





January 27th – February 02nd, 2019

Issue: 138

Brief History of the 501st, 502nd and 2nd Brigade (101st ABN DIV)

The 502nd, or "five-oh-deuce", was activated July 1, 1941 at Fort Benning, Georgia as the 502nd parachute infantry battalion, as an experimental unit formed to test the doctrine and tactics of parachute assaults. The 502nd entered combat in World War II on June 6, 1944, by jumping into Normandy, with allied forces landing on D-Day and the Battle of Normandy. Between 1945 and 1964. A major reorganization took place on 3 February 1964, when the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne was activated at Fort Campbell, replacing the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 501st Infantry Regiment. The reorganization from the battle groups to brigades and battalions placed two battalions of the 502nd in different brigades of the 101st.

The 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry was in the 1st Brigade with 1-327th and 2-327th Infantry. Which deployed to Vietnam and arrived at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam on 29 July 1965, they were commanded by the most notable commander LTC Hank "The Gunfighter" Emerson.



The new 2nd Brigade's original organic battalions were the 1st and 2d Battalions, 501st Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry. December 1967 the 501st, 502nd and 2nd Brigade deployed by C-141 aircraft and arrived at Bien Hoa Airbase on 13 December 1967. Over the next five years, Soldiers of the "Ready to Go" Brigade participated in twelve campaigns, compiling of a distinguished combat record as well as an enviable reputation for success in the rehabilitation of a war-torn nation. The Brigade redeployed to Fort Campbell in April 1972.









During this week, in the span of 8 years since the 501st Infantry Regiment, 502nd Infantry Regiment and 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division deployed in support of the Vietnam War the following are from After Action Reports, Staff Duty Logs, and Personal Accounts. (* All items have been reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives.)

27 January –	
3 February 1968	From the 1 st CAV DIV journal of 26 January 1967: 2BDE became opcon 1 st ACD upon closure of 2BDE CP at LZ EL PASO at 1200H and assumed control of 1-501 IN BN. The 1-501 IN BN assisted in security of LZ EL PASO with three companies while its D/1-501 IN air assaulted to [an area outside the perimeter] and conducted operations in that vicinity. 2-501 IN BN closed LZ EL PASO at 1810H, OPCON to 2BDE, 101 st ABN"
	The 1-501 IN BN took over its sector of the perimeter that evening, and the 2-501 IN BN went into its position the afternoon of the 27 th . That day, A/1-501 IN and B/1-501 IN conducted company-sized heliborne assaults and extractions in areas near LZ EL PASO – seeking enemy contact in operations or six or seven hours' duration. The 1-502 IN BN, OPCON to the CAV's 1BDE, was on "base security" at LZs SHARON and BETTY, near QUANG TRI to the north.
	On 28 JAN, the 1 st CAV decided to move the 1-501 IN BN and our brigade CP to LZ JANE, south of LZ JANE, relieving the 1/5 CAV BN there. On 29 JAN, we were ordered to make this move the next day, a day earlier than planned. (We were lucky, if we had moved as planned, TET 1968 would have caught us at LZ EL PASO.) The 2-501 IN BN would join us at LZ JANE but meanwhile it would move to the CAV's new base at CAMP EVANS, to perform perimeter security.
	The 1-501 IN BN, A/1-321, and BDE HHC with our signal and MP platoons left LZ EL PASO by truck convoy in the early morning 30 January. They traveled through HUE and up Highway 1. SFC Timothy O'Connor of the 1-501 IN BN has written in his book, "Blood Brothers, "There were numerous villages along the way (It was TET, the Chinese New Year) and the people were having a good time. When we reached HAI LANG, we turned left and came to a large sized hill LZ JANE. Each company was assigned a sector of the perimeter. I called the platoon together and told them that 'Charlie is watching us so let's dig our bunkers deep.'"
	The massive NVA/VC countrywide offensive known as TET 1968 began that night, attacking Saigon, 36 of the RVN's 43 province capitals, 64 of its 242 district towns, and field positions throughout the countryside, including LZ JANE. From the brigade journal: "LZ JANE began receiving mortar & RPG fire at approximately 0405H (31 JAN) At 0427H, units reported enemy activity to their front, enemy tried to penetrate the 1-501 IN BN perimeter. By 0455H, elements reported all quiet. 1-501 IN BN had 6 WIA. 14 NVA KIA and 3 NVA POW, 11 individual weapons and 1 RPG-2 launcher captured. Negative further activity." The 1-501 IN BN had been ready. There was more to come.
	We were told that the 1-502 IN BN, securing LZs SHARON and BETTY, had not been attacked that night. It went immediately into action. On 1 February, A/1-502 IN, with a D/1-502 IN, platoon and the recon platoon, was sweeping the area between the two LZs, in a four-hour fire fight, supported by the CAV's gunships, it killed 35 and captured 2 NVA, captured an 82mm mortar, two .50-cal. and one light machine gun and many individual weapons. Four men had been killed, including A Co's commander, Captain Holland, and first sergeant. The 1-502 IN BN continued with sweeps and ambushes.
	The TET Offensive caught the 2-501 IN BN with its move to CAMP EVANS only partially completed and with the rest of the battalion yet to move because of poor flying weather, intensive enemy anti-aircraft fire, and low C-47 availability. (By LTG (then COL) John H. Cushman)
27 January 1967	Operation FARRAGUT: 2-502 IN BN conducted an overland move from PHANG RANG into the southern portion of the AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the NW. (HQ, 1BDE, 101 st ABN DIV; After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT)
27 January 1968	2-501 IN BN (2d BDE), went into its positions and that day A/1-501 IN and B/1-501 IN conducted company-sized heliborne assaults and extractions in areas near LZ EL PASO – seeking enemy contact in operations for six or seven-hour durations. The 1-502 IN OPCON to CAV's 1 st BDE was on "Base Security" at LZ's SHARON and BETTY, near QUANG TRI to the North.
27 – 31 January 1968	HHC/1-502 IN moved to LZ EL PASO by road convoy. This greatly reduced many of our logistical problems. LZ EL PASO came under 60mm mortar fire the morning of the 31 st . B/326 th MED BN, reported 4 killed in the action and 4 wounded in the action. Counter mortar fire engaged the enemy position with unknown results.
27 January 1969	Screaming Eagle offensive continued, with 11 enemy killed and one prisoner captured. The 2-502 IN BN killed six enemy while 1-327 IN BN troopers killed two enemy near FSB ANZIO. (Rendezvous with Destiny (Volume 2, Number 1); Spring 1968-69)







27 January 1969	Operation SHERMAN PEAK/Operation NEVADA EAGLE: A/1-502 IN conducted RIF operations from YD465003 to YD455992. At vicinity YD465003, A/1-502 IN, 1 st platoon found 1 8mm French Bolt action carbine. In the vicinity YD470998, A/1-502 IN found 43 bunkers, 3 kitchens (2 of which were underground), 1 latrine, 1 pick and 1 shovel. 5 of the bunkers were newly constructed with 4 old fire ashes in the kitchen. B/1-502 IN continued to provide security for FSB VEGHEL. C/1-502 IN conducted RIF operations. At YD559028, C/1-502 IN found fresh tracks of 3 persons. A search of the area produced negative results. D/1-502 IN conducted RIF operations from YD533038 to YD527037. At YD533038 the company found 1000 AK-47 rounds, 350lbs TNT, blasting caps, 100 Mauser rounds and a M60 MG in bad shape. At YD531038 they found 123 boxes of 12.7mm rounds. D/1-501 IN was located at FSB BASTOGNE. The company minus conducted RIF operations with an engineer party to YD800059 and returned to FSB BASTOGNE.
27 January 1969	At 1020H, elements of B/2-502 IN discovered 5 BC bodies buried in a small gravesite (YD858008) 14km south of PHU BAI. Three (3) of the dead appeared to have been killed within the week, 2 by artillery and the third by small arms fire. The causes of death of other 2 bodies could not be determined. Nearby, a cache of 144 rounds of 82mm was found. (III MAF Sig Event; TT 1201005028c.pdf, pg. 15)
27 January 1971	1-501 IN BN had a routine Medevac. One man had a cut on his face.
28 January 1967	Operation FARRAGUT: In two brief contacts, the 2-502 IN BN produced 4 VC KIA (BC) and 3 individual weapons captured. Documents captured as a result of this encounter indicated that the NVA forces were being used as fillers in local VC units. (HQ, 1BDE, 101 st ABN DIV; After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT)
28 January 1968	1 st CAV moved 1-501 IN BN and 2BDE CP to LZ JANE, relieving the 1-5 CAV BN there.
28 January 1968	At 1000H, D/2-501 IN, Forward Observer observed an unknown number of personnel carrying weapons vicinity 799143. A request to fire at that location was requested. At 1005H, D/2-501 IN sent a patrol to vicinity 799143 to determine activity at that location. At 1250H, D/2-501 IN reported a round landed to the left front and a couple of individuals were wounded.; 2BDE requested the amount of personnel evacuated and at 1321H it was reported to 2BDE that none of the personnel belonged to D/2-501 IN. At 2105H, B/2-501 IN spotted one individual to front, fired 2 M-79 rounds at 200 meters. At 2155H, B/2-501 IN, 2 nd platoon observed 2 personnel, approximately 500 meters fired M-79, two personnel turned and marched in the other direction away from B/2-501 IN elements. (HQ, 2-501 IN; Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log; 28 January 1968)
28 January 1968	Operation SAN ANGELO: A/2-502 IN while OPCON to 2-17 CAV vicinity YU104076 exhumed two graves resulting in 2 VC KIA. At vicinity YU122065 A/2-502 IN engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 NVA KIA and capturing 2 AK-47 assault rifles. (HQ, 2-502 IN: Operation SAN ANGELO, Combat After Action Report; 17 February 1968)
28 January 1969	Operation SHERMAN PEAK/Operation NEVADA EAGLE: A/1-502 IN conducted a RIF from YD470990 to YD456991. B/1-502 IN security at FSB VEGHEL. 2 nd platoon conducted a RIF with engineers along RF 547 and returned to FSB VEGHEL. At YD561045, B/1-502 IN, 2 nd platoon found 9 85mm rounds, 200 12.7mm rounds and 100lbs TNT. At YD559004, 2 nd platoon found 6 old bunkers, 7 destroyed enemy trucks (3/4-ton size) and the remains of a downed helicopter. C/1-502 IN conducted a RIF operation from YD555037 to YD530046. At YD550035 the company found footprints and followed them with negative results. D/1-502 IN conducted RIF operations from YD527037 to YD517045. At YD517045, the company found 4 hootches, 1 kitchen, 1 classroom with signs that read "Training Center" and "Attack Enemy", 3 small bunkers, 1 latrine and 1 lookout tower. D/1-501 IN provided security at FSB BASTOGNE. At 2230 hours, the company received automatic weapons fire from SW of FSB BASTOGNE form an estimated enemy force of 10. They also received RPG rounds. D/1-501 IN returned fire with small arms fire and artillery. There were no friendly casualties.
28 January 1969	Three contacts by 2-502 IN BN in the 1BDE operation were reported, with two enemy killed. The point man of C/2-502 IN engaged five VC, who fled leaving behind two weapons. Elsewhere in the AO, seven enemies were killed. (Rendezvous with Destiny (Volume 2, Number 1); Spring 1968-69)
28 January 1971	1-501 IN BN moved to FSB ARSENAL but due to bad weather only one half of the move was completed. A/1-501 IN OPCON to 1-502 IN BN.
29 January 1968	2BDE was ordered to make their move a day earlier than planned, if the 2BDE didn't move as planned they would've been at LZ EL PASO during the TET. The 2-501 IN BN would join the 2BDE at LZ JANE but meanwhile it would move to the CAV's new base at CAMP EVANS to perform perimeter security.







At 0715H, Helicopter 712 reports to C/2-501 IN location. At 0842H, pickup time for C/2-501 IN at 1700H confirmed by 2BDE, S3 Air. At 1125H, reported from 2BDE that 1-501 IN BN operation cancelled and 2-501 IN BN will conduct an airmobile operation commencing at approximately 1200H. At 1140H reported from battalion Forward Observer in front of D/2-501 IN observing personnel in 81mm impact area. At 1200H, S3 Air issued patrol order to 2-501 IN BN, Recon platoon. At 1220H, reported by battalion commander that Aircraft now estimated lift off in 5 minutes. At 1221H, reported from Aircraft that its airborne now, gunships will be up in a few minutes. At 1223H, battalion S1 reported battalion strength of the following:

HHC: 129 A: 137 B: 137 C: 138 D: 135

E: 114

At 1232H, S3 Air reported that takeoff time is 1235H. At 1237H, Chinook reported to S3 that they were holding over in HUE and will come in after LZ is declared green. At 1235H, 1st touchdown at LZ GREEN. At 1342H, Chinook down on LZ CHARLIE. At 1347H, last lift reported. At 1300H, Juliet departed D/2-501 IN location on recon patrol. At 1452H, C/2-501 IN reports finding evidence of movement in vicinity of 799109. At 1730H, D/2-501 IN report that is OP received sniper fire from valley to his front approximate azimuth 215. D/2-501 IN reported that the firing cam form vicinity 803152. Firing Artillery and was given ground clearance.

At 1740H, it was reported that the TET cease fire will be from 29 January at 1800H to 31 January at 0600H; during this period 1-501 IN BN and 2-501 IN BN will conduct short range platoon size defensive patrols and establish night ambush patrol; no H&Is will be fired during this period. Firing will be restricted to illumination and defensive fire when fire upon.

At 1753H, D/2-501 IN reported having one more round hit its front bunker left of its position. At 1750H, A/2-501 IN vicinity YD802171 observed 4 personnel; 1 carrying a weapon, dressed in gray uniform moving north. At 1757H, B/2-501 IN observed 5 personnel vicinity YD801171. 2 were carrying large caskets, 2 sandbags, 1 carrying nothing. Now a total of 13, moving on azimuth of 5500. At 1820H, D/2-501 IN, OP reports 5 personnel left from where the firing took place from previous incident.

At 1905H from COL Cushman: Only difference in rules of engagement during TET is that there will not be an HI. We do not have to be fired on before expending. If we have definite indication of attempted infiltration, i.e., trip flare or identified movement, then may engage with M-79. (HQ, 2-501 IN; Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log; 29 January 1968)

29 January 1968 HQ, 1st ACD reported 2000H that the government of South Vietnam in a public announcement has modified the TET cease fire. In I Corps and DMZ no stand down for military operations will be observed in addition airstrikes will continue against logistical complexes and movements every precaution in planning and execution authorized in military operations will be taken to ensure that safety for civilian populace is complete. (HQ, 2-501 IN BN; Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log; 29 January 1968)

29 January 1969 Operation SHERMAN PEAK/Operation NEVADA EAGLE: A/1-502 IN conducted RIF operations in the vicinity YD4599. B/1-502 IN conducted RIF operations in the vicinity of FSB VEGHEL. In vicinity YD529036, 2nd platoon found an old bunker complex with commo wire running throughout it. At YD554046, 1st platoon found an abandoned ammunition cache containing 240 7.62mm rounds, one 75mm HE round, 500 rounds of 25mm AA-ammunition, 12 – 60mm mortar fuses, 3 – 75mm fuses, 400 empty Russian rocket boxes, 300 – 60mm cases, 300 – 82mm cases, 50 – 82mm fuse cans, 15 aiming points, 25 – 55 gal. fuel drums. Also, they found 50 heavy bunkers, 150 fighting bunkers, tracks from wheeled and tracked vehicles, a strip of corduroy road, and 10 ammo dumps. C/1-502 IN and D/1-502 IN conducted RIF operations. D/1-501 IN continued to provide security for FSB BASTOGNE.

29 January 1969 STRIKE FORCE (2-502 IN BN) troopers accounted for three enemy killed near FSB QUICK II. Near PHAN THIET, 3-506 IN BN paratroopers killed three VC. (Rendezvous with Destiny (Volume 2, Number 1); Spring 1969-69)

29 January 1971 1-501 IN BN move to FSB ARSENAL was completed. C/1-501 IN vicinity YD775035 discovered one spider hole. Negative recent enemy activity.

- 30 January 1967 **Operation FARRAGUT:** 1-327 IN BN and 2-502 IN BN extracted from the FARRAGUT AO to PHAN RANG and prepared to initiate Operation GATLING I in LAM DONG province, while the 2-327 IN BN continued Operation FARRAGUT. The movement of the 2-502 IN BN from field locations to PHAN RANG deserves comment in that a heliborne extraction of one infantry battalion was accomplished during the hours of darkness. Seven separate PZ's were utilized to extract 448 troops between 1847H and 2115H. (HQ, 1BDE, 101st ABN DIV; After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT)
- 30 January 1968 **TET Offensive of 1968**: The outbreak of the TET Offensive, the 2BDE continued to move north and joined the heavy fighting in the battle for QUANG TRI with the 1CAV. After QUANG TRI was cleared, the 2BDE and the 1CAV moved south to set up blocking forces in the countryside around HUE, while US Marines and ARVN forces fought to retake the city from the NVA. The 2BDE cleaned out pockets of enemy resistance between HUE and QUANG TRI and intercepted NVA units attempting to reinforce the former Imperial City.







30 – 31 January 1968	1-501 IN BN, A/1-321, and HHC 2BDE, Signal, and MP platoons left LZ EL PASO by truck convoy in the early morning. They traveled through HUE and up HWY-1. SFC Timothy O'Connor of 1-501 IN BN wrote in his book, "Blood Brother, there were numerous villages along the way (It was TET, the Chinese New Year) and the peoplewere having a good time. When we reached HAI LANG, we turned leftand came to a large sized hillLZ JANE. Each company was assigned a sector of the perimeter. I called the platoon together and told them that 'Charlie is watching us so let's dig our bunkers deep."
	The massive NVA/VC countrywide offensive known as TET 1968 began tonight.
	Combined North Vietnamese Army and VC forces attack Saigon, 36 of 43 provincial capitals, and 64 district capitals to begin the Tet Offensive. From the brigade journal:
	 0405H: 1-501: A/1-501 IN receiving 3 incoming mortar rounds, C/1-501 IN receiving small arms fire. 0410H: 1-501: E/1-501 IN reports incoming mortar rounds. 0412H: 1-501: D/1-501 IN reports 4 incoming mortar rounds, 4 WIA, one machine gun position took a hit. 0415H: 1-501: C/1-501 IN reports 1 enemy KIA 0440H: 1-501: C/1-501 IN reports 11 enemy KIA, all carrying demolition kits. 0455H: 1-501: D/1-501 IN reports 2 enemy KIA, C/1-501 IN reports 12 enemy KIA total 0540H: 1-501: D/1-501 IN estimates having received 20 rounds of RPG-2 fire; A/1-501 IN estimates 4 rounds of PRG fire; C/1-501 IN spotted enemy in the wire, set of claymores and observed 3 secondary explosions presumably from satchel charges. As a result of these explosions and small arms fire, C/1-501 IN reports 12 VC KIA and 2 VC WIA POW and D/1-501 IN reports 2 VC KIA.
	Information was passed down that 1-502 IN BN, securing LZ SHARON and LZ BETTY had not been attacked this night.
30 January 1968	Proposed location at CAMP EVANS for 2-501 IN BN vicinity YD809162. At 0822H, 2-501 IN BN, Recon platoon commenced movement at this time, crossed SP. On 09 September at 0505H, 1-501 IN BN crossed SP, cleared 1 st AIR CAV DIV SP at 0912H. At 0917H, 2-501 IN BN, Recon platoon at CP1. At 1037H, 2-501 IN BN, Recon 6 at CP2. At 1101H, 2-501 IN BN Recon 5 at CP2. At 1145H, Recon 5 & 6 at YD785152. At 1255H, 1-501 IN BN on coming convoy hit mine vicinity YD488367. At 1321H, 2-501 IN BN, Recon 5 at CP3. At 1412H, 2-501 IN BN, Recon 6 closed BN CP. At 1445H, 2-501 IN BN, Recon 5 closed BN CP. At 1505H, CPT Justice reported 1 2 ½ ton truck broke down at CP2, need wrecker, make coordination with MP's and wrecker, this was done at 1615H call from CPT Justice later, do not send wrecker, one is coming from CAMP EVANS. At 1925H, 1-501 IN BN was notified that they are to provide platoon size element to assist C/326 ENG platoon sweep the access road to HWY-1 from LZ JANE commencing 0730H, 31 January and strong point the road until 1800H, 31 January. At 2335H 1-501 IN BN reported firing 8-12 rounds of M-79 at a target. Negative results reported. Firing occurred at 2315-2325H.
	2BDE (1), 101 st ABN DIV began displacement of select units from LZ EL PASO to LZ JANE during this reporting period in support of FRAG ODER 2 to OPORD 5-68 published on 29 January. Elements of HHC and 1-501 IN BN comprised the initial convoy. No significant incidents occurred enroute except to note the road contained numerous convoys traveling both north and south causing many delays during movement. The BDE CP was operation in the new location at 1824H. 1-501 IN BN was assigned the primary mission of security for the FOB. 2-501 IN BN remained at LZ EL PASO with the responsibility for security of units remaining at the location; TF 1-502 IN BN remains under the OPCON of 1BDE, 1 st ACD; the majority of TF support units are at HUE-PHU BAI airbase under the command of BDE XO – additional units are still arriving from CHU CHI. The BDE TF is deployed along a NW-SE line from vicinity QUANG TRI to HUE-PHU BAI a distance of approximately 70km.
	(HQ, 2BDE, 101 st ABN DIV; Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log; vicinity QUANG TRI (YD377430); 30JAN1968)
30 January 1969	Operation SHERMAN PEAK/Operation NEVADA EAGLE: A/1-502 IN conducted a RIF form YD457995 to YD460002. At YD460000, 3 rd platoon found 9 old bunkers, at YD458002 they found 17 old bunkers and at YD458997 found 6 old bunkers. At vicinity YD458997, 1 st platoon found 2 small bunkers and at YD450002, 3 rd platoon found 2 bunkers with 101lbs TNT and 200 electric blasting caps. B/1-502 IN provided security for FSB VEGHEL and conducted RIF operations in the vicinity. At YD554047, 1 st platoon found 2 75mm rounds in box and metal canister. At vicinity YD531041, 3 rd platoon found 3 bunkers containing 10 sealed cases of 12.7mm ammunition. C/1-502 IN conducted RIF operations. At YD536061, C/1-502 IN found 3 60mm rounds. At YD542067, C/1-502 IN found old bunkers and 2 82mm rounds. D/1-502 IN conducted RIF operations in the vicinity of YD5006. Recon platoon was OPCON to A/1-502 IN. At YD42008, Recon found 18 small foxholes, 1 bunker, 1 pick and 2 NVA shovels. D/1-501 IN continued to provide security for FSB BASTOGNE and conducted squad size patrols around FSB BASTOGNE.
31 January 1966	Personal Account of VC Snatch on Mountain during TET Ceasefire TUY HOA, Vietnam; by George R. Basset (E-4) Fire Team Leader & Point Man; B/2-502 IN, 1 st platoon, 2 nd Squad, 101 st ABN DIV. I will relate my participation in an event that took place at TUY HOA, Vietnam on January 31, 1966 (TET – Chinese New Year) 3 Day cease fire:
	A 3-day cease fire was agreed to for the Chinese New Year, Jan. 1966. We were in TUY HOA, PHU YEN Province, VN, a combination of rice paddies and very tall mountains. There were six or seven of us in our squad led by our Squad Leader, Sgt. Estevan "Chico" Alvarado.
	Our company had set up a temporary fire support base and squad sized patrols were dispatched to selected locations to observe any enemy activity during the cease fire. We were tasked to patrol 13,000 meters to a very prominent mountain and then go to the top of it and observe the vast paddy areas below us for the next three days. We covered the distance to the mountain, I was the point man as I usually was. We carried our own radio that day. After a very difficult and exhaustive climb we approached the summit of the thickly jungled mountain, the wind was howling, and the top was so







steep that we had to climb it on all fours. When almost to the top, I stopped movement and listened as I thought that I could hear bits of the Vietnamese language being spoken thru the howling wind, heard it several times. Chico crawled up to my position on point to see why I had stopped the patrol and we both listened, but I heard nothing more and decided to continue, we were only about 30 meters from the top. When we gained the top, it was bald solid rock, and you could see 50 miles in some directions. It was an ideal observation post for us, and it proved to be so for the VC as well. I found a Viet cigarette that had been put out in a crease in the rock, it smelled very fresh with no morning dew stains. We realized that somebody had been up there as we had approached the top but did not feel that we had been compromised. We were placed by Chico in two-man positions. The mountain top was very small and had a vertical drop of about 30ft. where my partner and I were assigned to observe from. There was a ledge about 3 ft. wide and about 10 ft. from the top that we crept out onto and both sat down where it petered out with our backs to the rock face. We were below the crest, blended in with the rock even though we were sitting out in the open with no cover, our feet dangling over the edge. We had a fantastic view of open rice paddies for miles below us. We had not sat there on that dead-end ledge for long when we realized that we had screwed up really bad. We heard approaching voices below us not very far away and they were getting louder fast, we didn't have time to get off that dead end ledge where we were sitting in plain sight. A minute later, with our rifles at the ready, from immediately below us, close enough to throw a rock, we observed a VC carrying a satchel and behind him a woman with a large tray of food held above her head with one hand and a third VC who appeared to be also unarmed. We both fired and hit the first VC, throwing him back into the woman, knocking her and the tray into the rocks. The third man disappeared back from the direction they had come from, and then reappeared with a grenade in his hand cocked above his head. We shot him and dismounted from the ledge and went and grabbed the woman who was uninjured. I held up the first VC and my buddy took my picture with him blowing bubbles from the holes in the front of his black shirt. Just then we heard what sounded like military commands being shouted in Vietnamese from not far below us. Chico appeared and told us to grab the girl and haul ass. She had long black hair, I wrapped it around my hand, and we ran down the side of the mountain as fast as we could, me dragging the girl and none of us worrying about caution and noise discipline. The girl shed her shoes in an effort to slow us down, when she lost her footing, I dragged her along until she regained it. We could hear the VC shouting behind us. Chico radioed our fire base for a fire mission, and they walked artillery on our back trail, giving us the opportunity to gain some ground on them. Soon we heard no more shouting and stopped to catch our breath before our lungs burst. The girl indicated to me that she had to putty. I still had hold of her hair, knowing better than to release my grip. If she got away, we had no time to look for her, if they had gotten close enough to us that she became a liability and was slowing us too much, I would have had to shoot her. Wouldn't have felt good about it-but that really didn't matter. We made it back to the fire base with no further scares. She was turned over to ARVN. Word came back to us that she said that we grabbed her from her village, but she couldn't explain the satchel that we grabbed from the first VC which had some loose carbine ammo in it and some pay records, no money. The contents of the satchel were all in Viet and we had no clue what they were until the interpreter at the fire base translated them. We didn't even get an "Atta Boy" out of that. Those cease fires were all rear echelon crap. The arty didn't shoot and the planes didn't bomb, but out in Indian country, when you bumped into them, the small arms war went on. They used these cease fires to openly transport supplies. If it had not been for the cease fire we would not have been sent so far to patrol and observe from our fire base, 13,000 meters. If we had been engaged, I suspect that we would still be there. If we had suffered a WIA we would have had some very difficult decisions to make and not much time to make them. AS AN ASIDE: When it was safe, and we had stopped to catch our breath, the girl indicated to me that she had to go to the bathroom and motioned to a spot some feet away. I pointed to spot a couple feet in front of me, close enough that I could reach out and grab her if need be and I pointed my rifle at her and indicated to her that I would shoot her if she tried to get away. She took a crap there, I reached into my shirt pocket and passed her a small packet of c-ration toilet paper. She opened it and looked it all over and then put it in her pocket, then reached over and selected a moss-covered rock and wiped on that. I did turn my head but not to the point that she dared to try to get away. We summarized that the three VC were on the mountain top observing as we were going to do, and that their unit was encamped a short way down the mountain and as we approached the top they left the mountain top to get food and were returning to their post on the mountain top with it (the tray), not suspecting that we had occupied the top in their absence. Suspect they got a little complacent and left their weapons at their base camp. As a result of the intelligence gained from the VC female, a week later we over ran a VC hospital complex. The labels on most of the bottles of medicine indicated that they were made in the U.S. and W. Germany. There was also a supply of inflatable splints that were made in Flint, Michigan. Our medic told me that the inflatable splints were so new that the U.S. Military did not have any in country at that time.

31 January – 01 February 1968

At 0300H, the VC/NVA launched their TET offensive. During the early hours of the battle, a VC Sapper platoon breached the court-yard wall, placing a significant threat on the American Embassy, Saigon. A Ready Reaction Force from C/1-502 IN was directed to conduct an air mobile assault to the roof top of the Embassy building, and to clear and secure the Embassy and surrounding area. After two attempts, the assault force was able to land on the HOT LZ at 0834H on 1 February. In less than 1 hour, the Embassy and surrounding area had been secured. The action resulted in 9 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's credited to the 101st ABN Troopers. There was one US casualty, a door gunner on one of the assault helicopters was wounded by SA fire. (Operational Report – Lessons Learned, HQ, 101st Air Cavalry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1968)







A platoon from C/1-502 IN conducts a combat air assault onto the roof of the US Embassy in Saigon in order to retake the embassy if it fell to the VC Sappers. Upon landing, they reinforced the beleaguered MPs and Marines guards who had been battling the enemy attack.



31 January 1968

B/2-501 IN had elements sent out to check LP with negative contact. They must have passed the LP on the way out and on return the LP threw 2 hand grenades wounding a couple of Soldiers lightly. Soldiers sent back to be checked for shrapnel. Both individual's wounded have been evacuated to be checked and classified very lightly wounded by company aidman.

2-501 IN BN reported at 0355H approximately 10 incoming rounds, 4.2 platoon reports 2 casualties. Medic B/2-501 IN reported 2 killed, 3 wounded; wounded personnel situation unknown. 4.2 platoon reported 3 wounded, dust off not needed at this time. B/2-501 IN, Medic reported 4 KIA, 5 WIA extent not known. E/2-501 IN reported at 0410H 1 lightly WIA with AF 2 lightly WIA. B/326th Med reported at 0415H 5 WIA, 4 KIA. 326th Engineer reported at 0420H 2 lightly WIA. One AF being treated by medic will be evacuated to hospital. B/326th Medic confirmed at 0432H casualty count as 4 KIA, 4 WIA. C/2-501 IN reported at 0510H receiving 10 rounds of M-79.

Marines report that VC are in the village at 795195. Artillery was called in. Marines report enemy at coordinates 905116, 900122 and 912116. At 0940H, Marines reports 600 VC at coordinates 900122, 905119 and 912116; 100 VC at 805196, requesting gunship to standby. At 1015H, reports of 200 VC at coordinates 820178 heading toward main compound

B/2-501 IN reported at 1040H small arms firing approximately 1000 meter to their front in vicinity of 200 VC reported area. Stakeout reported 200 VC at 809186. C/2-501 IN reported two personnel at 814165 in grave area. At 1319H A/2-501 IN reported on man slightly wounded form an apparent spent 7.62 round. At 1332H, B/2-501 reported 2 personnel in black with weapons vicinity YD809179. Taken under fire continued to observe movement north. B/2-501 IN reported at 1340H receiving SA fire from 809179.

A/2-501 IN reported chopper being fired on coordinates 785185 at 1432H; Reported at 1506H location of hill from which chopper "clipper 566" was fire on vicinity YD785175 from A/2-501 IN, Commander. BDE S3 want undulator ready for hook lifts to JANE; Griffin 68G reported chopper on ground at 753209; India given ground clearance for vicinity 785175 – A/2-501 IN patrolling. D/2-501 IN patrol at 815150 (Tiger 1 and 779175 (Tiger 2). Maj N returned from search for Clipper 566 with negative results. BDE S3 reported No FAC available, all up directing strike now. S5 departed in H-23 to look for Clipper 566. A/2-501 IN returned to company position, D/2-501 IN reports group personnel at 767137.

At 1915H, reported from S5, checked in hospital - SSG Zeigler is KIA and CPT Lay is WIA. (HQ, 2-501 IN BN; Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log; 31 January 1968)

31 January 1969 **Operation SHERMAN PEAK/Operation NEVADA EAGLE:** A/1-502 IN continued with RIF operations. At YD456016, A/1-502 IN, 2nd platoon found bombed out AA gun position containing 4 12.7mm rounds. B/1-502 provided security at FSB VEGHEL. 2nd platoon and 3rd platoon conducted RIF operations vicinity YD545048, 2nd platoon found 600 rounds of M60 ammunition, 2 60mm rounds and 1 CS gas grenade. C/1-502 IN and D/1-502 IN conducted RIF operations with negative results. Recon platoon was OPCON to A/1-502 IN. Recon found 3 55gal drums of gasoline with Russian lettering. D/1-502 IN continued to provide security for FSB BASTOGNE and conducted a mine sweep to FSB BIRMINGHAM.

31 January 1970 FSB BIRMINGHAM was hit by 5 mortar rounds. A/1-502 IN, 1st platoon was on a night move in the piedmont area SE of FSB BIRMINGHAM and observed this plus a fire fight several KM west of FSB BIRMINGHAM and East of FSB BASTOGNE.









01 February 1966	Operation VAN BUREN: 2-502 IN BN conducted Recondo patrols and prepared for operations to the South to protect the rice harvest in the SONG DA RANG River Valley. The 2-502 IN BN, Recondo platoon returned form TUY AN to the battalion base. 2-502 IN BN conducted a heliborne assault on LZ RED CQ075535 and LZ BLUE CQ055332 on 02 February at 1055H. Later in the day a Wire Laying Party, secured by the Recondo platoon was ambushed by an estimated VC platoon vicinity CQ085355 at 1330H. B/2-502 IN (-) flanked the VC force from the East and a vicious fire fight ensued. Three (3) air strikes, artillery fire and 4.2" mortar fire supported the operation. The operation terminated at 1900H with friendly losses of 1 KIA and 19 WIA. Enemy losses were 16 VC KIA (BC), 17 VC KIA (EST), 1 VCS and 2 weapons captured. At 1900H the 2-502 IN BN conducted Recondo patrols vicinity CQ059303 and accounted for 2 VC KIA (BC), 9 VC KIA (EST), 1 VCS and 2 weapons captured. Friendly losses were 1 KIA and 3 WIA. (HQ, 2-502 IN; Operation Van Buren, After Action Report 150600H January 1966 – 201200 February 1966)
01 – 04 February 1967	Operation GATLING I: 1BDE minus 2-327 IN BN commenced Operation GATLING I in LAM DONG Province northwest of BAO LOC by conducting an airmobile raid following a B-52 strike on a suspected high level enemy conference near TAN DJIRAN, YT990865. 2-502 IN BN initiated airmobile assaults from PHAN THIET at 0919H with a task force consisting of A/2-502 IN, B/2-502 IN HHC/2-502 IN (-). C/2-502 IN and the remainder of HHC/2-502 IN arriving by C-130, conducted an airmobile assault from BAO LOC and by 1400H the 2-502 IN BN had completed the block and had begun moving west on multiple axes.
	During the period of 01-03 February 1-327 IN BN, 2-502 IN BN and attached units conducted a thorough search of the objective area with negative results. No evidence was found that would substantiate the presence of enemy headquarters in the area. 2-502 IN BN extracted from the AO and closed on BAO LOC airstrip on 04 February at 1000H. (HQ, 1BDE, After Action Report; Operation GATLING I and II; March 1967)
01 – 15 February 1967	Operation GATLING: Location: BAO LOC, PHAN THIET, TAN RAI, TAN DJIRAN, LZ MARY, LZ JANE, LZ PEG, LZ LIZ, LZ SHIRLEY, LZ LUCKY STRIKE, LAM DONG, BINH TUY and BINH THUAN Provinces.
	 Type: search and destroy. Controlling headquarters: 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. Task organization: 1-327 IN, 2-502 IN, 2-7 CAV (-) (5-15 Feb), Co B, 5th SFGA (1-4 Feb), 2-320 ARTY (-), B/1-30 ARTY, A/326 ENG (-). Intelligence: Headquarters MR 6. Execution: Operation GATLING was conceived as a raid against the suspected meeting place of the enemy's Military Region 6 Headquarters northwest of BAO LOC in LAM DONG Province. During phase I (1-4 Feb), the brigade minus was extracted from the FARRAGUT AO and moved secretly to BAO LOC and PHAN THIET. On 1 Feb, following a B-52 strike on a suspected high level enemy conference near TAN DJIRAN 12 km northwest of BAO LOC, 1-327 air-assault ted into LZ MARY, followed by 2-502 IN BN air assaulting into blocking positions near LZ JANE. MIKE Forces from TAN RAI were also inserted into LZs PEG, LIZ and SHIRLEY to complete the trap while a company from 2-7 CAV was moved to BAO LOC to serve as the brigade reaction force. During the following days, the units conducted a thorough search of the objective area but found no sign of the presence of an enemy headquarters and the battalions were extracted back to BAO LOC. Phase II (5-15 Feb) began on 5 Feb with the brigade air assaulting into the suspected location of the MR6 Headquarters northwest of PHAN THIET on the border between BINH TUY and BINH THUAN Provinces. 2-7 CAV (-) became opcon to the brigade and air-assaulted from the BYRD AO into LZ LUCKY STRIKE. Once again, contact was minimal and on 8 Feb all units terminated offensive operations in observance of the TET cease fire. On 12 Feb, aggressive search and destroy operations were resumed until 15 Feb when all elements were extracted from the AO to PHAN THIET. Results: 19 enemy killed, 6 captured, 19 detained, 5 US KIA, 21 US WIA, 2 ARVN KIA, 11 ARVN WIA. (Vietnam Combat Operations; A chronology of Allied combat operations in Vietnam 1967; Stephane Moutin-Luyat - 2011)
01 – 02 February 1968	1-501 IN BN had operated out of LZ JANE to relieve the ARVN district chief at his compound at HAI LANG. During the afternoon of 02 February, the CG, 1 st CAV DIV, MG Tolson, had told COL Cushman that the next day that there BDE would move the BDE's command post to CAMP EVANS and take command of the 2-501 IN BN, which was still split between HUE-PHU BAI and CAMP EVANS, and that they would leave the 1-501 IN at LZ JANE to be OPCON to the CAV's 1 st BDE. (By LTG (then COL) John H. Cushman)
01 February 1968	At 0014H, B/2-501 IN was engaged with 5-6 VC with M-79 vicinity YD802178 with negative results. At 0350H, Vodka 1 at PHU BAI Airstrip reported that a ground attack at 2400H from the north and north-east and a mortar attack at 0200H that lasted approximately 25 minutes. Vodka 1 reported no casualties among Vodka or Shark personnel in the area, and the airstrip is still serviceable. At 0405H, Vodka 1 called 2-501 IN BN, saying that PHU BAI Airstrip is again receiving very heavy Rocket and Mortar fire. Casualties and damage at this time unknown. At 0420H, Stake-Out reports radio station at 713198 under attack by VC company; no further details. CPT Madsen reported that there are no casualties in his are from all the 2BDE units there belonging to Shark and the shelling has ceased from PHU BAI. At 0542H, D/2-501 IN received automatic fire form their left flank, at a range of 400 meters, azimuth 2000m, returned fire and enemy broke contact. At 1015H, 2BDE Commander informed 2-501 IN BN to prepare all airmobile elements to move on order to location and time to be announced; other elements to move to PHU BAI by road and placed under control of 2BDE XO. Mission to be announced later.

At 1715H, C/2-501 IN received approximately 3 round mortar; 3 US WIA: 1 from C/2-501 IN, 1 from D/2-501 IN and 1 from unknown unit, all medevaced. Reported at a delayed entry at 1805H 1 KIA from 1st CAV DIV (PFC Thomas M Martich). (2-501 IN BN; Daily Staff Journal Entry; 01 February 1968)







01 February 1968	A/1-502 IN and D/1-502 IN platoon and the recon platoon, was sweeping the area between LZ SHARON and LZ BETTY who were engaged in a four-hour fire fight, supported by the CAV's gunships, killing 35 and captured 2 NVA, captured an 82-mm mortar, two .50cal, and one light machine gun and many individual weapons. Four (4) US Soldiers were killed, including A/1-502 IN commander, CPT Holland, and there 1SG. 1-502 IN BN continued with the sweeps and ambushes. The TET Offense caught the 2-501 IN BN with its move to CAMP EVANS only partially completed and with the rest of the Battalion yet to move due to poor flying weather, intensive enemy anti-aircraft fire, and low C-47 availability.
01 February 1968	B/2-501 IN was engaged M-79 with 5-6 VC in vicinity YD802178 with unknown results. D/2-501 IN had a tripped flare, fired M-79 in area, unknow results. D/2-501 IN received automatic fire from their flank at a range of 400-meters, azimuth 200-mils; returned fire, enemy broke contact. D/2-501 IN received additional sniper fire on their left flank, returned fire; individual was found dead at 811147 and no weapon found.
	2BDE informed 2-501 IN BN to prepare airmobile elements to move on order to location and at time to be announced. Other elements to move to PHU BAI by road and placed under control of 2BDE XO. Mission to be announced. Non- airmobile units (Arty; HHC, 2BDE, Bravo Medics, MPs and 326 Engineers) convoyed to PHU BAI and closed at 1622H.
	At 1715H, C/2-501 IN received 3 rounds of mortar fire. Sustained casualties as follows: One (1) critical (326 Eng); 1 -C/2- 501 and 1 D/2-501 IN medevaced. Updated reports at 1805H reported that C/2-501 IN wounded was KIA from 1 st CAV. (HQ, 2-501 IN BN, 101 st ABN DIV; Daily Staff Journal Entry; 01 February 1968)
01 February 1968	By noon on 1 February, QUANG TRI City had been cleared of the enemy and the 1BDE immediately initiated pursuit. A/1- 502 IN made a heavy contact just south of QUANG TRI killing 76 of the enemy with the help of aerial rocket artillery. Other units of the 1BDE made numerous smaller contacts throughout the day as the brigade elements moved out in ever- increasing concentric circles around the city.
01 February 1968	At 0200H, PHU BAI was under mortar attack that lasted 20-25 minutes, they also were under ground attack from the North and North East, the airstrip was not damaged and is still operational. Sporadic rounds are still being received. (HQ, 2BDE, 101 st ABN DIV; Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officers Log; 1FEB1968)
01 February 1968	Operation SAN ANGELO: A/2-502 IN conducted a recon in force in AO Mary west of SONG BE. At 1230H, vicinity YU120164 they engaged 3 VC on a trail resulting in 1 VC KA and capturing 1 AK-47 assault rifle. At 1427H, vicinity YU116055, A/2-502 IN engaged approximately 40 VC in fortified positions. The enemy employed B-40 rockets and automatic weapons fire. A/2-502 IN maneuvered to the flanks and swept the position with the following results: 16 VC KIA, 4 US WHA, 1 US KHA, 2 Medevac ships shot up, 2 AK-47 assault rifles captured, 24 82mm mortar rounds captured, 1 Chicom grenade and miscellaneous military equipment captured. (HQ, 2-502 IN: Operation SAN ANGELO, Combat After Action Report; 17 February 1968)
01 February 1969	Operation SHERMAN PEAK/Operation NEVADA EAGLE: A/1-502 IN conducted a saturation patrol. In vicinity YD483025, 2 nd platoon found 1 complete truck engine, 2 engine blocks and 1 footlocker of uniforms with insignia (button had Chinese writing on them). B/1-502 IN continued to provide security for FSB VEGHEL. 2 nd platoon and 3 rd platoon conducted RIF operations in the vicinity of FSB VEGHEL. C/1-502 IN conducted RIF operations from YD532088 to YD524095. D/1-502 IN conducted RIF operations near YD502094, found four 2-man hooches and remains of fires. D/1-501 IN continued to provide security for FSB BASTOGNE.
February 1971	Operation JEFFERSON GLEN: The STRIKE FORCE (2-502 IN BN) entered 1971 still engaged in Operation JEFFERSON GLEN with the 1BDE. The CP remained on OP Checkmate located on Hill 342 approximately 10 miles Southwest of HUE City. Checkmate was a show place and a source of pride to the STRIKE FORCE Battalion. It boasted such luxury features as plank sidewalks, hot showers, (for those ambitious enough to carry the water), hard surface chopper pads, a barber shop, neatly painted structures and even a television for evening viewing in the briefing room. The bunkers were manned by personnel who for various reasons could not perform in the canopy. These Soldiers included temporary and permanent physical profiles, excess cooks, commo personnel, and the like. Their performance was evidence of their pride in the battalion and these were the Soldiers who built and defended "The Hill".
	Heavy ad frequent rains characterized early 1971 as the monsoon dragged to an end. In the canopy, the "grunt" lived a wet, chilly and uneventful existence through January. Resupply was not regular as aircraft were frequently grounded by bad weather. Few combat assaults were conducted and movement on the ground was kept to a minimum. The area of operations through January and most of February remained the same as the last three months of 1970 – from Sang Bo River to 8 kilometers east and north form FSB VEGHEL about 12 kilometers. Constant patrolling produced extensive coverage of the area effectively denying the enemy a base of operations. One measure of success is the fact that TET, the Vietnamese Lunar New Year celebration, passed quietly without any attacks on HUE City – scene of bloody conflict during TET of 1968. The North Vietnamese were then heavily engaged in Cambodia which diverted their attention from traditional targets of previous years. Whatever the reasons might have been, it was both satisfying and a relief that TET 1971 passed without incident.
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	Early in February the "STRIKE FORCE" gradually worked into security operations. C/2-502 IN joined D/2-502 IN in securing the road from OP Checkmate to FSB VEGHEL. Recon Platoon secured the road east of FSB BASTOGNE and A/2-502 IN secured the road east of FSB BIRMINGHAM. B/2-502 IN was digging up a tunnel complex near the Song Bo.
	Gradually the 2-502d Infantry's AO was extended to cover all the area East of the Song Bo, South from the 12-grid line approximately ten kilometers and East past FSB BIRMINGHAM for kilometers. The basic mission in this new AO was to secure Route 547 in support of operations to the West.
	Also, at this time the companies were moved individually to Camp Eagle for 36 hours' stand-down. D/2-502 IN, because they were securing FSB VEGHEL was excluded from this abbreviated stand-down.
	"Jump CP" was saying used quite often at the TOC at OP Checkmate. The Battalion was put on numerous contingency plans and each time a jump CP was readied to meet communications and command requirements. (2-502d IN Unit History)
01 – 28 February 1971	During this period the 1-501 IN BN conducted search and attack operations in its assigned area of operation. The battalion occupied FSB ARSENAL from 01 February to 04 February conducting operations in the area. B/1-501 IN provided security for the FSB and also conducted nightly ambushes. On 04 February, the battalion moved to FSB Tomahawk and FSB Los Banos and continued operations with the battalion CP located on FSB Tomahawk, and elements from A/1-501 IN securing both the Fire Bases. During this operation, the 1-501 IN BN joined forces with the 155 th ARVN Company to search out and attack the enemy forces in the area. A/1-502 IN was OPCON to 1-501 IN BN from 04 February to 09 February. The 1-501 IN BN moved to a field location vicinity YD934078 just to the south of ANZIO on 14 February with A/1-501 IN providing security. On 14 February elements from C/1-501 IN were taken to PHU BAI Combat Base (PBCB) to conduct nightly ambushes to aid in the defense of the installation. The 1-501 IN BN moved to FSB Thunderbird on 15 February with C/1-501 IN manning the perimeter. On 18 February, the 1-501 IN BN terminated operations in the area and returned to PHU BAI Combat base by truck for refresher training. Training was orientated towards marksmanship, maintenance contact teams, and commanders time. The 1-501 IN BN was air lifted to DONG HA Combat Base on 24 February and received a warning order to move on 25 February to A-1, B-1 and A-2. The move was completed, and operations were resumed in that area. During the reporting period a light mortar platoon was organized in B/1-501 IN and C/1-501 IN respectively. These elements consisted of one 82mm mortar tube and fifteen to twenty men. The platoon remained in the company's area of operation and conducted daily patrols. Its purpose was to provide the Company Commanders with fire support under his direct control.
01 – 04 February 1971	1-501 IN BN occupied FSB ARSENAL and conducted operations in the area. B/1-501 IN provided security for the FSB and conducted nightly ambushes.
02 February 1968	CPT Justice, 2BDE 3 Yankee, informed 2-501 BN to be prepared to provide 1 platoon with engineer capability to move by helicopter in morning to PHU BAI, this platoon will escort 12 SP's trucks (sweeping in front) to EL PASO. Platoon will then escort trucks back to PHU BAI with supplies. Be prepared for pickup of this platoon at approximately 0800H.
	At 1037H, LT Bush reported finding documents, letters and medical supplies in building vicinity YD820179. At 1135H, 2BDE S3 informed that the BN will not move from EL PASO today – BDE CO will come with further instructions. At 1515H all companies informed to be prepared to move on foot from current location.
	At 1607H, all companies informed to be prepared to move immediately. Troops should be prepared to move out. Order of March C/2-501 IN, D/2-501 IN, A/2-501 IN, B/2-501 IN, D/2-501 IN, E/2-501 IN and BN CP. At 1910H, BN CP closed in at new location vicinity HUE – PHU BAI Airfield.
	At 2210H, BDE XO informed 2-501 IN BN to be prepared for pickup at 0800H on 03 February. 30 Soldiers will be loaded on each helicopter. There will be enough for whole element. Entire element will be in 1 st lift.
	(HQ, 2-501 IN BN, 101 st ABN DIV; Daily Staff Journal Entry; 02 February 1968)
02 February 1968	2-501 IN BN was placed under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, 1 st Air Cavalry Division and remained in this status for approximately two weeks. During this period, the 2-501 IN BN initially provided security for CAMP EVANS and subsequently conducted limited operations in the rocket belt around Camp Eagle and CAMP EVANS.
02 February 1969	Operation SHERMAN PEAK/Operation NEVADA EAGLE: The 1-502 IN Bn continued RIF operations at YD498091.

D/1-502 IN, 3rd platoon found an old 3-4 man sleeping area, 1 pair rubber sandals, 1 fishnet and cooking utensils. D/1-501 IN continued to provide security for FSB BASTOGNE and mine sweep to FSB BIRMINGHAM.

02 February 1970

C/1-502 IN, 3rd platoon called in medivac for on Soldier with severe headaches. A Soldier was killed in a non-hostile action on FSB BIRMINGHAM bunker line. This shooting was accidental.







During this week, in the span of 8 years since the 501st Infantry Regiment, 502nd Infantry Regiment and 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division deployed in support of the Vietnam War the following awards were awarded to the service members during combat operations.

- 5 x Silver Star Medal (1 x Posthumously)
- 3 x Bronze Star Medal with Valor (1 x Posthumously)
- 3 x Bronze Star Medal (3 x Posthumously)
- 1 x Army Commendation Medal
- 10 x Purple Heart Medal (8 x Posthumously)
- 34 x Air Medal
- 81 x Combat Infantryman Badge
- 1 x Died from Non-hostile injuries or illness

28 January 1966



SP4 Thomas R. Devlin (C/2-502 IN) died from Non-hostile causes from multiple gunshot wounds to body. He was on night combat operation as point man when encountered friendly patrol. The point man of that patrol opened fire and hit him in the PHU YEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

29 January 1969



PFC Dennis C. Eshleman (C/1-501 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight in the Thua Thien Province, Republic of Vietnam.

1LT Joe H. Rufty (D/2-501 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal and Purple Heart Medal

(Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from small arms gun fire wounds while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight in the Thua Thien Province. Republic of Vietnam.

29 January 1970



29 January 1972

The following Soldiers from A/2-501 IN:

PFC Daniel R. Sellers SGT Barry L. Rooks SP4 Richard R. Thompson SP4 Retty G. Wobride 1LT Hugh R. Guill SP4 Kenneth M. Wohlberg PFC Douglas E. O'Tremba PFC Timothy E. Taylor SGT Robert E. O'Bryan SGT Stephen M. Suto SGT Ruben A. Quezata SGT Marvin L. Vander Ark SP4 David A. Menting SP4 David L. Dortch SP4 Johnnie D. Dyer SGT James E. Mc Aruther SP4 George L. Barthel SGT Rafael G. Sanchez SGT James R. Pooler PFC Joe C. Louis PFC Robert D. Smith 1LT James C. Hunn PFC Richard W. Lewis SGT Gregg H. Todd SGT Robert L. Johnson PFC Craig C. Russell PFC Joseph M. Purchio SP4 Robert H. Martin SP4 Keith D. Balliew SP4 Jon A. Williamson PFC Curtis B. Loyd PFC Thomas D. Tripp PFC Kenneth A. Pratt

Was awarded the Air Medal for meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flight in the Republic of Vietnam (DA, HQ, 101st Airborne Division (AM); G.O. Number 890, 29 January 1972)

30 January 1969



PFC Steven E. Frederick (C/2-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal (Posthumously). PFC Frederick died from Non-hostile causes as a ground casualty in the Thua Thien Province, Republic of Vietnam.







01 February 1968



PFC John T. Brown (A/1-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with Valor and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wound received while on a combat operation when encountered hostile force 6km west of HAI LANG in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

01 February 1968



SGT James E. Hamilton (A/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gunshot wound received on a combat operation when hit by hostile small arms fire 6km west of HAI LANG In the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

01 February 1968



PVT Larry E. Wittler (A/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death when he was engaged by hostile small arms fire while on combat operation in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

01 February 1968



CPT Joseph P. Holland (A/1-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from metal fragment wound received while on combat operation when engaged hostile force in firefight 6km west of HAI LANG in the QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

02 February 1966

02 February 1966

Order Number 14; 07 January 1966) PFC Ovra Pericins (2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal for military merit and for wounds received in connection with military operation against a hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam. (HQ, 8th Field Hospital, General

SP4 Sammy Veach (2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal for military merit and for wounds received in connection with military operation against a hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam. (HQ, 8th Field Hospital, General

02 February 1966



SGT Jesse T. Bailey Jr. (B/2-502 IN) was awarded the Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death from gun wound to the head received in hostile ground action in the PHU YEN Province, Republic of Vietnam.

02 February 1968

The following Soldiers from HHC, 2nd BDE:

Order Number 14; 07 January 1966)

SP4 Carl E. Durham

SP4 Gale E. Hunt

SP4 Roosevelt Perkins

Was awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge in the South Vietnam. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV, Special Orders Number 33; 2 February 1968)

02 February 1968 The following Soldiers from HHC/1-502 IN:

> LTC Bertram J. Bishop** 2LT Albert C. Mata SGT Bruce H. Matthews SGT Roger Schumacher SP4 Benjamin J. Baynes SP4 Milo E. Stasiak

1LT Timothy B. Jeffrey 1SG Cecil J. Cash* SGT Fred A. Bowen SGT Donald O. Squires SP4 Tai Y. Chiu SP4 James F. Shirley

1LT Tilahman R. McLemore SSG Danny Singletary Jr. SGT Robert P. Jackson SP4 John A. Dees SP4 Melvin B. McWhorter SP4 Phillip P. Matto

1LT James W. Mathews SSG Valreese C. Chase SGT Luis A. Rivera SP4 William M. Eagleson SP4 Rueben M. Phillips PFC Allen E. Tingwald

Was awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge in the South Vietnam. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV, Special Orders Number 33; 2 February 1968)







The following Soldiers from A/1-502 IN:

Was awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge in the South Vietnam. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV, Special Orders Number 33; 2 February 1968)

02 February 1970




SP4 Donald E. Bartek (C/1-502 IN) was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal (Posthumously) for military merit and for wounds received which resulted in his death while he was on guard duty when he was mistaken for a hostile force and fired upon by friendly fire at FSB BIRMINGHAM in the Thua Thien Province, Republic of Vietnam.







STRIKE HISTORY (Citation's and Awards):



01 February 1969



MAJ Jerome A. Bruschette (HHC/2-502 IN) was awarded the Army Commendation Medal (1-OLC) for distinguishing himself by meritorious achievement in ground operation in the Republic of Vietnam during the period of 1 February - 30 June 1969. His outstanding performance during the cited period contributed significantly to the war efforts in the Republic of Vietnam. He overcame the adverse conditions of a hostile environment and accomplished all his assigned duties in a superior manner. His meritorious achievements inspired his comrades and were in the finest tradition of the American Soldier. His initiative, sound judgement, and devotion to mission accomplishment reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, 101st ABN DIV; General Orders Number 13464; 3 November 1969)







PFC Juan Sanchez Jr. (HHC/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal. PFC Sanchez was a member of an element consisting of a wire laying team and one squad from the Recondo platoon which had been given the mission of laying a section of wire. As the element approached a small village it was suddenly brought under heavy fire from an enemy ambush. Private Sanchez immediately began to fire his machine gun into the enemy positions only to have it jam after several short bursts. Realizing how precarious the situation was becoming, Private Sanchez charged through the murderous fire and obtained a pistol from his Squad Leader and again with complete disregard for his own personal safety returned through the fire to secure the right flank. Private Sanchez again exposed himself to the intense enemy fire, firing a rocket launcher which he had been carrying into one of the enemy machine gun positions, killing several of the enemy soldiers and knocking out the machine gun. Private Sanchez then returned to his machine gun, broke it down, and corrected the malfunction. When the machine gun was again put into operation condition Private Sanchez began directing suppressive fire into the enemy position. After a short period of time, Private Sanchez was wounded in the leg but refused medical aid and began to secure his equipment so that it would not get into enemy hands. At this time Private Sanchez observed that one of his comrades had been wounded and lay in exposed area. Private Sanchez, disregarding his own safety and wounds, crawled to the side of his wounded comrade and dragged him to an area where he could be evacuated. Private Sanchez's outstanding display of courage and his devotion to duty are within the highest military traditions and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, IFFV; General Orders Number 153; 11 February 1967)

02 February 1967

SFC Camilio Gonzalez (B/2-502 IN) was awarded the Silver Star Medal for distinguishing himself while acting as platoon leader on a mission to relieve other friendly elements heavily engaged with the enemy. As he approached the battle area, his platoon suddenly received intense Vet Cong small arms and automatic weapons fire causing several casualties. Realizing that further efforts to advance would result in numerous losses, Sergeant Gonzalez called for reinforcements and an air strike. After directing the air strike, he organized his platoon for an assault. Because of the well-fortified Viet Cong positions, he was forced to stop short of the objective. Observing that two squad leaders had been wounded, Sergeant Gonzalez reorganized his platoon and started forward again. After moving approximately 20 meters, they received intense hostile fire and sustained additional casualties. He then set up an extraction point and supervised the evacuation of the wounded. After the wounded were evacuated, Sergeant Gonzalez assembled his battle-weary platoon, and once again assaulted the enemy fortifications. Sergeant Gonzalez, at the head of his platoon, charged forward and ran 50 meters across the open rice paddy, oblivious of the withering fire that engulfed the battlefield and that tore away his equipment and knocked off his helmet. His men, spirited by this almost unbelievable act of heroism, assaulted behind their platoon sergeant and routed the enemy from its prepared defenses. Sergeant Gonzalez' extraordinary heroism in close combat against a numerically superior hostile force is in keeping with the highest traditions of the military services and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. (HQ, IFFV; General Orders Number 474; 30 May 1967)







ACRONYMS

ACAV: Armored Cavalry ACD: Air Cavalry Division AD: Americal Division AD: Airborne Division (Would be after numeric numbers) AO: Area of Operations ARA: Aerial Rocket Artillery ARCOM: Army Commendation Medal ARVN: Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (also known as the South Vietnamese Army (SVA)) BDE: Brigade BN: Battalion BSM: Bronze Star Medal **BBT: Booby Traps** CA: Combat Assault CANOPY: Heavily Wooded Terrain CAV: Cavalry CO: Company CP: Command Post **DIV: Division** DSC: Distinguished Service Cross DZ: Drop Zone ENG: Engineer FSB: Fire Support Base HQ: Headquarters IED: Improvised Explosive Device IFFV: I Field Force Vietnam **IN: Infantry** KBA: Killed by Air or Artillery KHA: Killed by Hostile Action KIA: Killed in Action KNHA: Killed by Non-Hostile Action LZ: Helicopter Landing Zone MI: Military Intelligence MOH: Medal of Honor MP: Military Police NDP: Night Defensive Position NVA: North Vietnamese Army **OBJ:** Objective **OP: Observation Post** PAVN: People Army of Vietnam POW: Prisoner of War **PF: Popular Forces** PZ: Helicopter Pick-up Zone Recon Platoon: Reconnaissance Platoon RIF: Reconnaissance in Force **RF: Regional Force** ROK: Republic of Korea SA: Situational Awareness SIGINT: Signal Intelligence SSM: Silver Star Medal STRIKE FORCE: 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry SVA: South Vietnamese Army TF: Task Force **TOC: Tactical Operations Center** USARV: United States Army Vietnam USARPAC: United States Army Pacific WIA: Wounded in Action WHA: Wounded by Hostile Action WNHA: Wounded by Non-Hostile Action "V": Valor VC: Viet Cong





