



STRIKE

Vietnam War Weekly History



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Brief History of the 501st, 502nd and 2nd Brigade (101st ABN DIV)

The 502nd, or "five-oh-deuce", was activated July 1, 1941 at Fort Benning, Georgia as the 502nd parachute infantry battalion, as an experimental unit formed to test the doctrine and tactics of parachute assaults. The 502nd entered combat in World War II on June 6, 1944, by jumping into Normandy, with allied forces landing on D-Day and the Battle of Normandy. Between 1945 and 1964. A major reorganization took place on 3 February 1964, when the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne was activated at Fort Campbell, replacing the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 501st Infantry Regiment. The reorganization from the battle groups to brigades and battalions placed two battalions of the 502nd in different brigades of the 101st.



The 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry was in the 1st Brigade with 1-327th and 2-327th Infantry. Which deployed to Vietnam and arrived at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam on 29 July 1965, they were commanded by the most notable commander LTC Hank "The Gunfighter" Emerson.



The new 2nd Brigade's original organic battalions were the 1st and 2d Battalions, 501st Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry. December 1967 the 501st, 502nd and 2nd Brigade deployed by C-141 aircraft and arrived at Bien Hoa Airbase on 13 December 1967. Over the next five years, Soldiers of the "Ready to Go" Brigade participated in twelve campaigns, compiling of a distinguished combat record as well as an enviable reputation for success in the rehabilitation of a war-torn nation. The Brigade redeployed to Fort Campbell in April 1972.



During this week, in the span of 8 years since the 501st Infantry Regiment, 502nd Infantry Regiment and 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division deployed in support of the Vietnam War the following are from After Action Reports, Staff Duty Logs, and Personal Accounts. (* All items have been reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives.)

- 06 – 07 May 1968 2-17 Cav and D/1-501 IN were conducting a RIF operation when they contact and attacked estimated NVA company occupying defensive positions in the village of LA CHU, 5km northwest of HUE (YD694240). B Troop with an OPCON tank platoon maintained constant pressure to the front of the enemy force, while the mobile Troop A engaged the enemy with 106mm RR fire from the flanks. The battle was continued throughout the night under continuous illumination until contact was broken at approximately 0020hrs. The operation resulted in 55 NVA KIA (BC), 5 NVA POW's, 30 weapons captured. Friendly Casualties were: 1 US KIA and 15 US WIA. (Operation Report, Lessons Learned, HQ 101st ABN DIV (AM), 26 December 1968)
- 06 May 1968 1-502 IN BN continued its pacification operations. A/1-502 IN NDP was under sporadic contact from 0335H till 0545H hours and had 2 WIA from SA fire, from estimated reinforced squad. First light check revealed 1 NVA KIA (BC). B/1-502 IN established 3 ambushes. At 2140H one ambush fired on 4 NVA across the river from them. No assessment could be made. At 0745H another ambush fired on 5 NVA in a sampan. Results, 5 NVA KIA (BC) and sampan sunk. B/1-502 IN combat assault village vicinity 750291 and encountered heavy fire. Formed a cordon of the village with D/1-502 IN and called in air strikes and artillery. C/1-502 IN ambush killed 2 NVA KIA (BC). D/1-502 IN combat assault to 748294 and were pinned down by heavy fire. Went into cordon with B/1-502 IN suffering 2 KIA, 7 WIA. Results: 2 KIA, 9 WIA; Enemy: 8 NVA KIA (BC), 4 NVA QIA (Est.)
- 06 – 17 May 1968 **Operation DELAWARE:** 2-502 IN BN air assaulted to the north into the Brigade Recon zone to establish its new AO. Initially C/2-502 IN and the TAC CP advance party air assaulted into LZ ZULU and began the construction of FSB STRIKE. On the next day companies, A/2-502 IN and B/2-502 IN air assaulted into LZ YANKEE and began to push out to the southeast and to their respective AO's. Also, on 07 May the remainder of the TAC CP and Reconos went into FSB STRIKE. Reconos began their surveillance and Recon patrolling along the SONG BO River. A/2-502 IN made the initial contact, mostly meeting contact, with the VC/NVA along the trails. The most significant contact was made by A/2-502 IN when the enemy initiated the organized probe against their NDP on 12 May.
- The results were 9 x KIA, 6 x AK-47's, 1 x SKS, 1 x M-2 Carbine, 1 x RPG CIA. B/2-502 IN made contact mostly during their daylight ambushes along trails. The terrain was hilly, and thick with vegetation and tall triple canopy. Streams were frequently encountered. Fortunately, there were quite a few areas cleared both from the bomb craters and cultivation that could be used for LZ's with little preparation. However, hoist Medevac's still had to be used on several occasions. The BN effectively accomplished its mission during Operation DELAWARE. In both phases the enemy sustained substantial significant losses, particularly in equipment, and intelligence documents. The enemy suffered 43 x KIA, 1 x VC POW, 2 X NVA POW, 39 x individual weapons captured, and 300lbs of rice destroyed. Operation Delaware was finished.
- 06 – 08 May 1969 **Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER:** 1-502 IN BN combat assaulted into an area five kilometers from the Laotian Border again in response to intelligence reports and discovered a recently used medical aid station that contained eighteen weapons and forty cases of medical supplies. This operation was concluded on 08 May with the following results: 175 NVA/VC KIA, 2 NVA POW's, 1 HOI CHANH, 857 individual weapons captured, in addition to 40 crew-served weapons and 30 vehicles captured. (HQ, 101st Airborne (Airmobile), Operational Report – Lessons Learned. Dated 20 August 1969)
- 06 May 1969 **Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER:** Operations continued and B/1-502 IN moved by CH-47 to Eagle Beach and A/1-502 IN returned to FSB LASH and secured the firebase. C/1-502 IN continued RIF to the south and west, made a point contact with 2-3 enemy. Contact was broken after 7 minutes. Results: 3 US WIA.
- 06 – 10 May 1970 FSB HENDERSON, 15-km south-southwest of CAM LO, was attacked twice by elements of 8/66 NVA Regt on 06 and 10 May. At 0530H on 06 May, A/2-501 IN and 54th ARVN Regt, occupying the FSB, received mortar and rocket-propelled grenade fire followed by ground attacks from the northwest. The 2-hour engagement cost the enemy 29 KIA while the defenders sustained 51 KIA (32 US, 19 ARVN), 79 WIA (35 US, 40 ARVN, four PF), two MIA, and three 155mm howitzers heavily damages. Four days later at 0600H-1130H, 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire fell on FSB HENDERSON resulting in three ARVN KIA and 15 WIA. (HQ, USMACV; Command History 1970, Volume III; 19 April 1971)
- 06 May 1970 An NVA/VC man shot up the operations section of AN HOI and fled. The PF sent out a patrol after him. Results one NVA/VC KIA. The 1-502 IN BN, Recon Team #1 found fresh set of tracks on trails. PF forces engaged four VC vicinity 945167 with negative results. Recon Team #1 found fresh elephant tracks estimated to be two days old. In the village of PHU THU an VN woman was assassinated by VC last night. Her husband had been killed by the VC three years ago.



06 May 1970

The Battle of FSB HENDERSON; 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), (Operation Texas Star), 6 May 1970; South Vietnam; located at MGRS YD081411; Company A, 2nd Battalion, 501st Infantry and Attachments. (By James E. Mitchell, BG, USA, Ret.)



(THE MAP SHEET ABOVE IS AN EXACT DUPLICATE OF THE ONE I CARRIED THROUGHOUT OPERATION TEXAS STAR... 1:50,000; EACH GRID SQUARE IS A KILOMETER SQUARE; THE BROWN CONTOUR LINES ARE AT 20 METER INTERVALS IN ELEVATION.)

I was the A Company and U.S. Forces Ground Commander responsible for HENDERSON's defense throughout the battle that occurred on 6 May 1970 until we were extracted with a "change of mission". I was their leader throughout the fight; I fought for and with them; I led them off of the hill when so ordered. The men who fought there were (and are) common Americans of uncommon patriotism, valor, and fidelity. They fought courageously for me and for one another for "greater love has no one than this: to lay down one's life for one's friends".

MY PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF HENDERSON IS IN MEMORY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS BUT ESPECIALLY FOR TWO BRAVE INFANTRYMEN WHO WERE LISTED AS MISSING IN ACTION FOR SO MANY YEARS...SSG REFUGIO THOMAS TERAN, AND SSG LARRY GENE KIER.

I don't recall the exact time my UH-1 (Huey) touched down on the sunbaked one-ship landing zone (LZ) on the 5th of May 1970, but I certainly recall the aerial view of Fire Support Base HENDERSON and its surrounding terrain as we executed the long sweeping left turn and flared on "short final" before landing. As I got my first glance of the hill we were to defend from the air I was astounded by the prominent high ground overlooking three sides of the barren hilltop...an irregular, goose-egg shaped 50 by 200-meter hill that straddled a sweeping ridge line running down eventually to the Song QUANG TRI River about a kilometer north and below. I still remember, as if it were yesterday, scrambling to align the thick roll of map sheets I was issued before we began the long move north from near the city of HUE and into an area of operation (AO) we had never seen before. By my initial map analysis, I knew we were being inserted no more the 9 miles or so northeast of the Laotian Salient and we were uncomfortably close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Approximately 15 miles to our east-north-east was the city of QUANG TRI. I didn't need the Division's most recent Intelligence Summary to know that our new AO had to be saturated with large, well-trained and untested North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces making their way into South Vietnam from the North. Even though I had not been issued an operation order and had no intelligence briefing before the air assault into HENDERSON, I had been "up north" near the DMZ once before while commanding E Company, 2n Battalion, 501st Infantry. The experience had occurred in the fall of 1969 and had left me with a clear understanding that we were being moved north this time with a mission that carried substantially higher risks. Working near the DMZ and the Lao Salient was unnerving to say the least and many of the seasoned vets with A Company shared my concerns.

Only a few weeks earlier the senior leadership of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and our Army of Vietnam (ARVN) partners in northern I Corps, had jointly made the decision to conduct combined operations to interdict NVA forces moving across the DMZ with operations to commence 1 April. One interesting aspect of the operation provided for ARVN forces to continue their tactical control of their AOs assigned however, the 3rd Brigade, 101st was tasked to reopen Fire Support Base HENDERSON. In opening the fire base, the 3rd Brigade assumed responsibility for providing base defense and security of both U.S. and ARVN artillery units supporting ARVN infantry operating to the south and west.

During the last week of April 3rd Brigade, 101st opened HENDERSON by air assaulting one U.S. infantry company onto the hill for fire base defense followed by B Battery (-), 2-11 Field Artillery (U.S.-155mm) and B Battery (-), 12th Field Artillery (ARVN-105mm) plus the 54th ARVN Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and its supporting elements. The rest of the U.S 3rd Brigade, 101st and its infantry battalions remained well south with very limited capability to reinforce HENDERSON, if required. As HENDERSON opened, the 54th ARVN infantry battalions were inserted by air some



distance from HENDERSON. The 54th Regiment's 1st Infantry Battalion was inserted on 30 April well south of HENDERSON, and on 1 May the 54th Regiment's 2nd Battalion air assaulted into its AO on Fire Support Base Tun Tavern even further from HENDERSON. In hindsight, this tactical decision to open HENDERSON without clearing the immediate surrounding terrain proved to be a fatal error that dramatically increased HENDERSON's vulnerability and made the hill a much more lucrative target.

To this day I recall thinking, "Wow...who in their right mind could have picked this place to build a fire base?" By simple terrain analysis one could quickly conclude that the hill was not defensible! Once on the ground what I found while I walked the perimeter of HENDERSON for the first time disturbed me even more. In absolute shock, I instantly recognized that defensive preparations on HENDERSON were next to nonexistent compared to any other fire base I'd ever seen. With almost a week of occupation, HENDERSON's fighting positions along and within the perimeter were, for the most part, nothing more than perhaps waist deep holes; few were sand bagged; at best no more than a single strand of concertina (protective wire) had been emplaced; there was no "tangle-foot" at all, and fields of fire had been cleared no more than 15 to 20 meters forward of our lines of defense leading into the dense vegetation. Defensive materiel, normally pre-positioned around the perimeter of newly occupied fire bases, was primitive at best and next to nonexistent. As best I remember, the only positions with even questionable overhead cover were the ARVN TOC, the ARVN Medical Facility, a few positions near the artillery batteries, and my Command Post (CP) some 15 to 20 meters north and below the TOC. I was dumbstruck to see such a lack of tactical preparation for defending HENDERSON given the hill had been occupied by a U.S. infantry company (D Company, 1-501st Infantry) since 30 April.

As A Company, 2-501 Infantry's 80 plus infantrymen (less than 60 percent of our authorized strength) continued to land one aircraft at a time on HENDERSON and make their way up and onto the hill to occupy the defensive positions, I walked back through the two artillery battery positions on top of the hill to better understand the terrain we were to defend. I was amazed to see a number of unprotected pallets of artillery ammunition (approximately five to eight as I recall) and at least one or more fuel bladders positioned at or within the artillery positions. I could not have imagined a potentially more lethal mistake. Little did I know of the effects this blatant tactical error would cost us in lives in just a matter of a few hours. As I made my way back to my CP, I stopped by the ARVN TOC to introduce myself and gather as much information as I could before meeting with my platoon leaders to walk our perimeter. I briefly spoke with the senior ARVN officer there and casually spoke with an ARVN captain who proudly announced that he was a graduate of our Infantry School at Fort Benning. During our initial conversations I quickly determined that HENDERSON had no combined defensive plan. There were no direct or indirect fire plans, no counterattack plans, no counter-reconnaissance plans, no surveillance plans, no obstacle plans, no designated reserves, and no "hard wire" communications from my CP to any locations around the hill. HENDERSON was a disaster waiting to happen and I knew it within the first hour I was on the ground. Essentially, the 54th ARVN Regiment and I had no command relationship either! Neither of us could require anything of the other in defense of the hill. I was absolutely dumbfounded by the lack of "unity of command" on HENDERSON. I departed the ARVN TOC confused, frustrated, and angry for having been injected into such a tactical mess but determined that we absolutely had to make the best of the remainder of the daylight hours to fix what we could before nightfall.

Arriving back at my CP, (a roughly eight by ten-foot hole covered by three or four sections of steel planking and sandbags) I found my Artillery Forward Observer (FO) Team, RTOs, and others in my command group busily setting up our own static communications equipment and taking closure reports from our subordinate units as they filled in the perimeter. By radio, as I recall, I immediately instructed my platoon leaders to focus on preparing our fighting positions along the perimeter with priority to getting appropriate overhead cover on them before last light. Frankly, such instructions were not required for the work had already begun at the direction of my subordinates. The survivors of A Company's successful defense of Fire Support Base Granite only about a week earlier knew the importance of digging in properly with the requisite overhead cover as well. From the moment A Company's infantrymen got on the bunker line there were frantic efforts to get "underground" and construct some form of overhead cover. Getting dug in with appropriate overhead cover was my message to my platoon leaders, (1st LT Jim Knight [1st Platoon], 1st LT Rick Hawley [Recon Platoon], 1st LT Lyn Hargrave [2nd Platoon], and SSG Bob Nichol [3rd Platoon]). Jim Knight and I were the only two A Company officers left to make the trip to HENDERSON since we had moved north the first week of April as part of the 3rd Brigade offensive. Rick Hawley and about 14 members of our battalion's Reconnaissance Platoon were attached to the company as last minute reinforcements given, we were already so terribly under strength. Rick and I had served together as platoon leaders in C Company, 2-501 Infantry back in the fall of 69, operating along the Song Bo River west of Fire Support Base Bastogne. Lyn Hargrave joined us to lead the 2nd Platoon for the HENDERSON operation having formerly been a Platoon Leader in C Company, 2-501 Infantry and most recently he had been leading a Mobile Training Team for the 2nd Brigade. SSG Bob Nichol led the 3rd Platoon in the absence of an officer, however, I had absolute confidence in Bob for he was an A Company veteran...a smart, crafty leader, and one of the finest noncommissioned officers I'd humped the jungle with while in Vietnam. Sometime around mid-day we received a few additional infantry replacements but even with these and the attached Recon Platoon our foxhole strength around the perimeter was no more than about 120 soldiers...still well short of our authorized strength and certainly far short of our needs to effectively man HENDERSON's irregular perimeter.

While A Company and its late arriving attachments were racing to dig in properly, my senior RTOs and I had another battle on our hands in that we were unable to communicate effectively with the 3rd Brigade Headquarters almost 30 miles southeast of HENDERSON. I had been forewarned that the problem had existed since the fire base had been opened but we simply had not been able to establish continuous direct radio contact. The dilemma was that we were required to maintain radio contact through a distant "retransmission site" using our own organic communications equipment and a single AN/GRC 292 radio antenna. Either faulty equipment at the retransmission site or the extended distances made communications nearly impossible. (Only years later would I learn that the division had provided a Multi-Channel Radio System to the 54th ARVN TOC twenty yards directly behind me and provided them with an operator or operators as well!). For more than a week the 3rd Brigade had ignored the requirement to establish reliable communications with the defenders of one of its fire bases...an unpardonable "sin" that added to the list of leadership failures existent on HENDERSON. Despite our best efforts we never established continuous communications with our higher headquarters and were forced to relay our hourly required situation reports. On a more positive note, my FO was able to maintain



excellent communications with our direct support artillery Fire Direction Center (FDC). I believe this communication link would later play a vital role in preventing an NVA reinforcing attack for we had 155mm fires on the ground within minutes of their initial assault and we were able to pound likely attack positions along most likely enemy avenues of approach as the battle progressed.

At this point in my account of the battle I must add that one or more accounts of the afternoon of 5 May suggest a visit to our hill by the 3rd Brigade, 101st Commander, my immediate commander on HENDERSON. I recollect a brief visit by the 1st Division (ARVN) Commander but I must admit, I can't recall COL William Bradley's presence or his visit on the 5th. However, and in all honesty, my interests on the day of our arrival were focused on our vulnerabilities and the enormous amount of work that needed to be accomplished before nightfall. We had a real mess to clean up and not a moment to spare. With all candor I must add here as well that I had learned to routinely "discount" senior officer visits into our jungle locations (including forward fire bases) as nothing more than "face time with the troops" unless they were conveying specific actions and orders. I had concluded months before (with an admitted level of cynicism) that senior officers didn't have the slightest idea of what we "grunts" were enduring day after day in the mountainous jungles of Vietnam nor were they "situationally aware" of the unique dangers and personal challenges we faced as jungle fighters in Vietnam's mountainous north. Frankly, most were absolutely oblivious to the fact that as jungle fighters, our immediate and perhaps most difficult task was surviving the environment. We learned by mostly trial and error to live in harmony under the harshest of conditions or become a casualty of its circumstances. I would opine that we survived by sheer determination, individual toughness, and "pack instincts" and, as such, we assumed the role of the most intelligent and dominant beasts in the jungle's food chain. Said another way, we lived under the jungle canopy much like the creatures (both man and beast) we encountered. It was a cruel, survivalist, "kill or be killed" environment made more hazardous by the enemy we faced. Unless you humped an eighty tone hundred plus pound ruck in the mountainous jungles every day, laid on a wet ambush site every night and faced every contact with the enemy at fifteen meters or less, you had little in common with those of us who did...matter of fact, "visitors" to our environment hardly spoke our language! It was as simple as that! Again... recognizing the degree of my cynicism that comes with these observations, most of us saw our senior leadership as stark aliens helicoptering in from their stuffed chairs and elaborate headquarters, freshly showered/shaved and well fed... adorned in starched jungle fatigues and spit-shined boots, and well air-conditioned...ready to shake a few hands and ask a few mundane questions before disappearing into the sky in a matter of a few moments. I always marveled at the contrasts with our "guests" who ventured into the jungle to visit us. They hopped from their glossy command and control aircraft and infiltrated the tattered, filthy, often unshaven grunts who had been trudging the jungled mountains, oftentimes for the better part of a month...worn, weathered, sleep-deprived, jungle-rotted, and always hungry. I've often made the point that we were more beast than man having endured endless days in the jungle...all of our senses were distinctly modified and different...we were acclimated to nothing more than whispering and attuned to be instinctively survivalists above all else. I think I can speak for any "grunt" that humped the jungle with me that a low aerial kicks out of the red mail bag every week or so was far more welcome in our midst than having to scramble to an LZ to meet one of our senior leaders! I would add as well that our "guests" were, more often than not, treated as a nuisance and their noisy arrival by air always compromised our locations, disrupted our "battle rhythm", and forced unnecessary movements thereby increasing our vulnerability of being ambushed or being caught up in untimely meeting engagements with an enemy that was grossly underestimated. Every time my radio announced the inevitable "visitor" my first thoughts were that we would be operationally compromised. I learned a lot from these all too frequent "intrusions" and as a Colonel and General Officer later in my career I sought to make my encounters with subordinate units in the field far more purposeful and much less intrusive.

On the 5th of May 1970 the darkness arrived far too soon on HENDERSON for an understrength, somewhat battered, tired and edgy group of defenders, some who had just arrived and were newly assigned to A Company and others, like the Recon Platoon, who were unaccustomed to operating within a rifle company structure. For many soldiers the night of the 5th would be their first exposure to the combat environment (and sadly for many, their last). The seasoned few combat veterans of A Company, particularly those who had participated in the fights on REUP Hill and FSB Granite during the previous weeks, had all heard the rumors that HENDERSON would be "a quiet and welcomed break to give the company some time to rest and reconstitute itself and integrate the many replacements" that had just joined us after losses incurred the previous month. That was the message I got as well, however most of us veterans just didn't "take the bait". We knew we were extremely vulnerable, but we had done our absolute best to improve our positions before darkness fell and I was hopeful that we could get through this first night and start a new day of making vast improvements in our defensive posture. By around 2100 on the night of the 5th, HENDERSON was quiet and the clouds and dampness from the valley below had crept up and onto our hilltop adding to its darkness.

At approximately 0430 on 6 May my FO and I were up and sitting on top of the company CP just below the ARVN TOC working the last minute details of a series of scheduled calls for artillery fire against preplanned targets on the hills and ridge lines that lined the eastern side of HENDERSON. Although most of us had accepted a rather sleepless night trying to work through our communications problems with the 3rd Brigade, we had prepared (as was our Standing Operating Procedure in A Company) to hit the terrain around us hard with artillery at first light. Such use of artillery was a routine piece of our defensive planning any time we were defending from a fire support base and its purpose was to disrupt and/or deter early morning attacks. We had no idea that the assault elements of the 8th Infantry Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment of the 304B Division (NVA) were already inside our planned and scheduled defensive targets and in their final attack positions for the assault on HENDERSON.

At precisely 0505 in the fog-shrouded darkness, I recall the silence on HENDERSON being broken by a single burst of automatic weapons fire to my right rear along HENDERSON's eastern perimeter followed by an almost immediate roar of exploding grenades, claymore mines, satchel charges (improvised explosive devices), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and assorted types of small arms fire, both friendly and enemy. I knew immediately from my experience a week earlier on FSB Granite that the NVA were in or through our single strand of protective wire and the face-to-face perimeter fighting had commenced along our thin lines of defense. Within a matter of a few minutes the ground attack to my right rear and to my front intensified dramatically. As our hand flares streaked into the low hanging cloud cover, I observed and engaged



several attacking NVA Sappers to my immediate front between my CP and the bunker line below. The NVA movement across and through the bunker line to my immediate front told me that the soldiers who had occupied those forward positions had been killed or wounded within moments of the initial assault. Each of the NVA soldiers appeared to be crouched or crawling toward us throwing improvised explosive devices as they advanced, and it became immediately obvious their attacks were focused on specific assigned objectives within our perimeter. I have always marveled at how they attacked with such "tunnel-vision" to their pre-designated targets, oblivious to the chaos around them. I recall that at one point a single NVA soldier rose from behind one of our neutralized fighting positions about 20 meters to my front and fired a single RPG round directly at us before I could get off a shot with my M16. The RPG round appeared to strike our 292 radio antenna about 10 feet up its aluminum mast almost directly above our CP with a tremendous concussion and showered one of my radio operators (RTO) and me with aluminum fragments or small pieces of thin steel. Although my RTO had received a serious wound to the hand and I had collected several smaller pieces to the head, both of us were extremely fortunate to have survived the incident. I recall thinking sometime later that we were probably not his target...his aim was likely directed at the ARVN TOC behind us and he had accidentally hit our antenna mast in the darkness. For several minutes my RTOs and I continued to engage and repel several NVA attackers attempting to either come through us toward the TOC or move across our front, right to left. The fighting was close and intense under the drifting shadows of our hand flares...for a while we shot anything moving that didn't wear a helmet (as did the ARVN defenders at the ARVN TOC door I confirmed later).

Behind me and to my right the NVA attack continued to build in intensity. It was apparent that small elements of the attacking sapper forces had pierced our defensive line in at least two platoon sectors and it was clear by the volume of fire that the enemy efforts were focused on our principle indirect fire weapons (our artillery batteries) located atop and center of the fire base.

The volume of satchel charges and RPG explosions near the 2-11 FA Battery location was so intense that it was difficult to distinguish each detonation individually. At this point in the fight radio or visual communications with subordinate leaders on the perimeter and with our higher headquarters was nonexistent due to the sheer noise of exploding munitions, small arms fire, and smoke and fires in and around the top of the hill. Any effort to move to reinforce adjacent units was not a viable option either given the hill was being raked with small arms fire from both U.S. and NVA forces. Frankly, everything attempting to move on HENDERSON during the initial 30 to 45 minutes of the battle was being engaged by either friend or foe in the fog and flare-lit predawn hours. Perhaps 30 or so minutes into the intense fight I heard several long hissing sounds characteristic of a flamethrower to my right rear and I could not believe at that moment that such a weapon was being employed by the NVA. I had seen and heard U.S. flamethrowers before in training exercises but never under combat circumstances. Almost immediately and with the illumination over HENDERSON I could see the orange and white flickers of fires beginning to grow in intensity in the vicinity of the pallets of artillery ammunition and shortly thereafter the rounds began to "cook off" due to the intense heat. For at least 5 to 10 minutes or more the artillery rounds exploded one after another driving other hot unexploded illumination and high explosive projectiles into the air and raining them down all over the hill. Finally, the ammunition fires became so intense that HENDERSON was suddenly and violently rocked with at least one or more deafening, ground-shaking sympathetic detonations some 30 or more meters up and to my rear. The whole fire base shuttered as if hit by an earthquake with these devastating explosions no doubt taking the lives of both friendly and enemy soldiers. Concurrently, the bladder or bladders of fuel had been ignited as well sending a stream of fire across and down the hill on the east side of HENDERSON and into and around several of our fighting positions. The chaos and carnage atop HENDERSON and along much of its perimeter was indescribable unless you were a participant in the fight. Not only were we dealing with small groups of NVA hurling explosives from several locations along the bunker line, but we were trying to deal with our own exploding artillery ammunition and the fires they were creating.

I recall that about first light our attack helicopters finally arrived over HENDERSON. Initially, they were limited in their usefulness primarily due to the low ceiling, foggy conditions at ground level and the fires and smoke coming from along the hilltop and eastern perimeter. I know the courageous pilots were frustrated as they made continuous nap-of-the-earth gun runs screaming across the battered and burning hill without being able to engage because of the low ceiling and sparse targeting information from us on the ground. However, their presence was a significant threat to the NVA and, even without firing a shot, they were a critical component in repelling a determined NVA force hell-bent on destroying HENDERSON.

We were still taking an occasional RPG and some sporadic small arms fire as dawn broke but most of the NVA had withdrawn back onto the Hills to east and southeast. During the lull many of the war fighters on HENDERSON who had survived the initial assault were making a frantic effort to locate, collect and treat our wounded, rescue others in and around smoldering fighting positions along the eastern perimeter, account for the missing, and reestablish our defenses. At the same time, gallant efforts were common place among our attack aviation assets as they continued to scream low over HENDERSON under the cloud cover to attack suspected NVA targets in the surrounding hills. I cannot over emphasize their contributions to the fight even if their targeting (and ours) was suspect due to the weather or lack of information about known enemy positions. Concurrently, we were pouring artillery fires into suspected enemy locations along the eastern side of HENDERSON. I recall at one point the ARVN 105mm howitzers on HENDERSON cranked their tubes down into the direct fire mode and fired "point blank" into the ridge line no more than a few hundred meters or so across from our location. I'm certain these direct and indirect fires prevented NVA reinforcements from mounting a counterattack.

In the 6 May early morning twilight leaders crawled and scrambled from position to position to search for missing infantrymen all along the perimeter and to reestablish new lines of defense around the now rubble hill. There were many soldiers and leaders unaccounted for as daylight exposed our beleaguered hilltop. Many of HENDERSON's defenders who had survived the initial attack were thrust into new leadership positions regardless of rank and their performance was nothing short of magnificent. As I made my way up behind the ARVN TOC and into B Battery, 2-11 FAs positions I quickly determined that our 155mm howitzers were all inoperable. In fact, I found the area hardly recognizable and the infantry



fighting positions below them along the eastern perimeter were still burning. Many of the fighting positions along the eastern perimeter were difficult to locate due to the fires and the damage done by the huge explosions that had rocked the hill only an hour or so earlier. Much of the area around B Battery's positions was now blackened, smoldering rubble. Lieutenant Rick Hawley's fighting position just east and below the artillery batteries was a smoldering pile of rubble and unapproachable due to the intense heat. (Later in the morning I returned to search for Rick in and around his position but to no avail).

As quickly as we could safely land them, our medical evacuation helicopters (MEDIVACs) were taking out the most seriously wounded. The crews of these "Angels of Mercy" time and again risk their lives to land on both ends of HENDERSON to extract those deemed most critical. The LZ near my CP quickly became a collecting point for many of the wounded and two or three of our surviving Medics worked feverishly to administer morphine and perform other lifesaving measures as they prepared the wounded for extraction. The LZ directly in front of my CP was lined with casualties awaiting extraction and the hard baked ground was a bloody mess. All-the-while, the more able war fighters continued to carry in our wounded as the evacuations continued. The carnage and dismemberment around the hill, both enemy and friendly, was beyond my description as was the gallantry, bravery, and heroism of so many who had desperately fought to hold onto HENDERSON. There are countless stories of the seriously wounded continuing to fight and protect those among the wounded who were unable to raise a rifle to defend themselves. In the days ahead, I would conclude that I had learned as the leader of this magnificent group of men, a combat infantryman's most valuable lesson..... "SOLDIERS FIGHT, ABOVE ALL ELSE, FOR ONE ANOTHER...FOR SMITH ON THELEFT AND JONES ON THE RIGHT". Time and again I saw men rise from their fighting positions under the most intense fire to defend a brother in harm's way. Throughout my career, I would cite this lesson learned over and over again to those preparing for combat. It is the essence of the American Warfighter...a critical element of our ethos.

Sometime later in the morning, perhaps around 0730, after the ground fighting had reached its conclusion, I received a radio call from Colonel William Bradley, the 3rd Brigade Commander. He indicated that he was approaching HENDERSON by helicopter and he notified me that his intent was to land at the LZ immediately to my front. I informed him that I felt a landing and ground move (about 30 meters) up to the ARVN TOC was extremely risky and that any instructions he might have for me would best be radioed to the hill rather than chance a landing and walk up to the TOC. (I based my recommendations to him solely on my experiences a week or so earlier while defending Fire Support Base Granite in that we all were waiting on the NVA mortar attack that we knew was imminent.) Bradley's response was that he intended to land anyway, and he would move directly to the ARVN TOC. I replied that if that was his decision, he'd best dash into my CP until his helicopter lifted off and if all remained quiet, he could make his way on up to the safety of the TOC. I watched from my CP fighting position with great concern when he, his Operations Officer (MAJ "Tex" Turner), his Fire Support Officer (Captain Hopkins), and his Command Sergeant Major (CSM Raymond Long), stepped onto the LZ and started up toward the TOC. I waved them toward my position but all of them walked briskly and purposefully past my position in route to the TOC entrance. COL Bradley had just stepped through the TOC door with his command group party in trail when I observed a mortar round impact some five to 10 meters behind them. I knew some in his party had to have been hit and almost immediately heard a cry for a Medic. My Company "Doc" and I ran from my CP to render help. We reached the TOC in seconds finding CPT Hopkins suffering from obvious wounds to the lower extremities and CSM Long down and motionless on the TOC floor. My Medic instinctively went to attend to the CSM who appeared to have suffered life-threatening head wounds. Tragically our Brigade CSM's wounds were fatal and he died almost immediately. While my Company Senior Medic tended to MAJ Turner and the more seriously wounded CPT Hopkins, COL Bradley turned to me to and demanded that we medically evacuate CSM Long. I told him that I was not authorized to medically evacuate a deceased soldier however his response was to do it anyway. We complied with his directive and the medical evacuation helicopter pilot called me immediately after liftoff to express his ire over our blatant disregard for division medical evacuation protocol. The "Dust-off" Pilot had every right to be angry for not only had we risked a helicopter and the lives of its crew but one of our own wounded had been "bumped" in the priority of life-saving evacuation. I have never, ever forgotten this incident nor the tragic and unnecessary loss of CSM Long. COL Bradley's ill-advised decision to land on HENDERSON coupled with his total disregard for the ground commander's assessment of the threat resulted in unnecessary risks to many others and the loss of a great professional soldier. I have yet to come to grips with such blatant battlefield incompetence.

Around mid to late morning as I recall, and without prior coordination, the 3rd Brigade inserted one or two "others" onto HENDERSON to "provide assistance" in our efforts to reorganize, rearm, and refit. Much has been written about their contributions and heroics however, as the senior U.S. ground commander, let me make clear.... their contributions were minimal at best and their presence as an operational entity separate and apart from my chain of command made my job that much more difficult.

Throughout the remainder of the day we conducted seemingly continuous aerial evacuations of our wounded and our KIA's while receiving tactical emergency resupplies of ammunition and water. Our supporting tube and Ariel rocket artillery continued to hit suspected NVA targets located on the ridge lines that looked down onto HENDERSON from several sides. Between the sporadic NVA mortar attacks we searched for several missing soldiers and we were harassed by inaccurate but unsettling recoilless rifle fire coming from the northwestern side of the perimeter. Either the NVA had faulty recoilless ammunition or their gunners were untrained and for that all of us were quite thankful.

As I recall, the remnants of A Company and its attachments left HENDERSON's blood-spattered LZ mid to late afternoon on the 6th. We departed still under the threat of NVA mortar and recoilless rifle fire. Arriving back at Camp Evans, we were at best an infantry unit of no more than forty to fifty men (many walking wounded, including me). Despite our desperate searches prior to our departure from HENDERSON I was unable to account for three soldiers (Rick Hawley, Refugio Teran, and Larry Kier). All three were last seen in or near their assigned fighting positions as the fighting commenced. The areas of their loss were still smoldering from the intense fires and horrendous explosions that had consumed several of the fighting positions they would have been in or near as the NVA assault progressed. We had done our very best, given the circumstances, to account for them but our search revealed nothing. We all came off of the



helicopters at Camp Evans exhausted and those requiring medical treatment moved immediately to the nearest Aid Station for treatment. I recall standing in line with a dozen or so others to either have shrapnel removed or have cuts cleansed and closed as a result of the melee on HENDERSON. As soon as we were patched up, each of us walked back to the Evans LZ to find the rest of the men of A Company "crashed" on their rucks around the LZ's edge.... those awake were sitting in twos and threes quietly talking to one another, sipping on coffee or hot chocolate.

While we were there at Evans, I recall receiving a summons to report to COL Bradley at his headquarters, so I headed that way promptly. Upon my arrival in the headquarters area, I was offered the "VIP Hooch" for the night which I promptly declined. Frankly, I was far more concerned for the survivors of the HENDERSON fight still on the unprotected Camp Evans LZ and their immediate physical and emotional needs. I had no plans or desires to be anywhere other than with them for we had much to do in regenerating and reorganizing ourselves as quickly as possible. We were still a rifle company operating with its "emergent leadership" having lost so many leaders and I really wasn't sure what I had left in noncommissioned officers that could fight. I had lost all but one of my platoon leaders as well (1LT Rick Hawley was missing and 1LT Lyn Hargrave had been wounded)1LT Jim Knight and I were the only officers left in the company.

I recall meeting with COL Bradley in his office for no more than about thirty minutes or so and our initial discussions centered on the operational aspects of the battle at HENDERSON. The meeting began very cordially but our conversation was business-like and commander-to commander regarding the events that had transpired over the past 24 hours. I made it quite clear to COL Bradley that "I HAD A COMPANY FULL OF HERO'S" and I was proud beyond description of our organization's performance in defending the hill under the most difficult circumstances. While in his office I wanted him to understand clearly the true intensity of the fight and the courage and bravery of so many who risked or had given their lives to hold on to the hill. I suspect that my statement about the heroic performance of many in A Company was used in the printed account of the HENDERSON fight published in the theater newspaper a few days later although that was never confirmed. As we neared the conclusion of our conversation, I was taken aback when COL Bradley's demeanor took a sudden and quite unforeseen turn in subject and seriousness. He quite sternly informed me that I would remain silent regarding the details of the HENDERSON battle and that I was specifically prohibited from making comments to anyone from the press about our actions on HENDERSON. Furthermore, I would only comment on the fight at HENDERSON if so, ordered by the Division's senior leadership. I'm certain that he noted my expression of dismay in receipt of such instructions, but I did not question his direction at the time. Shortly thereafter I was dismissed, and I returned to the Evans LZ and the remnants of the A Company team. (Sometime later I did provide a statement concerning the battle to LTC Bobby F. Brashear's [MG, USA, retired], [my former battalion commander in the 2-501 Infantry], who I believe had been appointed by the 101st Airborne Division to gather facts and prepare a written report concerning the HENDERSON affair).

I was glad to get away from the 3rd Brigade Headquarters and return to the LZ and the A Company team. Frankly, I had hoped the purpose in visiting with Bradley was to receive orders of another "change in mission" so that we might return to our parent battalion's control. The 2-501 Infantry was far more capable of tending to the company's personnel and logistical needs. That didn't happen, and we were subsequently "missioned" for about a week to augment the Camp Evans base defense. During the remainder of our stay at Evans all of us began to deal with the devastating losses of so many friends and great soldiers who had given their lives so that we could survive to fight another day. I was overwhelmingly proud of A Company and its attachments for their heroic defense of HENDERSON. In reality, the surviving veterans of A Company had seen 36 killed and approximately 100 wounded over a period of 8 days while defending Fire Support Bases Granite and HENDERSON. In fact, there were very few survivors of both of these battles that were not awarded one or more Purple Heart Medals. To this day, the acts of bravery, heroism, gallantry in action, and dogged determination have, for the most part, been ignored and thus been unrecognized. Neither the 3rd Brigade, the 101st Airborne Division, nor the Army bothered to fully document what actually happened on HENDERSON on the 6th of May 1970. However, the facts are clear for those of us who fought there. A Company and its attached and supporting units on HENDERSON had inherited a disaster waiting to happen and the war fighters on HENDERSON had made possible the impossible by sheer courage and determination in the finest traditions of the 101st Airborne Division and the United States Army. A Company and its attached and supporting units had repulsed the NVA's best efforts to kill or capture all U.S./ARVN forces on that hill and it remained under our control until we were ordered to leave. The 66th NVA Regiment had not gained or retained an inch of ground on HENDERSON and had paid dearly for their encounter with the soldiers of the 2-501 Infantry.

For the rest of my career I often was challenged or queried with the following: "Oh...were you on HENDERSON when it was overrun?" In response, I've quite pointedly and proudly responded with the following: "HENDERSON was not overrun...A Company and its attachments and supporting units were never overrun. We held HENDERSON throughout the battle at a terrible cost of our own killed and wounded and we departed the hill when so ordered in an orderly fashion still under fire!"

U.S. casualties on HENDERSON have been the subject of considerable debate from the moment the battle concluded until now. Initial reports were 32 U.S. KIA...in fact, the Division's After Action Report states 32 were killed during the battle as do a host of official documents citing the division's records. However, by my review of several available casualty records I can account for only 27 soldiers listed as "killed on HENDERSON or likely killed on HENDERSON". My search continues for others who may have died of wounds as a result of the fight at HENDERSON on 6 May 1970.

Similarly, an accurate count of U.S. wounded on HENDERSON as a result of the 6 May battle has been even more elusive. In all likelihood, the number of wounded will never be known and is primarily attributable to questionable records keeping within our array of otherwise excellent medical facilities. I'm certain however, that at least 70 U.S. soldiers were treated for wounds received as a result of the fight on the 6th.

The list of the 27 Killed In Action or likely killed 6 May 1970 on HENDERSON (as best I have been able to confirm) are as follows (with rank after posthumous promotion, MOS, unit of assignment, cause of death and home of record):



1. Refugio T. TERAN, SSG, 11B-Infantryman; E Company, 2-501 Infantry; died while missing; body not recovered, repatriated 13 Jun 1996, identified 28 Feb 2002. (HOR Westland, MI)
2. Larry G. KIER, SSG, 11B-Infantryman; A Company, 2-501 Infantry; died while missing; body not recovered, repatriated 13 June 1996, identified 28 Feb 2002. (HOR Omaha, Nebraska)
3. George W. BENNETT, Jr., CPL, 11B-Infantryman; A Company 2-501 Infantry; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-Dallas, TX)
4. Gregory A. CHAVEZ, SGT, 11B-Infantryman; E Company, 2-501 Infantry; died of burns. (HOR-Colorado Springs, CO)
5. Douglas W. DAY, CPL, 11C-Indirect Fire Infantryman; E Company, 2-501 Infantry; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-Hacienda Heights, CA)
6. Robert A. DENTON, SSG, 11B-Infantryman; B Company, 2-501 Infantry; died of gun or small arms fire. (Wichita Falls, TX)
7. Lawrence L. GORDON, CPL, 11B-Infantryman; A Company, 2-501 Infantry; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-Noblesville, TN)
8. Frank F. LEWIS, SGT, 11B-Infantryman; A Company, 2-501 Infantry; died from artillery, rocket, or mortar. (HOR-Afton, MO)
9. Ronald D. VAN BEUKERING, SP4, 11B-Infantryman; E Company, 2-501 Infantry; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-Kalamazoo, MI)
10. Gary F. SNYDER, SFC, 11B-Infantryman; E Company, 2-501 Infantry; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-Toledo, OH)
11. John G. WIDEN, SGT, 11C-Indirect Fire Infantryman; E Company, 2-501 Infantry; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-Owatonna, MN)
12. John J. WILLEY, SSG, 11B-Infantryman; A Company, 2-501 Infantry; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-West Covina, CA)
13. Frederick P. ZIEGENFELDER, SSG, 11B-Infantryman; A Company, 2-501 Infantry; died from multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-St Mary's, OH)
14. Michael L. ANTLE, SGT, 11B-Infantryman; A Company, 2-501 Infantry; died from artillery, rocket, or mortar. (HOR-Tulsa, OK)
15. Melvin BOWMAN, SGT, 91B-Medic; HHC, 2-501 Infantry; died from artillery, rocket, or mortar. (HOR-Iva, SC)
16. Jay T. DILLER, SGT, 91B-Medic; HHC, 2-501 Infantry; died from artillery, rocket, or mortar. (HOR-Chambersburg, PA)
17. Tommy I. HINDMAN, CPL, 11B-Infantryman; A Company, 2-501 Infantry; died from artillery, rocket or mortar. (HOR-Cedar Rapids, IA)
18. Richard A. HAWLEY, Jr., CPT, 1542-Infantry Unit Commander; E Company, 2-501 Infantry; died from multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-Devon, PA)
19. David E. OGDEN, SSG, 11F-Infantry Operations and Intelligence Specialist; E Company, 2-501 Infantry; died from multiple fragmentation wounds. (Paramount, CA)
20. Dickey W. REAGAN, SGT, 11B-Infantryman; E Company, 2-501 Infantry; died from artillery, rocket, or mortar. (HOR-Lumberton, NC)
21. Edward VESER, SGT, 11B-Infantryman; E Company, 2-501 Infantry; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-Milwaukee, WI)
22. * James D. JENNINGS, SGT, 31M-Multichannel Transmission Systems; A Company, 501st Signal Battalion; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. Casualty Record misidentifies unit of assignment; service member killed on 6 May 1970 during an attack of a Fire Support Base in 101st Airborne Division area of operations. (HOR-Brandon, MS)
23. Ray L. LONG, Jr., SMAJ, 00Z-Command Sergeant Major; HHC, 3rd Brigade; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-Little Rock, AR)
24. Michael F. BROWN, SSG, 13B-Cannon Crewman; B Battery, 2-11 Field Artillery; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-Baltimore, MD)



25. John E. GRANATH, Jr., CPL, 13A-Field Artillery Basic; B Battery, 2-11 Field Artillery; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-McHenry, IL)
26. David YELDELL, SP4; 13A-Field Artillery Basic, B Battery, 2-11 Field Artillery; died of multiple fragmentation wounds. (HOR-Greenwood, SC)
27. * Billy J. WILLIAMS, MAJ, 2162-Operations and Training Staff Officer; Advisory Team Three, HQ, MACV Advisors, MACV; died from artillery, rocket, or mortar. Service member killed by mortar fire on Landing Zone in QUANG TRI Province, Vietnam (101st Airborne Division area of operations); "may have been with ARVN at FSB HENDERSON" on 6 May 1970. (HOR-Marion, KY)

"TO THOSE LOST ON FSB HENDERSON, YOU WILL FOREVER BE REMEMBERED, AND MAY YOU REST IN PEACE; TO THE SURVIVORS OF THE HENDERSON BATTLE, YOU TOO ARE BROTHERS-IN-ARMS FOREVER".

The author of this account, Brigadier General James E. Mitchell, USA, Retired, served on active duty for more than thirty years. He led two rifle platoons (one in combat); commanded four infantry companies (two in combat); commanded a motorized infantry battalion, a light infantry battalion, and a light infantry brigade and served as a Division Deputy Commander for Support and Division Deputy Commander for Operations. Key staff assignments included: Battalion S3 Air (twice), Infantry Battalion S3, Infantry Battalion S2, Infantry Battalion XO, Light Infantry Division G3, Chief of Current Operations, U.S. Army-Pentagon, and Deputy Director of Operations, The Joint Staff-Pentagon. He is a graduate of the Army Command and Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University.

06 May 1970

Around 0500H members of the 33rd NVA Sapper Battalion attacked FSB HENDERSON from several directions. A/2-501 IN counted the most fatalities with 11. CPT Mitchell was the company commander on FSB HENDERSON when the attack occurred. He carried the names of the deceased on a 3 x 5 Card throughout his career. (Alpha Avenger website); The 29 U. S. troops killed at Fire Base HENDERSON, 16 miles south of the demilitarized zone, were the most American soldiers slain in a single action in 20 months. Fifteen North Vietnamese were reported killed. **101st Airborne Division Article:** Twenty-nine enemy soldiers were killed May 6 during a furious attack, on Fire Base HENDERSON, 10 miles south of CAM LO in QUANG TRI Province. Troopers of the 101st ABN DIV (Airmobile) and gunners of the 11th ARTY. received mortar and RPG- fire, followed by a ground attack from an unknown-sized enemy force. Division soldiers were engaged in a daylong battle in mountainous jungle 20 miles southwest of HUE May 9. Troopers, from the 5-502 IN BN. (501st Inf.), were searching the area when they were attacked by an enemy force firing small arms and RPGs. The Communists were hidden in a bunker complex laced with inter-connecting tunnels. Cobra gunships and airstrikes swept in to support the Screaming Eagles, who killed 18 enemy soldiers. In the northern I Corps area of operations May 7, an air observer supporting the 3rd Squadron, 5th Armored Cav., engaged 20 enemy soldiers. Helicopter gunships gave support in that action 10 miles southwest of CAM LO and 10 enemy soldiers were killed. Screaming Eagles killed another 18 enemy soldiers during four actions in mountainous jungles 20 miles southwest of HUE May 5. Elements of the 2nd Bn., 502nd Inf. approaching an enemy bunker complex were engaged by an unknown-sized force. The battalion soldiers quickly surrounded the bunkers and returned fire killing five enemy soldiers. (The Army Reporter; May 25, 1970)



NVA sappers took advantage of the situation at Henderson and left a trail of destruction by targeting artillery pieces and the ammunition dump in a night attack. U.S. troops fought back during the horrific explosion. However, 1500-200 of the enemy.

06 May 1970

At 0505H, FS/OB HENDERSON received RPG, small arms fire, satchel charges, recoilless rifle and mortar fire followed by a well organized and coordinated ground attack by the 8th Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment. Fires started when the NVA employed flame throwers against the fire base, caused approximately 1000 rounds of 155mm artillery ammunition to explode. Defending forces supported by ARA, tube artillery and gunships accounted for 29 NVA killed. The enemy withdrew at 0720H. B/2-501 IN moved by air to reinforce A/2-501 IN, and to conduct a daylight sweep. Friendly elements received incoming mortar fire sporadically throughout the day; Artillery, ARA, gunships, and air strikes were employed against enemy mortar positions. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd ARVN Regiment assaulted south of FS/OB HENDERSON to locate and destroy the remainder of the enemy force. A number of friendly casualties were caused by the exploding 155mm artillery ammunition. Thirty-two US were killed in actions, 33 wounded, and two missing in action. ARVN casualties were 19 KIA and 45 WIA. (Operation Report – HQ, 101st ABN DIV (AM), Period Ending 31 July 1970; 15 August 1970)

06 May 1970

Operation TEXAS STAR: At 0615H C/2-502 IN defensive position was hit by an NVA sapper element of unknown size. RPG's, AK-47 fire and satchel charges were employed by the enemy killing 1 US Soldier in the initial burst. C/2-502 IN returned fire with claymore mines and small arms fire as the enemy fled. At 1100H, D2/5-202 IN reinforced C/2-502 IN. A/2-502 IN continued sweeping north toward the top of Hill 882. B/2-502 IN maintained their mission of screening the firebase to the south.

06 – 08 May 1970

In reaction to heavy enemy activity in the FS/OB HENDERSON area, B/3-187 IN and D/1-501 IN passed to the operational control of the 2-501 IN BN and assaulted into the area north of FS/OB HENDERSON on 7 May to locate enemy units. A 3BDE control element directed operations form the firebase. C/2-501 IN and D/2-501 IN passed to the operational control of 2-506 IN BN and continued operation south of FS/OB Ripcord.

C/3-187 IN and D/1-501 IN returned to parent unit control on 08 May and the 3BDE terminated operations in the FS/OB HENDERSON area as the 2-501 IN BN returned to Camp Evans. (Operation Report – HQ, 101st ABN DIV (AM), Period Ending 31 July 1970; 15 August 1970)



Operation CARENTAN II: TF 2BDE, 101st ABN DIV continued to conduct offensive operations in support of Operation CARENTAN II to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces, bases and logistics in the coastal plains area. Contact was light with a total of 5 contacts. Today's statistics: 4 VC KIA (previously listed at 4 US MIA), 3 US WIA (2 medevac); Enemy assessment: 25 NVA KIA (BC), 2 NVA POW, 7 SKS, 2 AK-47's, 1 RPG-2 launcher, 1 60mm mortar, 13 B-40 rounds, 4 60mm mortar rounds, 1 82mm mortar round, 630 rounds SA, 2 CHICOM grenades and 3500 lbs. rice.

1-501 IN BN

A/1-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD683314 with ambushes vicinity YD676313 and YD685312. At 071945 (late report) vicinity YD685312 engaged 2 NVA with SA. Results: 1 NVA KIA (BC), 1 AK-47. Conducted RIF operation to vicinity YD685304 and YD691305. At 0745H vicinity YD684312 a BBT grenade resulted in 1 US WIA. Established night position vicinity YD691306 with local ambushes.

B/1-501 IN Occupied night position vicinity YD794304 with ambushes vicinity YD707305, YD702302 and YD707309. Conducted RIF operation SE to vicinity YD685277. Established night position vicinity YD685285 with local ambushes.

C/1-501 IN OPCON 1-502 IN BN occupied night position vicinity YD759326 with ambushes vicinity YD755318 and YD762330. AT 2245H vicinity YD756324 platoon moving to ambush position engaged approximately 6-8 enemy moving SE. Results: 4 NVA (BC), 1 SKS. At 0626H vicinity YD762330 ambush engaged 1 NVA. Results: 1 NVA KIA (BC). Conducted RIF operation to village vicinity YD747305. During search of village found 2 NVA KBA (BC). AT 1315H vicinity YD746303 found 4 US MIA from C/1-502 IN from contact on 07 May. Also captured 2 NVA POW's (WIA's) in village, 1 SKS, 13 B-40 rounds, 1 82mm mortar round, 1 60mm mortar round, 600 rounds SA. At 1600H conducted a combat assault from PZ vicinity YD743302 to LZ vicinity YD685282. OPCON 1-501 IN effective 1545H. At 1630H conducted a combat assault from a PZ vicinity YD743302 to LZ vicinity YD685282. Closed 1720H, established night position vicinity YD691285 with local ambushes.

D/1-501 IN remained at LZ SALLY. Prepared for future operations.

Recon platoon OPCON 2-17 CAV

2-501 IN BN

A/2-501 IN continued to close out FSB GERONIMO. Provided minesweep security of FSB GERONIMO access road.

B/2-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD696203 with ambushes vicinity YD681235 and YD666232. Conducted RIF operation YD6723, YD6724 and YD6623. Established night position vicinity YD686244 with local ambushes.

C/2-501 IN provided security for FSB PINKY and improved defensive positions.

D/2-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD655240 with ambushes vicinity YD661245 and YD647239. Conducted RIF operation vicinity YD6424, YD6425, YD6524 and YD6525. Established a night position vicinity YD663223.

Recon platoon provided security for LZ SATAN and conducted local patrols.

1-502 IN BN

A/1-502 IN occupied night position vicinity YD715303 with ambushes vicinity YD712294 and YD7144310. Conducted RIF operation to village vicinity YD720295. At 1100H vicinity YD716295 received SA and AW fire from the lead elements of an estimated company size force. Engaged with organic weapons. Withdrew to YD715295 to be supported by artillery and air strikes. At 1407H received SA and AW fire from YD717296. Withdrew to YD714296 and continued to be supported by artillery and air strikes. Occupied blocking position from vicinity YD717294 to YD716297 as a cordon was established around the village vicinity YD720295. Negative casualties; negative enemy assessment.

B/1-502 IN occupied night position vicinity YD749301 with ambushes vicinity YD753307 and YD760310. At 2053H ambush vicinity YD749301, engaged 1 NVA with M79, results 1 NVA KIA (BC). At 2013H ambush vicinity YD760310 engaged 1 NVA with SA and AW. Enemy returned fire. Results: 1 US WIA (medevac); 1 NVA KIA (BC), 1 AK-47. At 2154H ambush vicinity YD749301 engaged approximately 30 NVA moving from the village vicinity YD748304 to the SE. Engaged with SA, AW, M79 and claymore mines. Intense fire was returned. Contact broken 2225H. At 2232H ambush received 4 rounds 60mm mortar from vicinity YD753312. Engaged suspected location with artillery. At 0003H sighted 3 NVA vicinity of ambush, engaged with SA, received SA fire. Results: 1 US WIA; Negative enemy assessment. At 0451H exchanged fire with 4 NVA. Contact broken at 0459H. Negative enemy assessment. At 0631H engaged 1 NVA fleeing from site of ambush. At 0700H first light sweep of vicinity ambush produced 15 NVA KIA (BC), 5 SKS and 1 RPG-2 launcher. Conducted RIF operation to YD763301. AT 1746H conducted a combat assault from PZ vicinity YD763301, to LZ vicinity YD726296. Closed LZ 1815H. At 1805H received SA fire from the west. Returned fire. Contact broken at 1810H. Negative casualties; Negative enemy assessment. Established a blocking position from vicinity YD722302 to YD724294 as part of a cordon around village vicinity YD720295. Totals: 1 US WIA; Enemy assessment: 16 NVA KIA (BC), 5 SKS, 1 AK-47 and 1 RPG-2 launcher.

C/1-502 IN occupied night position vicinity YD744305 with ambushes vicinity YD749311 and YD743300. Moved to a blocking position vicinity YD747309 to YD744306. AT 1712H moved to PZ vicinity YD732308. At 1907H conducted a combat assault to LZ vicinity YD715302. Closed LZ 1922H. Established a blocking position from vicinity YD716297 to YD720304 and to YD722302 as part of a cordon around village vicinity YD720295.



D/1-502 IN occupied a night position vicinity YD772314 with ambushes vicinity YD764315, YD769317 and YD773322. Conducted RIF operation to village vicinity YD764323, NE to village vicinity YD768327 the W to night position vicinity YD763315.

Recon platoon OPCON 2nd BN, 1st Infantry effective 0600H. OPCON 1-502 IN effective 1745H and returned from YD680360 to FSB OMAHA.

(Commanders Situation Report; 072001H May – 082000H May 1968; James J Waldeck, MAJ, IN., Kayo 3)

- 07 May 1968 A three-day cordon of LA CHU Village, three miles northwest of HUE, was completed by elements A/2-17 CAV, B/2-17 CAV, C/2-34 ACAV, B/1-501 IN, D/1-501 IN, A/2-501 IN and C/2-501 IN. Fifty-five NVA were killed, five prisoners were taken, and 30 weapons were captured in the cordon. (Rendezvous with Destiny; Volume 1, Number 2; July 1968)
- 07 May 1968 B/1-502 IN swept village at first light, vicinity 750290 and made contact. Results, 3 WIA: 5 NVA KIA (BC). C/1-502 IN made contact at 0800H and remained in contact throughout the day, vicinity 748307. There was heavy MG, light MG, AW and SA. Called in artillery and air strikes. Results: Friendly: 2 KIA, 11 WIA, 4 MIA (later confirmed and recovered as KIA); Enemy: 5 NVA KIA (BC)
- 07 May 1969 **Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER:** The 1-502 IN BN continued operations and experienced sporadic contact. C/1-502 IN suffered 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA from enemy sniper fire and trail watchers.
- 07 May 1970 **Operation TEXAS STAR:** C/2-502 IN and D/2-502 IN swept a bunker complex that C/2-502 IN previously fought the enemy. All bunkers were destroyed with no enemy resistance. A/2-502 IN, continuing to sweep north toward the top of Hill 882, located two bunkers destroyed by air strikes and several fresh blood trails. The day ended with negative contact with enemy.
- 07 May 1970 Phu Thu sniper team engaged three NVA/VC with a believed result of two NVA/VC killed in action. HUE received eight 122mm rockets resulting in several casualties and one civilian house destroyed. RF forces engaged five to six VC at 777125 with negative results.
- 07 May 1971 1-501 IN Recon platoon found four bunkers vicinity ZC120984, 3x6x4' w/o overhead coverage. Results: four bunkers destroyed.
- 08 May 1968 2BDE ambushed a position established 6 km north of HUE, along a known enemy LOC, observed 20 NVA moving toward the canal. The platoon from B/1-502 IN allowed the enemy to move well within the killing zone, then violently executed the ambush employing claymore, SA, AW, and M-79s. A first light sweep of the area revealed a total of 17 NVA killed and 6 weapons captured during the night action.
- 08 May 1968 In the jungle four miles north of HUE, paratroopers from B/1-502 IN established an early morning ambush position and killed 17 NVA after two squads of enemy soldiers walked right into the position. There were no paratrooper casualties. Continuing application of their highly successful cordon tactics, airborne infantrymen from the 1-501 IN BN trapped a reinforced NVA company in PHU LUONG A village, six miles northwest of HUE. Fifteen enemy were killed in the initial contact. In Delaware action, the paratroopers of C/1-327 IN captured the ninth enemy ammunition cache of the operation. Less than two miles east of VEGHEL, they found more than 2,000 rounds of 76mm high explosive ammunition, 200 rounds of 76mm smoke ammunition, and 6,300 rounds of 23mm anti-aircraft shells. The cache was stored in bunkers built into a hillside and protected from aerial observation by triple canopy jungle. (Rendezvous with Destiny; Volume 1, Number 2; July 1968)
- 08 May 1968 The 1-502 IN continued RIF and security missions of AN LO and QL #1. A/1-502 IN made contact at YD715294, cordoned the village and called in air strikes. B/1-502 IN sprung an ambush on 30 NVA with organic weapons. At first light revealed 16 NVA KIA (BC). C/1-502 IN suffered 2 KIA and 2 WIA from sniper fire.
- 08 – 13 May 1969 **Operation Apache Snow:** The 2-501 IN BN moved from an AO surrounding fire support base whip to a new AO adjacent to and overlooking the northern A SHAU Valley. The Battalion Command Post was located on FSB AIRBORNE. After the initial combat assault of the Bn (-) into LZ GREEN at YD296017 on 10 May 1969, each of the three assaulting companies moved out to assigned objectives.
- Subsequent RIF operation saw the three maneuvering companies close to objectives in the vicinity of YD284031 and then conducting a battalion size RIF operation toward the northwest. When all elements were clear of their objectives, each company continued to conduct RIF and search and destroy operations within the assigned AO.
- As the AO assigned to the 2-501 IN BN expanded, each company was assigned an area to search. The preponderance of contacts during the entire operation was with small local security forces of 4-5 personnel or with trail watchers. Only two contacts involved larger than squad size elements. The first contact occurred the morning of the 13th of May at FSB AIRBORNE in the vicinity of YD355070. At 0330H, FSB AIRBORNE came under very heavy mortar fire of 82mm, 60mm, and RPG fire. Approximately two reinforced infantry and sapper companies assaulted the perimeter from the northeast and northwest. A/2-501 IN repelled the attack which lasted two hours. Conventional artillery direct fire was employed along with "Spooky" and 81mm mortar fire resulting in 32 NVA KIA (BC) US casualties were 13 KIA and 16 US WIA. (HQ, 2-501 IN; Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation Apache Snow, 22 June 1969)



08 May 1969 **Operation BRISTOL BOOTS:** A series of OPCON shifts took place: 1-327 IN BN and 2-502 IN BN became OPCON to the 2BDE while 1-502 IN BN and 1-501 IN BN became OPCON to the 1BDE. In addition, the area of operation was expanded to include a reconnaissance zone along the Laotian Border and Base Area 607. As the maneuver elements of the 1BDE moved into this area the enemy withdrew to the west into LAOS. (HQ, 101st Airborne (Airmobile), Operational Report – Lessons Learned. Dated 20 August 1969)

08 May 1969 **Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER:** C/1-502 IN established contact with 2 enemy snipers resulting in 1 US KIA. At 1200H, Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER closed and 1-502 IN BN became OPCON to the 1BDE.

08 May 1970 PHU THU districts RF's found one Chi Com machinegun. FB BIRMINGHAM was visited by a troop air lift Commanding General. A/1-502 IN located a C sign on a tree. The estimated age of the sign was three months.

08 May 1970 **Operation TEXAS STAR:** A/2-502 IN continued sweep operations to the north when they initiated contact with enemy at 1000H. An estimated enemy platoon employing grenades, small arms and machine gun fire pinned down the first platoon. The second platoon was brought up as reinforcements and the enemy displaced. Contact with the enemy was again established as A/2-502 IN continued to assault up the ridge. ARA was employed with one bird taking automatic weapons fire forcing it to break station and force land at FSB Blaze (YD535020). Both pilots were medevac'd. Contact with the enemy was maintained until 1300H when the enemy again displaced leaving behind six bodies and 7 AK-47's. Two US Soldiers were killed during the contact. B/2-502 IN continued screening operations south of FSB SHOCK while C/2-502 IN and D/2-502 IN patrolled the ridge south of Hill 714.

08 May 1971 **Operation LAM SON 720:** An ARVN unit located at CO PHUNG and the STRIKE Force Battalion were extracted back to FB Jack (VIC YD 4928) to prepare for insertion on the following day into the area west of OP Checkmate and north of FB VEGHEL. (2-502 IN BN Unit History, 1971)

09 May 1968 B/1-502 IN found 15 NVA KIA (BC) from air strike at 724294. C/1-502 IN CA'd to YD715302 and made heavy contact, suffering 2 KIA and 3 WIA. C/1-502 IN established ambushes around the area of contact and captured 1 NVA who crawled up to one of the positions while trying to escape. D/1-502 IN made moderate scattered contact during the day and killed 8 NVA (BC). Recon found 3 NVA KIA (BC) in a grave at YD723311. Results: Friendly 2 KIA, 2 WIA; Enemy: 26 NVA KIA (BC), 1 POW.

09 May 1969 A/1-502 IN (-) provided security for FSB LASH and B/1-502 IN remained OPCON to 3BDE. At 1233H at YC661615, C/1-502 IN received fire from an unknown enemy sized force. C/1-502 IN, 1st and 2nd platoon maneuvered against the enemy force. The enemy broke contact during a heavy thunderstorm. The results were 2 US KIA and 7 US KIA with negative enemy assessment.

09 May 1969 **Operation APACHE SNOW:** On the evening of 9 May the 101st ABN DIV – specifically the 3BDE working in conjunction with the 1st ARVN Division and Ninth Marine Regiment – was poised for the attack against enemy forces, bases and lines of communications in and adjacent to the Northern A SHAU Valley. Then artillery batteries had their tubes in position at FB BRADLEY (YD 273123), FB AIRBORNE (YD 355071), FB CURRAHEE (YC 398949), FB BERCHTESGADEN (YD 424011) and FB CANNON (YD 474028). The troops participating in the combat assaults the following morning were being marshaled in the vicinity of FB BLAZE (YD 536020). The paratroopers of the 1-506 IN BN, 3-187 IN BN, 2-501 IN BN hurriedly prepared their gear, cleaned their weapons, and wrote the letters that they would not have the time to write in the coming days. The following morning, they would be helilifted into the inhospitable A SHAU Valley. (Narrative Operation APACHE SNOW; MG John M. Wright Jr. Commanding; 10 May – 7 June 1969)

09 May 1970 A man from B/1-502 IN was medevaced because of a kidney stone passing blood. At location YD900229 the 160th PF platoon found one M60 machinegun and one M1 carbine.

09 May 1970 **Operation TEXAS STAR:** A/2-502 IN pressed toward the top of Hill 882. An enemy force put at approximately 40 enemy in a bunker complex of 20 to 30 bunkers, engaged the 1st platoon with fragmentation grenades, RPG's and satchel charges. The platoon withdrew and was reinforced by the 2nd platoon. After employing heavily artillery and ARA support, the two platoons again attacked the enemy position. After several hours of bitter fighting, the enemy withdrew leaving 27 NVA KIA. The platoon leader of A/2-502 IN point assault platoon was killed in action with 12 WIA. The Battalion displaced to FSB VEGHEL and closed FSB Shock. C/2-502 IN was moved by air to the top of Hill 714 and given the mission of sweeping west to Hill 882. D/2-502 IN continued sweeping west of Hill 714.

09 May 1970 At 1030H, vicinity YD495954, A/2-502 IN received small arms and RPG fire and fragmentation grenades from an estimated 12-15 enemy in bunkers. The company returned fire and withdrew as artillery, ARA, gunships, and air strikes were employed. A sweep of the area revealed 18 NV KIA. US casualties were one KIA and 12 WIA. (Operation Report – HQ, 101st ABN DIV (AM), Period Ending 31 July 1970; 15 August 1970)

09 May 1970 The 2-501 IN BN (-) redeployed in the division AO vicinity FS/OB GLADIATOR and GRANITE with C/2-501 IN and D/2-501 IN returning to battalion control. A/2-501 IN remained at CAMP EVANS to augment security and reequip. (Operation Report – HQ, 101st ABN DIV (AM), Period Ending 31 July 1970; 15 August 1970)

09 May 1970 In another action involving members of the 2-502 IN BN, "Strike Force" troopers, while on a reconnaissance mission, receive small arms and RPG fire and fragmentation grenades from an estimated 12 to 15 enemy in bunkers. The Screaming Eagles return fire with organic weapons and call in Aerial Rocket Artillery, artillery and air strikes. A sweep of the area after the successful support strikes reveal 18 NVA KIAs. (Rendezvous with Destiny (Volume 3, Number 2); Summer 1970)



09 – 18 May 1971

Operation LAM SON 720: The returned to OP CHECKMATE and the surrounding AO lasted only ten days. During the period of timeframe, the Battalion patrolled the area surrounding FB VEGHEL.

09 May 1971

1-501 IN BN Pink teams spotted 6-10 bunkers vicinity ZC129933. Artillery employed.

10 – 11 May 1968

Operation CARENTAN II: TF 2BDE, 101st ABN DIV continued to conduct offensive operations in support of Operation CARENTAN II to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces, bases and logistics in the coastal plains area. Contact was light with a total of 3 contacts. Today's statistics: Enemy assessment 4 NVA KIA (BC), 1 SKS, 1 82mm mortar sight, 1 CHICOM claymore (Dest), and 2 RPG-7 rounds (Dest).

1-501 IN BN

A/1-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD682300 with ambushes at YD681297. Conducted RIF to vicinity YD611313. At 1103H vicinity YD676297 found 1 RPG-7 round, 1 82mm mortar sight, medical supplies and some NVA uniforms. At 1123H found a 250 lb bomb vicinity YD674293 (destroyed in place). At 1152H conducted CA from PZ YD670296 to LZ YD667297 (LZ Green). Established night position vicinity YD611313 with ambushes location at YD605315, YD607316 and YD616313.

B/1-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD696296 with ambushes at YD696300 and YD701294. AT 0849H B/1-501 IN conducted a CA from PZ YD696296 to LZ YD681278 then moved to LZ SALLY. At 1700H, B/1-501 IN departed LZ SALLY and established night position vicinity YD608265 with ambushes at YD606261 and YD613259.

C/1-501 IN continued to secure the AN LO Bridge. AT 0250H received 4 rounds 60mm mortar with negative casualties. Suspected mortar position was engaged with 81mm fire. Company continued to secure the AN LO Bridge and improved defense positions.

D/1-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD666286. Conducted RIF operation to YD668296. At 1040H vicinity YD668287 found 2 NVA KIA (BC), 1 SKS, 1 CHICOM claymore and 2 RPG-7 rounds (claymore and RPG-7 rounds destroyed). Established night position vicinity YD668296 with ambushes at YD668292 and YD660295.

Recon platoon occupied night position vicinity YD610258 with local ambushes. Conducted sweep of area vicinity YD608355 where enemy element had been engaged on 10 May with negative results. At 1510H moved to LZ SALLY. Departed LZ SALLY at 1703H and established night position vicinity YD684275.

2-501 IN BN

A/2-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD692202. Conducted RIF operation in vicinity YD6919, YD6920 and YD7019 with negative contact. Established night position at YD6921202 with ambushes at YD685205, YD685201, YD689194 and YD701197.

B/2-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD644254 with local ambushes. Conducted RIF operations vicinity YD6525, YD6625, YD6624 without contact. Established night position vicinity YD662258 with ambushes at YD662257, YD667253, YD658250 and YD562258.

C/2-501 IN occupied night position at YD673232 and established local ambushes. Conducted RIF operations vicinity YD6823, YD6822 and YD6922. At 0830H found a 500lb bomb at YD688222. EOC team disarmed the bomb.

D/2-501 IN continued to secure FSB PINKY. One platoon conducted RIF operation vicinity YD6925, YD7025, YD7125, YD7126, YD7227 and YD7228. Conducted MEDCAP operation vicinity YD725291. Platoon returned to FSB PINKY. D/2-501 IN continues to secure FSB PINKY with an ambush location vicinity YD695248.

Recon platoon continued to secure LZ SATAN (YD663223). Conducted local patrolling without contact and returned to LZ SATAN.

1-502 IN BN

A/1-502 IN occupied night position vicinity YD728318 with ambushes vicinity YD739317 and YD740308. Conducted RIF operation from YD723312 to YD745325, SW to YD752310 and to YD743317. Established night position vicinity YD756320 with local ambushes.

B/1-502 IN occupied night position vicinity YD685367. Conducted local patrols and prepared for future operations. Night position vicinity YD685367.

C/1-502 IN occupied night position vicinity YD736333 with ambush vicinity YD730335, YD732334 and YD739338. Conducted RIF operation NW through village vicinity YD728335. AT 0958H vicinity YD729331 found the MIA (now KIA) from previous day and 1 NVA killed by SA on 10 May. Results: 1 NVA KIA (BC). Moved to vicinity YD740323 and then established night position vicinity YD741325 with local ambushes.

D/1-502 IN occupied night position vicinity YD718325 with ambushes YD722339, YD720333, YD720328 and YD728323. Occupied night position and ambush sites until 1220H as a blocking force for C/1-502 IN. Conducted RIF operation to vicinity YD718310 and to villages vicinity YD722311 and YD726306. At 1320H vicinity YD723309 engaged 3 NVA with SA fire. Enemy fled with negative enemy assessment. At 1549H vicinity YD726307 found 1 NVA killed by air approximately 10 May. Established a night position vicinity YD735306 with local ambushes.



Recon platoon OCPON B/1-502 IN.

(Commanders Situation Report; 102001H May – 112000H May 1968; James J Waldeck, MAJ, IN., Kayo 3)

- 10 May 1968 C/1-502 IN made contact with an NVA reinforced platoon 9 km north of HUE. C/1-502 IN immediately employed heavy volumes of organic weapons fire as the enemy struggled to disengage. C/1-502 IN maneuvered, pursuing the withdrawing enemy until by mid-morning the NVA platoon was trapped against the PHA TAM CIANG bay. Heavy volumes of artillery and tactical air were employed on the trapped enemy force which, together with the fires from airborne troops, resulted in 21 enemy killed.
- 10 May 1968 In action five miles north of HUE along Pha Tam Giang inlet, airborne riflemen from C/1-502 IN trapped an NVA platoon inside a horseshoe cordon and drove the enemy toward the water. The fierce paratrooper attack drove the enemy force from its position and the NVA left 21 dead behind. (Rendezvous with Destiny; Volume 1, Number 2; July 1968)
- 10 May 1968 1-502 IN BN continued RIF and security missions in AO and made moderate to heavy contact. C/1-502 IN had a running fight with 2 NVA snipers that led into a village where they received heavy fire that killed their point man and prevented his recovery. Air strikes were called in and caused 10 NVA to leave their bunkers and run into C/1-502 IN positions. Results: Friendly: 1 KIA, 1 WIA, and 1 MIA (KIA); Enemy: 11 NVA KIA (BC). D/1-502 IN made contact at 715328 and called for an Air strike. After the strike, a sweep of the area revealed 13 NVA KIA (BC). Recon found 8 NVA KIA (BC) at 720296, killed by Air strikes, the day before.
- 10 May 1968 **Operation DELAWARE:** At 0530, TAC CP (2-502nd) vicinity YD576171 received 41 rounds of incoming 82mm mortar fire from approx. coordinate YD578153; engaged with Artillery and mortars. Results: 4 US WHA (Minor). At 1050, A/2-502nd vicinity YD538121 engaged enemy sniper with SA and swept contact area. Results: 1 NVA CIA, 1 AK-47 CIA. At 2000, TAC CP received approx. 25 Rounds of 82mm mortar fire from YD582158; engaged with Artillery and mortars. Results: 2 US WHA (Minor).
- 10 May 1968 Col. Cushman observes an NVA prisoner captured by 2nd Brigade being interrogated pointing at the Eagle Patch of a nearby trooper and asked the interpreter what he was saying. The interpreter's reply was "He is saying that little bird is really mean" An arch is built over the Brigade TOC with the new Brigade motto: "That Little Bird is Real Mean"
- 10 May 1969 1-502 IN BN continued its normal operations. The only contact occurred when the C+C helicopter received small arms fire at YC6606015 resulting in 4 US WIA. The area was engaged with artillery and ARA. There were negative enemy results.
- 10 May 1969 **Operation APACHE SNOW:** XXIV Corps operation, begins with a massive air assault of troops. Sixty-five helicopters lift two Screaming Eagle battalions to two landing zones near the Laotian border within 45 minutes; the rest of the units are in place within four and a half hours. The 3-187 IN makes initial contact with trail watchers near DONG AP BIA. (Rendezvous with Destiny (Volume 2, Number 2); Summer 1969)
- 10 May – 07 June 1969 **Operation APACHE SNOW:** On 10 May, the 3BDE in cooperation with the 1st and 3rd ARVN Regiments and in coordination with the 9th Marine Regiment initiated XXIV Corps Operation – Operation Apache Snow in the northern A SHAU Valley. 3BDE employed the 1-506 IN BN, 2-501 IN BN, 3-187 IN BN and TF 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry (D/1-506 IN OPCONED). 1st ARVN Regiment employed the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions, the 3rd ARVN Regiment employed its 1st Battalion. On D-Day the 1-506 IN BN, 3-187 IN BN, 2-501 IN BN, 4-1 ARVN and one company of the 2-1 ARVN conducted multiple battalion assaults along the Laotian borders behind known enemy defenses oriented towards the A SHAU Valley. Those assaults and subsequent operations were supported by ten (10) batteries of artillery located in fire bases on the eastern mountains overlooking the Valley.
- The 3-1st and 1-3rd ARVN Battalions reinforced those already operating in the vicinity of the Valley. Extensive prepping of the area of operations, with particular emphasis on the flight routes and on the LZ's, by arc lights, TAC air, tube and aerial rocket artillery, and detailed reconnaissance of the LZ's by the air cavalry squadron prior to insertion produced highly professional and successful battalion combat assaults, without incident, into a traditional enemy stronghold. The 3-187 IN BN encountered enemy resistance as did the 1-506 IN BN after insertions. While the resistance against the 1-506 IN BN was quickly eliminated with 12 NVA KIA, the 3-187 IN BN contact grew heavier. The enemy dug-in in fortified bunkers along DONG AP BIA Bridge (YC3298) maintained determined resistance to repeated assaults by the 3-187 IN BN, and reinforced their positions nightly from LAOS. As enemy resistance continued the 2-501 IN BN, 1-506 IN BN and the 2-3 ARVN battalions were employed on all sides of the ridge and on 20 May a coordinated attack against the heavily bunkered ridge resulted in vicious close-in fighting and after a two (2) hour battle, battalion objectives were secured on the ridge complex is currently underway; however, the enemy suffered awesome losses in comparison to his known strength and it is judged from the 454 bodies thus far counted that two battalions of 29th NVA Regiment have been rendered ineffective. Results of the 22 May were: 616 NVA KIA, 2 POW's, 89 IWC, 25 CSWC, and a large assortment of captured ammunition. (DA, Senior Officer Debriefing Report; MG Melvin Zais, CG, 101st ABN DIV; Period 19 July 1968 – 25 May 1969)



10 May – 07 June 1969

Operation APACHE SNOW: Intelligence gained prior to Operation APACHE SNOW indicated that elements of the 6th, 9th, and 29th NVA Regiments were using the Northern A SHAU Valley as a primary line of communications for movement of material and infiltration of troops to enemy units throughout I Corps Tactical Zone. The mission given to the 3d Brigade and 1st ARVN Regiment was to conduct airmobile assaults into the Northern A SHAU Valley in conjunction with the 9th Marines and 3d ARVN Regiment to destroy the NVA/VC forces, obstruct enemy routes of egress into Laos, interdict enemy lines of communication, and to locate and destroy enemy caches.



Prior to D-Day, the 1st and 3d ARVN Regiments and the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, constructed three mutually supporting fire bases in and around the Northern A SHAU Valley – FB BRADLEY (YD 278122), FB AIRBORNE (YD 355070), and FB CURRAHEE (YC 399949). On D-Day 10 May, following TAC Air, artillery, and ARA preparations five maneuver battalions (three US – 1-506 (-), 2-502 (-), and 3-187; two ARVN – 2-1 (-), and 4-1) were inserted into five separate landing zones along the Laotian Border in the Northern A SHAU Valley. Following the insertion all maneuver battalions initiated reconnaissance in force operations to the east and northeast toward the Valley floor. The insertion of an additional ARVN battalion was accomplished when 2-1 ARVN (-) combat assaulted and secured FB TIGER (YD 253090). The following day 3-1 ARVN Battalion combat assaulted into the Valley to support the other maneuver battalions in their reconnaissance in force operations.




At 111645H, B/3-187 IN began to receive heavy small arms and machine gun fire from the ridges of Hill 937 marking the beginning of the ten-day battle for DONG AP BIA Mountain. Heavy contact was experienced by the 3-187 Infantry and 1-506 IN BN (redirected to support 3-187 IN BN assault on Hill 937) as both battalions assaulted the heavily fortified enemy positions of DONG AP BIA. On 19 May, A/2-506 IN was combat assaulted into the Northern A SHAU Valley and became OPCON to 3-187 IN BN. The following day 2-3 ARVN BN combat assaulted into the Valley to add additional support to the attack.



With the support of TAC Air, artillery, and ARA throughout the ten-day period, the 3-187 IN BN with A/2-506 IN OPCON, 2-501 IN BN, 1-506 IN BN, and 2-3 ARVN successfully assaulted and drove the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th NVA Regiment from their mountain fortress atop Hill 937 on 20 May. The following day 3-187 IN BN became OPCON to the 2BDE and 2-506 IN BN was returned to 3BDE control.

Throughout the period 21 May – 7 June the enemy contact decreased, and discoveries of enemy caches increased as enemy elements withdrew from the area into Base Areas in Laos. 2-501 IN BN in conjunction with A/2-17 CAV following the capture of DONG AP BIA began pursuit operations west to the Laotian Border in order to destroy the remaining defenders of Hill 937. On 22 May, 2-506 IN BN with all elements combat assaulted into FSB AIRBORNE and conducted extensive search and reconnaissance in force operations in and around FSB AIRBORNE to locate NVA Warehouse 54, known to exist in the area.

The 1-506 IN BN, following the capture of DONG AP BIA, conducted extensive search and clear, in addition to reconnaissance in force operations, from DONG AP BIA south toward FB Currahee, 4-1 ARVN BN moved north and was extracted on 5 June. 2-3 ARVN moved to the south to support 2-327 IN BN in reconnaissance in force operations in the southern A SHAU Valley.




This operation was brought to a close on 7 June. The maneuver battalions of the 29th NA Regiment, in addition to its central headquarters with organic and attached technical units, were rendered combat ineffective and forced to withdraw across the border into Laos preventing them from again using the Northern A SHAU Valley as a staging and storage area for future operations into I Corps Tactical Zone. The resultant enemy losses were 691 NVA/VC KIA, 5 NVA POW, 241 individual and 40 crew served weapons, and four trucks captured. Friendly losses were 78 US KIA, and 536 US WIA.

(HQ, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile); Operational Report – Lesson Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for period ending 31 July 1969; 09 December 1969)



10 May 1969

Operation APACHE SNOW: At H-hour, 0730H, the lead elements of the four battalions were picked up by sixty-five UH-1H helicopters from FB Blaze and moved to their respective landing zones. Prior to the combat assaults each landing zone was bombarded for seventy minutes by tactical aircraft and artillery with final suppressive fire being delivered by air cavalry gunships and aerial artillery. B/1-506 IN, C/1-506 IN, and D/1-506 IN, in addition to the 1-506 IN BN's command post were the first to hit the ground in the area of operation at 0812 hours. Once on the landing zone (YC 312949) all companies began maneuvering on multiple axes towards the Laotian Border.



By 1600H all companies and the battalion's command post of the 3-187 IN BN combat assaulted from FB BLAZE to their two-ship landing zone (YC 320988). Once on the elephant grass covered landing zone which opened to high ground in the west, they began their reconnaissance in force operations in the vicinity of Laotian Border. D/3-187 IN, which was the first on the landing zone, moved along a ridge to the southeast as planned. Elements of A/3-187 IN and C/3-187, once they were on the landing zone, secured the northwest and southern portions of the landing zone perimeter respectively (See Map). Once the landing zone was secured A/3-187 IN reconnoitered to the northwest and C/3-187 IN reconnoitered to the southwest. B/3-187 IN assault was completed by 1600 hours. They moved from the landing zone southwest to the battalion's location where they received instructions to move southeast toward Hill 937. B/3-187 IN established their night defensive position on the lower slopes of DONG AP BIA (Hill 937) and began preparation to move out at first light the following morning and secure the hill. No one at this time realized the size of the enemy force positioned on the hill or what was ahead for the battalion before this order could be fulfilled.

The third of the four battalions conducting the combat assaults in the area of operation was the 2-501 IN BN. B/2-501 IN, C/2-501 IN, and D/2-501 IN and the 2-501 IN BN's command post assaulted onto the landing zone (YC 288015), at 1047H while A/2-501 IN secured and continued construction of FB AIRBORNE.

The last battalion to be helilifted into the area on 10 May was the 4-1 ARVN Regiment which assaulted into a landing zone at coordinates YD241041 and began their operations in the immediate area of the Laotian Border.

The round out one of the most fantastic days of airmobile operations for the 101st ABN DIV, one company of the 2-1 ARVN Regiment was sent into FB TIGER (YD 252090) to secure the fire base for the assault of 2-1 ARVN on the following day. This brought the total units lifted to four battalions and one company and coupled with the ten batteries of artillery which were moved the day before, indicated the thoroughness of planning and preciseness of execution of the Division airmobile operations the days' activity pointed out the tremendous influence of the helicopter on modern military operations.

Once on the landing zones and security established the battalions maneuvered throughout the area of operations. Following a brief encounter, the 3-187 IN BN moved toward the high ground to the east. It was from this position – northwest of DONG AP BIA – that the battalion headquarters controlled and supported operations throughout the period of 10 – 21 May. At 1645H, B/3-187 IN received two RPG rounds and one burst of sniper fire fifty meters to the southwest of their position (YC 328981). They engaged the area with organic weapons, artillery, aerial rocket artillery (ARA) and air strikes resulting in two NVA killed and suffering three wounded (evacuated 1720H). The air strikes continued to pound the suspected enemy location until darkness. Initial impressions were that the enemy were probably trail watchers, but after sustaining casualties it was evident that the fire was too well controlled for trail watchers and that stiffer resistance would be encountered.

The other battalions involved in the operation continued to maneuver in their respective zones and discovered numerous small caches containing mixed small arms, mortar rounds and crew-served weapon ammunition. (Narrative Operation APACHE SNOW; MG John M. Wright Jr. Commanding; 10 May – 7 June 1969)

10 – 21 May 1969

BATTLE OF DON AP BIA – HILL 937 “Hamburger Hill”: The battle to defeat the 29th NVA Regiment dug in on the slopes summit of DONG AP BIA Mountain was the most intense and brutal conflict entered into by the 3rd BDE, 101st ABN DIV since its arrival in the Republic of Vietnam in December 1967. “Hamburger Hill” as known as DONG AP BIA has come to be called, was captured in the traditional gallantry manner, by assault. That this victory was obtained with so much allied casualties can be attributed to the teamwork and near-perfect coordination between ARVN & US, as well as US Ari Force, Artillery, Aviation and the Infantry. The battle of “Hamburger Hill” is characterized in the words of the motto of the Third Brigade, “Ready to Move, Ready to Fight, “Airborne!”


10 – 20 May 1969

Operation APACHE SNOW: The Rakkasans wage a fierce battle to wrest control of DONG AP BIA (Hill 937) from the 29th NVA Regt. On the last day, they are joined by the 1-506 IN BN, 2-501 IN BN, 2-3 ARVN Regt. and A/2-506 IN. (Rendezvous with Destiny (Volume 2, Number 2); Summer 1969)



10 – 21 May 1969

Operation APACHE SNOW: On D-Day, 10 May 1969, following TAC Air, artillery, and ARA preparations five maneuver battalions (Three US – 1-506 IN BN (-), 2-501 IN BN (-), and 3-187 IN BN; two ARVN – 2-1(-), and 4-1) were inserted into five separate landing zones along the Laotian Border in the Northern A SHAU Valley. Following the insertion all maneuver battalions initiated reconnaissance in force operations to the east and northeast toward the Valley floor. The insertion of an additional ARVN battalion was accomplished when 2-1 ARVN (1) combat assaulted and secured FB TIGER (YD253090). The following day 3-1 ARVN Battalion combat assaulted into the Valley to support the other maneuver battalions in their reconnaissance in force operations.



At 111645H, B/3-187 IN began to receive heavy small arms and machine gun fire from the ridges of Hill 937 marking the beginning of the ten-day battle for DONG AP BIA Mountain. Heavy contact was experienced by the 3-187 IN BN and 1-506 IN BN (redirected to support 3-187 IN BN assault on Hill 937) as both battalions assaulted the heavily fortified enemy positions of DONG AP BIA. ON 19 May, A/2-506 IN was combat assaulted into the Northern A SHAU Valley and became OPCON to 3-187 IN BN. The following day 2-3 ARVN BN combat assaulted into the Valley to add additional support to the attack.

With the support of TAC Air, artillery, and ARA throughout the ten-day period, the 3-187 IN BN with A/2-506 IN OPCON, 2-501 IN BN, 1-506 IN BN, and 2-3 ARVN BN successfully assaulted and drove the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th NVA Regiment from their mountain fortress atop Hill 937 on 20 May. The following day 3-187 IN BN became OPCON to the 2BDE and 2-506 IN BN returned to 3BDE control.

10 – 21 May 1969

The Presidential Unit Citation (Army) was awarded to the following assigned and attached units of the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, United States Army, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division:

- 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry
- 2d Battalion, 319th Artillery
- 2d Battalion, 501st Infantry
- 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry
- 3d Battalion 187th Infantry
- Company A, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry
- Company D, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry
- Companies A and B, 158th Aviation Battalion
- Company C, 326th Medical Battalion
- Troop A, 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry
- Battery C, 1st Battalion 83d Artillery
- Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery
- Battery C, 2d Battalion 11th Artillery
- Battery C, 4th Battalion, 77th Artillery
- 25th Public Information Detachment

- Tactical Air Control Party, 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron, United States Air Force
- 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions, 3d Regiment, 1st Infantry Division Army of the Republic of Vietnam
- Battery A, 11th Artillery Battalion, Army of the Republic of Vietnam
- Battery A, 12th Artillery Battalion, Army of the Republic of Vietnam
- Battery B, 34th Artillery Battalion, Army of the Republic of Vietnam

For action during the period 10-21 May 1969 the foregoing assigned and attached units of the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division distinguished themselves by extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy in the vicinity of DONG AP BIA Mountain, A SHAU Valley, Republic of Vietnam. The 3d Brigade commenced Operation APACHE SNOW by striking at the enemy on his ground. For four days, the enemy harassed the men of the Brigade with mortar, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms fire. Undaunted by this enemy action, the units of the 3d Brigade continued to uncover huge amounts of enemy stores and equipment and to destroy his forces. After pinpointing a stronghold on DONG AP BIA Mountain, the Brigade launched a series of determined attacks during the ensuing eight days to drive the well trained and equipped enemy from his entrenched positions. Each day the enemy continued to infiltrate reinforcement to help repel the determined American and Vietnamese forces. After eight days of intense combat, units of the Brigade broke through the enemy defense and overran his bunker complexes. The battle continued for another 36 hours while the men of the Brigade searched for and destroyed all remaining pockets of enemy resistance. During the 12 days of battle the 3d Brigade and attached units eliminated more than 500 enemy troops, seized large quantities of weapons, explosives, and other military equipment, and captured tons of rice. The determination, devotion to duty, undomitable courage, and extraordinary heroism demonstrated by the members of the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and attached units, are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon them and the United States Army.

10 May 1970

1-502 IN, Recon platoon found three booby traps rigged in C-ration cans on a trail. All the booby traps were blown in place. PF platoon 161 while on night ambush spotted on NVA/VC at a great distance. A sweep was made with negative results.

10 May 1970

Operation TEXAS STAR: D/2-502 IN was inserted south of Hill 882 and passed through A/2-502 IN which was then extracted. No enemy contact was made on this day.

10 May 1971

1-501 IN Recon platoon found six bunkers vicinity ZC138926, 3x5' with 4" overhead coverage. Estimated 4-12 months old.



11 May – 2 August 1967

Operation MALHEUR I-II.

Locations: I Corps: QUANG NGAI Province; SONG NE and SONG TRA CAU valleys; DUC PHO; MINH LONG; MO DUC; FSB CHAMPS.

Type/Objective: Search and Destroy designed to keep Route 1 open to the BINH DINH Provincial border and to assist in the area's revolutionary development programs.

Units: USA –Task Force Oregon - 25th Infantry Divisions; 3BDE (1-14 IN BN, 1-35 IN BN, 2-35 IN BN); 101st Airborne Division 1st BDE: 1-327 IN BN, 2-327 IN BN, 2-502 IN BN); 19th Light Infantry Brigade (2-1 IN BN, 3-21 IN BN, 4-31 IN BN); NVA/VC – 2d NVA Division.

Event: 18 June – Second platoon of A/3-21 IN (196th LIB) ambushes an NVA unit 16 miles south of CHU LAI. Two Americans are WIA, two NVA KIA, and two captured.

Casualties: U.S. casualties are from the 101st Airborne only; other figures not included in source documents. NVA/VC totals are for the entire operation. U.S. – 45 KIA, 433 WIA; NVA/VC – 869 KIA, 80 POWs.

11 May – 02 August 1967

Operation MALHEUR: HQ, USARV directed that 1BDE, 101st ABN DIV become OPCON to Task Force OREGON and move from vicinity of KHANH DUONG to DUC PHO. The Brigade closed into Carentan Base (the Brigade forward base camp) on 08 May 1967. Task Force OREGON directed the Brigade to conduct search and destroy operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in the areas west and northwest of DUC PHO commencing 11 May 1967. The mission was later expanded to include areas southwest of DUC PHO as well. (HQ, 1st Brigade, 101st ABN DIV; Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR; 02 September 1967)

11 May 1967

Operation MALHEUR: The 2-502 IN BN conducted an airmobile assault into NORMANDY AO, 20 kilometers to the west of DUC PHO. From 4 LZ's elements began Search and Destroy operations toward the east, discovering many signs of recent enemy activity. In the valleys, there were neat farms and well-tended fields of mountain rice and in the hills, large VC/NVA base camps were discovered, and storage hootches containing food and clothing were hidden in the woods near trails. The enemy appeared to be east of the STRIKE FORCE, and only minor contacts were made until the 15th.

11 May 1967

Operation MALHEUR: One platoon of the 2-502 IN BN encountered 40 gravel mines and punji stakes in one area resulting in 3 US WHA. (HQ, 1st Brigade, 101st ABN DIV; Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR; 02 September 1967)

11 – 12 May 1968

Operation CARENTAN II: TF 2BDE, 101st ABN DIV continued to conduct offensive operations in support of Operation CARENTAN II to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces, bases and logistics in the coastal plains area. Contact was light with the exception of the 2-17 CAV which was in contact with an estimated company vicinity YD630300 at the close of the reporting period. Today's statistics: 1 US KIA, 9 US WIA (2 medevac); Enemy assessment: 7 NVA KIA (BC).

1-501 IN BN

A/1-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD611313 with night ambushes vicinity YD605315, YD607316 and YD616313. Conducted RIF operation to AN LO Bridge. At 1431H, 1 platoon OPCON 2-17 CAV. At 1740H, A/1-501 IN (-) began moving from the bridge vicinity YD637308, OPCON 2-17 CAV. Returned to OPCON of 1-501 IN BN at 1800H and occupied a blocking position vicinity YD644309 to YD634313.

B/1-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD608265 with ambushes vicinity YD606261 and YD613259. Conducted RIF operation to a PZ vicinity YD616257. At 1629H conducted a combat assault to LZ vicinity YD651315. Closed LZ 1647H. OPCON 2-17 CAV effective 1633H. Returned OPCON 1-501 IN BN at 1800H. Occupied a blocking position vicinity YD644323 to YD646316.

C/1-501 IN provided security for AN LO Bridge. Conducted RIF operation NE to vicinity YD640314. AT1115H received intense SA and AW fire from vicinity YD641317 resulting in 1 US KIA. C/1-501 IN withdrew to be supported by Tac Air. At 1152H contact has broken. At 1230H OPCON 2-17 CAV. At 1800H returned OPCON 1-501 IN BN and occupied a blocking position vicinity YD646316 to YD644309. Results: 1 US KIA; Enemy assessment – Negative.

D/1-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD668296 with ambushes vicinity YD668292 and YD660295. At 2006H vicinity YD662296 received 6-8 M79 rounds with negative casualties. Conducted RIF operation NW to vicinity YD659305. OPCON 2-17 CAV effective 1230H. At 1605H vicinity YD628326 received SA and AW fire from an estimated platoon size force. Returned fire with organic weapons. Negative casualties; Enemy assessment – Negative. Returned OPCON 1-501 IN BN effective 1800H. Occupied a blocking position vicinity YD638327 to YD644323.

Recon platoon occupied night position vicinity YD672285. At 0032H moved 1 squad SW to vicinity YD670228. At 1703H Recon platoon departed YD674268 and moved by vehicle to LZ SALLY. Established a night ambush site to the S of LZ SALLY vicinity YD630263.

2-501 IN BN

A/2-501 IN occupied night position FSB GERONIMO with ambushes vicinity YD685205, YD685201, YD689194 and YD701197. One (1) platoon conducted RIF operation to vicinity YD698205 and YD694219 and returned to FSB GERONIMO. OPCON 1-501 IN BN effective 1650H.



B/2-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD662258 with ambushes vicinity YD662257, YD667253, YD658250 and YD652258. Conducted RIF operation vicinity YD667259 and closed FSB PINKY at 0828H. One (1) platoon conducted RIF operation to vicinity YD682355 and returned. Provided minesweep security from FSB PINKY south.

C/2-501 IN occupied night position vicinity YD674245 with ambushes vicinity YD670238, YD662241, YD682230 and YD680238. C/2-501 IN (-) conducted RIF operation vicinity YD693228. One (1) platoon conducted RIF operation vicinity YD685237, YD693228, YD700224 and YD710233 and returned to join C/2-501 IN (-) at YD693288. C/2-501 IN returned to FSB PINKY and OPCON 2-17 CAV at 1700H. Moved by vehicle to AN LO Bridge.

D/2-501 IN provided security for FSB PINKY. Ambushed vicinity YD701250 and YD680255. Conducted RIF operation vicinity YD660241. At YD660241 found 6 NVA in graves approximately 3 days old. At 1206H vicinity YD660241 BBT grenade resulted in 1 US WIA (medevac). At 1810H vicinity YD654245 found 1 NVA killed approximately 3 days prior. Established night position vicinity YD654240 with local ambushes. Results: 1 US WIA (medevac); Enemy assessment: 7 NVA KIA (BC).

Recon platoon provided security at LZ SATAN and conducted patrols to vicinity YD666205 and YD646224.

1-502 IN BN

A/1-502 IN occupied night position vicinity YD753320 with ambushes vicinity YD752314. At 0855H conducted a combat assault PZ vicinity YD750320 to LZ vicinity YD751211. OPCON 2-501 IN BN effective 0830H. At 0855H conducted combat assault from PZ vicinity YD750320 to LZ vicinity YD751211. Closed LZ 0956H. Assumed security of HUE Bridges at 1125H.

B/1-502 IN occupied night position vicinity YD685367. At 1135H conducted RIF operation to vicinity YD678314. At 1439H received SA and AW fire from an estimated company vicinity YD676314 and YD680312. B/1-502 IN held in place vicinity YD678314 and was supported by artillery and Tac Air. Contact broken at 1700H. Negative casualties; Enemy Assessment – Negative. Established ambushes to the NE of village vicinity YD675310.

C/1-502 IN occupied night position vicinity YD741325 with ambushes vicinity YD738323 and YD735333. With one (1) platoon PF conducted RIF operation to villages vicinity YD715322 and YD715238. Moved to vicinity YD717325. At 1854H conducted a combat assault to LZ vicinity YD668309. Closed LZ 1925H. At 1920H the last lift from the PZ received intense AW fire. Negative casualties. LFT supported. Negative enemy assessment. Upon closing LZ, C/1-502 IN established ambush position to the SW of the village vicinity YD675310.

D/1-502 IN occupied night position vicinity YD735306 with ambushes vicinity YD736313 and YD735301. Conducted RIF operation to YD726303 established a blocking position from vicinity YD726303 to YD726293. C/1-502 IN (-) remained in blocking positions. One (1) RF platoon and one (1) platoon from D/1-502 IN conducted patrols to villages vicinity YD735295, YD720300, YD730290. Moved to PZ vicinity YD728297 and conducted a combat assault at 1727H to vicinity YD629314, closed at 1824H. OPCON 1-501 IN BN effective 1800H. Occupied blocking position vicinity YD634313 to YD633323.

Recon platoon occupied night position vicinity YD685367. At 0942H with one (1) PF platoon conducted RIF operation to vicinity YD685367. Returned FSB OMAHA, closed 1515H. Departed FSB OMAHA at 1836H and established ambushes vicinity YD689325.

(Commanders Situation Report; 112001H May – 122000H May 1968; James J Waldeck, MAJ, IN., Kayo 3)

11 May 1968

1-502 IN BN had light contact during the day, and C/1-502 IN recovered their MIA (KIA) and found 1 NVA KIA (BC)


11 – 12 May 1968

Operation DELAWARE: At 0600H, A/2-502 IN vicinity YD539124 engaged NVA squad along trail with SA. Enemy did not return fire, but yelled and ran around confused, as though trying to surrender; enemy retreated leaving behind 3 NVA KIA and weapons. When A/2-502 IN fired a claymore from its NDP, it heard the enemy fleeing and one individual groaning near the perimeter. At 0800H, TAC CP (2-502 IN BN) receives approx. 18 rounds of incoming 122mm rockets from southeast. Division LRRP's spotted firing location and called gunships on the target. Results: 1 US KIA, 4 US WHA (Minor), 1 Back hoe damaged. At 2330H, the A36 element received an organized probe by an unknown size force. When one of A/2-502 IN, M-60's opened up on 1 NVA, the enemy returned fire with an RPD, knocking out the M-60 position. A/2-502 IN requested gunship and during their last pass one or two rockets went astray, wounding 17 friendly personnel in an ambush position approximately 300 meters from the contact area. On 120900H May, while moving to an LZ to affect Medevac, A36 engage an enemy squad size force with SA. Total results: 3 US KHA, 1 US KIA, 3 US WHA, 16 US WIA, 9 NVA KIA, 6 AK-47's, 1 SKS, 1 M-2 Carbine, 1 RPG Captured.



11 May 1969

Operation APACHE SNOW: B/3-187 IN conducted a first light check of the previous day's contact and found numerous blood trails (seven) and three additional bodies, besides one AK-47, one light machinegun, one RPG rocket launcher, and miscellaneous equipment.



Later that day as they maneuvered in the vicinity of the Laotian Border due west of A Loui. B/3-187 IN made contact at 1624 hours with an unidentified size enemy force well entrenched on the ridge line in the vicinity of Hill 937 (YC 327983) (See Sketch). Receiving enemy heavy machinegun, small arms, RPG, and mortar fire the company employed ARA, air strikes, and artillery support in addition to small arms fire which resulted in five NVA killed. These were discovered while the unit was searching the hut and bunker complex. B/3-187 IN lead platoon suffered three killed and nineteen wounded in the contact and was forced to withdraw a short distance to regroup, leaving the wounded where they fell. The company initiated a second advance to retrieve those initially wounded and suffered additional casualties. On the third attempt LTC Honeycutt, the battalion commander, instructed them to increase their volume of fire and push up past the wounded rather than trying to retrieve them under direct enemy fire. This was accomplished at 1645H.

At 1700H during a med-evac for B/3-187 IN, a cobra gunship accompanying the med-evac inadvertently banked and fired six rockets into the 3-187 IN BN command post, D/3-187 IN, and the mortar platoon leaving one killed and thirty-five wounded in its wake. The 3-187 IN BN Commander, S2, S3, and artillery liaison officer were wounded, and all were evacuated except the battalion commander and the S3. By 1900 hours the wounded had been evacuated and the companies began establishing their night defensive positions.

A significant discovery in the area by the 3-187 IN was a group of documents identifying the unit involved in the contacts as the 29th NVA Regiment. The documents indicated that the 29th NVA Regiment had returned from North Vietnam in April and had been conducting reconnaissance operations between Base Area 611 and Laos and Route 548 in the A SHAU Valley.

Elements of the 1-506 IN BN while maneuvering near the Laotian Border west of TA BAT received mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds resulting in seventeen wounded, all of which were later evacuated. The 2-501 IN BN, on the other hand, encountered minimal contact during the day, but resulted in five enemy killed.

With the battalion's command post at FB BRADLEY, elements of the 2-1 ARVN Battalion combat assaulted south of FB TIGER (YD 252090) to search out the area of operations. (Narrative Operation APACHE SNOW; MG John M. Wright Jr. Commanding; 10 May – 7 June 1969)

11 May 1969

A/1-502 IN conducted a C/A from FSB LASH to D/1-502 IN location at YD645655 and D/1-502 IN moved to FSB LASH and assumed the mission of providing security for FSB LASH. At 0835H, A/1-502 IN was hit by friendly artillery during a recon by fire, resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA.

11 May 1970

1-502 IN, Recon platoon at location 761055 found one 60mm in the ground set as a booby trap. They called in an EOD team. VC of an unknown number fired rockets at a school house and were repulsed by PF forces in the village of THON THONG. PF platoon 100 engaged one VC and thought they wounded him in the leg. A seep under illumination produced negative results.

11 May 1970

Operation TEXAS STAR: D/2-502 IN began the sweep north with no enemy sightings. C/2-502 IN continued their operations on Hill 714. They began movement to the west to the saddle (YD502072) connecting Hills 714 and Hill 882. A/2-502 IN began operations to the southwest of FSB VEGHEL, while B/2-502 IN continued screening, the mission they assumed until the end of the period.

12 May 1967

Operation MALHEUR: Three light contacts by the 2-502 IN BN resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee. (HQ, 1st Brigade, 101st ABN DIV; Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR; 02 September 1967)

12 – 14 May 1968

The 1-502 IN BN had light contact during the days as the Battalion continued the RIF and security missions in the AO. On the 14th, Recon and B/1-502 IN operating with PF's form QUANG DIEN, killed 1 NVA (BC), 2 VC (BC)

12 May 1969

Operation APACHE SNOW: Redlegs and troopers of the 2-501 IN BN fend off a vicious attack on FB AIRBORNE, a Screaming Eagle outpost built in the enemy's A SHAU "warehouse area." Thirty-one enemy die—and AIRBORNE remains alive as an irritating roadblock for the enemy. During the DONG AP BIA fight the 2nd Currahee battalion exploits the warehouse. (Rendezvous with Destiny (Volume 2, Number 2); Summer 1969)

12 May 1969

Operation APACHE SNOW: The 3-187 IN BN continued their push through the thick bamboo and elephant grass along the rough ridges of DONG AP BIA. Two air strikes were requested and completed at 0804 hours in support of B/3-187 IN's advance up the ill and C/3-187 IN's advance to the northeast of B/3-187 IN. At 0913H, B/3-187 IN began receiving sniper fire from their rear and by 0921 hours they were receiving intense automatic fire from the front and incoming mortar rounds. To aid in the evacuation of the wounded the battalion commander requested engineer support to blow a landing zone for B/3-187 IN. Attempting an insertion at 1024 hours the engineer ship was hit by RPG and small arms fire causing it to crash and burn resulting in seven casualties.

B/3-187 IN continued to maneuver against the well-disciplined force, estimated at two companies, which were dug in about 200 meters to their front. The 3-187 IN BN called for ARA and artillery fire in order to dislodge the enemy from his fortified position, but the enemy held fast and throughout the day the 3-187 IN continued to receive heavy automatic



weapons and RPG fire interspersed with mortar fire. Heavy air strikes consisting of 500 and 1000-pound bombs (high drag and delayed fuse), in addition to napalm and artillery fire, were continually placed on the enemy's position.

Meanwhile, the other battalions – 2-501 IN BN and 1-506 IN BN – continued to conduct reconnaissance in force operations throughout their areas of operation encountering limited contact. B/1-506 IN while maneuvering in the vicinity of coordinates YC 309941, encountered three NVA, killing one and capturing his AK-47.

While on reconnaissance in force operations in the immediate area of the Laotian Border 3-1 ARVN BN discovered a small cache of miscellaneous equipment and weapons – eight individuals and twelve crew-served weapons.

Simultaneous with the maneuvering of the battalions on the ground, A/2-17 CAV conducted air reconnaissance in the support of the ground forces throughout the area of operations. (Narrative Operation APACHE SNOW; MG John M. Wright Jr. Commanding; 10 May – 7 June 1969)

12 – 13 May 1969

FSB AIRBORNE: While being manned by artillery batteries protected by elements of 2-501 IN BN, the base was attacked by the 6th NVA Regiment supported by 46 men from the K-12 Sapper Battalion. The bloody fight which followed left 27 American dead and at least 61 wounded. NVA losses were not accurately known since the attackers had, as usual, taken as many of their dead with them as was possible, but 39 NVA bodies were left behind. C/2-329 ARTY and A/2-501 IN had borne the brunt of the attacks.

12 May 1969

The 1-502 IN BN conducted RIF operations with D/1-502 IN providing security for FSB LASH. At 0935H at YC645615 the pointman of C/1-502 IN, 3rd platoon spotted 3-4 VC and opened fire. The results were 1 US WIA and 1 VC KIA. At 1141H at YC647618, C/1-502 IN, 2nd platoon received fire from 3-4 VC, resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA.

12 May – 14 August 1969

Ten days after the inauguration of Richard M. Nixon, the communist leadership resolved to test his will and the will of the American people. COSVN Directive Number 71 ordered the North Vietnamese Army and its supporting local forces to maximize American combat casualties while disrupting lines of communications and disabling the pacification programs.

In 1969, more than 11,500 American servicemen (and one woman) died in Vietnam, nearly half of them in the first four months of Nixon's presidency. The year's best-known combat action was the battle for Ap Bia Mountain (Hill 937), known as the battle of Hamburger Hill. But over one hundred miles to the south in Quang Tin Province, a little-known but highly significant set of military events unfolded. Shortly after midnight on May 12, 1969, under cover of a moonless sky, two regiments of the 2nd NVA Division with support of local and regional units, a force of perhaps more than 2,500 soldiers, launched an offensive in the eastern third of Quang Tin Province, now part of present-day Quang Nam. This enemy force quickly gained control of nearly 80 percent of the targeted area, and threatened to overrun and capture several key allied military installations, including the provincial headquarters at Tam Ky. The U.S. Army's 23rd Infantry Division, the Americal, was responsible for this tactical area of operation, but proved no match for the well-prepared, highly motivated, and determined enemy. On May 14, a Tactical Emergency was declared when the Americal called for help.

In the pre-dawn hours of May 15, land lines were busily ringing and FM radios loudly squawking as the plea from the Americal began to be answered. The 101st Airborne Division hastily prepared plans to send a brigade task force south to Quang Tin Province. Clerks, cooks, supply personnel, truck drivers, and other rear-echelon types were roused from their beds. At 4:30 a.m., division staff met with 1st Brigade staff. Aviation crews were called into briefings while two infantry battalions and the two artillery batteries that supported them were ordered to prepare for extraction from the field and transport to the Camp Eagle/Phu Bai area. Dense early morning fog nestled in the valleys around fire support bases Pike and LASH in the southern end of the A SHAU Valley near the border with Laos. As the sun began to illuminate the verdant peaks and ridges of the Truong Son Mountain Range, artillerymen readied their 105mm howitzers, shell canisters, powder bags, and firing projectiles in huge rope nets to be slung beneath Chinook helicopters. Meanwhile, grunts from the 1st Battalion, 501st, and the 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry regiments boarded Huey helicopters at landing zones around the area of operations. These units belonged to the 2nd Brigade but were placed under operational control of the 1st Brigade. In turn, for the duration of Operation Lamar Plain, the 1st Brigade would become OPCON of the Americal.

Charlie Company, 1/501st, was on FSB PIKE providing security. Around 9:25 a.m., Alpha Company arrived from the field, and within the next hour its sister companies were there as well. The men knew little, if anything, about the events that were unfolding. But rumors were rampant. Had the war suddenly ended? After more than three months in the A SHAU Valley, were the grunts finally going to get that well-deserved stand-down at Eagle Beach on the South China Sea? Before long, the words "Tam Ky" and "Americal" began to circulate among the men. They realized that something big was going on down south. In the east was the distant but unmistakable sound of in-bound helicopters. The men scrambled to their feet to put on their rucksacks. As they braced themselves for the wind and dust storm of rotor wash, flights of the big twin-rotor CH-47 Chinooks arrived at the firebases. Before long, the big choppers were headed east with them carbo-loads of men, equipment, and supplies. Operation Lamar Plain was underway.

Meanwhile, folks in the rear prepared for deployment to Tam Ky as they loaded all available trucks and Jeeps with ammunition, tents, equipment, rations, and all things necessary to support an airmobile brigade task force. Support units also prepared for the trip to Quang Tin Province. These included a maintenance company, a medical company, a signal company, a company of combat engineers, and a forward support and supply element. Aviation crews, which had been working since before first light, boarded their helicopters and headed south. These included an air cavalry troop, a battery of aerial rocketry artillery, an assault helicopter company, an assault support helicopter company, the brigade aviation unit, and a company of medical evacuation helicopters.

After arriving at the Phu Bai airbase, the infantrymen waited to board Air Force C-130 and C-123 transport planes. While they waited, they had hot showers, ice cream, cold sodas, and were entertained by Donut Dollies. The men were given



new jungle boots, fatigues, and boonie-hats. They traded damaged weapons for good ones. The division's top brass joined the XXIV Corps commander, along with the division band, to see the troops off.

Tam Ky lies about 40 miles south of Da Nang. Located in the coastal plain, the town is a market center where people come to buy and sell fruits, vegetables, and fish. By mid-afternoon on May 15, 1969, the little airstrip south of Tam Ky was the focus of activity as transport planes from Phu Bai touched down and offloaded men, vehicles, and equipment. While old men and women squatted on their haunches, crowds of noisy wide-eyed children gathered to stare through the barbed-wire fencing that surrounded the airstrip. Young men and boys raced about on motorbikes spooking water buffalo and chickens. The air was clouded with red dust, diesel fumes, and smoke. Darkness fell, but planes continued to arrive throughout the night. As the first day of Operation Lamar Plain drew to a close, nearly 80 tons of supplies and equipment and 751 soldiers from the task force had been delivered to Tam Ky.

While men and materiel continued to arrive the next day, the Screaming Eagles wasted no time going after the enemy. Two 105mm howitzer batteries were transported from Tam Ky to fire support bases Young and Professional. By early afternoon on May 16, they began preparatory fires. As mid-afternoon approached, the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry, minus Alpha Company, made a combat assault north of LZ Professional and began to conduct reconnaissance in force to the south. Temperatures soared over 100 degrees, and there were many heat casualties.

As the infantrymen began their RIF, they began to find well-established enemy huts, hootches, bunkers, and trenches—some of which had been occupied as recently as the night before. The air cavalry and brigade aerial recon teams also discovered many enemy installations while facing withering fire from .51-caliber machine-gun positions. During the next two weeks, virtually every aircraft assigned to the operation received damage from ground fire, and many were shot down. Infantry contact with the enemy was light for the first two days in the field. However, it was only being a matter of time before that changed.

On the morning of May 18, Bravo Company, 1/501st Infantry began to climb Hill 187, north of LZ Professional. As the third platoon reached the summit, several enemy mortar rounds rained down. As the remainder of the company, joined by recon and mortar platoons, reached the top, a command post was established. Soon thereafter, enemy mortar crews had the CP bracketed. One round fell on each side and a third directly hit the CP. The company commander, Capt. John C. Pape, and the senior medic, Spec 4 Russell Lane Jett, were killed in the blast, while the commander's RTO and five others were wounded. Mortar rounds continued to fall on Hill 187 until late afternoon, eventually killing four men and wounding 18.

Shortly after Bravo came under siege, Charlie Company began receiving intense small-arms and machine-gun fire while following a trail north of Hill 187. The first and third platoons tried an assault on enemy positions atop a small hill. The second platoon was defending the company CP and also engaged with the enemy. The assault on the little hill failed; the men pulled back. There were wounded, and ammo and water were running low. It became essential to secure the area so that a resupply helicopter and medevac could come in. Shortly after the men pulled back, a flight of Douglas A-1E Skyraiders, or "spades," rolled in and passed directly overhead, dropping 500-pound bombs onto the enemy position. Charlie Company eventually secured the hilltop, and the dead, one seriously wounded, and heat casualties were evacuated. As the men began to dig in for the night, they surveyed the surreal scene around them. Melted napalm hung from splintered, blackened vegetation. Tree stumps smoldered. Bomb fragments—ugly jagged chunks of steel—littered the landscape. The stiffening bodies of dead NVA soldiers lay close by. The air smelled of combat and death. The men of Charlie Company would call this hill Ghost Mountain.

The 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry entered the action on May 19 when they established a command post at Hau Duc. Meanwhile, their infantry companies and recon and mortar platoons conducted combat assaults by helicopter west of Professional and southeast of Tien Phuoc. The object was to seize the high ground surrounding Professional and take the pressure off of the firebase and district headquarters at Tien Phuoc. Contact with the enemy was generally light and sporadic until May 21 when 1/501 units, northeast of Hill 187, made contact in the early morning. Fighting continued throughout the day as two companies and the recon platoon were ambushed. The fighting was concentrated around a small hill where the enemy occupied well-concealed spider holes, trenches, and steel-reinforced concrete bunkers.

By mid-afternoon, Delta Company was scattered south and east of the hill. They were badly shot up and pinned down by heavy enemy fire. Worse, the location of one of their platoons was unknown. Recon also was hurting after losing its platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and several other men, leaving a Spec 4 rifleman in command. Bravo assaulted the enemy hill position from the northeast and sustained many casualties. They collected the dead and wounded and set up a CP and aid station.

Charlie Company, in reserve, was ordered to assault the hill late that afternoon. The third platoon stood up on line, shoulder-to-shoulder, and before the command to charge could be given, the enemy opened fire. Immediately, second platoon was ordered into the fight and the two platoons charged across a rice paddy toward the hill. Several men fell wounded in the paddy, and more at the base of the hill as from above, the enemy fired mortar, machine gun, and rocket-propelled grenades. As the men leaped over a stone wall and began to advance up the hill, the first platoon and company CP also came under attack. The enemy tried to encircle them.

Murderous fire brought down several more of Charlie Company's men. But using grenades and fire and maneuver, they reached a second stone wall. Then they were fired on from every direction. Enemy soldiers wearing grass and tree limbs as camouflage rose up from spider holes and trenches and charged from behind. The fighting became very close, often hand-to-hand. There were many acts of personal courage. After taking out several enemy bunkers with light anti-tank weapons and spraying rifle and machine-gun fire into the trees where enemy soldiers had tied themselves with ropes, the 101st moved further up the hill toward a third stone wall, behind which there was a continuous line of spider holes interconnected by tunnels. To the left and right, behind the wall, were bunker and tunnel complexes. Each time a bunker



was taken out, more enemy soldiers crawled through the connecting tunnels and trenches, pulled their dead away, and replaced them in the firing positions. The beleaguered grunts finally fought their way to the top of the hill and destroyed the last of the enemy bunkers. They were exhausted, nearly out of ammo and water, and without radio contact with the CP. The two platoon leaders, Don Gourley and Dan O'Neill, made the decision to recover their wounded and withdraw from the hill. After getting the wounded off the hill, Gourley led a group back up the hill to recover the dead, but the tactical situation prevented their recovery efforts. Only with the help of guys from Bravo's third platoon were they able to police up their weapons and equipment and get their wounded to a makeshift assembly area and aid station. Helicopters, under enemy fire, took out the wounded well into the night. Evacuation of the remaining wounded and recovery of the dead were the priorities the next morning. During the day's fighting, the 1/501st had 12 men killed in action and 49 wounded. Over the next dozen days, the enemy stalked the 101st units with well-placed mortar and sniper fire. Aircraft losses continued steadily. During this period, 18 men were killed and 54 were wounded. A 24-hour cease-fire was declared for May 30, Buddha's birthday.

On June 2, B Troop, 2/17th Air Cavalry inserted its aero-rifle platoon onto Hill 376, Tien Loc Mountain, for a reconnaissance mission. The undermanned platoon consisted of 18 men, including a medic and two Kit Carson scouts. They soon came under small arms fire and were ordered to turn around and go down the other side of the mountain. The two men at the lead were wounded in an ambush and the rest of the unit was pinned down. The medic, Joseph Guy La Pointe, rushed forward to help the two wounded men. La Pointe was hit but continued to administer aid until enemy grenades landed on his position, killing all three men.

As the battle continued into the afternoon, two more cavalymen were killed, and several others wounded. The C&C helicopter was shot down over the battlefield. The situation remained precarious. Bravo Company, 1/501st moved onto Hill 376 to relieve the beleaguered cavalry platoon. The next morning, June 3, two more infantry companies and the recon platoon from the 1-501 IN BN arrived. For the next nine days, the Screaming Eagles moved up and down the ridgelines assaulting enemy bunkers, often facing murderous machine-gun fire, mortars, and grenades. By the time they left Hill 376 on June 12, they had suffered 23 killed, 34 wounded, and one missing in action. In addition, a helicopter crew of four men from the 101st Aviation Battalion and a passenger were killed in the area, while elements of the 1/46th Infantry suffered casualties south of Hill 376. After a month of bitter fighting in which neither side gained an advantage, Operation Lamar Plain reached a turning point. It became a game of chasing an enemy that avoided contact while moving toward its sanctuaries deeper in the interior. Operations intelligence identified possible base camps and other enemy locations. Some were the subject of combat assaults, only to find the enemy had moved out ahead of assaulting units. Other locations were the targets of B-52 air strikes.

Then, in late June and early July, the 1/502nd Infantry started to make contact around Hau Duc. They found many enemy trails and a large transportation route. They also located enemy huts and a medical complex in which supplies were cached.

On the morning of July 8, Alpha Company, 1/502nd Infantry made a grueling march to a location about 3 km northeast of Hau Duc. There, in a fallow rice paddy, they were supposed to rendezvous with a resupply helicopter. Capt. Chuck Scribner ordered his third platoon to move forward and recon the area before putting out two squads as perimeter security. As those two squads advanced, the lead squad discovered a line of comms wire. When they reported their finding, they were ordered to follow the wire, which led to a small hootch. With a man on each flank, the squad leader stepped forward and fired into the hootch, killing three NVA soldiers.

The lead squad then turned around and moved back down the trail. Suddenly they heard intense rifle and machine-gun fire. The second squad was caught in an ambush with the enemy positioned on the right side of the trail, and a pair of machine guns, one located on each side, firing directly down the trail. Enemy mortars located on higher ground supported the ambush.

Under intense fire, the ambushed squad maneuvered to form a small defensive position, and desperately fought amid a hail of mortar and RPG fire. Meanwhile, the enemy flanked the lead squad under cover of mortar fire. A fierce firefight ensued. During the confusion of battle, some of the men became separated from the squad while others fell wounded or dead. Late in the afternoon, Alpha's three dead and five wounded were evacuated by helicopter to Chu Lai. The enemy finally broke off the fighting at around 8:00 p.m. There was no radio contact with the two cut-off platoons. Thirteen men were declared missing in action.

During the night, the enemy searched some of the bodies of the missing Alpha Company soldiers; some were still alive and feigned death. Toward morning the enemy recovered and buried their dead and began to move out of the area. They left behind some snipers and a small harassment force.

Early on the morning of July 9, Bravo Company, 1/502 arrived to secure the area while members of Alpha Company began a search for their missing men. An air cavalry Loach pilot spotted Ted Brenner, Duane Scott, and John Hanie, three of the missing men. The pilot, Luther Lassiter, landed his chopper. Scott and Hanie crawled inside the cockpit while Brenner hopped onto a skid. The overloaded chopper labored to lift off, but Lassiter managed to gain altitude and fly the soldiers to Hau Duc. When Lassiter returned to the area, he rescued a fourth soldier, Julius Bray.

Troops searching on the ground found two men, Kenneth Walker and Nelson Lucas, alive but wounded. By late morning, the bodies of six soldiers were recovered. The body of the thirteenth missing man, Sgt. James Manning, was not found until the following day.

For the remainder of Operation Lamar Plain, the Screaming Eagles continued to chase the enemy and engage whenever possible. Most of the operation was by then confined to the southern portions of the tactical area. Because the enemy had mostly broken up into many groups of fewer than ten soldiers, the operational tactics changed from RIF to saturation



patrols, many of them in the vicinity of Fire Support Base Boxer. These patrols revealed extensive bunker and tunnel complexes, hospitals, classrooms, and other enemy structures. Many graves containing enemy soldiers killed by artillery and air strikes also were discovered. During this latter stage of the operation, 24 American soldiers and airmen were killed and 58 were wounded.

Early in the afternoon of August 11 an Air Force C-130 departed Tam Ky with a load of grunts from the 1/501st Infantry. They arrived at Camp Evans and were taken home to LZ Sally via trucks. Over the next three days, transport flights, vehicle convoys, and helicopters continued to take the Screaming Eagles home, and Operation Lamar Plain officially ended at 8:00 a.m. on August 14, 1969.

Sandwiched between the fighting at Ap Bia Mountain during Operation Apache Snow and the siege of Firebase Ripcord during Operation Texas Star the following year, Operation Lamar Plain was one of the last extensive operations conducted by the 101st Airborne Division against the North Vietnamese Army. Lamar Plain received little media attention, however, even though 126 men died, 404 were wounded, and it occurred because of a tactical emergency.

Even today, few people outside of those who participated in Lamar Plain know anything about it. The families of many of the men who died in the fighting during Lamar Plain believed that their loved ones died on Hamburger Hill, and many of the soldiers' obituaries reflect that.

The men who fought in Operation Lamar Plain are proud that they came to the aid of another military unit in a time of crisis, allowing that unit to recover from its losses and eventually return to normal combat operations. (Bitter Fighting in Quang Tin: Operation Lamar Plain; By Roger Ables)

12 May 1970

The 2-501 IN BN moved to PHU BAI Combated Base to conduct battalion refresher training and returned to operational control of the 2BDE. (Operation Report – HQ, 101st ABN DIV (AM), Period Ending 31 July 1970; 15 August 1970)

12 May 1970

Operation TEXAS STAR: 2-502 IN BN Recon platoon and elements of the 3rd platoon, A/326 ENG repelled onto the top of Hill 882 to cut an LZ. The last helicopter into the area received small arms fire, forcing the chopper to land at FSB SHOCK and seriously injuring the pilot. ARA was employed, and the engineers once again began the dangerous and arduous task of blasting the LZ under enemy fire. D/2-502 IN continued their sweep north to the top of Hill 882 with no enemy contact. Two bunkers were found and destroyed, and two enemy bodies killed by air strikes were found. Twenty-Four M-16 rifle magazines were found on and around the bodies indicating the enemy had used M-16 rifles. No weapons were captured, however. C/2-502 IN continued to move west.

A/2-502 IN combat assaulted to the top of Hill 882 on the LZ prepared by the engineers. They joined forced with the Recon platoon and began movement along the ridge line to the east to line up with C/2-502 IN in the saddle. D/2-502 IN, having cleared the ridge to the top of Hill 882, began a sweep back to the south.

12 May 1970

Three planes took ground fire from location 864159. Intelligence indicated 56 unknown persons moving in area immediately south of Arsenal. The firebase will be on 100% alert tonight.



During this week, in the span of 8 years since the 501st Infantry Regiment, 502nd Infantry Regiment and 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division deployed in support of the Vietnam War the following awards were awarded to the service members during combat operations.

2 x Distinguished Service Cross (1 x Posthumously)
20 x Silver Star Medal (8 x Posthumously)
4 x Bronze Star Medal with Valor (1 x Posthumously)
12 x Bronze Star Medal (12 x Posthumously)
66 x Purple Heart Medal (62 x Posthumously)
1 x Good Conduct Medal (1 x Posthumously)

06 May 1966



SP4 David A. Scott (HHC/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death as a result of gunshot wound to the abdomen received in hostile ground action in the province not reported, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1968



CPL Donald R. Brogdon (A/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wound received while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in a firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1968



SP4 John A. Martinez (A/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wound received while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in a firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1968



PFC Patrick B. Hession (D/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wound received while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in a firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1968



CPT Tilghman R. McLemore (HHC/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from fragment wounds received while in base camp when camp came under hostile attack in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1968



PFC Kenneth R. Quan (D/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death while on combat operation when hit by fragment from hostile mortar round in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.



06 May 1968



CPL Howard A. Threet (A/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from fragment wounds received when base camp came under hostile rocket attack in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam. CPL Threet was admitted to an Army hospital facility and then transferred to a Naval hospital ship where he expired.

06 May 1970



Michael L. Antle (A/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from artillery, rocket, mortar wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



CPL George W. Bennett Jr. (A/2-501 IN); was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from artillery, rocket, mortar wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SGT Melvin Bowman (HHC/2-501) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from fragment wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SGT Gregory A. Chavez (E/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from fragment wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



CPL Douglas W. Day (E/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SSG Robert A. Denton (B/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SGT Jay T. Diller (HHC/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from fragment wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.



06 May 1970



CPL Lawrence L. Gordon (A/2-501 IN); was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



CPT Richard A. Hawley Jr. (E/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



CPL Tommy I. Hindman (C/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from artillery, rocket, mortar wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SSG Larry G. Kier (A/2-501 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death. SSG Kier was on Fire Support Base HENDERSON, about 9 nautical miles south-southwest of Camp Carrol and was occupied by 2-501 IN and 2-11 ARTY when FSB HENDERSON came under attack, first by heavy mortar fire, then assault by a North Vietnamese Army battalion. When FSB HENDERSON was relieved 24 American service members were dead and two were missing, which PFC Kier was one of them. He was declared dead on 12 September 1978 and on 13 June 1996 his remains were repatriated, and positive identification publicly announced on 28 February 2002.

06 May 1970



SGT Frank F. Lewis (A/2-501 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from artillery, rocket, mortar wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SSG David E. Ogden (E/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SGT Dicki W. Reagan (E/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from artillery, rocket, mortar wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SFC Gary F. Snyder (E/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.



06 May 1970



SSG Refugio T. Teran (E/2-501 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death. SP4 Teran was on Fire Support Base HENDERSON, about 9 nautical miles south-southwest of Camp Carroll and was occupied by 2-501 IN and 2-11 ARTY when FSB HENDERSON came under attack, first by heavy mortar fire, then assault by a North Vietnamese Army battalion. When FSB HENDERSON was relieved 24 American service members were dead and two were missing, which SP4 Teran was one of them. He was declared dead on 29 September 1978 and on 13 June 1996 his remains were repatriated, and positive identification publicly announced on 28 February 2002.

06 May 1970



SP4 Ronald D. Van Beukering (E/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SGT Edward Veser (E/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SGT John G. Widen (E/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SSG John J. Willey (A/2-501 IN); was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SSG Frederick P. Ziegenfelder (A/2-501 IN); was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



SSG Kenneth L. Foutz (B/2-501 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death multiple fragmentation wounds while at a fire support base when the area came under attack by hostile force while at FSB HENDERSON, 11 KM Southeast of Ca Lu when area came under attack by hostile force in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

06 May 1970



CPL Phillip R. Warfield (E/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragment wounds while at a night defensive position when the area came under attack by a hostile force in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.



06 May 1970

PV2 Dale R. Lewis (A/2-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal for military merit and for wounds received in combat against a hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam (HQ, 101st Airborne Division; General Order Number 5805; 23 May 1970)

07 May 1966



PFC Philip P. Jenkins (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death as a result of gunshot wound to the right side of his chest, under arm received during a hostile ground attack in the province not reported, Republic of Vietnam.

07 May 1967



PFC Charles L. Seefeldt Jr. (C/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death when a hostile mine detonated while on combat operations 4km E-SE of DUC PHO in the QUANG NGAI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

07 May 1968



MSG Eddie B. Sands (A/1-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from fragment wounds when a hostile command mine detonated on the edge of Eight Klickville North of HUE in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

07 May 1968



1LT David B. Land (B/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal for military merit and for wounds received in action in the Republic of Vietnam. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Order Number 6852)

07 May 1968



SFC George M. Victor (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds received while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

07 May 1968



SGT Billy E. Myers (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds received while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

07 May 1968



PFC Jerry W. Clark (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds received while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.



07 May 1968



PFC Robert J. Deike (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds received while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

07 May 1968



CPL Donald W. Williams (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds received while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

07 May 1968



SGT Ronald E. Long (D/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal for military merit and for wounds received in action in the Republic of Vietnam. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV., G.O. No. 9394)

07 May 1969



CPL Paul D. Martinez Jr. (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds in the QUAN NAM Province, Republic of Vietnam.

07 May 1969



SP4 Roosevelt F. Penn (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death by small arms fire from a hostile force while on combat operation in the Quan Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam. SP4 Penn was admitted to a military medical facility and expired shortly thereafter.

08 May 1966



SP4 Robert McCaig (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds received to the neck while in hostile ground action in the province not reported, Republic of Vietnam.

08 May 1966



PFC Stephen J. Steriti (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds to the head while in hostile ground action in the province not reported, Republic of Vietnam.

08 May 1968



SP5 Ellis L. Faircloth (A/1-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.



08 May 1968



CPL Michael J. Ford (HHC/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death while on combat operation when hit by fragment from hostile anti-tank round in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

08 May 1968



SGT John F. Moran (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wound received which resulted in his death from fragment wounds while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

08 May 1969



CPL Dwayne R. Pickart (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while on combat operation when encountered a hostile force in the QUAN NAM Province, Republic of Vietnam.

08 May 1969



SGT Miguel E. Briales (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while on combat operation when encountered a hostile force in the QUAN NAM Province, Republic of Vietnam.

08 May 1969



PFC Arturo Pelajo (A/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death while on combat operation when area came under rocket attack by a hostile force in the Quan Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam. PFC Pelajo was admitted to a military medical facility, placed on the VSI list, and later expired.

08 May 1970



SGT Wayne K. Smith (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while on combat operation on Hill 882, NW of FSB VEGHEL when hostile force was encountered in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

08 May 1970



SP5 Peter F. Nolan (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while on combat operation on Hill 714, NW of FSB VEGHEL when a hostile force was encountered in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

09 May 1968



SSG Everett S. Jones (D/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.



09 May 1969



1LT Bruce D. Dick (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while on combat operation when encountered a hostile force in the QUAN NAM Province, Republic of Vietnam.

09 May 1969



CPL Jimmy L. Henry (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while on combat operation when a hostile force was encountered in the QUAN NAM Province, Republic of Vietnam.

09 May 1970



1LT Roy L. Richardson (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while on combat operation on Hill 882, NW of FSB VEGHEL when a hostile force was encountered in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

10 May 1966



SGT Willie J. Peppers (HHC/2-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds to his chest received in hostile ground action in the Province Unknown, Republic of Vietnam.

10 May 1968



SP4 Larry G. Patterson (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

10 May 1968



PFC Shelby E. Cooley (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wound and burns received while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

11 May 1966



PFC Andrew C. Evans (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death as the result of gunshot wound to thigh near BU GIA Map in hostile ground action 36km W-SW of BU PRANG Airfield in the PHUOC LONG Province, Republic of Vietnam.

11 May 1966



2LT William F. Otto (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple gunshot wounds to his body near BU GIA Map in hostile ground action 36km W-SW of BU PRANG Airfield in the PHUOC LONG Province, Republic of Vietnam.



11 May 1966



SP4 Wayne M. Traylor (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death as a result of gunshot wound to back near BU GIA Map in hostile ground action 36km W-SW of BU PRANG Airfield in the PHUOC LONG Province, Republic of Vietnam.

11 May 1966

SP4 Leslie Hereford (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal for military merit and for wounds receive in the Republic of Vietnam. (HQ, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, General Order Number 147; 27MAY1966)

11 May 1968

SGT Edward Walker (C/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from fragment wounds received while at command post when post came under hostile mortar attack in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

11 May 1969



SP4 Heinrich Ruhlmann (A/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from fragments while on a combat operation when an artillery round directed at a hostile force landed in the area in the KONTUM Province, Republic of Vietnam.

12 May 1968



SGT Robert M. Fletcher (C/1-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

12 May 1968



SGT John E. Laipple, (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds when hit by hostile small arms fire while on combat operation in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

12 May 1968



CPL Charles D. Dorman (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds when hit by hostile small arms fire while on combat operation in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

12 May 1968



SP4 Richard W. Van Blarcom (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds when hit by hostile small arms fire while on combat operation in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

12 May 1968



PFC Richard L. Lohse (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds when hit by hostile small arms fire while on combat operation in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.




12 May 1968



PFC Charles W. Harbert (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wounds when hit by hostile small arms fire while on combat operation in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

12 May 1969



SP4 Olen W. Smith (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from multiple fragmentation wounds while on combat operation when a hostile force was encountered in the QUANG NAM Province, Republic of Vietnam.

12 May 1969

SP4 Olen W. Smith (A/2-501 IN) was awarded the Good Conduct Medal (First Award) (Posthumously) for military merit from 21 May 1968 to 13 May 1969. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Orders Number 5136; 22 May 1969)

12 May 1969



CPL Richard L. Hopkins (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while at a defensive position when he was mistaken for a member of a hostile force in the QUANG NAM Province, Republic of Vietnam.



STRIKE HISTORY (Citation's and Awards):

06 May 1970



CPT James E. Mitchell (A/2-501 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal (1-OLC) for gallantry in action while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam on 6 May 1970. Captain Mitchell as company commander of Company A, 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 501st Infantry, during a coordinated indirect fire and sapper attack on Fire Support Base HENDERSON, Republic of Vietnam. Leaving the security of his company command post when the firebase came under an attack, Captain Mitchell moved to an exposed position to direct aerial rocket artillery fire on the enemy. Though he sustained a shrapnel wound in the head, he continued to direct aerial rocket artillery and engaged the advancing sappers with small arms fire. Captain Mitchell contributed greatly to the successful defense of the besieged firebase. Captain Mitchell's personal bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Orders Number 10080; 12 September 1970)

06 May 1970



1LT Lynwood Hargrave (A/2-501 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action while engaged in military operations involving conflicts with an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam on 6 May 1970. Lieutenant Hargrave distinguished himself while serving as platoon leader with Company A, 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 501st Infantry, during an attack on Fire Support Base HENDERSON, Republic of Vietnam. While under heavy assault from enemy mortar and sapper fire, Lieutenant Hargrave led his platoon in defending the perimeter. Aware of the gravity of the situation, Lieutenant Hargrave deployed his men into more effective fighting positions. Despite the heavy fire, Lieutenant Hargrave ran to the aid of several wounded comrades, pulling them to safety. While supplying his men with ammunition and directing their fire, Lieutenant Hargrave was seriously wounded. He continued to direct the counter attack and aid his wounded comrades until he lost consciousness and was medically evacuated from the area. Lieutenant Hargrave's personal bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Orders Number 10858; 12 September 1970)

06 May 1970



SGT Michael L. Antle (A/2-501 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal (Posthumously) for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam on 6 May 1970. Specialist Antle distinguished himself while serving as a rifleman in Company A, 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 501st Infantry, at Fire Support Base HENDERSON, Republic of Vietnam. The fire base came under a coordinated hostile mortar, rocket propelled grenade, and sapper attack. Noticing the enemy overrunning adjacent positions, Specialist Antle abandoned the safety of his foxhole to trap several insurgents in crossfire. While returning to his original position for additional ammunition, Specialist Antle was mortally wounded. His actions were instrumental in repulsing the sappers. Specialist Antle's personal bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Orders Number 6998; 20 June 1970)

06 May 1970

SSG Robert H. Nichol (A/2-501 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. Sergeant Nichol distinguished himself while serving as a platoon sergeant in Company A, 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 501st Infantry, during combat operations at Fire Support Base HENDERSON, Republic of Vietnam. When the firebase came under a coordinated mortar and sapper attack, the ammunition dump caught on fire, isolating a reconnaissance platoon from the rest of the company. Sergeant Nichol led his platoon to the area to reinforce the isolated element, and, despite the intense enemy fire and the danger of the munitions exploding, he administered first aid to the wounded and supervised their evacuation. Sergeant Nichol was instrumental in the medical treatment and evacuation of the wounded and the successful defense of the firebase. Sergeant Nichol's personal bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Orders Number 10882; 12 September 1970)

06 May 1970



SSG Kenneth L. Foutz (B/2-501 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal (Posthumously) for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam on 6 May 1970. SSG Foutz distinguished himself while serving as a squad leader in Company B, 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 502d Infantry, in the THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam. While on a combat operation, Sergeant Foutz's unit came under automatic weapons fire from several dispersed enemy positions. After deploying his men to suppress the hostile fire, Sergeant Foutz singlehandedly assaulted one of the enemy positions. Although he was mortally wounded, his actions served as an inspiration for his men. Sergeant Foutz's personal bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Orders Number 7009; 20 June 1970)

06 May 1970



SP4 George F. Banda (HHC/2-501 IN) the Bronze Star with Valor for heroism in ground combat against a hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam on 6 May 1970. Specialist Banda distinguished himself while serving as a medical aidman in the reconnaissance platoon of Company E, 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 501st Infantry, during combat operations southwest of QUANG TRI, Republic of Vietnam. Specialist Banda was helping secure Fire Support Base HENDERSON when an estimated North Vietnamese Army Battalion began to attack the firebase. The insurgents fought their way through the perimeter and spread throughout the firebase throwing satchel charges at the artillery and mortar positions and at defensive positions on the bunker line. Soon after the fighting began a man near Specialist Banda was badly wounded by an enemy satchel charge, and Specialist Banda moved through the intense hostile fire to the wounded man's position. One there, he spent many minutes exposed to the enemy fire treating and comforting the man. After moving the injured man to a safer place, Specialist Banda was himself wounded. In spite of his wound he continued to treat his wounded comrades. Only after all others had been evacuated did he allow himself to be treated. Specialist Banda's personal bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Order Number 8923; 10 August 1970)



06 May 1970



PFC Allen W. Pope (A/2-501 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with Valor for heroism in ground combat against a hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam on 6 May 1970. Private Pope distinguished himself while serving as a rifleman in Company A, 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 501st Infantry, defending Fire Support Base HENDERSON, Republic of Vietnam. During an intense mortar and sapper attack, a fire started at the ammunition's storage point and blocked access to a friendly beleaguered reconnaissance element. Subjecting himself to the exploding munitions, Private Pope maneuvered through the burning area to aid wounded comrades in the besieged sector. Despite the constant danger, Private Pope maneuvered from position to position, rendering medical aid and carrying the wounded personnel to an evacuation zone. Private Pope's personal bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Orders Number 10469; 03 September 1970)

06 May 1970



SGT Frank F. Lewis (A/2-501 IN) (than specialist) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with Valor (Posthumously) for heroism in ground combat against a hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam on 6 May 1970. Specialist Lewis distinguished himself while serving as a rifleman in Company A, 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 501st Infantry, defending Fire Support Base HENDERSON, Republic of Vietnam. When the fire base came under a coordinated mortar and sapper attack, several sappers penetrated the perimeter and advanced toward the command post bunker. Before Specialist Lewis was able to open fire, the insurgents took cover in a foxhole. Specialist Lewis left the security of his bunker and maneuvered under heavy fire to the enemy location. Although seriously wounded by a satchel charge, he crawled to the foxhole and destroyed the insurgents with a hand grenade. As he maneuvered back to his original position to help repel the attack, he was mortally wounded by enemy grenade fire. Specialist Lewis' personal bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Orders Number 7441; 29 June 1970)

07 May 1966



PFC Philip P. Jenkins (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal (Posthumously) for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. Private First Class Jenkins distinguished himself on 7 May 1966 during a search and destroy mission near the Cambodian border in the Republic of Vietnam. With keen alertness, Private First Class Jenkins detected a Viet Cong ambush consisting of at least ten insurgents armed with automatic weapons. Realizing that elements of his platoon were already in the killing zone, he exposed himself, shouted a warning to his comrades, and immediately delivered a heavy volume of fire on the insurgents. As a result, the Viet Cong concentrated all their firepower on him and his fellow soldiers reached cover. With complete disregard for his safety, Private First Class Jenkins assaulted the insurgents while receiving hostile fire. Although critically wounded about 15 feet from the Viet Cong position, he continued to place effective fire on the insurgents and killed two Viet Cong before he died. Inspired by the gallant actions of Private First Class Jenkins, his comrades assaulted the Viet Cong and forced them to disperse into the jungle. Private First Class Jenkins' extraordinary heroism in close combat against a hostile force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 4036; 21 June 1966)

07 May 1970



1LT David B. Land (B/1-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam on 7 May 1968. First Lieutenant Land distinguished himself while serving as a platoon leader on a combat Vietnam. While in a platoon size night ambush position the three-man listening, post became in danger of being overrun by a platoon sized enemy force. First Lieutenant Land moved to a forward position with two other volunteers, under enemy fire, and placed effective small arms fire on the enemy. He stayed at his forward position for nine hours until the listing post could be safely brought in. His action resulted in heavy enemy losses and was an inspiration to those who witnessed his bravery. First Lieutenant Land's personal bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st AIR CAV DIV; General Orders Number 4208; 31 July 1968)

08 May 1966

SGT Donald E. Bear (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. Sergeant Bear distinguished himself on 8 May 1966 during a search and destroy mission near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. While enroute to join the rest of the company, Sergeant Bear's platoon received intense hostile fire from a well-fortified Viet Cong force. After observing his platoon leader in a precarious position struggling to free himself from some tangled vines while directly in the line of hostile fire, Sergeant Bear charged and silenced a Viet Cong position. Although he was exposed to the Viet Cong fire, Sergeant Bear succeeded in reaching his platoon leader. Later while pursuing the withdrawing Viet Cong, his platoon ran into a second Viet Cong position. Acting as point man, Sergeant Bear began to reconnoiter the area by fire and forced the hidden insurgents to fire prematurely. Although wounded, SGT Bear continued to fire on the Viet Cong positions which were only 50 meters away. As a result, he prevented an ambush. Sergeant Bear's extraordinary heroism in close combat against a hostile force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 5002; 26 July 1966)

08 May 1966



SP4 Robert L. McCaig (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal (Posthumously) for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. Specialist Four McCaig distinguished himself on 8 May 1966 while serving as point man during a search and destroy mission along a narrow jungle trail near the Cambodian border in the Republic of Vietnam. With keen alertness, Specialist Four McCaig detected a Viet Cong ambush consisting of at least two machine guns and several individual positions. Specialist Four McCaig aggressively assaulted the first Viet Cong machine gun, firing from his hip, killing one insurgent and forcing the other crew members to flee. While charging the second machine gun, he was critically wounded. Although bleeding profusely, Specialist Four McCaig crawled toward the insurgent position firing his weapon until he died. His valiant actions disrupted the Viet Cong ambush and prevented numerous casualties. Specialist Four McCaig's devotion to duty and extraordinary heroism against a numerically superior hostile force were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 4040; 21 June 1966)



08 May 1966



PFC Stephen J. Steriti (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal (Posthumously) for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. Private First Class Steriti distinguished himself on 8 May 1966 while serving as point man during a search and destroy mission along a narrow jungle trail near the Cambodian border in the Republic of Vietnam. With keen alertness, Private First Class Steriti detected a Viet Cong ambush consisting of at least two machine guns and several individual positions. Private First Class Steriti aggressively assaulted the first Viet Cong machine gun, firing from his hip, killing one insurgent and forcing the other crew members to flee. While charging the second machine gun, he was critically wounded. Although bleeding profusely, Private First Class Steriti crawled toward the insurgent position firing his weapon until he died. His valiant actions disrupted the Viet Cong ambush and prevented numerous casualties. Private First Class Steriti's devotion to duty and extraordinary heroism against a numerically superior hostile force were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 4039; 21 June 1966)

09 May 1970



1LT Roy Lee Richardson (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (Posthumously) for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations involving conflict with an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam, while serving with Company A, 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. First Lieutenant Richardson distinguished himself by exceptionally valorous actions on 9 May 1970 while leading a platoon in search of suspected enemy positions near an allied fire support base. As the platoon advanced through the area of operations, they were suddenly ambushed by a well-concealed enemy force utilizing hand and rocket-propelled grenades. Lieutenant Richardson immediately began moving through the enemy fire to deploy his men into defensive positions and direct aerial rocket artillery on the hostile force. As the enemy fire intensified, the lieutenant moved forward to rescue a critically wounded comrade. Although under constant enemy attack, Lieutenant Richardson continuously maneuvered through the fusillade to place suppressive fire on the enemy while inspiring his men to sustain their defensive efforts. As the contact continued at an intense level, Lieutenant Richardson was mortally wounded by the hostile fire. First Lieutenant Richardson's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty, at the cost of his life, were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 4826; 14 October 1970)

09 May 1970



SP4 Edward Matyjasik Jr. (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with Valor for heroism in ground combat against a hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam on 9 May 1970. Specialist Matyjasik distinguished himself while serving as a radio-telephone operator in Company A, 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 502d Infantry, during a reconnaissance-in-force operation in THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam. While inspecting an area that was the target of an earlier air strike, Specialist Matyjasik's platoon came under hostile small arms, automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenade fire. When his platoon leader was critically wounded, Specialist Matyjasik immediately administered emergency treatment while continuing to monitor his radio. He relayed coordinating instructions to the elements of the platoon, enabling them to mount a counterattack. Specialist Matyjasik kept his superiors informed on the changing tactical situation and assisted in moving his wounded platoon leader through the enemy fire to a protected position. Specialist Matyjasik's personal bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Orders Number 9263; 13 August 1970)

10 May 1966

SP4 George N. Kirtley (HHC/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. Specialist Four Kirtley distinguished himself on 10 May 1966 while serving as a medic during a combat mission near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. When a platoon sustained numerous casualties during a vicious battle, Specialist Four Kirtley immediately ran through intense hostile fire to the aid of his comrades. Since he was unable to move the injured men, because of the intense Viet Cong fire, he moved from position to position on the fire swept battlefield and administered first aid. When the large Viet Cong force threatened to overrun his position, Specialist Four Kirtley delivered suppressive fire on the attacking insurgents. Although the Viet Cong maneuvered within fifteen meters of his position, he refused to abandon his stricken comrades. When the remainder of the platoon arrived, and sustained an additional casualty, Specialist Four Kirtley again exposed himself to the hostile fire to assist the injured man. Assured that all casualties had been treated, he then moved to the body of a dead comrade, defended his body, and denied the Viet Cong his equipment and weapon. Specialist Four Kirtley's extraordinary heroism in close combat against a numerically superior hostile force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 4934; 22 July 1966)

10 May 1966

SFC Lawrence N. Koontz (HHC/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. SFC Koontz distinguished himself on 10 May 1966 while serving as platoon sergeant on a combat operation near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. While moving toward their objective, the lead element of his platoon received intense hostile fire. Platoon Sergeant Koontz ran to the front of his platoon to reorganize his men. During the course of action, he dauntlessly exposed himself to direct Viet Cong fire while carrying a fallen comrade from the killing zone. Shortly after this, the Viet Cong launched a determined assault on his position. Braving almost certain death, Platoon Sergeant Koontz immediately charged the assaulting Viet Cong and killed three insurgents at extremely close range. Aggressively continuing his assault, Platoon Sergeant Koontz singlehandedly repelled the Viet Cong attack. After establishing a hasty defense, he personally led five men in an assault to expand the perimeter. The Viet Cong fire became more intense and Platoon Sergeant Koontz was seriously wounded. Although in great pain he refused medical attention and continued to direct his troops in their assault. Through his heroic efforts, Platoon Sergeant Koontz was most instrumental in routing the insurgents. His unimpeachable valor in close combat against a numerically superior Viet Cong force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 4591; 12 July 1966)



10 May 1966

SGT Richard M. Burt (HHC/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. Sergeant Burt distinguished himself on 10 May 1966 while serving as squad leader of a platoon on a combat operation near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. While moving toward their objective, Sergeant Burt's platoon received intense hostile fire and sustained two casualties. Unhesitatingly Sergeant Burt charged forward to assist in the extraction of his fallen comrades. As he attempted to evacuate a wounded man, the Viet Cong launched a determined assault on his position. Completely exposed Sergeant Burt concentrated a deadly volume of suppressive fire on the insurgents. He then successfully established and defended a small perimeter forward of the wounded men. While receiving intense hostile fire, he then organized his men and personally led them in an aggressive assault on the Viet Cong emplacements. Through his heroic efforts, Sergeant Burt was most instrumental in routing the insurgents. His unimpeachable valor in close combat against a numerically superior Viet Cong force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 4518; 8 July 1966)

10 May 1966

SGT Roy J. Roedel (HHC/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. Sergeant Roedel distinguished himself on 10 May 1966 while serving as a member of a platoon on a combat operation near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. While moving toward their objective, Sergeant Roedel's platoon received intense hostile fire and sustained several casualties. Dauntlessly, Sergeant Roedel charged through intense hostile fire and fought furiously to protect his fallen comrades. He overran and totally destroyed one Viet Cong position. During the course of action, Sergeant Roedel, with complete disregard for his safety, braved the deadly Viet Cong position. During the course of action, Sergeant Roedel, with complete disregard for his safety, braved the deadly Viet Cong fire as he helped carry his wounded platoon sergeant to safety. He then took charge of the embattled platoon, quickly organizing them into an effective fighting unit, and placed the squads in a position where they effectively engaged the insurgents. During the ensuing battle, Sergeant Roedel repeatedly exposed himself as he moved from position to position to redistribute ammunition. His impelling leadership and aggressive spirit contributed immeasurably to the success of the operation. Sergeant Roedel's unimpeachable valor in close combat against a numerically superior Viet Cong force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 4520; 8 July 1966)

10 May 1966

SGT Roy E. Romans (HHC/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. Sergeant Romans distinguished himself on 10 May 1966 while serving as squad leader of a platoon on a combat operation near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. While moving toward their objective, Sergeant Romans' platoon received intense hostile fire and sustained two casualties. Unhesitatingly Sergeant Romans charged forward to assist in the extraction of his fallen comrades. As he attempted to evacuate a wounded man, the Viet Cong launched a determined assault on his position. Completely exposed, Sergeant Romans concentrated a volume of suppressive fire on the insurgents. He then successfully established and defended a small perimeter forward of the wounded men. While receiving intense hostile fire, he then organized his men and personally led them in an aggressive assault on the Viet Cong emplacements. Through his heroic efforts, Sergeant Romans was most instrumental in routing the insurgents. His unimpeachable valor in close combat against a numerically superior Viet Cong force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 4519; 8 July 1966)

10 May 1966



CPT Walter R. Brown (HHC/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. Captain Brown distinguished himself on 10 May 1966 while leading a task force during a combat operation near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. While maneuvering to a rendezvous point in Viet Cong occupied territory, Captain Brown's lead element received intense hostile fire. Captain Brown immediately ran forward to direct the deployment of his men. As the battle continued, he exposed himself to the hostile fire to call the medics and his radio operator forward. When his radio operator moved to safety after being wounded, the radio was left in the open. Captain Brown ran into the clearing through the Viet Cong fire, secured the radio, and ran for cover. He then contacted his air support and skillfully directed air strike on the insurgent positions. As the Viet Cong assaulted to evade the air strikes, Captain Brown fearlessly charged into the attacking Viet Cong and forced them to withdraw. Through his courage and outstanding leadership, he contributed immeasurably to the defeat of the Viet Cong force. Captain Brown's extraordinary heroism in close combat against a numerically superior hostile force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 4899; 22 July 1966)



11 May 1966



2LT William F. Otto (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (Posthumously) for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam. ON 11 May 1966, Lieutenant Otto, a member of Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, was participating in a search and destroy mission when they captured a Viet Cong who revealed that a four-company ambush was set forward of the company along their axis of advance. To foil the ambush, Lieutenant Otto placed a point squad well to the front of his platoon that was the company's lead element. Approximately 0900 hours, Lieutenant Otto's platoon came intense small arms and automatic weapons fire from the front. Lieutenant Otto rushed forward, braving the insurgent fire to estimate the situation. He then placed two squads on line to assault the well-entrenched Viet Cong and again braved the hostile fire fearlessly moving along the assault line to direct his squad leaders. The platoon attempted an assault but was pinned down as the insurgents unleashed a devastating volume of fire. Lieutenant Otto called for artillery fire and airstrikes. With professional skill, he called artillery fire to within 30 meters of his position making a direct hit on a machine gun emplacement; however, this failed to destroy it. Realizing that the bunker must be destroyed. Lieutenant Otto again personally braved the fire and crawled to within 15 meters of the machine gun bunker. Disregarding the danger from other machine gun emplacements in the immediate area, he arose and threw a grenade into the bunker destroying the gun and crew. Being fully exposed so he could throw the grenade, another machine gun mortally wounded him. Lieutenants Otto's courage in actual combat served as an inspiration to his men and was instrumental in overcoming the hostile insurgents. Lieutenant Otto's extraordinary heroism and supreme sacrifice are in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Army and reflect great credit upon himself and the military service. (HQ, USARPAC; General Order Number 200; 25 August 1966)

11 May 1966



PFC Andrew C. Evans (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal (Posthumously) for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. PFC Evans distinguished himself on 11 May 1966 during a search and destroy operation near the Cambodian border in the Republic of Vietnam. Private First Class Evans was a member of the flank security when the leading element received intense fire from extremely close range. One man was seriously wounded by the initial volume of fire and fell in an open area. Private First Class Evans with complete disregard for his safety dashed into the open area and dragged the fallen trooper to safety. Since the platoon was unable to maneuver due to the intense hostile fire, Private First Class Evans aggressively assaulted a Viet Cong position. As he rushed through the dense vegetation firing from his hip, he killed on insurgent and wounded another before being mortally wounded himself. Following the superb and inspiring example set by Private First Class Evans, his comrades aggressively assaulted and overran the insurgent positions. Private First Class Evans' extraordinary heroism in close combat against a numerically superior hostile force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 4026; 21 June 1966)

11 May 1966

CPT Henrick O. Lunde (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal (1-OLC) for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. CPT Lunde distinguished himself on 11 May 1966 while serving as commanding officer of a task force on a search and destroy operation near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. While moving toward their objective, the lead elements received intense hostile fire from a large Viet Cong force. After determining the main line of resistance, Captain Lunde moved to the front of his force to enable him to better direct their retaliatory fire. Realizing that the insurgent positions overlapped his flanks, he committed a portion of his reserve force to the left flank. Although repeatedly exposed to intense hostile fire, he moved along his front line to better apprise himself of the situation on the right flank. During the course of action, a platoon leader was killed. Unhesitatingly, Captain Lunde moved through the bullet swept area to the platoon which was engaged in a vicious firefight. With complete disregard for his safety, he moved among his men, inspiring them and rallying them to defend their positions. He then returned to the center platoon and began to skillfully direct friendly air strikes and artillery fire. While moving forward by fire and movement, he continued to adjust artillery fire until he was within twenty-five meters of the bursting radius of the exploding rounds. After assuring himself that all his forces were in position, Captain Lunde directed and led a coordinated assault on all fronts against a well disciplined and entrenched Viet Cong force. Through his heroic efforts, the insurgents were routed. His extraordinary heroism in close combat against a numerically superior Viet Cong force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 5343; 11 May 1966)

11 May 1966

SSG Jose S. Laguana (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal (1-OLC) for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. SSG Laguana distinguished himself on 11 May 1966 while serving as a squad leader during a search and destroy mission near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. After moving approximately 1000 meters in Viet Cong occupied territory, Staff Sergeant Laguana's squad received intense hostile fire from an estimated platoon. Although exposed to intense Viet Cong fire, he organized his squad and directed suppressive fire on the insurgent positions. He then maneuvered up and down the assault line to encourage his men and supply them with ammunition. Staff Sergeant Laguana personally killed two Viet Cong during the engagement. Through his courage and outstanding leadership, he contributed immeasurably to the defeat of the Viet Cong force. Staff Sergeant Laguana's extraordinary heroism in close combat against a numerically superior hostile force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 5268; 8 August 1966)



11 May 1966



SFC Joseph W. Rounseville (C/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. SFC Rounseville distinguished himself on 11 May 1966 while serving as acting platoon leader during a search and destroy mission near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. While moving his platoon through dense jungle and into an assault position, Platoon Sergeant Rounseville received intense hostile fire. He immediately maneuvered his platoon up a hill against an estimated Viet Cong squad which was supported by a machine gun. Platoon Sergeant Rounseville repeatedly exposed himself to the hostile fire by moving along the assault line and directing his men. He then led his platoon forward while firing his weapon and throwing hand grenades. Platoon Sergeant Rounseville killed at least three Viet Cong, and his platoon completely routed the insurgents from their fortified positions. Through his courage and outstanding leadership, he contributed immeasurably to the success of the mission. Platoon Sergeant Rounseville's extraordinary heroism in close combat against a hostile force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 5270; 8 August 1966)

11 May 1966

1LT Karl L. Beach (C/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. 1LT Beach distinguished himself on 11 May 1966 while serving as executive officer flying overhead reconnaissance for his company which was conducting a search and destroy operation near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. At approximately 0900 hours, the company made contact with a large Viet Cong force. During the course of action, First Lieutenant Beach descended onto the battlefield by a rope which was attached to a medical evacuation helicopter. Immediately upon landing, First Lieutenant Beach began to organize and supervise the evacuation of the dead and wounded. After leading a detail forward to retrieve the casualties, First Lieutenant Beach braved hostile fire while carrying two fallen comrades to a covered position. After this he moved wounded personnel to a more secure area and provided ammunition resupply to the platoons. Throughout the day, First Lieutenant Beach moved throughout the battle area, while exposed to hostile fire and encouraged the engaged troopers. Through his courageous actions, he saved the lives of two wounded and contributed immeasurably in routing the insurgents. First Lieutenant Beach's extraordinary heroism in close combat against a numerically superior Viet Cong force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 5753; 20 September 1966)

11 May 1966

PFC Luis A. Aguila (C/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. PFC Aguila distinguished himself on 11 May 1966 during a search and destroy mission near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. As his unit was moving through the dense jungle, it suddenly received intense hostile fire from a well-entrenched Viet Cong force. Observing that an insurgent machine gun was hampering the assault, Private First Class Aguila maneuvered through the intense fire to a position approximately 30 meters from the Viet Cong emplacement. When one of his hand grenades fell short of the target, Private First Class Aguila moved even closer to the position, threw a second-hand grenade, destroyed the machine gun and killed the two Viet Cong defenders. Through his courage and determination, he contributed immeasurably to the defeat of the Viet Cong force. Private First Class Aguila's extraordinary heroism in close combat against a numerically superior hostile force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Orders Number 5288; 10 August 1966)

11 May 1966



SP4 Wayne M. Traylor (A/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal (Posthumously) for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam. SP4 Traylor distinguished himself on 11 May 1966 during a search and destroy mission near BU GIA Map, Republic of Vietnam. His platoon had maneuvered within 30 meters of a camouflaged and well-fortified Viet Cong force when they received intense hostile machine gun fire which effectively pinned them down. At this time, Specialist Four Traylor leaped to his feet, ran through a barrage of hostile fire, and assaulted the Viet Cong machine gun emplacement. He killed three insurgents before being seriously wounded himself. Bleeding profusely, he refused to seek cover or medical attention and placed suppressive fire on the Viet Cong until he died from his wounds. Specialist Four Traylor's extraordinary heroism in close combat against a hostile force was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, USARV; General Order Number 4035; 21 June 1966)

11 May 1968



MAJ Leonard Williams (HHC/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam on 11 May 1968, while serving as Battalion Surgeon for the 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 502nd Infantry. Major Williams was present at the tactical command post when they came under an intense 122mm rocket attack. As time first rockets hit and a cry for a medic rang out, Major Williams, with complete disregard for his own personal safety, rushed from his bunker and began moving toward the position of the wounded troops. In his haste to get to the wounded personnel, he completely disregarded his helmet and flack vest. Despite being knocked down several times by concussion from incoming rockets, Major Williams was able to reach the position and began treating the wounded. Throughout the attack Major Williams moved from position to position administering aid to the wounded troopers and dragging the more seriously wounded men to safety for further treatment. Though wounded while shielding the wounded personnel with his own body, Major Williams continued in his work. Never once showing concern for his own personal safety, he managed to treat all wounded men and pull them to cover. Major Williams' outstanding display of gallantry in action and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st AIR CAV DIV; General Orders Number 4204; 31 July 1968)



11 May 1968

SGT Grady L. Towns Jr. (D/2-501 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action in the Republic of Vietnam on 11 May 1968. Sergeant Towns distinguished himself while serving as a squad leader with Company D, 2d Battalion, 501st Infantry, near HUE, Republic of Vietnam. On the evening of the cited date, Sergeant Towns led a ten-man patrol from company's night defensive perimeter to set up an ambush along a well-used trail leading out of the mountains. After the patrol had been in position for approximately four hours, Sergeant Towns observed movement to his front and counted thirty North Vietnamese troops walking down the trail in file formation. Seeing that his men were already alerted, he waited until the last possible moment to allow a large number of the enemy to enter his killing zone. The ambush was initiated when one of the enemy discovered a Claymore mine and attempted to cut the wire. In the fighting which followed, Sergeant Towns remained in an unprotected position to direct the fire of his men against the numerically superior enemy force. When the enemy discovered the friendly ambush position, they maneuvered around to the flanks. Sergeant Towns immediately ordered his men to withdraw, while he remained behind under the increased volume of hostile fire to give counter fire for his element. Without regard for his own safety, he continued to fire upon the enemy until all of his men had safely withdrawn. Sergeant Towns' personal bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Orders Number 304; 3 April 1969)



ACRONYMS

ACAV: Armored Cavalry
AD: Americal Division
AD: Airborne Division (Would be after numeric numbers)
AO: Area of Operations
ARA: Aerial Rocket Artillery
ARCOM: Army Commendation Medal
ARVN: Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (also known as the South Vietnamese Army (SVA))
BDE: Brigade
BN: Battalion
BSM: Bronze Star Medal
BBT: Booby Traps
CA: Combat Assault
CANOPY: Heavily Wooded Terrain
CO: Company
CP: Command Post
DSC: Distinguished Service Cross
DZ: Drop Zone
FSB: Fire Support Base
HQ: Headquarters
IED: Improvised Explosive Device
IFFV: I Field Force Vietnam
IN: Infantry
KBA: Killed by Air or Artillery
KHA: Killed by Hostile Action
KIA: Killed in Action
KNHA: Killed by Non-Hostile Action
LZ: Helicopter Landing Zone
MI: Military Intelligence
MOH: Medal of Honor
MP: Military Police
NDP: Night Defensive Position
NVA: North Vietnamese Army
OBJ: Objective
OP: Observation Post
PAVN: People Army of Vietnam
POW: Prisoner of War
PF: Popular Forces
PZ: Helicopter Pick-up Zone
Recon Platoon: Reconnaissance Platoon
RIF: Reconnaissance in Force
RF: Regional Force
ROK: Republic of Korea
SA: Situational Awareness
SIGINT: Signal Intelligence
SSM: Silver Star Medal
STRIKE Force: 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry
SVA: South Vietnamese Army
TF: Task Force
TOC: Tactical Operations Center
USARV: United States Army Vietnam
USARPAC: United States Army Pacific
WIA: Wounded in Action
WHA: Wounded by Hostile Action
WNHA: Wounded by Non-Hostile Action
"V": Valor
VC: Viet Cong

