



THE HURRICANE

JULY 1968

NUMBER NINE

A PUBLICATION OF II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM



**By the rockets'
red glare...**



The immortal words of Francis Scott Key have a special meaning to those of us serving in Vietnam. Many have thrilled to see by the rockets red glare that our flag was still flying. Our celebration of Independence Day is deeply enriched by knowing that we are assisting a brave ally preserve his independence. He also is uplifted by the

dawn's early light as he sees that his position, or his home, still stands safe from the attacks of those who would deprive him of the right to his independence. We celebrate this Fourth of July proud to assist the people of South Vietnam—as we were assisted—walk the road of nationhood and freedom.

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This month the HURRICANE begins a new department — PERSPECTIVE — to give a comprehensive overview of the military and civil, GVN and US, efforts to sustain South Vietnam as an independent republic. See the "Posture of the Enemy," by LTG Fred C. Weyand, CG, II FFORCEV, on page 21.

Astute readers will have noted our changed format last month and our continuing efforts to improve. The HURRICANE tries not to duplicate other unit newspapers and magazines in the day-to-day coverage of the war—instead we seek the illustrative article about unique units and activities.

And, if you are happy with the HURRICANE and feel it spotlights unknown parts of the "big picture," send it home to your family and friends. You may mail it in an 8½×11 envelope airmail for 40¢ or for free in a 5½×11 envelope (magazine folded) providing it is an inclosure to a personal letter.

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53D SIGNAL BATTALION *Photo Support*

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The Mohawk Team

by Captain Malcom Gray, Jr.



The low-pitched hum and passing whine of twin turboprops is a familiar sound to the residents of the Vietnamese coastal town of Vung Tau. It continues throughout the night, greets them as they wake up in the morning, and is with them all day. The sound belongs to the Mohawks of the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company as they depart and return on their round-the-clock surveillance schedule in III Corps Tactical Zone.

Utilizing the OV-1 Mohawk, a high performance aircraft carrying sophisticated electronic sensors and cameras, the officers and men of the 73d work on a 24-hour basis to provide visual, photographic and electronic surveillance as required by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), allied forces, and US forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. To accomplish its mission, the 73d has three flight platoons—a Visual/Photographic platoon and two “exotic” platoons: Infrared (IR) and Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR).

A flight team consists of an aviator and an observer. The IR and SLAR technical observers are enlisted men and are school trained at the United States Army Combat Surveillance School/Training Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. In

Specialists in the Imagery Interpretation Section keep their equipment in top shape


All-weather Surveillance for III Corps

addition, the officers of the Imagery Interpretation Section fly on visual missions to personally keep abreast of what is happening and increase their own knowledge of the situation.

During the day the visual flight teams, equipped with the KA-30 aerial camera mounted in the belly of the Mohawk and the KA-60 panoramic camera mounted in the nose, roam over the area of operations, performing low level visual and photographic reconnaissance in search of Viet Cong activity, areas of infiltration, and troop buildup.

As the sun sets, the night teams depart Vung Tau for their vigil in the same area. The SLAR teams, high in the sky, record night movements of the Viet Cong and report the movements to ground forces for action by armed helicopters or artillery batteries. The IR teams, flying search patterns, seek out "hot spots" and send in immediate reports of the infrared emissions. After the return of an "exotic" team, the data is processed, evaluated and interpreted by the Imagery Interpretation Section and a full report forwarded to the requesting agency.

The integrated use of its several surveillance systems is standing operating procedure for the 73d, and it is not unusual for an area



Maintenance is a 24-hour a day job


The Mohawks

to be covered by electronic sensor and photo/visual observation in one 24-hour period. A variety of information is obtained in this manner and each flight has the benefit of the data previously collected. Always maintaining contact with the troops on the ground, the "Hawks" also report timely information for immediate action.

Speed with accuracy is the operational criterion for the 73d. In-flight reporting of mobile targets is standard, and rapid interpretation of mission imagery is a necessity if effective action is to be taken. Working around the clock, the 73d interpreters prepare reports on the 500 to 600 feet of photographic, SLAR and IR imagery produced in a typical day. Detailed analyses are performed in an effort to detect the telltale changes which indicate enemy activity. "Hot" reports are called in the minute imagery is received with full reports following later. Total time from aircraft landing to a finished report on its way by teletype is frequently less than three hours.

The 73d Surveillance Airplane Company traces its Vietnam lineage back to the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment. The 23d SWAD was activated at Fort Rucker, Alabama in July 1962 for deployment to Vietnam. The US Army Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon (Augmented) formed the nucleus of the new organization. Its aircraft were six JOV-1C's modified to carry .50 caliber machine guns and 2.75-inch rockets. Because of the uniqueness of armed fixed-wing aircraft in the Army, aerial ordnance training was conducted by the Navy at Jacksonville Naval Air Station, Florida.

On 19 September, 1962, the aircraft arrived at Nha Trang. Full scale operations began in October. From August 1963 until December 1963, the 23d SWAD was based at Bien Hoa Base and has been at Vung Tau since then. In December 1964 the 23d SWAD and 4th Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon were deactivated and the assets consolidated to form the 73d Aviation Company (Aerial Surveillance) to give the new unit a 24-hour, all-weather capability. Using Side Looking Airborne Radar and infrared sensors



to augment its visual and photographic reconnaissance capabilities, it discouraged the Viet Cong from moving at night as it had previously hindered their daily movement.

Success of a routine mission can be exemplified many ways. For example, Captain Paul Piper and SP4 John Boyd, while on a SLAR mission, received radar echos from along a river west of Saigon. While in flight, they radioed an armed helicopter fire team in Saigon, which destroyed 45 sampans.

Visual and photographic reconnaissance flights flown by Major Gene Hall's visual pilots have monitored and recorded the infiltration of Viet Cong supplies and troops along the many infiltration routes in III CTZ. Captain Forrest Lanning, while flying with Lieutenant Robert Harris, was diverted from his assigned mission and sent to search an area north of Tay Ninh. On the second pass down a highway they received intense automatic weapons fire. They had found what they were sent for—a Viet Cong convoy on the move.

The organization of Army Surveillance Airplane Companies such as the 73d is unique in that the units are virtually self-controlled, requiring no outside support in order to produce the final goal—intelligence. Equipped with a full range of facilities, from photo labs to camera and sensor repair shops, plus a complete Imagery Interpretation Section, the 73d is capable of dealing with all phases of surveillance from the mission request to final delivery of the mission results in the form of an immediate imagery interpretation report.

In addition to its primary mission, the personnel of the 73d take an active interest in civic action in the Vung Tau area. The 73d, through its families and friends in the US and contributions from members of the company, provide items such as blankets, sheets, soap, towels and medicine for the Le Loi Hospital, run by an Australian Surgical Team. The 73d also contributes money and comfort items on a monthly basis to four children in Baria who were orphaned during the Tet offensive.



Circuit Riding Judge

by 2LT Pierre Loomis



The solitary rider paused at the ridgeline, etched against the sunset and the desert sky. He gazed down on the frontier town that had not known a judge since his last visit, more than half a year ago. The rider's saddlebags bulged with the misery and hopes of a dozen towns like this one, towns isolated from a more settled world, depending on men like him to bring justice to a tempestuous existence. The circuit-riding judge sighed, and guided his horse down the rocky path...

...The Huey waited for its passengers with rotors turning, raising clouds of choking dust. Seven soldiers, replacements going to B Battery, 42d Artillery in western Bien Hoa Province, double-timed single file across the landing pad. They climbed aboard and took their seats, M-16 rifles between their knees. They waited; someone was late.

Soon a jeep squealed to a stop near the waiting chopper. An older man jumped out—still fastening a .45 caliber pistol to his right hip—and scrambled aboard. And they were airborne.

This was Lieutenant Colonel Irwin M. Kent, the staff judge advocate for II Field Force Vietnam. He had a busy day ahead, but Colonel Kent and the eight men in his office expect every day to be busy. Their mission is "to provide

Lieutenant Colonel Kent returns from a field trip (left); and Captain Greene, a member of the SJA staff, counsels a soldier on his legal rights

total legal services for...all members of this command."

Colonel Kent was going to B Battery to assist the commanding officer and first sergeant with the legal problems they face in the administration of the artillery battery.

But Colonel Kent had another reason for going. That was to offer his services to anyone—right down to the youngest private—who needed legal assistance.

Whenever Colonel Kent or members of his staff make a field trip, they carry a legal assistance kit in the form of an old battered brief case. This legal "black bag" contains enough forms and references to solve most legal ailments on the spot. Colonel Kent calls the bag "my portable office."

It was early afternoon before Colonel Kent finished with the battery commander. Their conference was interrupted several times by fire missions called into B Battery. The colonel had the word passed among the men that a legal assistance officer was available for counsel. He set up shop on the hood of the battery commander's jeep and soon had a busy practice going. A private first class wanted to re-

gister for the pending elections. A sergeant was being sued for divorce by his wife in Boston. A lieutenant wanted to know whether he could run for political office while serving in the armed forces.

One of the men who came to see Colonel Kent that day was a staff sergeant with a serious problem—a problem not unlike many others the colonel and his staff have handled.

A few years ago, the non-commissioned officer (let's call him Smith) sold his home—near Ft. Knox, Ky.—to Sergeant Jones. Jones agreed to assume balance of the Veteran's Administration loan which Smith had yet to pay. Smith failed to get a release from the VA before proceeding with the sale. This left him legally responsible for the loan should his fellow NCO fail to keep up the payments. And that's what happened. Smith was in Vietnam serving as a crew chief on a 105mm howitzer when the loan company threatened foreclosure if he didn't come in immediately and "straighten this matter out."


Colonel Kent quickly analyzed the problem, took down the necessary information and promised to

help. But he did more than just help. By working through the judge advocate office at Ft. Knox, he had the entire matter cleared up in five weeks.

Colonel Kent, a veteran of 26 years' service as an Army lawyer, feels strongly about protecting the rights of American soldiers. "An artillery sergeant in South Vietnam needs just as much legal protection as a baker in St. Louis. The difference," he continues, "is that it isn't so easy for men like Sergeant Smith to seek legal counsel. I suppose that is what sends me on my trips out through 'Indian country'."

He is willing to give his traveling legal assistance to anyone at any unit he is visiting, or when a commander calls and reports that distant units have several cases needing advice, either he or a member of his staff will make a special trip.

What he suggests, however, is that when units know that he is coming out, they should announce the impending visit to their men and assemble those needing assistance to meet with him—at a desk, or on the hood of a jeep, or under a spreading cu chi tree.



Automatic 8th

by SP4 Ronald Pejsa

When the North Korean People's Army opened a new offensive on June 25, 1950, they encountered an artillery unit like none they had ever seen. The unit was dug in and prepared to support the 27th Infantry (Wolfhounds) when contact was made.

Some 30 days later the fire direction center of the 8th Field Artillery heard the magic words they were waiting for—"Fire mission!" Quickly computations were made, fire orders were given and "on the

way" echoed throughout the firing battery. An urgent plea for "all available" quickly came back to the gunners from the infantrymen as the North Koreans continued their forward push.

Firing in rapid succession for hours, ignoring blistered hands and exhausted bodies, the gunners repelled and destroyed wave after wave of three different North Korean divisions.

Shortly thereafter, when a group of Korean prisoners of war was

taken to the rear, they stopped suddenly and refused to go any further. Their verbal barrage left their guards thoroughly confused. When an interpreter was called, the POW's again stated their verbal charge. Quickly a wide smile spread across the interpreter's face. He explained that the prisoners would go no further until they could see the "automatic artillery" which had been firing so incessantly at them. The artillerymen had worked so rapidly that the



guns sounded like an automatic weapon. Thus, the 8th Field Artillery had earned its distinctive title of the "Automatic Eighth."

Today the 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery is carrying its title of "Automatic Eighth" to new successes in the Republic of Vietnam. Since its arrival in Vietnam on June 29, 1967 from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the battalion has safely and accurately fired more than 100,000 rounds of heavy artillery in rapid response to more than 65,000 fire missions.

The battalion is a part of the 54th Artillery Group under direct control of II Field Force Vietnam Artillery. It is armed with the Army's most accurate artillery piece, the 8-inch howitzer, and the field artillery piece with the greatest firing range, the 175mm gun. The 8-inch howitzer is pin-point accurate at distances up to 12 miles and the 175mm gun can fire at ranges of more than 22 miles.

The "Automatic Eighth" is composed of a headquarters and headquarters battery, three firing batteries and a service battery. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Todd S. Marsh, the unit presently mans firing batteries in Bien Hoa, Ben Suc and Xuan Loc.

Bravo Battery brought distinction to the battalion in September, 1967, by being the first, and thus far the only, heavy artillery battery to be airlifted in Vietnam. The guns, equipment and men were airlifted by C-123 and C-130 cargo planes from Bien Hoa to Song Be in northern Phuoc Long province. The battery remained there for more than a month and delivered about 5,000 rounds in support of U.S. and ARVN ground operations. Between fire missions the men built personnel and ammo bunkers, cleared the area, established a perimeter and constructed sturdy firing pads.

When the battery was ordered back to Bien Hoa it was necessary to leave the guns behind because of the problems involved in lifting the weapons, which weigh more than 50,000 pounds. Personnel from the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, took over the positions and the 7th of the 8th took over the 6th of the 27th weapons.

The three firing batteries also have been taking part in a new firing concept in Vietnam, the artillery raid. To accomplish the artillery raid, two or more guns are removed from the firing location in the base camp and placed outside the defensive perimeter.

While in Gia Ray, northeast of Saigon, Bravo Battery learned of several enemy locations and fortifications just beyond its firing range. So one morning, two of its guns were moved outside of the unit perimeter, bringing the targets within firing range. From the new raid site it fired on and destroyed the enemy positions. Once the mission was completed, the raiding guns returned to the base camp for further missions. From these base camps throughout south and central South Vietnam, the battalion has fired more than 15 million pounds of high explosive ammunition in supporting every major unit in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

The 8th Field Artillery was formed at Fort Bliss, Texas, on July 7th, 1916, in response to con-

stant harrassment against several small Texas towns by one of Mexico's most notorious bandits, Pancho Villa. At the time, most of America's existing regular army was deployed along the Texas border, but had had little success in stopping Villa's costly raids. Faced with continued threats against its own borders and a growing threat in Europe, the United States moved to increase its armed forces by creating the new artillery unit.

For its combat effectiveness, the 7th of the 8th has received two Distinguished Unit Citations, the Navy Presidential Unit Citation, the Navy Unit Commendation, the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, two Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citations and 14 Campaign Streamers.

Shells stacked in the foreground for the 8-inch gun weigh 200 pounds each



A Village is Born

by 2LT Pierre Loomis



The seed of a hamlet has been planted in Phuoc Tuy province. Called Ap Suoi Nghe, the bustling community is putting down roots in former jungle land distributed to its new owners by an impartial lottery.

The people of Ap Suoi Nghe formerly were scattered throughout a ten-square-kilometer area in the hills north of Nui Dat, 60 kilometers southeast of Saigon. Their peaceful existence ended when the Viet Cong began using the area for infiltration and supply. The 1st Australian Task Force, based at Nui Dat, was faced with a problem: the Viet Cong had to be eliminated but a military operation would produce many civilian casualties. The solution was painfully obvious—all the people in the hills would have to be moved. Further, a new hamlet would have to be constructed to house 1,300 civilians affected.

The Australians undertook the work. In a week, the Royal Engineers constructed 100 wooden homes. According to Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Latchford, the 1st Australian Task Force Civil Affairs

The people of Ap Sui Nghe agreed to distribute land by lottery. Head of each family drew a number and was assigned the plot of land corresponding to it

unit commander, "These buildings were, in most cases, an improvement over the ones left behind." He also pointed out that the move was necessary for the people's safety. "Artillery and air strikes were going to be called into the area," he said, "and we had to move them. We took great pains to explain why it was necessary and most of them understood—most of them accepted it."

Because of security, the people were not told about the move until the night before it took place. On September 6, 1967, the night before the move, an Australian soldier was assigned to each of the 250 families in the area. The soldier stayed with "his" family all night and helped pack their belongings.

The next day, army trucks were used for the 10-mile trip to Ap Suoi Nghe. The soldiers stayed with the families and helped them settle in their new homes.

Colonel Latchford, a native of Sydney, said, "We brought everything. In some cases we even disassembled their houses and loaded the lumber on the truck. These people grow lots of pumpkins. We even took those... must have hauled thousands of them."

Each new house came with a plot of land suitable for gardening. The newly transplanted families went to work and soon the fertile land produced vegetables. But these Vietnamese are more than gardeners: they are farmers and they needed a farmer's most important possession—land. To solve this problem, the Royal Engineers went back to work. Using Rome plows, they cleared 450 acres of virgin jungle adjacent to the hamlet. The people made charcoal from the felled trees and sold it in nearby villages. Soon the land was ready for farming and the Government of Vietnam planned to give each family a hectare of land, about 2.5 acres.

But there was another problem. Some sections of the freshly cleared land were better than others. Which families were to get which? What should be the basis of selection? The Australians, basing

their advice on a tradition of their homeland, suggested that a lottery would be the fairest method. The people thought about it and agreed.

Each hectare of land was given a number. On the day of the lottery, May 10, each family would simply draw a number from a hat and be granted the corresponding plot. The Government of Vietnam would supply legal title.

When the 10th arrived, the children celebrated by playing on a new set of swings. The people watched carefully as the head of each family picked a number. It was a proud moment as the farmers stepped forward to receive their titles from Mr. Huynh Cong Nhut, the province land service chief, who ran the lottery.

Major Nguyen Ba Trouc, prov-

ince chief of Phuoc Tuy, attended the ceremonies and praised the people for their hard work. He pointed out the challenge that lay ahead. Then, he waded into the crowd shaking hands, smiling and talking with the people.

The popular response was gratifying for the representatives of the GVN and for Australian advisors. Ap Suoi Nghe soon would be taken off the welfare rolls and the resources devoted to another area. The people of the hamlet knew and accepted this. They just had received their last rice hand-out. Shortly after the ceremonies were over, the farmers headed for their new land.

Despite the overall success, the project had problems. When the Australian soldiers first moved in-



Titles to the land were provided by representatives of the Government of Vietnam. The titles are legal and permanent

..... out of the seed springs the fruit


to the peoples' former homes to help with the relocation, several people melted into the jungle, even though it was made clear that the area was to be a free-fire zone. Some of these were members of the Viet Cong infrastructure, which had been particularly strong in the area before the move. Some were neutral villagers, who simply did not want to leave their homes. (According to the Australian advisors, the infrastructure is much weaker in the new hamlet.)

The Viet Cong, in what is perhaps the best indication of allied success in the operation, have directly attacked the new settlement. During the Tet Truce violations, VC guerrillas entered the hamlet and assassinated the hamlet chief and his deputy. The guerrillas spread the word that the same thing would happen to any

freely elected hamlet chief. Understandably, no one wanted the position. But the hamlet has since held its own election and a new hamlet chief is operating effectively. "This was a big step forward," commented Colonel Latchford. "These people held the election completely on their own."


What lies ahead for Ap Suoi Nghe? A plot of land has been set aside for a school and a large marketplace is already under construction. Soon farming tool kits will be handed out by the GVN. Seeds will be distributed and agricultural advisors are at work in the hamlet. But the real test lies in the future. One never knows whether a transplanted rice shoot will take hold. And one never knows about a transplanted hamlet. But the seedling has sprouted.

A Vietnamese official gives the people instructions about the lottery



Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Latchford (right) chats with Major Nguyen Ba Trouc, province chief of Phuoc Tuy





MATS

A School for MATS

by SP4 Ronald Pejisa



Weapon safety is a key element in the RF/PF training. The forces are shown that to be sure a weapon is cleared they should place the weapon on their shoulder and pull the trigger, eliminating the risk of shooting someone within the compound

Since Americans first became involved in the Vietnam conflict, the advisory effort has been one of the most important yet least understood parts of the war. Americans have long advised the South Vietnamese on military, economic and agricultural conditions. Relative successes have varied, however, depending on the personalities and previous training of the individuals involved.

Because there was no central training area and because individual backgrounds varied considerably, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) established a training school in early 1968. The Mobile Advisory Team

School (MATS) is located in Di An, Bien Hoa province, 15 miles north of Saigon, and is run by the United States Army Vietnam (USARV). All future MAT advisors are now sent to the 16-day school. Five-man MATS teams, composed of a team leader, heavy weapons specialist, light weapons specialist, medic and radio-telephone operator are sent after training to Regional and Popular Force outposts. They live, work with and advise the RF/PF's for a minimum of four months.

The MAT school, directed by Lieutenant Colonel Edwin F. O'Brien, trains approximately 200 advisors in each cycle. Emphasis

is placed on the Vietnamese language, tactics, weapons and culture.

When the training begins, the men feel the language will be the most difficult subject. "Almost to a man they feel it will be impossible to learn. As they graduate, however, most are amazed at how much they actually have learned," Colonel O'Brien said. The primary difficulty comes in learning the various tonal patterns used by the Vietnamese. "One word may have four or five different meanings, depending solely on how it is pronounced. For example, the word 'ban' may mean able, shoot, friend or sell," the colonel said.



Once their classes are completed, the advisors become the instructors. RF/PF soldiers at Cu Chi 3 are being shown how to break down the M-16 rifle

The course, because of time demands, concentrates primarily on a working knowledge of the basics. Included are items necessary for "survival" such as military language, methods of calling in artillery and air strikes and communications.

The study of weapons includes everything that may be used by the Regional and Popular Forces: the M-1 rifle, M-16 rifle, carbines, Browning Automatic Rifle, .30 caliber machine guns, 60mm mortars and the M-79 grenade launcher. "Once the men learn how to operate, break down and clean all the weapons, they are required to fire each of them. The firing is done after dark, as this will be when they will probably use them the majority of the time, and it will better prepare them for their future assignments," the colonel said.

Tactics include the study of small unit maneuvers, operations unique to the RF/PF and methods used by the Viet Cong against the outposts. "Analyzing techniques that the enemy is using in various areas is of great advantage. Certain situations will dictate specific responses and enable the RF/PF to deliver crumbling blows to the Viet Cong," the colonel said.

The study of Vietnamese culture is broad and includes customs, taboos, sanitation, hygiene, finances, revolutionary development and other related areas.

Captain Clarence Holmes, team leader at the 165th Regional Force

Company in Tay Ninh City, 70 miles northwest of Saigon, said his men were much better prepared to cope with each new challenge because of the MATS training. "Now

... mobile advisors learn the trade

they are not only specialists in their own areas, but also have sufficient exposure to other advisory areas," Captain Holmes said.

His team employed their training immediately. They were assigned to Cu Chi 3, a new RF/PF

outpost north of Tay Ninh City.

Bunkers were makeshift, the defensive perimeter needed expansion and sanitation and health conditions needed improvement.

The RF commander, First Lieutenant Do Van Tha, greeted the new team with a great deal of enthusiasm. "We appreciate your being here. You and all your men should feel completely free to advise us and make recommendations about our outpost," Lieutenant Tha said.


Within three days the advisors and Regional Forces began constructing new bunkers. "We are going to work systematically, tearing down one bunker at a time. We'll use new sandbags, lumber and PSP (perforated steel planking, usually used for runways) to fortify the bunkers and increase our defensive effectiveness," Captain Holmes said.

"From here we'll build storage areas, improve sanitation facilities and expand our military operations outside of the compound. All of this will take time, but with continued hard work and cooperation we will succeed," the captain said.

Although the training school has a short history, solid beginnings such as this at the "rice roots" level will enable Regional and Popular Forces to increase their effectiveness.

Class is in. New advisors are instructed in the assembly, disassembly and capabilities of each weapon they may use at their Regional and Popular Force outposts. Here the men are reviewing the procedure for breaking down the M-1 rifle





Special Forces

The Green Berets

by LT Andrew Krier

photography by SP4 Paul Temple

Company A, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces is like no other company in III Corps Tactical Zone. Even its name is misleading, for in actuality this Special Forces Company is directly associated with the operations of more than 10,000 Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) soldiers.

The role of the U.S. Army Special Forces in counterinsurgency operations is, upon request, to provide advice, assistance and


training to indigenous military forces and, if necessary, to employ military units to prevent or suppress subversive insurgency.

The fighting 12-man "A" detachment is specially trained and specifically available for special warfare missions including unconventional warfare and psychological and counterinsurgency operations. It is area oriented, partially language qualified, and is maintained in a state of operational readiness. Its members are prepared, from

the standpoint of training and psychology, to work in remote areas with foreign soldiers and civilians, including primitive groups, under conditions of relative hardship and danger.

The team is led by a captain, with a first lieutenant as executive officer. In addition to their normal branch training, these officers are further trained in Special Forces operations and tactics and are handpicked for the assignment. The 10 enlisted men are trained in five specific fields; operations and intelligence, weapons, medical,

Special Forces





radio and combat engineer. They are a well-knit team of specialists that can recruit, train and fight with indigenous soldiers and are self-contained. Their training lasts from seven months to a year and, before they are really considered Special Forces qualified, they are cross-trained to every job on the team. Once they have been fully trained, they are then awarded the coveted Green Beret. The late President Kennedy said, as he signed the Executive Order giving Special Forces authority to wear

the Green Beret, that it was "a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom."

The 600 Special Forces soldiers in III CTZ advise the Vietnamese Special Forces on how to use the CIDG mercenary forces on continuous surveillance and interdiction missions. The CIDG program is designed to assist the ARVN border surveillance operation and to expand control in remote and under-populated areas where



Special Forces advisors are always concerned about the welfare of the CIDG families. These youngsters represent the next generation in Vietnam

ARVN and Free World conventional units are not deployed. Each of the 13 "A" Detachments in Company A operates with 12 to 15 Special Forces soldiers and the same number from the Vietnamese Special Forces. Within the camp are approximately 600 CIDG soldiers in fighting companies, two combat reconnaissance platoons, a recoilless rifle section, a psychological operations squad and mortar teams. Most of the soldiers are Vietnamese nationals of Cambodian or Chinese extraction, or are Montagnards of one type or another.

A Special Forces camp costs between \$50,000 and \$75,000 to build and is designed to be a virtually impenetrable fighting position. From this operating base each fighting camp has 50 percent of its strength out on operations at all times. Authorities have placed the CIDG units on a par with the ARVN airborne units, which means that at any one time in the III CTZ there are more than 6,000 highly effective CIDG soldiers performing patrol, ambush, reconnaissance, reinforcement and reaction operations. Usually, two Green Berets accompany all extended operations but the forces are commanded by Vietnamese Special Forces troops.

There are several "A" Detachments that operate with special missions or in special areas. Detachment A-352 at Tra Cu operates an air boat facility utilized to effectively interdict enemy traffic on canals in Hau Nghia Province. Detachment A-302, Long Hai, is the corps area Mobile Strike Force. It consists of seven companies of indigenous personnel led by Green Berets who provide reinforcement and reaction operations in support of the A Detachments. Detachment A-301 at Trang Sup operates a CIDG training center similar to a basic training camp.

Since May 1967, II Field Force has had a responsive, long range, special mission reconnaissance organization known as Project Rapidfire. Detachment B-36 performs missions throughout III Corps. This unit is composed of Special Forces soldiers and 20 Long Range Patrol troops from the major units in II Field Force and is capable of accepting a mission and deploying anywhere in III CTZ to operate within 48 hours. It is one of the most combat effective units in III Corps and normally conducts extended operations in hostile areas well outside the normal operating limits of conventional forces. This unit has been successful in obtaining initial intel-

ligence so that II Field Force Vietnam could make necessary decisions to commit conventional forces against the enemy.

The "A" Detachment is a constant target for enemy mortar attacks and an objective for enemy operations. It stands as a barrier to enemy movement and activities and is therefore in constant danger and must be well guarded and defended.

The Special Forces team, in addition to carrying out its advisory mission on operations and training, plays a big part in maintaining the camp as a livable and defensible home for itself, the Vietnamese and the CIDG and their families. The executive officer of the camp handles the approximately \$25,000 per month needed to pay salaries and for the food and materials needed to operate the camp. There is a constant construction and improvement effort in each camp for better living conditions and camp defenses. The average day in the Special Forces camp begins at 0001 hours and ends at 2400 hours, seven days a week. There is constant activity associated with radio watch, guard, enemy activity, outgoing and incoming operations, cleaning up after operations or preparing for the next one. Of primary importance always is the welfare and morale of the CIDG soldier and his living conditions.

Long before assignment to Vietnam, the Special Forces soldier dedicates himself to becoming a qualified, diversified, self-sufficient individual and knows that he will one day work as a member of an "A" Detachment. In the Republic of Vietnam he is placed in a tactical situation and advisory role that demands his best efforts. It is here only that he can perform in the true spirit and intent of the Green Beret.

PERSPECTIVE

The Posture of the Enemy

EDITOR'S NOTE: In this first article of a continuing series to put the war in III Corps Tactical Zone into perspective we were privileged to have the II Field Force Vietnam CG outline his views on the enemy situation. General Weyand has completed two-and-one-half years of continuous service in this war, first as commanding general of the 25th Infantry (Tropic Lightning) Division, and finally, since 12 May 1967, as CG, II FFORCEV.



Fred Weyand

Five months have passed since the spectacular enemy violation of the Tet Truce; two months have passed since he attempted his second major ground attack on the populated areas of Saigon-Cholon and Long Binh-Bien Hoa.

In the III Corps Tactical Zone some purely military facts are now clear. In our Tactical Area of Operations the enemy has failed to achieve a single military objective. During the period 1 January to 15 May ARVN and US units have killed 32,787 of the enemy and captured 2,930. The enemy also lost 7,290 individual and 2,059 crew-served weapons during that same period.

His main force units have been disastrously shattered in a series of battles which began before the Tet Truce violation. At Loc Ninh, in Binh Long province, the enemy began the first of a series of fanatical attacks which were the tip-off that he had given up the idea of "protracted conflict". In that fight the 1st Infantry Division (Big Red One) killed 852 members of the 272d and 273rd Viet Cong Regiments.

Beside disastrous losses to his main forces, the enemy has also had his local forces—guerrillas—



Devoted herculean efforts to the task of assisting unfortunate civilians...

PERSPECTIVE

badly defeated, and many members of his infrastructure have been sacrificed as riflemen.

Losses of local force soldiers and infrastructure cadre are actually the most significant as long as the enemy hopes to pretend that this is a civil war or revolution.

Where established, the political apparatus of the infrastructure parallels the traditional Vietnamese chain of command. Viet Cong

cells attempt to operate at all levels of government (see chart on page 23). At hamlet level, the local force arm is a 30-man platoon. Districts have 80-man companies, and provinces, 350-man battalions.

When 1968 began, we had identified 14 local force battalions, 29 companies, and 336 platoons in our area.

Our combined military-civil operations, conducted by ARVN, US,

and police, have been targeted against all three prongs of the threat: main force, local force and infrastructure. The attack on the infrastructure is the most difficult, however, since the Government of South Vietnam has to prove in a court of law that a suspect is in fact a member of a subversive organization.

Through late December and the month of January it became clear that the enemy was seeking some kind of psychological victory—at least the temporary capture of a district or provincial capital. Attacks on such targets as Trang Bang, Bao Trai and Tan Uyen, coupled with traceable enemy movements from the Cambodian border and toward the populated areas, began filling in our intelligence picture.

The III ARVN Corps and II Field Force Vietnam units began their redeployments to meet the new threat. Without a doubt, we underestimated the extent to which the enemy would suicidally commit his men in repeated and hopeless attacks. Such wanton disregard for the lives and welfare of troops is uncommon even among the most ruthless military leaders.

It is probable that the Hanoi leadership had committed a more serious error—that of self-deception. Captured documents and the interrogation of prisoners and Hoi Chanh (Returnees) indicate that the enemy seriously believed those news reports which painted the Government of South Vietnam as a "corrupt and unpopular puppet dictatorship" supported by an "inefficient and cowardly ARVN army".

That was a deadly mistake. Although as many as 50 percent of the ARVN soldiers were home on leave enjoying their sacred holidays, no ARVN unit was defeated in the sneak attacks. In this corps area, our Vietnamese allies withstood the worst the enemy threw at them. Despite the confusion and the interdicted lines of communication, most of the soldiers immediately began to return to their units. By early February most ARVN units had recovered their strength.

Hanoi had obviously misread the GVN story.

In the weeks that followed, US and ARVN units in this corps area began mopping up the enemy still milling around in Gia Dinh province. At the same time they devoted herculean efforts to the task

of assisting unfortunate civilians to recover from the devastation of the attacks.


Operation Quiet Thang, a joint ARVN-US operation, was then launched to drive the fragmented and disorganized enemy units away from the populated centers. During that operation, from 11 March to 7 April, the enemy lost 2,658 killed and 147 captured. He also lost 173 122mm rockets and 184 tons of rice.

Our next operation was Toan Thang, also a joint campaign, which had the objective of keeping the pressure on the enemy in his base areas so that he couldn't reorganize and refit. Toan Thang's success was indicated by the fact that of the 26 enemy battalions which attempted to reattack Saigon, 13 were stopped far away, elements of six were able to reach the outskirts of the city and none penetrated the city as organized units. By mid-May, enemy losses, killed and captured, totaled almost 9,000 men.

His defeats during the Tet attacks and our two offensive operations began convincing his field commanders that further attacks at this time were suicidal. Two high-ranking leaders, one the CO of the 165th NVA Regiment, and the other a high-placed VC political officer, defected to the Government of South Vietnam because they were being ordered to sacrifice their troops in what they knew were futile attacks.

Other facts became clear before the enemy's April 5 attempts to hit the populated areas. The nature of his forces had changed drastically. Obviously he was fielding relatively untrained and inexperienced—although better equipped—troops. He had lost many of the local forces who were familiar with particular areas and he had sacrificed many of his underground cadre in military roles for which they weren't trained. His techniques of thoroughly policing a battlefield after a fight became the exception rather than the norm. Our units began finding great quantities of crew-served weapons days after an engagement. The old days of carefully rehearsed actions were also past.

Increasingly, the enemy we met was North Vietnamese—in most cases only recently infiltrated into South Vietnam. The native Viet Cong killed or captured in the hundreds of small unit engagements were steadily younger and, in many cases, female.



The government of South Vietnam controls its people through a fairly simple civic structure. The Viet Cong attempt to impose their shadow government on the same structure. Their "muscle" comes from local force military units and the 5th and 9th VC and the 7th NVA division.

...the enemy has failed to achieve a single military victory



Hanoi had obviously misread the GVN story...



Our Vietnamese allies withstood the worst the enemy threw at them...



We must hit hard to take advantage of this changed situation...



It became clear that the enemy was seeking some sort of psychological victory...

With this dilution of his resources, the enemy has obviously realized that his threats of continuing the war for decades cannot be fulfilled. His "second wave" attack on February 18 sputtered out almost as soon as it began. His third wave attack, a forced march to a premature D-Day, failed outside Saigon and Bien Hoa.

Units targeted on the Bien Hoa Air Base were met and shattered by 1st Division forces on the west side of the Dong Nai River and were never able to reach their initial attack positions.

By mid-May it became obvious that the present enemy in the III Corps Tactical Zone could no longer maintain the same intensity of his threat without a wholesale invasion of fresh North Vietnamese units and replacements. His recruiting efforts in the south were failing and he was being forced to kidnap youngsters for his units.

While no single facet of the threat, main force, local force or infrastructure, is more important than another, the massive destruction of the communist main force units has deprived the local forces and infrastructure of their most powerful shield. Conversely, the sacrifice of local forces and infrastructure cadre has deprived the main force of their eyes, ears and hiding places.

This loss of quality, coupled with

the increasing effectiveness of the GVN and ARVN and US efforts—military and civil—has changed the balance of power in our favor. Now, more than ever, we must hit hard to take advantage of this

changed situation. Now is the time to redouble our efforts to find, fix, fight and finish the enemy until he agrees to halt his aggression against the people of South Vietnam.

His third wave attack was a forced march to a premature D-day and failed...



The 'Old Reliables'

Defend Saigon

by CPT Frank Reysen, Jr.

Troops of the 9th Division (Old Reliables) played a stingy tollkeeper to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attackers trying to enter Saigon over the Y-Bridge and the Kinh Doi Canal during the recent unsuccessful "third wave" attacks on the South Vietnamese capital.

Division infantrymen, armored personnel carriers, gunships and artillery killed more than 700 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army Regulars who tried each day to enter the capital via the Y-Bridge and Kinh Doi Canal, two miles from the Presidential Palace. Old Reliable units lost 27 killed in the five-day fight, May 7-11.

The enemy's renewed but greatly diminished show of strength sent thousands of men, women and children pouring across the bridge, seeking refuge inside the city. Many didn't make it; the communists honored no distinction between allied forces and civilians.

Action first exploded before dawn May 7 when an estimated VC platoon assaulted the Y-Bridge leading into downtown Saigon. At the same time, an ARVN outpost

Soldiers from the 9th Division watch explosions from an allied airstrike on a Viet Cong battalion trapped as it tried to enter Saigon from the south



farther west came under siege by an enemy company. APC's of the 5th Mechanized Battalion, 60th Infantry, which had helped repel hostile intruders from Cholon during February's Tet turmoil, were rushed into the area from the Mekong Delta. As Company C, 5/60th, approached the ARVN outpost, it encountered heavy small arm, automatic weapon and B-40 rocket fire. Simultaneously, Company A, 5/60th, moving to intercept the enemy at the bridge, also met intense VC fire. Gunships and artillery supported both contacts.

At dawn, U.S. airstrikes saturated the area, killing many VC who had taken cover in a nearby factory complex. When the trapped enemy tried to flee south across open rice paddies, they were battered by gunships of the 3rd Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry,

and 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry.

While Company A sealed off the bridge access, Company C's tracks roared through the factory rubble from the west, shutting off the enemy in a cement block building near the center of the complex. Huey Cobras and the new OH-6A Cayuse gunships hammered the VC positions with miniguns and rockets. The enemy body count reached 213 as fighting tapered off by late afternoon. Contact continued into the night, with ARVN Rangers moving into the east side of the complex to complete the deadly pincer movement.

Early the next morning, elements of the 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry were summoned from Long An province to guard the southern entrances to the city. Reaching the Kinh Doi Canal, a major shipping lane bordering the

district of Cholon, the unit received heavy fire from dwellings in the area. A house-to-house counter-attack chased enemy snipers to the roofs in a vain attempt to halt the 3/39th. Allied gunships again devastated the battleground with miniguns and rockets.

Meanwhile, further south the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry, turned back another enemy force on its way to Saigon. In all, 115 enemy perished during the second day of fighting.

An armored personnel carrier acts as a shield for soldiers from the 5th Mechanized Battalion, 60th Infantry, as they pour on a Viet Cong battalion trapped near the Kinh Doi Canal on the southern outskirts of Saigon





The area surrounding the "Y" bridge was a deathtrap for 213 Viet Cong who tried to storm into Cholon

'Old Reliables' Fight...

At about 10:00 a.m. on May 9, elements of the 5/60th ran into heavy contact along the canal, while the 3/39th engaged the enemy near the bridge. As fighting intensified, the 2d Mechanized Battalion, 47th Infantry rushed in from Bear Cat, 20 miles away, to assist in parrying the communist thrust. When heavy small arms and rocket fire greeted the 2/47th tracks east of the bridge, the Panthers answered back with .50 caliber machine guns, which, together with gunships and airstrikes, soon forced another enemy withdrawal.

The division's newest maneuver battalion, the 6/31st Infantry, made its first significant contact since arriving in Vietnam in early

April. Most of the action flared between Highways 15 and 230. At one point during the afternoon the 6/31st forces were pinned down, but they soon overcame the snipers and moved to secure the bridges north and south of the contact.

Shortly after, about 3,000 yards from the battle site, gunships observed two enemy 107mm rocket positions, mounted and ready to fire. The gunships disposed of the sites and the two rocket warheads near them.

On May 10, division units, continuing to sweep and secure the southern fringes of Saigon, combined to kill 106 enemy in separate engagements throughout the day. At least 13 of the kills were

credited to gunships from B Troop, 7/1st Cav and D Troop, 3/5th Cav.

The next day was relatively tranquil until about 7:20 p.m. when the 3/39th exchanged heavy fire with the enemy about 500 yards south of the Y-Bridge. Airstrikes and gunships helped the infantrymen kill 80 VC in the two-hour struggle. At the same time, eight miles south of Saigon, the 6/31st felled 24 enemy in an hour-long battle punctuated by airstrikes and gunships.

The much-vaunted "third attack" had ended a failure, and the "Old Reliables" moved out to pursue the fleeing foe.

An aerial photograph of a village in a tropical region. A wide, muddy river flows through the center of the village. On the left bank, there are several large, dense patches of green mangrove vegetation. The houses are built on both banks, with many having traditional brown tiled roofs. Numerous palm trees are scattered throughout the village, casting long shadows on the ground. A small boat is visible in the river. The overall scene depicts a typical rural settlement in a coastal or riverine area.

Hau Nghia

HURRICANE PROVINCE

Hau Nghia

Land of

Bountiful Justice

by Major Cleve Cunningham

Photography by Sp4 Paul Temple



...*Khiem Cuong* scarcely resembles a province capital



Hau Nghia, known as the "Land of Hope", but which translates as "Bountiful Justice", is a recently created province through which pass most of the major North Vietnamese infiltration and invasion routes toward Saigon. For this reason, its political and economic life is overshadowed by military considerations, even though its fertile land and gentle climate make it an exporter of rice, cattle, pigs and poultry.

Formed by presidential order on October 15, 1963, from the Duc Hoa and Duc Hue districts of Long An province, the Trang Bang district of Tay Ninh, and the Cu Chi district of Binh Duong province, Hau Nghia was created primarily to coordinate military activities on Highway 1 and both sides of the Kinh Tay swamp, which was the border between Binh Duong and Long An provinces. Viet Cong units had previously slipped back and forth across the swamp to evade meaningful pursuit or engagement from GVN forces of one of the other provinces.

Khiem Cuong (pronounced Keem Koong) was picked as the provincial capital because of its central location and to avoid offending any of the four competing district towns. Previously known as Bao Trai, and still called that by most, it was a small and primitive hamlet with 800 people. Even today Khiem Cuong scarcely resembles a province capital.

Because it shares a 27-kilometer border with Cambodia and its capital is only 20 kilometers as the crow flies from Saigon, the province represents the major passage-way for North Vietnamese supplies and re-enforcements—a dagger pointed at the western edge of the national capital.

The principal shield protecting Saigon and Gia Dinh province from the enemy dagger is the presence of the 25th ARVN Division, with headquarters at Duc Hoa, and the 25th US Division, with headquarters at Cu Chi. Provincial security also comes from 12 RF companies and platoons and 650 National Police and a police field force company.

No wonder, then, that the Province Chief is a highly-respected military officer who is more apt to be found at the head of his troops or out among the people than at his desk. Lieutenant Colonel Ma Sanh Nhon is a stocky and impressive Ranger/Airborne-qualified soldier—and holder of the U.S. Silver Star—with what his senior advisor calls "charisma"—the overpowering ability to capture the loyalty of the troops he leads. The province senior advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Carl F. Bernard, former RF/PF Advisor for III Corps CORDS and a three-war veteran, holds the Distinguished Service Cross, earned in the Korean War.

Although the sound of war is seldom silenced for the quarter of a million inhabitants of the province, living goes on at a surprisingly high level of prosperity. The basic industry in Hau Nghia (pronounced How Nee-Ya) is agriculture. Approximately 50,000 hectares (2.5 acres to the hectare) are classified as riceland with an average yield of two tons per hectare. Other crops, ranked in number of hectares in cultivation, are

sugar, rubber, peanuts, vegetables and tobacco.

Sugar was once a major industry—and with peace will be again—but security problems have caused sugar production to decline. The Hiep Hoa sugar mill, on a bank of the Oriental River, once was the largest sugar mill in Vietnam. Today it produces alcohol and a form of rum; its compound houses the district headquarters of Duc Hue.

Livestock production is also relatively high. In 1967 there were an estimated 25,000 water buffalo, 15,000 cattle, 100,000 pigs, 232,000 chickens and 800,000 ducks in the farmyards and on the fields.

Most Hau Nghians are farmers who supplement their diets with fish caught from the Vam Co Dong River or the canals and waterways which criss-cross the land. Ethnically, most of the people are lowland Vietnamese, with a few Khmer (Cambodians) and about 3,000 Chinese scattered among them. More than half the population is Buddhist. Another 27 percent is Taoist-Animist-Confucist; approximately nine percent is Cao Dai; 10 percent is Catholic (mostly refugees from North Vietnam); and the balance is considered Protestant.

Vietnamese is spoken universally but the Khmers and Chinese also speak their parental languages. French and English are widely used as second languages by the educated. Approximately 30,000 students attend the province's 64 public or private schools. Each district has a public high school; Duc

Hoa, Cu Chi and Trang Bang have, in addition, at least one private high school each. These districts also have 13, 12 and 13 public elementary schools, respectively, while lesser-populated Duc Hue has six. All told, there are nearly 600 teachers in the province.

The four districts contain only 24 villages, sub-divided into 155 hamlets. Even today, there is little sense of provincial consciousness among the inhabitants of these villages. As a province pieced together out of slices of others, district and village ties are frequently to former affiliations. For example, the Cao Dai adherents in Trang Bang have close ties to their Holy See in Tay Ninh. Much of Cu Chi still relates to Binh Duong and Gia Dinh provinces more than to the capital of Khiem Cuong. Duc Hoa is closely interwoven economically with Long An and Gia Dinh.

Part of this fragmentation is



Most Hau Nghians are farmers who supplement their diets with fish caught in the Oriental River



understandable in light of the districts' individual histories, and part when measured against the history of war in the region.

Cu Chi, long a stronghold for rebel activity, was named after an enormous tree of the Cu Chi variety which was located at the site of the present district capital. Reputed to have been more than 100 feet tall and seven feet in diameter, the tree provided a large shaded area which became a natural gathering place for the exchange of local produce and news. The surrounding area at the time was a part of Hoc Mon district, then belonging to Gia Dinh province.

In 1946, during the war between the Viet Minh and the French, the French moved forces into the town, destroyed the Buddhist pagoda, and ordered the big tree chopped down. In 1962 and early 1963, a concerted effort was made to clear and pacify the area on both sides of Highway 1 as a part of the original Strategic Hamlet Program known as Operation Sunrise. Although many kilometers of perimeter fences were erected and thousands of people relocated, there was very little genuine pacification or elimination of the enemy infrastructure.

Hiep Hoa, Tan My and An Ninh, on the eastern bank of the Vam Co Dong, were transferred from Duc Hoa district.

Trang Bang, a comparatively rich district, was founded more than a century ago by Dang Van Tuoc, a madarin of Marshall Le Van Duyet. After driving out the reinvading Cambodians, Tuoc stationed troops at Trang Bang, which he named after the virgin forest on the site. He encouraged his military garrison to clear the forest for fuel, and subsequently, for farmlands. Tuoc also developed handicraft industries, particularly straw mat and carpet-making, and a city was born.

In its early days, Trang Bang was a part of Tay Ninh province. After the French invasion of 1858, Tay Ninh was incorporated into the Saigon administration and two French military units were stationed in the area. In 1948, part of Trang Bang district became the separate district of Go Dau Ha but was later restored to Trang Bang. The confusion persisted through 1963 when the area was transferred to Hau Nghia.

Hau Nghia, in other words, is still politically divided and fragmented, but this problem is slowly

posture, or strategic locations along major lines of communication.

During 1967, Hau Nghia had 12 New Life Hamlets, five Ap Binh Dinh's (Pacified) and three Ap Cung Co's (Consolidated). The 1968 program has increased from 20 hamlets to 52, with 10 Ap Doi Moi's, 17 Ap Binh Dinh's, and 25 Ap Cung Co's. The budget has increased from 35 to 48 million piasters, or \$410,000.

The RD self-help program is another indication of the GVN interest in its people. Between December 1966 and the end of January 1968, despite problems in local administration and security, the province completed 72 funded and 22 unfunded projects. Most of these, funded and unfunded, were structural—schools, health centers, dispensaries, maternity clinics, meeting halls, multi-purpose centers, markets, bridges, springs and wells. These projects improved the welfare of the people and, since the local populace planned and cooperated for their own interests, are more apt to remain as visible evidence of provincial and national interest in the communities affected.

Medical needs in Hau Nghia are met by the Provincial Public Health Service with a system of medical facilities throughout the province. The main installations are the four maternity-infirmiry-dispensaries located in the provincial capital and the district capitals of Duc Hoa, Cu Chi and Trang Bang. Additionally, the rural population is served by hamlet maternity clinics, 11 of which were constructed in 1967. Seven more are included in the RD plans for 1968. Malaria control teams practice preventive medicine throughout the province and a Philippine Medical Team from the Philippine Civic Action Group (HURRICANE, February 1968) supplements the Vietnamese Public Health Service.

Improved security and governmental operations aren't enough to meld a geographical area into a political entity if the people in one area are not sure of what is happening in another. The frequent tours of the Province Chief help spread the word; the activities of the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) provide the day-to-day supplement for the achievements of the government.

The VIS uses a province monthly newspaper, daily newsletters, district weekly newsletters, and portable battery-operated radios and

Bountiful Justice

Duc Hoa, formerly an area where the Khmer lived until driven out by the Vietnamese, was administratively a part of the Cholon Metropolitan area until 1909, when it became a separate province. This political division lasted until 1956 when it was incorporated into the newly formed Long An province. That lasted until 1963 when the district formed the nucleus of Hau Nghia. In 1964, after much of the Duc Hue district was lost to the Viet Cong, three of Duc Hoa's villages were transferred to Duc Hue.

Duc Hue, in turn, was established as a separate district of Long An province in 1959. Situated in the area west of the Vam Co Dong and bordering on the Plain of Reeds, its original capital was the My Qui Agrovillage. In 1963, the district was transferred to Hau Nghia and in 1964 the capital was reestablished at the Hiep Hoa Sugar Mill (Hang Duong hamlet) and the villages of



being solved. The improvements in provincial government, coupled with increased internal communications resulting from the opening of roads (particularly Highway 1) and greater and more efficient efforts by the Revolutionary Development cadre, are all helping to make the province a "Land of Hope."

The Revolutionary Development (RD) program is the Government of South Vietnam's immediate program of counterinsurgency and nation-building. In Hau Nghia it is intended to be the major program, coupled with psychological operations, to give the province a sense of geo-political unity.

Centered on the work of 59-man teams, the RD program in Hau Nghia during 1967 was the task of six teams; in 1968 there are 10 teams. Most of their efforts were concentrated on New Life Hamlets (Ap Doi Moi's) which are specially selected hamlets with significant population densities, economic

Bountiful Justice

The present



. And the future

TV's in key locations throughout the province to keep the people informed. While there are more than 200 portable radios and 27 TV receivers officially placed in Hau Nghia, a recent survey determined that there are more than 15,000 radios and approximately 150 TV sets in private hands. Face-to-face communication, considered by many the most important means of disseminating information, is primarily practiced by mobile broadcast teams.

Making a unified province out of Hau Nghia would be a difficult task for the Government of South Vietnam under any condition; making Hau Nghia secure enough to unify is rendered even more difficult by the continuous invasion of North Vietnamese by way of the jungles of Cambodia. The job is by no means accomplished yet, but the highly dedicated teams of Vietnamese and Americans who work in the province are convinced that it can be done. To them, Hau Nghia is the "Land of Hope".

Putting a combined American and Vietnamese force on the trail of hot intelligence causes double trouble for the Viet Cong in Tay Ninh province.

Known as the Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon (CRIP), the allied unit is a quick reaction force for countering Viet Cong small unit activity in and around Tay Ninh City.

Half of the CRIP is from the 25th Infantry Division's 1st Brigade and half from the Regional and Popular Forces of Tay Ninh province. Formed in early February, the unit works for both the 1st Brigade and the province chief and his MACV advisory team. The CRIP is constantly alert to react to intelligence gathered by the US 25th Infantry Division and the Vietnamese military units in Tay Ninh province.

The Vietnamese soldiers' rapport with the local populace and knowledge of the area combined with the Americans' skill in military tactics has helped the CRIP establish an impressive record in halting Viet Cong activities in the area. First Lieutenant John Scherban and Warrant Officer Nguyen Hong Chau are the joint leaders of the CRIP. According to Lieutenant Scherban, "Working with the Vietnamese the way we do is an experience that I'll always remember. Every one of us has learned to respect our counterpart on this team. The Vietnamese have their own ways of doing things which was contrary to some of my thinking when I first arrived here. But I learned that they know what they're doing, and I now have complete confidence in any action Mr. Chau takes.

"It's a complete partnership. We sleep, eat, work and play together," added Lieutenant Scherban.

The night ambush is the main tactic of the CRIP. Three or four nights a week intelligence reports suggest an ambush patrol to deny the Viet Cong free movement through the rice paddies and streets under the cover of darkness.

The ambushes are led by Lieutenant Scherban and Staff Sergeants Walter Crutchfield and Lonnie Grice.

Staff Sergeant Lonnie Grice talks through his interpreter to a civilian who gave the patrol parts from the VC mortar used to shell Tay Ninh the evening before

..... pressure on the enemy in Tay Ninh

CRIP

by SP4 Rick Adams



"The three of us take turns leading our ambushes while we always have a reaction force ready to rush to the patrol's aid if they hit heavy contact," Sergeant Crutchfield explained.

"All the patrols are equally representative of both nations. If we have a patrol of 12 men, six are American and six are Vietnamese," commented Sergeant Grice.

A typical ambush started on a Saturday evening when intelligence reports indicated heavy Viet Cong activity in the southwestern sector of Tay Ninh City. At CRIP headquarters in an old French-built compound in the city, plans were made for an ambush. Lieutenant Scherban and Sergeant Crutchfield stood in front of a map of the city and the surrounding area and briefed the men. The compound bustled with activity as each man prepared his equipment. The gun jeeps were given a final check and the .50 caliber machine guns were placed on the jeeps' gun mounts. Americans and Vietnamese congregated in several groups joking and talking.

At twilight, the men climbed into the jeeps and moved out to a prearranged drop-off point. Once there, everyone jumped off the jeeps and smoked what would be his last cigarette until morning.

The men moved down the road in single file. They turned off and walked along the dikes of the rice paddies, through a wood line, and once more through rice paddies.

Once at the ambush site, each squad took up positions along the small dikes that divided the paddies into sections. They put out claymore mines and began the long wait. Only the sounds of insects and sporadic artillery fire interrupted the stillness of the night.

Three Allied outposts near the site made contact with the Viet Cong, and there was a good chance that when the fighting stopped the VC would move into the ambush kill zone. The CRIP sat and watched the men at the outposts fight the VC under the illumination of the flares.

Shortly after midnight, the VC set up a mortar tube off to the patrol's north side and fired rounds into Tay Ninh City. Sergeant Crutchfield quickly called in the co-

ordinates and artillery rounds soon pounded the enemy position.

By 6:00 a.m. no enemy contact had been made, and the troopers retrieved their claymores and walked back to the compound. After breakfast, the men returned to the VC mortar site to assess the damage. A large impression remained in the ground from the mortar's base plate, but the mortar tube was gone.

The CRIP searched the area and questioned the people who lived nearby. They checked wells, hay

mounds and other likely hiding places but could not find the mortar. However, they found caps and wires displaced by 16 rounds fired during the night. They also found an 82mm mortar head with Chinese markings.

Although no contact was made on this patrol, CRIP had broken up a VC mortar site and soon would be back on the enemy's trail. VC in Tay Ninh province must move with greater stealth and must expect greater losses because CRIP is on patrol.



The CRIP moves out to search for an enemy mortar site spotted the night before

WHY DUCKS

SLEEP ON ONE LEG

... Vietnamese Legend

People often wonder why ducks sleep in the funny way that they do—with one leg lifted. The Vietnamese have a reason for this.

Heaven had created the world, and all God's creatures were happy except for four ducks, who found themselves with only one leg each. All the other animals had at least two legs and the four ducks found it hard to move about and get their food.

After much discussion the four ducks decided to make their complaint to heaven, but they were not sure exactly how to go about doing so. With help from a rooster, they drafted a petition. Their only problem was carrying it to heaven and none of the ducks knew the way. Again the rooster was called for help. He told them that not far away was a golden temple, and said he was a friend of the temple's god who in turn was a representative to heaven. The rooster drafted a letter to the god with complete introductions for them. The delighted ducks left for the golden temple.


As they entered the temple, they heard a harsh voice wanting to know why there were eight legs instead of four on the temple's incense burner, and that the four extra legs would have to go. The ducks' hopes rose as they shuffled forward.

As they approached the god, they could tell he was angry about the additional legs. Nevertheless, one duck spoke to the god, gave him the letter from their friend the rooster and explained why they had come to the temple. But the god told them that what they had received during creation was final, and there was nothing he could do.

The youngest duck, more desperate than others, spoke up and told the god that the four of them had heard about the extra legs on the temple's incense burner, and asked why couldn't they have them? The god was vastly amused.

After much laughter, the god agreed to let the four ducks have the four extra legs. But he warned them that because the legs were made of solid gold, the ducks would have to be alert and watch out that thieves did not steal them.

The ducks left the temple brimming with indescribable joy. They attached the golden legs and soon were able to move around like all other animals. But at night, when they went to sleep, they pulled up their golden legs so that no one could steal them. The other ducks thought this was the proper way to sleep, and in imitation began lifting a leg before retiring for the night. And so the custom has remained to this day.



*The land of bountiful justice exports pigs,
poultry, rice and cattle.*

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