
MDMRF	Mekong Delta Mobile Riverine Force
MECH	Mechanized
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MF	Main Force
MG	Major General
MHE	Material Handling Equipment
MI	Mile
MIA	Missing in Action
MIL	Military
MILCON	Military Construction
MILPHAP	Military Provincial Health Assistance Program
MINRON	Mine Squadron
VIS	Military Intelligence Service
MISC	Mobile Infiltration Surveillance Center
MTUWG	Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Group
MM	Millimeter
MND	Minister of National Defense
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOD&WV	Ministry of Defense and War Veterans
MOI	Minister of Information (GVN)
MON	Monitor
MOOSE	Move Out of Saigon Exeditiously
MORD	Ministry of Revolutionary Development
MP	Military Police
MPC	Military Payment Certificate
MPW	Ministry of Public Work
MR	Military Region
MRE	Mobile Riverine Base

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MRF	Mobile Riverine Force
MRC	Mobile Riverine Group
MRS	Military Railway Service
MSF	Mobile Strike Force
MSQT	Master Sergeant
MSTS	Military Sea Transport Service
MTDA	Modified Table of Distribution & Allowance
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization & Equipment
MTON	Metric Ton
MVA	Ministry of Veterans Affairs
NAF	Nonappropriated Fund
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFORV	Naval Forces, Vietnam
NAVSUPFACT	Naval Support Activity
NBI	Non-Battle Injury
NCB	Naval Construction Brigade
NCR	Naval Construction Regiment
NGO	Noncommissioned Officer
NDC	National Defense College
NETT	New Equipment Training Team
NFLSVN	National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
NGF	Naval Gunfire
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NIC	National Interrogation Center
NIRP	National Identification Registration Program
NISOV	Naval Investigatory Service Office, Vietnam
NLD	New Life Development
NLF	National Liberation Front
NMCF	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NOD	Night Observation Devices
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NORM	Not Operationally Ready, Maintenance
NORS	Not Operationally Ready, Supply
NP	National Police
NPF	National Police Force
NSA	Naval Support Activity
NSAD	Naval Support Activity, Da Nang
NT	Nong Truong
NTC	National Training Center
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam
NWC	National War College
NZ	New Zealand
OASD(PA)	Office of the Asst SECDEF, Public Affairs
"OBN"	Project Letter Designation
O/H	On Hand
OIC	Officer in Charge
OICC	Officer in Charge of Construction
OIR	Other Intelligence Requirements

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OJT	On-the-Job Training
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OP	Observation Post
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPN	Operation
OR	Operational Readiness
OSA	Office Special Assistant American Embassy, Saigon
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI	Office of Special Investigation
PA&E	Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc.
PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PACEX	Pacific Exchange System
PACNAVFACV	Pacific Naval Facility, Vietnam
PACOM	Pacific Command
PACV	Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle
PAL	Philippine Airline
PAL	Parcel Airlift
PAN AM	Pan American Airway
PANDP	Plans and Policy Division
PBR	River Patrol Boat
PCE	Escort Patrol Craft
PCF	Fast Patrol Craft
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PDC	Propaganda Development Center
PERI	Perimeter
PF	Popular Forces
PFO	Present-for-Operations
PFTC	Popular Force Training Center
PG	Patrol Gunboat
PHIL	Philippines
PHILCAGV	Philippines Civil Action Group, Vietnam
PI	Physically Impaired
PIC	Prisoner Interrogation Center
PID	Public Information Division
PIOCC	Provincial Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center
PL	Public Law
PLAF	Peoples' Liberation Armed Forces
PLC	Peoples' Liberation Committees
PLT	Platoon
PMDL	Provisional Military Demarcation Line
PM	Provost Marshal
POD	Port of Debarkation
POD	Psychological Operations Division
POL	Petroleum, Oils, & Lubricants
POLWAR	Political Warfare
PO-FICC	Permanent Office of the Province Intelligence Coordinating Centers

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P&P	Plans and Policy
PPC	Printing and Publications Center
PROV	Province
PROVCORPSV	Provisional Corps, Vietnam
PROVMAACK	Provincial Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea
PRP	Peoples' Revolutionary Party
PRU	Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PSID	Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector
PS&S	Pacific Stars & Stripes
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PTO	Personnel, Training and Organization Branch
PUB	Publication
PW	Prisoner of War
PX	Post Exchange
QTR	Quarter
R	Refrigerated Rations
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
P. AND A	Review and Analysis Branch
RAG	River Assault Group
RAR	Royal Australian Regiment
RATS	Remote Area Terminal System
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
R&D	Research and Development
RD	Revolutionary Development
RDC	Revolutionary Development Cadre
RDD	Required Delivery Date
RDPG	Revolutionary Development People's Group
RDS	Rounds
RDT&E	Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation
REC	Receive
RECON	Reconnaissance
REGT	Regiment
REGTL	Regimental
REINF	Reinforced
RESP	Responsibility
RET	Returned
RF	Regional Force
RF	Radio Frequency
RFOTT	Regional Force Company Training Teams
RFI	Radio Frequency Interference
RGR	Ranger
RIF	Reduction in Force
RIVASRON	River Assault Squadron
RKG	Royal Khymer Government
RLT	Regimental Landing Team
RMK-BRJ	Raymond-Morrison-Knudsen/Brown-Road-James (Civilian Construction Firm)

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ROCMAAGV

ROK  
ROKA  
ROKAF  
ROKVF  
ROKMC  
ROKKG  
RP  
R&R  
RSR  
RTA  
RTAFB  
RTAVF  
RTAVR  
RTFV  
RVN  
RVNAF  
RVNAFLS  
RVNR  
RWD  
S  
(S)  
SA  
SA  
SA/AB  
SAC  
SACMD  
  
SA4CZ  
SAM  
SAM  
SEA  
SEAL  
SEASIA  
SEATO  
SEAWBS  
SECDEF  
SECSTATE  
SECORD  
SEER  
SEVAC  
SF  
SFGA  
SHEDS  
SLAM  
SLAR  
SLF  
SMMY  
SMPC

Republic of China Military Assistance Advisory Group  
Vietnam  
Republic of Korea  
Republic of Korea Army  
Republic of Korea Air Force  
Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam  
Republic of Korea Marine Corps  
Republic of Korea Government  
Route Package  
Rest and Recuperation  
Required Supply Rate  
Royal Thai Army  
Royal Thai Air Force Base  
Royal Thai Army Vietnam Forces  
Royal Thai Army Vietnam Regiment  
Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam  
Republic of Vietnam  
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces  
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School  
Vietnam Regional Exchange  
Rounds Per Weapon Per Day  
Non Refrigerated Rations  
Secret  
Small Arms  
Senior Advisor  
Army Advisory Detachment Airborne Division  
Strategic Air Command  
Army Advisory Detachment Capitol Military District  
Special Zone  
Army Advisory Group - IV Corps Tactical Zone  
Space Available Mail  
Surface-to-Air Missile  
Southeast Asia  
Sea, Air and Land  
Southeast Asia  
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization  
SEASIA Wideband System  
Secretary of Defense  
Secretary of State  
Secure Voice Cordless Switchboard  
System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF  
Secure Voice Access Console  
Special Forces  
Special Forces Group, Airborne  
Ship Helicopter Extended Delivery System  
Search, Locate, Annihilate and Monitor  
Side Looking Airborne Radar  
Special Landing Force  
Spanish Medical Mission, Vietnam  
Saigon Market Party Committee

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SMH  
SMI  
S/O  
SOR  
SPD  
SPOS  
SPT  
SPTD  
SQ  
SRAO  
SSS  
STZ

## Supply, Classes of

Class I  
Class II  
Class III  
Class IV  
Class V  
Class VA

SVN  
SVNLA  
TA  
T/A  
TAGAIR  
TAC  
TACC  
TAD  
TAOR  
TAOR/I  
TASE  
TC  
TCN  
TD  
TDA  
TDY  
TE  
TF  
TFA  
TFCW  
TFES  
TFS  
TFW  
TG  
TMA  
TNT  
TOC  
TOE  
TOP  
TRIM  
TRP

Service to Military Hospitals  
Service to Military Installations  
Stockage Objective  
Specific Orders and Requirements  
Special Projects Division  
Strong Point Obstacle System  
Support  
Supported  
Squadron  
Supplemental Recreational Activity Office  
Simplified Supply System  
Special Tactical Zone

## Rations

Clothing and Equipment  
POL  
Organisational Equipment and Fortification Material  
Ammunition  
Air Munitions  
South Vietnam  
South Vietnam National Liberation Army  
Table of Allowances  
Table of Authorisation  
Tactical Air  
Tactical  
Tactical Air Control Center  
Temporary Additional Duty  
Tactical Area of Responsibility  
Tactical Area of Responsibility or Interest  
Tactical Air Support Element  
Training Center  
Third Country Nationals  
Table of Distribution  
Table of Distribution and Allowance  
Temporary Duty  
Tactical Emergency  
Task Force  
Task Force ALPHA  
Task Force CLEARWATER  
Territorial Force Evaluation System  
Tactical Fighter Squadron  
Tactical Fighter Wing  
Task Group  
Transportation Management Agency  
Trinitrotoluene  
Tactical Operations Center  
Table of Organization and Equipment  
Training, Organization and Personnel Advisory Board  
Trail Road Interdiction Multi-sensor  
Troop

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TS  
TSRD  
TRU  
TSN  
UAL  
UCMJ  
UDT  
UI  
UNC  
UNICEF  
UNK  
US  
USA  
USAECAV  
  
USAF  
USAHAC  
USAID  
USARPAC  
USARV  
USASF  
USCG  
USD  
USFK  
USG  
USIA  
USMAAGV  
  
USMC  
USN  
USNS  
USO  
USS  
USSR  
VATLS  
VC  
VCI  
VIC  
VIP  
VIS  
VN  
VNAF  
VNN  
VNMA  
VNMCMC  
VNRS  
VNSF  
VP  
VRE  
VSSP

Top Secret  
Truong Son Revolutionary Development  
Technical Research Unit  
Tan Son Nhut  
Unit Authorization List  
Uniform Code of Military Justice  
Underwater Demolition Team  
Unidentified  
United Nations Command  
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund  
Unknown  
United States  
United States Army  
United States Army Engineer Construction Agency,  
Vietnam  
United States Air Force  
United States Army Headquarters Area Command  
United States Agency for International Development  
United States Army, Pacific  
United States Army, Vietnam  
United States Army Special Forces  
United States Coast Guard  
Unattended Seismic Detector  
United States Forces, Korea  
United States Government  
United States Information Agency  
United States Military Assistance Advisory Group,  
Vietnam  
United States Marine Corps  
United States Navy  
United States Naval Ship  
United Services Organization  
United States Ship  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Visual Airborne Target Locator System  
Viet Cong  
Viet Cong Infrastructure  
Vicinity  
Volunteer Information Program  
Vietnamese Information Service  
Vietnamese  
Vietnamese Air Force  
Vietnamese Navy  
Vietnamese Naval Military Academy  
Vietnamese Marine Corps  
Vietnamese Railroad System  
Vietnamese Special Forces  
Vice President  
Vietnam Region Exchange  
Veterans' Stars and Stripes for Peace

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VUNC  
WAAPM  
WAFC  
WBLC  
WESTPAC  
WHEC  
WIA  
WPB  
WPC  
WPN  
YRBM  
YTB

Voice of UN Command  
Wide Area Anti-personnel Mine  
Women's Armed Forces Corps  
Water Borne Logistics Craft  
Western Pacific  
USCG High Endurance Cutter  
Wounded in Action  
Coast Guard Patrol Boat  
World Peace Council  
Weapon  
Repair, Berthing, and Messing  
Large Harbor Tug

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## INDEX



Abrams, GEN Creighton W. . Jr., 2

Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), 2, 32, 33, 383, 521, 522, 523, 560, 564, 608

AC-47 Gunship (SPOOKY), 403, 404

Acoubouy (See Intrusion Sensors)

Advisors, Tour Length, 809, 810

Advisory Teams, Mobile, 233-237

Aerial Reconnaissance, 431-433

Aid to NVN:

- Communist China, 51-55
- Soviet Union, 51-53

Airborne Personnel Detector (SNIFER) (See Intrusion Sensors)

Air Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detector (ADSID) (See Intrusion Sensors)

Airdrop Capability, 623

Airdrop Monthly Statistics, 624

Air Force Advisory Group, 594

Air Force Weapons Laboratory, 758

Airlift, 429-430, 668

Airline Ticket Sales, 828-829

Air Search, Rescue and Recovery, 430-431

ALLENBROOK (See Operations, Ground)

Alliance for National Democratic and Peace Forces (ANDPF), 45, 75-77

American Embassy, Saigon, 130

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

American Forces Radio & Television Service, Vietnam, 950-953

American Red Cross, 810-832

Ammunition, Five-by-Five Plan (See Munitions)

Amphibious Ready Group, 442, 462

An, Nguyen Ngoc, 550

Angel Wing Area of Cambodia, 187

Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 374

Anti-Infiltration Barriers:

DUCK BLIND, 911, 926-932

DUEL BLADE, 911, 912, 915-919

DUFFEL BAG, 592, 826, 911, 932

DUMP TRUCK, 911, 919, 925

DYE MARKER, 911-919

IGLOO WHITE, 409, 911, 919

ILLINOIS CITY, 911

MUD RIVER, 561, 581, 911, 919, 923, 926

MUSCLE SHOALS, 911, 919-926.

Anti-swimmer Buoy, 768

ARC LIGHT B-52 Program, 403, 407, 408, 418-425

Armed Propaganda Teams, 521, 597

Army Concept Team, Vietnam (ACTIV), 760

Army of Republic of Vietnam:

Artillery Command, 302

Effectiveness, 281-282, 303-304

Improvement and Modernisation, 305-306

Interpreter Program, 306-308

Articulated Cargo Carrier, 759

A Shau Valley, 24, 382

Assault Youth Group, 104

Attacks on Shipping, 459, 460

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Australian Task Force, Vietnam (ATFV), 300, 354

Autonomous Administrative Committee (AAC), 66, 67

## Awards:

Civilian, 801-802  
General, 800-803  
For Other Than US, 800-801  
Impact, 800

## B

B-52 Operations (See ARC LIGHT)

BAEK MA 9 (See Operations, Ground)

Balanced Pressure System (See Intrusion Sensors)

Ba, Pham Van, 80

Barrier, Anti-infiltration, 911-932

Base Areas, VC/NVA, 96-103

Beehive Munitions (See Munitions)

Ben Hai River, 375

Bien Hoa Air Base, 130

Binh, Nguyen Thi, 79

Black Market (See Currency Control)

BLACK SPOT Airborne Night Search and Attack System, 755

Bombing Halt, 6, 9, 41, 44, 56, 379

BOX SPRINGS (See Operations, Ground)

## Bridges:

Doumer, 49, 50  
Pont Des, 49

Budget, GVN Defense, 1969, 711

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

BUGLE NOTE Bombing System, 419, 420

**Bunkers:**

Fighting, 912  
Living, 912, 914

BURLINGTON TRAIL (See Operations, Ground)

Burst Transmitter, 770

BYRD (See Operations, Ground)

C.

**Cambodia:**

Border Crossings, 459, 502-503  
Infiltration, 57-58  
VC/NVA Base Areas, 102

CAMEL PATH Leaflet Program, 611

Campaigns, Vietnam, 803

Camp Sentinel Radar, 750-751

Cam Ranh Bay, 386, 665, 688, 691

Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC), 217, 219-221, 394, 861, 862

Capital Military District (CMD), 221

Cap Mui Lay Sector (CMLS), 408

CARENTAN II (See Operations, Ground)

Ceasefires (See Stand-down)

Central Executive Committee, Lao Dong, 96

Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), 59-60, 77, 96, 104-105, 390

Central Recovery Committee, 536

Central Training Command (See RVNAF)

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Chaine Annamitique, 376, 384  
CHAMPAIGN GROVE (See Operations, Ground)  
Chan, Le, 46  
Chaplaincy, 832-834  
Chieng Hoi, 16, 17, 33, 520-522, 549-551, 599, 604-607  
Chi Hoa Prison, 898  
China, 44, 355  
Chuong, GEN Le, 79  
CINCPAC, 11, 12, 13, 217, 242, 375, 437  
Civilian Defendent Restraint Facilities, 677  
Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), 16, 251, 283, 344 -345  
Civilianisation Program, 228-233  
Civilian Proselyting Section, 65  
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), 519, 537  
CLAXTON (See Operations, Ground)  
Climate, SVN, 371  
Coastal Force, Vietnamese (See Operations, Vietnamese Navy)  
COBURG (See Operations, Ground)  
COCHISE GREEN (See Operations, Ground)  
COFRAM (See Munitions)  
Colby, Ambassador William E., 522  
COMANCHE FALLS I (See Operations, Ground)  
COMANCHE FALLS II (See Operations, Ground)  
COMBAT LANCER, Test of F111A, 414, 415, 431  
COMBAT SKYSPOT Bombing Technique, 412, 416, 425

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

COMBAT TRAP, System for Preparation of Helicopter Landing Zones, 757-759

Combined Campaign Plan, 1968, 13, 14, 15, 19

Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC), 574-578

Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), 569, 571-573

Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC), 580

Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC), 578-580

Command and Control, US, 217, 221-222

Command Information Division, 935, 949

COMMANDO HUNT (See Interdiction Campaigns, Air)

COMMANDO NAIL Bombing Technique, 415, 416

Commo-liaison Section, VC, 65

Commo-liaison System, 122

## Communications:

Automatic Digital Data Network, 718

AUTOSEVOCOM, 721

Dial Central Office, 716

Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS), 724

Project MYSTERY STORY, 730

RED ROCKET, 727

SEASIA Wideband System, 713

TALK QUICK, 720

VC/NVA, 119-123

COMUSMACV, 2, 19, 20, 24, 26, 217, 227, 238, 240, 243, 245, 371, 421, 423,  
437, 750, 765-766

Construction Program, 670-671, 680

Container Delivery System (Air), 426

Contractor Force, Expansion, 678

Controlled Fragmentation Munitions (See Munitions)

Convention of Veterans of Foreign Wars, 1968, 7

# UNCLASSIFIED



# UNCLASSIFIED

CORONADO IX (See Operations, Ground)  
CORONADO X (See Operations, Ground)  
CORONADO XI (See Operations, Ground)  
CORONADO XII (See Operations, Ground)  
"COUNTER" (See Project COUNTER)  
Country Plan, 706  
Critical Munitions, 635, 636  
Culture Drama Teams, 597  
Currency Control, 349-351, 826-827, 840-841  
Current Affairs Committee, 62, 74, 96

## D

Dai, Bao, 46  
Da Nang Air Base, 127  
DAWSON RIVER (See Operations, Ground)  
DAZZLEM (See Operations, Ground)  
Deep Draft Port for Northern I CTZ, 697-699  
Defense Communications Planning Group, 750, 911, 914, 918  
Defense Force, MACV, 864  
Defoliation, 373  
DELAWARE/LAMSON 216 (See Operations, Ground)  
Delta, Mekong River, 371, 397  
Delta Transportation Plan, 674, 675  
Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), 7, 15, 129-130, 374  
Dependent Housing Program, 675, 676

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Deployment Program 6, 225-228, 248  
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 252, 253  
Desertion, VC/NVA, 83, 85  
Diem, President Ngo Dinh, 60  
Dien Bien Phu, 129  
Discipline, 836-841  
    Courts Martial of Civilians, 837-839  
    Saigon Courts Martial Proposal, 837  
District Intelligence & Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCC), 544  
DODGE CITY (See Operations, Ground)  
Do, GEN Tran, 73, 78, 390, 901  
Don, GEN Nguyen, 79  
Dong Nai River, 388  
Dong, Pham Van, 41-44  
Dong Tam Reconstruction Operation, 542  
Dou, MG Nguyen, 45  
Downward Looking Infrared Radar (DLIR), 753  
Dry Weather Campaign, 401  
Duc Lap, Battle of, 403-404  
Duc Lap Special Forces Camp, 388  
DUCK BLIND (See Anti-infiltration Barriers)  
DUEL BLADE (See Anti-infiltration Barriers)  
DUFFEL BAG (See Anti-infiltration Barriers)  
DUMP TRUCK (See Anti-infiltration Barriers)  
DYE MARKER (See Anti-infiltration Barriers)  
"DYE MARKER Regiment," 914-915

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## E

Eisenhower, President Dwight D. , 5  
Enemy Swimmer Activity, 445, 446, 452, 455, 470  
Engineers, Troop Strengths and Distribution, 679, 680  
En-Lai, Chou, 53-56  
Evacuations, Medical, 705, 706  
Executive Committee, VC, 62

## F

Fa-Hsien, Wu, 56  
FAIRFAX (See Operations, Ground)  
FAYETTE CANYON (See Operations, Ground)  
Fence, Chain Link Defensive Barrier, 673  
F-111A (See COMBAT LANCER)  
Fighter Aircraft Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detector (FADSID)  
(See Intrusion Sensors)  
Filhol Plantation, 391  
Finance and Economy Section, VC/NVA, 65, 96, 104, 110  
Fire Support Bases:  
    BUELL, 394  
    BURT, 391  
    DOT, 395  
    POPE, 395  
Fleet Command, Vietnamese (See Operations, Vietnamese Navy)  
Forward Air Controllers (FAC), 403  
Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR), 753  
Forward Supply Council, 96, 104, 105, 108, 111

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

FRANTIC GOAT Leaflet Program, 610-611

Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF), 12, 221, 345-355

Funding, Military Assistance Service, 706

Funds:

MILCON, 650  
Military Construction FY68, 680  
Navy OPN, 650  
OMA, 650

## G

GAME WARDEN (See Operations, US Navy)

Geneva Accords, 7, 53, 60, 841

GIANT SLINGSHOT (See Operations, US Navy)

Glaf, GEN Vo Nguyen, 138

Go Teams, 578

GRAVEL Anti-personnel Harassment Mine (See Munitions)

Ground Proximity Extraction System, 426, 429

Gunship Airborne Attack Systems, 755, 756

## H

Hai, GEN Tran Guy, 79

Haiphong Harbor, 41

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), 519, 520, 523-527

Hand Emplaced Seismic Intrusion Detector (HANDISID) (See Intrusion Sensors)

Harriman, Ambassador W. Averill, 9

HAWK Units, 245-246

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Helicopter Landing Zones, 757-759

Helicopter Seismic Intrusion Detector (HELOSID) (See Intrusion Sensors)

HENDERSON HILL (See Operations, Ground)

Herbicides, 373

Highways:

    Civil Advisory Function, 648

    Overview, 651-655

    Security, 655

    Significant Events, 656

    Statistics, 655

    Support, 649-651

Hill 861, 378

Hill 8815, 378

Hobo Woods, 391

HOP TAC (See Operations, Ground)

HOP TAC I (See Operations, Ground)

Hoi Chanh Returnees, 522, 549-551

Hospitals:

    Construction, 676

    Requirements, 701

Hospital Ships, 500-502, 702

HOUSTON (See Operations, Ground)

Hue, Battle of, 130-131, 381

Hue, City of, 378

Hungary, 51

Hurricane Forward (See CMAC)

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

I

**IGLOO WHITE (See Anti-infiltration Barriers)**

**ILLINOIS CITY (See Anti-infiltration Barriers)**

**Infiltration, 56-59**

**Infiltration, Waterborne, 18, 447, 448**

**Infrared Intrusion Detector (See Intrusion Sensors)**

**Infrastructure, VC (VCI), 14, 18, 61-81, 519, 544-549**

**Information Advisory Division, 938**

**Information Advisory Program, 939-942**

**Improved Conventional Munitions (See Munitions)**

**Intelligence Collection Programs, 581-588**

**Intelligence Operations, VC/NVA, 123-128**

**Intelligence, US/FWMAF, 369-388**

**Interdiction, Air, 406-418**

**Interdiction Campaigns, Air:**

- COMMANDO HUNT, 406, 409-411, 926**
- ROLLING THUNDER, 406, 412-418, 430**
- THOR, 406, 408-409**
- TURNPIKE, 406, 407-408**

**Intrusion Sensors:**

- Acoubouy, 748-749**
- Airborne Personnel Detector, 749**
- Air Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detector, 748**
- Balanced Pressure System, 749**
- Fighter Aircraft Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detector, 748**
- Hand Emplaced Seismic Intrusion Detector, 748**
- Helicopter Seismic Intrusion Detector, 748**
- Infrared Intrusion Detector, 749**
- Magnetic Intrusion Detector, 749**
- Multi-purpose Concealed Intrusion Detector, 749**
- Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector, 749**
- Unattended Seismic Detector, 749**

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## J

JEB STUART (See Operations, Ground)

Johnson, President Lyndon B., 5

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 10, 11, 252, 256, 375, 439

Joint General Staff (Vietnamese) Compound, 130, 131

Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), 223, 591

## K

Keim, Tran Buu, 79

Kennedy, President John F., 5

KENTUCKY (See Operations, Ground)

Khe Sanh Combat Base, 1, 8, 24, 38, 43, 111, 128-129, 131, 156-158, 160-161, 196-199, 378, 379, 922, 925

Kit Carson Scouts, 551

Komer, Ambassador Robert W., 522

Korea (See Republic of Korea)

KUDZU (See Operations, Ground)

KUDZU II (See Operations, Ground)

Ky, Vice President Nguyen Cao, 519, 537

## L

Lam, Ha Khan, 80

LAMSON 193/11 (See Operations, Ground)

LAMSON 260 (See Operations, Ground)

LANCASTER (See Operations, Ground)

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

LANCASTER II (See Operations, Ground)

Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, 131, 379

Laos Dong Party, 60

Laos, 7

Infiltration, 57, 58  
VC/NVA Base Areas, 101

Lau, Col Ha Van, 44, 46

Leave Program, Special 30-Day, 809

LE LOI (See Operations, Ground)

Le, Nguyen Than, 43, 46

Liberation Army, VC, 96

Liberation Committees, VC, 76, 77

LIBERTY CANYON (See Operations, Ground)

Lien, Do Thi, 80

Lines of Communication (LOCs), 647

Logistics:

Advisory Effort, 621, 622  
Buildup, I CTZ, 618  
General, 615, 616  
Over-the-Shore (LOTS), 619  
Responsibilities for, 617, 618  
Transition to 1968, 615  
VC/NVA, 96, 104-111

Logistics Concept:

I CTZ, 616  
II CTZ, 617  
III CTZ, 617  
IV CTZ, 617  
RVN Support of Free World Forces, 617  
US Support of Free World Forces, 617

Logistical Support, IV CTZ, 620, 621

# UNCLASSIFIED



# UNCLASSIFIED

Logistics System, ARVN Support Through US, 622  
Long, Han Niem, 54  
Long Range Patrol, 243-244  
Long Range Planning Task Group, 793-795  
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Sound Ranging System (LASL), 760  
Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System, 426, 429  
Low Light Level Television, 752, 753, 754  
Luat, Tran Trieu, 75  
Luong, GEN Tran, 68

## M

MACARTHUR (See Operations, Ground)

Maccomery, 869-871

Accomplishments, 869, 870  
Recognition, 871

MACV (Forward) (See US Units, XXIV Corps)

MAENG HO 9 (See Operations, Ground)

Magnetic Intrusion Detector (See Intrusion Sensors)

Maintenance:

NAVFORV, 645  
Recovery Vehicles, 645  
Track and Wheeled Vehicles, 644  
TS4-L-13 Engines, 645  
USARV, 644  
III MAF, 645  
7th AF, 641

MAMELUKE THRUST (See Operations, Ground)

Man, Gen Chu Huy, 78

Manila Communique, 7

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Marihuana, 811-815, 839-840

MARKET TIME (See Operations, US Navy)

MARSHAL MOUNTAIN (See Operations, Ground)

MAUI PEAK/HUNG QUANG 1/74 (See Operations, Ground)

May Offensive, 2, 28, 38, 132-134, 393

MCLAIN (See Operations, Ground)

MEADE RIVER (See Operations, Ground)

Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), 597-598

Medical Operations:

RVNAF, 702

US/FWMAF, 699

Medical Services, VC/NVA, 110, 111

Medical Services, RVNAF, Reorganization, 703

Medical Units, Arrival in RVN, 700

Medicine, Preventive, 703-705

Messes, Field Ration, Conversion, 626, 807, 808

MIGHTY YANKEE (See Operations, US Navy)

Military Airlift Command, 669

Military Assistance, Factors Affecting Amount and Composition, 709

Military Party Affairs Section, VC, 65, 104

Military Post Performance, 696-697

Military Proselyting Section, VC, 65

Military Provincial Health Assistance Program (MILPHAP), 598

Military Regions, VC/NVA, 62, 63, 67, 68, 69

MR 2 and 3, VC/NVA, 29, 70

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

MR 5, VC/NVA, 69, 70

MR 6, VC/NVA, 69

Military Staff Subsection, VC, 66

Mines and Mining, 451-453, 455, 458

Minh, Ho Chi, 2, 7, 40, 41, 43, 60

Minister of Interior (GVN), 549, 555, 562

Mission Council, 222-223

MITHRAS FIREWATCH, Artillery/Mortar/Rocket Detection System, 761-762

Mobile Advisory Teams (See Advisory Teams, Mobile)

Mobile Area Logistics Teams (MALTS), 234-237

Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), 18, 242-243, 397, 442, 443, 466-473

Mobile Training Teams, 597

"MOOSE" (See Project "MOOSE")

Morale, VC/NVA, 81-85

MUD RIVER (See Anti-infiltration Barriers)

Multi-mode Forward Radar, 753

Multi-purpose Concealed Intrusion Detector (See Intrusion Sensors)

Munitions:

Beehive, 637

B-72 Propane Bomb, 766

Controlled Fragmentation, 769

Five-by-Five Plan, 634

GRAVEL Anti-personnel Harassment Mine, 764, 765

Improved Conventional Munitions (formerly COFRAM), 769

M-121 10,000-lb Bomb, 758

PAVE WAY Guided Bomb, 412, 768

RINGTROP Anti-personnel, Anti-vehicle Device, 764  
Selected, 769

WALLEYE Guided Bomb, 412, 768

Wide Area Anti-personnel Mine (WAAPM), 765

VC/NVA, 106, 111-119

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

MUSCATINE (See Operations, Ground)  
MUSCLE SHOALS (See Anti-Infiltration Barriers)  
Mutual Interference Incident, 492 - 495

## N

NAPOLEON/SALINE (See Operations, Ground)  
NARASUAN (See Operations, Ground)  
National Correction Center, 534  
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN), 10, 60, 62,  
71, 80, 81, 84, 133, 154, 197  
National Identity Registration Program (NIRP), 535, 607-608  
National Police Force, RVN, 23, 521, 534-536  
Naval Advisory Group, 595  
Naval Gunfire Support, 374, 449-451, 480-498  
Naval Operations, 441-503  
Navy Mobile Construction Battalions, 44, 475-480  
Navy, Vietnamese (See Vietnamese Navy)  
NEVADA EAGLE (See Operations, Ground)  
New Life Development, 557-560  
New Zealand Forces, 354-355  
Nghai, Le Thanh, 50, 54  
NGUYEN TRAI Campaign, 607  
Nhan Dan, NVN Newspaper, 44, 47, 54-55  
Nha Trang Air Base, 126  
Nhon, Tran Thung, 75  
Nhut, Ho HUU, 75

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

NITE GAZELLE Surveillance System, 752

NITE PANTHER Surveillance System, 752

NLF Five Point Peace Plan, 41-42, 44

NLF Political Officials, 79-80

NVN Four Point Peace Plan, 41

## O

"OBN" (See Project OBN)

Offensive, First General (See Tat Offensive)

Offensive, Second General (See May Offensive)

Offensive, Third General, 32, 38, 39, 133, 134, 135, 183

Office of Information, 935

Office of the Science Advisor, MACV, 744, 746-747

Operational Objectives, 21

Operation DONG TAM (Pacification), 675

Operation BANISH BEACH (See Operation INFERNO)

Operation INFERNO (Jungle Burning), 767-768

Operation NIAGARA, 423-426

Operation RAPID ARROW, 621

Operation STOPS OUT, 608-610

Operation Plans, 777-782

Operations, Ground:

ALLENBROOK, 381

BAEK MA 9, 387

BOX SPRINGS, 391

BURLINGTON TRAIL, 382

BYRD, 388

CARENTAN II, 379

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

CHAMPAIGN GROVE, 382  
CLAXTON, 883  
COBURG, 391  
COCHISE GREEN, 386  
COMANCHE FALLS I, 380  
COMANCHE FALLS II, 380  
CORONADO IX, 399, 467  
CORONADO X, 399  
CORONADO XI, 399  
CORONADO XII, 399  
DAWSON RIVER, 383  
DAZZLEM, 386  
DELAWARE/LAMSON 216, 24, 380  
DODGE CITY, 24  
FAIRFAX, 391, 893  
FAYETTE CANYON, 384  
HENDERSON HILL, 381  
HOP TAC, 399  
HOP TAC I, 399  
HOUSTON, 381  
JEB STUART, 379, 381  
KENTUCKY, 378, 381  
KUDZU, 399  
KUDZU II, 399  
LAMSON 193/11, 380  
LAMSON 260, 382  
LANCASTER, 378  
LANCASTER II, 37 91  
LE LOI, 384  
LIBERTY CANYON, 46  
MACARTHUR, 386  
MAENG HO 9, 387  
MAMELUKE THRUST, 381  
MARSHAL MOUNTAIN, 383  
MAUI PEAK/HUNG QUANG 1/74, 382  
MCLAIN, 388  
MEADE RIVER, 383  
MUSCATINE, 381  
NEVADA EAGLE, 380  
NAPOLEON/SALINE, 380  
NARASUAN, 392  
PATRICK, 386  
PEGASUS, 8, 24, 379  
PERSHING, 386  
PERSHING II, 386  
PHOENIX, 24, 30  
QUYET CHIEN CAMPAIGN, 400  
QUYET THANG, 392, 907  
PEOPLE'S ROAD, 399  
RILEY, 392

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

SAN ANGELO, 24, 391  
SANTA FE, 24  
SARATOGA, 391  
SCOTLAND, 378, 379  
SCOTLAND II, 380  
SOMERSET PLAIN/LAMSON 246, 382  
SPEEDY EXPRESS, 401  
SWIFT MOVE, 384  
TAYLOR COMMON, 384, 759  
TIEN BO 20, 388  
TOAN THANG CAMPAIGN, 392, 907  
TRAN HUNG DAO, 390, 907  
TRAN HUNG DAO II, 390, 907  
TRUONG CONG DINH, 399  
UNIONTOWN, 391  
WALKER, 386  
WHEELER/WALLOWA, 381  
WILDERNESS, 391  
YELLOWSTONE, 391  
YORK, 24  
YORK I, 24  
YORK II, 24  
YORK III, 24  
YORK IV, 24

## Operations, US Navy:

GAME WARDEN, 442, 446, 455-460, 464  
GIANT SLINGSHOT, 474  
MARKET TIME, 322, 442, 444-454, 582  
MIGHTY YANKEE, 856  
SEA DRAGON, 442, 480  
SEA LORDS, 474, 475  
STABLE DOOR, 442, 445-446, 452  
TIGHT JAW, 856

## Operations, VC/NVA:

I CTZ, 154-165  
II CTZ, 165-177  
III CTZ, 177-187  
IV CTZ, 187-195

## Operations, Vietnamese Navy:

Coastal Force, 322  
Fleet Command, 321-322  
Riverine Force, 323-325

Order of Battle-1968, VC/NVA, 89-95

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Organization Section, VC, 65

## P

Pacification, 15

Pacification Development Guidelines, 523

PARROTS BEAK Region, 130

PATRICK (See Operations, Ground)

Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle, 757

Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector (See Intrusion Sensors)

PAVE WAY Guided Bomb (See Munitions)

"PEACE COLT" (See Project PEACE COLT)

Peace Negotiations, Paris, 9, 39, 41, 45, 51, 53, 56, 79, 83, 132, 138

PEGASUS (See Operations, Ground)

Peking, 41

Pentilateral Agreement, 866

People's Liberation Committees, 76, 77, 78

People's Liberation Councils (PLC), 76, 77, 78

People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), 45, 60, 61, 62

PEOPLE'S ROAD (See Operations, Ground)

Perfume River, 886

PERSHING (See Operations, Ground)

PERSHING II (See Operations, Ground)

Personalities, VCI, 78-79

Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL):

Consumption, 174, 631, 633

Tankage Objective, 631

# UNCLASSIFIED



# UNCLASSIFIED

Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam (PHILCAGV), 353-354  
Philippines (See Republic of the Philippines)  
PHOENIX (See Operations, Ground)  
PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program, 33, 520-521, 544-549, 607  
Phu Cat Air Base, 127  
Phu Tho Race Track, 131, 390, 898, 901  
Plans and Policy Division (MACOI), 939  
Policy, US, 5, 7  
Political Subsection, VC, 66  
Political Warfare College (See Schools, RVNAF)  
Popular Forces: (Also See RF/PF)  
    Pay Raise, 343-344  
    Training Center, 299-300  
Port Development:  
    Cam Ranh Bay, 665, 688, 691  
    Chu Lai, 685  
    Da Nang, 663, 684, 691  
    Dong Tam, 691  
    Hue-Phu Bai, 683, 691  
    Nha Trang, 687, 691  
    Phan Rang, 688  
    Qui Nhon, 665, 686, 691  
    Saigon, 664, 689, 691  
    Vung Ro, 687  
    Vung Tau, 689  
Ports Performance, 663  
Postal Operations, 829-830  
Post Exchange System, 821-829  
Pravda, USSR Newspaper, 50  
Presidential Palace, 390, 899  
Press, Favorable, 976

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Press Relations and Problems:

- Accreditation, 966
- Casualty Reporting, 971
- Credibility Gap, 953
- News Embargo Violation, 963
- Violation of Ground Rules, 942

Prison, Con Son Island, 678

## Prisoners of War:

US/FWMAF, 841-850

- Cambodian Detainees, 847-849
- Prisoner Escapes, 849-850
- Released by VC/NVA, 841-847

VC/NVA, 850-859

- Camp Construction, 850
- Determination of PW Status, 858-859
- Handling of PWs, 851-853
- NVN Seamen, Release, 449, 856-857
- Release of PWs, 853-856

Prison Facilities, Vietnamese, 677-678

PRIZE CREW, Project (See "Quite Aircraft")

Production, VC/NVA Logistical, 105, 106, 107

Program 6 Deployment (See Deployment Program 6)

Program, Commercial Consumables Transfer, 710

Program, Dollar Line, 708

Program, Major Item, 708

## Project:

- COUNTER, 627
- MOOSE, 803-805
- "OBN", 712
- PEACE COLT, 336
- RECOVERY, 2, 520, 536-544
- STOP/SEE, 627
- TAKEOFF, 519

# UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

Propaganda, Training and Indoctrination Section, VC, 65  
Propaganda, VC/NVA, 149-154  
Propane Bomb (B-72) (See Munitions)  
Province Party Committee (PPC), 62, 64, 65, 66, 69  
Provisional Corps Vietnam (PROVCORPSV) (See U.S. Unit, XXIV Corps)  
Provisional Military Demarcation Line (FMDL), 374  
Psychological Operations, 560-561, 591-611  
Psychological Operations Directorate (MACV), 591-592  
Psychological Operations Division (CORDS), 592  
Public Information Division (MACOI), 1, 937, 942  
Pursuit, Immediate, 375

### Q

Quarters, Air Crew, 807  
"Quiet Aircraft," 751-752  
QUYET CHIEN Campaign (See Operations, Ground)  
QUYET THANG (See Operations, Ground)

### R

Radio Jamming, VC/NVA, 121  
Railroads:  
    Performance Statistics, 662  
    Restoration, 657  
    Security Goals, 657  
    Security Status, 660  
RAPID ARROW (See Operation RAPID ARROW)

## UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Rations:

Category "MCI", 624, 625, 626  
Category "R", 624, 625, 626  
Category "S", 624, 625, 626

Rear Services Section, 66, 96, 104-106, 108

Recruitment, VC/NVA, 85-89

Red River, 49

Remote Area Terminal Landing System, 770

Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKFB), 346-351

Air Force, 348-349  
Hold Baggage, 349  
Marine Brigade, 217  
Tanks, 347-348

Republic of Philippines, 353-354

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), 12, 27, 243-345

Awards & Decorations, 288-290  
Central Training Command, 298-300  
Commissary, 294-296  
Desertion Control, 275-280  
Desertion Rates, 276-277  
Effectiveness (See respective Services)  
Emergency Resupply, 623  
Improvement and Modernisation, 249-261 (See also respective Services)  
Logistical Forces, 260-261  
Mobilisation, 270-275  
Morale Services, 283-296  
Pay and Allowances, 290-291  
Post Test Status, 280-283  
Promotions, 284-287  
Rations, 294  
Reorganization, 280-281  
Schools (See Schools, RVNAF)  
Training, 283  
Training Centers, 299-300  
Veterans Affairs, 291-294  
Weaponry, 261-270

Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation, 743-770

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Resolution, 6th COSVN, 76

## Rest & Recuperation:

Australia, 818-820  
Bangkok, 820-821  
General, 810-811  
Guam, 821  
Okinawa, 821  
Reduced Fares, 815

Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF), 15, 31, 251, 255, 283, 290-291, 299  
342-344, 320, 330, 334

Revolutionary Development, 74, 443, 476, 519, 554-555, 905

Revolutionary Development Cadre, 21, 556, 557, 599

RF/PF, Advisory Buildup, 233-237

Rifle, M-16, (See Weapons)

RINGTROP Anti-personnel, Anti-vehicle Device (See Munitions)

RILEY (See Operations, Ground)

Riot Control Agent(CS), 391, 638, 639, 765-766

Riverine Force, Vietnamese (See Operations, Vietnamese Navy)

Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam (RTFV), 351-353

Rules of Engagement, Ground, 371

## S

Sabotage, VC/NVA, 143-149

Saigon, Enemy Activity, 130-131, 133, 136-137

Saigon Port Authority, 695

Saigon River, 388

SAN ANGELO (See Operations, Ground)

San Antonio Formula, 6

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Sanctuaries, 2

SANTA FE (See Operations, Ground)

SARATOGA (See Operations, Ground)

Schools, RVNAF:

- Command & Staff College, 298
- Infantry, 298-299
- Language, 298
- Military Academy, 296-297, 677
- National Defense College, 297-298
- National NCO Academy, 299
- Naval Academy, 320
- Political Warfare College, 596

SCOTLAND (See Operations, Ground)

SCOTLAND II (See Operations, Ground)

Seabee Teams, 443, 476, 598

SEA DRAGON (See Operations, US Navy)

SEA/LAND Container Ship Service, 667

SEA LORDS (See Operations, US Navy)

SEALS, 412, 452, 457, 458, 475

Search-and-Destroy Operations, 371

Searchlights, 373

Security:

- Bridge, 865-866
- Communications Facilities, 864
- Concept of Operations, 860-861
- Installation and Air Base, 863-865
- Objectives - 1968, 860
- RVN Correctional Centers, 864-865

Security Section, VC, 65, 104

Selected Munitions (See Munitions)

Self-Defense, Right of, 373

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Seng, Wou Yu, 54

Senior Military Advisor in Paris, 793

Sensors (See Intrusion Sensors)

Sheds, Interim, 619, 620

Shelters, Aircraft, 671-673

Shipping, Intra-coastal, 666

Side-looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), 753

Single Manager for Air Concept, 433-440

SOMERSET PLAIN/LAMSON 246 (See Operations, Ground)

Song Tan Revolutionary Development, 556-557

Sound Ranging Detection, 760

Spain, 355

Special Projects Division (MACOI), 937, 948

Special Tactical Zone (44th), 397

SPEEDY EXPRESS (See Operations, Ground)

STABLE DOOR (See Operations, US Navy)

Stand-down:

- Christmas, 376
- Holiday, 375, 376

"STOP/SEE" (See Project STOP/SEE)

Strategic Research and Analysis, 571

Strategy, 5

- Combined, 13
- COMUSMACV, 20, 22, 29
- Guidance, 11

Strategy & Tactics, VC/NVA, 128-158

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Strength, Forces:

FWMAF, 224, 345  
RVNAF, 224 (See also respective Services)  
US, 223-225  
VC/NVA, 89

Strong Point Obstacle System (SPOS), 911, 912

## Studies, MACJS:

International Affairs Division, 788-792  
Special Plans Division, 785-787  
US/SEATO Division, 782-783  
Vietnam Division, 783-784

Subsistence, Basic Allowance, 806

## Supply Classes:

Class I, 624-626  
Class II & IV, 626-631  
Class III, 631, 633  
Class V & Va, 633-639

## Supply Services:

Ice Plants, 640  
Laundry, 639  
Mortuary, 641-643  
Property Disposal, 640

Supply Teams, Rapid Area, 627

Surface-to-Air Missiles, 374

SWIFT MOVE (See Operations, Ground)

## I

TACAIR, 403, 407, 424, 425

Tactical Zone, I Corps, 376

Tactical Zone, IV Corps, 397

"TAKE OFF" (See Project TAKEOFF)

# UNCLASSIFIED



# UNCLASSIFIED

Tan, GEN Le Trong, 79

Tan, GEN Ha Ke, 79

Tanks, PT-76, VC/NVA, 114, 131, 379

Tan Son Nhut Air Base, 126, 127

Tao, Trinh Dinh, 45

## Task Forces:

Alpha, 409, 921, 922, 923, 924, 930  
CLEARWATER, 457, 460-463, 468  
GALLOWAY, 382  
HAY (See CMAC)  
Joint, 728, 911  
OREGON, 217  
XRAY, 378, 381

TAYLOR COMMON (See Operations, Ground)

Taxation, VC/NVA, 105, 108, 109, 110

Tax Problem with GVN, 866-868

Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES), 530-534

Territorial Organization, VC/NVA, 62, 63, 74

Territorial Security, 527, 530

Terrorism, VC/NVA, 138-143

T-Day Planning, 779-781

Tet Offensive, 1, 3, 19, 26, 37-38, 70-74, 125, 129-132, 134, 150, 167, 386,  
390, 397, 426-429, 692, 759, 881-908

Thai, LTG Hoang Van, 45, 78

Thao, GEN Hoang Minh, 79

Thi, Dinh Ba, 80

Thieu, President Nguyen Van, 7, 519, 520, 533, 536, 544, 552

Thailand Forces (See Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam)

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Tho, Le Duc, 45, 46

Tho, Nguyen Huu, 55

Thu, COL Vo, 52

Thuy, Xuyan, 43, 44

TIEN BO 20 (See Operations, Ground)

Tien, Nguyen Van, 80

TIGHT JAW (See Operations, US Navy)

TOAN THANG CAMPAIGN (See Operations, Ground)

Tour Length, 808-810

Towers, Observation, 674

Tra, GEN Tran Van, 78

TRAIL CAMPAIGN Leaflet Program, 611

Trailer Park, MACV Senior Officer's, 805, 806

TRAIL/ROAD Interdiction Multi-sensor Project, 753

Training, VC/NVA, 86, 87

TRAN H'UNG DAO (See Operations, Ground)

TRAN HUNG DAO II (See Operations, Ground)

Transportation:

- Enemy, 108
- General, 647
- LOC Division, 647

Tri-Thien-Hue MR, 67, 68, 70

TROPIC MOON Airborne Detection and Attack Systems, 754

Truce Violations, 375

TRUONG CONG DINH (See Operations, Ground)

Truong, Nam, 77, 80

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Tse-Tung, Mao, 54, 56

Tuy Hoa Air Base, 126

## V

U Minh Forest, 195

Unattended Seismic Detector (See Intrusion Sensors)

UNIONTOWN (See Operations, Ground)

Units, ARVN Battalion:

11th Ranger Bn, 386  
21st Ranger Bn, 384  
22d Ranger Bn, 892  
23d Ranger Bn, 892  
33rd Ranger Bn, 393  
37th Ranger Bn, 379, 384  
39th Ranger Bn, 384

Units, ARVN Division:

1st Div, 378, 883  
2d Div, 303, 382  
5th Div, 390  
7th Div, 282, 325, 397  
9th Div, 251, 282, 325, 397  
18th Div, 230, 304, 390  
21st Div, 282, 397, 892  
23d Div, 230, 251  
25th Div, 304, 390  
Airborne Div, 282, 283

Units, ARVN Infantry Regiment:

2d Regt, 380, 887  
3d Regt, 380, 887  
15th Regt, 903  
16th Regt, 903  
41st Regt, 890  
42d Regt, 892  
44th Regt, 386, 891  
49th Regt, 392, 395  
51st Regt, 378, 383

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Units, Enemy:

1st NVA Div, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 388  
2d NVA Div, 189, 187, 188, 180, 162, 163, 164, 165, 171, 384  
3d NVA Div, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 170, 173  
4th NVA Div, 158  
5th NVA Div, 170, 181  
6th NVA Regt, 378  
7th NVA Div, 177, 181-186  
7th Bn, 18th NVA Regt, 387  
9th NVA Regt, 138, 378  
12th VC Sapper Bn, 378  
24th NVA Regt, 892  
275th VC Regt, 895  
304th NVA Div, 89, 128, 131, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161  
308th NVA Div, 83, 160, 161  
320th NVA Div, 89, 135, 156, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 883  
328C NVA Div, 128, 155-158, 170-173  
341st NVA Div, 157  
804 NVA Bn, 378  
810 NVA Bn, 378  
Hue City Sapper Bn, 378

## Units, FWMAT:

Capital ROK Div, 387, 890  
Queen's Cobra Regt, 393  
Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regt, 392  
1st Australian Task Force (ATF), 391  
2d ROK Marine Bde, 378  
9th (White Horse) ROK Div, 387

## US Ships:

USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62), 442, 495-498  
USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY (LST-1167), 470

## Units, US Battalion:

1st Bn, 502d Abn Inf, 899  
2d Bn, 12th Inf, 395  
3d Bn, 8th Inf, 387  
3d Bn, 187th Inf, 395  
3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf, 891  
4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf, 890  
19th POLWAR Bn, 596  
20th POLWAR Bn, 596  
40th POLWAR Bn, 596

# UNCLASSIFIED

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## Units, US Brigade:

1st Bde, 5th Inf (Mech), 380, 381  
3d Bde, 82d Abn Div, 227, 228, 244-245, 394  
3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), 381  
3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, 381, 386  
3d Naval Construction Bde, 475, 476  
173d Abn Inf Bde, 386  
196th Lt Inf Bde, 381  
198th Lt Inf Bde, 381  
199th Lt Inf Bde, 390, 390, 391, 895

## Units, US Division:

Americal Div (See 23d Inf Div)  
1st Cav Div (AM), 24, 219, 244, 245, 376, 379, 383, 396, 886  
1st Inf Div, 392  
1st Mar Div, 246, 378, 885  
3d Mar Div, 246, 378, 379  
4th Inf Div, 244, 344, 386  
9th Inf Div, 242, 243, 244, 392, 893, 895, 903  
23d Inf Div (Americal), 217, 382  
25th Inf Div, 390  
101st Abn Div (AM), 24, 219, 242, 245, 376, 379, 387

## Units, US General:

I FFORCEV, 244, 909  
II FFORCEV, 219, 242, 390, 393, 893-895, 899  
III MAF, 219, 226, 227, 236, 245, 246-247  
IV CTZ, SA, 401  
XXIV Corps, 217, 218, 219, 245, 376, 378, 408, 409

## Units, US Group:

3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group (ARRG), 430  
5th Special Forces Group, Abn, 891  
4th PSYOP Group, 592-593  
7th PSYOP Group, 593  
525th Military Intelligence Group, 569

## Units, US Regiment:

1st Mar Regt, 886  
3d Mar Regt, 380, 885  
4th Mar Regt, 378  
5th Mar Regt, 886  
9th Mar Regt, 378  
11th Armored Cav Regt, 896  
20th Mar Regt, 378

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Units, US Wing:

1st Mar Air Wg, 246-247  
14th Air Commando Wg, 594  
432d Tac Recon Wg, 431  
460th Tac Recon Wg, 431

United Services Organisation (USO), 799, 834-835

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 223

United States Army, Vietnam (USARV), 227, 229, 232, 235, 243, 245

United States Forces, 223-249

Urban Self-defense Groups, 554-555

USSR, VC/NVA Relationship, 75

## V

Vance, Ambassador Cyrus R., 9

## Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF):

General, 251, 255-256, 283, 335-341  
Improvement & Modernisation, 336-341

Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC), 255, 282, 325, 341-342, 395, 887, 898

## Vietnamese Navy (VNN):

Amphibious Task Force, 325-326  
Buildup, 308-309  
Civic Action, 321  
Effectiveness, 331-334  
Improvement & Modernisation, 327-331  
Operations, (See Operations, Vietnamese Navy)  
Organisation, 309-317  
Shipyards, 317-320  
Structure Changes, 326-327  
Training, 320-321

Village Assistance Teams, 598

Village Cells, VC/NVA, 106

VINATEXCO Textile Mill, 897

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Vinh, Port of, 30, 857

Violation of Cambodian Airspace, 449

Visual Airborne Target Locator System, 762-763

## W

WALKER (See Operations, Ground)

WALLEYE Guided Bomb (See Munitions)

### Weapons:

Captured Enemy Weapons Program, 641

M-16, 629-631

M-16, Impact on ARVN, 302-303

VC/NVA, 106, 111-119

Weapons Reward Program, 606-607

Weapon System, M-551 Sheridan, 628-629

Westmoreland, GEN William C., 2

WHEELER/WALLOWA (See Operations, Ground)

Wide Area Anti-personnel Mine (WAAPM) (See Munitions)

WILDERNESS (See Operations, Ground)

WINTER/SPRING Campaign, VC/NVA, 76, 105, 122, 129, 132, 137

Workshops, VC/NVA, 106-107

WUNDER BEACH, 619

## XYZ

YELLOWSTONE (See Operations, Ground)

Yi, Chen, 53-54

YORK (See Operations, Ground)

# UNCLASSIFIED

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**YORK I (See Operations, Ground)**

**YORK II (See Operations, Ground)**

**YORK III (See Operations, Ground)**

**YORK IV (See Operations, Ground)**

**Youth Exploitation Program, 606**

**YANKEE STATION, 414**



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