

TOP SECRET  
SUMMARY SHEET  
(DA FORM 10-12)

CLASSIFIED BY OPCS-005  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO		FOR		FROM	
DCSOPS	CGPC	1-2	APPROVAL	AGENCY	TELEPHONE
DCSPER	ACBFOR	2	SIGNATURE	ODCSOPS	DEC 31, 1967
DCSLOG	ACST	1	COORDINATION	CONTACT OFFICER	
COA	TAG	2		LTC Sturm	
CRD	CLL			S OF A	

FILE REFERENCE: OPS OD TO  
SUBJECT: Deployment of the 101st Airborne Division (-) (U)  
DATE: 10 OCT 1967

IMPLICATIONS (Implications checked are involved in this action, are discussed below or in a separate inclosure, and have been considered in final recommendation.)

CONTROL PROGRAM    MANPOWER    SECURITY    CONGRESSIONAL  
 BUDGET    PUBLIC RELATIONS    MORALE    LEGAL    NONE

PURPOSE  
(S) To provide the SA and CofSA with the feasibility of closing the 101st Abn Div in SVN NLT 20 Dec 67 and to recommend a deployment schedule.

DISCUSSION

- (S) In light of SECDEF's decision (TAB A), current schedule for deployment of 101st Abn Div is, (a) air deployment of 3d Bde Task Force and hqs element (about 5,000 troops) 1 Dec 67, closing o/a 17 Dec 67, (b) remainder of Div departing CONUS by surface 2-6 Jan 68, closing NLT 31 Jan 68.
- (S) COMUSMACV now requests closure of the Div prior to 20 Dec 67 (TAB B). CINCPAC concurs. The reason is the possibility of an extended moratorium on deployments at Christmas time. To meet this date requires deployment c/a 1 Dec 67.
- (S) A DA and USCONARC team visited the Div on 4 Oct 67. The findings were as follows: (a) Personnel. The accountable deployable strength was 83 percent of authorized. As of 9 Oct 67 the accountable deployable strength had increased to 91 percent of authorized. The remainder will join NLT 15 Nov. Personnel discussion is at TAB C. (b) Logistics. The Div has shortages in 43 line items of MEE -- will be issued by 1 Dec. Logistics discussion is at TAB D. (c) Training. Div requires eight weeks training prior to commitment to combat, which can be completed in CONUS, SVN, or a combination. Under the current schedule, the lead bde would require a minimum of four weeks training in SVN. TAB E provides training discussion.
- (U) CGUSCONARC's remarks are at TAB F. He and CG101st Abn Div concur with the accelerated schedule provided a decision is received NLT 10 Oct and the Div is allowed the required training in-country.
- (S) Under the circumstances, there are two alternatives for deployment.
  - Deploy the Div on its current schedule.
    - Advantage: Allows the Div to complete its training in CONUS.
    - Disadvantage: Does not close the Div by 20 Dec 67. Could delay the deployment of the remainder of the Div provided a moratorium on deployment was placed in effect for an extended period around the Christmas holidays.
  - Deploy the entire Div by air to close NLT 20 Dec 67.
    - Advantage: Closes the Div prior to a possible Christmas moratorium on deployments.
    - Disadvantage: Requires the entire Div to complete four weeks of training in SVN.

CMLTS #68-1

CONCLUSIONS \*Additional discussion on page 2.

- (S) The Div can be deployed on either schedule discussed above.
- (S) In light of a possible extended Christmas moratorium on deployments, alternative b is the most desirable.

DCofSA No. 610167

HSP

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OPS OD TO

SUBJECT: Deployment of the 101st Airborne Division (-) (U)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) That the conclusions be approved.
2. (U) That the memo attached at TAB G be forwarded from SA to SECDEF.

COORDINATION

ACSFOR - *Col Hyoung 72472*  
DCSPER - COL E.C. Samusson, 52497  
DCSLOG - *Major Gen. Jon. M. Helzer, Jr. 78401*  
COA - *COL MERRILL G. WATON, 80081 (1967)*

7 Incls  
as

*Harry J. Lemley Jr.*  
HARRY J. LEMLEY, JR.  
Lieutenant General, GS  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
for Military Operations

\*ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

1. (C) The additional transportation costs to the Army for accelerated deployment is about ten million dollars. These cost data are at TAB H. Based on initial estimates the additional costs for 40 days in RVN vs the same period in CONUS will be approximately 5.3 million dollars. Broken down as follows: O & MA funds 2.8 million, PEMA (ammunition) .9 million and MPA Cost 1.6 million.
2. (S) COMUSMACV's announced reasons for closure of the Division in SVN by 20 Dec 67 are to support his 1968 campaign plans and the probability of an extended moratorium on deployments at Christmas. See green marker at TAB B. CINCPAC supports this position (TAB I). By message at TAB J MACV now indicates some adjustment of his 1968 campaign plans.
3. (S) Accelerated deployment of the remainder of the Division will not provide an operational element earlier than the current schedule. Accelerated deployment, however, will close the Division by 20 Dec 67 and, in the event of an extended moratorium on deployments at Christmas, will not leave the 101st Abn Div astride the Pacific.
4. (U) I adhere to my original recommendation.

10 Incls  
(Added 3 incls)  
TAB H - Cost Data  
TAB I - CINCPAC Msg  
TAB J - MACV Msg

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S/WILSON

for LEMLEY

SEE REVERSE

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RECEIVED SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

SEP 22 3 34 PM '67  
OFFICE  
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

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22 SEP 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Deployment of 101st Airborne Division (-) (U)

I approve your plan to deploy by air a brigade task force and headquarters and control element of the 101st Airborne Division (-) (approximately 4500 personnel) in December 1967. Actual deployment will be authorized by normal deployment procedures through the JCS. Program #5 will be adjusted accordingly. A decision on the accelerated deployment of the remainder of the 101st Airborne Division (-) will be made at a later date. The Army should accomplish this move within funds currently authorized for the Army in FY 68 with the understanding that the additional costs of this movement will be included within guidance already issued for the revised FY 68 budget estimates.

*Robert S. McNamara*

TAB A

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EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION  
EXCEPT BY THE ISSUING OFFICE  
DOD DIR 5300.10

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DEFENSE STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

PAGE  
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GROUP 4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

CLASSIFIED BY brh/v  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFY ON: Dec 31, 77

281500Z SEP 67

FROM: COMUSMACV  
TO : CINCPAC  
INFO: CJCS  
NR : 31998

FROM MACCOC  
WESTMORELAND SENDS

UNCLASSIFIED

Subj: Reorientation of In-Country Forces (U)

1. ~~(TS)~~ In view of the accelerated deployment of the 101st Abn Div and the heavy enemy pressure in I CTZ, I have made a reassessment of planned operations and force deployments projected for the northeast monsoon season. As you know, my overall fall-winter objectives have been to:

A. Relieve the 1st Cav Div in Binh Dinh and commit it to successive country-wide offensive operations: Phoenix to eliminate MR6; Santa Fe to destroy the 5th VC Div; San Angelo to disrupt MR10 and York to clean out the Do Xa.

B. Reinforce I CTZ to the extent practicable without unduly retarding other progress.

C. Move additional elements of the 9th Inf Div to the Delta.

D. Reinforce III CTZ so that we can attack during favorable weather in a series of peripheral operations which should open Highway One, neutralize War Zone C, disrupt War Zone D and force the enemy into a vulnerable posture away from populated areas.

2. ~~(TS)~~ My overall projections have heretofore been based on freeing the 1st Cav to reinforce II FFORCEV in early December. The prospective early arrival of the 101st Div will now allow for initiation of planned operations in III CTZ while diverting the 1st Cav Div to I CTZ as required by the intensified enemy situation there. To insure adequate combat ready forces for III CTZ operations, I now plan to delay the movement of additional 9th Div elements to the Delta; however, a Vietnamese marine battalion will deploy to IV CTZ to reinforce our mobile riverine operations planned for that area.

3. ~~(TS)~~ These moves are carefully planned to preclude any regression in the vital coastal areas of II CTZ; to insure that the ultimate posture of forces required to meet objectives for next year is not changed significantly; to do what is necessary to relieve and reverse the situation near the DMZ; and to conduct large scale operations in selected areas

31  
SCD FORM 35  
1 MAY 62

DA IN 376465 B

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TAB B

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DDO/SAL No. 610167

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PAGE 1 of 3 PAGES

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STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

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AGE

NR : 31998

when weather is favorable. By this reoriented effort, I desire to preempt the enemy strategy of attempting to tie down forces and denude the pacification shield.

4. ~~(TS)~~ The deployments which I plan to make are as follows:

A. Immediately deploy one ~~1st Cav Div~~ <sup>1st Cav Div</sup> to I CTZ thus freeing a marine regt for ~~support~~ <sup>support</sup> of Ai Van Pass. In conjunction with the reduction of forces in Binh Dinh, I propose to obtain accelerated ROK action throughout their TAOR with emphasis on the Phu Cat Mountain area of southern Binh Dinh. Concurrent with the deployment of the 1st Cav elements north will be the return of the 2/11th ACR to III CTZ where favorable weather will exist for armored operations.

B. The 173d Bde will become an organic part of I FFORCEV with its base camp relocated, as soon as possible, at An Khe. This will make facilities available at Binh Hoa for the early arrival of the 101st Div.

C. The 198th Bde will be employed as part of the Americal Division upon its arrival.

D. O/A 15 October the 173 Bde will deploy from Phu Yen and Kontum to the Pershing AO. Its fourth battalion will go to An Khe upon arrival O/A 23 October. The bn of the 1st Cav now in Phu Yen will remain there after Operation Bolling terminates. One bn of the 4th Div will move to Kontum upon departure of the 173d Bde. In Binh Dinh, the 173d Bde will relieve the 1st Cav Div. In addition to its organic battalions, the 173d will retain the T/50 ~~unit~~ <sup>unit</sup> and one bn of the 1st Cav.

E. In late October a second bde of the 1st Cav and the Div Hq will deploy to I CTZ to relieve additional Marine forces as required for employment in the northern areas.

F. Upon arrival of the 1st Cav in I CTZ (about 25 Oct) the 1st Bde of the 101st Div will deploy to Binh Thuan to initiate Operation Phoenix against MR6.

G. Operation Phoenix will terminate in late November and the 1st Bde, 101st Div will pass to OpCon II FFORCEV to participate in Operation Santa Fe against the 5th VC Div during December.

H. During December II FFORCEV will conduct operations in War Zone C utilizing elements of the 1st Div and 25th Div.

I. Assuming the early arrival of the 101st Div, it will be employed in late January or early February in San Angelo against MR 10 while simultaneously a multi-div operation, Dodge City, will be launched against War Zone D.

J. Upon the arrival of the 11th Bde in the Americal Division the 3d Bde, 4th Div will slip south to Binh Dinh to relieve the 173d Bde and the remaining elements of the 1st Cav Div. Subsequent to this, Operation York against the Do Xa will be initiated utilizing two bdes of the 1st Cav Div.

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PAGE 2

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PAGE

NR : 31998

After the termination of this operation, the 1st Cav Div will be in a posture to facilitate future offensive operations in I CTZ.

5. ~~(TS)~~ I have already started action to accomplish the above. Higher authority can provide the following additional assistance:

A. Accelerate the deployment of the 101st Div to close all major elements of the Div prior to 20 December 1967. This will facilitate early combat readiness of this force and allow its employment in late January against MR 10.

B. Continue the retention of the elements of 9th MAB now in-country. My evaluation now of the situation in I CTZ indicates a continuing requirement for this force through the spring of 1968.

C. Accelerate deployment of 11th Separate Infantry Bde to arrive in-country during December 1967. Early arrival would permit early release of the 173d Abn Bde which would be employed in II CTZ. A consideration in all accelerated deployments is the possibility of an extended holiday moratorium resulting in an agreement of status quo on force deployments.

D. Provide an immediate surge in B-52 sorties to maximum sustainable rate, with a goal of 1200 sorties per month as soon as possible.

E. Investigate feasibility of employing 2000 pound and larger bombs in B-52's to penetrate fortified positions in and above the DMZ.

F. Request CSAF and CNO conduct earliest tests to determine optimum spacing of MK-36 weapons, and maximum resistance to concussion to prepathetic detonation. Thereafter, if tests are favorable, make a liberal allocation of MK-36 weapons for use in the DMZ.

G. Augment NGF assets in the DMZ area.

H. Approve increases in RVNAF as recommended to the Secretary of Defense in July.

I. Obtain increase in free world forces.

J. Accelerate issue of M-16's to ARVN units as recommended in DTG 211155Z Sep 67 (S).

K. Intensify R&D effort in field of target acquisition of concealed artillery pieces.

GP-4

NOTE: -----BEING SERVICED - MESSAGE RELEASED SUBJECT TO CORRECTION  
ADV CYS SENT TO DCSOPS AOC AT 290746Z SEP 67  
211155Z IS DA IN 366851 (21 Sep 67) JCS (ARMY DCSOPS)

ACTION: JCS (ARMY DCSOPS)  
DISTR : OCOFSA, ACS1  
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PAGE 3

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ACTION  
FEB  
INFO  
TO /  
PDC

FROM: COMUSMACV

NR : 31998

281500Z SEP 67

Please correct page 2 para 4A lines 1 and 2 to read as follows:

A. Immediately deploy one Bde of the 1st Cav Div to I CTZ thus freeing a Marine regt for further employment north of Ai Van Pass.

Please correct page 2 para D lines 7, 8 and 9 to read as follows:

In addition to its organic battalions, the 173d will retain the 1/50 (Mech) and one bn of the 1st Cav.

GP-4

NOTE: CORRECTIONS UNDERLINED

31-5

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ACTION: JCS (ARMY DCSOPS)  
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SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL STATUS

1. Strength

a. As of 9 October 1967, the assigned deployable strength of the 101st (-) Division was 90% of authorized.

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>% Authorized</u>
Enlisted	9,463	8,580	91%
Officer*	714	607	85%
Warrant Officer*	154	133	86%
TOTAL	10,331	9,320	90%

\*Status as of 7 Oct 67

b. Replacement fill from USARSO and USAREUR will be completed by 22 October 1967; as of that date strength of the division will be at 95% of authorized.

c. Remainder of Division fill will be completed by 15 November 1967.

2. Officer. Of the assigned officer strength, 8 officers are presently undergoing civil affairs or signal training. These officers will join the unit in-country during December 1967.

3. Enlisted. As of 9 October 1967 the assigned NCO strength (personnel in grades E-5 through E-9) was 54% of authorized. With completion of the USAREUR and USARSO fill on 22 October 1967 the assigned strength of these personnel will be at 60%.

4. Non-Airborne Fill. Approximately 300 non-airborne personnel will be assigned to the Division. These personnel will consist of cooks, wiremen, helicopter repairmen and other technical specialists. All personnel assigned to combat maneuvers elements will be airborne qualified.

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TAB C



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Statement of Logistics Impact on  
Accelerated Deployment of the 101 Airborne Division

1. The accelerated deployment of the 101st Division can be supported logistically with very little impact.

2. Currently, the Division is short 43 mission essential lines of equipment. The Division will get OH-23's in lieu of OH-6's in-country. Three items will be sent direct from production for fill in-country. The telescope, M-84, will be filled from in-country assets. All other shortages will be issued to the Division prior to the 1 Dec ERD. (List of mission essential shortages attached).

3. MTOE actions are in process. Preliminary review reveals there will be very little impact and no equipment shortfalls of mission essential items.

Compass Magnetic Lenticular	1750	1750	27 Sep 67
Compass Magnetic, M-2	471	471	Nov Production *
Device Anti-Intrusion	515	515	11 Mar 68 In-country
Device Night Observation	51	51	29 Jul 68 In-country
Flarethrower F101	24	27	Avail - will be shipped
Launcher Grenade, 80mm, M-79	874	203	Shipped
Machine Gun M-60	209	45	Shipped
Mortar 81mm	75	19	Avail - Diverted from Marines
Radar Set, AN/TPQ-3	14	0	No longer short
Radio Set, AN/PRC-4	449	449	October production*
Radio Set, AN/PRC-7	449	449	October production*
Radio Set AN/PRC-23	449	174	Shipped
Radio Set AN/PRC-76	25	25	October production *

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MISSION ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES AS REPORTED BY  
THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION ON 4 OCTOBER 1967

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QTY</u> <u>AUTH</u>	<u>QTY</u> <u>SHORT</u>	<u>EDD</u> <u>STATUS</u>
Aiming Circle	56	7	22 October
Armament Subsystem SM-23	33	33	Delivered with Aircraft
Armament Subsystem XM-27EI	9	9	For OH-6A Unit Receiving OH-23
Armament Subsystem XM-21	13	13	Delivered with Aircraft
Armament Subsystem M-5	4	4	Delivered with Aircraft
Armament Subsystem SS-11	4	4	Not Being Sent to RVN
Binoculars Infrared	335	335	1 Oct 68 In-country
Compass Magnetic Lensatic	1750	267	27 Sep 67
Compass Magnetic M-2	471	96	Nov Production *
Device Anti-intrusion	516	516	31 Mar 68 In-country
Device Night Observation	51	51	29 Jul 68 In-country
Flamethrower PTBL	74	37	Avail - will be shipped
Launcher Grenade, 40mm, M-79	874	203	Shipped
Machine Gun M-60	309	45	Shipped
Mortar 81mm	75	19	Avail - Diverted from Marines
Radar Set, AN/PPS-5	14	0	No longer short
Radio Set, AN/PRT-4	448	448	October production*
Radio Set AN/PRR-9	448	448	October production*
Radio Set AN/PRC-25	601	124	Shipped
Radio Set AN/PRC-74	36	36	October production *

\* Add 15 days for delivery.

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	<u>QTY</u> <u>AUTH</u>	<u>QTY</u> <u>SHORT</u>	<u>EDD</u> <u>STATUS</u>
Radio Set AN/GRC-125 (1/4 Ton)	279	105	58 Shipped. Remainder 15 Nov.
Radio Set AN/GRC-125 (3/4 Ton)	28	2	In above assets
Radio Set AN/VRG-24 (1/4 Ton)	6	1	Shipped
Radio Console AN/ARC-122 (AN/ASC-10 Replaces this item)	12	12	AN/ASC-10's from Oct production
Radio Cont Set AN/GRA-39	219	6	Shipped
Radio Cont Set AN/GRA-74	39	39	Shipped
Radio TT Set AN/VSC-2	20	14	Shipped
Revolver Cal. 38	261	261	15 Dec 67 Expedite overhaul order to meet ERD
Telephone TA-312	1126	114	Shipped
Rifle M16A1	9765	1719	All new weapons to Division before 31 Oct
Telescope M-84	60	60	In-country issue
Truck Platform 1/2 Ton, M-274	256	27	12 Oct 67
Truck Utility 1/4 Ton M151	561	43	7-27 Sep 67 36 - 21 Oct 67
Truck Cargo 2 1/2 Ton	138	58	30 Nov 67
Truck Cargo 2 1/2 Ton w/WN	55	7	31 Oct 67
Truck Dump 2 1/2 Ton	21	2	28 Oct 67
Truck Tank Fuel 2 1/2 Ton	8	6	Redistribution from CONARC Assets
Truck Wrecker 3/4 Ton	3	3	31 Oct 67
Truck Wrecker 2 1/2 Ton M-60	8	4	5 Ton Avail for issue in lieu of

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NOMENCLATURE

	<u>QTY</u> <u>AUTH</u>	<u>QTY</u> <u>SHORT</u>	<u>EDD</u> <u>STATUS</u>
Trailer Water	65	30	Avail for issue
Helicopter Observation OH-6A **	25	19	Will get OH-23 In-country
Helicopter Utility UH-1B **	8	6	Aircraft Avail
Helicopter Utility UH-1D **	29	7	Aircraft Avail

\*\* Authorizations Less Armd Cav Trp

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TRAINING

1. (C) The 101st Airborne Division was in a C-1 training status prior to being warned for deployment to SVN. As the result of replacing approximately seven thousand non-deployables, USCONARC estimated that the division requires a minimum of eight weeks training prior to commitment to combat.

2. (C) The current deployment schedule is as follows:

<u>Element</u>	<u>Str</u>	<u>Mode</u>	<u>ETA SVN</u>
Hq Elem & 3d Bde TF	5059	Air	17 Dec 67
Remainder of Div	5286	Surface	27/28 Jan 68

3. (C) Deployment of the division on the above schedule allows time for completion of prescribed training in CONUS, except for the 3d Bde TF, which will complete 4 weeks in CONUS and its last 4 weeks in SVN. If the entire division was deployed by air to close SVN NLT 20 December, it would be necessary for the division (-) to complete its last four weeks of training in SVN.

4. (C) To ready the Div (-) for deployment by 1 Dec, unit training will terminate on 4 Nov 67. This will provide for only 4 weeks of training for the first task force and division support elements. The last brigade task force may be able to complete up to 5 weeks of training because of a later departure date. Training for maneuver units will be limited to squad and platoon level; artillery battalions will complete battery tests; the engineer battalions will complete small unit mission training; service support units will conduct TOE mission training. Following the Division's arrival in-country, a minimum of 4 weeks intensive training period devoted to advanced unit training would have to be provided prior to being committed to combat operations. This period would have to be exclusive of any administrative processing and base camp development activities.

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CGUSCONARC and CG101ST ABN DIV COMMENTS ON  
FEASIBILITY OF EARLY DEPLOYMENT

Assuming a decision date of 10 Oct, the Division can deploy with an ERD/PRD of 1 December 1967. It will have completed four weeks of training at that time and will require an additional four weeks of training after arrival in the gaining command. This training period must be exclusive of time required to establish a base camp facility after arrival in-country.

Foregoing is also predicated on the assumption that the Division will receive minimum essential equipment for training and the additional personnel and equipment required prior to operational commitment.

It is understood that MEE refers principally to 81MM mortars, GRC 125 Radios and M79 grenade launchers. 81 mortars and M79 shortages can be largely overcome by pooling although some degradation in training effectiveness will result.

Old model radios are present as substitutes until GRC 125s are available.

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TAB F

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Deployment of 101st Airborne Division (-) (U)

In response to your decision of 22 September 1967, the Army is proceeding to deploy a headquarters element and one brigade task force of the 101st Airborne Division (-) by air to close Vietnam by mid-December 1967.

Since your decision, General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp have expressed a desire to accelerate deployment of the remainder of the Division and close it in Vietnam by 20 December 1967. Their request is based upon the MACV 1968 campaign plan and the possibility of an extended moratorium on deployments around Christmas.

The current schedule calls for the Division to deploy as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>MODE</u>	<u>ETA SVN</u>
Hq Elem 101st Abn Div (-) and 3d Bde TF	5059	Air	17 Dec 67
Remainder of Division to include 2d Bde TF	5286	Surface	27-28 Jan 68

The Division (-) can be deployed by air to close Vietnam by 20 December 1967. This accelerated deployment would require the completion of four weeks of training in-country prior to commitment to combat. Additional transportation costs to the Army associated with this acceleration is about 10 million dollars. Further, support of the element in SVN over the CONUS cost for the same period is approximately 5.3 million dollars. The acceleration will not provide General Westmoreland an operational element earlier than now programmed; however, it will insure that the division is closed in SVN, in the event of an extended moratorium on deployments at Christmas.

It is recommended that you approve deployment of the Division (-) to Vietnam by air to close by 20 December 1967.

Request your decision on the above by 16 October 1967. This will allow 45 days for movement planning and relocation of dependents so that an orderly move of the Division can commence 1 December 1967.

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Tab 6

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COMPARATIVE COSTS

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CURRENT SCHEDULE

1. Hq Element 101st Abn Div (-) plus 3d Bde TF deploy by air with remainder of division (-) by surface.

Requirement

Air Move	Surface
5059 Pax	5286
5363.4 S/T	4641.8 S/T
	32,283.2 M/T
	5843 M/T Aircraft

AIR COSTS

<u>5363.4</u> S/T	=	298 sorties (10 Pax per sortie -
18 ST per C141		2980 Pax)

<u>2079</u> Pax	=	22 sorties
96 Pax per C141		

TOTAL 320

320 sorties X \$42,453 per sortie =	<u>\$13,584,960.00</u>
TOTAL AIR	\$13,584,960.00

SURFACE COSTS

Rail bulk Cargo Campbell to West Coast	
4641.8 S/T X 2000 lbs = <u>9,283,600</u>	
100	
92,836/100 lb units X \$5.72 =	\$ 531,021.92

Surface bulk Cargo West Coast to RVN	
32,283.2 MT X \$38 per M/T =	1,226,761.60

Helicopter Costs	
29 sorties Campbell to West Coast 29 X \$7,149 =	207,321.00
West Coast to RVN 5483 M/T X \$24.40 per M/T =	133,785.20

Personnel Campbell to West Coast	
2000 miles X .05 per mile X 5286 =	528,600.00

Personnel West Coast to RVN	
2 ships X \$14,000 per diem per day X 22 days =	<u>616,000.00</u>
TOTAL SURFACE	3,243,489.72
TOTAL AIR	<u>13,584,960.00</u>
	\$16,828,449.72

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ACCELERATED SCHEDULE

2. Move of entire Division (-) by air.

Requirement  
10,345 Pax  
10,005 S/T  
5,483 M/T Helicopters

Sorties Required

<u>10,005</u> S/T	=	556 sorties (10 Pax per sortie -
18 S/T per C141		5,560 Pax)
<u>4,785</u> Pax	=	50 sorties
96 Pax per C141		
Helicopters	=	<u>29</u> sorties
TOTAL		635 sorties

COSTS

635 sorties X \$42,453 per sortie = \$26,957,655.00

3. COST Difference

Air Costs	\$26,957,655.00
Air & Surface	<u>16,828,391.72</u>
	<u>\$10,129,205.28</u>

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TO RUEKDA/JCS  
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
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GP 4

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T O P S E C R E T

- REORIENTATION OF IN-COUNTRY FORCES (U)
- A. COMUSMACV 31998/281500Z SEP 67 NOTAL
- B. SAC 10085/282025Z SEP 67 NOTAL
- C. SAC 10088/282104Z SEP 67 NOTAL
- D. CINCPAC 012030Z JUN 67 NOTAL

1. REF A REVIEWS COMUSMACV'S OVERALL FALL-WINTER OBJECTIVES;  
SETS FORTH CHANGES NECESSITATED BY THE INTENSIFIED ENEMY SITUATION IN  
I CORPS AND PERMITTED BY THE PROSPECTIVE EARLY ARRIVAL OF THE 101ST  
DIV; AND RECOMMENDS CERTAIN ACTIONS WHICH WOULD ASSIST IN COPING

WITH THE SITUATION IN I CORPS AND CONCURRENTLY PERMIT OFFENSIVE  
OPERATIONS IN II, III AND IV CORPS. REF B DELINEATES SAC'S CAPABILITY  
TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM EFFORT STRIKES IN THE DMZ AREA. REF C DISCUSSES THE  
POSSIBILITIES OF USING 2000 POUND BOMBS FOR ARC LIGHT.

2. THE DETAILED PLAN DISCUSSED IN REF A REQUIRES ACCELERATED  
ARRIVAL OF THE 101ST DIV AND THE 11TH BDE AND RETENTION OF ELEMENTS  
OF 9TH MAB NOW IN-COUNTRY THROUGH THE SPRING OF 1968.

3. CONCUR IN DESIRABILITY OF ACCELERATING, TO DEGREE  
FEASIBLE CONSIDERING STATE OF UNIT TRAINING AND EQUIPAGE,  
THE ARRIVAL ALL MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE 101ST PRIOR TO 20  
DECEMBER 1967 AND ARRIVAL IN-COUNTRY OF THE 11TH BDE DURING  
DECEMBER 1967. BOTH UNITS SHOULD ARRIVE PRIOR TO ANY POS-

ACT...J3-8 (1-8)

- INFO...CJCS-1 (9) DJS-3 (10-12) SJCS-3 (13-15) J5-2 (16-17) DIA-2
- (18-19) CSA-1 (20) CNO-2 (21-22) CSAF-1 (23) CMC-3 (24-26)
- SACSA-3 (27-29) FILE-1(30)ONO/DC

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SIBLE HOLIDAY MORATORIUM ON FORCE DEPLOYMENTS.

4. CINCPAC IS REEVALUATING THE STATUS OF THE 9TH MAB TO INCLUDE CONTINUED RETENTION OF DEPLOYED ELEMENTS.

5. AN INCREASE TO 1200 ARC LIGHT SORTIES WAS RECOMMENDED BY REFERENCE D ON 1 JUNE 1967. APPROVAL OF THIS PROPOSAL HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THIS INCREASE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. APPROVAL FOR OVERFLIGHT OF LAOS WOULD REDUCE THE FLYING TIME PER SORTIE FROM U-TAPAO AND, IN LONGER TERM, WOULD IMPROVE THE SORTIE RATE CAPABILITY AND TACTICS AND AXES FOR ATTACK IN DMZ AREA. AN INQUIRY TO AMB SULLIVAN REGARDING CURRENT POLITICAL FEASIBILITY HAS BEEN INITIATED BY CINCPAC.

6. CONCUR IN THE DESIRABILITY OF INVESTIGATING THE CAPABILITY OF USING 2000 POUND AND LARGER BOMBS IN B-52'S. RECOGNIZE THERE ARE LOAD LIMITATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH USE OF THESE WEAPONS AND THAT CERTAIN AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS MAY BE REQUIRED. RECOMMEND DETERMINE AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE LARGE BOMB LOADS WHICH COULD BE MADE POSSIBLE BY MODIFICATION. IF DETERMINED FEASIBLE AND ADVANTAGEOUS, LARGE BOMB PRODUCTION SHOULD BE INCREASED AND A AIRCRAFT MODIFICATION INITIATED.

7. ACTIONS HAVE BEEN INITIATED TO IDENTIFY AND CORRECT ANY MK-36 PROBLEMS WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIED AND TO INSURE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE DMZ AREA.

8. SEA DRAGON FORCES HAVE BEEN DIVERTED AND MADE AVAILABLE TO COMUSMACV FOR USE IN THE DMZ AREA.

9. CONCUR IN DESIRABILITY OF OBTAINING INCREASE IN FREE WORLD FORCES, APPROVAL OF RECOMMENDED INCREASES IN RVNAF AND ISSUE OF M-16'S TO ARVN UNITS AS RECOMMENDED.

10. THE LONG RANGE NATURE OF R&D IN THE FIELD OF TARGET ACQUISITION OF CONCEALED ARTILLERY PIECES IS RECOGNIZED. CONCUR THAT INTENSIFICATION OF THIS EFFORT IS NEEDED.

11. OF THE RESOURCES THAT CAN BE BROUGHT MOST IMMEDIATELY TO BEAR IN THE DMZ, EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON INCREASING EMPLOYMENT OF B-52 ARC LIGHT SORTIES AND TACTICAL AIR AS FEASIBLE. THE DMZ AREA ALREADY HAS BEEN ACCORDED PRIORITY FOR BOTH. LIMITATIONS ON TARGET ACQUISITION AND

SORTIE RATE, DUE TO WEATHER, PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF TACTICAL AIR, MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. SUCH ADDITIONAL FORCES AS CAN BE GAINFULLY EMPLOYED IN THIS AREA WILL BE ASSIGNED.

GP-4.

BT

NNNN

ADV TO NMCC

REF A IS 14370 REF B,C, NOT IDENT REF D IS 48725

2 OF 2

19184

NOTE: A IS DA IN 376465 (28 SEP 67) JCS (ARMY DCSOPS)  
B IS DA IN 376006 (28 SEP 67)  
C IS DA IN 375971 (28 SEP 67) JCS (ARMY DCSOPS)  
D IS DA IN 216547 (1 JUN 67) JCS (ARMY DCSOPS)

ACTION: JCS (ARMY DCSOPS)

DISTR: OCOFSA

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COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

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GROUP-4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

FROM: COMUSMACV  
TO : CINCPAC  
INFO: CJCS  
NR : 3049

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FROM MACCOC

FROM GEN WESTMORELAND TO ADM SHARP, INFO GEN JOHNSON

Subj: Force Deployments

Ref : COMUSMACV DTG 281500Z Sep (TS)

1. (TS) Reference outlined my projected plans for deployment of forces during the Northeast Monsoon season. As the first step in this plan, the D Bde of the 1st Cav deployed to Chu Lai on 2-4 Oct and commenced operations in Quang Tin/Quang Nam Provinces as a part of the Americal Division. This freed the 1st Marines (-) for movement to Dong Ha where, together with one SLF, other elements of D Marine Div and ARVN forces, they will commence operations o/a 9 Oct against base area 101.

2. (TS) All indications since 1 Oct point to an enemy withdrawal from the Con Thien area, across the Ben Hai and possibly beyond the flood plain to the North of the Ben Hai. Over the past twelve days, there has also been a marked reduction in enemy indirect fire on Marine positions in Quang Tri.

3. (TS) The significant change in the situation along the DMZ, coupled with the continuing existence of enemy activity in Phu Yen and Binh Dinh Provinces, has led to my decision to hold in abeyance any further reinforcement of I CTZ in the immediate future. However, I retain the capability of doing so on very short notice, if required.

4. (TS) My current plan calls for the retention of the

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NR: 3049

173d Bde in Phu Yen for an indefinite period to continue combined operations with the 47th ARVN Regt and elements of the 9th ROKA Div. I will replace the bn of the 173d Bde in Kontum with a bn of the 25th Inf Div o/a 12 Oct. The relieved bn will join its parent Bde in Phu Yen thus freeing the 2/8 Cav to rejoin its Bde in Binh Dinh.

5. (TS) The 1st Cav (-) will continue to operate in Binh Dinh, but will be prepared to reinforce III MAF with another Bde and the Div HQ, if the situation in the north requires it.

6. (TS) I am going ahead with plans to shift the base camp of the 173d Bde to An Khe during Oct. Also the 2/11 ACR, which has been relieved by the 1/1 ACR in Chu Lai will return to III CTZ by 1 Nov, to be reequipped and prepared for operations in Dec in that area.

7. (TS) Although the 198th Bde will arrive in Chu Lai o/a 24 Oct I have been advised by GEN Johnson that it will require one month of additional training prior to becoming fully operational. Therefore, I do not intend to move the 1st Bde of the 101st until at least 20 Nov. This Bde is prepared to move to Binh Thuan to conduct operations PHOENIX along routes 1 and 20, and against MR-10 in Dec.

8. (TS) I am continuing with plans to commence offensive operations in III CTZ in Dec (War Zone C) and Jan (War Zone C and 5th VC Div). After arrival of the 101st Div (-) in Dec/Jan, and the completion of required in-country training, operations against War Zone D and MR-10 is planned.

9. (TS) In summary, the changing situation along the DMZ has caused me to withhold execution of further reinforcement of III MAF, and to proceed with plans to conduct required operations in the populated and base areas of II, and III CTZ. At the same time, I retain full flexibility to resume reinforcement of III MAF.

Gp-4

NOTE: REF 281500Z IS DA IN 376465 (28 SEP 67) JCS(ARMY DCSOPS)

ACTION: OSD (ARMY DCSOPS)  
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