

MACV COMMAND HISTORY 1965



**Annex B
Free World Military Assistance**



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ANNEX B - FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Background

(U) In April, and again in December 1964, the President publicly requested that other nations of the Free World contribute toward the GVN's struggle against the VC insurgency.¹ Prior to that request, aside from the US, only Australia had provided military aid in the form of a training team of some 30 members, highly skilled in counterinsurgency, which arrived in 1962.²

(S) The GVN made formal requests for aid from specific nations, but much of the planning behind these requests was conducted by the US.³ A shopping list of various types of assistance was prepared, and during July 1964, the GVN formally requested assistance from 36 nations of the Free World.

(S) By January 1965, at least 26 nations were providing assistance to GVN.⁴ Some of these nations were:⁵

Australia, with 88 Army advisors, a RAAF detachment consisting of six Caribou aircraft with air and maintenance crews (74 men), an eight-man surgical team plus economic aid.

Canada, which donated \$730,000 to be used in education and academic development.

Republic of China, with a political warfare detachment of 15 senior officers and also 86 agricultural experts.

France, which furnished medical assistance, academic assistance and loans.

Germany, which sent \$5,000,000 to be used in development projects as well as teachers and equipment for technical schools.

Japan, which sent a six-man surgical team, 29 ambulances and 20,000 small radios.

Korea, with one MASH composed of 130 men, and ten Taekwondo (Karate) instructors.

Malaysia, which sent vehicles and police instructors.

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New Zealand, with one 25-man engineer team.

Philippines, with three medical teams totaling 16 doctors, nurses and medical technicians, plus 18 civil affairs and psywar advisors.

Thailand, with C-47 crews composed of seven pilots, one navigator, and nine maintenance personnel, and the furnishing of T-33 (jet) transition training for 24 SVN pilots.

United Kingdom, with six British policemen to work with the USAID Public Safety Division, plus some diesel engines and road-building equipment.

(U) The basic diplomatic accord that enabled other nations to be of assistance to GVN was the so-called pentilateral agreement. This agreement among the nations of Cambodia, France, Laos, SVN, and the US was signed on 23 December 1950. Under its terms the US Government agreed to provide certain unspecified aid to the then-called French Union. In return for this assistance the other signatories agreed to allow duty-free treatment and exemption from taxation upon importation, exportation, or movement within Indo-China of US-furnished material. They also agreed to receive such US personnel as might be required to administer the program. In effect, US personnel so provided were to be considered as members of the US Mission and, as a result, would receive the normal privileges granted under diplomatic immunity.⁶ Relations between the GVN and FMAF were based on extensions of this agreement. In 1965 there were no status of forces agreements between SVN and any of the nations furnishing military aid.

(U) As a result of increasing Free World assistance during 1964, and with the promise of more to come, COMUSMACV found it necessary to establish a special staff agency to deal with the international military assistance effort. On 22 December 1964, IMAO was established under the staff supervision of USMACV ACoS J5.⁷ Initial manning for this section was provided from J5 resources. In August 1965 arrangements were completed with the GVN to provide the so-called Madame Nhu Building to house not only the IMAO but also the representatives of all Free World nations active in SVN. This building was dedicated on 16 December by raising the flags of all member nations.⁸ On 6 October, the name of the IMAO was officially changed to FMAO, the better to express the role of those countries involved in providing support for the RVN.⁹

(S) One of the first accomplishments of the FMAO during 1965 was the preparation of a draft policy and procedures guide that was forwarded to CINCPAC in January. After staffing, this document was published and received distribution on 29 August as a CINCPAC manual.¹⁰ This manual provided guidance to COMUSMACV

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in establishing, coordinating, and utilizing other Free World forces active in SVN. Key points of this document are summarized as follows:ll

1) SECTION I, INTRODUCTION: The introduction to this manual described the general scope to the international military assistance program to include a guide to command relationships. RVNAP and COMUSMACV jointly determined the form of assistance desired. Assistance would be supportable by the US, the GVN, or the Free World nation involved. Agreements would be written between the US, the GVN and the pertinent nation, to cover in detail the relationships involved. Each country furnishing troops to assist the GVN would have its own commander. Operational control would be exercised by him, and might be exercised additionally by USMACV or GVN. A policy council would be established for each international military assistance force to establish command and control relations, based on the written agreements between the states involved. The following quote summarizes the aims of the program:

Although many forms of assistance are urgently needed in the Republic of Vietnam the most sought-after are support units or individuals that will have major impact on favorable progress in the counterinsurgency effort by:

1) Dramatically demonstrating to the government and people of the Republic of Vietnam and to the rest of the world that other free countries are interested in helping the Vietnamese people maintain their freedom and achieve peace.

2) Providing assistance, short of direct combat actions, of a form that will have the most immediate and noticeable effect on the counterinsurgency effort in a particular locale.

2) SECTION II, PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION: This section of the manual covered normal personnel functions with relation to the Free World effort. It included such items as mail, morale and PX privileges.

3) SECTION III, INTELLIGENCE: This section of the manual covered procedures for the exchange of classified information and intelligence with the third country.

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4) SECTION IV, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING: This section of the manual covered normal operational relations, to include the recommendation that all FVMAF elements would receive pre-deployment training on operations in SVN. It was also stated that USMACV was willing to provide lesson plans and instructors to assist in this training.

5) SECTION V, LOGISTICS: This portion of the manual covered basic supply procedures for the FVMAF and stated that donor nations should provide full TOE authorization of equipment for all units deployed, in addition to a supply of repair parts. The donor was expected to supply logistical support for its own units below depot level. GVN would provide basic subsistence consisting of rice, salt, tea and shortening. The GVN would also furnish depot support as available. The US would provide any backup necessary.

6) SECTION VI, COMMUNICATIONS: FVMAF communications would be integrated into US and GVN facilities. The US would provide certain facilities as required, such as use of overseas equipment to contact the donor's home state.

7) SECTION VII, CONTROLLER: The US might finance costs related to defense supplies, replacement items, and services in support of units, to the extent consistent with US laws and programming guidelines. Donor nations would be encouraged to bear as much of the cost as possible short of withdrawal of assistance. Methods to finance the FVMAF included the following: increased AID to the donor state, increased AID to the RVN, increased RVN MAP, and utilization of the services of the US military establishment without reimbursement. This section also included detailed information on funding procedures to be used.

8) SECTION VII, PUBLIC INFORMATION: Basically this portion of the manual stated that public information facilities, to include accreditation of war correspondents, would be made available to the donor states on a co-equal basis with the US.

9) SECTION IX, LEGAL: Although the US obviously could not establish the context of agreements between two other nations, there were three pages of recommendations as to what the agreements between the GVN and other Free World countries should contain.

(S) Early in the year GVN prepared draft regulations to serve as a guide to relations between the GVN and those nations providing assistance. So far as can be determined, these regulations were never formally published, although they were of

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historical value in that they indicated the feelings of the VN toward other nations helping their country.¹² Many of the provisions of these draft regulations were overcome by events arising out of the arrival of Free World combat elements. The general contents of this proposed document follow:¹³

1) International military assistance units of the Free World nations provided to assist the RVN would be according to the four basic principles below:

- a) No direct participation in search and destroy operations.
- b) Would be used in areas already secure or cleared.
- c) If having the capability, would take charge of close-in self-defense activities.
- d) Would be placed under the operational control of RVNAF and would be provided logistical support by RVNAF and the various US military and civilian agencies in SVN; would be self-supporting as regards personnel and pay, with the help and assistance of USMACV.

2) This proposal also described in great detail actions permitted when an international military assistance force was faced with civil disturbance and also what self-defense actions against VC attack would be authorized. In general the fact that these provisions were included in draft regulations indicates the fact that the GVN was concerned that members of assistance forces might tend to meddle in domestic politics. This was an attempt to preclude that possibility.

(C) Although the GVN thought that all FWMAF units should be under operational control of RVNAF, this did not take place. (Command and control arrangements will be discussed in connection with each nation providing aid to SVN, as appropriate.)

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Australia

(U) The most significant event, with relation to FWMA during 1965, was the arrival of combat elements, as opposed to units strictly involved in advisory and civic action functions. Once again Australia led the way, and thus became the first nation, aside from the US, to provide forces designed actually to engage the VC as a cohesive military unit.

(U) As stated earlier Australia was the first of the Free World nations (the US not included) to have given active military assistance to SVN. The initial contingent of 30 Australian army personnel had arrived in August 1962, and had been assigned duties as advisors working with US teams located in the I CTZ.

(S) Initially, the GVN made a strong effort to keep the Australian aid a "closed circuit" between the two governments. On learning of this, the then COMUSMACV, General P. D. Harkins, stated that the Australian contingent must be under his operational control. GVN agreed and a precedent was established for the operational control of other FWMAF.¹⁴

(S) The first military working arrangement between COMUSMACV and another country was signed with Australia on 27 July 1962. The arrangement stated that Australia would provide the 30-man element, that it was to be integrated into the US advisory structure, and that it would be under the direction of COMUSMACV. Under this arrangement, the US was to provide all administrative and logistical support for the Australians on a reimbursable basis; the GOA agreed to pay the United States \$150 per month per officer, and \$125 per month per enlisted man. In addition, a flat sum of \$100 per month was to be paid to cover the cost of a sedan and driver provided to the Australian commander.¹⁵ Thus, to all intents and purposes, the small Australian contingent was made part of the US advisory effort in the I CTZ and received exactly the same support as US personnel.

(S) In August 1964, an RAAF detachment arrived and was also employed under the operational control of COMUSMACV as part of the SEASIA airlift. This element brought six Caribous and consisted of 74 personnel. The arrival of this new detachment resulted in a slight change in the initial USG-GOA agreement. The revision served to broaden the terms of the references under which the Australians were operating. No longer were they restricted to "training of the ground forces of South Vietnam in that country in jungle fighting and village defense." They were able to give ". . . almost any type of assistance necessary in

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this type of operation.¹⁶ The change was of significance in that it indicated a broadening of the conflict and a realization on the part of the GOA that perhaps greater efforts might be required in the future.

(C) This heightened awareness was to result in an offer by the GOA to take a more active part in the growing struggle. To implement this decision, made early in 1965, a task force was formed, composed of the following elements:¹⁷

- 1) Headquarters, Australian Army Far East.
- 2) First Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (+).
- 3) 709th Signal Troop.
- 4) Logistical Support Company.

(C) At that time it was also determined that all Australian elements then in SVN, the advisors and the aviation detachment, would be placed under the control of the new HQ soon to be established. An employment restriction was placed on the Australian force in that it was not to be used to quell SVN civil disturbances.¹⁸

(C) During May 1965 a new working arrangement was drawn up between the US and Australia, and it was agreed that the Australian battalion would be attached to and under the operational control of a US brigade. Thus, the concept of having FWMANF under operational control of COMUSMACV was continued. Command, of course, was retained by the senior Australian officer in SVN. The CG, 173d Abn Bde, was selected to exercise operational control over the 1st Bn, RAR. In effect, the 1st Bn, RAR, became the third infantry battalion of the 173d Abn Bde. The precedent already established for operational control of the Australian forces thus continued in effect. In the arrangement it was also stated that the new force would receive essentially the same administrative and logistical support given equivalent US units.¹⁹

(C) On 26 May the reconnaissance party for the battalion arrived in SVN followed by the advance party on 29 May. Between 2 and 11 June, the major portion of the Australian contingent landed and was employed with the 173d Abn Bde, and supported by a New Zealand field artillery battery. This brigade was thus the only major international combat element operating in SVN at that time.²⁰

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(S) The GOA continued to reimburse the US for all support received. Owing to the fact that there was no experience factor available in funding an FVMAF element of this size, it was decided to divide the initial operating period into three phases as indicated:²¹

1) Phase I - A six-month period of stabilization during which the force would substantially support itself in Class II and IV supplies and perform its own maintenance and repair functions.

2) Phase II - A six-month period immediately following Phase I during which logistical support would come from the USA 1st Log Comd, except for maintenance and repair of items unique to Australia.

3) Phase III - A period during which all Australian equipment would be made fully compatible with US equipment. All support would come from the 1st Log Comd. The Australian force would, at this point, be co-equal to an organic battalion of a US brigade.

(S) In the financial working arrangement between the US and Australia, signed during September, it was agreed that Australia would reimburse the US as follows:²²

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
1) Rationed, not quartered:	\$40	\$40
2) Quartered, not rationed:	\$50	\$45
3) Rationed and quartered:	\$ 0	\$56
4) POL products: \$20 per vehicle per month.		

(S) Because it was difficult to make a good estimate of cost per man, it was decided to base the reimbursement on a functional cost factor. The average administrative and logistical cost of supporting one man for one month was determined. Within this agreement, separate schedules were also prepared for the Australian Army Training Team (AATT) and the RAAF detachment, which revised the average reimbursement contained in former working arrangements. All rates were only applicable during Phase I of the operation and were subject to renegotiation at the end of that phase.²³

(U) On 30 September, an augmentation to the battalion arrived, consisting of a 105-mm howitzer battery, a field engineer troop, an APC troop, an air reconnaissance flight detachment, and filler personnel. A signal troop arrived on the same date to augment the Australian HQ in Saigon.²⁴

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(TS) Initially, the battalion was to operate in defense of the Bien Hoa area; however, the GOA gradually relaxed this restriction and COMUSMACV was able to report, in October, that the battalion proper could operate anywhere in the III Corps area and that the artillery battery could be employed any place in SVN in support of US troops. The only remaining qualification was that Australian troops would not become involved in incidents on the Cambodian border.²⁵

(TS) In November, COMUSMACV discussed with the Australian Ambassador the possibility of deployment of an additional battalion to SVN.²⁶ Higher HQ, however, later announced that this matter would be handled by the SECSTATE.²⁷ Toward the end of the year, COMUSMACV expressed his goals with regard to additional deployment of ANZAC forces. His short range objective was a second Australian battalion; his long range objective was a full ANZAC brigade capable of self-support, to be employed under the opcon of a US corps.²⁸ With the past history of Australian and New Zealand assistance to VN, it was almost certain that their forces in-country would be increased during 1966.

New Zealand

(FOUO) The Australian battalion received part of its fire support from a New Zealand artillery battery. The overall New Zealand support for operations in SVN had been small but most welcome, as it provided representation from still another country in the war against the VC.

(U) On 30 May 1964, in response to a request for increased Free World assistance, the charge d'affaires for the New Zealand Embassy called on Prime Minister Khanh of SVN and offered him the services of an engineer detachment. This offer was accepted and the engineer team consisting of some 25 personnel arrived on 29 June 1964. On 30 June this team was extended rights and privileges under the pentilateral agreement with the GVN. At the same time they were told that the GVN would supply building material necessary for their construction projects. They were assigned a variety of civic action programs, which continued until their departure on 20 July 1965.^{29,30}

(S) The New Zealand detachment had numerous problems in obtaining supplies and equipment while in SVN. This was partly due to difficulty in establishing proper sources of supply prior to deployment of the team, i.e., MAAG, USAID,

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GVN or USMACV. The problems were later solved. The team had plans for full employment including a long list of worthwhile projects and were equipped with sufficient tools. However, GNZ decided to withdraw this team and replace it with the artillery battery, considered by US, GVN and GNZ to be of more value.³¹

(S) On 27 May 1965, concurrent with an announcement from the Prime Minister of New Zealand, his Ambassador talked with the GVN Minister of the Interior and offered a New Zealand 105-mm artillery battery to assist the RVN. In the announcement by the Prime Minister was the statement that the engineer team was to be withdrawn.³² In spite of attempts on the part of USMACV and the State Department to keep the New Zealand engineer detachment in SVN, a final decision to withdraw the team was made in late June. It was stated at the time that the withdrawal was necessary politically in order to obtain permission to send the artillery element. Also to be taken into account, however, was the fact that the team was, on the average, less than 50 percent employed, which probably played a part in the decision.³³

(C) It is interesting to note that no working arrangement was ever signed between New Zealand and USMACV during the stay of the engineer team. This also may have been one of the causes of the problems that arose.

(S) There were no command and control problems with the engineer team, as they worked directly under US sector advisors. Prior to the arrival of the artillery battery, a working arrangement was signed stating that this unit would be under the operational control of COMUSMACV, would be brigaded with an American element and would normally operate in support of the Australian battalion. To all intents and purposes the New Zealand battery, which arrived on 21 July, operated as part of the 173d Abn Bde. (Initially there was an operating restriction imposed on the New Zealand battery by its government which stated that it would be employed only in the Bien Hoa area unless prior governmental approval was granted for movement. This restriction was later removed.) In any event, there was sufficient US artillery available in-country to preclude the necessity for moving the New Zealand battery.^{34,35}

(S) The financial problems that existed with some of the other FVMAF elements were not encountered with the New Zealand unit. New Zealand and Australia were the two Free World countries paying their own way in SVN. In return for administrative and logistical support, on the same basis as that provided US forces, New Zealand reimbursed the US with \$56.50

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per man per month. New Zealand also paid \$26,880 per month for ammunition and \$20 per vehicle for POL. The financial working arrangement was in diplomatic channels and had not been signed at year's end, although it was being used in Saigon as a basis of operation. Agreement was expected shortly after the first of the new year.³⁶

South Korea

(S) One of the Free World nations providing major assistance to RVN was the ROK. In August 1964, based on requests from the US and GVN, the ROK decided to send a MASH and Taekwondo instructors to RVN. As part of the implementation of this decision, the ROK JCS published an operations order on 28 August 1964, establishing the terms under which the ROK force would operate, to include the fact that these elements of ROK Military Assistance Group, Vietnam (ROKMAGV) would be under the operational control of COMUSMACV.³⁷

(C) On 5 September 1964, a working arrangement was signed between the GVN and ROK to establish relations governing activities of the Korean MASH and Taekwondo instructors. This document covered such items as the location of the force, construction of facilities, supply procedures, security to be provided, and functions of the ROK contingent. Included was the key point that ROK forces would be subject to the provisions of the 1950 pentilateral agreement thus granting, in effect, diplomatic immunity for these personnel. The ROK element arrived during September 1964 and was stationed at Vung Tau and various training centers. On 31 October 1964, the rights under the pentilateral agreement were again confirmed by the passage of a diplomatic note between the two governments.^{38,39,40}

(C) In early 1965, the GVN decided that additional assistance was needed to combat the growing VC pressure and, as a result, the ROK was requested to provide additional non-combatants. The reason for this request was that the GVN troops had been diverted to civic action projects related to the heavy flooding during the fall monsoon in 1964.⁴¹ The Government of Korea (GOK) agreed that more support could be provided and agreed to furnish a task force composed as follows:⁴²

HQ Commander Republic of Korea Military Assistance Group, Vietnam (COMROKMAGV), one army engineer battalion, one army transport company, one marine engineer company, one LST with crew, one security battalion, one service unit, a liaison group, and one MASH (already in-country).

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(C) On 10 January 1965, a planning group arrived from the ROK to discuss arrangements for deployment of the ROK engineer task force which was also known as the Dove Unit. Conferences were conducted by a group known as the International Military Assistance Policy Council (after 1 October 1965, FWMAPC). This council was charged with policy making pertaining to operational control of the ROKMAGV. Present during these meetings, the first of which took place on 24 January 1965, were senior officers from RVNAF, USMACV and the ROK advance party.⁴³

(C) Arrangements for arrival of the Dove unit were completed by the FWMAPC on 6 February. On 7 February a military working arrangement was signed between ROKMAGV and RVNAF and on 8 February an arrangement between COMROKMACV and COMUSMACV was signed.⁴⁴ The ROK-GVN arrangement included several unusual features: the ROK's were not to fire unless attacked, but in any event could not fire or pursue outside their delineated area of responsibility; in the event of a VC attack, the senior ARVN commander in the area would provide assistance; ROK's were not to act against civil demonstrations unless forced to by circumstances, and authorized by the VN liaison officer. Operational control was not mentioned in this arrangement, although it implied that in combat action the senior ARVN officer would exercise control.⁴⁵ The arrangements provided that both COMUSMACV and RVNAF would provide logistic support for the ROK force. TOE equipment would be furnished through the MAP and issued by ARVN. Maintenance services would be provided by the VN. Basic Class I supplies, to include rice, salt, tea, sugar and shortening would be provided by GVN with supplemental rations furnished by USMACV. Other necessary equipment not available through MAP would also be supplied by USMACV.^{46,47}

(S) The question of command and control was a problem for the three nations involved. At one point, the VN stated that they desired full operational control by the appropriate corps commander over all FWMAPC employed in SVN. In January 1965, Brig General Lee, senior ROK officer in SVN, stated that his government could not accept control under any international authority other than the US.⁴⁸ Using as a precedent the fact that the initial ROK element had been placed under operational control of COMUSMACV, and also to salve the Vietnamese national pride, a method was discovered to overcome this stumbling block. The basic solution was to utilize the FWMAPC as a combined staff to determine the general operational functions of the ROK force. This council was composed initially of the CofS, USMACV, the senior Korean officer in SVN, and the RVNAF CJCS. Subsequently COMUSMACV took the place of his CofS. Various subordinate staffs

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handled day to day operations. Evidently, the three nations involved found these arrangements to be satisfactory, since the military working arrangement between COMUSMACV and COMROKMACV, already discussed, contained provisions that the FWMAPC would establish operating parameters for the Dove unit; that command would be retained by COMROKMACV; that operational control would be under COMUSMACV; and that the force would be responsive to the senior commander in any given area of operations.⁴⁹

(U) On 25 February the advance element of the Dove unit arrived, to be followed on 16 March by the main party. The group was located at a base camp in Bien Hoa and during 1965 constructed three bridges, four schools, two dispensaries and two hamlet offices, and accomplished numerous other minor projects. Medical elements of the Dove unit treated some 30,000 patients. Based on recommendations by COMUSMACV, the ROKMACV was increased by 272 officers and men on 27 June and by two LSM's on 9 July.^{50,51,52,53,54}

(U) During the summer and early fall of 1965, numerous discussions were conducted on the diplomatic level regarding ROK combat elements to assist the RVN. (As mentioned earlier, the Dove unit was restricted by working agreement to selfdefense only.) These discussions culminated on 12 August when the ROK approved deployment to SVN of a combat division composed of an HQ, one Marine regiment, two infantry regiments, and a field support command.⁵⁵

(TS) Prior to the arrival of the ROK division, considerable study of possible locations for deployment took place. The initial thought was to employ the division in the I CTZ with major elements at Chu Lai, Tam Ky and Quang Ngai.⁵⁶ This concept envisaged the ROK troops joining with the III MAF, and perhaps other FWMAF elements, to form an international FWMAF. Subsequently, this idea was dropped for several reasons. First of all, it was decided that support of another full division in that area would be logistically difficult, since over-the-beach supply would be necessary. Employment in I CTZ would also necessitate offensive operations as the enclaves were already adequately secured by III MAF elements. This might, in turn, provoke problems of "face" between the two Asian nations of RVN and ROK, especially if the ROK forces turned out to be more successful during encounters with the VC than the VN.⁵⁷ For these reasons, and also because logistics bases in the II CTZ were in need of security forces, COMUSMACV made the decision to employ the ROK forces in the Qui Nhon area. This would provide necessary base security as well as supply a force to keep the vital land LOC of Route 19 open to traffic.⁵⁸ In the USMACV operations plan, the mission of the ROK division was stated as providing security for bases in the II CTZ.⁵⁹

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(TS) One of the major problems in bringing ROK elements to SVN was the necessity for determining who was going to pay the cost. Since the ROK military forces were MAP supported, supply presented no great problems; however, pay for the individual soldier definitely did. After much discussion, the decision was made in Washington that, if necessary, the USG was willing to underwrite whatever was needed to have ROK combat forces take part in the war.⁶⁰ The eventual negotiated arrangement provided that each ROK soldier in SVN was to receive special overseas pay ranging from \$1.00 per day for a private to \$7.00 per day for a brigadier general. These funds were transferred from Washington to Seoul - to the ROK Embassy in Saigon--and, finally, to the troops.⁶¹ Another financial problem was the ROK refusal to pay claims that might be brought against them because of their presence in SVN.⁶² As of the end of the year, no arrangement had been signed, although it appeared that claims would be paid through the office of the USMACV SJA using US funds.⁶³ A limited financial working arrangement was signed in December, covering such items as subsistence allowance, TDY travel, and special activity costs.⁶⁴ Discussion of the financial arrangements between the US and ROK was expected to continue into 1966.

(C) The advance planning group for the Korean division arrived in Saigon on 19 August to make final deployment arrangements. After a series of conferences, new working arrangements were signed between RVNAF and Commander Republic of Korea Force, Vietnam (COMROKRV) on 5 September and between COMUSMACV and COMROKRV on 6 September.⁶⁵ This new arrangement contained several interesting features. In the first place, there was no reference to operational control. The only formally recognized control agency was the FVMAFC that continued in its policy-making role. Command, of course, remained with the senior ROK officer. In this agreement, COMUSMACV stated that ROK forces would receive the same logistical support given to similar US units. This was possible because of the formation of the 1st Log Comd in SVN. COMUSMACV also agreed to support the establishment of a ROK HQ in Saigon, not to exceed 230 personnel; however, GVN was to supply all real estate requirements. To all intents and purposes, COMUSMACV thus provided all combat service support for the ROK division.⁶⁶

(U) On 15 September, the advance party for the 4th Capital Infantry Division, to include staff personnel to fill out the ROKRV HQ, arrived in Saigon. The division itself began landing on 8 October and deployment was complete on 8 November.^{68,69} The ROK Marine regiment was stationed at Cam Ranh Bay and the division (-) at Qui Nhon, in consonance with

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COMUSMACV's operations plan.⁷⁰

(S) As already mentioned, there was no provision for command and control in the military working arrangement signed between COMUSMACV and COMROKRV on 6 September. As a result, this matter was discussed by the FWMAPC, and a paper was prepared for signature, indicating that COMUSMACV would exercise operational control over all ROK forces in SVN. This proposed arrangement was presented to the ROK representative on 23 October.⁷¹ On 28 October COMUSMACV discussed with Maj Gen Chae Myung-Shin (COMROKRV) and Brig Gen Cao Van Vien (CJCS, RVNAF), the contents of this proposal. At the time COMROKRV stated that he could not sign the arrangement without first checking with his government; however, in the meantime, he would follow the outlined procedures.⁷² The ROK's submitted a rewrite of command and control arrangements which, after study, was found by COMUSMACV to be too restrictive. On 20 November it was returned to ROKRV and he was reminded that the verbal agreement made on 28 October would continue to be followed.⁷³ After additional discussions, COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC that a formal signed arrangement could be politically embarrassing to the ROK's as it might connote that they were subordinate to, and acting as mercenaries for, the US. COMUSMACV felt that a formal arrangement was no longer necessary since COMROKRV had agreed to de facto operational control by US commanders. COMFORCEV and COMROKRV understood that, although directives to ROK units would be in the form of requests, they would be honored as orders. It was also thought appropriate that ROK officers be assigned to the COMFORCEV staff to assist in matters relating to ROK elements. This would not constitute a combined staff, as they would serve in the positions of liaison officers.⁷⁴ Thus, by the end of 1965, COMUSMACV had de facto operational control over all F/M/F operating in SVN.

(TS) Shortly after arrival of the ROK Capital Infantry Division in SVN, COMUSMACV was notified that the ROK Minister of Defense was interested in sending two additional divisions to SVN in order to form a corps structure.⁷⁵ After study, COMUSMACV recommended deployment of one division, one regimental combat team, and sufficient capability to process 350 tons of supplies per day for their logistical support.⁷⁶ In mid-December the decision was made that SECSTATE would request this additional force. COMUSMACV was directed not to discuss the matter with ROK authorities until such time as State/Defense plans to tie in additional Free World elements with increased US forces were complete.⁷⁷ COMUSMACV's position was that the additional Korean forces would be used to provide security for developing base areas, with the RCT being deployed to Tuy Hoa and the division to Nha Trang,

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Duc My, Cam Ranh, and Phan Rang. In addition, if necessary, COMUSMACV would not oppose a ROK lieutenant general's slot in Saigon although it was not required as the ROK troops were already under operational control of FFORCEV.⁷⁸ COMUSMACV requested that the RCT be on hand in SVN by 15 April 1966 in order to provide security troops for the new Tuy Hoa airfield. If the ROK elements were not available he would be required to obtain these troops from other in-country sources.⁷⁹ Pending completion of diplomatic negotiations and approval by the GOK, it appeared reasonably certain that additional ROK troops would be dispatched to SVN during 1966.

Philippines

(U) One of the nations to provide early support for SVN was the ROP. The initial ROP contingent arrived in August 1964 and was composed of 12 medical personnel and 16 civic action/psywar advisors. These teams received support from both USAID and the GVN Department of Public Health. An augmentation to this team, actually a second team, consisting of 18 more medical personnel and 16 additional psywar/civil affairs advisors arrived on 17 April 1965. The medical personnel were located in Tay Ninh, Kontum, Binh Duong and Dinh Tuong; with the psywar/civil affairs advisors in the CMR and III CTZ.⁸⁰

(S) These teams evidently had some problems in coordination of support between US and GVN agencies. On 14 August, FMAO reported that the commander of the ROP contingent had rotated members of his medical teams without consulting other agencies. At the same time, it was stated that the commander of the ROP contingent felt that USAID was "pushing him around."⁸¹ This situation may have been aggravated by the fact that there was no working arrangement in effect during this period. As in the case of the New Zealand engineer detachment, the question of command and control was not resolved. In addition, the Filipinos often expressed the desire to be given the responsibility for a specific sector in order to retain their national identity.⁸² The lack of a unified effort may have been a point of friction that helped to intensify some of the other irritations.

(U) A new team arrived on 23 August to replace the first team that had, by now, completed a full year in SVN.⁸³

(C) By 13 September a draft military working arrangement had been prepared and was forwarded to the ROP for study. The arrangement contained the normal provisions as recommended in

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the CINCPAC Policy and Procedures Guide.⁸⁴ As of 31 December, final action on the arrangement had not been taken, and the ROP contingent continued to function under informal arrangement with COMUSMACV and the GVN.

(S) Since 1964, there had been continued efforts on the part of the US to encourage the ROP to deploy additional troops to the RVN. These negotiations were centered around a CAG to be composed of engineer elements, an infantry selfdefense force, and support troops. By June, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) had agreed in principle to provide this force; however, it stated that all equipment for the CAG must be supplied by the US and be on hand in SVN before deployment. In addition, any equipment brought from the ROP by the CAG would have to be replaced by the US and be on hand or on the way before deployment, not merely promised.⁸⁵

(S) In order to deploy this team, it was necessary for special legislation to be passed by the ROP Congress; however, although the House did approve the measure, Congress adjourned late in June 1965 without taking final action.⁸⁶ Early in July, the President of the Philippines called a special session of Congress to consider the national budget and also to consider the bill to provide the CAG for RVN. Once again, on 12 July, Congress adjourned without taking action on the bill. Since the Senate was not to convene again until January 1966, there was little chance that any additional support would be provided by the ROP before that time.^{87, 88} The problem in passage of the bill was due more to internal political difficulties than any continued firm opposition to the commitment of combat type troops to SVN.⁸⁹

(S) After the national elections in the ROP on 9 November, President-elect Marcos publicly stated that he favored sending troops to assist in SVN.⁹⁰ This was further expanded in early December, when he said that he would recommend to Congress the dispatch of the 2,000-man CAG already discussed.⁹¹ In the meantime, the US SECSTATE requested that the US Embassy Manila look into the possibility of sending a self-contained combat force in addition to the CAG.⁹² After study, COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC that the ROP armed forces were in no condition to supply combat troops.⁹³ Provided President Marcos was able to overcome local political opposition, it appeared probable that the CAG would be approved and deployed to the RVN during 1966. Pending this approval, COMUSMACV took continuing actions to assure that necessary supplies and equipment would be available to the CAG if it were eventually committed.⁹⁴

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Republic of China

(C) Another nation providing assistance to RVN was the ROC. In May 1964, a US-GVN team went to Taiwan in order to determine what type of assistance would be appropriate for the ROC to give to the RVN. As a result of this trip, it was reported to COMUSMACV that the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) could best support the GVN, at that time, by providing a political warfare training team. Consequently, COMUSMACV recommended to GVN that their Political Warfare Department be reorganized and that assistance in this field be accepted from the ROC. 95,96

(U) Following COMUSMACV's tacit approval on 28 July 1965, the Minister of Defense, GVN, requested the GRC to provide assistance to RVN in the form of political warfare cadres. On 8 October, 14 officers from ROC arrived in Saigon and Military Assistance Group, Republic of China, Vietnam (MAG-ROCV) was formed. The team was assigned to work with RVNAF JGS Polwar Directorate. 97,98

(S) By 1 December a draft military working arrangement had been prepared by the USMACV IMAO; however, Commander Military Assistance Group, Republic of China, Vietnam (COMMAGROCV) declined either to concur or non-concur in the draft and it was not signed at that time. The draft arrangement contained several provisions that were deleted from the final version, to include the clauses that the ROC would reimburse the US in the amount of \$125 for each officer serving in SVN per month and that US MP's had the authority to apprehend members of the MAG-ROCV whose actions were prejudicial to good order and discipline. 99,100

(C) In early 1965, the draft arrangement was reviewed, and several changes recommended by the USMACV staff were incorporated. On 6 May 1965, COMMAGROCV and the CofS, USMACV, signed the arrangement. This arrangement contained many of the standard clauses including: 101,102

1) The ROC would establish a political warfare advisory team that would be under the command of the senior Chinese Nationalist (CHINAT) officer.

2) An International Military Assistance Policy Council (IMAPC) would be established, composed of CofS, USMACV; CJCS GVN; and COMMAGROCV, to formulate tasks and establish missions. COMUSMACV would coordinate control arrangements made by the IMAPC.

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3) COMUSMACV would provide logistical and administrative support.

(C) The ROC political warfare team was scheduled to remain in SVN for a period of one year, to depart on or about 7 October 1965. Action was initiated by both COMUSMACV and the US Ambassador in an attempt to have the team remain for at least one more year. At the end of 1965, the CHINAT advisors were still present in SVN.¹⁰³

(S) The major problem connected with the use of CHINAT personnel in SVN was the possibility that the CHICOM's would use the presence of the CHINAT's as an excuse for direct intervention. As early as December 1964, this problem was discussed in a message from the SECSTATE to the US Ambassador in Taipei. In this message, it was stated that great care must be used not to export the Chinese civil war to SVN and that the CHINAT's should not wear their military uniform. Even the use of noncombatant troops, such as engineers, was discouraged. It was recommended that the ROC continue to serve the RVN in economic and technical fields and that they be induced to send medical teams.¹⁰⁴

(S) The problem again arose when, in May 1965, FMMAO reported that information had been received from a "reliable" source that the ROC was willing to send a 1000-man force of irregular troops to assist militant Catholic Father Hoa in An Xuyen Province. This possibility was not pursued in 1965. There were obvious political problems involved in bringing a CHINAT force to SVN. In September, Prime Minister Ky made an informal comment indicating the possibility that he might request the ROC to supply crews to assist in flying transport aircraft.^{105,106}

(S) In early October, COMUSMACV informed the US Ambassador that six C-46 aircraft with crews could be used by the RVN for integration into the VNAF 33rd Support Wing at TSN. It was also stated that, if available, landing craft would be most welcome.¹⁰⁷ After discussion, it was determined that two C-46 aircraft could be furnished. These aircraft would be supplied under the name of "China Airlines" and crew wages would be paid by the GRC. Food and lodging for the crews, as well as fuel for the aircraft, would be provided by the GVN. Necessary aircraft maintenance would be performed by the CHINAT's. These aircraft were to be placed in SVN for a three-month trial period.¹⁰⁸ On 25 November 1965, the local press announced the transfer of two aircraft from the ROC to the RVN.¹⁰⁹

(S) It was considered highly probable that the ROC would provide additional aircraft and some form of shallow-draft shipping during 1966. The latter was of particular interest to

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COMUSMACV owing to the prevalent port congestion problems. CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV in the request and final action was expected in early 1966.¹¹⁰

Thailand

(C) The RTG also provided a limited amount of military assistance to the RVN in the form of a small contingent of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF). These 16 men arrived in SVN on 29 September 1964, and were stationed at TSN airfield and assigned for duty with VNAF as transport crews. They received no support from USMACV except PX and commissary privileges.¹¹¹

(S) COMUSMACV's position relative to the assistance provided by the RTG was that it should be brought into line with that from other nations. In October 1965, a USMACV FVMAO officer went to Thailand and presented four recommendations to the RTG: that the chief of the air force group in the RVN should be a Lt colonel; that the status and mission of the Thai effort be unclassified; that a proposed military working arrangement be signed; and that Thailand request extensions of the 1950 pentilateral agreement to cover its unit. The RTG agreed to the first two recommendations and the other two were still under discussion at the end of the year.¹¹²

(S) During these discussions in Thailand, Lt Gen Kriangsak, Commander Supreme Command, stated that his country was interested in vastly increasing its aid to SVN.¹¹³ This increase might be in the form of LST's and cargo aircraft to help solve the problem of port congestion.¹¹⁴

Spain

(C) Early in November 1965, the Government of Spain made an offer to send four ambulances with military crews to aid in the war against the VC. Following coordination with COMUSMACV, USAID, and the US Embassy, the GVN requested that a twelve man army medical team be provided instead. On 29 November, the Spanish Council of Ministers approved this request and the team, consisting of four doctors, four nurses, and four technicians was expected to arrive early in 1966. The team was earmarked for employment in the provincial hospital in Go Cong Province.¹¹⁵

Summary

(TS) By the end of 1965, SVN was receiving military assistance from seven nations, including the US. Four of these--

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the US, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, were providing combat elements. In December, the SECSTATE again appealed for additional assistance, especially from Asian countries. These forces were necessary, not only for military purposes, but also because there was concern within the US that Free World nations were not doing their share. 116

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