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
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IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (29 Nov 72) DAFD-OTT

15 December 1972

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: LTG W. G. Dolvin, Commander,
XXIV Corps, Vietnam, 9 June 1971 - 20 March 1972 (U)

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
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1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U), 2 July 1971.
2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Lieutenant General W. G. Dolvin, subject as above.
3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.
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AVII-300

SUBJECT: Senior Officers Debriefing Report (LTG W.G. Dolvin), RCS
CSPCR-74 (U)

d. The Combined Campaign Plan - MR1 for 1972 recognized the diminution of US and FWMAF presence in MR1 focusing on the advisory, assistance and support role. Extensive coordination and planning was carried out with I Corps and GVN agencies for the transfer of operational responsibilities in tactical areas of interest vacated by redeploying US and FWMA Forces.

The measures taken by I Corps to compensate for these troop withdrawals is covered under the discussion of the friendly situation and the Vietnamization Program.

5 (C) SITUATION:

a. The situation, in so far as enemy and friendly strengths, dispositions and capabilities are concerned, underwent dramatic changes during the period of my command. These changes are reflected in the succeeding paragraphs and are displayed in greater detail at the end of this report.

b Enemy situation:

(1) The enemy organization for command and control in MR1 includes three major tactical commands which are: The B-5 front in northern Quang Tri Province and the DMZ area, Military Region Tri-Thieu-Hue (MRTTH) in Thua Thien Province and southern Quang Tri, and MR5 which covers the three southern provinces of GVN Military Region One. In June of 1971 these headquarters controlled 19 NVA regiments of infantry, two regimental equivalents of 9 independent battalions and 6 separate infantry battalions. These were augmented throughout the region by local VC forces as well as VC and NVA artillery, rocket, sapper and service units.

(2) As a result of Operation IAM SON 719 the enemy reinforced southern Laos in substantial multi-division force, some of which came from MR1. The repositioning of these forces coupled with the heavy casualties inflicted during IAM SON 719, left the enemy with a significantly reduced combat capability during the remainder of 1971.

(3) Intelligence developed in January and February 1972 indicated a rapid increase in enemy forces along the DMZ and Laotian border areas of western Quang Tri and Thua Thien. This build up coincided with a multi-division threat developed in the Tri-border region west of Pleiku. There were also indications that a newly formed NVA division headquarters had been reintroduced into Base Area 112 in western Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. A major enemy offensive expected to begin during the TET holidays or later when President Nixon visited China, failed to materialize; however, the enemy build up continued in the DMZ and the northwestern border areas as

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review the mission, concept, and various aspects of US and RVNAF operations, Vietnamization, Pacification, Community Relations, and the Redeployment of US Forces.

3. (C) MISSION: When I assumed command, the XXIV Corps mission, as stated in the 1971 Summer-Fall Campaign Plan for MRL, was to support and assist I Corps-MRL through advisory programs, military assistance (material), and limited military operations. This mission remained virtually unchanged with the development and implementation of the 1972 Combined Campaign Plan; however, less emphasis was placed on US participation in military operations as our forces withdrew from MRL. Responsibility for all combat, pacification and development, security and psychological operations was transferred to RVNAF and GVN agencies in MRL, with XXIV Corps providing assistance to I Corps - MRL forces to fully develop their capabilities in these areas. As US troop withdrawals accelerated in late 1971 and early 1972, the Corps was assigned responsibility for the orderly phase out of US units. This included the responsibility to maintain the security and safety of US troops and installations during the transition and turnover of tactical areas of responsibility and facilities from US forces to RVNAF. Effective 19 March 1972 the mission of XXIV Corps in the Republic of Vietnam terminated as responsibility for US support and assistance in MRL was assumed by the First Regional Assistance Command

4. (S) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Beginning in late May 1971, XXIV Corps operated under the concepts set forth in the USMACV 1971 Summer-Fall Campaign Plan which extended into early 1972. The stated objectives of this campaign coincided with those of the Combined Campaign Plan for 1971 which, in essence, called for continued destruction of enemy forces and Viet Cong Infrastructure through both unilateral US and combined RVNAF, US and PWMAF combat operations. Coupled with this was the mission to provide combat support and combat service support to ARVN I Corps. US efforts in this campaign were designed to promote increased reliance on RVNAF capabilities and to increase the stability of the GVN. Particular emphasis was given this latter precept during the October 1971 GVN national elections.

b. It was of utmost importance that major subordinate commands maintain the momentum gained during operation IAM SON 719 and 720 in destroying NVA and VC main force units and the enemy logistical system. PWMAF operations were focused on eliminating the enemy from the clearing and border surveillance zones and in improving security of LOC and areas vital to the economic development of MRL.

c. Saturation type operations (HIEP DONG/HOANG DIEU) were employed by I Corps territorial and paramilitary forces along with other GVN agencies in neutralizing enemy base areas, to eliminate the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), disrupt the enemy logistic pattern and destroy the already weakened logistic system.

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well as in Base Area 112. At the time of my departure there were known to be 8 NVA infantry regiments, 18 independent infantry battalions and 17 sapper battalions supported by NVA and VC combat and service forces throughout the region. A discussion of enemy dispositions and strength is at Incl 1.

(4) In two separate actions, one in May and another in July of 1971, enemy documents were captured which described a strategy for protracted war in MR1. In essence this strategy called for a continued build up of base areas in the western highlands that would eventually sustain large scale operations against the populated lowlands. These operations would be designed to defeat friendly territorial and mobile field forces, regain control of the population and establish a seat of government. A further coverage of these captured strategy documents is included at Inclosure 1. The base area build up and low scale of enemy initiated attacks during the latter half of 1971 and early months of 1972 tend to lend credence to the protracted war strategy; however, the enemy, in March 1972, was fully capable of launching a major offensive in MR1 at a time and place which he felt would lead to a quick and spectacular victory and support his military and political objectives in South Vietnam.

c. Friendly Situation:

(1) US Forces:

(a) The major US forces deployed in MR1 in June 1971 included the 23d Infantry Division operating in the southern three provinces, the 101st Abn Div (Abnl) in the two northern provinces and the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) adjacent to the DMZ, XXIV Corps Artillery was positioned in Northern MR1 and the 11th CAG was providing Army Aviation Support throughout MR1. Along with these forces were their supporting elements backed by the Da Nang Support Command which rendered consistently superior service during the period through its logistics base and forward support elements. Also located in Da Nang was a major Air Force installation on which was based the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, other tactical air support units, reconnaissance and PSYOP elements and their ground support activities. The US forces in MR1 were engaged in dynamic defense operations, primarily in the lowlands and piedmont areas, as well as in support of ARVN offensive combat operations in the highlands and border areas. In August of 1971, major US Army units began incremental redeployments which progressed at an ever increasing rate until March 1972 when a small force of one reduced strength infantry brigade, with limited outside support, remained for security operations. Concurrently, supporting troops and equipment were drawn down proportionately. More detailed comments on redeployment are provided in a separate section of this report.

(b) During the 10 months of my command, the largest concentration of US combat power in Vietnam was located in MR1. Our troops continued to conduct operations against the enemy even as they were preparing for and executing draw down and redeployment. Our sustained support of RVNAF with both ground and aerial combat forces, supplies and equipment was absolutely essential during this crucial period when the Vietnamese forces were expanding and improving their combat capabilities for the eventual take over of complete responsibility for military operations in MR1.

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(2) The 2d Republic of Korea Marine Corps Brigade, operating in Quang Nam Province, returned to Korea in phased redeployment beginning 4 December 1971 and completed their withdrawal 24 February 1972, ending approximately five years of presence in MR1. The 2d ROKMC Brigade was an efficient, skilled fighting force maintaining tight control in its TAOI which guarded the southern approaches to Da Nang. Their sector was taken over by elements of the ARVN 1st Special Bde and Quang Nam Territorial Forces.

III RVNAF:

ARVN forces in MR1 in June 1971 consisted of the 1st Infantry Division in Quang Tri and Thua Thien, the 2d Infantry Division in Quang Tin and Quang Nam, 1st Task Force in Quang Nam and 8 Ranger Border Defense Battalions operating in the southern three provinces. The additions to these forces; the 3d Infantry Division, 20th Tank Sqdn and expansion of the Artillery are covered in the section entitled Vietnamization.

(3) Territorial Forces, i.e., Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF), Popular Self Defense Forces (PSDF) and National Police Field Forces (NPDF), existed in each of the provinces in MR1. These were also increased during the year and their role expanded in the area of security for pacification and development.

IV VIETNAMIZATION:

a. The transition from US to Vietnamese predominance in offensive combat operations was achieved in MR1 through a remarkable program of RVNAF expansion, disposition and training. As a result, US forces as well as the ROKMC were able to relinquish their areas of responsibility to well trained and highly motivated Vietnamese Forces. That a shift in combat operations of this magnitude was accomplished without incident and with virtually no enemy counter action attests to the skill of Lt General Huang Xuan Lam, the I Corps Commander, and his staff in the planning and timely execution of this realignment of forces. Some of the force changes, programs and operations that were of particular importance in accomplishing this transition are discussed in the following paragraphs.

b. There were four significant combat operations conducted during my tenure in which ARVN forces carried out all ground combat operations, with only combat support and logistic back up provided by US units.

(1) The first of these was LAM SON 720. This operation was conducted in the western area of northern MR1 during the period 14 April to 31 August 1971. The purpose of the operation was to exploit the success obtained during LAM SON 719 by placing maximum pressure on enemy forces in NMR1 to include denial of the lines of communication between vital lowlands and the interior sanctuaries. Units participating were the 1st ARVN Division, the 147th VNBC Brigade, and the 258th VNBC Brigade, supported by the US 101st Abn Division (Abnl) and XXIV Corps Artillery. During this operation, US Advisory personnel encouraged their counterparts to initiate detailed

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planning at the earliest practical time for the use of such combat support resources as aviation, artillery, TAC air and engineers. This was done to insure that maximum use was made of resources available and to provide longer lead and planning time for the support means in responding to operational requirements. US advisors continually recommended that their counterparts utilize organic artillery, thus building confidence in their own support means as opposed to relying so heavily on US assets. As ARVN forces were required to plan and control the various means of fire support available, they became more self-reliant and confident in the integration of their key assets. Developing proficiency in ARVN combat, combat support, and combat service support operations has been one of our main goals and has been progressing well.

(2) Another operation, Quyet Thang 20B, which had begun before I arrived, was concluded on 29 June 1971 with excellent results. This operation was conceived and planned by the 2d ARVN Infantry Division to strike deep in the highlands of Western Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces in an effort to destroy or disrupt the enemy's MR5 command and control structure, logistic system and base area. The 2d Division's 4th and 5th Regiments, one battalion of the 6th Regiment, the intelligence companies and Division Artillery carried out the operation. The US 23d Infantry Division provided aviation assets and artillery support with VNAF providing TAC air and additional airlift assets.

(3) Operation IAM SON 810 commenced on 6 September and terminated 18 September 1971. Prior to this operation the enemy had been building up his force near the DMZ and western Quang Tri Province. In addition, the NVA had built roads and established lines of communication inside the southern half of the DMZ and were also improving their LOC in Laos and western Quang Tri Province. The mission of ARVN forces (1st Inf Div, 147th VNMCC Brigade, 369th VNMCC Brigade) was to destroy communist base camps, storage depots and supply routes leading into South Vietnam from Laos to the west and the DMZ to the North. The intent of IAM SON 810 was to conduct a massive spoiling attack against the enemy in western Quang Tri Province prior to the 3 October GVN Presidential Election. This operation was preceded by saturation bombing by B-52's along the DMZ and western Quang Tri Province. The 101st Abn Div (Amb) provided combat support and performed a rear guard role to allow ARVN forces to vacate certain fire support bases and move into western Quang Tri Province. Once again, XXIV Corps Artillery supported ARVN forces with heavy artillery (8 in/175 mm) and target acquisition assets.

(4) The fourth operation, Quyet Thang 22B, began 23 February 1972 in the Que Son Mountains area astride the Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provincial boundary. This operation, conducted by the 5th Regt, 2d Division; 51st Regt (-), 1st Special Bde, two Ranger Border Defense battalions and Territorial Forces, was the first major operation of the summer campaign for I Corps in MR1. US participation consisted of aviation and air cavalry support, TAC air, Arclight strikes and artillery support. The objective of Quyet Thang 22B was to clear the critical Que Son area of enemy troop concentrations and logistic system. The operation was also designed to preempt the enemy's capability to launch

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An early dry season attack into the populated lowlands of Quang Nam and Quang Tri. The operation continued through March with significant casualties inflicted on the enemy in a series of contacts throughout the period.

c. Operational Support Coordination Group:

(1) During LAM SON 720 we developed and employed an organization designed to assist the I Corps Commander in coordinating and controlling a variety of supporting resources and activities during large scale operations. The Operational Support Coordination Group (OSCG) concept was to form a single center for collective support planning collocated with the decision makers at the operational command center.

(2) The OSCG that was deployed during LAM SON 720 remained operational to assist in the planning and execution of the follow-on operation, LAM SON 720. This group was particularly effective during this operation, primarily signing requests for assistance with the appropriate US agencies that were providing combat support and combat service support for the maneuver elements. At about this same time, the I Corps Commander directed that a staff committee similar in function and organization to the US OSCG, be formed for employment during future Corps level operations. The OSCG concept proved to be a highly effective management tool for the commander conducting large scale joint and combined operations. A report on OSCG activities and organization during LAM SON 720 and 810 is attached. The ARVN I Corps directive covering the Operational Coordination Support Committee can also be found with that Incl.

3. ARVN Forces Expansion: In order to replace the loss of US and FWMF combat power withdrawing from MR1, a number of new ARVN units were introduced to MR1.

(1) On 1 Oct 71 the 3d Inf Div was activated under I Corps to be employed along the DMZ and throughout northern Quang Tri Province. This division was organized with three infantry regiments, the 2d, 56th and 57th with its headquarters at Quang Tri. Initially the division did not represent a significant increase in combat power since its initial two regiments, the 2d and 56th were actually units formerly with the 1st Infantry Division. A third regiment, the 57th, was activated on 1 Nov 71 and completed its organization with the arrival of a third battalion, from the 2d Div in Feb 72. Unit training was also completed that month and the regiment deployed for operations. The first commander of this division was BG Vu Van Giai, an aggressive, combat seasoned and professionally competent leader who has had extensive combat service in Northern MR1.

(2) I Corps Artillery (ARVN) has made significant progress in the forming and training of three artillery battalions; two 175 mm gun (SP) battalions and one air defense battalion.

(a) The 101st Artillery Bn (175 mm) began organization of the firing batteries and drawing of TOE equipment on 1 July 1971. Battery and battalion training was successfully completed on 8 November 1971. This unit has the majority of its equipment and is currently deployed on Fire Base Carroll,

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Dong Ha and at Fire Base Salley. The 101st Artillery Battalion headquarters is located at PK 17 Compound (YD647284).

(b) The 102d Artillery Battalion (175 mm) initiated the training of key cadre personnel on 10 August 1971. Instruction was given by the US 1st Battalion, 39th Artillery. Additional cadre were trained during the period 1 October - 31 October 1971. Activation of the three firing batteries is currently underway, with deployment scheduled for April 1972. Major items of TOE equipment that are not yet on hand include twenty-one ammo trailers, eight five ton trucks and one recovery vehicle, M578.

(c) The 1st Air Defense Battalion (40 mm guns, 50 cal MG) began the training of selected cadre on 19 July 1971, with instruction given by the US 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW). Three weeks of on-the-job training began on 1 September and terminated on 22 September 1971. On 1 November 1971, the battalion began unit training though equipment shortages have severely hindered training and caused a delay in achieving a combat ready status. Thirty-two Dusters and forty-eight quad-50 machine guns were issued and the battalion became operational 7 February 1972. Its platoons were deployed between that date and 7 March 1972 with four dusters and 6 quad-50's assigned to each of the three infantry divisions, 1st Special Bde, the two 175 mm Gun battalions, the Da Nang Air Base, and to I Corps HQ.

(d) All three battalions have received excellent training and will contribute significantly to the overall capability of I Corps Artillery. The results of tests indicate that the batteries are capable of providing timely and accurate fire for a supported unit. Presently, the training and issuing of equipment to the 33d Field Artillery Battalion (105 mm) is being accomplished. This unit is scheduled to be organic to the 3d Infantry Division (ARVN).

(3) 20th Tank Squadron (ARVN):

(a) This squadron is the first M48 tank unit to be formed in ARVN, and upon completion of training, it will become part of the 1st Armored Brigade. The unit received fifty-one of its authorized fifty-four tanks during the period 17 September - 31 October 1971 and was organized with a headquarters element designated the Squadron Command and Command Service Troop, and three tank troops. Initial cadre and filler personnel were assigned to the squadron by the Armor Command (ARVN) in Saigon.

(b) The unit commenced training in August 1971 at Quang Tri Combat Base, in Quang Tri Province, assisted by a twenty-eight man US MACV training team. Once the formalized training period ends, a four man advisory element will remain with the squadron on a permanent basis. The 20th Tank Squadron is scheduled for deployment and operations in northern Military Region 1, north of the Cua Viet River.

(c) The major problems encountered in the formation of the unit were the lack of organizational tools and equipment and the shortage of repair parts. Training, both individual and unit, suffered when security requirements

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during the hours of darkness resulted in guard personnel not being available for training the following day. In addition, the adjustment to highly technical, specialized items of equipment inside the turret represented a training challenge. The range finder, for example, required many additional hours work until the trainees confidence in themselves and in the equipment was established and their proficiency increased.

(d) Civil Affairs.

(1) Due to the redeployment of US units from MRL, the emphasis on military civil affairs necessarily shifted to short range, high impact civic action projects. The 23d Infantry Division and the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) concentrated on such projects as upgrading roads to an all weather status, providing construction materials for schools, hamlets and orphanages, well digging and establishing scholarship funds from voluntary contributions. Through coordination with local GVN officials, US commanders encouraged such long range programs as economic growth through industrial and agricultural development, public safety, public works, utilities and education.

(2) The key to all successful civil affairs projects is that they be a combined effort, controlled and coordinated through civil affairs channels after having been approved by local Vietnamese officials. It is an absolute necessity that Vietnamese participate in all aspects of these projects, from planning to completion, in order to develop the expertise to carry on these activities in the future. This approach has been fruitful as evidenced by the pride and confidence that the Vietnamese now display whenever they undertake civil affairs development projects.

(e) Psychological Operations.

(1) In general, the approach to psychological operations in MRL incorporated centralizing planning of PSYOP campaigns with decentralized execution of these plans by the units.

(2) One particularly important PSYOP campaign that was initiated in August 1971, stated that by mutual agreement of the US government and the GVN, US Forces were being withdrawn from the Republic of Vietnam because they were no longer needed to assist the GVN in providing security to the population.

(3) On 1 October 1971, USARV initiated a program of flying white medical evacuation helicopters in MRL. This required an extensive PSYOP effort, consisting of leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts, to inform the enemy and the population that these were ships of mercy. Preliminary indications are that the PSYOP effort, which preceded the employment of these aircraft, was a success. It is too early yet to make a positive judgement on the value of the program since corresponding statistics on both colors of medevac helicopter have failed to show any appreciable difference in anti-aircraft attacks on either type.

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(4) There were several other successful PSYOP campaigns conducted in MR1. Campaigns such as the Chieu Hoi Campaign, Support of Pacification and Development Campaign, Anti-NVA Campaign, PSYOP Support for Land Clearing Operations, Rice Denial, and the Anti-Booby Trap/Mine Campaign, supported and enhanced Allied combat operations.

(5) All FWMAF commanders operating in MR1 continually encouraged participation in PSYOP by GVN officials and ARVN units. The Vietnamese have now acquired enough expertise and equipment that they should be able to launch highly successful, independent PSYOP in the immediate future. This, of course, has been one of our objectives, and the results of our endeavors are now beginning to be realized.

7. (C) PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT:

a. Territorial Forces:

(1) The responsibility for security of the lowlands in MR1 was given to the respective Province Chiefs. The forces available in each Province to accomplish this task included a varying number of Regional Force companies and battalions, Popular Force platoons, National Police Field Force platoons, Provincial Reconnaissance units, Armed Propaganda Teams, National Police, and the civilian manned Peoples Self Defense Forces.

(2) The departure of US troops produced a diminished combat force density throughout MR1 which in turn placed an increased burden on RVNAF and the Territorial Forces in particular. After a careful study of the situation and frequent conversations with LTG Lam about the strength of the Territorial Forces in MR1, we both recommended, through our respective chains of command, that these forces be expanded significantly in MR1. This, in part, would help fill the void caused by redeploying US Forces. In addition, ARVN forces were repositioned and the 3d Infantry Division was created to help cover some of the areas vacated by departing US units. Regional and Popular Force units were levied for filler personnel to man the new 3d Infantry Division. This in turn required that a concentrated recruiting program be initiated to replace the troops in the Territorial Forces units. In addition, a program was begun to decrease the size of the PF platoons and to create new platoons from the excess personnel that this would generate. Both recruiting and new PF platoon programs have met with remarkable success. Coupled with this was a carefully worked out scheme for redeploying RF companies and PF platoons to improve troop densities, particularly in the south. Details on the progress of these programs are attached.

b. A number of the development programs that have been introduced in MR1 are in this report. Among the more successful of these has been the resettlement program. All goals for this program have been vastly exceeded and progress continues. During the year the GVN resettled people from MR1 into new homes in MR3. As security increases resettlement progresses rapidly as it has over the past 10 months in MR1.

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c. The advances in government have also been remarkable with the people now carrying out elections in a routine manner. The national level elections held in August and October of last year were carried off with only minor interference which again attests to the increased security that prevails in the region. Even at the local level there has been a marked increase in the involvement of the people with their governmental process.

d. In nearly all sectors there has been significant advances, many of them as a direct result of our CORDS advisory and assistance program. Highlights of the progress in economic, health, agricultural, and industrial development are contained in this report.

8. (C) ZONE COORDINATION:

a. Zone Coordination organization: As the Zone Coordinator of MR1, I established, per direction of the Area Coordinator (DCG, USARV), four subzones to eliminate duplication of functions, maximize utilization of available resources and regulate communal activities and facilities.

b. Prior to 30 July 1971 the subzones were assigned to the commanders of the two US divisions, the 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), and 2d ROKMC Bde. Their subzones generally coincided with the area encompassed by their TAOI's. As the units redeployed, the area vacated was assumed by the adjacent subzone coordinator. For example, when the 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) departed, the CG, 101st Airborne Division (Abn) became responsible for all coordinator functions in the northern two provinces. With the withdrawal of the 23d Infantry Division in November, XXIV Corps discharged subzone responsibilities for the entire southern portion of the region less the Hoi An Subzone. The city of Da Nang, due to the dispersion of US installations throughout the city, was further divided into four subsectors coordinated by the senior commanders located in each of the four areas. As an added responsibility, the CG, 196th Infantry Brigade (Ser) was designated the single manager for the dynamic defense of the Da Nang Complex.

c. The zone coordination authority was found to be a most useful means of arriving at both joint and combined solutions to such common problems as installation defense and security, discipline, law and order, traffic regulations, construction, morale and welfare activities, and community relations. Through this channel, I was able to arrive at coordinated positions locally rather than having to request decisions at the highest joint and service component command levels in matters pertaining exclusively to MR1. This authority was also exercised to obtain emergency supplies and support for disaster relief following Typhoon Hester. Where applicable, this means of coordination results in an economizing of time, manpower, facilities and supplies as well as insuring a unified effort toward a common goal.

d. Command Evaluation Visits:

(1) Consistent with my dual responsibilities as CG, XXIV Corps and

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Zone Coordinator, MRI, I saw a need to develop a system to evaluate the effectiveness of command in the XXIV Corps subordinate commands and the coordination in subzones and installation. Accordingly, the Command Evaluation Visits Program was devised.

(2) The XXIV Corps Evaluation Team is headed by a general officer with staff representation from G1, G3, G4, Engineer, Signal, Surgeon, Provost Marshal and others as required for each visit. Some of the areas evaluated during these visits are installation defense, maintenance of law and order, morale, welfare, recreation, safety, medical support, repairs and utilities, standards of dress and appearance, etc. Reports of the Command Evaluation visits are used to provide assistance in upgrading zone coordination procedures in MRI and have proven to be effective leadership tools as they highlight problem areas that need immediate correction. The goal has been to schedule one command evaluation visit per week within MRI.

9. (S) REDEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES

a. The major redeployment of US forces from MRI actually began with the departure of the III Marine Amphibious Force. The Marines had just completed their withdrawal at the time I assumed command of XXIV Corps in June 1971. The 23d Division's 196th Brigade had shifted north to fill in those areas in the vicinity of Da Nang which were vacated by the III MAF. The first US Army unit to leave was the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry (Mech) from northern Quang Tri Province. The "Red Devil's" were followed by the 23d Infantry Division, less the 196th Bde, during October and November. The 101st Airborne Div (Amb) departed northern MRI in two increments from December through February. Supporting forces were also redeployed in direct relation to the withdrawal of the combat elements they supported.

b. Beginning in June with increment VIII of Keystone redeployment operations, planning and scheduling of redeployment of US forces from MRI was centralized at Corps under an informal organization known as the Redeployment Planning Group. This group was comprised of staff representatives from XXIV Corps HQ, Da Nang Support Command, the 92d Keystone Br. and each of the major subordinate commands having units redeploying in a particular increment. With the planning and scheduling done by this group we were able to effectively and efficiently program the turn-in of equipment and processing of personnel. Those subordinate organizations that employed this centralized planning and scheduling concept down at unit level found that the transition from a combat posture to inactivation could be accomplished smoothly.

c. Logistics planners at higher levels found it difficult to resist the temptation to schedule units with a high equipment density, such as

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engineers, aviation and artillery, early in an increment before lightly equipped units. Unfortunately the heavy equipment units are often the very ones needed to support the standdown of the lighter units. We ran into many such instances during redeployment, especially with engineer units, where logistical considerations were allowed to override operational considerations.

d. All aspects of withdrawal, in an active combat environment, must be weighed carefully to insure that the balance of combat power is not drastically reduced in any given area as to present the enemy with an opportunity for successful offensive action. The security of the troops redeploying must also be guaranteed, particularly in their standdown areas and after their means of self defense have been turned-in. Finally, the supporting echelon must remain proportional to the combat forces remaining so that the organization can continue its mission until the last possible moment.

e. It is also essential that the Vietnamese be kept informed as far as the security and impact on their interests are concerned. I made it a practice to make LTG Lam aware of our intentions in sufficient time and in detail so that he could make the necessary adjustments in his troop dispositions to compensate for our withdrawal and to plan the takeover of US installations passing to RVNAF. I think that the fact that the enemy was unable to take tactical advantage of our redeployment is due, at least in part, to the coordination existing between our two commands at all levels.

f. A final aspect that must be considered during redeployment is that the continuity of zone coordination be maintained. As major headquarters are withdrawn there still remains the responsibility for integrated security and support as well as the coordination necessary for the many other military and non-military functions accomplished under this authority.

g. A discussion of the redeployment of major US forces is contained in this report.

10. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. Drug Program:

(L) Drug abuse by US personnel has posed a unique problem for commanders at all levels in Vietnam. In past wars there have been problems associated with troop morale, discipline, law and order, but never before have US commanders been faced with a comparable drug problem. The first difficulty is getting commanders to recognize that they have a drug problem in their units. Once this is realized, they can take necessary action to combat the debilitating effect that drugs have on a unit.

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(2) I gave full indorsement to an aggressive drug detection and rehabilitation program in MRL which has proven very effective over the past several months. In addition, in July 1971, through the cooperation of the I Corps Commander and other Vietnamese officials, we were able to substantially reduce the accessibility of dangerous drugs through Vietnamese sources. A more complete description of the XXIV Corps Drug Program is attached.

b. Human Relations:

(1) Human Relations Councils have been established down to battalion level and have served as an excellent forum to discuss topical problems. These councils provide the commander at each echelon with an upward flow of information that he may not be able to acquire from other sources.

(2) In MRL we have discussed such issues as race relations, drugs, traffic control and regulations, discipline, law and order, and leadership. At these council meetings one commander or group has been able to learn from the experience of others, without having to go through the misery of "growing pains". The benefit of these council sessions cannot be overlooked by the prudent commander. The MRL council was chaired by the Deputy Commanding General, XXIV Corps.

11. (C) ENGINEER:

a. Tactical Roads:

(1) A tactical road construction program was developed in January 1971 with the purpose of establishing priorities and responsibilities for the 1971 construction season. The goal of the program was to establish a tactical, all weather road network in MRL that required minimum continuous maintenance. The program was well under way when I assumed command in June and was completed by 30 September 1971. In all, 246 kilometers of road were constructed under this project. The value of these roads, during the monsoon season and as LOC's for ARVN use after the US troop redeployments, made the commitment of this extensive engineer effort worthwhile.

(2) When the Northeast Monsoon arrived in MRL, the engineer road effort changed from a construction posture to one of road maintenance. The use of landline communication is more critical during the monsoon than at any other time. A Corps wide "Monsoon Watch" was put into effect to identify and repair roads damaged by either enemy activity or the monsoon. It was a difficult task and the weather soon took its effect on such main routes at QL 1, QL 9 and HL 547. Major reconstruction effort will be required to restore these routes to full capacity.

b. Protective Structures: On 21 May 1971, a 122mm rocket with a delay fuse struck and collapsed a bunker at Fire Support Base C-2 in the DMZ area. There were 29 KIA and 33 WIA in this incident. By 15 July 1971 engineer units in the DMZ area had inspected and upgraded all of the

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bunkers at US bases to better enable them to withstand the threat posed by this weapon. Bunkers on fire bases were to be constructed to defeat the perceived threat. Only those essential bunkers were upgraded since to improve all structures would require excessive construction resources. The use of large protective bunkers was discouraged to lessen the number of lucrative targets for the enemy. Perimeter defenses were to include fighting positions with overhead cover and protection from the weather. Units were also instructed to inspect and upgrade protective structures, perimeter defenses, and aircraft pavements in their base areas.

c. Land Clearing Operations:

(1) As the drawdown of US forces continued, the defense of vital installations and critical facilities became more important. Conversely, to the enemy, these vital areas represented potential targets. Therefore, in July 1971, LTG Lam and I agreed to conduct land clearing operations, utilizing US and ARVN land clearing units in order to diminish the threat in the Da Nang Rocket Belt. In order to clear the lowland plains areas in Hoa Vang and Hieu Duc Districts, it was necessary to employ two US and one ARVN engineer land clearing company. Between 12 July and 12 October 1971 these units cleared a total of 21,990 acres. They also destroyed a total of 27 bunkers with several hundred meters of tunnels and connecting trenches. A total of 100 mines and booby traps were detonated resulting in 18 friendly casualties. This operation was sustained until the advent of the rainy season required its termination.

(2) Approximately 90 percent of the cleared area was either mined and booby trapped by VC or was previously occupied by friendly forces with unknown, unmarked mine fields and dud areas. The objectives of the clearing operation must be considered successful. Therefore, I recommend that commanders, in areas where it is appropriate, give strong consideration to this type of operation.

d. Typhoon Hester:

(1) Typhoon Hester, which struck Military Region 1 with little warning on 23 October 1971, was the worst storm in 27 years. Severe wind damage was incurred in southern and central MR1, with light damage in the northern portions of the region. The Chu Lai base, home of the 23d Infantry Division, which was standing down at the time of the storm, was the hardest hit. A total of forty-eight aircraft of the 23d Infantry Division, or in support thereof, were reported damaged or destroyed. Most of this damage resulted from the destruction of heavy duty "typhoon proof" hangars which fell in on the aircraft secured inside. The high voltage power system received severe damage, and additional technicians were flown in from Saigon-Long Binh to assist in its repair. By 26 October power had been restored to Division Headquarters and the 91st Evacuation Hospital. Fifty percent of the buildings at Chu Lai were destroyed; subsequently, priority for repair operations was given to those structures required to continue Keystone operations, and those providing for the health and welfare of personnel.

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(2) The Marble Mountain Army Airfield (MMAAF) complex and the 95th Evacuation Hospital, in the Da Nang area, suffered moderate building damage and some aircraft damage occurred at MMAAF. In west Da Nang the 196th Inf Bde area sustained moderate to heavy damage to structures and utilities were impaired for several days. In other areas of Da Nang, damage consisted mostly of roofs blown off and water damage.

(3) In the Hue-Phu Bai-Camp Eagle area, damages were light to moderate. There were no major interruptions to power and water services, nor was there any major damage at out-lying firebases or at Camp Evans.

(4) The combat capability of the 101st Airborne Division remained essentially unaffected. The 23d Infantry Division suffered substantial aircraft losses; however, this did not significantly alter the Division's ability to secure its standdown area or the operational capability of the 196th Infantry Brigade. The 11th Combat Aviation Group sustained some degree of damage to fifty-six helicopters and one fixed wing aircraft. Despite the temporary loss of these aircraft, all essential aviation requirements were fulfilled. 101st Airborne Division Aircraft assisted the 11th CAG in meeting mission requirements in southern MR1. Flooding caused the 2d Republic of Korea Marine Brigade to withdraw from many of their outposts; however, this was not serious, as the temporary flooding effectively denied the area to the enemy as well.

(5) Damage to lines of communication consisted primarily of shoulder erosion on QL-1, minor washouts and the loss of three culverts and small bridges which were under construction. The only major interdiction occurred on HL 547, where the Pohl Bridge was washed out. This vital supply route to Fire Bases Bastogne and Birmingham, was kept open using a M&T6 raft constructed by the 10th Engineer Group (ARVN).

(6) In summary, the actions taken by all concerned were timely and in consonance with the weather forecasted. The storm greatly exceeded the intensity predicted and did not follow the path forecasted. All aircraft that were destroyed and most major damage to aircraft occurred in the collapse of heavy duty hangars at Chu Lai base that had withstood typhoon strength storms for approximately five years without apparent damage. The response by subordinate commands to the storm warnings was prompt and efficient. The post-typhoon recovery was rapid. All logistic elements responded in an outstanding manner, with most self-help repairs being completed by 5 November 1971. US Forces suffered three killed and fifty-one injured. In view of the unexpected severity of Hester, MR1 was remarkably fortunate not to have incurred far greater personnel casualties and physical damage.

12. (S) GENERAL COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS:

a. US Air Force Arc Light Program:

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(1) The devastating effects of the B-52 strikes in support of ground operations in Vietnam has been well documented and justifiably praised. The contribution of the Arc Light Program to the success of the Combined Campaign in MR1 cannot be denied. Since my arrival in June of 1971 there have been over 1000 Arc Light targets struck in MR1 or within its adjacent areas of influence. In the main, the Air Force response to our requests for strikes has been excellent. Although our routine requests are sometimes denied because of weather conditions or operational priorities in other areas, MACV has been responsive in supporting those targets which I, Lam or I have expressed personal command interest.

(2) During Operations Lam Son 720 and 810, ground operations through targeted areas confirmed that these strikes had achieved the desired result of destroying the enemy and his base logistic system. This denied him the opportunity to sustain offensive operations or conduct a strong defense of his areas for some time. Recent intelligence feedback reflects the enemy's growing concern over the effects of the B-52 Arc Light program.

It has been of continuing concern that we have not been able to get a timely and comprehensive analysis of the Arc Light strikes. The instant photo coverage indicating secondary explosions, when available, is a good indication of successful targeting but does not tell the whole story. Aerial post-strike analysis by FAC's and observers or, better yet, ground surveillance is necessary in providing the commander with the type of information upon which to base operational decisions. As yet we have been able to exploit only 10 percent of the strikes in this manner. I feel that increased emphasis should be placed on improving the post strike analysis system not only for the Arc Light program but for TAC Air as well. Where target damage assessments have been accurately completed we are able to make valid judgements and decisions.

(3) Employment of Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Night Observation (STANO) Systems.

(1) By June of 1971 all US combat units in MR1 had employed the improved Phase III family of unattended ground sensors (UGS). These new sensors used in conjunction with ground surveillance and target acquisition radar systems, detection devices and the newly developed Integrated Observation System (IOS) gave the commanders a vastly improved integrated intelligence collection and target acquisition capability. These systems were utilized around base camps, firebases, ASP's, along the avenues of approach in the piedmont area; and along route networks throughout the DMZ and western Quang Tri and A Shau Valley. System redundancy, overlap and improved communications and coordination between monitor sites enabled us to confirm sensor activity with other means available. This information was then analyzed at the various TOC's as part of the overall intelligence collection and evaluation process and, when appropriate, targeted by TAC Air, Arc Light, artillery, ground operations or

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identified for further surveillance. The all weather capability of sensors was a very important factor during the monsoon season allowing us to maintain some degree of surveillance of sensitive enemy locations, border areas and routes into RVN. The sensors and detection devices also proved very effective in early warning and security of installation, base camps, fire-bases and ASP's. During the height of the sensor program, from June through September 1971 there were up to 450 sensor strings, totaling nearly 1700 individual sensors, being maintained in MR1. These strings were emplaced by both 7th Air Force and Army helicopters in about equal proportion.

(2) The departure of US units caused a gradual decrease in overall sensor population with about 335 remaining active at this time. As US units redeployed, the sensor equipment and monitoring was turned over to the ARVN units occupying the areas of operation. Of the 335 strings remaining, ARVN is continuing to monitor some 220; the 7th AF is presently reading out 80 strings in the DMZ and western portions of the two northern provinces in support of MR1. Of these strings 51 are Air Force implants and 29 are unit implants. The remaining 35 strings in MR1 belong to the US 196th Infantry Brigade.

(3) The first Palletized Airborne Relay (PAR) and Palletized Airborne Relay Terminal (PART) is scheduled for delivery to I Corps on or about 25 March 1972. Six PAR's will be used on Vietnamese C-47 aircraft orbiting over a sensor field. The PART will be located at the Electronic Combat Detachment, I Corps. This initial PAR/PART will not replace the USAF Deployable Airborne Relay Terminal (DART), but will be used to monitor sensor fields in western Quang Nam Province. The USAF DART will continue to be operational until such time as a second PAR/PART is used as a replacement. The PAR/PART will eventually become the Vietnamese replacement for the USAF DART. Also, A-37 aircraft will begin to phase out USAF F-4 aircraft in the role of high speed sensor implant within high threat areas. It is anticipated that MR1 will be able to boast of a sophisticated, viable, highly effective Tight Jaw Program which is responsive to the Regimental Commanders NLT December of 1972.

(4) Unattended ground sensors contributed significantly to the intelligence collection effort and proved their usefulness as a source of target data for immediate reaction. During this year a total of 13,350 sensor activations were monitored and developed by US and ARVN units. UGS served as an economy of force, security device and as an all-weather intelligence collection means. Although sensors cannot stand alone, judicious application in the overall intelligence collection effort makes UGS a most valuable asset. This latter consideration is particularly important to the ARVN as the density of friendly forces is reduced through US and FWMAF redeployment.

(5) Complementing the UGS target acquisition effort were several types of ground surveillance radars and the Integrated Observation System.

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(a) AN/TPS-58 (RATAC) ground surveillance radar. This ENSURE item was utilized throughout MRI and proved itself a valuable target acquisition asset. The AN/TPS-58 was French designed developmental item. Maintenance was provided by TTT Gilfillan, through technical representatives who traveled to all parts of MRI to provide service as required. This particular radar averaged approximately 240 hours meantime between failures (MTBF), and was able to detect vehicles at ranges of 20,000 meters, groups of individuals out to 16,000 meters and single individuals out to 6,000 meters.

(b) AN/PPS-5 ground surveillance radar: The PPS-5 has been used extensively at the Bn level as a means of extending detection and observation groups or individuals attempting to infiltrate infantry strong points. A particular problem in the use of the PPS-5 was masking caused by heavy jungle foliage and precipitous terrain. On many occasions the PPS-5 was integrated with battalion indirect and direct fire support means to engage suspected enemy sapper parties and infiltration groups. The biggest problem encountered with the PPS-5 was the inconsistency of the batteries. Generally when they were down it was because of the batteries.

(c) The integrated Observation System (IOS) consisted of a pedestal mounted pair of 10-20 power ship's binoculars for daytime use, a night observation device (NOD) for hours of darkness and a LASER range finder. The IOS was employed throughout the MR with particular emphasis on the DMZ where U.S. troops were deployed there. The system was limited only by weather and the ranges of the NOD (15,000 meters) and the LASER range finder (30,000 meters). As in the case of the AN/TPS 58 radar, the IOS was an intelligence collection and an artillery target acquisition asset which proved quite effective.

c. Command Relationships

(1) "Stovepipe" Chains of Command

One area in which some difficulties were encountered was that of command relationships between the Corps and certain of its supporting elements. Under what has come to be referred to as the "stovepipe" chain of command we sometimes found units supporting the Corps drawn between differing operational missions, those dictated by XXIV Corps and those established by their intermediate functional headquarters, e.g. Medical Command, Engineer Command, 1st Aviation Brigade, and 1st Signal Brigade, to name a few. Even when agreements were reached at the local level they were subject to review and approval by a headquarters too far removed from the situation to fully appreciate the needs of the user. Immediate problems calling for immediate solutions were sometimes delayed in this overly centralized system. While these disparities were not the rule, they were of sufficient frequency and magnitude to

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create problems not only for the support or service units concerned but for Corps as well. The redeployment schedules for MR1, planned in detail to insure a balanced withdrawal with necessary security and support, were sometimes disrupted when the functional commands interjected divergent criteria for their units causing excessive turbulence and rescheduling of equipment turn-in and base turnover to RVNAF. We found ourselves having to subordinate operational and security considerations to those logistic or administrative conditions imposed by intermediate command headquarters on their units located in MR1. Resolution of differences often required communications up through USARV and down the functional chain of command to the local unit. The net result being a loss of time and effectiveness for the support unit and Corps alike. More responsive support is inevitably rendered when the commander has ultimate control of his direct support resources.

(2) Zone Coordination

Zone coordination has been discussed earlier in some detail but I think it appropriate to add a comment here in regard to command relationships. When faced with the dilemma of accomplishing the area responsibility mission with a tactical organization, the zone coordination authority offered a workable solution. Through this channel meaningful relationships were developed between the many interdependent headquarters in the area despite the existing "stovepipe" chains of command and differing missions that were being pursued throughout the area. By virtue of active coordination of all three areas of responsibility inherent with command of XXIV Corps, i.e., tactical commander, Senior Advisor and Zone Coordinator, we were able to provide centralized direction for the vast number of organizations, large and small, represented in the region. Thus we could focus our collective capabilities toward accomplishment of the common goals established for the GVN, RVNAF and US Forces in MR1.

d. The Role of the Advisor.

(1) Military: As RVNAF shouldered the full responsibility for sustaining the military offensive, we found ourselves making good on the promise made years ago, that our advisors will eventually work themselves out of a job. In MR1 this has become a fact. As the US role shifted exclusively to support of RVNAF, the need for advisors, per se, diminished rapidly. Consequently, only the liaison link was maintained for interface with such US support means that remain available such as Tac Air, Arc Light and certain combat services support functions that are still unavailable to ARVN. There still remain some areas where the advisor continues to play an active role. The recently formed 3d ARVN Division maintains advisors for the new battalions just now deploying into combat after completion of their training. This is true also of the 20th Tank Squadron which is a unique organization for ARVN with its "one of a kind" type equipment, the M48 tank.

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Tactical employment training for this unit is still being conducted and we are providing the needed experts in the field. VNAF is still building its capabilities and relies heavily on the advisory effort in its behalf. It will not be long, however, when we will see the advisory role completely changed to that of assistance only.

(2) CORDS: The advisory function of the Civil Operations for Rural Development Agency has not diminished to any great extent except perhaps in the area of military personnel. In March of 1972 there were only 18 of the 42 districts that had a military advisory team. A liaison team continues to provide communication and support through the CORDS system. In many of the other areas sponsored by CORDS, the advisory role remains virtually as ever. In those areas generally ascribed to the civilian sector, such as agriculture, economics, industry, public health and government, there are yet and meaningful programs that can be introduced and supported through the CORDS advisory system. Here again, as the Vietnamese develop these areas to the point where US expertise is no longer required, it should be withdrawn.

— The Soldier in Vietnam

(1) Virtually millions of words have been published on the US soldier and his personal involvement with the war in Vietnam. There are also divisive forces within as well as outside the military today have made our job here more difficult. Our soldiers have been subjected to the closest and most severe scrutiny that our highly technical society has been capable of devising. His exploits and his failings have been held up for public judgement through the most critical media coverage of any event in history. Yet, the problems he faces and the troubles he endures are not new to this war. There have always been pitfalls for the soldier. Some in line of duty and others of the more personal nature. It is perhaps the first time in history that there has been the widespread awareness of events both from within and outside the military. Through it all and in spite of the public condemnation that has been heaped upon him, the American soldier has done his job, in combat and in the supporting role, in an exceptionally fine manner. When properly led and motivated he has acquitted himself in the finest traditions of our American military heritage.

(2) Perhaps the most insidious detriment to our mission has been the indulgence in drug abuse by our young men. I am greatly concerned at the utter waste and depravity that drug abuse fosters. The time and energy that have gone into combatting it could well have been spent more profitably in seeing to the needs of the vast majority who did not fall prey to this major vice. We must not let up in our efforts to eliminate the drug abuse problem from our ranks here and elsewhere. In this regard I have included a rather detailed discussion of the XXIV Corps Drug Abuse Control Program.

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f. In conclusion, I feel that the last ten months have been crucial to the eventual establishment of a viable national government in South Vietnam, protected and guaranteed by a capable military establishment. During this period we have accomplished the transfer of responsibility from US to RVNAF for conducting the military campaign. In MRL our forces have withdrawn from this most sensitive region and have been replaced by well led and increasingly proficient RVNAF combat forces. The enemy at present is engaged in a low scale, protracted type war. However, there is every indication that he can and will attempt a large scale offensive when and where the most advantageous situation arises. Fortunately, the military forces of GVN show every indication of gaining and maintaining the initiative over the enemy. There are still many ways in which US support is needed, but these are also diminishing. I feel confident that despite the many problems that our presence in Vietnam has created, that we leave it a much more stable and competent nation in all respects.

W. G. Dolvin

W. G. DOLVIN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

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ENEMY SITUATION

1. (C) Organization, command and control: The enemy includes MR1 within the areas of interest of three major tactical commands, which are: The B-5 Front, Military Region Tri-Thieu-Hue (MRTTH) and Military Region 5 (MR5). The B-5 Front controls the enemy forces just north of and within the DMZ as well as the northern half of Quang Tri Province. MRTTH extends southward from its boundary with B-5 Front, the Cua Viet River and Highway 9, to the boundary between Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces. MR5 is responsible for the southern three Provinces and extends into GVN MR II.

2. (C) Disposition: In June 1971 the enemy had 19 regiments of infantry operating within or near the borders of MR1. These were augmented by two NVA regimental equivalents of 9 independent battalions and 6 separate infantry battalions. Artillery, rocket, sapper, and service units support these maneuver forces throughout the region. The heaviest concentration of enemy combat power, eleven regiments, was located in proximity to the northwest province, Quang Tri. The remaining combat forces were distributed throughout the other provinces with the heaviest density of NVA forces in the north, while VC mobile, local and guerrilla forces predominated in the south. Throughout the rainy season the enemy continued to build up his base areas, LOC's and logistical system in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. There were also indications of buildup to the west in the vicinity of the border between Quang Nam and Quang Tri Provinces. It is very likely that two NVA divisions and perhaps a third will be reintroduced into the northwestern base area and that a new division would become operational for control of forces in the southern portion of the region. As the weather began to improve in January and February 1972, the enemy predictably stepped up his infiltration of forces and equipment into the region. At the time of my departure the principal enemy forces known to be in MR1 consisted of 8 Infantry regiments, 18 independent Infantry battalions and 17 sapper battalions. Thier forces were augmented by normal supporting units, to include artillery and rocket units.

3. (C) Capabilities: As a result of LAM SON 719, the enemy significantly reinforced Southern Laos in multi-divisional strength with supporting elements some of which were redeployed from MR1. The repositioning of these units, coupled with the heavy casualties inflicted during LAM SON 719, resulted in a reduced NVA capability in MR1 during the remainder of 1971. Subsequently, intelligence developed in January and February indicated significant increases in enemy capabilities in the two northern provinces along the DMZ and Laotian border as well as the tri-border region just south and west of MR1. A threatened TET offensive failed to materialize; however, the enemy continued to build his capability to conduct multi-divisional attacks in the northwest and central portions of the region.

4. (C) Vulnerabilities: The enemy is most vulnerable when he masses for large scale operations and is subject to detection by multiple means of surveillance and reconnaissance with subsequent attack by B-52 strikes, TAC Air, artillery and airborne combat assault. This is also true to a lesser extent for enemy troop infiltrations which usually occur during periods of low visibility. We found that the enemy's morale was particularly susceptible to exploitation through psychological operations which oriented

on his defeats in combat, failure to support the needs and aspirations of the people, fear of death, battle hardships, disease and poor medical facilities.


5. (C) Strategy: From documents captured in May and July of 1971, the enemy strategy for pursuing a protracted war in the MR1 highlands was revealed. In essence, this strategy calls for the development of secure and well established base areas from which combat operations could be staged, maintaining pressure on friendly Territorial and Mobile Field Forces. The base areas are to become self-sufficient in the area of food production through the introduction of a major agricultural program. This program includes improved control methods, equipment and farming products. An ambitious construction program was also described in the strategy documents wherein roads, trails and bicycle routes between base areas and major troop and population centers would be reestablished or repaired to the point where they would accommodate small vehicle traffic. This program is to continue so that by 1973 the communication lines will be capable of sustaining year round vehicular traffic and main roads from North Vietnam through the base area in the four northern provinces. Once the base areas are established and secured and the supply routes open, the enemy will launch systematic operations against the population and possibly attempt to establish a capital for his provisional government.

6. (C) It appears, for the time being that the enemy is content to carry out his protracted war strategy. This is attested to by the reduced scale and frequency of enemy initiated attacks and the sharp rise in terrorist activity in late February and March, He continues to build up the base areas in the western border areas, particularly in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The increased traffic in these areas would indicate that infiltration of the two divisions mentioned earlier will continue. Potentially, the enemy has the capability to launch a large scale, multi-divisional offensive to achieve his objectives in MR1.

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
- UNLOCATED
- | | |
|-----|-----|
| 304 | 308 |
| 320 | 204 |
| 48 | 320 |
| 64 | 320 |
| | U/1 |



Enemy Disposition as of 9 June 1971

QUANG TRI

- UNLOCATED
- | | | | |
|----|----|----|----|
| 15 | B5 | 33 | B5 |
| 31 | B5 | 2 | B5 |



Enemy Disposition as of 25 February 1972

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MONTHLY STRENGTH CHART - QUANG TRI (P)


<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>
NVA	19,560	19,175	18,455	15,940	13,430	11,460	10,080	9,581	9,581
MF	0	730	730	730	730	730	485	485	485
LF	622	42	42	96	96	96	96	96	96
GUERR	639	650	650	725	666	666	724	180	176
VC I	<u>887</u>	<u>896</u>	<u>896</u>	<u>896</u>	<u>824</u>	<u>850</u>	<u>850</u>	<u>575</u>	<u>574</u>
TOTAL	21,708	21,493	20,773	18,387	15,746	13,802	12,235	10,917	10,912

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
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Enemy
Disposition as of
9 June 1971



THUA THIEN

Enemy
Disposition as of
25 February 1972



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
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MONTHLY STRENGTH CHART - THUA THIEN (P)

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>
NVA	5,900	5,060	3,164	5,350	5,410	5,565	4,225	4,075	4,075
MF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LF	292	312	320	394	314	299	299	299	299
GUERR	400	407	407	387	385	385	419	115	106
VCI	<u>1,438</u>	<u>1,395</u>	<u>1,395</u>	<u>1,395</u>	<u>1,270</u>	<u>1,337</u>	<u>1,377</u>	<u>607</u>	<u>603</u>
TOTAL	8,030	7,174	5,286	7,526	7,379	7,586	6,280	5,096	5,083


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Enemy Disposition as of 9 June 1971

QUANG NAM



Enemy Disposition as of 25 February 1972

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
MONTHLY STRENGTH CHART - QUANG NAM (P)

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>
NVA	3,510	4,260	4,260	3,910	3,650	3,650	3,485	3,965	3,965
MF	4,255	4,220	4,220	4,220	3,965	3,965	3,851	3,850	3,850
LF	910	950	950	879	829	750	715	750	715
GUERR	2,383	2,429	2,429	2,400	2,543	2,543	2,348	1,883	1,783
VC I	<u>4,344</u>	<u>4,176</u>	<u>4,176</u>	<u>4,176</u>	<u>4,084</u>	<u>6,039</u>	<u>6,039</u>	<u>3,396</u>	<u>3,339</u>
TOTAL	15,402	16,035	16,035	15,585	15,071	16,947	16,438	13,844	13,652

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QUANG TIN



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
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MONTHLY STRENGTH CHART - QUANG TIN (P)

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>
NVA	0	0	1,100	1,100	1,825	2,200	1,825	1,745	1,745
MF	1,620	1,930	1,930	2,020	1,645	1,650	1,645	1,635	1,635
LF	1,385	1,253	1,253	2,240	2,250	2,320	2,310	2,245	2,239
GUERR	1,064	979	979	799	790	790	742	375	331
VCI	<u>3,640</u>	<u>3,407</u>	<u>3,407</u>	<u>3,407</u>	<u>3,607</u>	<u>2,274</u>	<u>2,274</u>	<u>3,086</u>	<u>3,062</u>
TOTAL	7,709	7,569	8,669	9,566	10,117	9,234	8,796	9,086	9,012


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Enemy Disposition as of 9 June 1971

QUANG NGAI



Enemy Disposition as of 25 February 1972

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
MONTHLY STRENGTH CHART - QUANG NGA I (P)

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>
NVA	3,993	4,082	4,082	3,274	3,620	3,630	3,630	3,630	3,630
MF	800	1,040	1,040	800	630	630	630	630	630
LF	1,913	1,913	1,913	1,190	1,235	1,185	2,270	2,370	2,370
GUERR	1,771	1,877	1,877	2,141	1,681	1,914	2,173	3,056	2,906
VCI	<u>3,413</u>	<u>3,438</u>	<u>3,438</u>	<u>3,438</u>	<u>2,722</u>	<u>3,495</u>	<u>3,495</u>	<u>4,097</u>	<u>3,456</u>
TOTAL	11,890	12,350	12,350	10,843	9,888	10,854	12,198	13,783	12,992

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
TERRORIST ACTIVITY
JUNE 1971 - FEBRUARY 1972



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


INFORMATION SHOWN INDICATES CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY CICV
FOR SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF TERRORISM

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
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ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS
JUNE 1971 - FEBRUARY 1972



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ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS
1968 through 1971



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OPERATIONAL SUPPORT COORDINATION GROUP
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS
APO San Francisco 96349

AVII-OSCG

3 October 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Support Coordination Group (OSCG)
After Action Report (U)

Commanding General
XXIV Corps
APO San Francisco 96349

Reference: OFIAN 23-C-71, OSCG, HQ XXIV Corps, DNG, RVN
DTG 010622Z Aug 71

1. (U) Operations Supported: Lamson 720 14 Apr - 31 Aug 71
Lamson 810 1 - 19 Sep 71

(U) Tactical Area of Interest: Quang Tri Province, from the Ben Hai River south to the 101st Abn Div (AMBL)/1st Inf Div (ARVN) boundary; from the Gulf of Tonkin west to the Laotian Border. Map, Vietnam Series L, 607, Sheets 6348 and 6442, 1:100,000.

3. (S) Command and Control Headquarters.

a. 1st Inf Div (ARVN) Fwd - 14 Apr to 31 Aug 71. Quang Tri Combat Base.

b. 101st Abn Div (AMBL) Fwd CP - 18 Aug to 20 Sep 71. Quang Tri Combat Base.

c. 1st Inf Div (ARVN) Fwd (Reinforced) - 1 to 19 Sep 71. Quang Tri Combat Base.

4. (S) Mission XXIV Corps establishes an Operations Support Coordination Group (OSCG) to ensure the maximum effective utilization of U.S. operational support assets during critical I Corps combat actions.

5. (S) General:

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AVII-OSCG

3 October 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Support Coordination Group (OSCG)
After Action Report (U)

a. On 14 Aug 71, a modified OSCG was alerted for deployment to Quang Tri Province to provide advice and assistance to 1st Inf Div (ARVN) during a period of significant threat during Lamson 720. The OSCG was operational at Quang Tri Combat Base at 151230H Aug 71. OSCG was collocated with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) Fwd and the 101st Abn Div (AMBL) Fwd. I Corps did not provide staff or command representation in the forward area. By 20 Aug 71, the threat to the Nui Bao Ho area had been successfully countered through effective utilization of U.S. and RVNAF operational support assets. The OSCG had assisted the 1st Infantry Division Commander by providing an accelerated method of processing requests for heavy bomber support, assisting in processing bomber divert requests to be immediately responsive to ARVN maneuver units and by increasing the number of heavy artillery units to reinforce ARVN artillery units. In the same period, a Counter Battery Information Center (CBIC) was jointly established in the ARVN TOC to improve the effectiveness of counter battery fire and eventually to be able to predict attacks by fire on DMZ positions. Lamson 720 was ended with the enemy's retreat to western Quang Tri Province positions and the I Corps Commander's announcement of an airmobile concept plan to pursue the enemy and destroy remaining forces and supply caches.

b. The OSCG remained operational to provide assistance to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) for development of concepts and plans to execute Lamson 810. Each OSCG staff element was augmented to provide complete assistance to determine intelligence requirements, develop fire support plans that integrated new assets and insured adequate support of each phase of the operation. The close hold planning pattern and the relatively short planning time fully justified the OSCG's presence as Arc Light requests, special photo reconnaissance requirements and other U.S. support assets were quickly aligned to insure continuous combat and combat service support to RVNAF maneuver forces. Lamson 810 was executed on schedule as logistical elements established forward supply points to meet new demands for Classes III, IIIA and V stocks. The 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), Reinforced, included 24 maneuver battalions, organic direct support artillery and engineer units totaling 16,442 GVN soldiers. GVN forces conducted three regimental size airmobile assaults (total 10 battalions) and two company sized combat assaults. U.S. Forces totaled 5,500 with approximately 3,500 troops providing support on a daily basis. U.S. support included heavy artillery, tactical air, AFA and air cavalry elements for each phase of Lamson 810. Withdrawal began on 18 Sep, with six battalions being extracted by air without incident. Contact throughout the operation was light and reconfirmed earlier estimates that the enemy had withdrawn to Laos and North Vietnam. During the operation in western Quang Tri, the enemy lost 129 KIA, 300,000 AK rounds, 100,000 37mm rounds, 403 recoilless rifle rounds, 787 82mm mortar rounds, 21C 12.7mm rounds, 200 hand grenades and B-40 rounds, 6 tons of rice and 90 bunkers. The enemy,

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AVL:OSCG

SUBJECT Operational Support Coordination Group (OSCG)
After Action Report (U)

apparently assuming that Khe Sanh airstrip would be re-opened, positioned artillery inside South Vietnam to counter ARVN forces. The detection of the artillery position resulted in the destruction of four 122mm field guns, 122mm rounds, six cargo vehicles and one full tracked vehicle. Additionally, 44,000 liters of fuel were destroyed and some communication equipment. New experiences and significant gains were realized in combined operations and use of long range heavy artillery in support of operations. Lamson 810 was a profitable operation in that significant challenges were successfully met by ARVN commanders and staffs and the new level of expertise augurs well for future operations.

(S) Significant Actions, OSCG, Lamson 810.

a. I Corps/XXIV Corps OSCG. Lamson 810 was not an operation requiring multi-division forces. Accordingly, I Corps did not establish a forward F. The requirement to evaluate OSCG to ensure a proper interface with the I Corps staff was valid, and coordination efforts were initiated to ensure the two headquarters were complementary in plans and organization. Representatives from OSCG and I Corps Advisory staff coordinated at the OSCG at Quang Tri and at I Corps Headquarters at Da Nang. This coordination effort revealed that a memorandum directing formation of an I Corps OSCG was being developed and did provide for an I Corps OSCG type command element that would be fully supported by the current XXIV Corps OSCG plan. Future evaluations and field tests should be coordinated by G3, XXIV Corps.

b. Counter Battery Information Center (CBIC). The establishment of a CBIC at Quang Tri has materially assisted the ARVN command staff in predicting and/or preventing attacks by fire. The all ARVN CBIC is effective, accurate and aggressive and has developed a comprehensive target bank for future counter battery/rocket/mortar fire plans. The CBIC effort will continue to be maintained by FSCE's of appropriate headquarters.

c. Fire Support Coordination Techniques. Significant gains were realized in the planning and execution phases of fire support coordination. First, ARVN staff specialists are now recommending Arc Light strikes specifically tailored for the attack area. Use of non-standard sized target boxes had not been considered before, and some improvement in BDA reports should be expected from the improved staff techniques. Secondly, the planning cycle was reviewed to provide for adequate processing time to sustain a pre-planned Tac Air program. The ARVN staff had placed heavy reliance on the QRF capability to the point of over-taxing the capabilities and doing without the desired type bomb load. The 1st ARVN Division staff now maintains several high value target areas (e.g., road construction areas) to ensure pre-planned tactical sorties can be used profitably if ground operations do not require assistance. Thirdly, significant improvement was realized in

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VII OSCG

SUBJECT: Operational Support Coordination Group (OSCG)
After Action Report (U)

Developing and processing targets for TOT type attack, or massing all available fire support assets. Counter mortar/rocket plans included TOT type attacks on a routine basis. Fourth, the division artillery FSE section has also improved techniques for maintaining the artillery - air warning control center and is effective in gaining additional fire support when circumstances require. The degree of coordination and cooperation had never been higher as the FSE's of each headquarters meet daily to ensure fire coordination agreements and fire plans schedules were fully coordinated to support operations.

d. Target Intelligence. Improvement was noted in processing fire requests based on in-flight readouts of IR missions and other aerial reconnaissance. In addition, the 1st Infantry Division G2 Section developed a control plan to ensure maximum utilization of aerial reconnaissance assets while providing extended periods of coverage over critical suspect target areas. Complete coverage of the TAOI was in being during Lamson 810.

2. (S) Summary and Recommendations

a. The mission of the OSCG was accomplished through two distinct operations. In Lamson 720, the timely adjustment of support priorities precluded enemy initiated actions from penetrating a RVNAF defensive line, thereby presenting another realistic indicator that the GVN forces are capable of maintaining a defense of critical and sensitive areas. Lamson 810 was a demonstration of a high standard of readiness as aggressive offensive plans were carefully executed by GVN forces, and profitable discoveries of supply caches were reported. A spirit of willingness, readiness and cooperation prevailed through each test. There are significant indicators to conclude that GVN forces would do the same if tested again.

b. The advisors role remains critical. The expertise gained, new techniques used and planning experience realized by the brigade and division staffs must be frequently challenged to ensure continued readiness. The OSCG's close working relationship with the ARVN division staff appeared to diminish the advisors role, but there was always an opportunity for an aggressive advisor to assist and aid in realizing the objectives and goals. The individual staff advisor must continue to aggressively support and ensure that the lessons learned through Lamson's 720 and 810 are retained and applied daily.


/S/ Robert J. Koch
/T/ ROBERT J. KOCH
Brigadier General, USA
CG, OSCG

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ORGANIZATION OF THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT COORDINATION GROUP (OSCG)



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MEMORANDUM

Republic of Viet Nam
RVN Armed Forces
I Corps and IMR
Staff G3
No. 11.255/TM3/3

SUBJECT. The Forming of I Corps/Operational Coordination Support Committee

1. In order to use swiftly and effectively all means of support of US Forces and ARVN in the IMR, especially the utilization of maximum support to large scale Corps operation level, Headquarters I Corps IMR decides to form a Committee named as: I Corps/Operational Coordination Support Committee. Effective from 15 September 1971.

2. Elements.

a. Elements of this Committee consists of experienced and full staff ability personnel, representing of all sections and services of:

- Battlefield Intelligence.
- Maneuvering of units.
- Artillery Support (including naval gunfire).
- Strategic Air Support (B-52) and Tactical Air Support (Tac Air).
- Maneuvering of Helicopter.
- Logistics.

b. The next highest ranking officer to the Commanding General will be assigned to command this Committee.

3. Organization.

The Committee is organized as described in the Annex Chart, inclosed. Number of personnel and elements of the Committee will not be fixed. This number will be increased/decreased according to the requirement or the importance of the operation.

Personnel and military equipment assigned to this Committee, provided by all sections.

G6 I Corps provides personnel and means of communication as received order.

4. Duty.

The I Corps/Operational Coordination Support Committee duty is primarily to assist the Commanding General in coordinating with the Operational Coordination Support Committee of XXIV Corps in order to regulate means of support for appropriate and immediate support, contribute effectively to Corps level operation.

5. Execution.

a. The I Corps/Operational Coordination Support Committee only assists and advises to the present staff operation, this Committee will not replace any section or element of I Corps Headquarters/IMR. This Committee only operates in large scale operations which need coordination and several US means of support.

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b. On normal conditions, representatives of all sections remain to operate the present duty. However the representatives must be ready for the important operation, which decided by the Commanding General, the representatives are able to move to the operation areas and operate on 24H/24H basis.

c. This Committee must near the sight of the Headquarters I Corps/IMR and this Committee must station with the Forward Headquarters I Corps/IMR.

Special Paragraph.

a. As received this Memorandum, all sections of I Corps/IMR assign representative officers and operation personnel according to the Annex copy included. The assigned personnel lists must be submitted to G3 I Corps NLT September 1971; any change must be informed immediately.

b. The XXIV Corps has formed a similar Group (Operational Support Coordination Group) and has instructed to all US Divisions to coordinate with ARVN Division for this matter (ref OPLAN 23-C-71).

c. 1st Inf Division and 2d Infantry Division coordinate with 101st Division and 23d Division and concerned Advisor to form a similar Committee at the division level.

d. The operational support coordination group of division level need not to be alike. The operational support coordination group must be formed accordingly to the Commanding General's ideas in order to meet immediately and effectively the combat support.

APO 4109 date 10 Sep 1971
Lt General HOANG XUAN LAM
CG I Corps and IMR
signed and sealed.


Copies to:

- XXIV Corps for info.

"A TRUE COPY"

/S/ Steve H. Denney
/T/ STEVE H. DENNEY
Major, ADA
FSE, OSCG

ELEMENTS OF THE OPERATIONAL COORDINATION SUPPORT COMMITTEE



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PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT

1. (U) The Pacification and Development Program in MR 1 has attained a great deal of success during the past year due in part to the increasing sense of security and stability that the GVN and RVNAF have instilled in the people. This inclosure highlights some of the significant activities and programs monitored through the Civil Operations for Rural Development Support (CORDS).

2. (C) Territorial Forces:

a. With responsibility for security in the lowlands given to the Province Chiefs, the role of the Territorial Forces became increasingly important. The redeployment of US forces also caused additional reliance to be placed on the capability of the Territorial Forces to fill the void these withdrawals created. This condition encouraged the enemy to begin to move more freely throughout the lowland areas in an effort to procure food and supplies. Terrorism increased and the enemy began to make a more concerted effort to extort the population. Recognizing the critical problems this condition could create, General Lam, in concert with CG XXIV Corps, requested permission to expand his forces, both regular and territorial. This led to the activation of the 3d ARVN Infantry Division. The division was created in part from existing forces in the region, and the remainder was to be recruited from Regional and Popular Forces as well as from the civilian manpower pool. The RF and PF furnished 1447 personnel from units in Quang Tri and Thua Thien. I Corps was then authorized to reconstitute these territorial forces through an active recruiting program. In addition, 127 new PF platoons were created under a program in which the original 32 man platoons were reduced to 29 men each. By transferring recruiting spaces and 20 platoon authorizations, 10 each from Quang Tri and Thua Thien, to Quang Nam and Quang Tin, a more favorable density and distribution of forces was achieved in the southern portions of the region. With the stepped up training program the newly organized platoons were quickly prepared for employment throughout the region.

b. Security requirements for the GVN elections in late August and early October, preempted many Territorial Force activities that could have been effective in halting or interdicting enemy activity in the lowlands. Unfortunately, preoccupation with the national elections slowed down progress in redeploying Territorial Forces any substantial distance from their home bases. In those instances where Popular Forces did in fact move some way from their homes there appeared to be a definite decrease in their effectiveness. The combat effectiveness of RF/PF units also varies with the type of enemy force against which they are tasked. Territorial Forces, for example, are relatively ineffective against NVA units. This is due primarily to their lack of depth in firepower.

c. There were several combined operations conducted between the Regional Forces and elements from either the 23d Infantry Division or the 101st Abn Division (Amb). Frequent ARVN/RF joint operations were also encouraged. This was usually accomplished by attaching an RF company to a US or an ARVN battalion. These operations enabled the RF units to develop expertise and confidence in airmobile operations and other professional military skills. The training and development of RF/PF cannot be overlooked, since these units represent a significant part of the GVN structure.

3. (C) National Police:

a. The National Police have played a key role in the security and pacification of MRL. Their operations both independent and in coordination with RVNAF, are instrumental in combating the Viet Cong Infrastructure. The National Police at all levels throughout MRL, have proven to be an efficient and highly capable adjunct to the overall combined campaign of I Corps and MRL. A few of the more significant programs that have been initiated in MRL over the past year are discussed below.

b. Village Sub-Station: National Police are required to establish sub-stations within 45 days after a village has held elections. There are 464 villages in Military Region I, 426 have held elections and sub-stations have been established in all 426 villages. In order to show police presence as a government representative, command emphasis was directed toward assignment of police to the rural village during CY '71. Assignment of uniform police to the villages progressed from 2388 in January 1971 to a present day strength of 7,361. Of the 177 existing village police stations 87 were constructed from surplus US Army SEA Huts. Currently, on hand is enough materials from surplus US Army SEA Huts to build the remaining 287 stations.

c. Police Operations: In mid 1971 the National Police reorganized their command structure from National Command level to district level. Most significant in this reorganization was the establishment of police operation centers. Some of the improvements brought about in organizing the operation centers was increased operations, better training, statistics and record management and specific targeting. Operations particularly improved over the last several months. The H-71 plan was designed to disrupt the Viet Cong as beginning to show police effectiveness by increased numbers of arrests and confiscations. A sub-plan of H-71, the X-12 plan, designed for the month of February and the usual VC high point during TET, is an example of police operations improvement. Combined efforts of all police elements produced 681 independent operations and 701 operations in cooperation with Territorial Forces or other government agencies for a total of 1,382 operations. Results of these operations include 55 Viet Cong neutralized, and 221 VC suspects, 141 members of the infrastructure and 229 VCI suspects apprehended, twenty insurgents were killed resisting arrest. Much refinement remains to be done in these police operation centers but a smooth flow of information and reports have been effected and it is felt that progress will continue to be made in these areas.

d. Police Patrols: A police priority program that gained momentum is the establishment of effective foot patrol operations in both rural and urban areas.

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Da Nang City was selected as the pilot project for establishing the initial police patrol plan in September 1971. This plan was a system of beats and zones patrolled on a 24-hour basis. Police Commanders realized the beneficial effect that efficient well-trained patrolmen can have on the internal security. Regular systems of patrols soon spread to province capitals and districts. Presently, patrol systems are being established in the more secure rural villages. The foot patrol is rapidly becoming an effective tool in the maintenance of law and order within MRI.

a. National Police MRI strength July 71 - February 72 - authorized 15,886

1971	June	16,305
	July	15,753
	August	16,005
	September	15,773
	October	15,817
	November	15,993
	December	15,801
1972	January	15,731
	February	15,784

NOTE During the period under review strength remained rather constant. This is due to having reached the authorized increase prior to that time. In January 1971, the strength was 13,334.

L (C) The Phung Hoang Program (Elimination of the VCI):

a. The MR 1 monthly neutralization goal of 300 was achieved during only one month, July 1971. However, during the period 1 June 1971 through 29 February 1972, 1832 VCI were neutralized. Shown below are VCI neutralizations by month in each province and Da Nang City:

MONTH	Quang Tri	Thua Thien	Quang Nam	Quang Tin	Quang Ngai	DaNang City	TOTAL
Jun 71	7	15	164	46	46	13	291
Jul	14	20	179	11	69	11	304
Aug	9	15	135	43	51	12	265
Sep	6	4	102	15	32	12	171
Oct	13	7	120	18	35	4	197
Nov	7	5	74	24	36	11	157
Dec	14	5	79	30	24	6	158
Jan 72	12	1	65	38	29	5	150
Feb	<u>6</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>139</u>
TOTAL	88	87	993	246	344	74	1832

b. Compared with previous periods, all methods of VCI neutralizations (sentences by the Province Security Committees, kills-in-action, and ralliers) and VCI captures have experienced decreases. The redeployment of US units, the subsequent repositioning of ARVN and other GVN forces, preoccupation with

GVN Elections, typhoon Hester, and, more recently, the preparation for possible enemy attacks during the TET season have all had a detrimental influence on the overall success of the Phung Hoang Program.

c. Over the past several months, there has been a significant increase in the number of VCI neutralizations as a result of specific targeting. This appears to be in response to newly proposed neutralization goals which require each province to neutralize a percentage of their "confirmed" VCI. The new requirement will compel the provinces to place increased efforts in specific targeting of VCI to achieve neutralizations rather than depending almost entirely on chance kills and captures through military operations as has often been the case in the past.

d. The Vietnamese National Motion Picture Service Center of the Ministry of Information produced a Phung Hoang film entitled "Peaceful Countryside". The purpose of the film is to aid in gaining the understanding of the Vietnamese people and motivating them to actively participate in the Phung Hoang Program. It is hoped that the film will increase the identification of the VCI and further efforts in specific targeting.

5. (U) Land Reform: The Land Reform program in MR 1 continues to move at a rather slow rate. Lack of security and recalcitrance of some officials are stumbling blocks to progress. Also, there are indications that the "Land to the Tiller" law lacks popularity among tradition-minded segments of the rural population. Reports from the field by both Americans and Vietnamese, conversations with local nationals, and results of surveys point up a feeling that the Land Reform program is not readily applicable to MR 1. Despite administrative improvements in the Land Reform program, the overall performance has not lived up to our expectations. Of the five Provinces, only Quang Tri and Quang Tin show strong percentage advances. The lowest achievement has been in Quang Nam Province, which is especially hampered by security problems. The lack of adequate security and the reluctance of village officials to act on title applications are most often cited as reasons for the lack of progress. Vast areas of land still remain under enemy control and this makes plot ownership investigation by GVN cadre very difficult and prevents tenants from reaching land they wish to claim. On the other hand, where tenants can and do apply for title, village officials often do not process the application due to pressure from landlords with a personal dislike of the program. This situation can be corrected by appropriate influence on the part of the GVN officials. With the recent promulgation of the "communal land" decree, the amount of land to be distributed in MR 1 under Land to the Tiller will be doubled. However, the total Land Reform effort here will account for only a fraction of the land to be distributed country-wide.

6. (U) Agricultural Development: One of the most significant agricultural developments in MR 1 was the opening of the Feed Mill in Da Nang during August 1971. This mill was the first commercial feed mill ever to operate in MR 1 and has a production capacity of 10 metric tons/day. During the first month of operation, a total of 115,540 kilograms of feed was produced. Plans are being made to open retail outlets for this feed throughout MR 1. Another significant agricultural innovation has been the opening of the first two Rural Development Banks on MR 1. Initial capitalization for the banks totaled 40,000,000 \$VN and

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should aid in the stimulation of agricultural growth in MR I.

7. (U) Industrial Development: In the agriculturally-oriented economy of South Vietnam and MR I, there is an obvious need for industrial development. The GVN has demonstrated a profound interest in the proposal for an industrial park in the Da Nang area. The Industrial Bank of Vietnam, the GVN agency to be responsible for the development and coordination of the project, has promulgated through their Da Nang office a list of 34 industrial proposals for MR I. It is hoped that this is not too ambitious a project and that the civilian sector of the economy possesses the capability to fulfill the responsibility of this rather large and important development task.

8. (U) Resettlement: Various resettlement programs in MR I have surpassed anticipated goals. For example, the 1971 goal for the resettlement program was 59,690 people, and as of February 1972 87,278 had been resettled. This amounts to 147% achievement of that goal. Another example is the Return-To-Village (RTV) Program. The goal for this program in MR I for 1971 was 84,452 persons. Achievement for this program was 110,837 people RTV or 146% of the goal. Throughout MR I there are approximately 2,135 development projects in various stages of construction, including refugee resettlements, RTV programs and refugee camps. The self-help projects, agriculture projects, and vocational training classes for refugees are progressing satisfactorily. More than 298,467,006 \$WR has been allocated to the five provinces to fund the development projects and they all should be completed by the end of the year. Survey reports indicate a clearcut desire by most of the population to remain in MR I, preferably as near to their original homes as possible. However, attempts have been made to interest those groups who cannot return to their homes in the near future to explore resettlement opportunities outside of this Military Region. During the month of January 1972, 1,364 people did in fact relocate from Quang Tri Province, MR I, to Phuoc Tuy Province, MR III, and in addition, Minister of State Dam has projected similar future interregional moves. The rapidity of resettlement is still dependent upon security and the redeployment of US troops and the closing of certain bases places a greater burden upon ARVN and Territorial Forces. Once Vietnamese forces have proven to the population that they can "go it alone", resettlement should progress at a steady rate. Land Clearing Operations, which will be discussed in detail later, also aided resettlement programs. The escalated withdrawal of US Force continued to cause unemployment figures to rise. The majority of these were refugees and had no job skill with which they could seek employment elsewhere.

9. (U) Public Health:

a. In the field of Public Health, one of the more important things we have been teaching the Vietnamese is to develop their own medical supply logistics system. This has been working well under Vietnamization and the Ministry of Health is gradually assuming more of the responsibility. The Da Nang Medical Depot still has a US advisor to assist with their logistics program until May 1972.

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b. The absence of disease outbreak, following TYPHOON HESTER, was attributed to an active immunization program which had been pursued throughout the year. The prompt response of the Ministry of Health officials contributed greatly to the intensive health education program, and preventive measures taken following HESTER.

10. (U) Government Development:

a. Without the capability of Vietnamese officials to administer responsive and responsible government, there would be little hope that the various programs and projects for effecting Vietnamization could be carried out. The increased security posture of the Vietnamese Regional Forces, Popular Forces, and Peoples' Self-Defense Forces (RF, PF and PSDF) has permitted the transition of Rural Development (RD) Cadre from security-oriented to development oriented activities.

b. The conduct of elections has become a routine function of local government. RD Cadre has been utilized in publicizing elections, orienting the citizenry as to their role, encouraging worthy people to serve as candidates, assisting in the preparation of voter registration lists, and in establishing the procedures for the conduct of elections. The effectiveness of the electoral machinery was demonstrated by the smoothness with which the election of Lower House Deputies, and the later national elections, were carried out. On 29 August 1971 some 921,960 voters (80.8 percent of the eligible voters in MR 1) went to the polls and elected 24 Deputies from among 144 candidates. Since then many mid-term elections have been held, and a new round of village and hamlet elections is in process. Despite VC threats to interfere with the electoral process, security has been good, and disruption minimal.

c. Training has played a key role in preparing locally elected officials as to their responsibilities, and in the unfamiliar government processes and procedures incumbent upon them. During 1971, some 1,538 village and hamlet officials were trained at national training centers, and another 6,939 were trained at the province training centers. To assure that instruction is put into practice, the group training is followed-up by specially prepared Mobile Instructor Teams which visit the trainees with individual on-the-job assistance at the village and hamlet level. In addition, Province Management Assistance Teams, with the participation of the various specialists on the province staff, make periodic visits to districts, villages and hamlets to receive problems, make decisions---when possible, on the spot, note action to be taken by higher governmental levels, and bolster local officials in responding to the needs of their constituents.

d. The October 3d Presidential Referendum has been publicly well documented, but there appeared to be greater adverse reaction in MR 1 than in the rest of the country. There were a series of anti-Thieu demonstrations in several urban areas during the week preceding the ballot. Region wide, however, election day was relatively quiet with the exception of Da Nang City where a series of incidents between Vietnamese police, students and veterans resulted in one dead and 18 wounded.

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11. (U) Community Relations:

a. This area has been of vital concern and has presented unique challenges to the staff and all personnel within the Corps. Of course, many of the problems arising in the area of community relations have been directly associated with the US draw down. In order to find viable solutions to these problems it has required patience and cooperation between Americans and Vietnamese at all levels. The tactics of "confrontation" did not start to become a problem of major proportion until July 1971. Since that time incidents have been on the rise and a concerted effort was made to eliminate the causes of the Vietnamese-American confrontations. Statistics show that most confrontations occur as a result of traffic accidents. Once confrontations begin, if not quickly "defused", an uncontrollable mob of Vietnamese military and civilians gathers at the incident scene, firing weapons, brandishing grenades and threatening US lives and property. This problem was discussed with LTG Lam on several occasions during July and August 1971. Several reasons were given for these confrontations. One reason offered was that because of the large backlog of claims against the US doubt had developed by Vietnamese of our intentions to pay claims in light of US redeployments. To alleviate this situation somewhat, XXIV Corps has been given authority to pay solatia up to a maximum of 50,000 \$VN in unusual death cases, and a 3-man Foreign Claims Commission in Da Nang to approve claims up to 500,000 \$VN is under consideration. Command emphasis was given to the urgency of paying claims early and one week was established as the goal. In order to seek better methods of preventing US/VN confrontations appropriate actions were taken in areas of crosscultural training, transportation, vehicle control, driver's training, and law enforcement.

b. During recent months both the Vietnamese and US Forces have taken decisive steps to curtail confrontations, effectively handle incidents as they arise, and on the broader plain, to create a climate in which Vietnamese and Americans work more closely together, develop understanding and create a rapport that will carry over into long time relationships. On the Vietnamese side, Community Good-will Councils have been established, with the senior American in the area as the Vice-Chairman; on the US side Community Relations Councils have been formed. This work is already paying substantial dividends and shows even more promise for the future.

REDEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR US FORCES FROM MR1

1. (C) With the departure of the III Marine Amphibious Force in June of 1971, there were two US Divisions and a separate Brigade operation under XXIV Corps. In addition there was the Corps Artillery made up of three heavy artillery battalions and one ADA battalion. In support of US as well as RVNAF operations was a vast array of supporting forces and service elements. In June the first units under redeployment increment VIII were notified of their coming withdrawal from MR1. From that time on US forces; combat, combat support and combat services support alike, have been redeployed from MR1 at an ever increasing rate. The areas of operational responsibility or interest of the US combat units at the conclusion of each major redeployment phase.

2. (C) In the discussion that follows are highlights of the redeployment activities of the major combat elements that withdrew from MR1. In addition, a schematic diagram of the areas of responsibility for US, ROK and ARVN forces are included. A comparison of friendly and enemy troop strength. While not to be considered as the sole basis for determining relative combat power, the figures do show that despite US withdrawals the comparative troop strength ratios have remained fairly constant.

3. (C) Redeployment of major combat units;

a. 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech):

(1) This was the first major US Army unit to redeploy from MR1. The brigade was notified on 12 June 1971 that it would depart the Republic of Vietnam by 31 August 1971. In actuality the "Red Devil" Brigade ended its mission in RVN on 19 August, after three years of determined combat operations.

(2) The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) had several unique problems to overcome. First, they had to stand down while still engaged in combat operations against the enemy. Second, the Brigade base camps were located over 100 miles from KEYSTONE Center at Da Nang. Third, the remote location of the Brigade base at Quang Tri made air transportation of personnel out of the area extremely difficult. Despite these problems and through hard work and coordinated team efforts, the Brigade made its withdrawal efficiently and on time.

b. The 23d Infantry Division:

(1) The 23d Infantry had occupied the largest area in MR 1, the three southern provinces. As the division departed, its area of operations was absorbed collectively by the 2d ARVN Infantry Division, 1st Special Bde and Territorial Forces. The large and well equipped combat base at Chu Lai, which had been the 23d's headquarters, was turned over to the ARVN 2d Infantry Division.

(2) The 23d Div, less one brigade, began its redeployment on 4 October and was completed on schedule by 27 November 1971. The only difficulty this division encountered was with Typhoon Hester which struck with little warning on 21 October. The division headquarters at Chu Lai took the full brunt of this most devastating storm. With the resilience that was typical of the American Division, the damage was cleared and keystone operations were effectively accomplished on schedule in a most outstanding manner.

(3) The 196th Infantry Brigade was selected to occupy the area adjacent to Da Nang that was vacated by the III MAF in early 1971. Reorganized as a separate Brigade upon withdrawal of the 23d Division, the 196th Brigade (Sep) remained as the principal US combat force in southern MRI. It was charged with the mission of dynamic defense of Da Nang and was the last major US combat element remaining in the entire region as XXIV Corps relinquished its operational mission to PHAF in March 1972.

c. XXIV Corps Artillery.

(1) XXIV Corps Artillery units began their stand down and redeployment and inactivation on 7 May 1971. On 1 November 1971, the two remaining Field Artillery Battalions, 1st Battalion, 39th Artillery and 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery were attached to the 101st Airborne Division (Amb). On 5 November 1971, the 108th Field Artillery Group stood down followed by Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW) on the 6th of November.

(2) The XXIV Corps Artillery had provided tactical command and control for approximately 300 US Artillery tubes at its peak in mid 1970. The Headquarters had been equally active in assisting Vietnamese forces in training their 175mm gun battalions and the Air Defense Battalion as well as the establishment of Artillery and Air Strike Warning Control Centers in each province of Military Region 1.

(3) The transition from a combat role to inactivation was conducted without encountering significant problems. This was culminated by XXIV Corps Artillery furling its colors in a ceremony conducted at Camp Horn, Da Nang, on 15 November 1971, ending a most impressive record of sustained support of US and ARVN combat forces in MR 1.

d. 101st Airborne Division:

(1) The 101st Airborne Division maintained their reputation for combat efficiency in the critical northern provinces of MRI until February 1972 when the division colors and selected units returned to the US. Actually, the 101st redeployment began in November 1971 with the withdrawal of the 3d Brigade during Increment X. The Headquarters and two remaining brigades stood down, cleared their bases and either redeployed or closed on Da Nang prior to MET, 15 February 1972.

(2) The 101st Airborne Division, like the 23d Infantry Division, formed a self-sufficient security force with one brigade which covered the Keystone


operations of the rest of the division. The "rollup" force then closed into Phu Bai after an expeditious turn-over of Camp Eagle and the outlying protective fire bases. With the closing of Phu Bai Combat Base the remaining divisional elements then proceeded to Da Nang or Cam Rahn Bay for final redeployment.

(3) The 101st maintained a battalion sized, color bearing task force which moved intact back to CONUS, symbolically representing the entire "Screaming Eagle" Division's return to its stateside home, Fort Campbell Kentucky.


e. Throughout the period covered in this report nearly 75,000 US Army spaces were redeployed from MR1. This represents the total reduction of the US ground offensive capability along with the combat support and combat service support organizations that sustained the US efforts in the region. Altogether, some 380 separate US Army organizations were redeployed from MR1 during increments VIII, IX, X, and XI. Those elements that will remain consist of the necessary security forces and logistics units to support ARVN I Corps and the US First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC). This latter organization became effective in MR1 on 20 March 1972

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US and ROKMC TAOI
June 1971 thru November 1971




US and ROKMC TAOI
Jan 1972 through March 1972



- As of 31 Jan 1972
- - - As of 17 Feb 1972
- · · As of 15 Mar 1972


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ARVN TAOR



Northern MR 1
17 Jun 71 - 30 Sep 71

SOUTHERN MR 1



ARVN TAOR
Southern MR 1
— As of 17 Jun 71
- - - As of 19 Aug 71
No change in ARVN
boundaries, SMR 1,
since 19 Aug 71.

COMPARISON OF FRIENDLY AND ENEMY TROOP STRENGTHS

<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>
ARVN	43,927	44,723	44,966	46,878	49,647	49,479	51,205	53,033	53,401
RF/PF	76,342	76,986	77,106	76,433	75,980	75,963	75,829	75,214	74,141
US	80,587	77,784	72,633	70,789	68,206	62,525	54,795	43,628	34,054
ROK	<u>7,077</u>	<u>7,077</u>	<u>7,164</u>	<u>7,164</u>	<u>7,164</u>	<u>7,164</u>	<u>4,974</u>	<u>4,974</u>	<u>1,262</u>
TOTAL	207,953	206,570	201,869	201,264	200,997	195,131	186,803	176,849	163,758
<u>ENEMY</u>									
NVA	32,963	32,577	31,061	29,574	27,935	26,505	23,245	22,996	22,996
MF	6,075	7,920	7,920	7,770	6,970	6,975	6,611	6,600	6,600
LF	5,122	4,470	4,478	4,799	4,724	4,650	5,690	5,760	5,719
GUER	6,257	6,342	6,342	6,452	6,065	6,298	6,406	5,609	5,302
VCI	<u>13,722</u>	<u>13,312</u>	<u>13,312</u>	<u>13,312</u>	<u>12,507</u>	<u>13,995</u>	<u>13,995</u>	<u>11,761</u>	<u>11,034</u>
TOTAL	64,739	64,621	63,113	61,907	58,201	58,423	55,947	52,726	51,651
RATIO Friendly to Enemy	3.2:1	3.2:1	3.2:1	3.3:1	3.4:1	3.3:1	3.3:1	3.3:1	3.2:1

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MR 1 DRUG ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM

1. Upon assuming command of XXIV Corps in the spring of 1971, one of the most formidable challenges with which I was presented was the problem of drug abuse by US servicemen in Vietnam. Preliminary investigation revealed that the scope of this problem was far greater than had been anticipated. During my tenure the magnitude of the problem was identified by senior officers and senior non-commissioned officers, measures were implemented to counter widespread drug abuse, and a coordinated US - ARVN offensive was launched to eliminate this problem from MR 1. The US Army developed testing equipment, promulgated regulations and offered assistance, but it is in the field laboratory of MR 1 that through the diligence of local commanders the problem of drug abuse has been arrested.

2. The first step in the drug abuse campaign was gaining an insight into the nature of the problem. Sensationalism in the press coupled with the inability of most leaders to recognize individuals with a drug habit compounded the problem. Commanders and medical officers were encouraged to canvass personnel within their units with respect to the availability and use of drugs. Leadership and human relationship councils addressed this problem and questionnaires were distributed to the troops to be completed anonymously with the goal of determining the extent of the problems and the awareness of local commanders to the abuse of narcotics in their units. Based on the results of these investigations, an intensive campaign was initiated to educate leaders in identifying drug abusers and interdicting the flow of narcotics onto US bases. By June of 1971 it became apparent that the magnitude of the problem exceeded our initial estimate. Accordingly, I directed that an Ad Hoc Committee chaired by a general officer be formed to determine the necessary measures to effectively expand our program. Concurrently, LTG Lam, I Corps Commander, initiated a comprehensive drug program through Government of Vietnam (GVN) channels. This indorsement by LTG Lam of our efforts to suppress drug abuse became a cornerstone for our program. Jointly, US and GVN officials participated in six committees designed to impede narcotics traffic and abuse: Allied Base Control, Airfield Control, Seaport Control, Drug Control, Information and Education, and Public Health and Welfare subcommittees. Subsequent to the convening of the Ad Hoc Board and the inauguration of the GVN campaign I held a meeting with the senior US commanders in MR 1 to discuss the concepts and goals of the plan. These were to make the Vietnamese aware of the danger which the availability of drugs posed for their own youth and the potential impact which their neglect to forcefully support our drug suppression efforts might have on future American support for Vietnam. Additionally, US commanders were apprised of the necessity that they must place the drug abuse campaign on a par with combat operations giving command emphasis accordingly.

3. The MR 1 program was nucleated on the concept that American servicemen can be educated to the dangers of drug abuse and will respond favorably. Also, that small unit leaders (squad, platoon and company level) can be taught to recognize drug abusers and drug "pushers" and with proper command emphasis will swiftly move to correct the situation. Directives, messages and notices were published outlining methods frequently employed by addicts to buy and transport drugs, to camouflage their addiction, and to recruit new members. XXIV Corps published and distributed a squad leaders handbook on methods of identifying addicts and procedures for rehabilitation or elimination. Scientific literature on the medical, psychological, sociological and legal ramifications of drug abuse was made available to field libraries. Unit half-way houses were established and amnesty programs were initiated.

4. In September the MR 1 program was augmented by three USARV programs which added depth to our endeavors: the drug education field team, unit urinalysis testing, and drug detoxification. This was followed by the opening of the USARV Drug Abuse Holding Center in October and two Drug Rehabilitation Centers in MR 1. The scope of the campaign now included education, interdiction of the narcotics flow, unannounced unit sweeps, detoxification and, where appropriate, rehabilitation or elimination.

5. The mechanics of the campaign were established with these programs, but commanders and staff personnel ~~required~~ time to develop appropriate ~~implementing~~ procedures. During the ensuing months the rates of drug abuse and confiscations fluctuated while measures were devised to preclude prior knowledge of unannounced unit urinalysis sweeps and shakedowns, to improve our rehabilitative efforts, and to expedite the elimination of incorrigible drug abusers. Follow-up testing of units as well as graduates of the drug program enabled commanders to identify individuals who had not successfully eliminated their drug habit. Once recidivists were recognized and eliminated, the existence of peer group pressure to entice experimentation was also reduced.

6. Detailed records of drug abusers were collected and maintained by XXIV Corps staff as a basis for establishing trends and profiles. Based on studies of these records numerous letters and messages were dispatched to higher headquarters outlining our recommendations on methods which could be ~~implemented~~ by the Army to preclude the continuance of the drug abuse problem. These recommendations centered on the need to elevate enlistment and retention standards to screen out individuals with a history indicative of a low resistance to drug abuse. The success of the MR 1 drug program is easily measured in the statistics which reflect abusive drug use: when the program to test DEROS personnel was inaugurated, MR 1 had a positive rate of over 5%; this has now been reduced to 2.4%. The rate of hard narcotics users (individuals which must be medically evacuated to CONUS) has been diminished from 3.8% to 1.5%. Confiscations have been reduced by one-half while methods of detecting drugs have improved. A most important statistic is that when the first group of personnel found positive on a unit sweep were retested, only 50% had terminated their drug use; this percentage has now increased to 74%. Since the inception of the unit testing program in MR 1, 60,884 personnel have been tested; 3,446 or 5.6% have been found positive. In the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Da Nang, 252 personnel have been admitted for treatment; 185 or more than 70% have completed the 14-day program (graduates) and 67 dropped out of the center prior to completion of the prescribed treatment. Follow-up tests of the graduates reveal that 40 returned to CONUS free of drugs, 67 returned to their former drug abuse and 94 are pending (submitted at least two urine sample, both negative and are still in RVN). If this trend continues we may see 50% of our graduates returned to CONUS free of their drug habit.

7. Although the MR 1 drug program encompassed all facets of education, exemption, enforcement, and elimination, it is in the area of rehabilitation that significant lessons have been learned. The more significant are summarized below:

a. The purely professional approach works. No catchy name was given the Center (The US Army Rehabilitation Center-Da Nang), no evocative slogans were used, nor were psychedelic posters displayed. The staff was all business from the start, leaving no doubt in the patient's mind that our mission was to return him to his unit as a functioning soldier; ~~from~~ all reports this approach worked well.

b. Once the tone of the Center was set, changes in key personnel such as Center Director, Medical Director, or Senior Social Worker was avoided. This was to ensure that the direction of the rehabilitative effort was consistent.

c. Former drug abusers are not necessary nor even desirable as staff members. They enjoy no advantage over the non-user in showing the "junkie" they need not resort to drugs. The character and behavior disorders that invariably characterize the drug abuser can often still be present although he may not presently be on drugs. Three former users selected for the staff were released, not because they reverted to drugs, but because they were un-

d. A withdrawal syndrome was found to be minor. Fewer than 5% of the patients exhibited significant withdrawal symptoms. Placebos work almost as well to relieve discomfort during withdrawal as do potent medications.

e. The resolve of even the most sincerely motivated of patients is so quickly tested during the first few days of the program that not more than one man per company was admitted within each group. If two men knew each other, invariably they both would "drop-out".

f. Everything should be suspect- glue, paint thinner, tooth paste, or spray deodorant. If its possible to get a "high", the drug user will

g. Visual deprivation is an important feature for the group session. The room should be plain and the walls unadorned, so there will be no distractions from participation in psychotherapy sessions.

h. The patient will have a voracious appetite after detoxification. In the 14 days will gain back from 15-25 of the pounds he lost while in. Extra rations should be requested and approved. Also the patient's bowels will move vigorously, often for the first time in weeks. More than the normal number of accommodations must be made available.

i. The patient profile is not representative of the American soldier in Vietnam or anyplace else. The drug abuse problem is not substantively a "heroin" problem - it is a personnel problem, i.e., 66% of the Center's patients abused drugs (not counting marijuana) prior to coming into the Army. Most of them had sociopathic personalities. As we see it, 50% of the problem could be identified and eliminated in Basic and Advanced Individual Training since more than half of our patients had received Article 15's in their first 16 weeks of training. Procedures should be implemented to void the enlistment contracts of those individuals at that time. Furthermore, approximately 70% of the problem could be eliminated by selective recruiting; 61% of the patients were high school drop-outs and 69% had civilian police records.

j. From these observations it appears that perhaps 90% of the problem, as it is presented to us, could be eliminated by using a test to identify the sociopathic personality, coupled with selective recruiting.

8. In summary, the nucleus of our drug campaign is based on a comprehensive education program for the individual soldier as well as commanders and staff officers, an effective detection program coupled with a vigorous crime and drug suppression effort, and a command emphasized policy of rehabilitation or rapid elimination from the Army.

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