

ORAL HISTORY
Lieutenant General John H. Cushman
US Army, Retired

VOLUME FOUR

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Preface

I began this Oral History with an interview in January 2009 at the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA. Subsequent interviews have taken place at the Knollwood Military Retirement Residence in Washington, DC.

The interviewer has been historian Robert Mages. Until March 2011 Mr. Mages was assigned to the Military History Institute. He has continued the project while assigned to the Center of Military History, Fort McNair, DC.

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For my own distribution in November 2012 I had Chapters 1 through 7 (Volume One) printed. In February 2013 I had Chapters 8 through 13 (Volume Two) printed. In March 2013 I had Chapters 14 through 17 (Volume Three) printed. This is Volume Four.

John H. Cushman

Chapter Eighteen

Commanding Fort Devens, Massachusetts

INTERVIEWER: How did you happen to be assigned to command Fort Devens?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: It was a stroke of very good luck. While I was commanding the 2d Brigade of the 101st, my wife Nancy was with our family living in Lexington, MA. In May 1968, the month before I relinquished command, she wrote me that she had broken her hip while ice skating. She had first been taken to the dispensary at Hanscom Air Force Base nearby and then to the station hospital at Fort Devens for hip surgery. Some weeks later I learned from my brother-in-law that there had been difficulties. I decided to request compassionate leave so that I could be with her.

I arrived home in early July, 1968. Nancy's situation was such that I decided that I must arrange that, rather than returning to Vietnam, I be at least temporarily stationed in the Boston area. I went down to the Pentagon to try to arrange that. I was standing in the Pentagon's river entrance talking with a friend when someone walked up and said, "Congratulations, Jack." When I said, "Why?" he told me that my name was on the new brigadier generals list. I went down to the general officer branch's hallway bulletin board and sure enough he was right. That was how I found out that I was going to be a brigadier general.¹

I then called the colonels assignment office to make my request. They told me that my records were now with the general officer branch. I called that office and explained my predicament to an assignment officer. I told him of my wish to be temporarily assigned in the Boston area. The first thing he said to me was, "How would you like to command Fort Devens?" That very morning the officer slated to take that command had been diverted to another assignment. The position was available to me if I wanted it. Of course I said Yes. That was how I came to be assigned to command Fort Devens, one of the luckiest things to ever happen to me.

INTERVIEWER: When did you assume command?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: After my orders were published I got in touch by telephone with the headquarters at Fort Devens. I let them know that I would remain on leave in Lexington for a couple of weeks before reporting. I arranged for my household goods to be moved from Lexington and for my family's move into quarters. I learned that the former commanding general had already departed and that Colonel Hugh Queenin was the acting post commander. I set August 1 for my assumption of command.

¹During the May 1968 encirclement by the 2d Brigade at Phuoc Yen (Chapter 17, page 17-23), I was joined on the ground by General Bill Rosson, then Deputy COMUSMACV. I have been told that General Rosson then went to the headquarters of the 101st Airborne Division and told General Barsanti to write an efficiency report on me that would make me a brigadier general. That report would be top in the file reviewed by the selection board.

While I was on leave I was surprised to see a headline in the Boston Globe, “Hunger Strike at Fort Devens.” As part of the mobilization of Reserve and National Guard units following the Vietnam Tet offensive and the North Korea Pueblo crisis,² the 107th Signal Company of the Rhode Island National Guard, home station Providence, had been called to active duty. It had been stationed at Fort Devens. Its enlisted men had called the hunger strike because authorities at Fort Devens had ruled that the urgency of their training was such that its men could not go home on weekends, 75 miles away. Fort Devens soon relented and the strike ended.³

A couple of weeks later, in a formation in front of post headquarters, Colonel Queenin and I went through a ceremony for the change of command. Hugh Queenin, six years older than I, was a senior colonel. Wearing colonel’s insignia, I was not to put on my brigadier general’s rank until November.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me about Fort Devens.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I could not have had a job I liked better or a job for which I was better suited at the time. In 1965-67 I had been director of installation supply and then chief of staff at Fort Campbell. That experience was fresh in my mind as I went to work.

Forty miles west of Boston on US Route 2, Fort Devens had begun in 1917 as Camp Devens, a temporary cantonment built on farmland taken from in the townships of Ayer, Shirley, Harvard and Lancaster. By the end of the 1930s it had become a permanent post with the necessary barracks, workshops, family quarters, and headquarters buildings. In 1968 its permanent structures and road network were well developed al-though cantonment buildings remained. Its reservation was a rectangle of 10,000 acres, the one-sixth of it to the north of Route 2 comprising its built-up area. It had an airfield. Fort Devens was New England’s only Army post. With the Nashua River running through it, it was a lovely place.

About half of Fort Devens’ 10,000 soldiers belonged to a tenant organization, the Army Security Agency School. That school trained specialists in electronic intelligence and electronic warfare. We had other tenant organizations, among them a military intelligence group. Under my command were an Army garrison, a general support group, a supply and service battalion, an engineer combat battalion, a station hospital and a host of sup-

² In January 1968, the USS Pueblo, a Navy electronics monitoring ship operating in waters near North Korea, had been boarded and seized by the North Korean military.

³ The 1968 National Guard and Army Reserve callup was the first of the Vietnam war. It had been planned in the utmost secrecy. It seems that the 107th Signal Company’s mission had recently been changed from tactical communications to long lines communications and the people preparing the callup plans might not have known that. In any event its proper equipment was lacking, on order. Its soldiers did not understand why they must remain on post for weekend “training” when there was no equipment for them to train on. The episode was a source of anguish, not to say mortification, to the Adjutant General of Rhode Island.

ply, maintenance, and other activities which also supported Army National Guard and Army Reserve armories, as well as Nike air defense missile sites, in New England. In late 1968, the 10th Special Forces Group, minus its 1st Battalion, was transferred to Fort Devens. Its 1st Battalion remained in Bad Tölz, Germany. I saw my job as threefold: troop commander, installation commander, and representative of the United States Army in the nearby region.

INTERVIEWER: What was your first impression on assuming command?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Although I had reasonably good people, both military and civilian, I could see that there was considerable room for improvement in virtually every aspect of unit and installation management. For one thing, Fort Devens' troop units were experiencing severe turbulence as personnel were assigned upon their return from Vietnam and others were being shipped out as individuals. The general condition of these units left much to be desired.

Fort Devens was located on a fault line of public sentiment about the Vietnam war. To our east were the towns of Harvard and Concord with their Thoreau-like heritage of civil disobedience. To our west were the blue-collar towns like Fitchburg with their veterans organizations and policemen's benevolent associations. Anti-war sentiment had grown since Tet of early 1968. Within 40 miles we had 250,000 college students and nineteen chapters of the Students for a Democratic Society. My duty performance would have to take this into consideration.

INTERVIEWER: What was the first problem situation that you encountered?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: That would be the post stockade. It was our local confinement facility or jail. Operated under the Fort Devens provost marshal and by his military police company, it housed prisoners from all over New England, men who had been convicted of offenses such as absent without leave, but not of the most serious offenses such as murder.

In my first week I learned of an incident in which a military policeman guarding a prisoner had accidentally discharged his weapon. No one was injured, but as I looked into the matter I learned that some serious things were wrong in the stockade.

Remembering my experience as chief of staff at Fort Campbell,⁴ I applied Operation Excellence to the problem. The Objective was Straighten out the Stockade. I assembled around a conference table those people who were either responsible for the stockade or who had an interest in it -- the G-1, the provost marshal, the MP company commander, the senior stockade NCO, the headquarters battalion commander, the food service warrant officer, the post engineer, etc. We began to describe to ourselves an accurate and

⁴ See Chapter 16, page 16-7.

complete picture of the situation. When satisfied that we understood it in detail, we listed the actions to be taken, who was responsible for each action and target dates for accomplishment. With a shared understanding of what must be done, all of us went to work. That, along or with monitored follow-up and scheduled progress review, was the secret of problem solving using Operation Excellence.

I soon decided on about eight command objectives. I began meetings on them, one at a time. Operation Excellence was perhaps the centerpiece of my tour at Fort Campbell.

INTERVIEWER: When did you get interested in the Nashua River?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: My first week I learned of an evening meeting in the high school auditorium in nearby Groton. It was a meeting of the Nashua River Cleanup Committee. I went to it.

The Nashua River originates in New Hampshire, flows south through Fitchburg, MA, enters western Fort Devens exiting from the east, flows north to join the Merrimack in New Hampshire, whence it goes out to sea from Massachusetts. In 1968 it was listed as one of the ten most polluted rivers in America. As it entered Fort Devens it had received the discharge from paper mills upstream. When in late spring and summer it went down, on its sandbars were sheets of carboard-like effluent that when dried could be picked up.

A group of activists from our region, led by a Groton resident named Marion Stoddard, had recently formed the Nashua River Cleanup Committee. The purpose of this meeting was to launch the Nashua River Watershed Association, with a mission to get the river cleaned up. Marion circulated a petition to President Lyndon Johnson asking for federal help, including money. Representing Fort Devens and its population, I signed it.

I provided Marion Stoddard a WWII cantonment building for an office with desks and a telephone on the Fort Devens switchboard. From Fort Devens' ample supply of spare people with little to do, I detailed to her a lieutenant and sergeant. I then proceeded to work hand in glove with Marion to clean up the Nashua River.⁵

INTERVIEWER: What was your most significant Operation Excellence objective?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Probably personnel accounting. Personnel accounting was suffering Army-wide from the turbulent effects of the Vietnam war. The difference between what the Army's Finance Center and the Adjutant General carried as the strength of the

⁵ In 2009 I was invited to the 40th Anniversary Celebration of the Nashua River Watershed Association in Fitchburg, MA. From its program: "General John Cushman's efforts at restoring the polluted Nashua River began in 1969 (sic) when he contacted Marion Stoddard offering help in her project... A special award, the first of its kind to be presented to a military installation, was presented in 1972 to Fort Devens by the Environmental Protection Agency in recognition of the service provided to the community..."

Army was then about 30,000, the size of the monthly draft call. Fort Devens' situation was deplorable.

In October I assembled all my commanders and their personnel people in a theater. With the help of Staff Sergeant Michael Lopez, Fort Devens' PSNCO (Personnel Staff Non-commissioned Officer), I had prepared a presentation. Sergeant Lopez later mailed me the text that he had recorded and transcribed. This is its first page.

*Recorded by
SSG Lopez, my
Post "PSNCO", who
to my surprise presented
this to me later.*

Conference held by Colonel Cushman
Theater No. 2
9 October 1968

Spoken from the heart.

COLONEL CUSHMAN: Gentlemen, this is a conference, commanders conference of personnel administration, but it's much more than that. It's a conference on the most important single problem that I face as commander here at Fort Devens. I ^{have} gathered all of you together -- commanders, staff officers, leaders, and individuals working in the personnel field -- so that I could convey to you directly and personally my own deep personal conviction on this matter. I want everyone in my command and working here at Fort Devens to understand that I feel very profoundly on the subject that I am about to discuss with you today. ✓

I want to convey to each of you the importance of the individual and that every man deserves to be treated as an individual. I want each of you leaders and those of you in the personnel field to know that here at Fort Devens we treat every man as the world's most important person because to himself that

is what he is, and the program that I am going to describe to you today is designed to do that. I'd like to share with you one lesson that I have learned in a good many years of service in the Army, and that is that to establish objectives and to state principles is only part of the work of getting things done. In fact, it's the easiest part. Things do not get done unless we master the paper work, unless we become masters of the detail involved, unless we get our hands into the problem up to our elbows, learn the procedures. Then, and only then, can we accomplish the objectives that we seek. Now, these objectives may seem somewhat idealistic or humanitarian or moral as I state them, but I assure you they are not only that, but they are objectives which will increase beyond our present ability to understand or conceive the efficiency of Fort Devens by establishing a climate of willing participation in the work of this Post by all personnel assigned here.

Sergeant Lopez had built for me a life-sized figure, cut and painted to resemble a soldier. He had prepared labels with Name, Rank, Service Number, Primary MOS, Secondary MOS, Duty MOS, and all the other items that were to be taken into account in personnel actions.

With that figure beside me on the stage, and placing the labels on it as I spoke, I went through the several forms that must be accurately completed, with compatible entries, in order for the personnel management system to function with efficiency. Telling my audience that job satisfaction was key to the soldier's morale and well being, I said that we must place each soldier in a duty slot that matched his primary or secondary MOS. If that was not possible we must put him in a suitable and useful slot and train him, possibly for a secondary MOS. I ended my pitch by placing a smiling face on the figure beside me and made once more the point, treat each soldier as an individual. My final words were, "Now, let's go out and do it." Which we did.

In every orderly room were a Personnel Data Card File (a PDC holds key data on every soldier) and, behind the 1st Sergeant's desk, an Organization Chart with each filled slot bearing a soldier's name, rank, and status. To complete the trio of essential orderly room tools, our Objective, Bring Personnel Administration to a High Standard, said, "Publish a DevReg on the Morning Report."

I wrote that Fort Devens regulation myself (In 1940 I was the company clerk in the 13th

Infantry's antitank company), incorporating the essential details of the Army regulation. I distributed the DevReg to commanders to company level, with instructions to become familiar with it. I called a meeting the commanders directly under me, the Big Seven, which I opened by passing out a short test on the DevReg. Colonel Vernon Greene, commanding the 10th Special Forces Group, threw down his pencil. He said, "It's not my job to know this stuff." I said, "Yes, it is," and meant it.

In this and other ways I insured that the chain of command was involved in achieving a high standard in personnel administration, and in other Operation Excellence objectives germane to them.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me more about your management style.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: It developed as I went along. As a troop commander I was concerned with one set of issues. As installation commander I had another set. As representative of the United States Army I had a third set. Each day usually brought challenges from all three. I was energetic, I was organized, I was into everything, and I did not want to waste time. My people knew it.

My office was on the second floor of the 1930s post headquarters. At first my chief of staff was next door. After a couple of months I double-hatted him as Deputy Post Commander and moved him to an office at the other end of the floor, alongside our conference room. Keeping me informed, he took care of ordinary business. For example, he handled the details of our support of the Nashua River Watershed Association.

I had a very good Comptroller, LTC Bob Fisher, whom I moved next door to be my honcho on Operation Excellence. He left most financial management and budgetary matters in the hands of his competent civilian deputy. Bob had with him a lieutenant who kept progress charts on each objective. A green dot meant that progress was OK, yellow meant that the effort was in trouble, and red meant it was behind. Bob's office became our Management Information Center.

In Operation Excellence I dealt directly with the program directors for each objective, with my G-1 for Objectives in his field, my G-4 for Objectives in his, and so on. When called for, a program director established secondary objectives. For example, if one step for attainment of "Straighten up the installation supply activity" were "Conduct an inventory," the program director might have a secondary objective, "Arrange temporary augmentation."

By a couple of months after the 1st of November 1968, when I was actually promoted to brigadier general, my operating style had pretty much matured.

INTERVIEWER: How did you communicate?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Largely in writing. As 1969 opened I put myself on orders as the Command Information Officer. I began a series of weekly Commanders Columns in the post newspaper. Here are the first paragraphs of one such...

This week I would like to talk about interdependence - or how all of us depend on each other to get the job done.

A couple of Mondays ago I was on my way to Command Reveille. It was raining hard and I saw a soldier walking along with a civilian type raincoat pulled over his head. So I gave him a ride.

I asked the soldier about himself - his unit, his MOS, his ETS, whether he was married, etc. Then I asked him where his Army issue raincoat was. He replied that he didn't have one. He had been at Fort Devens since January, so I asked him why he hadn't gotten a raincoat yet. He said that he had "been so busy" that he didn't have time.

Now that's really not a very good excuse, because it doesn't take very long to get a raincoat.

I asked myself - "Who is responsible for this soldier not having a raincoat?"

The soldier is responsible in part, but he is not entirely responsible. Soldiers can't be expected to do everything for themselves. The Army has to function to (1) require soldiers to do what's right, and (2) make it possible for them to do it.

In the final analysis, I am responsible. It is my job as Commanding General to get that soldier a raincoat so he doesn't get wet going to work. I accept that responsibility and I take it very seriously.

The remainder of the column went on to say that Fort Devens' supply operation and each unit's chain of command down to the squad and section, and the soldier himself, had to do their jobs right for that man to have a raincoat.

I instituted the weekly award of Grand Job Pennants to deserving individuals who had come to my attention. The Fort Devens maintenance shop crafted six small brass flagpoles mounted on pedestals with pennants at the top. I presented the pennants in the individuals' work place to be displayed there, and presented at the same time a certificate. A few days later my aide would come by to pick up the pennant for reissue the next week.

I gave direction orally as I moved around and at briefings. We worked out each Operation Excellence statement around a conference table and then issued in writing the agreed Objective, Current Situation, Steps to be Taken and the Responsible Authorities, How Progress is Measured, and Target Dates for steps to be completed.

INTERVIEWER: How did your people respond to Operational Excellence?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Some didn't get it at first. It seemed laborious, too much paperwork. They would rather get on with the job. For each objective we set up a time for a progress review, usually after three months. They got the idea when it began to achieve results.

One day I was in the office of the PMS&T at Harvard University's ROTC detachment. I dialed the local telephone number that would connect me to the Fort Devens switchboard. I found myself listening to a conversation. It was between the director of the Fort Devens installation supply activity, let's call him Charlie, and an off-post customer, let's call him Joe.

Charlie was telling Joe to come in and pick up the typewriters that had been waiting for him on the loading dock. Joe was telling Charlie not to get excited; he would pick them up directly. Charlie said something like, "If you don't pick them up right away, my general will see them." Joe said, "You don't have a general like that." To which Charlie replied, "Yes, I do."

It wasn't fair to Charlie that I went down the next day to the loading dock, saw the typewriters, and asked Charlie about them. I never told Charlie that I had overheard his conversation.

In May 1969 I got word that General Westmoreland, the Army Chief of Staff, was coming to Fort Devens. I decided to take him to our management indications center. Bob Fisher would brief him on Operation Excellence. Rather than tell him about our successes, Bob would describe how we were using it to deal with a, so far, intractable situation in our Headquarters Command.

As one step in achieving our Objective, Bring Personnel Administration to a High Standard, we had set up a Personnel Administration Inspection Team that was visiting every company size unit. The captain chief of the PAIT would brief General Westmoreland.

A week after his visit I got a complimentary letter from General Westmoreland. It included a copy of the letter he had written General Woolnough, commander of the Continental Army Command, suggesting that CONARC consider adopting Operation Excellence and the PAIT.

INTERVIEWER: 1968 and 1969 were turbulent years.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: The 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago showed that. Less violent equivalents were all around us. Fort Devens was an island in a turbulent sea whose waves were beating on us. For example, In April 1969 Harvard students took over the administration building and the police had to be called in. It was like being in a different kind of combat situation. I decided that the overriding thing that I had to do was to make Fort Devens a model installation and a recognized good neighbor

My internal audience was the troops and civilian employees at Fort Campbell and their families. In my first column in the post newspaper I named the “three guideposts for all of us as we do our jobs at Fort Devens.” In capital letters, they were WIPE OUT INEFFICIENCY, TREAT PEOPLE AS INDIVIDUALS, and MAKE GOOD USE OF PEOPLE’S TIME. I pressed on with these while paying attention to the world beyond. I came to believe that as time went on the reputation of Fort Devens as a well-run installation spread into nearby communities and the eastern Massachusetts region

My external audience was primarily eastern Massachusetts but really all of New England. It was always on my mind. The Nashua River Watershed Association was a start. National Guard units with armories nearby regularly trained at Fort Devens on weekends. I established a warm relationship with Major General Ambrose, Adjutant General of Massachusetts, who also happened to be on the Board of Overseers of Harvard University.

INTERVIEWER: How did you address that external audience?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I accepted all invitations to speak. The first was from the office of Speaker John McCormack of the US House of Representatives, to speak at the dedication of Kelly Square in Dorchester in September 1968. Danny Kelly had been a soldier in the 1st Cavalry Division when killed in action in April 1968. I gave a rather large crowd what I thought was a good explanation for his sacrifice. Speaker McCormack sent me a handwritten note of thanks (which I have unfortunately lost).

I reached out to the officials of neighboring towns and came to know their mayors and selectmen. I occasionally attended town meetings at which matters of governance were discussed and voted on. In casual civilian dress I visited the campuses at Harvard and MIT to sample the scene. I picked up copies of the Ole Mole, an underground newspaper (“free to GIs”). Its editors were apparently reading my columns. In one, explaining that saluting was a sign of good morale, I had said that saluting on post needed improvement, The Ole Mole’s headline: “Morale Poor At Fort Devens.”

That taught me a lesson: Anything can affect Fort Devens’ reputation. One day I spotted a sign at a company in the 10th Special Forces Group. It read, “Killing is Our Business and Business Is Good.” I told the 10th SFG commander that I understood what the com-

pany commander was after but, in the interest of public relations, to have him find a better slogan.

Dissent was in the air and active. Young people, both enlisted and officer, were susceptible. I wanted to be sure that; if any of its undesirable ideas penetrated Fort Devens, they would not thrive. After a conversation with an articulate young captain who seemed both straight and with it, I set up a desk for him in the office of my post command sergeant major. I told that captain that he would be my ombudsman. He and the command sergeant major would together be my trusted intermediaries charged with bringing to my attention incipient problems, whether individual or systemic, and with suggesting solutions. I wanted my finger on the pulse of the command.

INTERVIEWER: What about your internal audience?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: To get things done, both in troop units and in the installation, I relied on my written and oral direction and follow-up. From time to time my direction spelled out my philosophy. To reach my people en masse, beginning in March 1969 I wrote my Commander's Column in the Fort Devens Dispatch, distributed every Friday. I took considerable pains with these columns. On rereading the 20 or so that I still have, I think that beating the drum consistently, plus making good on my intentions, might have had a degree of influence on the people of Fort Devens.

My consistent theme was that at Fort Devens we insist that soldiers conduct themselves as good soldiers, meeting their responsibilities for proper performance of duty and soldierly conduct. At the same time, we insist that the administrative machinery deal separately, fairly, and efficiently with each man so that when he gets up in the morning he is satisfied with himself and his situation.

It was a time of racial unrest in society and Fort Devens was not immune. I had a conversation with an intelligent and articulate young African-American SP4. He struck me as a good man, with Black Panther leanings that could be dangerous to good order and discipline. In a discussion in my office he told me this story: "General," he said. "Out in New Mexico there is an Indian reservation run by the United States government. They have a grade school where they teach Indian students American history. In that grade school, they teach those kids that Columbus discovered America."

I made room in the command sergeant major's office for that SP4. He would be a way for me to hear about incipient racial problems, whether individual or systemic.

INTERVIEWER: General Seaman, First Army Commander, recommended that you be awarded a Distinguished Service Medal for your time at Fort Devens. The writeup mentioned your work with computers. Tell me about that.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: At Fort Campbell I had become familiar with computers in installation management. After arriving at Fort Devens I signed up for a one-week orientation on computers offered by IBM at Endicott, NY. There I heard about the new IBM 360. When I heard that First Army installations would receive IBM 360s and that Fort Devens was at the bottom of the list, I offered to pay for one out of our budget believing that I could do so with the money we saved. So Fort Devens got an IBM 360 right away. We had a very good computer programmer in the Comptroller's office. The first thing he got busy on was personnel management.

Every month a personnel accounting spreadsheet for each company-sized unit at Fort Devens came down from First Army. We sent it to the company first sergeant and company commander to correct according to the company's data. We would then send back the corrections to First Army. This system was not producing reliable data. I don't remember exactly what we did about it, but with the IBM 360 our Comptroller's office came up with a Fort Devens peculiar software program that resulted in reconciled information at every level all the way to the Army adjutant general. We did the same thing with the installation supply activity. When I left Fort Devens our computer operations were really humming.⁶

I would like to tell you a few stories, some vignettes to give you a flavor of my time in command.

INTERVIEWER: Go ahead.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I will call the first one Sanctuary. The commander of the U.S. Navy's First Naval District was Rear Admiral (upper half) Joseph Wylie, USNA 1932, a crusty sea dog. He, along with the commander at Hanscom Air Force Base, the commander of the First Coast Guard District, and I made up a committee through which from time to time we could coordinate our actions. I valued Admiral Wylie's wisdom.

In those days an AWOL soldier would occasionally be given "sanctuary" by a church congregation whose members opposed the Vietnam War. In the fall of 1969 one such soldier sought sanctuary in the student union of Boston's Brandeis University. Students harbored him and pledged to resist any arrest effort.

I asked Admiral Wylie's advice. He said, "Just leave him alone," which we did. Thanksgiving came and went. The students had a problem. Who would protect the soldier during the Christmas holidays? Their solution: persuade him to "give himself up under protest."

⁶ Toward the end of my tour I happened to visit the Pentagon where Bill Depuy, a general, was the assistant to the Army Vice Chief of Staff. In his office I told him about Fort Devens' computers. He said to me, "We're tired of you installation commanders inventing your own computer programs. We're going to standardize them." I told him that was OK by me as long as our programs were the ones adopted. To my disappointment I learned later, while commanding Fort Campbell, KY, that that was not to be.

A few days before Christmas, cars of students escorted the AWOL soldier to Fort Devens' gate. They were met by our provost marshal, a decorated Vietnam veteran. He received the soldier and placed him in confinement.

A Chore for the White House. In April 1969 I received a telephone call from Colonel Alexander Haig, the assistant to former Harvard professor Henry Kissinger who had been named national security advisor to the newly inaugurated President Nixon. I had known Al Haig in the Pentagon in the early '60s.

Al Haig said something like this: "Jack, Henry is concerned that the student riots at Harvard University (JHC note: in which students had seized the office of Harvard's president and scattered his papers) may spread to his (Henry's) office in a building on the campus. He is asking that you arrange to pick up some boxes of his papers and take them to Fort Devens for safekeeping. His secretary has them ready and is waiting for your call."

My aide and another captain, wearing jeans, rented a truck and accomplished the mission.

JUMPS. One day the Chief of Staff brought me a paper to sign. It was a report of Fort Devens' test of the Joint Uniform Military Payment System. JUMPS was a new Department of Defense system for paying the troops. The report was that that Fort Devens had tested the system, had found it satisfactory, and recommended its adoption. I had not known that we were testing the new system. I asked, "Show me how JUMPS handled my pay." The answer, "Sir, we didn't trust the system to handle your pay. We did that by hand."

That forced me to make a detailed analysis of JUMPS and our test before signing the paper.

At the Massachusetts Legislature. In the Journal of the House of the General Court of Massachusetts for April 2, 1969, is this: "During consideration of the orders of the day, the speaker declared a recess, there being no objection; and introduced Brigadier General John H Cushman, Commanding General of Fort Devens, Massachusetts. General Cushman then addressed the house at length."

Speaking in neighboring communities I had come to know a number of Massachusetts legislators. I had mentioned to one or more my willingness to address the legislature, to tell its members about Fort Devens and my command approach. I don't remember who arranged it for me but I still have that speech. Among other things I told them:

"We are a post of some 10,000 acres, 10,000 troops, 5000 wives and children, most of them living on post, 2000 civilian employees, and an annual budget of \$25 million -- \$75 million including military pay, and \$20 million of new construction now underway."

“At length” tells me that I might well have spoken much too long.

Boston Army Base. One day in 1969 we heard from First Army that Fort Devens would take over Boston Army Base in South Boston. Not only that, we were told that our annual budget would not be increased. I don’t remember how many employees were down there, perhaps 100, or what its annual budget was, perhaps \$5 million.

That we did so efficiently without additional funds was to me a lesson on how to save government money and that a way to do what’s necessary with less can usually be found.

Harvard Business School. Fancying myself as a good manager who could learn, I went to the Harvard Business School and asked if I could audit its MBA graduate course. They had not done that before but said Yes. I sat in on a few classes and attended a lecture or two.

An Adjutant General Corps major was there studying for his MBA. I invited him to visit Fort Devens to see our approach to management and he did. I suggested that as his thesis he describe and evaluate my management methods, including Operation Excellence. I asked that, doing so, he gather from my subordinate commanders their views on my methods and, without identifying anyone, offer me that critique. He did all of this. I remember that I found it valuable, but do not remember his findings.

The Business School was running a highly regarded Advanced Management Program for experienced business leaders from the United States and overseas. There were 150 students per class. A couple of them were Army officers of about my rank. Many students were far from home, with nothing to do on Sunday. I offered the class bus transportation to and from Fort Devens for a Sunday excursion. A busload of them accepted.

The schedule began with a midmorning breakfast at our Officers Club, which we asked them to pay for. We followed that with a briefing and discussion of our management methods. At about noon we invited those who, having been alerted, had brought their golf clubs to form threesomes or foursomes and play, shotgun start, 18 holes on Fort Devens’ golf course. Non-golfers were invited you to either play tennis or observe whatever training was taking place that Sunday for National Guard units. We met again for refreshments and a discussion before they took the bus back to Cambridge.

The first time we ran this program it was a great success. I ran it again twice before I left.

Rap Sessions. I found it useful to arrange meetings with representative groups of soldiers in one company or another. In them I solicited their questions or comments on any

subject and let them know my policies and thinking. To one such session late in my command tour I invited Crocker Snow, a young reporter from the Boston Globe.

His June 14, 1970, story: "A dozen soldiers -- 10 enlisted men and a pair of junior officers -- sat in a circle rapping about what's wrong with the Army. They were animated, intense, outspoken. Seated outside the inner circle... were some of their sergeants and superior officers... Both the technique and the subject -- 'How can the Army Adapt to the Characteristics of the New Soldier' -- spelled something special..."

The headline was "U.S. Army meets the Age of Aquarius." Subhead: "These are the days of dialogue." I was experimenting.

Bumper Stickers. Bumper stickers had become a vogue. I had one on our family car, distributed by the Nashua River Watershed Association. It said "Clean Water." However, I let it be known that, notwithstanding the principle of freedom of speech, I did not look favorably on political statements on cars that also carried a decal signifying Fort Devens' registration.

One day in the area of the troop barracks I saw a pickup truck bearing a Confederate flag posted alongside a Fort Devens decal. When I learned that the truck belonged to a non-commissioned officer in one of my battalions. I told the battalion commander to counsel that NCO.

He should tell him that, regardless of the intent, the display of such a symbol is construed by black soldiers as having a racist connotation and that, properly, a leader of men would not do such a thing.

INTERVIEWER: What might you have done that you were not all that pleased with?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I might have made a mistake when, a few weeks before I left Fort Devens, I tried to save government money on our laundry bills. In those days, a soldier living in barracks would every week turn in to the supply room his two bed sheets and pick up two clean ones.

Here are some paragraphs from my Commanders Column on the subject.

A couple of weeks ago we decided to see if we could save money on the laundry of bed sheets, by only sending one sheet per bed to the laundry each week instead of two. On linen exchange day, each soldier in barracks is now supposed to turn in the old bottom sheet to the laundry, change his top sheet to the bottom, and put a new clean sheet on top. The pillow case still gets washed each week.

So we decided to try out this new procedure to see if we really do get that kind of savings. While trying it out we will also see if there is any harm to troop sanitation or troop well being with such a procedure.

One thing is for sure - this really brings home to the troops that we do mean business when we talk about saving money. Every soldier in barracks now knows that there is an economy drive.

So, OK men, let's try it out.

And if you feel that we have other good ways of saving money than this, I would like to hear them. Just take a plain sheet of paper, write your suggestion on it and send it to your commander or directly to me. Every suggestion received will be carefully looked at. I expect that many of them will be very worthwhile. If a suggestion is adopted, you will be rewarded - oftentimes with cash.

I assure you that money is very tight today, and we need everybody's ideas on how to do more with less, and how to eliminate things we can do without.

In the meantime, one sheet at a time.

INTERVIEWER: How did your family like living at Fort Devens?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: They loved it. We had lovely quarters. Sp4 McCabe, my enlisted aide, cooked for us and was a big help. Our children were at home or nearby. My eldest daughter, Connie, having just graduated from college, had chosen to become a nurse. Dr. Leonard Cronkite, who ran a hospital in Boston and was also a brigadier general in the Army Reserve, helped get her accepted by a New York nursing school. Second daughter Cecelia graduated in 1969, taught school nearby for a while, then married Captain John Bohannon in a ceremony in front of our quarters. Third daughter Kathleen, in Wellesley College, in her senior year married Ed Miller, a Harvard senior. Fourth daughter Mary, liv-

ing at home, finished high school in Fitchburg. Jack, Ted, and Anne attended local schools.

My wife Nancy's parents had retired in Lexington, MA, just an hour away and visited us often. My Mom and Dad came up from South Carolina at Christmas-time 1968. I had two fine aides-de-camp, Ed Smith who retired as a three-star general and then Paul Kern, later a four star. They were invaluable, as was Eleanor Fischer, my secretary.

INTERVIEWER: Looking back, how would you sum up your Fort Devens experience?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Fort Devens was for me a confidence building time of optimum performance and growth. I had a free hand; First Army headquarters at Fort Meade gave me the required guidance and left me alone. And I had the right combination of installation management experience, smarts, energy, and initiative to do the job. I proved myself fully up to it.

On February 12, 1970, about a week after he had telephoned me to say that I would be receiving orders to return to Vietnam, Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seaman, commanding First Army, signed a recommendation that I be awarded a Distinguished Service Medal. It said...

“Brigadier General Cushman’s... record of improvements in the area of management, stemming directly from his astute leadership, is overwhelming... Through (his) extraordinary ability for accurate assessment, meticulous attention to detail, and boundless personal drive, Fort Devens attained outstanding results... Through a systematic and timely plan, (he) directed the conversion to automated systems in the logistics, personnel, and fiscal fields, all of which were handed almost entirely on a manual basis prior to his arrival. This effort culminated in Fort Devens being the second installation in CONARC to receive the IBM 360/30 computer... (He) exercised imaginative and vigorous leadership to stimulate and enhance understanding and appreciation of the Army by the civilian public in the New England communities... General Cushman displayed a tremendous personal concern for the individual soldier... (His) extraordinary management prowess, his efficient utilization of every resource, and his unique rapport with his subordinates has resulted in Fort Devens becoming a model Class I installation...”

The Army considered that performance “not of sufficient significance to meet the criteria for proposed award.” I was awarded a Legion of Merit.

Some time after I had arrived in Vietnam I received from SFC Lopez the complete text of the presentation that I have cited on page 18-5. Along with it was this copy of a letter that he had written to a general, I know not whom.

Sfc Lopez was my
Personnel Staff NCO at
Fort Devens. He transcribed
the briefing mat under,
which I have long con-
sidered one of the best
things I ever did. It
worked! Jotz

11 December 1970

Dear General:

I am writing this letter out of admiration and because I feel that in order to have an all volunteer army you must have generals like the one I wish to talk about. I know that it is not everyday that an enlisted man writes something nice about a general, but with so much talk these days about the concept of an "all volunteer army", I just feel somehow this general would fit in somewhere because deep in my heart I know the "all volunteer army" will never work unless you have generals like this.

While I was assigned to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, my Commanding General was Brigadier General John H. Cushman. Until he took over command there was little to say about that post without going into details.

Sir, I am inclosing some of General Cushman's Commanders Notes. As you can see, he took an interest in the individual soldier. General Cushman did more for the troops than any General I have encountered in fifteen years in the Army and I assure you sir, I have worked for many. They were good, but this General stands out from the rest. Until this day I and others who served with him just do not know how he did all he did at Ft. Devens Mass.

In closing sir, I am bringing to your attention one of the finest Generals I have known and one for whom I have great admiration.

Sincerely yours,

Michael Lopez
SFC
Adjutant General's Office
APO SF 96301

APO 96301 was at Eighth Army headquarters, in Korea.

Needless to say, it was with considerable satisfaction that I received this.

Chapter Nineteen

Advisor, IV Corps/Military Region 4, Vietnam

INTERVIEWER: Please tell me how you learned that you would be returning to Vietnam.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: In early January 1970 I received a call from Lieutenant General Seaman commanding First Army. He told me that I would be returning to Vietnam in March and that my assignment would be as assistant division commander of the Americal Division. I thought assistant division commander was not much of a job compared to commanding Fort Devens. Furthermore that division had recently come to public attention because of the My Lai episode. I kept to myself my lack of enthusiasm.

Preparing to comply, I soon received a call from Stanley Resor, Secretary of the Army, whom I had never met. Mr. Resor told me that he had arranged that my orders to the Americal Division be revoked and that new orders be issued assigning me as deputy senior advisor to the Vietnamese commander of IV Corps and Military Region 4 in Vietnam's Delta. He said something like, "Jack, you're too good an advisor to be wasted in the job of assistant division commander." Gratified, I speculated that Resor might have heard of me from Cyrus Vance, his Yale classmate.

I asked Nancy if she was interested in my volunteering for a two-year Vietnam tour, in which she and the family could be stationed at Clark Air Base in the Philippines and I could visit once a month. This arrangement encouraged longer tours for key personnel such as province advisors. By June our four younger children could finish school while the family lived in a set of quarters on post and all could then go to Clark Field. Nancy agreed, despite her bad hip. Broken during my last Vietnam tour, it had been partially repaired. Dr. Chandler of Massachusetts General Hospital, was ready to replace it, did not yet have FDA approval to do that for someone so young. Meanwhile Nancy would be on crutches.

I arranged to go on TDY for six weeks at the Aviation School, Fort Rucker, AL, where I took pilot training. Added to the hours I had already put together, this gave me aviator wings. With a few days of saying my goodbyes, I went off to Vietnam, arriving at Can Tho on March 26, 1970.

INTERVIEWER: How had you reacted to the Americal division's My Lai episode.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: In March 1968 the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division that I then commanded had been in a similar situation in Viet Cong-infested countryside. I could not fathom the evident lack of discipline in the unit responsible for the atrocity. As the story unfolded, I concluded that it was an open and shut case for disciplinary action against the division commander at the time, MG Samuel Koster. Although in the interval he had been named Superintendent of the US Military Academy, it had then been his re-

sponsibility at that time to have established such a chain of command within his division that so flagrant an atrocity would simply not have happened. That he did not justified, I believed, his immediate relief as Superintendent, USMA. He remained in place. Instead, the investigation focused on determining exactly what happened at My Lai and on who was responsible for keeping it quiet, i.e., the cover-up.

LTG William Peers was in charge of the investigation. He did a masterful job. His report was highly critical of top officers for participation in a coverup and of various officers and enlisted men for their actions at My Lai. The entire affair was a sordid reflection on the Army. Lack of command supervision had allowed it to happen.

INTERVIEWER: What was your job in Vietnam?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I was to be the Deputy Commander of the Delta Regional Assistance Command (DRAC). The CG, DRAC, was MG Hal McCown, whom I had known back in 1963 when he was senior advisor at II Corps stationed at Pleiku. Now his mission was to advise and assist the Vietnamese general who commanded both IV Corps and Military Region 4, the highly regarded MG Nguyen Viet Thanh.

IV Corps consisted of the 7th, 9th, and 21st Infantry Divisions and the 44th Special Tactical Zone. The 7th Division Tactical Zone comprised the areas of Vinh Binh, Kien Hoa, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, and Vinh Long provinces. 9th DTZ: Chau Doc, Kien Giang, An Giang, Sa Dec. 21st DTZ: An Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Ba Xuyen, Chuong Thien, Phong Dinh. 44th STZ: Kien Phong, Kien Tuong.



As deputy commander, DRAC, I was responsible for advice and assistance to these four division/tactical zone commanders. Each had a US Army colonel advisor with an advisory team. They were in my sphere of direction. Military Region 4 (MR4) was made up of these sixteen southernmost provinces of the Government of Vietnam. The Mekong River entered the region between Chau Doc and Kien Phong and exited in a delta centered on Kien Hoa.

In January 1969 President Nixon had turned to a policy of Vietnamization and withdrawal of US troops. In early 1970 the 9th Infantry Division, which had been the sole US combat force in the Delta, was gone. The ARVN now had it all.

Each province chief was an officer, usually a lieutenant colonel, of the Vietnamese Army. He commanded a number of regional force (company) and popular force (platoon) militia units. In that capacity he reported, as "sector commander," to the MR4 commander. In civilian matters he reported to GVN ministries, agriculture, police, taxation and the like, although the Commander MR4 wielded considerable influence. DRAC included the senior advisors and advisory teams to the province chiefs. Province senior advisers were often civilians; advisory teams were both civilian and military. Together they were part of the nationwide MACV CORDS (Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development).

General McCown's other deputy, the Director CORDS in MR4, was John Vann. In 1962-63 he had been senior advisor to the 7th infantry Division. Retired from the Army, he returned to Vietnam as a civilian in the pacification effort. Two years earlier he had been deputy for CORDS in II Field Force. John understood Vietnam, was imaginative, hard-driving, a good manager. His assistant was a retired colonel, the legendary Wilbur (Coal Bin Willie) Wilson.

CORDS offices were in an office building in Can Tho. Its billets, mess and club were in a nearby compound, The rest of DRAC's offices were alongside those of the corps/MR headquarters on the edge of Can Tho. DRAC minus CORDS occupied an adjacent compound.

USARV units -- medical, military police, road-building engineers -- were active in the Delta . A network of signal stations provided communications for US users. A US Navy presence had been established. Swift boats patrolled the waterways. A base, Solid Anchor, was at Nam Can on the tip of the Ca Mau peninsula. A helicopter squadron, the Sea Lords, flew support missions.

INTERVIEWER: What was the general situation in IV Corps/MR4?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: The Accelerated Pacification Program, supported by MACV CORDS, had been launched by the Government of Vietnam after Tet 1968. A broad-based

and well supported pacification drive had made good progress. The countryside had substantially changed since 1964 when I had left the 21st Division. "Blue" areas had expanded and enemy base areas had shrunk. Roads had been improved and could be mostly traveled without enemy interference. The indigenous Viet Cong was suffering.

But North Vietnamese Army units had begun to appear. They had come down through the Ho Chi Minh trail, which since I had left in 1968 had been made into a virtual highway through Laos and into Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk, Cambodia's ruler, had decided that the South was going to lose the war and had thrown his lot to North Vietnam. The NVA had established base areas along South Vietnam's border. Supplies were flowing through the port at Sihanoukville (Konpong Son) on the South China Sea.

Sihanouk was on a trip to Moscow and Beijing when on March 18, 1970, his government was overthrown by a group led by General Lon Nol, the premier. Lon Nol began as a neutralist but soon reached out to the Republic of Vietnam and the United States. On March 27, a ranger battalion from IV Corps advanced into areas near the Mekong River to destroy an NVA base. Four days later ARVN troops drove 16 kilometers into Cambodian territory. Other cross-border operations followed; on April 22 President Nixon authorized US air support for them. He soon authorized General Abrams, COMUSMACV, to begin secret planning for a large-scale US and Vietnamese effort.

On April 25 I wrote my wife: "Yesterday I got called to Saigon for a meeting with General Abrams, except that he couldn't be there because he was with the ambassador. Room filled with two and three star generals, and me representing DRAC." (General McCown was on a four day visit to his wife at Clark Field.) The next day I wrote, "Travelled yesterday to a meeting with General Abrams¹ and Lt Gen Davison, CG II Field Force, which is the US command north of the Delta."

Those meetings were for planning for the US/GVN incursion into Cambodia. On April 30 President Nixon, in a televised address to the nation, announced the attack into Cambodia, saying, "The time has come for action." The attack went in on May 1.

INTERVIEWER: What had you been doing before these Cambodian operations?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: The 164th Aviation Group was stationed at Can Tho. It had helicopters throughout the Delta. In a Huey (my copilot was a particularly experienced warrant officer). I spent days flying myself around the area, meeting commanders and province chiefs and their advisors, and becoming familiar with the situation.

Using Vu-graph charts that I had brought from Fort Devens, I began working with the three division commanders and their advisors on developing a version of Operation

¹ I wrote: "I am highly impressed with General Abrams - a most outstanding soldier. Very plain, very savvy, and a decent man."

Excellence. I started with rudimentary discussions on the situation descriptions for “Improve the advisory effort” and “Strengthen the infantry battalions of IV Corps.”

In late April I began to advise/assist in the planning for Cambodia by IV Corps forces and then in its execution. As General McCown’s deputy for tactical operations, that was my bailiwick. Until President Nixon made his announcement on April 30, planning took place in the utmost secrecy. General Thanh, corps commander, planned directly with the commanders of the 9th ARVN Division and the ranger group stationed in the 44th Special Tactical Zone. They were to launch the attack from Kien Tuong province into the part of Cambodia that thrust deep into Vietnam known as the Parrot’s Beak.

Supported by helicopters of the 164th Aviation Group and of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), the attack went in on May 1. Attacking forces uncovered huge quantities of supplies stockpiled by the NVA. Fallout from the incursion came quickly on the campuses of America's universities. On 4 May the unrest escalated to violence when Ohio National Guardsmen killed four unarmed students at Kent State University. President Nixon set a deadline of June 30 for the withdrawal of US forces from Cambodia.

On May 2 General Thanh was killed in a helicopter accident.² Commanded now by BG Ngo Dzu and augmenting its force, IV Corps drove on to clear the Mekong River area all the way to the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese Navy and US Navy’s Sea Lords cleared the Mekong River to Phnom Penh and Vietnamese Marines set up a position at the Cambodian town of Neak Loeng.

Cooperation ensued between IV Corps and corresponding echelons of the Cambodian Army, or FANK (Forces Armées Nationales Khmères). IV Corps units were directed from an advanced command post in Chau Doc. Together with FANK forces and supported by US tactical air, they operated against the NVA-supported communist Khmer Rouge in areas of Cambodia adjacent to the Delta. War had come to that hitherto peaceful countryside. These operations terminated at the end of June 1970.

INTERVIEWER: Wasn’t this about the time that Colonel David Hackworth joined you?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Yes. He had been sent to us by MACV to replace the senior advisor in the 44th Special Tactical Zone who was rotating back to the States. The 44th

² It was on the second day of the attack. I had been in my helicopter overhead, observing. When I landed by helicopter at a refueling point established by the 164th Aviation Group, I found that the VNAF helicopter being used by General Thanh, IV Corps commander, was being refueled. Thinking that I might be useful, I offered to accompany him. We took off. General Thanh, speaking in Vietnamese, became fully occupied directing operations on the ground. He had no need for my advice. When we returned to refuel, I bade him goodbye, boarded my own helicopter and took off. In a few minutes I heard “Mayday, Mayday” on my radio. General Thanh’s helicopter and another helicopter had collided in midair. I landed beside his burning helicopter and saw his charred body in the seat that I had occupied a few minutes earlier.

Special Tactical Zone was different from the three division tactical zones of MR4. Consisting of the provinces of Kien Giang and Kien Thuong, it encompassed the “Plain of Reeds,” defined by the online Encyclopedia of Britannica as a “...low, basin like, alluvial swampy region, a northwestern extension of the Mekong delta...” Not much of a rice growing region, its population density was well below the Delta average. Hamlets were scarce and commerce limited. CORDS presence was limited. The 44th STZ’s ARVN troops were entirely rangers.

Colonel Hackworth came from a tour as an advisor in the north. Recently promoted, he had extended to remain in Vietnam another year. He made a good impression. He had been a major in the 101st Airborne Division's First Brigade in Vietnam in 1965. He was the co-author, with S.L.A. Marshall, of the Vietnam Primer that we had used while training the 2d Brgade of the 101st at Fort Campbell in 1967. On a second tour he had been a battalion commander in the 9th Infantry Division. I knew him only by reputation.

I welcomed him and sent him to Cao Lahn, the province town of Kien Phong, to take charge of DRAC Advisory Team 50, stationed there. As will unfold in this narrative, in the following year he turned out to be a very bad apple.³

In the months that followed I visited Advisory Team 50 from time to time, but not to the extent that I visited the three division tactical zones. This lack of proper supervision had disastrous consequences, described in the Appendix, pages 19A-1 to 19A-5.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me about the change in the corps/MR commander.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: On May 17 I had written Nancy, “The news came yesterday that I was nominated for a 2 star rank... it’s pleasant to know that the lodge thinks well of you.”⁴

³ Wikipedia puts it this way, more or less accurately: “In early 1971, Lieutenant Colonel David Hackworth was promoted to the rank of colonel, and received orders to attend the Army War College. Hackworth... had turned down a previous opportunity to go there. Colonel Hackworth was being groomed for bigger and better things, but he had no desire to become a general officer and declined once again to go to the war college and would soon become totally fed up with the system, not to mention the war in Vietnam. Hackworth’s dissatisfaction ultimately culminated in a television interview with ABC. On June 27, 1971 he appeared on the program Issues and Answers and strongly criticized U.S. commanders in Vietnam, said the war could not be won and called for U.S. withdrawal. The interview enraged senior U.S. Army officers at the Pentagon. He soon found himself ostracized in the defense establishment. Hackworth was nearly court-martialed for various infractions such as running a brothel for his troops in Vietnam, running gambling houses, and exploiting his position for personal profit by manipulating U.S. currency. At the same time, he was experiencing personal problems that resulted in divorce. He was allowed to retire, in order to avoid a court martial, at the rank of colonel, and in an effort to rebuild his life, Hackworth moved to Australia.” He returned to the United States and was a correspondent in the 1989-90 Gulf War. Controversial to the end, he died in 2005, His obituary: <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/06/national/06hackworth.html>.

⁴ I added, “Major general is an even more exclusive club and entry therein depends on acceptance by a pretty straight group of peers. General McCown said that I would have to act more dignified now. I talked with General Rosson on the phone last night and at the end of our business he had some very nice words to say to me, in congratulations.” I was number 30 on the list and not to be promoted for several months.

Ten days later, on an airplane, I was writing her a seven page letter which began, "I have just completed a visit to the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st ARVN Division and my old area of operations. It was one of the most satisfying two days of my life. There has never been any doubt in my mind of the accomplishments of the 2nd Brigade in February-June 1968... to come back two years later and see firsthand the end result in the countryside and how well things have gone since that time was a truly rewarding experience."

In one paragraph I wrote: "General Truong (JHC note: Major General Ngo Quang Truong, commanding the 1st ARVN Division, with whom my 2d Brigade had worked closely and who was my good friend) welcomed me with a briefing and I gave a little speech in Vietnamese, for which the staff clapped. Then we visited the various division units, from the DMZ to Hue. They are doing very well and I only wish we had 20 more generals like General Truong."

In August 1970 we got some very good news. General Truong was being promoted to lieutenant general and would command IV Corps/Military Region 4. General Dzu departed to command II Corps.⁵ Now it was going to be my pleasure to be working with General Truong again. Hopefully, upon my promotion, it would be as his senior advisor.

In his book of Vietnam oral histories⁶, Harry Maurer had quoted me, "General Truong was one of the finest commanders in the Vietnamese armed forces. When I first knew him, he had been an airborne officer for fifteen years or more. He was in his forties, and he'd been fighting for twenty years. He was a brilliant, shrewd tactician and a scrupulously upright person. He loved his men, took care of them. He was a man of considerable character and presence, though he wasn't an imposing man. He didn't look like much, because he was so slightly built, even for a Vietnamese. But he was good, the best they had. Abrams used to say about Truong, 'He could command an American division.'"

John Vann lost no time in acquainting him with the CORDS program, and General Truong, a peerless leader, soon made his presence felt on the province chiefs. John had a practice of occasionally having his light helicopter drop him off at an outpost where he would spend the night to see what was going on. One day he invited General Truong to join him, wearing an ordinary soldier's uniform and pretending to be John's radio operator. General Truong did so and made good use of the *incognito* experience.

⁵ At the farewell luncheon for General Dzu, General McCown was absent and I was seated by deputy ambassador Samuel Berger. He asked me my opinion of General Dzu, whose reputation was not good. I did not have much to say, but thought it best to report the conversation to General Abrams in a "back channel" message. Early the next morning the Special Security Officer captain who handled back channels, came to my billet with one from General Abrams. In capital letters, as always, it read: "FROM ABRAMS. TO CUSHMAN. I RESERVE TO MYSELF DISCUSSION WITH THE AMBASSADOR." I asked the SSO, "How do I reply? With 'Yes, Sir?'" We decided that General Abrams was simply making a point and that the thing to do was for the SSO to let General Abrams know that the message had been delivered. The COMUSMACV was just breaking in a general.

⁶ Harry Maurer, Strange Ground: Americans in Vietnam 1945-1975, An Oral History, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1989, p. 522.

General Truong began a series of initiatives. One was the gradual elimination of the numerous places in the countryside where the enemy could hide out and be sheltered. This involved coming in with machetes and cutting down unnecessary foliage, and coupling that with one or more outposts nearby from which patrols were conducted.

One worrisome such hideout was Seven Mountains, jutting from the plain in An Giang province close to the Cambodian border. Truong solved that problem by directing the province chief to station a Regional Force company at the top of Nui Cam, its highest peak, and patrol and ambush from both the top and bottom. From the 9th Division he provided two 105mm howitzers for a 2,300 foot high firebase there. The situation got so bothersome to the Viet Cong that they gave up their base.

The most populated provinces, such as An Giang and Vinh Long, where pacification had progressed well, had been able to recruit province militia beyond their needs, while less populated provinces like An Xuyen and Chong Thien did not have enough. General Truong began to persuade the province chiefs who were well-off to send Regional Force companies abroad for two or three months into provinces that were less well off, rotating them. Although this was contrary to the rationale for which those companies had been recruited, General Truong was able to provide incentives to the province chiefs and prevailed. Pacification expanded. General Truong's impact was strong.

INTERVIEWER: What about your further operations in Cambodia?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: In January 1971 Cambodia requested United States and South Vietnamese help in opening Highway 4 from Phnom Penh, its capital, to the deep-water port of Kompong Som on the South China Sea. Sixty miles southwest of Phnom Penh the hills of Pich Nil pass were fortified by the Khmer Rouge. The FANK asked for US helicopter gunships, Cobras, to support an ARVN/FANK attack on those positions. MACV received US approval, with the proviso that US troops, including advisors, were not to be on the ground inside Cambodia.

As DRAC deputy senior advisor, I was told that the Cobra gunship fire support would be launched from U.S. Navy floating platforms in Kompong Som bay by helicopters staged from Rach Gia province in MR4, and that I would be in charge of delivering that gunship support. After looking at the use of USS Iwo Jima, an amphibious assault flattop, the Navy decided to use USS Cleveland, LPD-7, a landing ship, dock. In an article titled "Senior Officer Present Afloat" in the July-August 1991 Shipmate, magazine of the U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, I related my unique four-week experience.

There⁷ I tell of my decision to interpret President Nixon's order, that U.S. helicopters not touch down on Cambodian soil, as permitting, in the interest of mission accomplishment, the use of its "essential logistical support" exception. I had decided to combine the delivery of smoke grenades with the pickup of a needed Cambodian liaison officer. That helicopter touchdown appeared on the front page of the Washington Post, The President challenged it. General Abrams. COMUSMACV, supported my decision, taking the heat himself. Gratified, I had learned something about General Abrams.

INTERVIEWER: When did you finally become the senior advisor?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: It was not clear at first that I would be the senior advisor. It began to appear that John Vann wanted that job, although it would have been quite unusual to have a civilian as senior advisor/commander DRAC. I didn't know what John might have been doing to bring that about. I just sat tight. It finally turned out that John would indeed become a corps/MR senior advisor, but it would be in II Corps/MR2 with General Dzu. His deputy, my classmate George Wear, a brigadier general, would exercise the required command. John moved on, leaving Wilbur Wilson in charge of CORDS at MR4. That suited me fine. I really liked Wilbur.

General McCown was scheduled to go home in mid-May, 1971. He stuck to his schedule. In early April we had a promotion ceremony at Can Tho. I then went on leave, first to my family at Clark Field and then Stateside.

INTERVIEWER: What did you do Stateside?

While I was in the Pentagon I got word that General Westmoreland wanted to see me. When I entered his office he invited me to sit down. The first thing he told me was that when the 101st Airborne Division returned from Vietnam it would go to Fort Campbell and that I would command it. After that good news he showed me a clipping from the New York Times. It was an op-ed by Burke Marshall, a former deputy attorney general in President Kennedy's Justice Department. He was quite exercised about the piece.

After I had read it, he asked me if I was willing to write a letter in reply to the editor to the New York Times. I said Yes and went to a nearby office, typed the letter, then mailed it.

On the next two pages are the Burke Marshall op-ed, and my reply. General Westmorland did not mention it to me again.

⁷ Along with other writings of mine over the years, "Senior Officer Present Afloat" can be found at <http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/>.

About April 15, 1971

We Must End the War

By BURKE MARSHALL

NEW HAVEN—Everyone who believes, as I have, in the rule of law as an expanding, organizing force in national and international governance, has now to face the implications of the Calley trial and verdict. I have tried to do so, and have found that I almost cannot.

Some parts of the matter are clear, and inescapable.

One is that once the facts of the Mylai killings got into the bureaucracy of public knowledge, investigation, accusation, trial, and adjudication, someone was going to be found guilty. That person now is Lieutenant Calley, and perhaps there may be others. The evidence is that they did in fact kill women, children, old men, civilians all, under circumstances that were unjustified, unlawful, indefensible, not only by the Nuremberg rules and the Geneva Convention, but even by the field manuals—the most routine rules of conduct—issued by the United States military, as well as by any conceivable articulated standards of human charity and decency.

What, then, is there about the Calley judgment that offends me, and offends almost everyone? And what conceivable escape is there for us all?

It seems to me plain that it is not an escape to say that Lieutenant Calley is not guilty, because he is. He admitted himself to the killing of civilians—to “wasting” them for lack of an appropriate mine field for them to test—and while I share the normal reluctance of lawyers, politicians, newspapers, and others to assume guilt when proceedings are pending, it also seems plain that Lieutenant Calley and others at Mylai violated all of the rules of war we purport to enforce and abide by.

The reaction against the Calley verdict, I think, or at least I hope, is not because it is wrong. It is because it is unfair. But if that is so, we are led into deeper and deeper waters.

We know, or at least we should know, that our war in Indochina is based on killing civilians. We know, or at least we should know, that the number of civilians that we are respon-

We know, or at least we should know, that our war in Indochina is based on killing civilians. We know, or at least we should know, that the number of civilians that we are responsible for having killed, or disabled, or made parentless, or made childless, is far greater proportionately, and maybe even absolutely, than in any other war.

sible for having killed, or disabled, or made parentless, or made childless, is far greater proportionately, and maybe even absolutely, than in any war.

That is in Indochina. We also know, or at least we should know, that our entire weapons system, our whole strategic military planning, an enormous and preponderant part of our national budget, is designed, if ever used, to kill civilians. By the millions.

If this is true—and it is, inescapably, by the logic of events, certainly not by reason of any man's personal guilt, perhaps indeed as the only way of conducting affairs between the United States and the Soviet Union—how can we punish Lieutenant Calley personally for doing what we are doing now daily in Indochina, and threaten to do on a scale beyond personal imagination if the provocation is sufficient?

The answer, of course, lies in the traditional framework of criminal law. It is the rule of personal accountability. Lieutenant Calley, like those tried by us and our allies at Nuremberg, is not allowed to rely on his role in the system. It is his soul, his consciousness, his actions, judged against some moral concepts, that are at stake.

Those who accept the Calley verdict do so on that basis—that what he did was an individual act of brutality, for which he should be punished. He is

held personally accountable for acts personally done, against people personally seen.

I find it impossible myself to let the matter rest there. It is at the same time wrong to absolve Calley of guilt that is his, and unfair to punish him for what we are doing ourselves, in a less direct way, but still knowingly, consciously, intentionally, continually. The fact is that the Nuremberg experiment has failed. Its imposition of personal accountability for war, its effort to use a system of criminal justice and a rule of law as a way of teaching truth, as Socrates said should be done, has not worked. The dimensions of this failure are measured by our own acts, for we were the chief teacher and we have not learned the lessons we taught others, nor followed the rule of law we created.

It is therefore right and fitting that President Nixon should assume, as he has, a personal responsibility for Lieutenant Calley's punishment. He must deal with that case in a way that makes it clear that Calley is not being punished for deeds we have all participated in. For those that believe in the Nuremberg path of personal accountability, that would seem inevitably to lead to further trials, of generals and political leaders and military bureaucrats, as well as lieutenants and colonels. But I think now that that path is unwise as well as politically impossible. The accountability is national and the act of expiation that should accompany any diminution of Lieutenant Calley's punishment must be national. The only possible such act that meets the needs of our moral crisis would be an immediate cessation by the United States of all war-making in Indochina. That is the logic of events that Mr. Nixon will have to face; it is the only escape open to him and to us from an endless series of prosecutions, on the one hand, or a denial of plain guilt and any system of responsibility, on the other.

Burke Marshall, deputy dean of the Yale Law School, served as Assistant U.S. Attorney General in charge of the civil rights division during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

Letters to the Editor

Vietnam Orders: Spare Civilians

To the Editor:

I am home on leave from Vietnam and I have read Burke Marshall's Op-Ed article, "We Must End the War" (April 10.) As a responsible officer of the United States Army in Vietnam, I should like to comment on this article from first-hand knowledge.

Mr. Marshall says that "our war in Indochina is based on killing civilians." I must tell you that I know as to my own experience that this monstrous statement is simply not true.

I am on my third tour in that bitter and difficult war. I was an adviser in the Delta in 1963-64 and a brigade commander in the Tet 1968 fighting around Hue, and I am now an adviser again in the Delta. While I believe that the U.S. effort in Vietnam has been and is in a worthy cause, I am only too aware of the cost of the war, in all its dimensions, including the innocent civilians killed and maimed, and I share Mr. Marshall's anguish at the loss of civilian lives.

But I assure you that as a commander and adviser in the field the instructions which I personally and others like me have received have always been absolutely clear. Our solemn and repeated orders have always been to take every possible measure to keep civilians from harm. Wherever I have been, and wherever I have observed, we have gone to extraordinary lengths to do so. We have in fact sometimes exposed our men to increased risks in our efforts to carry out these instructions meticulously.

Mine is no isolated case; these are

the standard instructions of this war. They are not the characteristic instructions of a war "based on killing civilians." Such a horrifying concept is completely antithetical to the personal and professional code which must be the essential equipment of responsible officers in uniform.

Mr. Marshall refers to Lieutenant Calley's case. Lieutenant Calley was court-martialed for a clear and abominable violation of instructions. Despite our most natural grief at what his trial has revealed, it would be a fundamental error to go on to say, as Mr. Marshall does, that the premeditated murder of which Lieutenant Calley has been found guilty "we are now doing daily in Indochina."

I respect, indeed I admire, Mr. Marshall as a concerned citizen and an able lawyer. I would want him to

know that there are many good and decent men in the United States armed forces in Vietnam, not brutalized by that war, and immensely saddened by the destruction and loss of life and general suffering which this war, like all wars, brings to noncombatants as well as combatants.

These men are laboring well and with some good results in a multifaceted, interdependent military-civilian effort to achieve the limited U.S. objective there—namely, to gain as quickly as possible a reasonable assurance that the people of South Vietnam can determine their own affairs.

I believe you, and Mr. Marshall as well, would find that at the same time these men are doing their utmost, and not without success to keep the war from destroying the innocent.

JOHN H. CUSHMAN
Major General, U.S. Army
Sullivans Island, S.C., April 15, 1971



Edward Gorey

When I was with my parents on Sullivan's Island, near Charleston, SC, I read the published letter. It triggered about ten more letters in the following days, the majority not sympathetic to my views.

Returning from leave, on the day I arrived in Saigon I was invited to dinner with a group of correspondents, some of whom I knew. Among those was Fox Butterfield of the New York Times. I mentioned to the group my letter to the Times. Although I did not have a copy with me, I told Fox Butterfield that I thought that the editorial comment contained in the sketch that accompanied my op-ed was uncalled for. Fox said that he would say as much to Jack Oakes, editor of the New York Times.

With that I returned to the Delta.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me what you did when you finally commanded DRAC?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I took command of DRAC on May 14, 1971. I was ready and more than eager. The weeks that I had spent at home had made clear to me that the American public was concerned about troop morale and discipline in Vietnam, and especially about the reports of rampant drug usage.

I had decided that pacification in the provinces did not need much of my attention. General Truong and CORDS under Wilbur Wilson could take care of that very well. My first priority would be morale and discipline in the Delta.

As CG. DRAC, I commanded only the advisory teams who were with the ARVN units and the provinces in MR4. But MACV had made me Zone Coordinator for the entire Delta. This meant that I could issue directions not only to the units of US Army Vietnam (USARV) but to the US Navy and US Air Force units and advisors there as well.

I had my first commander's conference May 16. My aide-de-camp sent me a memo, "These are my notes from the Cmdrs Conf. this morning." They are on the next page.



NOTES FROM COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

1. CG will spend a lot more time with U.S. forces because (1) they need more attention (2) Army is in trouble.
2. CG is trying to get General Court Martial authority.
3. Make soldiers feel that they are in a productive job; that they are useful.
4. CG will be talking to troops at every level and on every job.
5. Don't try to fake it with the troops, be well organized, troops can spot a phony immediately.
6. General's Standards:

Do things the Army Way , follow regs and go by the book.

Get rid of extra people! Drops.
7. Let Vietnamese do the job where at all possible -- reduce U.S. profile and dependency.
8. Corruption in high Vietnamese positions must stop.
9. Commander's Guideline:

Be straight. *Missim mental*

Look out for your troops and take care of them.
10. CG will set the example and is their best friend.
11. Don't make statements or try to explain about war -- stay away from the subject.
12. Haircuts - Final decision, ^{ON} ~~no~~ leaders.

I decided that we would tackle the drug problem first and that it was so serious we would use extreme measures. On the next page is an extract of the DRAC after-action report.

a. MG Cushman assumed command of the Delta Regional Assistance Command on 14 May 1971. By 8 June 1971, the drug problem was defined to his satisfaction and planning began on a two phased program aimed at reducing the drug problem. Phase I, which began on 22 June 1971, was designed to be a hard and thorough crackdown on drugs. Planning was conducted in secrecy by a minimum number of people. Major subordinate commanders were not briefed on the Letter of Instructions (Tab A) until 20 June 1971. Servicemen in MR4 awoke on 22 June to find 100% shake-down inspections, all cities and towns off limits, and thorough searches of individuals and vehicles entering or leaving the installations. The shock effect had a great psychological impact on drug users and non-users alike. By about the third day the rehabilitation centers at Can Tho Army Airfield, Binh Thuy, and Vinh Long were filled with users withdrawing from drugs and an unknown number of additional users withdrew on their own in their units. Personnel accounting was emphasized during Phase I with nightly bed checks conducted in all units. Recreation facilities were expanded on installations to fill the void left by the off limits restrictions. Phase I was generally well received and successful. It lasted 11 days. See Tabs B through E for further documentation on Phase I.

b. Phase II was laid out in detail the last few days of Phase I, and placed into effect on 3 July. (See Tab F for instructions to unit commanders, with inclosures.) During Phase I it became evident that there now existed an opportunity to extend the effort beyond simply a drug drive. There had developed a spirit of teamwork, NCO participation and assumption of responsibility, troop concern for each other, leaders' concern for their men and the like that could be used in the broader field of basic standards of discipline, troop tone, and military professionalism. The Phase II directive (Inclosure 1 to Tab F) laid out the three interrelated lines of effort - law enforcement (or anti-drug abuse), rehabilitation, and military environment. The scope of Phase II can be seen by a perusal of Tab F.

c. The next significant item in the chronology was the institution of systematic NCO training. This began 11 July, with the publication of a memorandum to the Big Seven (major troop unit) commanders on NCO Development (Tab G). This was followed by a series of seminars for all the first sergeants of the Delta (Tab H). This was in turn followed by establishment of NCO schools at three locations -- Can Tho, Binh Thuy, and Vinh Long -- two days a week each, taught by a traveling DRAC team. (Tab I) This was succeeded by locally run NCO schools at those same installations, with some DRAC instructors, and this is the program now in effect. (Tab J)

Before any of this happened, I had to get General Abrams' approval of the whole program. So two or three days before June 22, D-Day, I took it to him. The Deputy COMUSMACV, General Weyand, was present. General Abrams gave his OK. Page 1 of our directive is on the next page.

HEADQUARTERS
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO 96215

MACDR - CG

20 June 1971

TO: Each Unit Commander of U.S. Forces in MR4

1. In my capacity as Commanding General, Delta Regional Assistance Command, and Zone Coordinator Military Region 4, I am today ordering a coordinated, intensive, and continuing effort toward drug suppression in U.S. units in MR4. This effort will concentrate on education, law enforcement, separation of users from suppliers, detection of addicts, and their rehabilitation or other disposition.
2. The effort will be in two phases. Phase I will be a high intensity drive aimed at prohibiting the introduction of dangerous drugs onto military installations, denying access by military personnel to drug supply off military installations, seizure of unauthorized drugs now on military installations or in the possession of military personnel, separating current users of drugs from their suppliers, educating all personnel in the hazards of drug abuse, extending amnesty to eligible drug users who choose to apply, detection of other drug users where possible, and a convincing demonstration to all our men of their commanders' determination to decisively deal with the drug problem. Phase II will consist of follow-on programs to consolidate the gains and apply the lessons learned in Phase I.
3. Phase I will be initiated on 22 June 1971. H-hour will be between 0530 and 0730, as determined individually by each installation coordinator. On 22 June 1971, commanders will:
 - a. At H-hour establish security, control and segregation of personnel in accordance with unit "C-day" SOP, as prescribed by MACV Directive 37-10 and USARV Directive 37-10. Maintain segregation until completion of "b" and "c" below.
 - b. Call a meeting, or meetings, of all unit personnel present for duty NLT H+2 and inform them that:
 - (1) Until further notice all cities, towns and built up areas within MR4 are off limits to U.S. military personnel except in the performance of official duties or unless assigned quarters in such an area.

I issued my command policy, reminiscent of my year and a half at Fort Devens.

3. COMMAND POLICY. The basic command policy toward drugs and other matters in the Delta can be summarized as follows.

a. Be Efficient. The aim is to run a straight outfit, where things are done right without wasting the troops' time, operations run the way they are supposed to, and job satisfaction is thereby enhanced and frustrations diminished.

b. Have Concern for the Individual. Commanders and staffs must have, and must demonstrate by visible and real performance, a genuine concern for the individual as to both his material and his psychological needs. "Being efficient" in such matters as personnel administration, pay, etc., is one way of evidencing this concern.

c. Work Together. There has to be an authentic spirit of a common effort toward a common goal, with all segments of the military society joining in -- younger, older, NCO, officer, black, white, "juicer", "head", and all the rest. Conversation, communication, face-to-face relationships, and the like, play a part in this.

d. Don't Fake It. Actions have got to be "for real", and clearly evident to the troops as authentically directed at their well being. Leaders and workers must be very careful not to exaggerate their accomplishments or ballyhoo their plans.

4. BASIC APPROACH. As to the drug program itself, the basic approach of the Delta is to deal with the problem along three separate but related lines of effort:

a. Law Enforcement - designed to reduce the supply and punish the offender who helps move the drugs. CG, DRAC, believes that while this effort might help some to reduce the supply or make drugs somewhat harder to get, and that while it does in fact demonstrate that the command takes the drug problem very seriously, this line of effort locally will not have a very substantial effect on changing the availability of drugs.

b. Rehabilitation and (or) Elimination - designed to deal with the drug abuser to help him cure his problem or, if that cannot be done, to remove him from the Delta, or from the military service.

c. Professionalism in the Command - designed to promote a healthy military environment conducive to keeping men away from drugs to begin with and assisting them to cure themselves if they do begin drug use. This line of effort is not directly drug related, but rather it involves the application of standard and tested leadership techniques aimed at the "whole man" or "whole unit" or "entire installation."

On July 29, in a letter from a group of noncommissioned officers in DRAC headquarters, I received this...

1. At long last the first gigantic step has been taken to curtail one of the biggest problems facing the United States Armed Forces in Vietnam today -- drug addiction.
2. On 22 June 1971 in Military Region 4, a command-wide program was set in motion in an effort to help stop and eliminate a menace which is threatening the well-being of our servicemen in Vietnam. This menace has created a weak link in our otherwise sound structure. It is up to us, the strong, to lend a helping hand in order that the weak can free themselves from this monster that day-by-day drives them further from reality.
3. We have been faced with greater and more difficult problems in the past and have emerged the victor. We are being challenged now; we are being tested by a creature who will thrive on our weaknesses in an unmerciful manner to destroy the spirit, morals and physical being of some of our men. It will continue to do so, if we do not prepare ourselves for combat.
4. It is astonishing that all of us are aware that the drug addiction problem exists in Vietnam and the world, yet, we know so very little about how to combat it effectively. We need professional guidance from the experts. We need training on how to identify the problem before it gets out of hand. We must know how we, as Senior Non-commissioned Officers in your command, can support you more effectively in solving drug addiction in Military Region 4. Let us be the first to set the example so that others may follow in our footsteps.
5. We are proud of you, your initiative, and personal concern for the welfare of those men who have fallen to this silent weapon, and for those who might have fallen had hard but fair measures not been taken.
6. We stand behind you wholeheartedly.

INTERVIEWER: What about problems of race?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: While we dealt with racial matters along with our campaign on drugs, an effort specifically on race did not begin right away. I made use of our troop newspaper, the Delta Dragon. It had been a monthly. I changed that to bi-weekly and doubled its circulation to 10,000, enough for one paper to each two men in the Delta. The first issue came out on June 20, two days before our drug crackdown. I wrote my first column for it, next page.

To the Troops:

Every issue of this newspaper will include this column. I will use it to talk to the troops in the Delta. I will write each message myself, because I want you to know exactly how I feel and what I think.

First, I believe that every man in the Delta deserves to be doing important work. If he's not, he shouldn't be here.

There's more than enough important work to do in the Delta, and no man should be asked to use his time on the unimportant. When there isn't something important for you to do, we want to send you home.

Second, I want every man to be doing his work well. By that I mean that those of us in charge must organize our operations so that our men don't waste their time. When we are efficient, and when the soldier down the line sees that his work is important, I do not doubt that he will work hard and well.

Third, I want us to recognize good performance. There are many ways to do this, but for me one way will be to announce in each issue of this newspaper the names of a few outstanding performers that have come to my own attention.

Fourth, our will be a "straight" command. Our units each have a chain of command down to, and up from, the last man. I expect it to work in both directions. I expect our leaders to organize their men well, and to direct them properly to get the various jobs done. I also expect our leaders, top to bottom, to be in close touch with their men, aware of their problems, and helping them solve their problems.

And, I expect all our men, leaders and troops and all, to be straight – to behave themselves, to drive carefully to stay away from drug abuse, to use alcohol sparingly, to be considerate of the Vietnamese, to do their jobs faithfully, and in general to act as the American people expect them to do in Vietnam.

I am not totally naive. I know very well that not everyone in the Delta will find himself doing important work, that some will not be doing their work very well, that many will go unrecognized, and that there will be a few who will not be straight.

However, I want you to know that I am personally and completely committed to attaining here in the Delta the goals I have just written down.

Obviously, I need your help. If you have any ideas, let me know. Send a note to me at Team 96, through the message center. Or telephone my office at Can Tho 2777.

MG J.H. Cushman
Commanding General
Delta Regional Assistance Command

Those were the days of “Black Power,” which was a growing assertiveness, even militancy, on the part of blacks, especially young blacks. This was manifested in the Army, and very much so in Vietnam where our black soldiers were bonding. The “dap” was a feature. It was a kind of extended handshake ritual that black soldiers would go through when they encountered one another. White soldiers were left out of this. Another manifestation was the use of bracelets by black soldiers and special pins on their uniforms. Another was the “Afro” haircut, the regulation of which I had coped with at Fort Devens.

My approach was to treat each soldier equally, making no exceptions. That meant that each soldier, black or white, obeyed the Army’s uniform regulations. It also meant that we cared equally for each soldier’s job satisfaction and well-being. I had let it be known that I was approachable by any soldier in the Delta, including by telephone.

One day in early July 1971 I visited Sa Dec where there was an advisory detachment and some troop units. I was told that a couple of soldiers had asked to see me. They were two clerks from a local finance detachment. Both were black, one unremarkable. The other was a scowling heavysset man, unshaven. I recognized him to be one of those negroes whose facial hair tended to grow inward and who were given, for medical reasons, permission to go unshaven. They identified themselves. I remember only the name of the scowling heavysset one, Specialist Four Grigsby.

I asked them what was on their minds. Extending his wrist, Grigsby showed me a boot lace that he had woven around his wrist like a bracelet and had extended to the base of his middle finger. I took it to be a symbol that he was proud to be black. He said, “Sir, we want to know why we can’t wear this.”

Cushman: “Because it’s contrary to Army regulations which say that jewelry worn by soldiers must be in good taste.” Grigsby: “Who says it’s not in good taste?” Cushman: “Your company commander, following my orders.” Grigsby took exception. The conversation continued.

Finally I made him an offer, saying something like this, “Grigsby, you seem to be an intelligent soldier. I would like to take you to Can Tho to work for me, in my office. I want to be able to ask your advice on how we should deal with the black soldiers. But if you do, you are going to have to take off that bracelet. How about it?”

After reflecting for a minute or two, Grigsby said Yes. I told him that I would return the next day to pick him up. That day happened to be the Fourth of July and I was scheduled to speak at a formation of an engineer battalion. Grigsby heard my remarks, in which I emphasized that the Declaration of Independence said that all men are created equal and that in the Delta we are committed to living up to that. I asked him if he heard what I said. He had.

I placed Grigsby in the office of my command sergeant major where he proved useful to me. I wrote this column for the Delta Dragon of August 5.



To the troops:



Elsewhere on this page is an article written by a friend of mine, a black soldier named SP4 Aubrey D. Grigsby.

I would like every man in the Delta to read what Specialist Grigsby has to say. I don't ask you to agree with it, just to read it.

Then try to understand it.

A black man will have no trouble understanding it. A white man will. There is a simple reason for this. The white man has never been black.

Can we ever have an Army (or Navy, or Air Force, or Marine Corps) in which a man like Aubrey Grigsby will not feel like writing something like that? I don't know if we can. But I know we are going to try here in the Delta.

Because I know that Specialist Grigsby is a good man. He is a good finance clerk, and a good soldier who wants to serve his country well.

He knows what it says in our Declaration of Independence -- that "all men are created equal." He wants to see the rest of us live up to those words. Furthermore, like blacks everywhere, he is proud to be black. I, for one, think that's a good thing. Black men have a heritage of which they can rightfully be proud.

Now, you and I and Aubrey Grigsby know that not all men have equal talents, or can run equally fast, or can lift equal weights, or have equal brains. Some will do better, and get more rewards. Some will do worse, and maybe even be punished.


But whether a man is rewarded or punished, and how much, must depend on what he is as a man, and must have no relation to the color of his skin.

We officers and NCO's who make promotions and pass out punishments must in our minds walk around to the other side of that desk, climb inside that man's skin, black or white, and look at the world the way he does. And when we make up our mind as to what action to take, we must not let blackness or whiteness enter into it.

And when any of us white men are sitting in a bar or club, or waiting in a line, or riding a bus, and we see a man who is black we should not simply think "That's a black man" and stop there. We should think -- I wonder what kind of a man he is - what his hopes are, what his problems are, what's going on inside him. We should look at him as a fellow man.

What I am saying is not always easy to do. Each of us has his own hangups to overcome. But I have found that the best way to overcome them is to try to imagine how I would feel if I were black. I ask every white man to do the same.

I said that Grigsby is my friend. That's true. Every man in this command is my friend. I would like my friends to be friends to each other.


J. H. CUSHMAN
Major General, USA
Commanding

The drug and racial situation in the Delta, while not extreme, called for some unusual measures. One of those was for me to go out and “rap” with the troops.

General ‘Raps’ With GIs in Delta, Encourages Them to Quit Drugs

BINH THUY, Vietnam (AP).

—Two rock bands blared from the floodlit stage as GIs in full uniforms, parts of uniforms, bleached T-shirts, cutoff jeans, striped bellbottoms and tennis shoes sat on straw mats in the evening darkness and listened to the music and the message.

“All you brothers,” said one black performer, “you blue-eyed brothers too. We’ve got to get together, help each other. We’ve got to get off this stuff, this skag, this smack, this speed, this grass. It’s bad for your body and it’s bad for your mind.”

Inside a half-finished coffee house in a nearby trailer Maj. Gen. John H. Cushman slouched on a straight-back wooden chair, hands folded behind his head, sweating in the heat, surrounded by maybe 100 GIs.

‘RAPS’ WITH MEN

The 50-year-old commander of the 18,000 U. S. troops in the Mekong Delta had come to “rap” with his men, something he has done almost nightly since a delta-wide drug crackdown — the most extensive yet for GIs in Vietnam — went into effect a week ago.

The GIs around Cushman were peace beads, headbands and Mickey Mouse T-shirts. They were the “heads,” the addicts and the ex-addicts that Cushman has been trying to help with his drug crackdown, dubbed the “Delta Dryout.”

The GIs had voiced their complaints, their reasons for trying drugs in the first place: boredom, homesickness, harassment by “lifers” (career noncommissioned officers and officers) lack of leadership and guidance and communication breakdowns with their superiors.

DRIVEN BACK

“If a guy admitted he was an addict and went on the amnesty program,” one soldier told Cushman, “and he came back to his unit clean, down, off dope, he’d get harassed more than ever by the lifers, he’d get the lousy jobs, the boring jobs, the rotten details—and he’d be driven right back onto dope.”

“Sir,” said one man in the group, “I’m an E-7—sergeant first class. I used to think all these guys were freaks. But that was ignorance. We’re learning too—we all have to



GI ADDICT ASKS HELP
... Army doctor listens

learn—that these are social and medical problems. We’re all in this together, we all have to learn together.”

“Well, there it is. This is the most rewarding thing I’ve ever been involved with. If we can save those five guys, or 25 or 50, keep them from wrecking their lives with skag, then it’ll be worth all the trouble and inconvenience this thing is causing all 18,000 of us in the delta.”

I held a seminar with only black soldiers. My memorandum for record, next page.

1. At 1400 hours, 14 August 1971, in the Can Tho NCO Open Mess, I held a seminar for approximately 120 black soldiers from the Delta, roughly two men from each unit in the Can Tho-Binh Thuy-Vinh Long areas. The seminar was ended at 1600, but discussion with some of the men continued until 1645.

2. The seminar was very orderly. For my part, I was not sure in advance how it would come off -- but I was very much impressed with the sincerity, decency, conviction and articulateness of the men who spoke. If these men were selected by, and representative of, their fellow blacks, then the black soldiers of the Delta have good judgment.

3. The men raised many problems. Most of these are familiar to us who have paid any attention to racial harmony in Army units. I summarize them below:

a. Military Justice: Almost every survey of racial problems leads to the conclusion that black soldiers think that Article 15 and court martial administration results in black soldiers getting more punishment than white soldiers for similar offenses. They believe that the Army and their unit have a double standard. (Some surveys have revealed that the facts bear out this judgment.)

b. Job Assignment and Promotion: I was impressed with the detailed understanding of these men with the regulations on MOS and classification and assignment policies. Blacks are very sensitive in their perceptions of commanders who do not go by these policies, regardless of race.

c. Black Pride: Commanders who fail to understand the thinking of the young black today may tend to interpret the pride a black man has in his race as "militancy". There is a mood of "black awareness" among blacks in our society that we must welcome. It is a very healthy development. The Army, and indeed American society as a whole, can benefit greatly from growing pride by blacks in their race and its achievements.

d. Lack of Understanding and Communication: This is at the root of most problems in the Army today, and not just the black problem. Commanders and leaders must take the time to communicate with their men. I would suggest that every commander set himself down with a few black men, or even with all the black men in his unit, and let the discussion move around openly. I would also suggest that commanders set-up discussion councils in their units in which both black and white soldiers would participate, and that the commanders lead these discussions, sensing the mood of their men and taking concrete action to improve things as problem areas are revealed.

4. One thing that impressed me very much about this meeting was the commitment that black men have to the 'American dream' - set forth in such words as "liberty and justice for all" from our Pledge of Allegiance, and "all men are created equal" from our Declaration of Independence. These soldiers want to make that dream come true. I, for one, think that white men and especially we leaders who are white can join them in that objective and can lead our Army and our country in that direction.

While we were getting started on all this, on May 25 General Truong and I were traveling in my Huey to Ca Mau. We were following a canal at about 200 feet and a Viet Cong drew a bead on us with his AK-47, fired a burst, and shot us down.

SAIGON (AP) — Viet Cong marksmen shot down a U.S. helicopter carrying an American general and a South Vietnamese general today, but a third general in an accompanying helicopter rescued them unhurt.

Aboard the downed helicopter were Maj. Gen. John H. Cushman, commander of the Military Assistance Command in the Mekong delta, and Maj. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, commanding general in the delta military region.

Their chopper was hit by small arms fire while over the northern part of the U Minh forest, about 145 miles southwest of Saigon.

The U.S. pilot and his crew were wounded, a U.S. military spokesman reported, but all the passengers escaped unhurt.

They were rescued in a few minutes by a helicopter carrying Maj. Gen. Nguyen Vinh Nghi, commander of the South Vietnamese 21st Infantry division, which has been conducting a

large sweep operation in the U Minh forest since Dec. 1.

A U.S. spokesman, Maj. Richard Gardner, said Gen. Cushman and Gen. Truong were on a "routine visit to military posts" in the Ca Mau peninsula.

Aides of Gen. Truong said it was the fifth time in the war he had been shot down in a helicopter.

In other action today, North Vietnamese forces 23 miles northwest of

I was not flying the helicopter. The pilot, wounded in the shoulder, autorotated it into a rice paddy. Its engine was disabled. 21st Division troops protected it until it was lifted out.

In the midst of all this the Hackworth affair erupted. His secret interview with ABC news was taped in April. It went on the air in July while he was on R&R in Australia. The MACV Inspector General began his investigation of certain Hackworth charges.¹ In so doing he discovered gross misdeeds in the Team 50 compound. Before a report could be written and charges preferred. Hackworth was on his way to the United States. See Appendix A, pages 19A-1 to 19A-5 below.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever get around to using Operation Excellence?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: In May we had begun organizing, concurrently with our planning for the drug crackdown. I had drafted three smart officers (LTC Finehout, Major Conforti, and Captain James) from CORDS. They had set up shop over there, where we had our many meetings.

The strategic objective being Vietnamization, I had established six objectives:

1. Pacification. This was already well in hand, the CORDS effort.
2. Turn Over to the GVN programs and activities currently performed by US advisors.
3. Train the RVNAF so as to build a skilled base of its own trainers.
4. Improve RVNAF military operations to function with less and less US support.
5. Professionalism in the Command, aimed at improving US forces' quality of performance.

¹ General Abrams, outraged at Colonel Hackworth, sent his Inspector General down into my Advisory Team 50 without letting me know that he was doing it. I did not like that. Although I believed that I was, through lack of attention for almost a year, culpable in not having had a clue about the gross misbehavior discovered by the IG, I was equally outraged. General Abrams never shared his feelings on Hackworth with me. I don't think he was ever of a mind to especially blame me.

6. Orderly Phasedown of the US effort, with emphasis on the word “orderly.”

I had brought with me from Fort Devens all my material on Operation Excellence. My first task was to indoctrinate my three smart officers. They grasped it well. Captain James came up with a name: REVAMP, Redoubled Vietnamization and Military Professionalism.

They wrote a paper of about a dozen pages that explained the methodology.

From the paper: "The technique by which the CG, DRAC, monitored and motivated this program was to meet for a total of 4–5 hours each week, 30 minutes at a time, with selected action officers to review the status of their programs and to give guidance. The REVAMP staff kept records of the actions taken at each meeting, and nominated to the CG candidates for the following week's meeting. Summary sheets were monitored by the REVAMP coordinator to reflect a new situation or accomplishments."

We followed the Fort Devens format: Objective; Situation; Program for Attainment of the Objective (assigning responsibility for each step); How Progress is Measured; and Target Dates. Steps in the Program for Attainment often generated a Level 2 Objective and even a series of Levels 3.

Taking one Objective at a time, I gathered around a table the individuals concerned with it. In two or three meetings we developed its Situation, Program for Attainment, and all the rest. By June 20 we were far enough along to print an article in the Delta Dragon.

Just as at Fort Devens, acceptance of the program did not come easily. It seemed excessive paperwork. But we stayed with it. In three months, Colonel Finehout and his team were getting results. Their widely distributed REVAMP Information Bulletin No. 8-71 of August 28, 1971, explained REVAMP's mechanics. It offered a Level 2 example under Turnover.

Objective: To turn over the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to the Vietnamese. It showed progress...

LEVEL 2	LEVEL 3	HOW?	WHEN?	PROGRESS
ACIFICATION REPORTING	1. HES	a. Form and train District Evaluation Teams.	30 Jun 71	Completed
		b. Have the teams submit practice reports.		1st Month OK
		c. If practice reports are acceptable turn over the reporting responsibility on the following schedule:		Completed
		10 Districts	1 Jul 71	1st Month some minor problems- corrected.
		12 Districts	1 Sep 71	
8 Districts	1 Oct 71			
10 Districts	1 Nov 71			
5 Districts	1 Dec 71			
d. Evaluate quality of reports.				
e. Upon receipt of guidance from MACCORDS, Plan turn over of remaining districts.		1 Dec 71		

In June Colonel Hill became available. I made him my Deputy Zone Coordinator and responsible for the REVAMP Objective, Professionalism in the Command. It entailed such Level 2 Objectives as: Improve Living Conditions; Improve Recreational Opportunities; Motivate and Train Junior Officers; Strengthen NCO Performance; Improve Troop Information; Reduce (to the minimum) Drug Usage by the Troops.

INTERVIEWER: What was the effect?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Around Christmas-time we had a visit from a Department of the Army drug control team that was touring Vietnam. For our presentation to them, I gathered around a table our team for Professionalism in the Command. As I remember, it included:

- Colonel Hill, Deputy Zone Coordinator
- Provost Marshal, with his MP company commander
- Commander, 3d Surgical Hospital
- G-1, DRAC, and his drug control officer
- The morale, welfare, and recreation officer
- Chief of PA&E, a civilian contractor who was responsible for barracks facilities²
- DRAC command sergeant major

² Pacific Architects and Engineers, called "Promises, Alibis, and Excuses" by the troops.

Alongside the sergeant major, who was black, was the (clean shaven) Specialist Grigsby. When it was the command sergeant major's turn to speak, he said something like "Before General Cushman got here, drugs and everything else were in bad shape. Since he got here, everything has gotten a lot better." Specialist Grigsby said, "I second that emotion."

INTERVIEWER: What was your relationship with General Abrams?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: As General McCown's deputy I had little contact with General Abrams. In command of DRAC I was one of his principal subordinates. He met with his MACV staff in a Weekly Intelligence Estimate Update (WIEU). Monthly he brought in his regional commanders and the commanders of Naval Forces Vietnam and the Seventh Air Force, for what was called the Monthly WIEU. I regularly attended.

After I took command my first face-to-face was on June 20 in his office. I laid out to him and General Weyand details of our plan for the Delta drug crackdown -- instructions for gate guards and the inspections of vehicles, what unit commanders were to say to their troops at reveille June 22, and the like.

Abrams listened, then asked General Weyand what he thought. General Weyand was dubious. I don't remember what bothered him; it may have been the scope of the crackdown. In any event, suggestions were made. I remember exactly what General Abrams said after our discussion, "This is just free advice. Go ahead with your plan."

For a few days during the crackdown, I kept him informed of results through daily back channels. Because our NCOs were rising to the occasion, he remarked that I was presented with the opportunity to broaden the crackdown into something bigger, which I did. When I reported daily no longer and as we went ahead with REVAMP, he kept himself informed of what I was doing.

A vignette: The CORDS staff under Wilbur Wilson conducted each month a day-long session for its sixteen province advisors to which were invited CORDS people from Saigon. I found these to be very informative. Inasmuch as nothing especially classified or sensitive was discussed, I invited a couple of newspaper correspondents whom I trusted to attend one such session, on "background."

Bill Colby, deputy COMUSMACV for CORDS came down for the session. In a discussion of outpost defense, Bill described a recent WIEU in which a particularly egregious incident of poor outpost defense was raised, and was commented on with vehemence by General Abrams. Unfortunately one of my "trusted" correspondents saw fit to file a story on the matter. At the next WIEU, a monthly one at which I was present, General Abrams asked, how does a story like that get into the newspapers so fast?

Bill Colby said, "I was the source" and told how it had happened. General Abrams said not a word then, although he might have asked what in the world I was doing inviting correspondents to a CORDS meeting.

Later in that WIEU I spoke about an initiative we had begun in the Delta. We had set up a Support Operations Coordination Center (SOCC) near the Cambodian border. It was manned by Cambodian and ARVN officers and a representative of the 164th Aviation Group. Its purpose was to facilitate aviation, specifically Cobra gunship, support of the FANK.

General Abrams asked, "Are you going to invite correspondents?" That was all. No more.

For a later monthly WIEU General Abrams telephoned and invited me to come up early and spend the night at his quarters in the MACV compound. I joined him in time for dinner and a discussion afterward with a few senior officers. A couple of his younger children were in the house. After breakfast the next morning he drove me to the WIEU. I took it that I might have come across to General Abrams as an intense sort of person and that he was trying to put me at ease.

In December a clipping from the Fort Campbell newspaper arrived. General Westmoreland, speaking at an AUSA event, had announced that the 101st Airborne Division was coming back to Fort Campbell in 1972 and that I would command it. My DEROS was approaching. My replacement at DRAC had been named. It was my classmate Tom Tarpley, then commanding the 101st Airborne Division. The 101st was itself preparing to return Stateside.

Back at Clark Field, Nancy had recently been suffering much pain from her partially repaired hip. She was more than ready to go home. A total hip replacement was waiting for her in Massachusetts General Hospital. Adverse reaction to painkillers had taken her into the Clark Field hospital. I was planning to take Christmas leave to be with her.

Before Christmas, I had a telephone call from General Abrams. He said something like this: "Jack, I'm just exploring the idea, but when Bill Colby leaves Vietnam early next year I'm thinking of making you my Deputy for CORDS. It's not a definite proposal, just something I am considering."


After telling him about Nancy, I said, "Sir, I've got to think about this." He said, "OK, let me know."

I called General Abrams from Clark Field. I told him that I appreciated his consideration of me but that in view of Nancy's situation I was unable to accept. I told him that, if Tom Tarpley could take over DRAC I was in fact interested in going home right away.

I did not return to Vietnam, My aide traveled back and forth from DRAC to Clark Field while I wound up my affairs and completed my end-of-tour report. In mid-January I was on the way home with my family.

On my efficiency report General Abrams wrote: "Of his age group he is the finest major general I know. Of all major generals I know he is among the four best. Should be selected for lieutenant general. Has all the right instincts and the courage and will to carry them through."

Before I left Clark Field, I received this...



Dear Jack - 16 January '72

I appreciated your note especially about Nancy's improvement. Please know that my best wishes are with you both and your children. I will especially include Nancy's health and recovery in my prayers.

I have enjoyed our service together. Most rewarding has been the chance to see you carry the responsibility of M&A. Your instincts are right and you have the courage and will to back them. I have great confidence in the quality of service you will provide your country.

Sincerely,
Christopher W. Abrams.

INTERVIEWER: How did your family get along at Clark Field?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: The trip there was an adventure in itself. Nancy went with Mary, seventeen, Jack, sixteen. Ted, twelve, and Anne, seven. They sailed from San Diego on the SS President Cleveland and stopped in Hawaii and Japan. When their ship arrived in Hong Kong I met them, then flew to the Philippines to greet them at Manila.

At Clark Field they had ample three-bedroom quarters, with room for a servant, in a community set aside for families of officers serving in Vietnam. Mary had been admitted to Wellesley and had chosen to delay entry for year. By September she was bored so I arranged for her to be admitted to a school in New Zealand. It was a college preparatory school run by the nuns of the Sacred Heart, the order that had educated her older sisters while I was working in the Pentagon; Mary was a one semester postgraduate student. After that she went home to college. Jack enrolled in the high school at Clark Field where there were teenage pals. He spent a summer in Australia as a "jackaroo" on a sheep station. Mary and Jack traveled together to visit Taiwan and came over to Vietnam for a week, part of which was out in the countryside. Ted and Anne went to the Clark Field grade school; playmates abounded. I was able to telephone Nancy frequently and at four or five week intervals I visited home for a weekend.

INTERVIEWER: How would you assess that Vietnam tour?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: One key finding is on page 2 of my end-of-tour report...

2. (U) The Need for Insight. "Insight" is mentioned above. All too often insight is gained too late, and through adverse experience. I believe that great costs could have been saved in the Vietnam experience if our individual and collective insight had been better as things were developing. I claim no particular insight, but I do have some views on how insight can be gained.

Insight - or the ability to see the situation as it really is - is the most valuable asset an advisor can have. Intellect alone does not guarantee insight. Soldierly virtues such as integrity, courage, loyalty, and steadfastness are valuable indeed, but they are often not accompanied by insight. Insight comes from a willing openness to a variety of stimuli, from intellectual curiosity, from observation and reflection, from continuous evaluation and testing, from conversations and discussions, from review of assumptions, from listening to the views of outsiders, and from the indispensable ingredient of humility. Self-doubt is essential equipment for a responsible officer in this environment; the man who believes he has the situation entirely figured out is a danger to himself and to his mission.

I dwell on this because, while insight is the secret of good generalship in any situation, it is even more a requirement among the intangibles, nuances, and obscurities of a situation like Vietnam. Certainly the responsible officer must be a man of decision, willing to settle on a course of action and to follow it through. But the reflective, testing, and tentative manner in which insight is sought does not mean indecisiveness. It simply raises the likelihood that the decided course of action will be successful, because it is in harmony with the real situation that exists. I am convinced that the subjective insight into the conditions which actually prevail comes about only in the way I describe.

I was expressing my long-held deep conviction that the first thing you have to do is to Understand the Situation.

I felt very good about my tour. I still do. I had demonstrated to myself that when put in charge of a large enterprise I could figure out the situation, determine what was required, and handle it reasonably well. I was gratified at General Abrams' favorable opinion of me.

As I headed home for command of the 101st Airborne Division and Fort Campbell in an all volunteer Army, I was confident in my ability to take on that task. I might have been too confident. At Fort Devens and in the Delta my direct superiors had given me free rein. In future assignments they would have ideas of their own.

I wonder now how my life would have unfolded if I had been able to accept General Abrams' invitation to consider being named his Deputy for CORDS. If he had done so it likely would have meant, in time, a promotion to three-star rank. It probably would have kept me in Vietnam for a couple of years, during which I suppose the same sort of events might well have occurred in that war. Eventually Vietnam would have been lost.

I would not have commanded the 101st Airborne Division nor have been Commandant of the Command and General Staff College. I probably would not have commanded I Corps (ROK/US) Group in 1976-78, defending Korea's Western Sector. That was my last job in the Army.

Those narratives will come in later chapters.

On leaving the Delta, among my mementos was (next page):

HEADQUARTERS
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO 96215

TO: CG

Sir,


I sure didn't think I'd be saying farewell in this manner.

If a LTC can say so to a General, I'd like to say I really admired your style. I've worked for many different people but, I don't think I'll ever again put our as much and learn as much about command as I have from you in the past six months.

It's been rewarding and definiately exciting and I do look forward to perhaps working for you again in the future.

Would you please jot a memento on the attached photo, believe it or not they were all grabbed up ~~from~~ by people who want to keep them. I'd like to point to it with pride some day when you are CSA.

Respectfully,



PAUL P. CORONEOS

LTC, US Army

Office of the ACofS, G1

DATE: 17 January 1971

Appendix (Hackworth) to Chapter 19

In late 2010 I was working on a paper titled "Chain of Command Performance of Duty, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, 2005-06."

My draft of November 4 had a section titled "Command Experiences That Have Shaped My Outlook," pages 35-40 of which were titled "Hackworth, 1971." Those pages used a 1998 posting that I had made on West Point-Org, a list server for USMA graduates. Having heard that the West Point Society of New York had invited its members to "A Library Evening at the Union League Club" featuring "One of Our Nation's Most Decorated Veterans Col. David Hackworth, USA Retired," I wanted my experience with Hackworth to be known to those West Pointers.

That posting follows. It was omitted in my final paper, dated November 11, 2010.

* * * * *

In 1970 and 1971 I was deputy senior advisor and then senior advisor to the Vietnamese commander in South Vietnam's Delta region. In August 1970, while I was a brigadier general and deputy senior advisor, Colonel David Hackworth reported in. He had been assigned by MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam) to become the senior advisor and chief of the 44th Special Tactical Zone, one of four division-level advisory teams in our region.

This colonel's reputation had preceded him. He had been a heroic figure as a lieutenant and captain in the Korean War. He had distinguished himself as a major in his first Vietnam tour with the 101st Airborne Division's First Brigade. He had been co-author, with the legendary S.L.A. Marshall, of an official U.S. Army text on counterinsurgency tactics. A rugged man with considerable charm, he was a favorite with the Vietnam press corps.

He came to us from a tour as an advisor in the north. Recently promoted, he had asked to be extended to remain in Vietnam another year in this new advisory job, even though he had reportedly been offered a very choice job in the Pentagon.

This colonel and his advisory team were within my sphere of responsibility as brigadier general, deputy senior advisor. I became major general and, in April 1971, the senior advisor. He and his team were under my, essentially full, command.

For about a year I was this colonel's boss. When his tour ended and he indicated his intention to retire from the Army, I not only recommended him for a Legion of Merit, in July

¹ Black Hearts, by Jim Frederick, told how, in 2005-06 in an insurgent-ridden area south of Baghdad, a platoon of the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, underwent a breakdown of discipline. Four soldiers raped a 14-year-old girl, shot to death the girl and her six year old sister and their parents, and burned their bodies. I had commanded the 2d Brigade Task Force of the 101st Airborne Division during the Vietnam War. Appalled at what I read, I decided to look into the matter and to write a paper with such conclusions as might be warranted about the chain of command's supervision.

1971 I presented him with it at my headquarters as a ceremony to which I had invited a news correspondent friend of his. A few days after that ceremony, he left for an R&R in Australia. To my vast chagrin, I then discovered that I had been taken in by this man.

Not only had this officer a few days earlier, while he was senior advisor and in his own compound, taped a network television interview in which he had assailed the U.S. advisory effort (dismaying enough, but no court-martial offense), in the next weeks an inspection of his former advisory team by the MACV inspector general revealed the most unsavory of conditions.

It turned out that this officer had been part of a Saigon-based ring selling supplies from his own Post Exchange on the black market. He had condoned, and even supported, prostitution on his compound. Married, with his wife living under MACV sponsorship at Clark Air Base in the Philippines, he had kept a mistress in his quarters. He had falsified records in his advisory team. And there was more.

Officers and enlisted men in Hackworth's advisory compound were well aware of much of this and other behavior. None had brought it to anyone's attention in a way that led to me having even a rumor of it.

Now, commanders are expected to know what is going on in their commands. They are expected to get out in their commands and look. They are expected to have good antennae, eyes open, ears open. They are expected to use effectively the standard techniques of command and inspector general inspection, both scheduled and surprise.

But I had failed. Under my very eyes, an unworthy officer had abused his trust and I had neither sensed nor known it was happening. I had taken things for granted, and the damage to the Army and Vietnam was great.

Although he never even hinted to me that I had failed him, I know that my boss, General Abrams, suffered. He and his Chief of Staff both remarked "He really fooled me," General Abrams deserved much better from me.

He sought to bring the officer to account. The offenses were clearly serious enough for a court-martial. But the offender started his counterattack. He claimed that he was being persecuted for speaking out on television, and later in the press, on the deficiencies in the Vietnam effort. He had his friends in the press. Knowing him for his reputation, they tended to think, or at least to reflect in print, that he was innocent of wrong-doing and was being victimized. A cause celebre began to develop.

Returning to Washington, this colonel engaged Joseph Califano, a Washington attorney who had been prominent in the Johnson administration. Eventually, and evidently because they saw no end to unfavorable publicity, it was the decision of the Secretary of

the Army and Chief of Staff to drop the case for court-martial and to let the officer retire from active duty. He did so, and moved to Australia.

Although I had not seen him in recent years, Joe Califano was a personal friend with whom I had worked in his early days in the Pentagon. When I returned to the United States in 1972 I saw him. I asked him how in the world he could have defended so vigorously an officer who was such a disgrace to the Army.

His reply was: "Jack, he showed me the citation of the Legion of Merit you gave him. I thought that anyone you had recommended for a Legion of Merit must be all right."

The author Ward Just, who once wrote admiringly of him, said to me once that Hackworth "had one Vietnam tour too many." To those of us who really know him he is unworthy of respect and questionable as an authority on anything. I could and should have uncovered his misbehavior while he was under my command.

(end of my 1998 posting for the benefit of the West Point Society of New York))

After I had been retired a few years, Hackworth's collaborator in writing his book About Face wrote me from Australia asking for my input on his time with me. I replied in scathing terms. Although in his last chapter he has little favorable to say about me, he quotes with pride my last OER on him...

"Colonel Hackworth is a brilliant officer, of impressive reputation as a combat unit commander, extraordinarily innovative, and with exceptional insight into the nature of insurgency. He is a natural leader of soldiers. He attracts outstanding people, especially those of his own 'tiger' type. He is tremendously able in a troop situation. He is an excellent organizer, writes very well, and is widely read in his profession. He has a magnetic, driving personality. His many achievements in this assignment include the imaginative development of effective mobile training teams for territorial forces, innovations in airmobile tactics, and major upgrading of advisory team administration and the team compound. He works very well with the Vietnamese. Colonel Hackworth is a real standout. If he were to stay in the Army, he should be given a broadening assignment outside a troop situation, working with someone he respects and could emulate, where he could further develop the maturity, tolerance, patience, and breadth that are essential characteristics of a general officer."

While in Vietnam I learned that the report of the MACV Inspector General's investigation of Hackworth listed among its conclusions that he, while acting in the capacity of Senior Advisor, Advisory Team 50, RVN:

- lied under oath to the MACV Inspector General;
- smoked marijuana with subordinate officers and enlisted men;
- condoned prostitution on the Team 50 compound;
- cohabited on the compound with a woman who was not his wife;

- "lacked the character, integrity and moral attributes required of an officer and a gentleman, acted without honor in dealings with his subordinates and superiors alike and was derelict in the performance of his duties as Senior Advisor of Advisory Team 50..."

I have yet to get over my failure to supervise.

There has come into my possession the full 1971 MACV Inspector General investigation of Hackworth. It is in the series, United States Army in Vietnam, Public Affairs and the Media, 1968-1973, by William M. Hammond, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1996. On its page 499, from footnote 14: "The Report of Investigation on Hackworth may be found in MACVIG, MIV-67-71, 26 Aug 71, sub: Report of Investigation Concerning Col. David Hackworth, 334-77-0074, box 1, vol. 5, tab T." (without however any of its 19 exhibits and 43 witness statements)

The report says that Colonel Hackworth departed Vietnam for the United States while an investigation was being conducted about his allegations that assailed the current US advisory effort and raised matters of a previous Vietnam tour. The report says that after Hackworth's departure information had surfaced to the effect that he had smoked marijuana with officers and enlisted men of his advisory team; an investigation had begun into Advisory Team 50.

Extracts from the resulting MACV IG report:

"During the investigation... many disclosures of COL Hackworth's dereliction of duty, unprofessional conduct and illegal practices were revealed... inducing his subordinates into performing an illegal act by converting MPC (military payment certificates, or "script") to US dollar instruments and sending them to CONUS for Colonel Hackworth... (and) further disclosures of COL Hackworth's duplicity and selling green US dollars for MPC on the Saigon black market for personal profit over a period of two and one-half years in RVN..."

"...in order to successfully conduct his operations, COL Hackworth fostered conditions at Team 50 that kept the team members happy. Normal military discipline was relaxed in that saluting in the compound was dropped and complete uniforms were not required. Female guests were allowed in barracks and a steam bath, which also provided the services of prostitutes, was built on the compound... the post exchange was expanded and offered items for sale which are not authorized... The club system was expanded... and an unauthorized snack bar established. Gambling was not only condoned but encouraged, drinking and gambling were commonplace. Three-day passes to Saigon and Can Tho were granted to individuals once each month. A liberal award program was established whereby team members were often given ARCOMs or BSMs every two months... COL Hackworth knowingly recommended LT (name omitted) and MSG (Name omitted) for Combat Infantry Badges which were not justified..."

“Colonel Hackworth had a magnetic personality, took interest in every team member and associated with men of all ranks. He developed and expected that they would have loyalty to him alone. He organized a small group of close associates who were primarily people who had served previously with him during his 20 years experience in the Army and whom he had brought together. They kept him informed of the entire situation of the team. The end result was a compound operating with little discipline and maximum pleasure where irregular or illegal practices were either unnoticed or condoned. Within this environment, COL Hackworth’s money manipulation program flourished...

“Although DRAC command and staff visits were conducted to Team 50 the emphasis was placed on current situation reports and not on the internal operations of the team. Although indicators of improper practices and poor management procedures were present, they were not noticed or were ignored. For example the operation of the steam bath and snack bar were known at DRAC headquarters and the large number of awards given to Team 50 members were processed through the DRAC staff by the AG without further action.

“GENERAL CONCLUSIONS...

“The broad allegations made by COL Hackworth to the news media and the specific allegations against (name omitted here) are unsubstantiated...

“Colonel Hackworth smoked marijuana with subordinate officers and enlisted men... lied while under oath to the MACV Inspector General... induced his subordinates to illegally purchase dollar instruments and transfer them from Vietnam on his behalf... it is highly probable that (he) engaged in manipulation of US currency... (He) was derelict in the performance of his duties... by signing false official documents, recommending undeserved awards, taking excess leaves and R&R’s... condoning prostitution on Team 50 compound... participating in and condoning gambling for high stakes at Monte Carlo night... openly gambling with enlisted subordinates... cohabiting with a female on advisory team 50 compound... misusing the military postal system in his money manipulation scheme...

“Command and staff visits by DRAC were ineffective in determining indications of problem areas in the internal operation of advisory team 50.” (underlining added)

I read that damning indictment with wonder. How did it happen that General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV, upon reading it in late August 1971, had not made then -- and never did -- make a mention of it to me, Hackworth’s commanding officer? No official notice has to my knowledge ever been taken of my failure to notice the gross misbehavior of Colonel Hackworth as it was happening.

General Abrams gave me a pass.

Chapter Twenty

Commanding the 101st Airborne Division

GENERAL CUSHMAN: With my family I left the Philippines in late January 1972. I had arranged for our travel to take us first to Lexington, MA, where Nancy's parents were living, for about four weeks leave. We would occupy VIP guest accommodations at nearby Hanscom AFB. Nancy would go into Massachusetts General Hospital for replacement hip surgery by Dr. Hugh Chandler. He was renowned, having pioneered in that operation. After Nancy's recovery, we would all go to Fort Campbell where our household goods and the family car that we had taken to the Philippines would be waiting for us. In early March I would take command and await the return from Vietnam of the 101st Airborne Division

INTERVIEWER: Let's talk about the big picture. How did you look at creating a division in the new all-volunteer Army?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: The war in Vietnam, having lost the support of Congress and the American people, was winding down. Morale was generally poor Army-wide. The draft would be ending;¹ we would be building an all volunteer division.

Reenlistments were low. For recruiting and retention the Army must be made attractive. In late 1970 General Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff, had emphasized that unnecessary elements and unattractive features of the soldiers' life must be eliminated.² In early 1971 he and the Secretary of the Army had made the newly promoted Lieutenant General George I. Forsythe, with a staff, their "Special Assistant for the All-Volunteer Army" and had launched Project VOLAR. Special measures were needed to improve the quality of military life, foster retention and attract volunteers.

From the imaginative George Forsythe (whose assistant was none other than my former colleague and new Brigadier General Robert M. Montague) ideas began to flow. While Nancy was recuperating I visited their offices in the Pentagon. George Forsythe told me about the Unit of Choice program. Approved by General Westmoreland a year earlier and

¹ From Wikipedia: "In 1968 Richard Nixon campaigned on a promise to end the draft. The Department of Defense and Congress opposed the idea so Nixon took no immediate action, forming instead a commission headed by former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr. The Gates Commission issued its report in February 1970 describing how adequate military strength could be maintained without conscription. In February 1971, the administration requested of Congress a two-year extension of the draft, to June 1973. After prolonged debate in the Senate the draft renewal bill was approved. Meanwhile, military pay was increased as an incentive to attract volunteers, and television advertising for the U.S. Army began."

² From Wikipedia: "In November 1970, General Westmoreland wrote a message to Army commanders, in which he provided detailed guidance on transitioning to a volunteer army. Westmoreland wrote specifically that "unnecessary elements and unattractive features of Army life' must be eliminated, and that they must "leave no stone unturned." Additionally, Westmoreland articulated his wishes that the recruitment and retention system should deal with people as individuals, on more personal levels. Army leaders desired not only basic improvements in the quality of Army life, but also in the standards of Army professionalism. The project needed to create substantive policies to do so. The project also needed to focus on the shifting cultural patterns of American youth, and determine precisely how their values intersected with the potential for their military enlistment." This guidance matched my own thinking and actions at Fort Devens and in IV Corps/MR4.

tested at Fort Benning, GA, by the 197th Infantry Brigade, the UOC program allowed newly recruited soldiers to enlist for a specific unit and be guaranteed that they would go there. The 197th Infantry Brigade had developed working relationships with Army Recruiting Command recruiters Georgia and nearby states, along with publicity programs. The UOC program was producing good results. It seemed just the ticket for the 101st Airborne Division.

INTERVIEWER: The mid-70s are remembered as a time when the Army was generally in bad shape world-wide. How did you prepare yourself to take command of the division?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: In Vietnam I had nailed down some key people. Colonel George Viney was the chief of staff of the division in Vietnam. I asked him to be my chief of staff at Fort Campbell. The division G-1 was Bob St. Clair. I thought we should have him at Fort Campbell for continuity. They both agreed. From the DRAC staff I took back Captain James of my REVAMP team to work in the office of the Fort Campbell Comptroller, where he would educate all on the philosophy of Operation Excellence. I also had orders cut on SP4 Grigsby, whom I would use as I did in Vietnam.

In touch with Fort Campbell I learned that Brigadier General Collier Ross was in command; he had been G-3 of the 1st Cavalry Division when the 2nd Brigade went opcon to it back in January 1968. I learned that the 173d Airborne Brigade, back from Vietnam, was at Fort Campbell, redesignated as the 3rd Brigade of the 101st. The Army Training Center that had been set up in 1966 had just about closed down.

For my change of command ceremony LTG Albert O. Connor, commanding Third Army, came up from Fort McPherson, GA, to pass the Fort Campbell colors to me. Third Army was our higher headquarters.

INTERVIEWER: What did you do in your first days of command?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Just five years before I had been chief of staff of the division and post. I did not need much orientation. My immediate concern was to get the right people on board. I sized up some of the key people and took measures to replace a couple of them. I telephoned the chief of officer personnel in the Office of Personnel Operations and arranged to discuss, in an early visit, candidates for key slots.

At this stage, February 1972, the 101st Airborne Division was simply a collection of company Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&Es), including for example a TO&E for each of thirty-six rifle companies. Without a draft my challenge was to fill every slot in those TO&Es, to equip the units and train them as a team, and to produce a combat ready airmobile infantry division. I set a target date of 1 July 1973, sixteen months away. One element was already on hand, the 3rd Brigade with three infantry battalions and a slice of division units -- field artillery, engineer, medical and so on. It was about half strength, 2000 men. It was to remain airborne.

In April the 101st would return from Vietnam bringing two or three thousand more. It would bring the flags of the 1st and 2nd Brigades and their battalions and of those units of the division base that were not with the 3d Brigade. It was to have few airborne slots, only pathfinders and such (including the division commander and a few more). The 101st in Vietnam had been converted to an airmobile division, with 400 helicopters.

Most drafted men who were in the division in April 1972 would soon be given an “early out.” The division’s authorized strength was about 16,000. The Army would send us officers, noncommissioned officers staff sergeant and higher (and some sergeants), plus those enlisted personnel requiring training in special skills, such as helicopter mechanics and medics. It would be our responsibility to recruit the remainder, about 12,000 soldiers. After their basic training elsewhere we were to complete their individual training and form them into units.

INTERVIEWER: How did you go about recruiting the division?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I set up and led a team to develop a Unit of Choice recruiting plan. The former chief of staff of my IV Corps/MR4 advisory team in the Delta, a Colonel Woody Cavender who had gone home from Vietnam and retired, had previously been assigned to the Army Recruiting Command. I called to ask him to join us on invitational travel orders as our recruiting effort consultant. He agreed.

The Army Recruiting Command was organized into regions, each with recruiting districts. In the cities and towns of each district there were recruiting stations, with NCO recruiters. Using Woody Cavender, we arranged a scheme. The 101st Airborne Division would place an NCO canvasser in selected recruiting stations. The canvasser would work with recruiting NCOs to bring men into the 101st as their Unit of Choice. Stations with no canvasser would also recruit for the 101st.

We developed a pamphlet (next page). It’s worth a careful look.

**YOUNG MEN OF TENNESSEE
WE WANT YOU!**



**TO JOIN THE
101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY**

YOUR "UNIT OF CHOICE"

YOU CAN ENLIST NOW, FOR THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION, UNDER THE "UNIT OF CHOICE" OPTION.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN TO YOU?

IT MEANS YOU AND THE ARMY SIGN A CONTRACT.

YOU AGREE TO SERVE FOR THREE YEARS.

THE ARMY AGREES:

FIRST, TO SEND YOU TO THE BASIC TRAINING CENTER OF YOUR CHOICE, EITHER FORT ORD, CALIFORNIA; FORT LEONARD WOOD, MISSOURI; FORT POLK, LOUISIANA; FORT JACKSON, SOUTH CAROLINA; FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY; OR FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY.

SECOND, AFTER YOU FINISH BASIC TRAINING, THE ARMY AGREES TO SEND YOU TO FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY, FOR ADVANCED TRAINING AS AN AIRMOBILE INFANTRYMAN OR ARTILLERYMAN. THIS TRAINING WILL TAKE ABOUT 10 WEEKS. WHEN YOU FINISH THIS TRAINING, YOU CAN TAKE TWO WEEKS LEAVE.

THIRD, AS A QUALIFIED AIRMOBILE SOLDIER, YOU WILL JOIN THE FAMED 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION FOR A GUARANTEED 16 MONTHS.

FINALLY, IF YOU WANT TO BE A PARATROOPER IN THE 101ST, YOU MAY VOLUNTEER. IF YOU PASS THE PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS, YOU WILL BE SENT TO AIRBORNE SCHOOL AT FORT BENNING, GEORGIA, FOR THREE WEEKS.

HOW ABOUT IT? WANT TO JOIN THE 101ST?

**HOME OF THE
101st AIRBORNE DIVISION
(AIRMOBILE)
"SCREAMING EAGLES"**



"WE'RE IN THE CENTER OF IT ALL"

ADVANTAGES TO YOU

SERVE NEAR HOME – YOU CAN PLAN FOR FREQUENT WEEKENDS AND LEAVES WITH YOUR FRIENDS AND FAMILY.

A MEMBER OF THE "SCREAMING EAGLES" – YOU WILL WEAR THE PATCH OF THE FAMOUS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION, RESPECTED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

BUILD YOUR LEADERSHIP – AS YOU DEVELOP YOUR LEADERSHIP ABILITY, INCREASING RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE YOURS.

USE OF YOUR TIME AND TALENTS – THE 101ST WILL INSURE THAT YOUR TIME IS WELL SPENT IN MEANINGFUL WORK, BECAUSE WE THINK YOUR TIME IS IMPORTANT.

PERSONAL GROWTH – FIND YOURSELF AND GIVE DIRECTION TO YOUR LIFE. OPEN NEW CAREER OPPORTUNITIES.

PROMOTION AND INCOME – THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION LIKES TO RECOGNIZE A MAN FOR DOING A GOOD JOB; AS YOU ADVANCE, YOUR INCOME INCREASES.

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES – YOU CAN LEARN MILITARY SKILLS AND ALSO CAN ADVANCE YOUR CIVILIAN SCHOOLING. YOU CAN TAKE COLLEGE COURSES AT FORT CAMPBELL AND AT NEARBY COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1/2 OF THE TUITION IS PAID BY THE ARMY).

OTHER BENEFITS OF THE MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY – FREE FOOD AND HOUSING, UNIFORMS, GOOD PAY, FREE MEDICAL CARE, RETIREMENT BENEFITS, VETERANS' BENEFITS, AND ALL THE OTHER ADVANTAGES OF MILITARY SERVICE ARE YOURS.

My Adjutant General printed them for almost every state in the Union (one was for the Young Men of New England).

The 101st Airborne Division had six colonels commanding its major units: three brigades, the division artillery, the aviation group, and the division support command. Dividing the United States into six zones (Far West, New York/New England, etc.), I gave each major unit commander his instructions: (1) Work with all districts of one of these zones. (2) Provide canvassers to selected stations. (3) With those canvassers and the districts, organize and conduct an all out recruiting effort. The Army Recruiting Command agreed wholeheartedly to the scheme. It told all its districts to cooperate with the 101st.

The 3d Brigade, commanded by Jack Hemphill, got started. When the remaining colors of the 101st Airborne Division and its contingent of troops arrived at Fort Campbell, Jack had cooperation already under way with the districts in his zone. He had canvassers in place.

There was one problem. Years earlier, after the 1st Cavalry Division with its extra large yellow shoulder patch had arrived in Vietnam, the Army decreed for reasons of camouflage that shoulder patches on battle dress uniforms were to be in subdued color. The Cav had complied, but not the 101st. Throughout the Vietnam war its Screaming Eagle patch was white. When the 173rd had converted to the 3d Brigade/101st it had adopted the subdued eagle patch. I thought that would never do.

I especially wanted to have our canvassers wearing full-color Screaming Eagle patches on their battle dress. The matter came to a head when at the return ceremony the Vietnam troops paraded in battle dress and full-color patches and Fort Campbell's 101st soldiers in subdued ones.

That homecoming was on April 6. Vice President Agnew, General Westmoreland and a host of military and civilian dignitaries were there, along with the public from nearby who enjoyed exhibits and a post open house. The sparse division and all its colors formed under Tom Tarpley at Campbell Army Airfield for a ceremonial change of command and a parade.

The Fort Campbell Courier published a special edition that day, for distribution to visitors. We sent the Recruiting Command enough copies for all of its recruiting districts. I I wrote a column for it:

This is a great day for the 101st. Homecoming Day.

Today the colors of the Screaming Eagles are officially returned from Vietnam. The 101st Airborne Division completes a "tough job - well done" and the division command post reopens at Fort Campbell.

Today old neighbors join us in celebrating our return, and new friends from many miles around are coming to see us for the first time.

To these visitors, new friends and old, I address this column. I say to you: We want you to know us better, because in the coming months we intend to recruit thousands of young men from your area to join the U. S. Army in their "unit of choice" - the 101st Airborne Division.

What kind of an Army will these men join?

They will join the Modern Volunteer Army, an Army systematically programming itself toward improved professionalism and a more attractive life for the soldier. This program is under way. It is getting results - at Fort Campbell and everywhere the Army serves.

What kind of a division will these men join?

They will join a division that will be worthy of the heritage of the Screaming Eagles.

They will join a division that will be of a quality that the American people have a right to expect.

What are some qualities that you can expect in this division?

First - Discipline. This division's units and men will obey orders. They will do what they are told to do.

This may not need saying, but we will tell you anyhow. "Discipline is the soul of an Army."

We will run this division, and Fort Campbell, on the idea that what the American people want and need is a dependable organization that can be relied on to do what it is told, intelligently and according to instructions.

We think that discipline and high standards are what young men expect when they join

the Army, and what Americans expect of their Army.

We who are in charge of this division intend that the American people can be secure in the knowledge that this is what they will have in the 101st Airborne Division.

A second quality is - Concern. Concern for the mission. Concern for the individual.

We expect each leader in this division to have a deep and abiding commitment to the mission at hand, whatever that mission might be.

And we also expect each leader and staff member to have a personal and profound concern for each man of this division as an individual--as a man who deserves fair treatment, good use of his time, a wholesome environment in which he can live and work, and personal attention to his specific situation and problems.

There are other qualities you can expect in this division.

Frugality - We intend to conserve the resources allocated to us and to use them efficiently. We recognize that they are limited.

Rectitude - We intend to be 100 percent straight in our dealings with each other and in our care of the property and funds trusted to our care.

Efficiency - We know that life can never be perfect, but we set a high standard for efficiency and especially for the intelligent use of people's time.

Pride - Finally, we want you to know of our pride in being Americans, in being members of the U. S. Army, and in being Screaming Eagles of the 101st Airborne Division.

This division is small today. It is just getting started in its old home.

But it will grow. We who are members of it now pledge to you that it will grow well and strong.

We will need your sons and brothers and friends to join us to make it grow.

Send them to us. We will do right by them.

While waiting for my turn to come forward and receive from General Westmoreland the division colors, I heard grumblings from nearby generals deploring the subdued patches on the 3rd Brigade troopers. I decided to act.

A newly assigned soldier in the 101st Airborne Division received six division patches, two in full color for his Class A uniform and four subdued patches for his battle dress. For each current 3rd Brigade soldier we needed to replace his four subdued patches with full color ones. I did not want to use appropriated funds for those 8000 patches. George

Viney suggested that the local chapter of the 101st Airborne Division Association might raise the money for that purpose. Its officers agreed. With a motorcycle Moto Cross, and with a raffle and other measures, they raised enough money for full-color patches for the 3rd Brigade.

I believed the switch to full-color patches was essential for mission accomplishment. Writing a column for the Fort Campbell Courier explaining my decision, I mailed a copy to Major General Warren Bennett, the Secretary of the Army General Staff, with a letter explaining my rationale. The column:

I have issued instructions that during the month of May the subdued 101st Airborne Division patch, being worn on the left shoulder of the field uniform and the field jacket, will be replaced by the full color division patch.

New men arriving in the 101st from now on will be issued full color patches for wear on their left shoulder on all uniforms.

Those men who are authorized to wear a unit patch on the right shoulder, and who choose to do so on the utility uniform and field jacket, will wear the subdued patch regardless of whether it is the 101st division patch or that of another organization.

Individuals changing patches will receive them at no cost, sewn on according to schedules set up by unit commanders. Incidentally, these patches are being provided by the 101st Airborne Division Association at no expense to the government.

Let me explain why I have issued these instructions to put the color patch on full display on the left shoulder of every man assigned to the 101st Airborne Division, in every uniform -- field or dress.

I have done this because of the fierce pride that goes with being a member of this illustrious division. To highlight this pride which has sustained the fighting men of this division in the toughest of combat, we display our patch proudly.

I want each man of this division to be easily identified as a member of this elite and proud organization as we move about the surrounding states in our combat dress demonstrating our capabilities and showing our insignia in the Unit of Choice Recruiting Campaign.

I also do it so that this division will perform at its maximum ability in combat should combat ever be required.

Soldiers have realized for centuries that what ultimately motivates men in the stress of battle is pride in themselves as fighting men and pride in their unit. Men of the 101st Airborne Division carried the full color patch on their shoulders at Normandy and Bastogne, and through almost seven years of combat in Vietnam.

It was full color in Vietnam and Europe, it will be full color here at Fort Campbell, and it will be full color if we ever have to go into combat again.

Let me tell a couple of stories about this patch and what it meant to my own 2nd Brigade of the 101st, fighting in the area around Hue in 1968.

The "Ready To Go" brigade distinguished itself in the manner that 101st Airborne units always do. That patch inspired the men of the brigade as they fought with skill and determination, using their highly effective tactics of encirclement and annihilation. It also made a deep impression of our enemy.

One day we captured an enemy document in an ambush. It told unit commanders of the NVA and VC units -- "If you make contact with the airborne, disengage right away and get out of the area. They will surround and destroy you."

Another day one of our Vietnamese interpreters was interrogating an enemy prisoner. The interpreter did not know the English word for "eagle." In translating for the American officers, he simply said that the the prisoner was saying "That little bird is real mean!" The prisoner knew what it meant to be faced by fighting men wearing that patch!

So at the 2nd Brigade command post we put up a little sign: "That little bird is real mean."

The division patch on the left shoulder is an intangible and enormous asset. It makes for unit pride. It inspires and motivates men to reach heights they would not otherwise reach. It makes them willing to fight harder and sacrifice more. It makes them stand out in a crowd as proud members of an elite organization. It therefore contributes to combat readiness in a most fundamental and profound way.

So, men of the 101st--proudly put on the full color patch. Stand tall as you wear it on your left shoulder. Remember what it means to the men who have served and sacrificed in this division. Remember what it means to you.

And live up to its standards.

The 101st had embarked on an effort to build almost from scratch a combat ready airmobile division. Not only that, I had an installation to run, on which there were units other than the 101st Airborne Division under my command that needed fillers. It was a formidable task. I considered myself ready for it.


INTERVIEWER: What was your management approach?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I got into matters up to my elbows. Everything was of interest to me. I was out and about, usually daily. I had two excellent assistant division commanders (Clyde Lynn had reported in), one for operations and one for support. Colonel John Dillard, whom I had held over from the Army Training Center, was my first rate deputy post commander. I relied on each of these for supervision in his respective sphere; nonetheless I did not hesitate to enter into those spheres. I delegated, but I also made detailed wishes known. That may not be a preferred management style. My job was to plant the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell. I did it the one way I knew.

I was deeply involved in shaping the division. To bring people in and direct their assignment, I worked with a team -- Lou Menetrey, G-3; John Crosby, G-1, and Tony DiBeradino, Adjutant General. We built a system that, using computers, began with the Unit of Choice recruits, tracked them as they arrived, and monitored personnel fill as units grew. To equip division units I relied on Morrie Brady, my new ADC for Support, to help me pull together the efforts of commanders, the division and post G-4s, and Installation Supply to bring in, and to track, equipment delivery.

Squads were filled, 3d Brigade first. Squad and Individual training began. Officers and NCOs began to flow in. Major unit and battalion headquarters began to flesh out. The division structure formed.

I focused on efficiency of the post and troop behavior and standards. I had laid out early, in four issues of the Fort Campbell Courier, the fundamental principles that would govern what we did at Fort Campbell. They were: "We Do Things Right," "We Care," "We Work Together," and "We Obey Orders." The first two columns' lead-in paragraphs were...



Columns 3 and 4 began...

<p>My theme for today is "We Work Together".</p> <p>Life is complicated today, and it is getting more so. One characteristic feature of life is that people depend on each other more and more.</p> <p>Things are such that, if people are to deal with the problems that confront them, even simple problems like food and shelter, they have to work together. There is no other way.</p>	<p>I have one more. "We Obey Orders." Obedience is required in many kinds of organizations and institutions. Life would be chaotic if instructions were disregarded at will.</p> <p>However, obedience to orders is the singular hallmark of a military organization. Without this basic characteristic a military organization does not deserve to be labeled as such.</p>
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The Clarksville (TN) News Chronicle picked up these columns and for the information of its readers reprinted them in full.

I set policy through post regulations, memoranda to commanders, and my columns in the Fort Campbell Courier. Throughout the year my interests were manifold. Here is a sample of topics addressed in just one of the ways that I communicated, Leadership Notes...

<p>Basic Leadership Actions Thoughts for Commanders (Lim Dist) Modern Volunteer Army Programs Routine Administration (Lim Dist) Scheduling of Leave (Lim Dist) Commander's Self-Evaluation on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Pass Privileges First Modern Volunteer Army Directive AWOL and Deserter Procedures Senior¹Subordinate Relationships Commander's Call - 5 September 1972 Professionalism and the AUSA Command Reveille Basic Standards The Ineffective Soldier Attention to Families of our Men</p>

I go through all this to convey the intensity and scope of the effort that I was undertaking, and the energy and drive, and some of the techniques, that I was bringing to it. It is not that I claim that I was doing everything right; far from it.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me about your approach to training.

GENERAL CUSHMAN; The 101st was pioneering in the use of Unit of Choice to build a division.

Soldiers who enlisted for the 101st Airborne Division under Unit of Choice went first to an Army Basic Training Center. After that they came to the 101st for advanced individual training in a military occupational specialty (MOS). The concept was that we would train them in either an infantry MOS (11B, 11C, 11H)³ or as a cannoneer (13B), In practice, we ended up training combat engineers (21B) and certain others.

We set up an AIT center of our own. Lou Menetrey, the division and post G-3, organized committees made up of selected NCOs. These committees conducted training in subjects that were required knowledge of all soldiers -- first aid, map reading, field sanitation, and so on.

As new soldiers came in, company first sergeants scheduled them to enter the sequence established by our mini-AIT Center. Division periodically conducted an MOS qualification examination test using a “county fair.” Stations in the county fair tested the soldiers’ knowledge in each of the subjects.

MOS-specific skills for light weapons infantryman, cannoneers, and so on were taught to the soldier right there in his squad or crew by platoon NCOs. When a soldier’s company commander determined that he was MOS qualified, an entry was made in his enlisted personnel record. Ordinarily he was promoted to private first class. At our peak we had more soldiers in AIT than Fort Jackson did -- and their primary mission was AIT!

I believed that proper squad training require the presence of every man in the squad. I believed that platoons should train with full strength squads, and that when a company went to the field every soldier should be there (clerks could be left behind). I believed that three days of the week were sufficient for unit training at full strength and that in the other two days of the week a commander could be doing other things with his men, including individual training.

That was the genesis of the 101st’s X-Y-Z training concept. X-days, three days a week, would be for unit training only. Y-days, two days a week, were for individual training and for a soldier’s necessary administrative time, such as medical appointments, drawing equipment, and the solving of pay problems. Z-days were weekends or holidays.

I divided the division into three “brigade slices,” each equivalent to that brigade’s task force, down to its MP platoon. For a given three months, the 1st Brigade slice might have Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday as X-days and Thursday and Friday as Y-days. For that same period the 2d Brigade slice would have Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday as its X-days. For the 3d Brigade slice, X-days were Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.

The two Y-days every week were also for attending Eagle University.

³In those days 11B was Light Weapons Infantryman; 11C was Indirect Fire Infantryman; and 11H was Heavy Anti-Arm³or Weapons Infantryman.

INTERVIEWER: What was Eagle University?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Eagle University was a consortium of schools and colleges⁴ that we put together to give a range of educational opportunities to our soldiers on both duty and off-duty time. It later expanded to include civilian employees and dependents. Here is a section of the minutes of a conference that I chaired on May 18, 1972, attended by representative of the participating institutions.

2. General Cushman stated that the purpose of the conference was to establish Eagle University. Eagle University will not be a university in itself, but will consist of a collection of courses established by the various area colleges and universities represented at this conference. General Cushman emphasized the need for superior education programs, since today's Army is a new kind of Army. Education should be an established way of a soldier's life, and should be as much a part of his training schedule as his mission. Eagle University will provide educational opportunities for military personnel, military dependents and civilian personnel at Fort Campbell, with an aim toward individual self-improvement and improved mission performance.

3. COL. Buddo presented through charts the concept of Eagle University as follows:

- a. Feasible integration into the training schedule.
- b. Equal ratio of on-duty and off-duty class time.
- c. Levels of instruction: High School, Vocational, College and Post Graduate.
- d. Wide variety of MOS related, technical and academic subjects.
- e. Campus is close to the troops.
- f. Use of established educational institutions.
- g. Accreditation is essential.

We were soon in business. From my Commander's Column of September 8, 1972...

⁴ The eventual consortium: Austin Peay State University, Hopkinsville Community College, University of Tennessee at Nashville, Middle Tennessee State University, Tennessee State University, Nashville State Technical Institute, Western Kentucky State University, Murray State University (KY), Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, Fort Campbell Dependent Schools.

This fall we embark on a new concept - Eagle University

Elsewhere in this paper you will find information about Eagle University's fall term. Pre-registration has already begun. The fall curriculum is now being put into final form, and new classes will be added as student interest indicates. The schedule will be modified and everything put in readiness for final registration on 28 and 29 September. Classes will start Monday, 2 October

Let no one underestimate the significance of Eagle University. It is at the heart of our Modern Volunteer Army concept. At all levels of command at Fort Campbell we have a great opportunity to demonstrate to our men our genuine concern for their welfare. We can now give our men a new means for self-improvement through education and encourage them to use it. I fully support this significant concept and I ask that everyone do so.

We intend that the 101st Airborne Division and Fort Campbell provide every man an opportunity for personal growth and development.

A man can gain much from military service. He learns to work effectively with others to improve his own self-reliance and confidence. He learns to become a member of a team, to adhere to high standards, to increase his sense of personal responsibility. He learns skills that are appropriate to his job.

A man need not attend every single class in order to be successful. The Eagle University authorities understand that there will often be requirements for our men to go into the field or to be away from Fort Campbell for valid reasons. For the student who is obviously making an effort to complete his subject they will make allowances.

We have set no quotas. The way a man improves himself personally is up to him. But this unique opportunity of Eagle University should not be passed by

A Catalog of Courses had been made available to our soldiers.



By 1 September the consortium had been formed, funds had been obtained, and a contract had been awarded to Austin Peay State University, Clarksville, TN, to provide the administrative structure (Dean, Associate Dean, Program Coordinators, and office staff). BOQ buildings had been renovated to provide office and classroom spaces. The post library became Eagle University's library. A book store was set up. In August a range of subject matter was offered to determine troop and community interests.

Troop tuition was paid for by the Army. Enrollees received academic credit from the participating institutions. The ten-week Fall term coincided with one cycle of the X-Y-Z rota-

tion. A soldier could not register for a course that met on his X-day. We used computers to track the attendance of enrolled troops. Company first sergeants were informed daily of absentees. Eagle Prep offered subjects for soldiers who lacked high school equivalency.

By 1977, when Eagle University ended its existence for bureaucratic reasons, approximately 138,829 credit hours had been earned by 28,878 different students in a total of 34,232 course enrollments. Eagle University had accomplished its purposes.

INTERVIEWER: What was the thinking that led you to the concept of Eagle University?

I believed in education; everyone should pursue it. I believed that soldiers needed something besides military training and duty to keep them interested in their lives. I believed that proficiency at the small unit level could be maintained on a schedule of three days a week with everyone present for duty, making time in other days available. Of course a field exercise at battalion level and above would require a week or more in the field, but our training schedules could allow for that.

INTERVIEWER: How did you manage creating the division in so short a time?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: By hard work, well-planned. A key event was a conference that I held September 5, 1972, where I assembled unit commanders from company on up. I gave a presentation on “where we are and where we are going.” My script, including its 21 Vu-graphs, was 13 pages long. After the conference I distributed the script through the chain of command, to company level. It became our living master plan aimed at a division readiness by 30 June 1973. Forty years later I am struck by the effort’s scope and intensity.

I said that, while Unit of Choice recruiting remains top priority, top priority is also training, and unit administration. I said, “The successful commander accommodates these equivalent priorities and does them all well.”

I said “Unit of Choice enlistees are now coming in.” I had visited the BCT at Fort Knox and had gathered there our Unit of Choice enlistees and presented each with a division patch. I said that 800 will arrive in September, 1500 in October, 2000 in November.

I said that the 3rd Brigade’s 2/503d Infantry had started squad training that very day and that by December six infantry battalions will have begun or finished squad training. I said that we were developing a standardized squad training and evaluation program, and that after squad training will come company, battalion, and brigade field training exercises. I said that the 3rd Brigade will have a field exercise in late January and that other brigades will follow as we progress to our target.

Switching to unit administration, of an equal priority, I introduced my commanders to Operation IMPROVE. This stood for “Imaginative, Modern, Professional, Ready Organization, Voluntarily Enlisted,” a term invented by Captain James. Using his experience from the Delta he had helped the Fort Campbell Comptroller put IMPROVE into place.

I had worked at a table with the staff officers concerned, and a selection of commanders and administrative people from division units. We came up with this...

OBJECTIVE: To raise personnel administration throughout the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and Fort Campbell to a superior level.

SITUATION, SEPTEMBER 1972: INT 0132--

Personnel administration throughout the 101st Airborne (Airmobile) and Fort Campbell is generally below the desired standard at all levels, from company to division/post. Organization and SOP's are poor or non-existent. Many commanders and personnel specialists are inexperienced and/or untrained. Administrative personnel are short and also untrained. PSNCO's are not assigned in many units; those assigned are often not qualified and some are inadequately supervised or poorly employed. Division/Post AG needs improvement on organization, procedures, and training. Regulations are unduly complex, and are misunderstood or not complied with. Unessential requirements for paperwork, administration, and reporting are overwhelming commanders and administrative offices so that essential actions are not being properly executed. Demands on the personal administration system are increasing. For example, UOC/AIT personnel accountability and management, VRB and enlistment bonuses, reenlistment, the officer records brief, and the expansion of the enlisted evaluation system are all demanding more attention. Companies and battalions and higher levels lack a systematic approach to solving all these problems in a comprehensive way. The welfare of our men and the accomplishment of our mission demand that we solve them. A complete systems overhaul and upgrade program is required.

I said that we were launching Operation IMPROVE division-wide and that its Objectives were aimed at troop welfare and unit administration and showed this dismal picture to the assembled commanders. I told them that the techniques of Operation IMPROVE included a step-by-step Program for the Attainment of the Objective. I said “Make no mistake. We are going to straighten out personnel administration.”

INTERVIEWER: Tell me about your standardized squad training program.

I wrote myself the three-page Training of Infantry annex to the 101st's training directive. Its first paragraph...

1. The infantryman in combat has the most demanding job in the Army. His job requires an almost superhuman combination of skills, endurance, and acceptance of personal risk. Yet, his is a job that must be done by ordinary men. The task of infantry leaders is to make infantrymen out of ordinary men. Once this is done, these men are no longer ordinary; they are extraordinary – they are infantrymen. Yet, they are the same men.

Its paragraph 5...

5. Infantry squad and platoon training is a matter of the following:
- a. Simple drills, repeated again and again.
 - b. Intelligent tactical judgment by leaders, adapting these simple drills to the existing situation.
 - c. Simple orders, using the chain of command. Orders are given by voice, by radio, by hand and arm signals, and by example ("follow me").
 - d. Disciplined, responsive obedience to these orders.
 - e. Initiative of infantrymen by doing what is right in the absence of orders.
 - f. Discipline and adherence to basic standards.

We prepared a Handbook on Infantry Tactics. It spelled out the essentials of offense, defense, and patrolling at squad and platoon. It told of the formations and execution procedures of standardized battle drill.

The 3d Brigade's 2/503d Infantry battalion was commanded by Jim Waldeck, He had been my brigade S-3 in Vietnam. Jim's A Company was commanded by Ed Smith. He had been my aide at Fort Devens. I charged them to work with brigade and division to develop the standard battle drill for all battalions of the division. When we were satisfied with it, we asked the Infantry School at Fort Benning to come up and make a training film of it. They did. We used it widely.

INTERVIEWER: What else did you cover in your September 5 meeting?"

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Six pages of my thirteen page script dealt with our efforts to both improve administration in units, and to simplify it.

I said, "Some of you may recall that in March of this year we had a pay situation that was indescribably and intolerably bad." Finance clerks, mostly draftees, had been leaving. All concerned had attacked the problem together. I showed a chart. In April 43% of our men had reported problems with their pay, 32% in May, 21% in June 15 percent in July and

12% in August. Operation IMPROVE had gone to work. I said that we are determined to approach zero pay problems

I said that division no longer required 10 copies of company weekly training schedules. With confidence in the chain of command we would track activities in training with reporting similar to that of combat.

With new chains of command and dozens of new company commanders and first sergeants, and their orderly rooms and supply rooms, it was not going to be easy to bring about superior company administration everywhere. Using IMPROVE, I put into effect measures similar to those that I had used at Fort Devens. Sluggish though they were, systems began to yield.

In three pages of my script I spoke about the responsibility of commanders to see to the personal development of their men. A variety of ways was available. Each soldier should be encouraged to seek, and should seek, personal improvement. This included taking advantage of Eagle University.

Although the 101st Airborne Division and Fort Campbell were far bigger and more complex than my command at Fort Devens, I still wanted every soldier to be seen as an individual.

INTERVIEWER: What other methods and techniques?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I believed that the daily company formation is an opportunity to fix attention on the chain of command. I also believed that a commander should “count his men every day,” and that his men should know it. Using the infantry drill regulations, the division command sergeant major, the G-3, and I developed a way of conducting a company formation that fostered this idea.

I assembled in Fryar Stadium all commanders through company, with their command sergeants major and first sergeants, for a class taught by me. It was a company formation demonstration. It began with the company first sergeant commanding, “Fall in,” and went on from there. My commentary addressed the underlying command accountability principles of each step in the sequence. My last words were, “That’s the way we will do it in the 101st Airborne Division.”

I sought to develop NCOs. Master sergeants, sergeants first class, staff sergeants, and a few sergeants came to us through the Army personnel system. But division had to grow some of its junior noncommissioned officers from newly recruited soldiers. Battalion commanders were authorized to promote to sergeant. To staff all the slots for sergeants (team leaders) in their rifle squads, they had to select the very best of their new men, train them in that slot, promote them to corporal, even to acting sergeant. Division set up an NCO Academy to which battalion commanders were encouraged to send such sol-

diers on Y-days. These procedures could not produce seasoned junior NCOs right away, but as time went on our NCO's got better.

Another idea was the Captain's Squad. This was a rotating team of three or four of my best captains, experienced company commanders. My SAMVA (Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army), put the squad to work regularly. My instructions were that the team was to visit, and help out, companies in the division, as arranged by the battalion and brigade commander. They were to go into detail with the company commander and his people, to observe exactly how he was running that company. They would report their findings, with advice, to the company commander alone, offering him observations and suggestions on how he could do a better job. Exit interviews with battalion and brigade commanders, not naming names, got the word around.

A couple of years ago I heard from Ted Douglas, now a construction management consultant in Wading River, New York. A former member of the Captains Squad, he wrote me a letter...

I was a member of the Directorate of Industrial Operations (DIO) staff from July 1971 until June 1973... In April 1972 the 101st was officially reestablished at its home. The Fort Campbell installation experienced growing pains and a tremendous learning curve as we all tried to learn our jobs and how to function in a peacetime army. Everything was moving at an accelerated pace with the requirements for training and equipping both the division and non-division units to achieve their readiness requirements. We worked extremely hard in the DIO office with our counterparts in the Division G-4 to procure the materials and equipment that was required for both training and logistics readiness.

After the Division was growing in personnel strength I was contacted to become a member of what became known to us as the "Captains Squad." We were summoned to meet with you in the Post Headquarters conference room where you explained that our assignment would be to visit the various battalion size units and report what we found back to you. Our time was to be limited in the units and we were not to represent ourselves as an "inspection team" nor were we permitted to write any reports or complete any inspection checklist. The Captains Squad leader was the division reenlistment officer. Units to be visited were nominated by the Brigade Commanders so we were guided to view their best units first... As you said, you wanted us to be your eyes and ears.

Although demanding, I could tolerate mistakes. From a Commander's Column...

This Commander's Column is about "mistakes".

One of our principles at Fort Campbell is "We Do Things Right". This is our objective, and not a condition that has actually been achieved, or that ever will be fully achieved. But we hold this goal in front of us.

Further, we intend to run this division and this post by decentralizing responsibility to lower levels so that commanders and responsible supervisors can use their own initiative and can decide for themselves as far as possible how things should be done. In this environment, some mistakes are going to be made.

Now, how do I look at mistakes?

First, I believe that mistakes are part of the learning process. I believe that it is far better to decentralize and have some mistakes made, if by so doing we develop experienced and strong leadership, than it is to strive for an error-free condition in which the opportunity to do it on your own is not provided.

On the other hand, I do look for attention to duty, so that whatever mistakes are made are insignificant and do not seriously affect the accomplishment of mission, the welfare of the men, or the good use of their time. Mistakes in execution we can learn from. Mistakes in planning are often costly.

Frankly, the kind of mistake that I cannot tolerate is one in which a "system" is out of order and the troops suffer. For example, our pay situation as it existed a few months ago was intolerable and could not be forgiven. It is still far from the desired standard. I, the commander, cannot accept a condition under which we put up with this sort of "mistake". Getting the troops paid correctly must be "done right". There is no substitute.

Similarly, if I were to go out to a training situation and see instruction which had not been thoroughly organized, for which the instructors were not ready, and which was wasting the time of the men I would consider

this a serious mistake of a "system". This would especially be the case if it were a generalized situation in which a senior and responsible commander had it within his capability to "do it right".

A mistake that involves unnecessary risk of the lives of men is also one that I cannot accept. For example, artillery firing must be such that absolute accuracy is achieved at all times and short rounds do not fall. Likewise, helicopter maintenance and aviation safety must be faultlessly professional because lives are at stake.

One morning in Vietnam a patrol in one of the battalions in my brigade was coming in from a night outpost position. It was mistaken as an enemy patrol and was fired on by another unit of the same battalion. Fortunately no one was hurt, although one round entered the helmet of a member of that patrol and the incident was very close to a tragedy.

I remember that the local commander, responding to my question as to why this happened, said to me "Well, sir, these things happen in combat."

My answer was, and is - No, we don't take that attitude. We do not accept that "these things happen". We commanders take the necessary professional steps to see to it that things like this do not "happen".

So I do not accept that type of mistake either.

In conclusion, I want to insure all leaders at Fort Campbell that it is my firm intention, to the maximum extent possible, to leave the responsibility for the operation of their units in their hands. We will have high standards, and we will supervise to see that these standards are in fact carried out. But we will tolerate those mistakes, by commanders to whom responsibility is decentralized, that are part of the learning process.

We will not tolerate mistakes that adversely affect the lives of our men, the mission of the unit, and the good use of our men's time.

INTERVIEWER: What about problems of racial harmony?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: . The problems of race were not new to me. My basic positions had been formed at Fort Devens and had just been fully developed in the Delta. I had brought SP4 Grigsby back with me. Until he took an early out and went back to Mississippi, I sought his advice and views on the racial climate. In filling division units we had been careful to keep the ratio of black soldiers fairly uniform.

I had expressed my convictions on racial matters in an early column in the Fort Campbell Courier. Another occasion to do so arose in December 1972.

Some black soldiers have asked me what my policy is with respect to discrimination against black personnel off-post - that is, in nearby civilian communities. One matter of particular interest is discrimination with respect to housing.

I would like to answer this question from two points of view. First, my moral responsibility. Second my official responsibility.

Fortunately there is absolutely no difference in the actions I would take from either point of view.

First, as a responsible participant in our American society, I feel a very strong moral obligation to do everything that I possibly can to insure that equal treatment is afforded to all personnel regardless of race. I believe that this moral responsibility extends not simply to the forms of racial discrimination but, further than that, to helping bring about those changes that must take place in the attitudes of American citizens toward one another if we are to achieve true equality of treatment.

In other words, I consider that the problem is one of the heart, and not simply one of adherence to laws and established regulations. Of course, both aspects are necessary; neither approach can solve these problems without the other.

Second, from the point of view of my official responsibility, my duty is clear. It is to comply with the policies and regulations established by the Government of the United States, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, and the commands superior to me. These policies are quite specific. They provide that the installation commander will not condone racial discrimination off-post by communities or individuals.

These policies are established in order to insure that military personnel, who are serving their country, and their dependents are afforded full equality of treatment, regardless of where they live. Current policies provide for measures to be taken by the command when personnel in the nearby communities fail to meet the standards expected with respect to the treatment of members of the military service and their families.

As the local commander, I am required to observe and enforce these regulations. I intend to do so.

Along these lines, Mr. Perry R. Barrington, Jr., Post Equal Employment Opportunity Officer (telephone 5113-2928) will act as my personal representative in visiting in the nearby areas. He will visit real estate agents and landlords as necessary to insure that there is no difficulty in their being able to observe these Federal policies and regulations.

I do not anticipate any problem whatever with this because I consider that our nearby real estate agents and landlords have a genuine interest in meeting these standards.

* * * * *

I want to repeat my personal commitment to insuring full equality of treatment to the black man and woman. I am convinced that this is one of the most serious and urgent problems facing American society today.

The only way in which we can deal effectively with this problem is for those of us who are white to make a genuine and sincere effort to picture for ourselves what it is like to be black.

The black man does not want our sympathy. He is not interested in a patronizing approach, or token measures. He is interested only in obtaining what he deserves. He wants to be recognized as a full American and human being in his own right.

At least that is what I think he wants. I believe it is what I would want if I were black. I will never know entirely because I am not black. And only the black man fully understands what it is like to be black.

I believe that, if we, at all levels of our command at Fort Campbell, in the surrounding civilian communities, and indeed in all America do not make a concerted and urgent effort to reach out a hand of understanding and friendship to our black friends, if we do not look into their eyes and say to ourselves - this is a creature of God and a fellow human being whom I must understand and whose personal qualities I must accept - this problem will rise up to make us wish that we had.

One thing I did do was to balance racially while recruiting the division and filling units.

INTERVIEWER: Was this going back to your time with the 22nd Infantry?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Right. I wanted companies to have maybe 10 or 15 percent black, about like the population at large. One brigade was recruiting in the southeastern United States, with its higher percentage of blacks. Recruiting in the midwest, around Minnesota and Wisconsin, was producing a lower percentage. I said Wisconsin get yourself a lot of those people, and South Carolina be careful what you're bringing in. As the division grew, I paid attention to its racial composition. I did not want to go over 15 percent black for the division. I thought that reflected the country.

INTERVIEWER: And you had the latitude to do this?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Yes. In the division I had an especially good black command sergeant major. I said to him, "Sergeant Major, I'm seeing a higher ratio of blacks enlisting to be cooks and going for supply jobs, and not as riflemen. I want to give everybody a chance to be a squad leader whether they are black or white. I'm thinking of giving some guidance on this." He said, "I don't think you should do that." I said, "Do you think that's managing blacks too much?" He said, "Right." I said, "OK, we won't do it." I didn't want to offend the blacks by singling them out, moving them around to MOSs for which they hadn't enlisted.

INTERVIEWER: You had noticed that there was a high percentage of black soldiers enlisting for support and supply and cook billets and so on, and you wanted to see more of them in the combat arms billets. But since this is a self selected force, the sergeant major recommended that you not.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Yes. But he did go along with monitoring a unit's racial composition as we were filling it. I said that I wanted to be sure that there was balance and he went along with that, but not with the MOS changes.

I didn't tell the people recruiting in the southeast United States to slow down. But I did say to the people up in Minnesota, speed it up. I had learned from experience that it's better to have a representative spread of racial origins. I was manipulating the composition of the division.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me more about community relations?


GENERAL CUSHMAN: Clarksville, Tennessee, just to the south. and Hopkinsville, Kentucky, a little further away to the north, had always been good neighbors and friendly Army towns. Building on that, I decided to set up a Lower Cumberland Cooperative Improvement Council. From the Hopkinsville newspaper, the Kentucky New Era, September 1, 1972...

"At a meeting in Clarksville, Hopkinsville Mayor George L Atkins Jr, has been elected president of the newly formed Lower Cumberland Cooperative Improvement Council. Attending the luncheon were the judges of Tennessee's Montgomery and Stewart counties, the judges of Kentucky's Christian and Trigg counties, the mayors of Clarksville and Dover, Tennessee, and the mayors of Hopkinsville and Cadiz, Kentucky. Maj. Gen. John H. Cushman, commander of Fort Campbell, outlined the objectives of the organization..."

The 101st's G-5, Civil Affairs Officer, became the honcho for pursuing this initiative. It went by the name of "civic action." Among other measures, it encompassed the use of Fort Campbell's automotive wreckers to remove, at a local authority's request, abandoned or wrecked vehicles from local highways. During the summer months of 1972, before new men began to pour in, our infantry battalions engaged in "adventure training"

by working with the U.S. Forest Service to clean up its preserve in the Land Between the Lakes to our west.⁵

In October 1972 I codified troop standards in a pamphlet, Basic Standards of the 101st Airborne Division and Fort Campbell. I deemed those standards high, but not unreasonable. I wrote my commanders: “This booklet raises one specific point that deserves the attention of each unit commander at a Command Information period.” It was in this paragraph:



b. Civilian clothes are perfectly acceptable for off-duty wear. Civilian clothing must be in good taste. Wear “mod” clothes if you like but use good taste. For example, do not go about the post with your shirt off or unbuttoned down the front. Also, “T” shirts and other items worn as undergarments, “tank top” sleeveless shirts, and similar items may not be worn as an outer garment in public places such as the PX, theaters, commissaries, service clubs, chapels, open messes, and medical and dental facilities.

I sent a copy of our pamphlet to Bob Montague, now a brigadier general and the assistant SAMVA to George Forsythe at Headquarters, DA. That paragraph caught his eye, as did another that said, “The haircut pictures posted around Fort Campbell show a man’s hair just before a haircut, not just after. In other words, that is as long as a man’s hair is supposed to get.”

Bob sent me a caustic note; such guidance was not in the spirit of the Modern Volunteer Army. I thought it was in that spirit, properly interpreted for a disciplined, well-behaved division.

INTERVIEWER: It must have been stressful on all.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I insisted on high standards of performance, and checked. That meant stress. But I tried to let people know when they were doing well. From time to time I gave an Outstanding Battalion award to one or another battalion that deserved it.

I was liberal with the Grand Job Pennant, adapted from my Fort Devens days.

⁵ In August 1974 the division and Fort Campbell received the Secretary of Defense’s Natural Resources Conservation Award for 1973. Arthur I Mendolia, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics): “You have made a genuine contribution to the quality of life through superior command interest and attention... and by your continuing cooperation with local, state and federal agencies. It is a credit as well to the troop forces and base personnel and to all those who have given of their time and efforts to make this program what it is today.”

In 2011 I received a letter from the civilian chief of today's Fort Campbell fire department. He wrote that he had found a photograph taken long ago. In it I am presenting a Grand Job Pennant and certificate to the then chief of the fire department.



INTERVIEWER: Tell me about other initiatives.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Here's one. It was reported on in the May 1975 issue of the National Guardsmen which carried a story headlined, "The 'One Army Concept'... a reality at Ft. Campbell, KY." It told how in 1972 the active Army under its "One Army Concept" organized itself so as to provide better support to Army National Guard and Army Reserve units. The story:

"The 101st Leads the Way... One of the Army's first units to prove that the new programs were indeed more than "lip service" was the 101st Airborne Division... Returned to Fort Campbell in April 1972... with an actual strength of slightly more than 4000 members, the 101st began a massive Unit of Choice recruiting program... It was not so preoccupied with returning to authorized strength that it disregarded the Army's new reserve component programs. Fort Campbell's first Mutual Support Conference was held Jan. 19-20, '73."

Another initiative was In March 1973, when I began a series of Town Meetings.

From a Commander's Column...

Last night we had another of our "Town Meetings" for the residents of family housing areas. Last night's meeting was held in the Ft. Campbell High School and was for residents of Hammond Heights and Stryker Village.

The purpose of these Town Meetings is to provide an opportunity for those of us who are responsible for operating this post - the Post Engineer, the Chief of Family Housing, the Superintendent of Schools, the Post Exchange Manager, and all the rest - to let residents tell us what we need to do to make Fort Campbell a better place to live and work.

We don't solve all the problems of our residents as a result of these meetings. Some problems are beyond our solution. However, we do solve some.

I favored bands. By TO&E we were authorized a large band, something like 54 instruments. There was another TO&E for a band, with existed, with 29 instruments. I decided to recruit enough bandsmen for two 29-man bands. We used both, often. And along about March of 1973 we heard about "The Liberation Symphony."

In 1969 the Netherlands had celebrated the 25th anniversary of its liberation in World War II. The 101st had parachuted in. The United States ambassador to the Netherlands was J. William Middendorf, later President Nixon's Secretary of the Navy. He was an accomplished composer of music. As a gift to Queen Wilhelmina, he composed a Liberation Symphony. Somehow it came to the attention of Austin Peay State University in Clarksville. Its student symphony orchestra performed the symphony.

I heard a recording of that performance. I believed it could be the basis for a composition that we could call The Screaming Eagle Battle Hymn. We had by then recruited a young black piano player who had left Princeton University where he was studying music and had enlisted for the 101st. The chief warrant officer commanding the division band proposed him as a composer. At a piano in the division museum he sat down with a group of about six of us. In a series of sessions, using butcher paper and magic markers, we came up with words to his music for The Screaming Eagle Battle Hymn. It began...

The Screaming Eagles' Battle Hymn

Chorus:

Normandy and Bastogne, Ashau and Quang Tri,

Screaming Eagles valiant, to our Destiny! ⁶

Refrain:

**Screaming Eagles! Pride of the Airborne!
Troopers valiant, prepared to strike.
Stormed into battle, on D-Day's drop zones,
Brought an everlasting end to Hitler's Reich.
Airborne!**

Chorus:

**Parachutes and gliders, striking from the sky.
Rotor blades in motion, "airborne" battle cry.**

...and went on with three more refrains. (At the time we could honor only what the 101st had done in World War II and Vietnam.)

All of this reads as if I were doing everything by myself. That was not so. I had two highly competent assistant division commanders. (Collier Ross had been replaced by Clyde Lynn). I had the energies and wisdom of George Viney and John Dillard, chief of staff and deputy post commander. I had initiatives by smart staff officers like Lou Menetrey and John Crosby. This is not to mention the troops and their commanders, who were breaking their backs for me. Grasping what I was trying to do, all pitched in. I realize now that I might have done better by at least getting the ADCs and my heads together more often for their suggestions -- and their taking ownership of our program.

The months rolled by. In late May, as the 101st Airborne Division approached the achievement of readiness, it celebrated its first Week of the Eagles, with an open house and exhibits. The week began with Kentucky and Tennessee Days of the Eagles, honoring each governor with a brigade review. Wednesday and Thursday were Old Timers Days. Members of the 101st Airborne Division Association, veterans of Normandy and Bastogne, were invited to spend nights in the barracks, to mingle with the troops, and to observe their wide-ranging skills competitions and sporting contests.

On May 25th, the division marched onto its parade field and formed into line. The reviewing stands were filled. General Zais was the reviewing officer. Distinguished guests were present. The Old Timers formed in a body to the left of the reviewing stand. Heads high and erect, they marched in step past the reviewing stand as the division band played the Screaming Eagles Battle Hymn. They halted. They entered their reserved bleachers. To the band's music I brought the officers and colors forward. We halted. I gave the command, "Present arms." I reported to General Zais, "Sir, the division is formed."

⁶The "chorus," bugled, was made into a call with which Fort Campbell began its working day. The band's score now rests in the archives of the 101st Airborne Division band. The band has played it for former members of the division as they marched in a body before the reviewing stands at division reviews that culminated periodic Weeks of the Eagles.



The troops then passed in review.

I felt good about the division. A battalion sent to serve as aggressor on a Readiness Command exercise had received high marks. Compliments had been offered by visitors to Week of the Eagles. LTG Joe Heiser, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, after two days with us, had been more than pleased with our logistics situation and had spoken well of what he had seen on post. Bill Knowlton, Superintendent at West Point, had been with us to check his fourth year cadets who were with us for brief duty as platoon leaders. He departed with praise.

In April, US News and World Report visited. It later carried a story on us.

ONE PLACE WHERE VOLUNTEER ARMY IS A BIG SUCCESS

Bonuses, do-it-yourself recruiting, pick-your-own-job—all are being used to lure GI's at one big base, where the "new Army" is a reality.

friends and classmates what life in the Army is like today.

At the high point of the recruiting campaign, these "canvassers" totaled 295, and 1,000 young men a month were volunteering for duty at Fort Campbell.

FORT CAMPBELL, Ky.

We were close to accomplishing what we had set out to do.

On May 31 I learned of trouble in the 2d Brigade's 1/501st Infantry. A pistol had been lost during Week of the Eagles.

From the report of the investigating officer (my check marks)...

a. Physical security procedures promulgated and utilized by Hqs 2d Bde are correct and are in compliance with current regulations and directives; however, correct physical security procedures were not in effect in A Company during the period in which it now appears highly likely that the weapon was lost.

b. During the tour of duty of the Bn Staff Duty Officer on 24/25 May, there was at least one serious irregularity on the part of the SDO, to wit: he failed to conduct the required joint inventory on the morning of 25 May prior to releasing the arms room keys to an authorized individual of A Company. Additionally, during his tour of duty the SDO allowed the key to the key box in which A Company's arms room keys were secured to pass from his direct and positive control.

c. No written SOP governing physical security exists in A Company in violation of current regulations. At this level during the period in question there were evidently so many breaches of both the letter and the spirit of the regulations that it is difficult to account for such gross ignorance and/or negligence in the performance of duty related to weapons accountability procedures. During close questioning, for example, Sgt Martinez, the company armorer, proved to be almost totally ignorant of the content of regulations and directives governing his duties. The individual assigned to assist the armorer, PV2 Douglas, appears to be interested in his duties but is inexperienced and on the day in question was lacking in supervision and guidance for a critical period. No-one interviewed by me was able to quote the exact procedure to be used to sign out a weapon when the user did not have a weapons card. The 3AA Form 6 was improperly executed in that each man who went to the arms room to draw a weapon without a weapons card was allowed to request a weapon from the armorer or assistant armorer, obtain the weapon without positive identification, and then sign the 3AA Form 6 without adequate supervision, well out of visual range of the person who issued the weapon. Neither the armorer nor the assistant armorer initialed the 3AA Form 6 next to the signature of the user when the weapons were issued nor when they were turned in, as required by current regulations. While this procedure was in effect, for at least part of the time, the Company Executive Officer was in the arms room. This officer stated that he was aware that the violation was happening but was condoned by him in the interest of expediency.

I told my commanders of my disappointment.

31 May 1973

Memo to: Cdrs Major Units
Plus Sup Bns

1. It is rather brutal for me to reproduce the attached report of investigation of a .45 pistol loss in '1501 Inf. I do it to point out simply that deplorable conditions such as this will not exist if commanders are doing their jobs. You are responsible to see that your commanders do their jobs. I expect you to instill in your chains of command, (and indeed all officers) a sense of personal responsibility that will permit no such flagrant violations in any unit of this command. This is an object lesson in what happens if you do not.

2. Close hold this. Reproduce no further. Just take the indicated necessary command action and officer indoctrination, plus supervision of units, SDO's, etc. We do not tolerate weapons losses in this command.

JTZ

I let the 2d Brigade commander go before his time. Lou Menetry's promotion to colonel was imminent. He took command of the 2d Brigade.

It was time to prepare the division's readiness reports for 30 June 1972.

Battalion commanders completed a readiness report on their battalions. I completed a readiness report on the whole division. Readiness had three components -- Personnel, Logistics, and Training, each with four levels. C-1 was "fully combat ready." C-2 and C-3 were degrees less ready. C-4 was "not ready."

I remember well the tensions of June 1973. The outfitting effort begun a year earlier had brought in the multitudes of items required to fill each unit TO&E, including repair parts. Materiel status was tracked. Battalions were checked off as they reached C-1 in Logistics. Almost all did.

Training had been tracked at every level. From platoon to battalion, artillery had supported live firing exercises and helicopter combat assaults had been featured. The 3d Brigade was first to run a three-day exercise of its task force. The 2d and 3d had followed. I rated Training at C-1.

Personnel was a problem. Believing from our recruiting data that basic trainees sufficient to fill the division were in the pipeline, I had in April directed an easing up on recruiting. By June it was evident that that had been a mistake. There was a need for two or three hundred more. The 1st Brigade was the last to fill. It would come up short.

I said to myself: "If I report that we are fully ready, I will be telling the Army that if the 101st Airborne Division is called upon to go to war, it will perform at a high level." A discussion ensued. Informed, and agreeing, that the detailed wording of the Army regulation for readiness reporting technically permitted my declaring that the division was at level C-1, I sent forward a C-1 rating, "fully combat ready."

Three years later, I responded to a Department of the Army Inspector General query triggered by a complaint from a constituent to his senator that I had "personally modified readiness ratings which resulted in a false C-1 rating for the division in June 1973."

I wrote, "I am satisfied with my judgment on the matter... Certain reporting units of the division were not C-1... But the division as a whole was C-1... In my judgment the division could be fully combat ready within the two weeks specified by regulation."

While the matter was dropped, I had begun to wonder. I came to believe that I had perhaps allowed my confidence in myself and in my division to overrule an impartial judgment, that such self-confidence might have hurt my reputation for speaking the truth, and that I might best have declared the 101st Airborne Division C-2.⁷

In my files are additional pages of the August 1973 issue of US News and World Report in which the story cited on page 20-25 above appears.


⁷ Since, to describe the condition of the 101st Airborne Division when I left it in August 1973, rather than saying "full readiness" I have said "near full readiness."

They include this...

VOLUNTEER ARMY—IS IT WORKING?

Interview With Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

There's a cost-cutting mood, heavy reliance on newcomers as the Army begins its postwar rebuilding. That's a big challenge, says the service's top general in an exclusive interview in this magazine's conference room.



Q General, we've heard in recent years of disciplinary problems in the Army. What's being done about them?

A We do have disciplinary problems. They are a constant source of concern all over the Army. A good sign is that the AWOL [absent without leave] situation has been improving.

Q Is this because of the end of the Vietnam war?

A That may have something to do with it, but that's not really the kind of AWOL I'm talking about.

The bulk of our AWOL problem has come from the fellow who—in his eyes—has problems at home, problems with his girl, or problems with his wife. These problems loom tremendous to him. Because they are personal, he hesitates to talk to anybody about them—his company commander, his platoon sergeant or any sergeant. So he just takes off.

We've been doing some psychological examinations of men when they first arrive at the training center. These tests have been developed by experts, and you have to have an expert to read the results, too. Where we've used the tests, the experts give the company commander a list of individuals who have been identified as having personal problems. The commander is urged to talk with each one as soon as he can. We have gotten some exciting results, but we are not at the stage where even the fellows who wrote the tests will claim they are the only reason for success.

Q How valid are reports that with an all-volunteer force you would end up with an Army that is largely nonwhite or with a low intelligence level?

A I don't believe that will happen. I don't think that the Department of Defense will let that happen. The Army should be representative, and if it's not, then it's not an Army of the United States. It has got to be that way, and if we can't do it, then we should say so and find another solution.

Q Then do you go back to the draft?

A I don't know of another way. I'm not prepared to say today that it cannot be done. But I think if we could do it

A There are 13 on active duty, but not all are ready for war.

The Ninth, at Fort Lewis, Wash., has been reconstituted only since last summer. Many of its men are somewhere in the training system, either in basic training or advanced training. The bulk of the advanced training is being done in the division itself. The 25th Division, in Hawaii, is at about the same state of readiness. The Fourth Division, at Fort Carson, Colo., is further along, but its training is still not completed. The 101st Division, at Fort Campbell, Ky., just ✕



"The thing that worries me is that we will let the Army go down to 500,000 men, then 300,000, and so on," the General says, because "many see the defense budget as immense—monstrous."

recently achieved full combat readiness. The remaining nine divisions are all ready for combat.

General Abrams: "The 101st Division... just recently achieved full combat readiness."

I had so reported. I wanted him to know that. It was an honest call.