

MACV COMMAND HISTORY 1965



Chapter 5 The Outcome (Plus Tables)



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CHAPTER V

THE OUTCOME

(U) The Year of Decision brought remarkable changes to the military situation in Vietnam, the most significant of which was the deployment of almost 200,000 US combat troops and the commencement of one of the largest construction programs ever undertaken by the US Armed Forces. It was a year in which the US faced challenges it had never before encountered. The degree of success with which these challenges were met could not always be measured—a perplexing and frustrating situation. The highest order of perseverance and judgment on the part of each serviceman was required. But his problems were recognized—the entire world became painfully aware of the vexing situation and the importance of events in Vietnam. This recognition was symbolized by Time magazine's choice of General Westmoreland as the "Man of the Year" for 1965.

BUILDUP

(U) The first US tactical units arrived in SVN early in the year. USMC air defense units arrived in Da Nang in February, followed by USMC infantry units at the same location on 8 March. The USA 173d Abn Bde arrived in the Saigon-Bien Hoa area on 5 May. By the end of the year there were 12 USMC battalions, two Army divisions, two separate USA airborne brigades and numerous USMC and USA aviation and support units deployed. Deployment of elements of the 25th Inf Div began toward the end of the year (see chronology).

(U) The purpose of the initial USMC buildup was to provide a security force for the Da Nang air base. This emphasis on security forces continued throughout the year. NP units were deployed to areas of high troop concentrations and, in May, USMACV corps advisory detachments were augmented to provide security for the various advisory elements.

(S) The year also saw the first overt employment of US air power in the war. Concentrated bombing of NVN began on 7 February with a raid by USN and VNAF aircraft in retaliation for the VC attacks on Pleiku on the same date. The first USAF strike of 1965 in NVN was conducted on 11 February when 150 USAF and USN aircraft struck in retaliation for the bombing of a BEQ in Qui Nhon. ¹ (NVN had been bombed once on 5 August 1964 following an attack by NVN PT boats on two US destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin.) US tactical jet aircraft commenced operations

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in SVN on 19 February and the first tactical employment of B-52 bombers occurred on 18 June. Aerial reconnaissance of Laos and the infiltration routes had been underway since May 1964 under the code name YANKEE TEAM. Some strikes had been made against air defense positions in Laos but the first US air strikes against VC/NVA infiltration routes occurred on 12 December 1964 under the code name BARREL ROLL (air strikes into the northern Laotian Panhandle).² BARREL ROLL, ARC LIGHT (B-52 strikes in RVN), STEEL TIGER (air strikes in the southern Laotian Panhandle), and ROLLING THUNDER (air strikes in NVN) operations were conducted throughout the year from bases in RVN, Thailand, Guam, and from 7th Flt carriers. Strikes in Laos and RVN continued throughout the year but there were two cessations of bombings in NVN (13-18 May; 25 December-unresumed in 1965) to provide opportunities for peace negotiations.

(C) There was a great increase in the USN role in the war. Aside from its support of the VNN through the NAVGP and its support of air operations from several CVA's, it provided extensive gunfire support and conducted MARKET TIME operations to maintain coastal surveillance against VC infiltration. Before May 1965 only five NGF ships supported counterinsurgency operations. At the end of the year 18 destroyers were providing this support. Occasionally as many as 25 ships participated in this role.³ In addition, USCG elements arrived in RVN during the summer to participate in MARKET TIME.

(C) Changes in USA advisory effort included an increase of advisory teams at subsector level and a POLWAR Directorate on the USMACV staff as well as an expansion in the intelligence field. More naval advisors were assigned to RAG and to the Coastal Force. Additional USAF advisors were assigned to newly-activated VNAF squadrons. However, there were no significant changes in the USMC advisory role during 1965.

(S) The year saw the first tactical commitment of FVMAF with the arrival of the 1st Bn, RAR, on 8 June. It was followed by a battery of New Zealand artillery, the ROK Capital Infantry Division and a ROK Marine brigade (see chronology). About 22,400 FVMAF troops were deployed by 31 December and plans were being made for deployment of another ROK RCT and another ROK division.⁴

(C) Given the long lines of communication across the Pacific, the inadequate terminal facilities in the RVN and the dispersion of field elements coupled with the hazardous nature of inland routes, it was clearly imperative that a logistics base should be developed. Initially, Saigon was the only major port; it was considered inadequate because of its limited space, the vulnerability of ships to VC attacks on the river and its

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location as a transshipment point. A dual logistics support system was developed in which the NAVSUPACT, Da Nang, would service the northern regions while the 1st USA Log Comd in Saigon would cover the southern area. This system called for the establishment of a major supply and support complex at Cam Ranh Bay and additional bases at Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa and Vung Tau. The development of these facilities was particularly necessary if US/FWMAF elements were expected to mount sustained military operations.

(C) By the end of 1965, except for some logistics units and four USAF squadrons, the US personnel buildup under Phase I was completed. Of the 184,314 US military personnel in-country, 116,755 were USA; 8,749, USN and USCG; 38,190, USMC; and 20,600, USAF.⁵ Although Phase II buildup had begun, it required augmentation (Phase IIA) to cope with the increased VC/NVA buildup.

(C) Except for the PF, RVNAF and other GVN forces managed to attain their respective MAP strength ceilings. However, RVNAF suffered from an extremely high desertion rate and heavy combat losses. These developments substantially decreased the RVN manpower resources to the degree that COMUSMACV was obliged to reduce the 1966 MAP supported force increases from a desired 326,725 for ARVN to 286,007.⁶ Approximate year-end strengths attained by GVN forces were: ARVN, 267,900; VNN, 14,500; VNAF, 12,700; VNBC, 7,400; RF 132,200; PF, 136,400; NP 52,200; and CIDG, 28,400.⁷

REACTIONS

(C) The campaign of terrorist attacks against both US and GVN installations increased greatly in 1965. Undoubtedly many of the incidents may be attributed to the VC's reaction to the increasing signs of US determination in fulfilling its commitment to the RVN. In preparation for the anticipated step-up in VC hostile action the evacuation of dependents of US military personnel and other US government employees was ordered on 8 February. VC-initiated incidents continued to rise throughout the year; the highest weekly record of incidents was for the week ending 1 December, when it reached 1,038.⁸

(C) In early 1965 it was apparent that infiltration of supplies from the north was increasing. There were also indications that NVA regulars were being introduced into the RVN. Intelligence reports tended to show that the VC would launch a big campaign in the II CTZ during the summer monsoons with one goal of splitting the RVN in half. The enemy demonstrated his ability to coordinate the actions of multi-battalion forces

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effectively and displayed a willingness to engage the US/FWMAF elements in large conventional warfare battles. It appeared as though the insurgent activity was developing into Mao's third stage of revolution--that of open warfare.

(U) The first public confirmation of the presence of NVA units in the RVN was made by a USMACV announcement of 15 July which identified the 101st NVA Regiment as being in-country. ⁹ Late in the year the enemy infiltration rate was estimated to have increased to a monthly rate of 4,500. It was concluded that VC/NVA strength in RVN doubled during the year, with a strength of 229,759 ¹⁰ at the year's end (see Table I-2).

(U) The year also saw a wide diversity of US public and international reaction to the US involvement in the war. In the US there were student protest marches, teach-ins and a few attempts to halt or delay shipments to Vietnam. However, these actions appeared to be protests of small albeit, highly vocal, groups. The vast majority of the US public appeared to support the policy of the US Government. Private citizens and civic organizations indicated their support by sending tons of Christmas mail and gifts to US servicemen in SVN. A massive airlift of Christmas mail, nicknamed "Operation Christmas Star," was initiated. Incoming mail handled by USMACV postal facilities in November and December totaled 6,429,216 lbs. In all, more than 1,500,000 letters and 100,000 packages were received by US personnel in SVN. COMUSMACV said that although it posed "an additional burden on our internal logistics system, . . . it was exceptionally worthwhile." ¹¹

(C) The number of official visitors to RVN created a serious problem in 1965. This was first evident when 407 military and 45 civilian officials visited RVN between 1 February and 15 March. ¹² COMUSMACV expressed his concern over the problem, pointing out that these visits caused a heavy drain on air transportation and billeting; required a great deal of support from USMACV personnel, and created a security problem. ¹³ He recognized that "visits by senior individuals play a constructive role in that they see the situation at first hand and can thus speak from experience upon their return to the states. Secondly, they can acquire expertise that can be brought to bear in helping us solve some of our problems". ¹⁴ He suggested to CINCPAC that visits be reduced to an absolute minimum. ¹⁵ CINCPAC and CJCS approved the following COMUSMACV-proposed criteria in alleviating the problems: Will the trip: Aid in eliminating a USMACV problem area? Aid in acquiring needed resources? Aid future operations of USMACV? Impart to USMACV significant information not otherwise available? Or involve personnel whose responsibilities require them to maintain periodic contact with field activities in the national interest? ¹⁶ In spite of these

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actions to discourage nonessential visits, the total for October reached an all-time high of 892. The CG, FFORCEV, noted in October that the volume of visitors to his HQ had begun to affect adversely his operational activities.¹⁷ This same concern was expressed by the CG, 1st Cav Div (AM), in December.¹⁸ (See Table V-1 for 1965 visitor statistics.)

(C) Concerned with the safety of VIP's who might desire to visit units engaged in combat, the Ambassador and COMUSMACV agreed that the decision as to whether such visits should be arranged or not should be made by the commanders (or if delegated, their immediate subordinates) of the respective major subordinate commands affected. In the IV CTZ, the Senior Advisor was to decide. The criterion governing these decisions was: to prevent unnecessary exposure to hostile action of key US/Free World officials whose injury or death would result in grave loss to the nation.¹⁹

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROBLEMS

(S) The Phase I buildup was a particularly noteworthy accomplishment considering its rapidity and the lack of a logistical base and adequate communications in-country. Great progress was made in both logistical and communications areas but much improvement was still needed at the end of the year. While there were critical supply shortages during the year, no combat operations were delayed by lack of adequate logistics support. However, the capability for sustained combat was hampered. The major problem that remained unsolved at the end of the year was that of port congestion and cargo through-put. Land LOC's were also largely interdicted forcing heavy reliance on coastal shipping and airlift. At year's end negotiation for additional LST's, barges and other forms of lighterage were underway. The cost of all this effort, though, was high. In November the SECDEF stated that the war was costing the US approximately ten billion dollars annually.²⁰

(S) In the field of communications, significant progress was made in planning and establishing systems to provide COMUSMACV with resources necessary for the exercise of responsive command and control. A secure voice net linking Saigon and Washington was completed. An in-country secure voice net was partially completed. Advisory communications were improved. A serious shortcoming of the year was the failure to complete construction of the IWCS to permit overall upgrading of the SEASIA long lines system. A serious message backlog developed causing COMUSMACV to place stringent controls on message traffic within his HQ. At the end of the year plans were underway for an expansion of the Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS)

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and for the introduction of TV into RVN both as a morale booster and for use in the GVN psywar program.

(C) Early in the year COMUSMACV stressed the need for an improved command and control system for tactical air operations. After COMUSMACV approved a 2d AD plan on 24 March, releasing US tactical aircraft from previous restraints, a Joint Tactical Air Control Center (JTACC) was established at TSN air base. 21 On 1 December a COC was established to control ground force operations and coordinate this control with the JTACC.

(C) Significant military achievements by US forces during the year were the blunting of the monsoon offensive and the engagement of the VC within his traditional sanctuaries. The US forces took a tremendous toll of VC lives and acquitted themselves creditably on the battlefield. Many US units were, like RVNAF, tied to a local security role but at year's end, with the buildup continuing, an expansion of operations was planned.

(C) The III MAF encountered a greater problem than other US units owing to the lack of RF/PF elements for securing hamlets within their TAOR. As a result, III MAF was not able to conduct operations outside their TAOR to the extent desired because of the need to use their own units in the securing phase of pacification.

(U) RVNAF forces recorded some significant victories and some costly defeats. When VC units were forced to stand and fight they were soundly defeated but they were often victorious in battles of their own choosing. During the first half of the year the VC held the initiative in many areas, attacking under favorable conditions and avoiding or breaking contact when conditions were unfavorable. Many RVNAF units were committed to the defense of key installations which left large areas where the VC could move freely. The introduction of US units and increased air strikes tended to deprive the VC of these traditional sanctuaries and as the year progressed RVNAF gained strength and confidence. An improvement in the RVNAF ability to use new equipment effectively was noted. Some ARVN commanders, especially in IV Corps, demonstrated an excellent ability to conduct successful military operations. 22

(C) The cost in lives, equipment and aircraft was higher than previous years but it was less than COMUSMACV's estimates. Personnel losses for US forces were 1,378 KIA; 6,148 WIA; 126 MIA and 17 known detained or captured. 23 RVNAF lost nearly 14,000 KIA 24 while the VC lost approximately 35,000 KIA and 6,000 captured. 25 On 20 January 1966 the Secretary of Defense announced that the US had lost 351 aircraft in SVN and NVN in 1965.

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Included were 76 helicopters and 275 fixed wing aircraft. Of these, approximately 160 (95 USAF; USN exact losses unknown) were tactical strike aircraft brought down over NVN. 27

(S) Significant developments of material and techniques were noted during the year, particularly in the field of target acquisition. SLAR was used to locate river and road traffic at night; IR devices were used to locate hidden campsites; the heliborne illumination system called "Lightning Bug" was developed for use with a SLAR aircraft to provide target illumination for armed helicopters at night. A tactic known as "Snipe Hunt" was developed in which targets were located by a SLAR aircraft working with a FAC, a flare aircraft and tactical strike aircraft. Delta teams were organized and used as long range reconnaissance teams. New techniques in night photography were employed. By year's end antipersonnel radars were in use in the Command.

(S) Significant advances were made in the field of psywar. JUSPAO was organized and the USMACV POLWAR Directorate was established. Each sector was provided two specially equipped Tri-Lambretta vehicles for use in the psywar effort. U-10 aircraft and UH-1 loudspeaker and leaflet drop aircraft were used extensively. US units took full advantage of the psywar effects of MEDCAP and construction projects. One of the more successful psywar efforts appeared to be the leaflet drop program over NVN which reached a wide audience and seemingly affected the morale among some segments of the NVN citizenry. The number of returnees in the Chieu Hoi program doubled in 1965 (11,000) over that of 1964. But a true evaluation of this program should not be based on plain statistics.

(C) Achievements in the pacification effort fell short of the established goals but some progress was made. The Hop Tac program was accepted in the GVN national pacification plan for 1966. A pilot program was initiated to provide subsector advisors with a revolving fund to assist in rural construction. A trial program was initiated in three provinces to bring the US effort in the rural construction field under one US coordinator, known as the Province Team Chief. This effort met with some success as the program was continued in two provinces after the trial period ended. Progress in the 1965 pacification program was hindered by political instability during the first half of the year; inadequate initial planning and coordination at the national level; slow clarification of policies, and insufficient personnel resources to expand into the cleared areas. At year's end, the VC controlled about 56 percent of the land area and 23 percent of the population²⁸ but new directives and plans, AB 140 and AB 141, developed at that time offered promise for 1966.

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(U) After 20 months of political instability, the Thieu/Ky government gave promise of halting this debilitating situation. At the end of 1965 this government had been in office more than six months and had begun to consider a formula for future political development of the country. This included a proposal to form a national advisory council to take up the task of drafting a constitution and laws governing elections and political parties.²⁹

(S) The year was marred by conflict between the Montagnard tribes and GVN. There were a series of incidents, the largest of which was the FULRO rebellion in Phu Bon in December. The rebellion was suppressed and four FULRO leaders were executed on 29 December.³⁰ At the end of 1965, as in 1964, the aspirations of the Montagnards were still largely unfulfilled and it appeared that 1966 would see the same tension which characterized GVN/Montagnard relationships up to that time.

(C) Both US and GVN authorities agreed that the inflation caused by increased US and GVN spending and the security of goods had to be checked. Inflation was one of the factors that prompted the US currency conversion to Military Payment Certificates in August. However, this and other measures were only temporarily effective and the situation appeared even more aggravated at the end of the year.

THE FUTURE

(C) The prospects for USMACV in 1966 were not entirely clear. The cessation of the bombing of NVN, already a week long, would probably continue for an extended period, to allow the President's peace efforts time for fruition. However, the enemy did not appear to be responsive or interested. In spite of the massive strength the US had assembled in SVN and the enemy's heavy personnel losses, VC/NVN leaders did not appear to be impressed. Increased enemy infiltration provided definite indications that the US/FWMA/RVN forces could only look forward to many battles ahead.

(C) The year 1965 was thus a year of decision, marked by the US buildup and the establishment of a huge logistics base in SVN. The firmness of the US position in SVN was amply demonstrated to the enemy and to the world. Phase I goals had been substantially achieved and Phase II and IIA deployment were assured of execution, thus providing adequate resources for the accomplishment of Phase II objectives. The one billion dollar base development program and the additional commitment of other resources were certainly formidable assets in support of the long and difficult process of regaining GVN control over the country. Unless the peace efforts were to succeed, it

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appeared inevitable that there would be increased fighting. The US goals continued to be: to defeat the enemy on the battlefield; to destroy his safe havens; to stop his infiltration; to neutralize his war-making capabilities in NVN, and to assist in creating those conditions conducive to the development of effective GVN control over the entire nation.

(C) In an address to the USMACV staff on the last day of the year, COMUSMACV envisaged 1966 as the Year of Opportunity. The enemy had lost the initiative; the GVN had stopped losing the war. Some progress had begun to show in the development of a mature and stable government which would, hopefully, begin to win the allegiance of the people. The opportunity was at hand for the US/FWMAF and RVNAF to begin the difficult march to victory and win for the Vietnamese people the peace they so long had sought. In all, 1966, the "Year of the Horse," held forth promise of being a "galloping" year. 31

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TABLES

FIGURES

FOOTNOTES

ANNEXES

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VIET CONG INCIDENTS, 1965-75

MONTH	ATK	ATK NRL HAM	AMBUSH	KIDNAP	OTHER TERR	OTHER ASSAS	SAB	PROP	TOTAL
JAN	64	2	16	125	1,428	31	272	190	2,287
FEB	78	7	25	86	1,239	35	251	81	1,855
MAR	83	11	24	134	1,347	48	248	93	2,080
APR	42	2	16	143	1,316	44	146	89	1,801
MAY	54	6	12	71	1,457	29	362	115	2,264
JUN	80	10	34	156	1,653	41	489	108	2,699
JUL	46	2	14	113	1,540	32	384	150	2,478
AUG	56	3	16	88	1,434	24	346	201	2,449
SEP	29	1	3	83	1,477	41	277	188	2,550
OCT	43	1	10	121	1,824	43	421	197	3,363
NOV	53	6	9	94	2,046	53	485	254	3,568
DEC	58	1	6	32	2,436	60	450	313	3,309
TOTAL	677	52	200	1,296	19,197	481	4,131	1,979	30,813

Table I-1

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VC/NVA PERSONNEL STRENGTH IN RVN:76

MONTH	REGT	TOT BNS	SEP COS	SEP PLTS	COMBT STR	SUPT STR	MILITIA	POLITICAL CADRE	TOTAL STR
Dec 64	5	47	135	29	33,000	-	60,000-80,000	-	93,000-113,000
Jan 65	5	47	135	29	33,000	-	60,000-80,000	-	93,000-113,000
Feb 65	5	50	144	30	37,250	-	60,000-80,000	-	97,250-117,250
Mar 65	5	53	142	35	38,460	-	80,000-100,000	-	118,460-138,460
Apr 65	9	61	188	114	47,000	17,860	80,000-100,000	-	144,860-164,860
May 65	9	64	188	114	47,000	17,860	80,000-100,000	-	144,860-164,860
Jun 65	9	65	188	114	47,750	16,860	80,000-100,000	-	144,610-164,610
Jul 65	10	71	189	101	50,050	16,860	100,000-120,000	-	166,910-186,910
Aug 65	10	71	189	101	50,050	16,860	103,573	39,175	209,667
Sep 65	10	73	189	101	53,550	16,860	103,573	39,175	213,167
Oct 65	14	89	189	101	61,911	16,911	103,573	39,175	221,159
Nov 65	18	100	135	101	68,000	16,911	103,573	39,175	227,659
Dec 65	19	107	185	101	70,100	16,911	103,573	39,175	229,759

Table I-2

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MONTH-END STRENGTHS - US FORCES - 1965 ⁶⁸⁹

MONTH	ARMY	NAVY *	MARINES	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
JAN	14,752	1,103	891	7,112	23,858
FEB	15,201	1,131	1,447	7,158	24,937
MAR	15,592	1,271	4,721	7,527	29,111
APR	16,192	1,561	8,944	9,324	36,021
MAY	22,588	2,912	16,265	9,963	51,728
JUN	27,350	3,756	18,112	10,703	59,921
JUL	39,650	4,646	25,533	11,593	81,422
AUG	48,077	5,324	34,227	18,719	100,347
SEP	76,179	6,039	36,442	13,637	132,297
OCT	92,755	8,529	36,788	15,207	153,279
NOV	104,508	8,869	37,897	18,297	169,571
DEC	116,755	8,749	38,190	20,620	184,314

*Includes US Coast Guard

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RVNAF DESERTION - 1965 690

MONTH	ARVN	VNAF	VNN	VNMC	RF	PF
JAN	2,259	15	41	69	1,470	3,359
FEB	2,459	1	8	64	812	3,894
MAR	4,946	13	0	59	1,137	5,010
APR	3,370	15	66	160	1,242	5,402
MAY	4,157	10	42	1	2,141	3,245
JUN	2,578	20	47	410	2,440	4,838
JUL	3,087	13	40	269	1,346	5,178
AUG	3,659	20	17	105	1,530	5,308
SEP	3,845	16	28	122	1,464	3,214
OCT	5,122	14	38	105	1,026	3,982
NOV	4,345	25	45	206	936	3,380
DEC	5,161	7	69	125	1,401	2,414

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RVNAF LOSSES - 1965* 691

MONTH	ARVN	VNAF	VNMC	VNN	RF	PF
JAN	382	6	11	7	531	828
FEB	373	2	17	7	393	1,194
MAR	372	2	26	19	451	834
APR	352	4	7	19	463	903
MAY	500	2	38	31	576	524
JUN	841	3	0	0	1,400	1,070
JUL	734	4	46	4	1,130	1,324
AUG	437	5	15	11	509	907
SEP	399	6	20	8	531	538
OCT	666	3	7	6	714	475
NOV	698	2	10	3	811	386
DEC	537	4	125	3	676	737

*(KIA, OTHER DEAD, and MIA)

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RVN FORCES MONTH END STRENGTHS - 1965 692

MONTH	VNAF	ARVN	VNMC	VNN	RF	PF	CIDG	POI
DEC 64	10,521	220,360	7,209	8,194	96,049	168,317	21,454	31,395
JAN 65	10,847	218,278	7,336	8,276	98,877	165,026	19,700	33,599
FEB 65	11,258	218,545	7,251	8,399	99,143	161,566	19,150	33,624
MAR 65	11,546	217,593	7,116	8,806	100,018	156,619	19,070	34,751
APR 65	11,949	224,515	6,931	8,892	102,680	152,514	21,000	36,606
MAY 65	11,781	229,006	7,039	9,045	105,506	150,538	20,366	38,831
JUN 65	12,081	234,136	6,842	9,037	107,652	149,029	21,721	43,851
JUL 65	12,351	243,491	6,691	12,931	111,194	144,669	23,130	42,898
AUG 65	12,701	250,288	6,839	13,285	117,162	141,148	23,401	47,206
SEP 65	13,085	257,730	7,249	13,507	120,004	137,806	24,369	48,555
OCT 65	12,830	264,127	7,259	13,786	125,913	135,486	26,557	49,376
NOV 65	12,766	263,928	7,519	14,274	130,704	135,362	28,188	51,100
DEC 65	12,778	267,877	7,380	14,559	132,221	136,398	28,430	52,242

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BUILDUP, FREE WORLD, 1965 693

MONTH	ROK	AUST	NZ	PHIL	ROC	THAI
JAN	140	162	24	32	14	16
FEB	609	162	25	28	14	16
MAR	2,127	160	25	31	16	16
APR	2,126	164	20	65	16	16
MAY	2,130	192	23	65	16	16
JUN	2,398	1,177	24	65	16	16
JUL	2,557	1,185	125	70	21	16
AUG	2,550	1,135	125	76	21	16
SEP	2,598	1,511	119	76	21	16
OCT	16,671	1,534	125	72	20	16
NOV	20,990	1,534	123	72	20	16
DEC	20,620	1,557	119	72	20	16

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MACV PERSONNEL STRENGTHS 694

MACV Hqs

	1 Jan 65		31 Dec 65	
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asg</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asg</u>
Cmd Gp	*	*	78	70
J1	35	46	91	97
J2	135	133	476	339
J3	130	153	318	243
J4	43	47	433	342
J5	30	35	49	42
J6	132	147	182	152
AG	136	147	248	260
SJA	7	9	34	23
FM	*	*	26	26
Chap	*	*	7	7
Hq Comdt	49	48	65	60
IG	*	*	6	4
Surg	21	23	33	28
CI	59	57	123	76
Compt	18	21	26	22
POL IAR ¹	---	---	49	42
Tng Dir ²	194	226	68	49
PWMAO	*	*	22	18
JRATA	12	13	16	20
MAP Dir	15	14	13	13
Flt Det	*	*	81	63
Hop Tac	*	*	20	16

SERVICE BREAKDOWN WITHIN MACV HCS

Table II-6

(As of 31 Dec 65)

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<u>Service</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asg</u>
USA	1,665	1,673
USN	218	136
USMC	131	56
USAF	113	277
Totals:	2,127	2,142

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ADVISORY PERSONNEL - MACV

(As of 31 Dec 65)

<u>Service</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asg³</u>
USA	5,352	4,387
USN	1,516	633
USMC	89	98
USAF	499	398
Totals:	7,456	5,516

US UNIT STRENGTHS - MACV

(As of 31 Dec 65)

<u>Service</u>	<u>Asg</u>
USA	110,326
USN	6,460
USMC	38,017
USAF	19,820
USCG	303
Total:	174,926

TOTAL PERSONNEL STRENGTHS - MACV

(As of 31 Dec 65)

<u>Service</u>	<u>Asg</u>
USA	116,755
USN	8,446
USMC	38,190
USAF	20,620
USCG	303
Total:	184,314

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- NOTES:
- Data not available.
 - Established May 1965.
 - Listed as O&T in 1964 History. Strengths at beginning of year included tng advisory deta.
 - Large discrepancy between assigned and authorized strengths due primarily to fact that personnel action incomplete on 15 Nov 65, JTD.

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KEY PERSONNEL LISTING - 31 DEC 65 695

HQS MACV

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Date of Incumbency</u>
Gen W. C. Westmoreland, USA	COMUSMACV	20 Jun 64
Lt Gen J. A. Heintges, USA	DEPCOMUSMACV	5 Nov 65
Vice Lt Gen J. L. Throckmorton, USA		
Lt Gen J. H. Moore, USAF	DEPCOMUSMACV for Air	14 May 65
Maj Gen J. B. Rosson, USA	CofS	8 Jul 65
Vice Maj Gen R. G. Stilwell, USA		
Maj Gen R. S. Abbey, USAF	DEP CofS	15 Jul 65
Brig Gen J. L. Collins, USA	Spec Asst to COMUSMACV	15 Apr 65
Maj Gen B. Sternberg, USA	ACofS, J1	20 Jan 64
Brig Gen J. A. McChristian, USA	ACofS, J2	13 Jul 65
Vice Maj Gen C. A. Youngdale, USMC		
Brig Gen J. E. DePuy, USA	ACofS, J3	9 May 64
Brig Gen J. D. Crowley, USA	ACofS, J4	14 Feb 65
Vice Maj Gen F. A. Osmanski, USA		
Maj Gen J. N. Swank, Jr., USAF	ACofS, J5	9 Aug 65
Vice Maj Gen H. B. Adams, USAF		
Brig Gen W. E. Lots, Jr., USA	ACofS, J6	18 Sep 65
Vice Col R. E. Kimball, USA		

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Major Subordinate Commands

US Army

Gen W. C. Westmoreland, USA CG, USARV/ACC 20 Jul 65

US Air Force

Lt Gen J. H. Moore, USAF Cdr, 2d AD/AFCC 31 Jan 64

US Marine Corps

Maj Gen L. W. Walt, USMC CG, III MAF/NCC 4 Jun 65

Vice Maj Gen W. R. Collins, USMC

US Navy

RAdm N. G. Ward, USN CHNAVGFP/CTF 115/116 10 May 65

Vice Capt W. H. Hardcastle, Jr.

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MISSIONS OF RVNAF 29

MISSION	SUBTASKS		PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SECONDARY
Defense of bases & LOC's			RF	ARVN
Harassment of VC bases & LOC's			ARVN CIDG	RF
Border surveillance			ARVN CIDG	
Air support			VNAF	
Sea surveillance			VNN	
Pacification	Security Restoration Phase	Clearing Subphase	ARVN	RF
		Securing Subphase	RF PF National Police	ARVN
	Development Phase			

Table III-1

Page 278 of 482 Pages

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CONTINGENCY PLANS - 1 JAN 65³⁰

<u>Plan</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Changes</u>
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 1-64	20 Oct 63	C1, C2 pending
CCRSFF OPLAN 4-64	20 Oct 63	C1
COMUSMACV OPLAN 32-64 (Ph II RVN)	1 Jul 63	C3, C4 pending
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 32-64 (Ph III & IV)	1 Dec 63	C4
COMUSMACV/THAI OPLAN 33-63	1 Jan 63	C1
COMUSMACV OPLAN 34-64	12 Jul 63	C19
COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A-64	15 Dec 63	C2
COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-64	15 Apr 64	C2
COMUSMACV OPLAN 38-65	15 Nov 64	--
COMUSMACV OPLAN 39-65	in preparation	--
COMUSMACV OPLAN 60-64	16 Mar 64	C3
COMUSMACV OPLAN 61-64	15 Sep 64	C1 pending
COMUSMACV OPLAN 98-64	10 Mar 64	C1
COMUSMACV OPLAN 98A-64	18 Dec 63	C1

Table II-2

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CONTINGENCY PLANS - 1 Jan 66³¹

COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 1-64	20 Oct 63	C1, C2 pending
CGRSFF OPLAN 4-64	20 Oct 63	C4
COMUSMACV/SEASIA OPLAN 22-66	pending	--
COMUSMACV OPLAN 32-64 (Ph II RVN)	1 Jul 63	C3
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 32-64 (Ph III & IV)	1 Dec 63	C6
COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-65	4 Mar 65	C1
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 38-65	15 Nov 64	--
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 39-65	15 Jan 65	C1 pending
COMUSMACV OPLAN 60-66	22 Sep 65	--

Table III-2

Page 200 of 482 Pages

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OFFICIAL VISITORS TO RVN PROCESSED BY MACV³²

1965

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>CATEGORY 1*</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
JAN	25	158	183
FEB	87	181	268
MAR	121	178	299
APR	103	136	239
MAY	80	240	320
JUN	78	229	307
JUL	163	207	370
AUG	95	422	517
SEP	82	346	428
OCT	162	730	892
NOV	172	432	604
DEC	205	169	374

*Brigadier generals, equivalents and above.

Table V-1

Page 281 of 282 Pages

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VC ATTACKS: BATTALION AND COMPANY SIZE ⁷⁷




Figure I-1


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VC AND RVN PERSONNEL KIA⁷⁸



1964: RVN KIA - 7,064
VC KIA - 16,969

1965: RVN KIA - 11,399
VC KIA - 36,925

Figure I-2

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VC ATTACKS BY CORPS AREA 79




Figure 1-3

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VC INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM BY CORPS AREA 80





Figure I-4

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VC INCIDENTS OF SABOTAGE BY CORPS AREA 81




Figure I-5
Page 286 of 300 Pages

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VC INCIDENTS OF PROPAGANDA BY CORPS AREA




Figure I-6

Page 287 of 300 pages

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VC ANTI-AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS BY CORPS AREA ⁸³





Figure I-7

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


Figure I-8

Page 289 of 300 Pages

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BUILDUP OF US FORCES, 1965 ⁶⁹⁶




Figure II-1

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


Figure II-2

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RVNAF REGULAR FORCE ORGANIZATION ⁶⁹⁸




Figure II-3

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RVNAF STRENGTH BUILDUP BY MONTH - 1965 REGULAR FORCES 699




Figure II-4

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RVNAF STRENGTH BUILDUP BY MONTH - 1965 REGIONAL FORCES 700




Figure II-5

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RVNAF STRENGTH BUILDUP BY MONTH - 1965 POPULAR FORCES⁷⁰¹




Figure II-6

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RVNAF STRENGTH BUILDUP BY MONTH - 1965 CIDG 702




Figure II-7

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RVNAF STRENGTH BUILDUP BY MONTH - 1965 NATIONAL POLICE⁷⁰³




Figure II-8


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USMACV ADVISORY STRUCTURE 704



Numbers in each box indicate 15 Nov 65 JTD paragraph numbers

Figure II-9

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HEADQUARTERS MACV ORGANIZATION CHART 705

31 December 1965




Figure IX-10
Page 299 of 322 Page


NOTE:

- 1 Under Joint Staff Supervision
 - 2 Under Joint Staff Supervision
 - 3 Under Joint Staff Supervision
 - 4 Under Joint Staff Supervision
 - 5 Under Joint Staff Supervision
 - 6 Under Joint Staff Supervision
- Direct Access to COMUSMACV as required by Law

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM 706

Command Relationships
(as of 31 Dec 65)



Legend: ——— Command and Control
 - - - - - Command Less Operational Control
 ······ Operational Control Only


- NOTES: 1. 173d & 101st Abn Bdes under opcon MACV, FPV or 1stInfDiv as missions indicate.
 2. 1stInfDiv(+) and K2 btry normally attached to 173d Abn Bde.
 3. 80K Div and 10K Marine Bde responds to FPV direction based on mutual agreement, CG, FPV and CG, 80K Div.

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U. S. LOGISTICAL CONCEPT 707



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Figure II-12

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REF. CONSULTATION - 1965 708




Figure II-13

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RAILROAD STATUS 709

31 DEC 1965

— OPERATIONAL
- - - NON OPERATIONAL




Figure II-14

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MAJOR HIGHWAYS 709




Figure II-15


Page 304 of 482 Pages

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710
C-130 CAPABLE AIRFIELDS

- ADEQUATE
- MARGINAL



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Figure II-16

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IN-COUNTRY CARGO MOVEMENT - 1965⁷¹²





Figure II-17

Page 306 of 482 Pages

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CONSTRUCTION LOCATIONS 713
\$ 10 Million or More



CONSTRUCTION FORCES

CONTRACTOR 22,000 EMPLOYEES

15 ENGINE BATTALIONS

TYPES OF FACILITIES

PORTS

PIERS
WHARFS
TRANSIT SHEDS
HARDSTANDS
LIGHTERAGE FAC.
LST RAMPS

DEPOTS

WAREHOUSES
OPEN/STORAGE
AMMO STORAGE
FUEL STORAGE
SHOPS
ADMIN FACILITIES

CANTONMENTS
MEDICAL FACILITIES
ROADS
UTILITIES
AIRFIELDS
COMMUNICATION FAC.

Figure II-18

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


Figure II-19


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1965 - AIRCRAFT
MONTHLY LOSSES TO COMBAT 346



USAF VNAP USN

Figure IV-1.

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GVN-US ORGANIZATION FOR RURAL CONSTRUCTION 347





Figure IV-2

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


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Figure IV-3

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JOINT US PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (JUSPAO) 349



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Figure IV-4